Applying Geospatial Information and Services Capabilities Beyond the Battlespace

Transcription

1 Applying Geospatial Information and Services Capabilities Beyond the Battlespace Brian J. Cullis, United States Air Force (Retired), Colorado Springs, CO, USA David F. LaBranche, Defense Installations Spatial Data Infrastructure (DISDI) Program, Alexandria, VA, USA ABSTRACT While geospatial information resources have traditionally imparted situational awareness in the battlespace, the past twenty years has witnessed broad adoption in other defense environments as well. This paper describes the major catalysts spurring broader investment and use of geospatial information and services (GI&S) beyond the battlespace and into a parallel defense installation mission area known as basingspace. Furthermore, the paper details how the benefits of GI&S for delivering shared situational awareness in both battlespace and basingspace has the National Guard poised to exploit geospatial technologies in a more strategic manner. This paper presents a concise history of how social and technical factors influenced the diffusion of applied geospatial technologies within the defense sector and the potential for greater unity of geospatial efforts for the Department of Defense and the nation. Keywords Basing, Common Operational Picture, Geospatial Information and Services, GIS Adoption, GIS Diffusion, Installation, Shared Situational Awareness, Situational Awareness INTRODUCTION Today s battlespace is a dynamic environment where enemy and friendly forces interact, and the victor often must dominate both the physical and cyber or information domains. Military planners from Sun Tzu to the present have always viewed knowledge of the terrain as vital for operational planning, albeit remarkable information technologies to include remote sensing and geographic information and services (GI&S) now empower warfighters with situational awareness (SA). The rapid diffusion of GI&S capabilities over the past twenty years beyond the battlespace has led to recognition of a parallel environment of basingspace where military forces have found knowledge of the built and natural infrastructures and the resulting SA to be vital for the defense mission. Today s military base or installation is the foundation of all successful national defense operations, including homeland defense. Each military service depends upon their installations to project power into the battlespace as well as to serve as force regeneration platforms. The base is also a military city in that they share many traits of a municipality to include infrastructure, schools and housing, as well as a need to interact with surrounding communities and governmental bodies. DOI: /IJAGR Copyright 2016, IGI Global. Copying or distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. 64

2 Geospatial information and services (GI&S) refers to the array of technologies, databases, personnel, web services and information resources essential for acquiring and conveying situational awareness. Just as warfighters pursue operational dominance with the aid of a common operational picture or COP, the protection, operation and sustainment of today s military base or installation also now requires an equivalent common installation picture or CIP to ensure unity of effort. Furthermore, GI&S technologies have proved invaluable for gaining shared situational awareness to support domestic operations in the wake of natural and man-made disasters within our national boundaries (Westlund, 2010). Whether the environment is the military battlespace, the military basingspace or the complex civil-military domestic operations arena, all share a need for situational awareness The advent of Net- Centric Warfare (NCW) introduced a new focal point to better convey the benefits of sharing GI&S in pursuit of shared situational awareness or SSA (Alberts, 2002; Nofi, 2000). NCW tenets logically associate a networked force with facilitating information sharing and collaboration, which, in turn, enhances shared SA, enabling self-synchronization and ultimately improved mission effectiveness. In short, NCW tenets offered a technology-agnostic paradigm of an effects-based outcome to pursuing GI&S for shared SA across all environments. This paper describes how the benefits of GI&S have diffused beyond the battlespace to be an integral part of the Department of Defense (DoD) basing mission and is poised for adoption by the National Guard to contribute to domestic operations. Hindsight reveals GI&S adoption in the DoD has been an inherently socio-technological process, while foresight portends an emerging GI&S paradigm of a more encompassing definition of geospatial intelligence to benefit the broader defense mission. BACKGROUND The advertised merits of geospatial information resources encouraged widespread investments in GI&S in the early 1990s from local governments to federal agencies, where all envisioned cost-effective sharing of geospatial information to serve countless purposes. Ironically, GI&S adoption researchers found bureaucratic attributes such as functional specialization and a lack of cross-functional processes severely limited the ability of GI&S investors to achieve their desired goals (Cullis, 1995; Omran, Bregt, & Crompvoets, 2009). In 2001, the USAF Civil Engineer launched the USAF GeoBase program in response to the discovery of very costly, redundant acquisitions of GIS technology by multiple organizations within their installations. All too frequently, these organizations acquired the commercial GIS solution before understanding either the mission requirements or designing an effective path to organizational adoption. Furthermore, the lack of any focal point to facilitate the sharing of geospatial information on the installation enabled disjointed, incompatible and redundant GIS acquisitions. Within two years, the USAF GeoBase program had secured the shared SA envisioned by NCW advocates within the varied cultures of twelve Major Commands, Field Operating Agencies and Direct Reporting Units. The GeoBase program achieved this unity of geospatial efforts by first establishing an empowered focal point for GeoBase activities on the Air Staff within the Civil Engineer Directorate and by establishing close ties with the new Air Force Chief Information Officer (CIO). The GeoBase program blazed a new cultural path by emphasizing the holistic, synergistic nature of GI&S as a portfolio of geospatial information resources, to include, but not limited to, software, hardware, personnel, data and imagery. The USAF GeoBase adopted well-known CIO best practices such as enterprise architecture and portfolio management to facilitate standards-based interoperability and information sharing. The US Army Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management rapidly 65

3 adopted a similar agenda and chartered an Installation GI&S program which featured Army Mapper as their core visualization component. The US Naval Facilities Engineering Command also mobilized a GI&S capability entitled GeoReadiness while the US Marine Corps Logistics and Facilities Directorate concurrently fielded their GeoFidelis program. All these programs shared the core values of enterprise architecture, IT portfolio management, and governance, as well as an envisioned cost-effective means for shared SA capable of concurrently fulfilling multiple mission needs. The success of these Service-specific GI&S programs spurred the Office of the Secretary of Defense to inquire whether GI&S could contribute much-needed SA to the complex Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 deliberations. Maps or imagery were never used in previous rounds of BRAC since the DoD Inspector General (IG) could not validate their accuracies and thus would not incur the risk of unqualified data being included in the deliberations. The credibility of the countless products derived through the GeoBase capability was heavily reliant on the role of metadata which offered the equivalent of an audit trail for the maps or imagery, and ensured an appropriate fitness for use. Subsequently, the DoD IG gave their full approval in 2004 to the development of the Installation Visualization Tool which, in effect, successfully empowered the seven BRAC 2005 deliberation bodies and the Secretary of Defense with the desired CIP and shared SA of all defense installations that were eligible for BRAC scrutiny. A SPATIAL DATA INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DEFENSE BASINGSPACE The proven benefits of the shared SA for BRAC 2005, coupled with the proven merits of spatial data infrastructures in other environments (Budhathoki and Nedovic-Budic, 2009; Craglia et al, 2009), convinced the Deputy Under Secretary for Installations and Environment (DUSD(I&E)) that GI&S could be applied to other mission challenges, including real property and financial accountability readiness. Chartered in 2004, the Defense Installations Spatial Data Infrastructure (DISDI) Program provided a geospatial foundation to all business transformation efforts within the defense installations and environment domain. The DISDI broke new federal ground in purposefully describing itself as a subordinate SDI to the larger national SDI (NSDI) which had been legislated through Executive Order in The IGI&S community across the Armed Services recognized that organizing and mobilizing shared access to authoritative geospatial information resources in support of the DoD installations and environmental missions would require a focal point for achieving consensus on supporting policy, standards, data and architectures (Rajabifard et al, 2002). Today the DISDI is as a federated mission capability comprised of people, policies, and practices necessary to acquire, steward, and share installation, environmental, and range geospatial data assets for defense, federal, and national goals. By early 2009, the DUSD (I&E) policy had codified the first formal definition of IGI&S. In 2015, the initial policy was replaced by a formal one, DoD Instruction , Installation Geospatial Information and Services (IGI&S). The 2015 policy defines IGI&S thus: The subset of GI&S activities that apply to the management of DoD installations and environment to support military readiness in the Active, Guard, and Reserve Components with regard to facility construction, sustainment, and modernization, including the operation and sustainment of military test and training ranges, and which support DoD business enterprise priorities as defined in the DoD BEA. IGI&S supports and is enabled by geospatial engineering and general engineering as defined in Joint Publication (Department of Defense, 2015) Furthermore, a collaborative governance group known as the IGI&S Governance Group was chartered by DUSD(I&E) to facilitate and coordinate IGI&S efforts across the DoD Components 66

4 to best employ GI&S capabilities to effectively and efficiently maintain and leverage its built and natural infrastructures worldwide. Core Principles for the DISDI Program Policy and guidance issued by the DoD CIO regarding implementation of the Net-Centric Data Strategy requires that all activities take steps to make their data visible, accessible, and understandable (Department of Defense, 2013a). The IGI&S Governance Group captured NCW tenets in their charter as follows: Data Visibility: Build and maintain enterprise web map viewers which display a broad array of IGI&S data to authorized users (e.g. DISDI Portal, Army Mapper, GeoReadiness Explorer); Data Accessibility: Provide enterprise sharing of authoritative installation geospatial information to authorized users through a mix of web services and sharing protocols; Data Understandability: Each IGI&S Governance Group member organization is committed to developing, maintaining and implementing consensus standards for data, metadata, and netcentric services. These mechanisms are not only vital for shared SA, but they are also essential to leveraging the value of IGI&S data through sense making, described as the first of four essential capabilities needed for successful NCW (Alberts and Hayes, 2005). The authors contend that sense making goes beyond understanding what is happening and what may happen to what can be done about it. The DISDI Program aims to provide authoritative, cost-effective defense installation geospatial information and services for fact-based decision-making across the DoD spectrum of operations. The well-known ability of GI&S to perform a range of analytical functions from simple to complex, both in a purely spatial context as well as more traditional analytic contexts, makes it an ideal capability to achieve core NCW goals of data visibility, accessibility, and understandability. Furthermore, IGI&S will also help to make sense of the complex basingspace and lead to more effective decision-making. The IGI&S Governance Group, chaired by the DISDI Program Manager, embraced the following guidelines as essential to achieving success: One Installation, One Map: The essence of shared SA, whether in the battlespace or basingspace, empowers all users to operate from a singular, authoritative information base; Buy Once, Share Many Times: In very practical terms, all data created with DoD resources belongs to the entire department, not just the organization which created it. Data stewards can rarely foresee the multiple ways which others can use their data. Through sharing and re-use, any specific investment in geospatial information resources, whether software, hardware, data or staff, can and must concurrently serve multiple missions; Engage Subject Matter Experts (SMEs): GIS Analysts are typically not knowledgeable of many details or attributes related to the objects or mission processes they are ultimately supporting downstream. Enlisting SMEs to collaborate with the GIS analysts to define requirements, standards, and metrics for IGI&S data is crucial to useful, understandable data and subsequent mission solutions; Identify Authoritative Sources: The sustained use of any GI&S product will depend on the targeted users having full confidence in the quality of the data. The importance of the data steward in establishing this confidence as the most informed authoritative source for a given feature set cannot be overstated. For example, the employment of IGI&S in BRAC 2005 demanded personal accountability and signatures from hundreds of installation-level authoritative data stewards for each feature depicted in all CIPs before the deliberating bodies could view them; 67

5 Collaborate with Mainstream Enterprise Architects: Enterprise architecture presents a holistic, disciplined approach to aligning and managing a dynamic information technology base to best satisfy constantly changing business needs. The DoD Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) is the blueprint for transforming DoD business operations. Therefore, for IGI&S to secure the greatest benefits for the DoD, the IGI&S Governance Group must ensure a tight-coupling between IGI&S efforts and the BEA. Teaming of GI&S SMEs with DoD business analysts has identified new geospatial touch points where the appending of location attributes to business databases has yielded immense fiscal and operational benefits; Monitor the Defense Mission Landscape for IGI&S Contributions: Real-world events often spur new requirements for shared SA or present a new consumer base for IGI&S investments. For example, the 2009 Fort Hood shootings prompted an independent review of how such tragedies could be avoided in the future. The board s recommendations included requiring each defense installation s Emergency Operations Center develop and maintain a common operating picture of their installation to support command and control and facilitate coordination of incident information. While fiscal efficiencies and improvements in asset management are certainly important benefits of IGI&S, there are no more compelling requirements than to ensure such resources also contribute to securing our most precious resources (Department of Defense, 2009). Maturing GI&S in the DoD Basingspace Research conducted in 2007 on GI&S adoption and benefits across the DoD Installations and Environment mission area concluded that while dozens of missions were benefiting greatly from GI&S, many barriers still remain. Among these were security concerns and data restrictions, a lack of data sharing policy and standards, and a lack of communication or collaboration between different functional organizations and disciplines (Lachman et al, 2007). The DUSD(I&E) issued DISDI policies in 2009 to address many aspects of the barriers to sharing reported by RAND, including standardization of data and processes, greater collaboration through the IGI&S Governance Group and greater coordination with other DoD agencies such as the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). In 2010, a new version of the Spatial Data Standards for Facilities, Infrastructure and Environment (SDSFIE) was published which was more tightly aligned with not only the DoD BEA but also more rigorously complied with various international, federal and DoD standards for information technology. The future of the SDSFIE includes aggressive interfacing with geospatial data ontologies promulgated by the Intelligence Community as well as NGA who serves as the DoD GI&S Functional Manager. This collaboration, coupled with vastly improved data sharing and recent declarations by Component intelligence agencies that IGI&S creators should be viewed as formal geospatial intelligence or GEOINT producers, will certainly help to diminish the long-standing cultural and operational gaps between battlespace and basingspace GI&S domains (U.S. Air Force, 2013). The benefits of IGI&S collaboration are not limited to just the active duty components. In fact, the Total Force infrastructure and assets are all subject to the policy purview of the DUSD(I&E) mission area. Therefore, the IGI&S Governance Group also aims to benefit the Guard and Reserve components. In the case of the National Guard, the GI&S capability has more recently found an interesting and valuable role that lies between the traditional battlespace and battlespace areas of operation, notably that of domestic operations (DOMOPS). The dilemma today is that most installation data is not accessible and understandable to the DOMOPS community since the National Guard fulfills a unique civil-military role across the 54 States, Territories and the District of Columbia. The IGI&S Governance Group has the potential to extend IGI&S benefits across the Total Force and fuse open, trusted information exchange pathways between asset managers, training resource managers, and GIS mappers for the DOMOPS and Homeland Defense mission managers. 68

6 EXTENDING GI&S TO DOMESTIC OPERATIONS The acquisition and sharing of location-based situational awareness across multiple local, state, federal, civil and military actors for domestic operations is absolutely vital for saving lives and mitigating property damage. The past decade has seen rapid maturation of geospatial information systems and web-based mapping services that have been aggressively pursued and acquired by numerous federal and defense components, including the Army National Guard (ARNG), Air National Guard (ANG) and Joint Force Headquarters-States (JFHQ-States). Unfortunately, the National Guard had no focal point to represent aggregate National Guard GI&S interests with the many commercial, federal and state agencies engaged in DOMOPS. This lack of a unity of effort led to poor interoperability and redundant investments, hampering the ability of the National Guard to execute their assigned state missions in the most effective manner possible. The National Guard Enterprise GI&S Challenge In January 2010, the ANG funded a study to research the potential for the National Guard enterprise to similarly leverage their aggregate GI&S capabilities in an innovative manner to secure shared situational awareness in support of domestic operations. The National Guard enterprise and DOMOPS mission presents a daunting challenge for those seeking to build consensus for any IT innovation such as GI&S. The National Guard is comprised of the aggregate Army and Air National Guard forces, to include a national joint staff activity referred to as the National Guard Bureau (NGB) that coordinates closely with the Army and Air National Guard Readiness Centers. Recently recognized as a formal joint staff, the NGB facilitates and coordinates the activities of 54 Joint Force Headquarters across the states, territories and the District of Columbia. The natural friction between federal and state entities further complicates facilitating the adoption of GI&S capabilities across such a heterogeneous enterprise. Unlike the active duty component, the general officer responsible for the National Guard has no command authority over the 54 Adjutants General, but rather is responsible for ensuring their success as they conduct their assigned state National Guard missions in support of their respective governors. Since the Army National Guard accounts for almost 80% of the National Guard end strength, the operational culture is biased towards US Army precedents and norms. Therefore, the 2009 launch of the Army Geospatial Enterprise (AGE) construct had a profound positive impact in demonstrating how GI&S capabilities could be organized and mobilized. The AGE is an integrated system of technologies and processes that delivers a standard, shareable geospatial foundation to facilitate the establishment of the Warfighter COP. The AGE applies to all phases of Joint operations and includes the personnel, units, systems, platforms, and processes that use, produce, store or manage geospatial data. The AGE offers a comprehensive framework for systematically exploiting and sharing GI&S to enable Army full spectrum operations and allow geospatial data and information to be efficiently collected, generated, managed, analyzed, used, visualized, and disseminated across countless actors and echelons (U.S. Army Geospatial Center, 2010). The new AGE paradigm was very timely in helping to raise awareness, especially within the NGB J2/J6 and J3 Directorates, for the potential of a similar GI&S consortium that would facilitate the primary mission of the National Guard in executing DOMOPS to save lives and property. GI&S Adoption Inhibitors for the National Guard Initial assessments of the National Guard GI&S culture yielded numerous factors which have collectively contributed to the lack of a more unified GI&S or SDI capability to date. Doctrine Doctrine and their cascading policies are the single greatest influence on the defense culture. Unfortunately, there is virtually no mention of the role of GI&S in current National Guard policies 69

7 and guidance. For example, the new U.S. Army policy on Civil Support Operations, Field Manual 3-28, included only two paragraphs on geospatial support. Unfortunately, the paragraphs described how Army forces could best gain SA for a domestic operation by using high-fidelity maps from local planning agencies, realtor associations, travel agencies, or utility company records (U.S. Army, 2011). There was no mention of the significant stores of CONUS-based GI&S accrued not only by Title10 installation GI&S teams, but also by a majority of the state and federal National Guard elements. Training The National Guard soldier-citizen must be proficient in both their DOMOPS roles as well as those skills required of them during their frequent deployment to the battlespace. In fact, many senior National Guard officers were outspoken advocates for the National Guard adopting the same command and control solutions used in the Southwest Asia battlespace for DOMOPS which also proved problematic. The formal GI&S training available through the National Guard Professional Education Complex focused on non-customized, technical training in commercial GIS software and included only a modest curriculum in Global Positioning System (GPS) technologies. Personnel The availability of a skilled cadre is a critical requirement for sustained adoption of installation GI&S. Unfortunately, the Joint Force Headquarters-State had yet to publish a formal unit manning document or equivalent force structure policy that established any GI&S billets. For all practical purposes, state ARNG Environmental and Facilities GIS program managers volunteer their services during crises to assist the JFHQ-State in fulfilling SA needs. Such intermittent, haphazard use of GI&S talents yielded little more than documented lessons learned highlighting the need for a more structured approach to acquiring and sharing SA for DOMOPS. Organization Any attempt to build a comprehensive GI&S strategy across the National Guard would require extensive networking across vertical and horizontal echelons and sub-cultures to gain the necessary consensus for change. Additionally, the sheer breadth of the National Guard, spanning 54 states, territories and the District of Columbia had stymied previous attempts to organize a single GI&S agenda. Internal debates as to which joint function should carry primary responsibility for crossfunctional GI&S capabilities also have proven frustrating. Materiel The National Guard must compete for operational funding with those requirements of the active US Army and US Air Force components, and often falls short of fulfilling their requirements. While sources such as National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations (NGREA) funding helped to secure numerous commercial GI&S capabilities across the National Guard enterprise, NGREA could not be used for sustainment funding beyond initial training and implementation, which discouraged long-term adoption (Department of Defense, 2012). Culture Clash An organization s culture is simply the way things get done around here. The single greatest impediment to adoption of GI&S capabilities across the National Guard has been the numerous cultural divides that separate the key civil and military parties engaged in planning and executing domestic operations. Civil versus military, federal versus state, ARNG versus ANG, ARNG and ANG versus NGB Joint Staff and active component versus reserve components all presented real 70

8 social differences that would need to be addressed in any strategy to organize and mobilize GI&S activities across the National Guard. A National GeoGuard Framework In 2011, the GeoGuard Initiative was proposed as a practical means for organizing a coherent strategy that would accommodate the numerous social and technological impediments similar to those encountered in the previously cited USAF GeoBase and DISDI programs. An Integrated Planning Team comprised of NGB Joint Staff, ARNG and ANG personnel compiled a comprehensive strategy-to-task GeoGuard Framework as a structured path for reaching consensus in the key SDI domains of standards, data, architecture and sustainment across the diverse actors and missions of the National Guard. The GeoGuard mission sought to build an integrated and coordinated GI&S capability across all components of the National Guard and facilitate communication, collaboration, and cooperation across their mission spectrum. The GeoGuard vision was a future National Guard enterprise seamlessly sharing GI&S and shared SA with local, state, and federal actors across the civil-military spectrum to save lives and mitigate property damage. Principles serve a vital role in ensuring that the many different goals, objectives and tasks all remain true to the original vision and mission of the change initiative. The need to respect state sovereignty and GeoGuard community members ensuring legacy resources were employed before acquiring new GI&S resources were fundamental tenets. Early in the development of the GeoGuard Framework, all parties also found common ground in their shared desire to: 1) complement and extend current geospatial capabilities and avoid degrading existing capabilities; 2) achieve interoperability through standards-based approaches; 3) promote and embrace best ideas, concepts and practices; 4) provide a dynamic geospatial information sharing environment; and 5) facilitate a unity of effort based on trust and partnering among stakeholders. Building a sustainable GeoGuard capability required attention to four key components: 1) a definition of requirements to validate subsequent investments; 2) an understanding of the broad stakeholder community; 3) a set of processes and technological infrastructure which allowed all users to optimally publish and/or consume shared information and web services; and 4) a frank acknowledgement of what was required to sustain this information capability. GeoGuard Requirements Federal researchers have documented the numerous benefits of GI&S in responding to natural or manmade catastrophes in the United States as well as the need for greater collaboration towards shared SA between civil-military sectors (National Research Council, 2007; General Accountability Office, 2008). With the unprecedented fiscal scrutiny of all DoD investments, no initiative can survive unless it directly supports a critical mission requirement. The need for improving shared SA and associated GI&S between and among the civil and military echelons becomes more evident with every natural or man-made disaster. New directives from the most senior government and DoD offices are also presenting new rationale for enhanced GI&S teaming for DOMOPS. Presidential Policy Directive 8, National Preparedness aimed to strengthen the security and resilience of the US through systematic preparation for the threats that pose the greatest risk to the security of the Nation. This directive was also meant to facilitate an integrated, all-of-nation, capabilities-based approach to preparedness including acts of terrorism, cyber-attacks, pandemics, and catastrophic natural disasters. The new Whole of Nation paradigm would further enabled by the mustering of a new GI&S capability within the National Guard that serves as the initial military response force for DOMOPS events (The White House, 2011). Two years later, though, Presidential Policy Directive 21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, more explicitly stated an enabling role for GI&S: 71

9 Coordinate with and utilize the expertise of Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs) and other appropriate Federal departments and agencies to map geospatially, image, analyze, and sort critical infrastructure by employing commercial satellite and airborne systems, as well as existing capabilities within other departments and agencies. (The White House, 2013) In support of the National Preparedness goal, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and American Security Affairs drew attention to the need for extraordinary planning to address complex catastrophes that exceeded the disaster scenarios outlined by the Department of Homeland Security. One of the five Complex Catastrophe Planning Workgroups that were chartered included a team focused on how the DoD could leverage defense installations and capabilities near the disaster to provide faster, more effective response compared to the current standing directives for Defense Support to Civil Authorities (Carter, 2011). The need to define the role of defense facilities within the US for disaster planning has raised significant interest to the merits of installation GI&S both within the active and reserve components. First, the DoD has noted that 523 large and medium installations and 4,249 sites throughout the U.S. and Territories bring significant capabilities to provide immediate life-saving and life-sustaining support (Department of Defense, 2013b). Secondly, installations and other DoD entities provide support under immediate response authorities to local, as well as State authorities. Thirdly, installations could temporarily shelter evacuees since installations plan with local and State authorities to provide support in terms of military capabilities, civilian personnel, facilities and infrastructure, and/or localized contracting capacity. Notably, the Complex Catastrophe Planning effort and the subsequent issuance of DoD Directive highlighted the integral role of the new NG JFHQ State as the best entity to lead the State level, military planning integration since they had a presence in all 54 States and territories (Department of Defense, 2011). Furthermore, the NG JFHQ-State had existing relationships with NORTHCOM, NGB, regional entities (Defense Coordinating Officers, Federal Coordinating Officials) and State civil authorities (governors and emergency managers) and the NG JFHQ-State was best positioned to integrate installation emergency plans within the State (Gates, 2012). GeoGuard Community A key GeoGuard objective was to create a GI&S community within the National Guard by facilitating communication, collaboration, and cooperation across the National Guard enterprise. Improved communication would result in valuable interstate collaboration and cooperation and better fulfill the shared National Guard mission. GeoGuard outreach mechanisms would also encourage collaboration with non-title 32 organizations, including but not limited to Title 10, federal, state, professional association, and community partners. Instilling trust between the National Guard community and external partners would lead to the dismantling of barriers to information sharing and more rapid and better informed decision-making for all organizations engaged in DOMOPS. The GeoGuard community encompasses not only the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, State National Guard and National Guard Bureau but an extended community of interagency stakeholders including other DoD and non-dod Federal departments and agencies, state and local emergency management organizations, industry associations and the vendor and consulting community. The broad scope of GeoGuard actors is an intimidating obstacle to those who advocate for greater sharing of GI&S since it also introduces complex legal and liability issues in how the various governmental agencies would collaborate. GeoGuard Processes and Technologies The GeoGuard processes and technologies domain focused on two areas that had proven essential for sustaining IGI&S across the DoD Components; IT portfolio management and architecture. 72

10 IT Portfolio management occurs when organizations have a thorough knowledge of their current information resources, and apply a disciplined requirements-based process prior to any new investments. By maintaining an accurate and current inventory of geospatial hardware, software, applications, services and personnel resources, the National Guard enterprise could optimize and extend the use of its current investments, thereby reducing future acquisition costs and minimizing wasteful redundancies. Architecture represents the guidelines, standards and blueprints that will be developed to communicate how geospatial IT investments should be configured to interoperate and maximize capabilities. GeoGuard intended to leverage practical architectural frameworks and net-centricity guidelines and extend these best practices into the National Guard geospatial enterprise. The GeoGuard architecture also proposed to achieve the following goals: Standards-based vice standardized: The National Guard enterprise had already made a significant investment in geospatial IT solutions. The GeoGuard architecture would assist in leveraging how these solutions and capabilities interfaced based on core standards. Initial architecture tasks would focus on the sharing of current technical solutions rather than seeking to define one single technical solution for all; Data discovery and interoperability: The development of authoritative geospatial data registries and protocols would facilitate universal discovery and access. These data interoperability guidelines would enable geospatial data sharing within states (between the state EOC and JOC), between states, with NGB, and among Federal organizations such as the USNORTHCOM and DHS; Applications interoperability: The GeoGuard architecture would guide interoperability of future geospatial applications in order to provide maximum compatibility in support of DOMOPS missions. This application interoperability would allow the National Guard enterprise to effectively link existing command and control tools like the Joint Information Exchange Environment, USNORTHCOM s Situational Awareness Geospatial Environment, state Emergency Operations Center mapping applications, and state Guard mapping applications within their Joint Operations Center. GeoGuard Sustainment Long-term adoption and sustainment is a convincing measure of success for any innovation. The more costly, complicated, and cumbersome a process or solution, the more likely it will fade away as soon as its champion is either distracted by other matters or moves on. The four critical aspects of GeoGuard sustainment included 1) manpower; 2) education and training; 3) policy and guidance; and 4) governance and programming. The GeoGuard strategy addressed how each of these components would contribute to broad adoption and sustainment across the National Guard community: Manpower: GeoGuard success would rely on establishing a network of contacts from each JFHQ-State, both Army and Air Force Readiness Centers, and the National Guard Bureau; Education and Training: Instilling GeoGuard values and behaviors within the National Guard culture would require an education and training program to ensure common awareness of methodologies for using GI&S in support of DOMOPS; Policy and Guidance: The GeoGuard strategy would necessarily incorporate policy and guidance practices from other precedent sources to include the Department of Homeland Security s National Geospatial Concept of Operations, DISDI policies and guidance, the Army s Geospatial Enterprise (AGE), the geospatial profile for the Federal Enterprise Architecture, and any best GI&S practices offered by the States; 73

11 Governance and Programming: The merger of the NGB J2 (geospatial intelligence) and the NGB J6 (information systems) Directorates in 2011 was also cited as an enabling means for building unity of effort regarding GI&S governance processes. Finally, the GeoGuard strategy aimed to embed new GI&S capabilities and policies within existing National Guard IT governance bodies such as the Joint Information Management Council whenever possible. To date, while the National Guard Bureau as a formal Joint Staff within the Department of Defense has not taken major steps outlined above to institutionalize the GeoGuard capability, the States have begun to self-organize and pursue many of the recommendations. The GeoGuard Initiative, at the very least, has raised awareness across the DoD Total Force (Active and Reserve Components) as well as the Federal and State echelons, for the merits of extending GI&S benefits and necessary steps to employing them in the complex challenge of coordinating civil-military activities for DOMOPS. CONCLUSION There are strong parallels between the national Whole of Nation paradigms and the initiatives aimed at better integration of DoD Total Force GI&S capabilities articulated in this paper. Total Force GI&S is needed beyond the battlespace to not only drive much needed business efficiencies but also to stimulate extraordinary civil-military teaming and shared situational awareness for domestic operations and preventing damage, saving lives and property, and leveraging defense resources in times of national emergency. Innovation adoption research has described how novel paradigms and/or practices can subsequently create a new culture that leads to new roles, organizations and doctrine (Kim and Mauborgne, 2000). A common trait of successful innovators was creating exceptional utility from the innovation such that targeted customers could not decline adoption as well as sharing the compelling benefits of the innovation with those who embraced the status quo. The authors of this paper hope the advances made in extending the battlespace GI&S paradigm to the basingspace and domestic operations will serve to encourage a broader effort for establishing and applying a more holistic GI&S capability to better satisfy the goals of our Department of Defense and our nation. 74

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