Project On Government Oversight

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1 Project On Government Oversight U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: How the Country Can Profit and Become More Secure by Getting Rid of Its Surplus Weapons-Grade Uranium September 14, G Street, NW, Suite 900, Washington, DC (202) POGO is a 501(c)3 organization

2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary... 2 Introduction... 4 Background... 6 U.S. HEU Security Protections Not Consistent... 8 Accelerate the Downblending Rate Any New or Modernized Uranium Facility Should Advance Downblending Market Impact of Increased Downblending is Overstated DOE Has No Financial Incentive to Speed Up Downblending Declare More U.S. HEU Surplus to National Defense Needs Misconceptions Surround Naval Reactor HEU Requirements Hundreds of Metric Tons of HEU Being Stored at Y New Arms Control Agreements Provide Opportunity to Secure HEU U.S. HEU Stockpile Accelerate the Dismantlement Rate Conclusion Recommendations Acronyms and Glossary Appendices Appendix A: Department of Energy, FY 2011 Congressional Budget Request, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of the Administrator, Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DOE/CF-0047), Volume 1, February 2010, p. 395 Appendix B: Department of Energy, FY 2006 Congressional Budget Request, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of the Administrator, Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, Naval Reactors (DOE/ME- 0046), Volume 1, February 2005, p

3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY A huge opportunity to save the U.S. taxpayers money, generate up to $23 billion in revenue for the Treasury, and improve security is right under the government s nose. The U.S. has nearly 400 metric tons (MT) of highly enriched uranium (HEU), a fissile material used in nuclear weapons, that is not necessary for U.S. defense needs and either has been or should be declared surplus and properly disposed of. Although not necessary for defense purposes, this vast store of HEU could be used for nefarious purposes by terrorists. With just enough to fill a shoebox, terrorists could create what is known as an improvised nuclear device that has the potential for a blast on par with the weapon that devastated Hiroshima, Japan, in They could do this within minutes if they gained access to the material a distinct possibility given the chronic and well-documented weaknesses in securing nuclear materials at numerous U.S. sites. Despite this danger, one of the most practical ways of reducing the risk has fallen by the wayside. The pace of converting surplus, expensive-to-secure HEU into low enriched uranium (LEU), which is unusable in weapons, has slowed to a snail s crawl. Just years ago, this process known as downblending was occurring at a rate close to ten times that of the downblending rate planned for the next four decades. The reason for the slow-down is that the Department of Energy (DOE) has not made downblending a priority. The U.S. government has the capacity to ramp up downblending of surplus HEU to previous levels, and even exceed them. Also, far more HEU can be declared surplus than has been. The results would be win-win: Jobs would be created during the economic downturn; billions in revenue could be generated for the U.S. Treasury while security costs could be radically reduced; and Americans would be less vulnerable to devastating terrorist attacks. In an investigation into the government s downblending efforts, POGO has found: As much as 300 MT of HEU is unnecessary for America s defense needs and can be designated as surplus. Downblending more HEU into LEU would reduce a security risk, cut government spending, and raise up to $23 billion through sales of the LEU to nuclear power plants (minus the cost of downblending). The federal government has slowed efforts to downblend the HEU already declared surplus from a high of 20 MT downblended in fiscal year (FY) 2004 to 3 MT to be downblended in FY The government plans to downblend 90 MT of HEU from now until 2050, a rate of only 2-3 MT a year. The government has the capacity now to downblend at a much faster rate. A blueprint to transform the U.S. nuclear weapons complex does not include increasing the downblending rate. The DOE has slowed its rate of dismantling the backlog of retired nuclear weapons, creating a hurdle to increasing the downblending rate. The DOE s lack of emphasis on downblending weakens efforts to encourage other nations, such as Russia, to reduce their stockpiles of weapons and fissile materials. 2

4 Security of nuclear materials is still insufficient. For example, there are three varying security standards for the same kind of nuclear material, depending on which government agency is in charge. While security of the nuclear weapons complex has improved since 9/11, there have been some troubling steps backwards; the results of performance tests make it clear that security is uneven, posing significant risks. RECOMMENDATIONS 1. The President should designate an additional amount of HEU, as much as 300 MT, surplus to defense needs and schedule that HEU for dismantling and downblending. 2. The President should direct the Department of Energy to accelerate the downblending rate of the approximately 90 MT of HEU that has already been designated surplus and scheduled for downblending so that the process is completed by 2015 rather than To accomplish this, the National Nuclear Security Administration should increase the dismantlement rate at the Pantex Plant in Texas up to 800-1,000 weapons per year and open up the Device Assembly Facility at the Nevada National Security Site (formerly known as the Nevada Test Site) for additional dismantlement activities to allow the backlog of 4,500 warheads to be dismantled by Congress should appropriate additional funds to DOE for downblending and dismantlement. 4. If Congress decides that the new Uranium Processing Facility is necessary, it should fence the appropriation for UPF to ensure that downblending, as well as activities to support downblending, is a core mission of the facility. 5. NNSA should transfer the scrap material containing less than 1 percent HEU from Y-12 National Security Complex s Building 9212 to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) in New Mexico to free up space for preparing HEU for downblending. 6. Congress should task the Government Accountability Office (GAO) with conducting a study on the Navy s HEU needs, the use of LEU fuel for any new naval submarines and nuclear surface ships, and on whether existing HEU reactor ships could be retrofitted with LEU reactors during the scheduled refueling process. 7. Congress should task the GAO with studying the Department of Defense s, DOE s, and NRC s different standards for securing HEU in order to determine whether one or more standards is necessary, and what the security standard(s) should be. 8. The DOE should make public an inventory of its HEU stocks. 3

5 INTRODUCTION When President Barack Obama took office, he acknowledged that securing nuclear materials is critical to global security. We must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.al Qaeda has said it seeks a bomb and that it would have no problem with using it. And we know that there is unsecured nuclear material across the globe. To protect our people, we must act with a sense of purpose without delay. 1 The President did not overstate the threat. Fissile material particularly highly enriched uranium (HEU) is a prime target for rogue states and nuclear terrorists. 2 With only approximately 110 pounds of HEU, enough to fit in a shoebox, 3 it is possible to create within minutes 4 an improvised nuclear device (IND) that has the potential for a blast on par with the weapon that devastated Hiroshima, Japan. 5 As Nobel Prize-winning physicist Luis Alvarez explained: With modern weapons-grade uranium terrorists, if they had such material, would have a good chance of setting off a high-yield explosion simply by dropping one half of the material onto the other half. Most people seem unaware that if separated U- 235 [highly enriched uranium] is at hand, it s a trivial job to set off a nuclear explosion.given a supply of U-235 even a high school kid could make a bomb in short order. 6 1 The White House, Remarks by President Barack Obama, April 5, (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter Remarks by President Obama ) 2 POGO raised awareness about the possibility that the U.S. nuclear weapons complex could be vulnerable to terrorists who are able to detonate an improvised nuclear device (IND) with the publication of its investigative report, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Security At Risk, October 1, This significant danger has since been recognized by international experts: Mohamed ElBaradei and Jonas Gahr Støre, How the world can combat Nuclear Terrorism, IAEA BULLETIN, 48/1, September 2006, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter How the world can combat Nuclear Terrorism ) and Charles D. Ferguson and William C. Potter, et al., The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, Monterey Institute-Center for Nonproliferation Studies Nuclear Threat Initiative, (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism) 3 Valerie Plame Wilson, A world without nuclear weapons: Ex-CIA agent Valerie Plame Wilson says we need to make it real, New York Daily News, July 22, _a_world_without_nuclear_weapons_excia_agent_valerie_plame_wilson_says_we_need_to.html (Downloaded September 10, 2010) 4 Due to the sensitivity of information about INDs, POGO s discussion of the issue is limited to public sources and is described in general terms. An IND explosion produces the same physical effects, catastrophic loss of life, and infrastructure destruction as a nuclear weapon explosion. It is qualitatively different from a dirty bomb. POGO used the conversion that 1 kilogram equals roughly 2.2 pounds. Matthew Bunn and John P. Holdren, A Tutorial on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear-Explosive Materials: Nuclear Weapons Design and Materials, Securing the Bomb 2006, President and Fellows of Harvard College, September 6, (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 5 The explosion from the nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima was created using the gun type method. The blast from the Hiroshima bomb was 13 kilotons; over 200,000 people died either in the blast or as a result in the five years following it. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, Nuclear Terrorism Tutorial: The Destructive Power of Nuclear Weapons: Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 2005, Chapter 2, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 6 Luis W. Alvarez, Alvarez: Adventures of a Physicist, New York: Basic Books, 1987, p

6 Yet, nations around the globe continue to keep stocks of HEU which pose unnecessary security risks, and the U.S. is no exception. The U.S. currently has an estimated HEU inventory of metric tons (MT) 7 equivalent to 20,000-24,000 warheads. 8 To combat the risk posed by unsecured fissile material around the globe, in April 2010 President Obama called for and hosted a nuclear security summit in Washington, DC. The intent of the summit was to prevent proliferation by bringing together more than 40 nations with the goal of securing the world s vulnerable nuclear materials in four years. 9 While the President can be commended for his leadership on bringing this issue to the global stage, it is problematic that he has not taken meaningful action to reduce our own stock of HEU. If the U.S. wants other nations to secure their fissile materials and advance a world free of nuclear weapons, we have to lead by example and reduce our own HEU inventory. Although the Obama Administration has stated that modernizing our nuclear infrastructure is a priority, its version of modernization is to invest in Cold War-weapons production policies rather than in genuine post-9/11 modernization efforts to secure HEU in the U.S. 10 For instance, the Administration is increasing programs that extend the life of the warheads, known as Life Extension Programs (LEP), 11 at the expense of programs that secure nuclear materials, such as 7 POGO arrived at this estimate, an admittedly wide range, based on the limited information that is publicly available about the U.S. HEU inventory: the U.S. had 740 MT in stock in 1996; 127 MT has since been downblended; and an additional, but much smaller amount has been used by research reactors. Department of Energy, Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking A Balance, January 2001, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking A Balance) and Department of Energy, FY 2011 Congressional Budget Request, National Nuclear Security Administration, Office of the Administrator, Weapons Activities, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DOE/CF-0047), Volume 1, February 2010, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter (DOE/CF-0047)) Also, since 1996, the Navy has consumed approximately 49 MT of HEU through its annual use 2 to 3.5 MT of weapons-grade HEU to power its nuclear fleet (14 years * 3.5 = 49 MT). The 3.5 MT per year figure comes from POGO inside sources. The 2 MT per year figure comes from Steven Aftergood and Frank N. von Hippel, Report: The U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium Declaration: Transparency Deferred but not Denied, NonProliferation Review, Vol. 14, No. 1, March 2007, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter Report: The U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium Declaration: Transparency Deferred but not Denied) and Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking A Balance, p POGO arrived at this figure using the conversion that 1000 kg of HEU = 1 MT of HEU, and that an average modern nuclear warhead contains 25 kg of HEU in the secondary (600 MT x 1000 kg / 25 kg = 24,000 warheads). International Panel of Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2008: Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, pp. 7 and (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter Global Fissile Material Report 2008) 9 The White House, Statement by President Obama on the 40th Anniversary of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, March 5, (Downloaded May 6, 2010) 10 The White House, Office of the Vice President, Remarks of Vice President Biden at National Defense University - As Prepared for Delivery: The Path to Nuclear Security: Implementing the President s Prague Agenda, February 18, (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 11 The Life Extension Program is a systematic approach that consists of a coordinated effort by the design laboratories and production facilities to: 1) determine which components will need refurbishing to extend each weapon s life; 2) design and produce the necessary refurbished components; 3) install the components in the weapons; and 4) certify that the changes do not adversely affect the safety and reliability of the weapon, see: Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Y-12 Site Office, Draft Site-Wide Environmental 5

7 dismantlement and downblending, a process that transforms surplus HEU into a safe form of uranium called low enriched uranium (LEU). LEU is not desired by terrorists, and is useable as fuel for nuclear power plants, 12 yet the rate of downblending has slowed. The Administration is also pouring at least $3.5 billion into the construction of a modern Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) 13 that does little to accelerate the downblending rate and could actually expand U.S. capability to produce new HEU components of nuclear weapons. 14 Furthermore, despite Obama s global leadership on nuclear materials, and unlike the last two administrations, the Obama Administration has not yet declared any HEU surplus to national security needs so that it can be downblended. This Cold-War style of modernization is being driven mostly by DOE s and the privately run weapons labs campaign to create doubt in the reliability of our nuclear arsenal, even in the face of scientific research indicating otherwise. This report is an attempt to recapture the term modernization and use it to describe how the U.S. can invest in programs that respond to the modern threat of nuclear terrorism. A modern complex only requires the amount of HEU necessary to ensure the reliability of the arsenal, and permanently removes surplus HEU so that it is not itself a security threat and a burden requiring costly systems to store and protect it. True modernization would accelerate the current glacial pace of downblending, declare more HEU surplus to national security needs, and decrease the backlog of warheads sitting in storage awaiting dismantlement. This approach to modernization makes the U.S. more secure, advances our global nuclear security agenda, and generates revenue for the U.S. Treasury from the sale of Cold War-era HEU that has been transformed to LEU for use in nuclear power reactors. BACKGROUND Between 1945 and 1992, the U.S. produced 1,045 MT of HEU 15 for nuclear weapons secondaries 16 (which are added to single-stage nuclear weapons to create a thermonuclear explosion); naval Impact Statement for the Y-12 National Security Complex (DOE/EIS-0387), October 2009, p. S (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter (DOE/EIS-0387)) 12 Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Fact Sheet: NNSA: Working To Prevent Nuclear Terrorism, September 9, (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 13 Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Final Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Summary (DOE/EIS-0236-S4), October 2008, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter (DOE/EIS-0236-S4)) 14 The Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Y-12 is projected to cost between $1.4 and $3.5 billion. Department of Energy,Y-12, Y-12 UPF Suppliers Outreach Event: About UPF, (Downloaded September 1, 2010) While NNSA has not made public its production rate of secondaries, in its plan to transform the nuclear weapons complex (Complex) into a smaller, more efficient enterprise that can respond to changing national security challenges, NNSA explained the manufacturing capacity necessary for facilities such as UPF: For the nuclear production alternatives, this SPEIS assesses manufacturing capacity operated in a single shift, five days per week, to produce, depending upon the alternative, weapons per year. The bounding case of producing up to 200 weapons per year assumes operations in multiple shifts and extended work weeks. (DOE/EIS-0236-S4), p. S Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking A Balance, p There are the two main parts to a nuclear warhead: the plutonium pits and secondaries, which are comprised mainly of HEU. Also referred to as canned subassemblies (CSAs), NNSA defines secondaries as the component of 6

8 propulsion reactors 17 ; and research reactors. 18 Although the U.S. stopped producing HEU in 1992, 19 we still have the world s next-to-largest stock, second only to Russia. 20 The exact amount of U.S.-owned HEU is classified. That classification designation is challenged by arms-control advocates. 21 POGO also argues that the unnecessary secrecy is counter to national security as it undermines international nonproliferation efforts by inhibiting a public accounting of downblending efforts. Former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the winner of the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize Mohamed ElBaradei and the Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Gahr Støre recognized this point in 2006, saying that to build trust, countries with civilian and military HEU stockpiles should be encouraged to release clear inventories of those stockpiles, and to publish a schedule under which the remaining HEU will be verifiably downblended. 22 According to the last inventory made public, the U.S. possessed 740 MT of HEU in Since then, approximately 127 MT have been truly secured through downblending, several dozen metric tons have presumably been consumed by the Navy to power its nuclear fleet, and a modest amount has been consumed by research reactors. 24 That leaves approximately MT of HEU that is a nuclear weapon that contains elements needed to initiate the fusion reaction in a thermonuclear explosion. Department of Energy, Record of Decision for the Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement Operations Involving Plutonium, Uranium, and the Assembly and Disassembly of Nuclear Weapons, Federal Register, Vol. 73, No. 245, Friday, December 19, 2008, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter Record of Decision for the Complex Transformation Supplemental Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement ) 17 According to NNSA, more than 40 percent of the Navy s major combatants are nuclear-powered, including aircraft carriers, attack submarines, guided missile submarines, and strategic submarines. Statement of Gen. Robert L. Smolen, USAF (Ret.) Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs & William H. Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy Before the Committee on House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, March 12, 2008, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter Statement of Gen. Robert L. Smolen, USAF (Ret.) Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs & William H. Tobey, Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration ) 18 Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking A Balance, p Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking A Balance, p International Panel of Fissile Materials, Global Fissile Material Report 2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament, pp (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 21 George Perkovich, et al., Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2007, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) and Report: The U.S. Highly Enriched Uranium Declaration: Transparency Deferred but not Denied pp How the world can combat Nuclear Terrorism, p Highly Enriched Uranium: Striking A Balance, p In its report to Congress, NNSA combines the number of metric tons of HEU that has actually been downblended with the amount of HEU that has been shipped for downblending, 127 MT in 2009: Department of Energy, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition, U.S. HEU Disposition Program, Presentation by Robert M. George at the International Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, July 2009, slide 9. (hereinafter Presentation by Robert M. George at the International Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting) and (DOE/CF-0047), p

9 being kept on hand in nuclear warheads, additional secondaries, and in various forms being stored at Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 25 U.S. HEU Security Protections Not Consistent The U.S. stock of HEU is being stored across the country with varying degrees of security. While security of the nuclear weapons complex has improved since 9/11, there have been some troubling steps backwards; the results of performance tests make it clear that security is uneven, posing significant risks. 26 There are several reasons for this uneven security: complex-wide, there are differing federal agency interpretations of the threat to nuclear materials; three different security criteria for the same material; different armament and equipment to secure the material; dissimilar training standards for security forces; significantly different approaches to force-on-force security testing, with results that cannot be compared; and significant conflicts of interest in the use of the same contractors for protection and testing. Three agencies the Department of Energy (DOE), Department of Defense (DoD), and Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) are responsible for setting security standards for the HEU under their protection, and all three agencies have different security requirements for the same material. The majority of the nation s HEU is stored at facilities managed by DOE s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), 27 with most of that at the Y DOE has, over the years, had numerous security standards based on estimates of potential adversaries capabilities called Design Basis Threats (DBT), 29 some of which were rigorous but the agency has recently weakened its security by adopting the malleable standard of the Graded Security Protection (GSP) plan. 30 The GSP is classified, but sources tell POGO that it varies the security 25 As the exact amount of the U.S.-owned HEU is classified, POGO has compiled these numbers from public and insider sources. As a result, these are our best estimates. 26 Government Accountability Office, Better Oversight Needed to Ensure That Security Improvements at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Are Fully Implemented and Sustained (GAO ), March (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (GAO ) (hereinafter (GAO ); Government Accountability Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory Faces Challenges In Sustaining Physical and Cyber Security Improvements (GAO T), September 25, (Downloaded September 1, 2010); Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, Contract DE-AC52-07NA27344, Fee and Award Term Recommendations, December 11, For example, in 2008, mockterrorists showed that they could assemble an IND and steal plutonium and HEU from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which is located in a residential community. Project On Government Oversight, Livermore Terrorist Exercise Ends in Debacle: TIME Magazine Reports Massive Security Failures, May 13, However, a more recent performance test was much improved. (GAO ) 27 Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration, About Us: Nuclear Security, (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 28 Department of Energy, Y-12 National Security Complex, Nuclear Nonproliferation. (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 29 The Design Basis Threat (DBT) describes the level of threat the protective force is required to defend against the number of outside attackers and inside conspirators, and the kinds of weapons and size of truck bombs that would be available to terrorists. Project On Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland Security Opportunities, May 19, Project On Government Oversight, In the Midst of Nuclear Weapons Site Security Test Failures, DOE Adopts New Test and Security Requirements, August 8, and Department of Energy, Departmental Directives Program, DOE O 470.3B, 8

10 requirements from site to site. Furthermore, the GSP requires sites to be able to defend against fewer attackers than was required in the DBT, and has downgraded the capabilities of those attackers that the site must be prepared to defend against. Whereas the DBT provided a consistent bar to measure security, the GSP is more of a floating bar, able to be increased or lowered based on the alleged weaknesses and strengths of a particular site. According to sources, the GSP emerged after it was clear that several DOE sites could not meet the DBT and did not want to spend the funds to meet it. Another weakness of DOE s security apparatus is that it employs members of its own protective force, who are not specifically trained as adversary forces, to test the security performance of its sites. The second largest stock of HEU in the U.S. is deployed and stored at DoD facilities in existing warheads and some in naval reactors. 31 DoD s protection strategy is strong in several ways, such as how sites are tested. 32 Its Defense Threat Reduction Agency oversees testing of the security of nuclear materials, and the testing itself is conducted by Mighty Guardian, 33 a unit of the Special Operations Command designed to mirror as closely as possible the size, armament, and tactical operations expected to be used by terrorist organizations. Mighty Guardian uses rigorous performance testing at the sites, often with a trained mock terrorist force called the Grizzly Hitch. Smaller amounts of HEU are found at private facilities for processing and at universities with research reactors, 34 whose safety and security is overseen by NRC. 35 The NRC has by far the weakest security standards of all, and the Commissioners have rejected their staff s recommendations to bolster the NRC s DBT. 36 Security of NRC s licensed nuclear power reactors and nuclear facilities in the U.S. is provided by a hodge-podge of security contractors. The government testing of security at these various sites is done by Wackenhut, under contract Graded Security Protection (GSP) Policy, August 12, (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 31 POGO determined that the DoD has the second largest stock of U.S. HEU by estimating that DoD facilities have most of the 9,613 nuclear weapons believed to be in the U.S. inventory, minus a few hundred warheads that are undergoing assembly or disassembly at the Pantex Plant. Hans M. Kristensen, United States Discloses Size of Nuclear Weapons Stockpile, FAS Strategic Security Blog, May 3, (Downloaded May 6, 2010) (hereinafter United States Discloses Size of Nuclear Weapons Stockpile ) 32 Defense Technical Information Center, Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification, February 2006, pp. 1 and (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification ) 33 The mission of the Department of Defense s Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is to safeguard America and its allies from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by reducing the present threat and preparing for the future threat. Exhibit R-2, RDT&E Budget Item Justification, pp. 1 and Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Backgrounder on Research and Test Reactors, November (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 35 Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Domestic Safeguards: What We Regulate, (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 36 This vote was classified, but POGO learned about the outcome from sources and it was confirmed by people directly involved with these discussions. POGO was not able to determine the Commissioners reasoning for rejecting the staff-led recommendations, which would have updated the number of adversaries and lethal weapons available to terrorists, including 50 caliber sniper rifles, Bangalore torpedoes, and rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) that the guard force would have to defend against. The NRC created a slightly higher DBT for its nuclear weapons sites than the weak standard it uses for commercial nuclear power plants. Project On Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Homeland Security Opportunities, May 19,

11 with the nuclear trade association Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI). 37 The adversary force used by NEI and Wackenhut to conduct force-on-force tests is a composite of guards from other sites. At a number of sites, the security contractor is Wackenhut. 38 It doesn t take a nuclear scientist to see this system is riddled with conflicts of interest. ACCELERATE THE DOWNBLENDING RATE The most important step to modernize the nuclear weapons complex is to accelerate the downblending rate of surplus HEU. Downblending involves diluting HEU with depleted, natural, or low enriched uranium (LEU) to produce a substantially larger quantity of LEU and render the HEU unusable in weapons. 39 NNSA contracts with facilities to do the downblending: the Nuclear Operations Group of Babcock & Wilcox in Lynchburg, Virginia (B&W-Lynchburg) 40 ; Nuclear Fuel Services in Erwin, Tennessee (NFS), which was recently bought by B&W 41 ; and to a lesser extent, the Savannah River Site near Aiken, South Carolina (SRS) and Y Although it is NNSA that tasks these facilities with downblending activities, it is the NRC with its significantly weaker security standards that is responsible for overseeing safety and security at NFS and B&W-Lynchburg POGO requested a copy of the contract from both NRC and NEI in phone conversations on September 3, NRC officials said they did not have a copy of the contract. NEI declined the request because they claim it was proprietary. 38 For more in-depth analysis of DOE s and NRC s security, see Project On Government Oversight, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Complex: Livermore Homes and Plutonium Make Bad Neighbors, March 17, and Project On Government Oversight, Nuclear Power Plant Security: Voices From Inside the Fences, September 12, Through downblending HEU, the weapon capability of HEU can be eliminated in a manner that is reversible only through isotope enrichment, and therefore, highly resistant to proliferation. J. David Snider, Candidate Processes for Diluting the 235 U Isotope in Weapons-Capable Highly Enriched Uranium, Prepared for Presentation at the American Institute of Chemical Engineers 1996 Spring National Meeting, February 1996, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) Both enriching and downblending uranium involves altering the concentration of U-235, the type of uranium that fissions (the nucleus splits, releasing energy) easily. Natural uranium is just.711 percent U- 235, the LEU that is employed as fuel usually falls between 3 and 5 percent, and the HEU used in nuclear weapons may surpass a 90 percent concentration. For every metric ton of HEU downblended, between 11 and 19 MT of LEU is produced. Nuclear Energy Institute, How it Works: Nuclear Power Plant Fuel, (Downloaded September 1, 2010); Sizes, Separative Work Unit, (Downloaded September 1, 2010) The ratio of LEU fuel produced from HEU is based on the enrichment level of HEU. POGO determined this range from a sampling of U.S. downblending milestones: the U.S. produced 250 MT of LEU from 20.8 MT of HEU; 220 MT of LEU from 12.1 MT of HEU; and 800 MT of LEU from 46.6 MT of HEU. Presentation by Bob George at the International Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, slides 4, 7, The Babcock & Wilcox Company, Business Units: Babcock & Wilcox Nuclear Operations Group, Inc. (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 41 The Babcock & Wilcox Company, Press Releases: B&W subsidiary acquires Nuclear Fuel Services, January 5, (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 42 Presentation by Robert M. George at the International Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, slides 3, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Locations of Major U.S. Fuel Cycle Facilities. (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 10

12 There are pragmatic reasons to downblend our surplus HEU. One reason is that doing so will make the U.S. more secure from terrorist attacks. Unlike HEU, LEU is not weapons-usable and therefore does not pose serious security risks 44 or require expensive security systems to guard it. Terrorists have no interest in LEU because reactor-grade LEU contains less than 20 percent U-235, 45 making it virtually impossible to sustain an explosive nuclear chain reaction. Another reason is that downblending our surplus HEU would advance the U.S. goal for world leaders to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years. 46 For this goal to be realized, the U.S. must practice what it preaches. As Harvard University s Matthew Bunn notes, Convincing foreign countries to reduce and consolidate nuclear stockpiles, to put stringent nuclear security measures in place, or to convert their research reactors from HEU to LEU fuel will be far more difficult if the United States is not doing the same at home. 47 A third reason to downblend our surplus HEU is that it would generate revenue for the U.S. Treasury. A lot of it. In fact, the U.S. is sitting on a veritable gold mine, one that could be worth billions of dollars. Russia, for instance, has been downblending 30 MT a year and shipping it to the U.S. since 1995, 48 and projects to earn as much as $12 billion from having partnered with the U.S. on the Megatons to Megawatts program to downblend its surplus military HEU. 49 And LEU is in demand as fuel for nuclear power reactors, both in the U.S. 50 (nuclear power provides 44 Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Definition of Weapons-Usable Uranium-233, March 1998, p. ix. (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 45 The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism, p Remarks by President Barack Obama. To support the negotiations of the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (a goal of the Obama Administration), the International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament supports a Fissile Material Control Initiative (FMCI) under which nuclear-armed states would voluntarily make regular declarations of their fissile material stocks; apply the highest standards of physical protection and accountancy to those stocks; regularly declare amounts of fissile material they regard as excess to their weapons needs; place such excess material under IAEA safeguards as soon as practicable; and convert excess material as soon as possible to forms that cannot be used for nuclear weapons. Gareth Evans and Yoriko Kawaguchi, Eliminating Nuclear Threats, International Commission on Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, 2009, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) The Commission is an initiative of the Australian and Japanese governments, and is comprised of former government officials and national security experts from around the world. The White House, Statement by the President on Beginning of Negotiations on Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, May 29, Material-Cut-off-Treaty/ (Downloaded August 20, 2010) 47 Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2008, Project on Managing the Atom, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Harvard University, Commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, November (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 48 Laura S. H. Holgate, Accelerating the Blend-Down of Russian Highly Enriched Uranium, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, June 10, 2005, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) and United States Enrichment Corporation, Megatons to Megawatts. (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter Megatons to Megawatts) USEC Inc. is a private company created by the U.S. government to restructure the government s uranium enrichment operation. 49 Megatons to Megawatts. 50 Russia recently signed a $1 billion deal to provide U.S. utility companies with LEU from 2014 and Russia, Ameren sign nuclear fuel deal, St. Louis Business Journal, May 26, (Downloaded September 1, 2010) Also 11

13 19 percent of U.S. electricity 51 ) and around the world. In fact, demands for LEU are likely to increase from anywhere between 38 and 80 percent by 2030 as nuclear power technology improves. 52 The amount of HEU that the U.S. could declare surplus and downblend could be worth as much as $23 billion, 53 minus the cost of downblending. Despite the benefits of downblending, U.S. policy-makers have placed little priority on accelerating the rate of transforming the HEU that has already been declared surplus. Congress has instead focused on multi-billion dollar facilities for the disposition of U.S. plutonium, such as the troubled Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility, 54 and on the disposition of HEU and plutonium abroad. 55 And the Administration s FY 2011 budget will actually slow the downblending process: the budget shrank from $39.2 million in 2009 to $34.7 million in 2010, and shrank again in the FY 2011 request to $26 million. 56 The DOE has also made it clear that downblending is not a priority. NNSA boasted in 2009 that 374 metric tons (MT), or roughly 15,000 nuclear weapons-worth, of highly enriched uranium (HEU) was removed from U.S. stocks : 174 MT had been declared surplus in 1994, 57 and 200 MT was declared surplus in But NNSA s statements are misleading. First, the term removed refers to how much HEU has been declared surplus, and while it has technically been removed from the military stockpile, it appears that only 127 MT has actually been removed by downblending it into LEU. (Appendix A) Second, of the 200 MT declared surplus in 2005, reflecting the LEU demand, politicians in some states are promoting uranium mining and enrichment facilities as good public investments for job creation. John Crane, 2009 Governor s race: Democrats talk uranium, energy at Danville debate, Danville Register & Bee, April 29, ergy_at_danville_debate/34179/ (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 51 Environmental Protection Agency, Nuclear Energy. (Downloaded September 1, 2010). 52 Nuclear Energy Agency of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Uranium resources sufficient to meet projected nuclear energy requirements long into the future, June 3, (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 53 Matthew Bunn, Expanded and Accelerated HEU Downblending: Designing Options to Serve the Interests of all Parties, Conference Paper, Institute for Nuclear Materials Management, July 17, 2008, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter Expanded and Accelerated HEU Downblending) th Congress, Department of Energy National Security Act for Fiscal Year 2007, S. 2769, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010); (DOE/CF-0047), p. 401; and Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: DOE Needs to Address Uncertainties with and Strengthen Independent Safety Oversight of Its Plutonium Disposition Program (GAO ), March (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 55 According to testimony from William Tobey, Deputy Administrator for NNSA, in fiscal year 2009, we will convert an additional eight HEU reactors to LEU, remove an additional 700 kilograms of HEU, and secure an additional 125 radiological sites across the globe. William Tobey, Deputy Administrator, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, National Nuclear Security Administration, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on Energy and Water Development, April 3, 2008, p pt5/pdf/chrg-110shrg394-pt5.pdf (Downloaded May 6, 2010) 56 (DOE/CF-0047), p Department of Energy, Excess Uranium Inventory Management Plan, December 16, 2008, Appendix C, p. C-1. (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 58 National Nuclear Security Administration, Fact Sheet: Reducing the Nuclear Weapons Stockpile. (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 12

14 160 MT were reserved for naval fuel; only 40 MT is to be downblended. 59 NNSA s schedule for transforming the approximately 90 MT of remaining surplus HEU, 60 most of which was declared surplus in 1994, has slowed to an almost glacial pace: downblending the 90 MT isn t scheduled to be completed until 2050, averaging out to only 2 MT per year. (Appendix A) This rate is unnecessarily slow NNSA downblended 20 MT in 2004 (Appendix B), 14 MT in FY 2008, and 10 MT in FY 2009 (Appendix A), clearly indicating that a rate far higher than 2 MT per year is possible. In fact, NNSA has the capacity to downblend significantly more than even the 20 MT per year. One of the privately owned facilities NNSA contracts with for downblending, B&W-Lynchburg, performed almost no downblending in POGO sources say the facility is considering closing its downblending operation because it is not profitable, a move that would even further impede U.S. downblending goals. In addition, POGO has learned from sources that NFS, too, has a large unmet capacity for downblending, with a number of downblending lines sitting idle. 61 Y-12 also has a downblending capacity, although it s unclear how much of one. Y-12 could be given more capacity by utilizing mobile downblending units, which could cut down on transportation risks and costs, as the units could be located next to the Highly Enriched Uranium Manufacturing Facility (HEUMF). In addition, more downblending prep work could be conducted at Building 9212, the facility at Y-12 where HEU is converted into the form that can be shipped for downblending. 62 In a meeting with POGO, NNSA officials said a key reason the downblending rate has slowed so much is that Building 9212 is not a modern facility. 63 As a result, the rate at which HEU is converted into the form necessary for downblending must be reduced so as not to wear out the building, NNSA told POGO at a meeting. But on closer examination, NNSA s explanation doesn t hold up. 59 In 2005, 160 MT had been set aside for naval reactors. Samuel Bodman, Remarks by Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Federal News Service, 2005, p (Downloaded September 1, 2010) (hereinafter Remarks by Energy Secretary Samuel Bodman to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace ) Some of that 160 MT has been used, and 31 MT was rejected by the Navy. This leaves somewhere between 100 and 160 MT on reserve for naval reactors. Presentation by Robert M. George at the International Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, slide POGO calculated this figure by subtracting the cumulative amount of surplus HEU NNSA has downblended to date (127 MT) from the cumulative amount it plans to have downblended by FY 2050 (217 MT): 217 MT 127 MT = 90 MT. There is a discrepancy of 3 MT between what the NNSA says it wants to downblend by 2050 (217), and how much HEU has, according to public sources, been declared surplus and slated for downblending (174 MT in 1994 plus 40 MT in 2005 = 214). POGO cannot account for the discrepancy using the information that has been made public. 61 With its operations limited by a recent shutdown, NFS has long been under scrutiny for safety lapses, including some very dangerous incidents, and such issues have to be resolved before increasing its capacity. For a review of its recent Inspection Reports and Performance Reviews, see Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Nuclear Fuel Services Active Facility. (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 62 Department of Energy, Y-12 National Security Complex, Recycled Uranium Mass Balance Project: Y-12 National Security Complex Site Report, December 2000, pp (Downloaded September 1, 2010) 63 POGO met with more than a dozen NNSA officials at the Department of Energy on May 12,