2016 ASIS Interna1onal / / Level 44 Security LLC LLC

Transcription

1 Active Shooter: Preparing For and Responding To a Growing Threat Presenter: Kevin T. Doss, MS, CPP, PSP CEO, Level 4 Security LLC Information Emergency Exits No video, pictures or recordings allowed. Do not ask for the electronic version of the slides. Place cell phones on vibrate or silent mode. Fill out your evaluation forms. Preface The content presented is for guidance ONLY This is not meant to replace Policies or Procedures from your own organization This program seeks to promote Best Practices Overall Goals: 1. Understanding the major challenges for the identification of an active shooter 2. Prevention, planning, protection response and recovery aspects of an active shooting. 1

2 Basic Statistics 98% - Act alone 96% - Male 66.9% - Over before Law Enforcement arrived 69% - Shooting duration of 1-5 min. even with LE officer onsite 14% ended in 2 minutes or less 55% ended in 2-5 minutes 15.6% (25) Fled scene before LE arrived 28.1% - (45) LE exchanged gunfire 46.7% - LE casualties when shooter engaged - 9 killed, 28 wounded Source: A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, (2014), FBI Recognizable Hazard Recent court rulings have shown that active shooter scenarios have become more prevalent and are now considered a recognizable hazard to employees. Recent court rulings have allowed negligence suits filed by victims of Active Shooters to proceed against employers for failing to provide training to their employees. Basically, companies can no longer avoid their corporate responsibility to provide training on both how to spot potential active shooters and response preparation if confronted with this type of emergency. 4 Levels of Coordination The agency, community, organizational and individual levels must work in unison to better prevent, communicate and respond to asymmetrical attacks such as terrorism and active shooters. K.T. Doss,

3 Common Characteristics Incidents can be spontaneous or planned and the shooters behavior is unpredictable. Usually a cowardly act of revenge. Attackers regularly engaged in some concerning behavior prior to the incident. Attackers often have difficulty coping with loses and failure. Attackers frequently felt bullied, persecuted, or injured. Shootings often stopped by non-law enforcement intervention. Lessons Learned Incidents occur in target rich environments. Others often know about attacker s idea/plan prior to attack. There is no accurate or useful profile of individuals. Organizations are usually not prepared to deal with such violent encounters. Prevention, Planning, Response and Recovery First responders are often outgunned and are not properly trained to respond. Tactical intervention is too late. Medical and other aspects often not considered. Response Challenges One officer taking action with back-up coming Military-style tactics required: Speed Surprise Aggression Swift application of lethal force. Equipment Tactical Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT s) Medical Supplies Training, Training, Training 3

4 Behavioral Aspects Targeted Violence Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and often times discernable process of thinking and behavior. Targeted violence stems from an interaction between 4 factors: 1. The individual 2. The situation 3. The setting 4. The target Pre-attack Behaviors 13% 10% 27% 31% 19% Threats Made Stalking / Harrassment Observed Behaviors Aggressive Acts Unknown / Other Source: USSS, FBI, USDoED (2010) 4

5 Profiling Violence Verbal Threats Written Threats Written Plans Disturbing Thoughts Thoughts vs. Action Mental Illness Death, Breakup, Loss of Job, Divorce Weapon/ammo purchasing & training Copycat fascination Bullying Violent video games Drugs Alcohol Ideology / Religion Few w/arrest records Some Personality Traits Poor relationships Abrupt changes Lack of empathy Sense of entitlement Low self-esteem Fascination with violence Externalizes blame Dehumanizes others Poor coping skills Narcissistic Depressed Angry Assessments 5

6 Risk Process Identify the threats and consequences Step 1 Step 2 Establish how to protect and vulnerabilities Review security measures and test security plans Step 4 Step 3 Identify measures to reduce risk Systems Thinking The Logic of Failure (Dietrich Dörner, 1996) argues that systems fail in small incremental steps, not with one catastrophic error. Source: Report on the Arapahoe High School Shooting, 2016 Threat Assessments An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to successful threat assessment. Effective threat assessment is based upon facts, rather than on characteristics or traits. The central question in threat assessment inquiry or investigation is whether a person poses a threat, not whether the person has made a threat. An integrated systems approach should guide threat assessment inquires and investigations. 6

7 Threat Assessment Team Identify, assess, and manage any individual who may pose a safety concern. Multidisciplinary skillsets and expertise to identify, evaluate and address potential problems Central repository for information Behaviors Communications Threats and security concerns Family and/or relationship issues Potential victims Courses of appropriate action (counseling, LE involvement, or other actions) Information Sharing Three major failures in information sharing include: 1. Failure to use effective information systems to document behavior and safety concerns (e.g., threat, risks, discipline response). 2. Failure to train staff in an anonymous reporting system. 3. Failure to implement internal and interagency information sharing. Source: Report on the Arapahoe High School Shooting, 2016 Incremental Failure Examples I Decision to not build a safety and support action plan for a troubled employee (previous violence is clearly a strong risk factor for future violence). Decision to ignore outside factors (Financial, relationships, mental illness, divorce, family issues). Decision to not enlist the help of a person who is trusted in the safety and support action plan. Source: Report on the Arapahoe High School Shooting,

8 Incremental Failure Examples II Decision to not have a safety and support action plan (mental health referrals, follow-up meetings) Decision to not have a training policy for those in leadership positions Decision to not thoroughly check the facts and collect accurate information on the person during the threat assessment process None of these decisions by themselves may cause a shooting, but together they can compound upon the other in a system illequipped to prevent it. Source: Report on the Arapahoe High School Shooting, 2016 Mitigation and Prevention Organizational Impact Lost Productivity Property damage Lost sales Medical costs Legal fees Physical Security Counseling Reputation Business relationships People/experience Building location 8

9 Reducing the Impact Integration, coordination and communication with law enforcement and first responders are the three major functions that can make a significant difference in lowering the casualty rates from such violent attacks. K.T. Doss, 2016 Overall Goals 1. Save lives and reduce casualties 2. Reduce confusion about what first responders will do or need 3. Maximize coordination efforts between the organization and responders Through the use of: Plans, Policies and Procedures Training Physical Security Measures Drills and Exercises Special Equipment Human Error While proximal error leading to an accident is, in fact, usually a human error, the causes of that error are often well beyond the individual s control. All humans err frequently. Systems that rely on error-free performance are doomed to fail. Lucian Leape Source: Report on the Arapahoe High School Shooting,

10 Potential Gaps No Active Shooter Plan No Emergency Plan Insider threat planning No communication/ secondary communication/ dead spots No prepared message No video or control room Lack of security measures and policies/plans No prior coordination w/ responders No trauma training or supplies Low expectations No training programs No Threat Assessment Team No coordination between tenants, contractors, volunteers Policies and Procedures Zero Tolerance Policy Harassment and bullying Weapons Pre-employment and selection Acceptable conduct Travel Equity and diversity Physical Security Investigations Reporting (Anonymous) Mental health Grievance and reporting Rewards & recognition Corruption / Ethics Salary, benefits and leave Performance and promotions Crisis management Major AS Plan Components A. Communications to staff and guests B. Reporting procedures (suspicious activity and incident) C. Threat identification (look, listen, move, communicate) D. Shooting responses (evacuate, hide, fight, etc.) E. Evacuation routes, secondary escapes, assignments and assembly and reunification areas F. Lockdown procedures (offices, departments and buildings) G. Communications and Contact Information and Media protocols H. Insider threat protocols I. Law enforcement screening and reunification J. Information on medical support and transport K. Recovery (cleanup, repairs, counseling, etc.) 10

11 Training General Awareness Industry Specific Scenario Based Response Based Tactical Site Specific Drills and Exercises Physical Security 1. Deter 2. Detect 3. Assess 4. Delay 5. Respond/Neutralize 6. Integration and Implementation Protection in Depth & Balanced Protection Security Department Assistance Site Security Plan Maps and floor plans Actions for Active Shooter & Hostage situation Evacuation plan and routes Tactical medical capabilities Identification of personnel Locations of hazardous materials Shortcuts and intimate site knowledge Coordination with local law enforcement 11

12 Security Officers Security Officer Response Armed verses Unarmed Contract and Post Orders Video Control Room Access and Security Assistance Video system Gates and turnstile operation Access controls Tactical Medical Planning Majority of fatal wounds occur within 30 min. Providing Care Under Fire After shooter leaves area (Cleared vs. Secured) Self Aid Training and emergency evacuation Medical items (must be within reach and you must know how to use them!) Tourniquets Blood clotting bandages Airway management References Goodrum, S. and Woodward, W. (2016) Report on the Arapahoe High School Shooting; University of Boulder and University of Northern CO. Doss, K.T. and C.D. Shepherd (2015) Active Shooter: Preparing for and Responding to a Growing Threat: Elsevier Butterworth- Heinemann. Blair, J. Pete, and Schweit, Katherine W. (2014). A Study of Active Shooter Incidents, Texas State University and F.B.I., U.S. Department of Justice, Washington D.C U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (2010) Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education, Washington, DC Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., Reddy, M., Borum, R., & Modzeleski, W. (2002) The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States. U.S. Dept. of Education and the U.S.S.S. International Association of Chiefs of Police (1999) Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence, Alexandria, VA 12

13 Questions? Level 4 Security LLC Kevin T. Doss, MS, CPP, PSP PO Box 665, Camp Hill, PA Kevin.Doss@Level4Security.com Web: Disclaimer: While every effort has been made to ensure the accuracy of the informa1on presented herein and its relevance, the professional who prepared this material do not make any representa1ons or warrantees rela1ve to its accuracy, usefulness or suitability for any par1cular purpose. It will not prevent criminal acts and cannot guarantee the safety of any involved in criminal acts or acts of terrorism. 13