25th May 2016 Issue 26

Transcription

1 25th May 2016 Issue 26 Issue 26 of the series continues to follow the developing conflicts in Yemen and Libya, instability around the Mediterranean, as well as detailing reports on security events and news from around the World. The Maritime Intelligence Report Series focuses on: Areas of instability which could affect the passage or port call of your vessel; Changes or impediments to navigation/restrictions of; and Charts and analysis detailing piracy, suspicious approaches and hijackings. MAST has a global reach and presence, delivering first hand, accurate and exclusive intelligence. MAST is entrenched and committed in continuing to support and promote the awareness of the very real risks that seafarers and stakeholders face. This Intelligence Report Series is a brief snapshot of MAST s Intelligence capabilities. MAST Intelligence specialises in providing clients with a suite of products, including; detailed port and vessel security briefs, vessel passage plans, threat and risk mitigation, travel risk management. Working closely in conjunction with a host of experts, MAST Intelligence offers a market leading service pertaining to all maritime affairs. Please follow MAST on LinkedIn and Twitter to keep abreast with these insightful weekly reports and more including real time security updates. Contents: Libya - Libyan Coast Guard and Naval Training - NOC - ISIS - Yemen - Ceasefire - Peace Talks - ISIS - Yemen Ports Mediterranean - Turkish Coast Guard attacked - Analysis - Regional Theatres of Piracy, Crime, Terrorism and News - Indian Ocean Region - Gulf of Guinea - South East Asia - Central & South America Mast Services MAST UK +44 (0) operations@mast-security.com Editor: Alexander Farrow Business Intelligence Officer alex.farrow@mast-security.co.uk MAST Singapore ben.stewart@mast-security.com 24/7 Emergency Telephone: +44(0)

2 Libya A NATO chief has stated that there are no plans for troops to be deployed to Libya, rather NATO will help to build up Libya s forces to secure itself. Any assistance provided must be requested from the Libyan government. Libyan Coast Guard and Naval Training Prime Minister designate Serraj has written to request rapid EU support contributing to the training of the Libyan Navy and Coast Guard as well as the security service. It has been reported that the Libyan Coast Guard intercepted approximately 850 migrants on the 22nd May near the western city of Sabratha. For further reading click here. National Oil Company (NOC) It has been reported that Libya s oil output has risen to 300,000 barrels per day following the reopening of Port Marsa al Hariga and the agreement reached between the two NOC branches. ISIS It has been reported that pro government forces have continued to gather west of ISIS held Sirte. It appears that the offensive is awaiting foreign weaponry which was posed to World Foreign minsters in Vienna, before initiating the assault. The establishment of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy will provide Libya with a greater capacity to secure its borders and waters. In Yemen ISIS has targeted police and army recruitment centres (see page 3) and it is possible similar destabilising methods could be used to ensure that an effective coast guard and navy is denied in Libya. The NOC is responsible for securing oil port facilities with their own armed force, the Petroleum Facility Guards (PFG). To date the PFG s have been highly effective at repelling ISIS and ensuring business continuity at open ports. The oil industry is integral to Libya s economy and is appropriately safeguarded. Divisions between the east and west NOC branches and the control of ports has yet to impact on the security of a vessel. Many Libyan ports are operational, but not without risk. MAST is able to provide risk assessments and crew training to improve situational awareness and risk appreciation. Controlled by the New General National Congress and Libya Shield Force Controlled by the Council of Deputies and Libyan National Army Controlled by so called ISIS Control of Northern Libyan territory (30th April 2016) Source: Wikimedia Commons 2

3 Yemen Ceasefire It has been reported that the 10th April declared ceasefire has been further breached by both sides, but is broadly holding within percent of the country, enough to allow peace talks to continue. Peace talks On the 23rd May peace talks in Kuwait resumed. It has been reported by the UN envoy for Yemen, Ismail Ould Cheikh Ahmed, that incredible progress has been made. Details of the progress have not yet been publicised. For further reading click here. ISIS We advise vessels to conduct a risk assessment and maintain increased levels of security when in the vicinity of Yemen or in Yemeni ports. As predicated by CMF at the May Oceans Beyond Piracy conference, the eastern section of the IRTC near the Yemen coastline has had reported piracy attempts. There have been 2 instances of gun fire exchange in the last 5 weeks and 1 instance of evasive actions taken by an MV (see below image taken from MAST s Risk Map). There have been 2 separate suicide bombings targeting security infrastructure claimed by IS. In Aden enlisting army recruits were bombed on 23rd May killing at least 40, and on 15th May police recruits in Al Mukalla were attacked with up There is still a considerable AQAP presence in the to 31 killed. These attacks undermine attempts to rebuild national security and aim to ensure continued instability. region and although Al Mukalla has been liberated, AQAP and pirates are not reliant on the use of a port to launch skiffs, which may present a false sense of increasing regional security. Houthi Pro Hadi Government Forces Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Control of Yemen territory (3rd May 2016) Source: Wikimedia Commons 3

4 Yemen Ports Maritime Combined Coalition Command (MCCC) advises that all vessels operating in and around Yemen maintain AIS at all times and use approved UN Location Codes. UN Verification and Inspection Mechanism for Yemen (UNVIM) The UN s Secretary-General has decided to institute a UNVIM for the facilitation of commercial imports to Yemen, at the request of the Government of the Republic of Yemen and in line with Security Council resolution 2216 (2015). UNVIM is operational with immediate effect. Shipping companies or vessel owners shipping commercial goods or services to any port not under the direct control of the Government of Yemen (Salif, Mokha, Hudaydah and associated oil terminals) need to apply for permits upon departure of the port of origin of their cargo. For further details click here. Port Aden: The port of Aden is under the protection of the Republic of Yemen security forces. Curfew in effect for Aden, daily. Merchant vessels wishing to enter Yemeni ports must first apply for a permit through the Yemeni Ministry of Transportation; contact: yemen.transport@gmail.com for more information. Final clearance to enter Yemeni ports (with permits in place) is authenticated by the coalition guard ship. Aden is the only port in Yemen currently able to facilitate container vessels. The container terminal has it s capacity. recently increased Port Salif: Capacity 2 berths. Operating at capacity. Vessels experiencing severe delays due to minimal port equipment. Port Hudaydah: Capacity 5 berths. Reduced vessel berth capacity from 8 to 5 due to substantial damage from air strikes in July, especially to cranes. Only 1 of 5 shore based cranes in partial operation, container vessels highly recommended to have their own internal cranes. RSNF is utilizing a holding area 60 NM west of the port of Hudaydah for all vessels attempting entry into Salif or Hudaydah. Inbound vessels should plan on holding within this area prior to receiving clearance from port control warships. Port Mokha: No recorded activity since August Port Al Mukalla: Capacity 2 berths. Al Mukalla port was liberated on the 23/24 April by the Saudi-led coalition and southern resistance. On the 25th April only skeleton staff were present at the port. Port officials have advised that port operations resumed on the 26th April. MCCC Notice: Following open source reporting of increased military activity in and around the Yemeni port city of Mukalla and the maritime security incident on the 24th April, where an MV was fired upon, please be advised that the security situation in the vicinity of the port has changed. Vessels using the port or operating nearby are advised to take additional security measures and proceed with caution. Coalition warships are patrolling in the area and should be hailed on VHF Channel 16 by any vessel witnessing or subject to threatening behaviour. 4

5 Mediterranean It has been reported by the International Organisation fro Migration (IOM) that there has been a 25% decrease of migrants drowning compared to the same period last year. This is thought to be a result of better migrant management (such as the EU turkey deal) and swifter rescue operations. Turkish Coast Guard attacked It has been reported that a Turkish coast guard sailor has died and a fishermen wounded due to an explosion whilst conducting a rescue operation on a drifting life raft containing 2 dead bodies. At present details on the incident are unclear, but there is a possibility that this was a terrorist related incident and the life raft was deliberately rigged with an IED to target the Turkish Coast Guard. For further reading click here. Analysis This incident is being investigated by the Turkish Coast Guard. So far they have not reported further on the incident, but it remains possible this was a deliberate attempt to target the Turkish Coast Guard or other rescuers. The location of the incident close to the Syrian coast lends weight to this theory. This is the first time we have seen the terrorists potentially target rescuers and there is a risk that this will be the first of a series of attacks which may become sophisticated as they develop expertise. 250, , , ,000 50,000 0 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Refugee crossings Source: UNHRC SOLAS operations in the Mediterranean can be complicated by the numbers of migrants involved, the nature of the migrant craft, the safety of the vessel s crew, medical issues or the potential for a terrorist incident. Until we hear further information as to the cause of the life raft explosion, vigilance and caution must be enhanced in the proximity of migrant vessels and life rafts in case vessels are bobby trapped. MAST can advise and provide training for crisis management and SOLAS Map depicting major migrant routes in the Mediterranean (24th May 2016). Source: UNHRC 5

6 Indian Ocean Region The British Permanent Representative to the UNSC, Matthew Rycroft, said that the African Union is responsible for the remaining 20% of the AMISOM budget required to keep the mission fully funded. The EU cut it s funding for AMISOM from 900 million to 750 million in January 2016, leading to the 20 % deficit. AMISOM troop-contributing countries have complained that the reduction has prevented them from paying complete salaries and conducting large-scale operations against al Shabaab. Incidents 1. India: 10May16, approximately 110nm off West Coast India. While Singapore-flagged LPG tanker was transiting from Singapore to Ras Laffan, the ship s radar picked up three targets (two targets from port bow and one target on starboard bow) approached towards the vessel at 2005 LT. Due to darkness, the crew could not visually see anything on these targets. The duty officer then switched on the deck search light, blew the ship's whistle, monitored the track of suspicious craft and placed extra lookout and informed UKMTO. The suspected boats aborted the approach when the vessel initiated antipiracy actions. Indian Coast Guard aircraft and ships sanitised the area, and contacted some merchant vessels in the vicinity to inquire whether or not they sighted some suspicious craft/ skiffs in the vicinity at the given time. The Oceans Beyond Piracy (OBP) conference (03May16) highlighted the worrying trend of vessels not registering with MSCHOA through the HRA. This limits the information and intelligence available to the military security operations in the region, placing commercial vessels at a higher risk. It is also clear that fewer vessels are taking armed security and vessels are routing closer to Somalia. It is known that Somali pirate investors take a close interest in international conferences and announcements by organisations like OBP. At a time when EUNAVFOR is concerned that the Somalis have the capability and intent to return to piracy operations, MAST reiterates that armed security is the only guarantor of preventing a successful attack. 1 Hijack Kidnap Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Theft 1st December 2015 HRA limits 6

7 Gulf of Guinea It has been reported that a new militant group, the Red Egbesu Water Lions, has surfaced in the Niger Delta region. Red Egesu Waters Lions are in league with the Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) who have vowed to completely reduce Niger Delta oil output unless their demands are met. The NDA were responsible for the attack on the Chevron oil platform. News and Analysis The former Director General of the Nigerian Maritime Administration Safety Agency (NIMASA), Raymond Omatseye has been sentenced to 5 years imprisonment by a Lagos Federal High Court. The charge was for extortion and has been appealed. Nigerian militant Tompolo s ongoing abstentia trial at the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission heard evidence citing 22 counts on the charges of extortion and forgery. Tompolo, on behalf of MEND, has again appealed to the Niger Delta Avengers, the group responsible for the sabotage of the Chevron oil platform, to cease the destruction of oil infrastructure. His spokesmen stated the following: I have said it again and again that destruction of oil facilities as it is being done now by the group cannot help the economy and I am reiterating my call on them to stop to save the Nigerian economy from collapse. ENI, which operates through Nigerian Agip Oil Co. has confirmed that some of their infrastructure was sabotaged by militants (22nd May) affecting the output of 4,200 barrels per day. At present the sabotage is unclaimed. All vessels operating in the GoG should conduct a thorough risk assessment and practice emergency drills. Locally procured patrol boats can, in the right circumstances, enhance a vessel s security. MAST advises against the use of embarked armed Nigerian Navy personnel. Under contact from pirates, embarked armed Nigerian guards will draw increased fire towards the bridge of the vessel which can result in the death or injury of crew members and damage to the vessel. The Secure Anchorage Area (SAA) off Lagos provides effective protection for drifting and waiting vessels and the area has been piracy free for several months. It has also been reported that there is an unofficial, but operational SAA off the Bonny River. MAST can advise on risk assessments, the most effective counter measures and on the most effective locally procured Nigerian patrol vessels to escort vessels to and from operation in Nigeria to 150nm offshore Hijack Kidnap Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Theft 7

8 South East Asia Incidents 1. Indonesia: 20May16, Batam Anchorage. Six robbers in a skiff approached and came alongside an anchored tug at 0330 LT. Four robbers wearing ski masks managed to board the vessel. Duty watchman noticed the robbers and informed the D/O on the bridge who raised the alarm and crew mustered. Upon hearing the alarm and seeing the crew alertness, the robbers escaped. Nothing reported stolen. 2. Indonesia: 17May16, Samarinda Anchorage. A robber boarded an anchored bulk carrier unnoticed, stole ship s properties and escaped. The incident was noticed later by the crew during routine rounds at 0000 LT. 3. Philippines: 09May16, Batagas Bay, Delta anchorage. While at anchor, the AB on Singapore-flagged vehicle carrier noticed that the watertight door to the forward mooring station could not be opened at 0330 LT. A watertight door was found to have been tied by an unidentified person with iron rods to prevent the opening. The general alarm was raised and the Master requested the agent to report and coordinate the matter to the nearest Coast Guard Station. In the presence of Coast Guard personnel, the watertight door was successfully opened. Some foot prints were found on deck. A search was conducted, following which it was determined that 2 fire hose couplings, 2 fire hose nozzles and 1 coil of welding cables had been stolen. Opportunistic theft of ships stores and equipment continues to be sporadically spread across the archipelagos of SE Asia. Thieves tend to be non violent and will escape when spotted. The terrorist group Abu Sayyaf has previously targeted tugs and vessels under tow with the intent of kidnaping crew for ransom. The agreement for a ransom of $1.14 million to Abu Sayyaf militants may increase the appetite for kidnap and ransom. Abu Sayyaf militants are heavily armed, and often many in number. 3 Hijack Kidnap Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Theft 2 1 8

9 Central and South America Incidents: Nothing serious to report Standing advice: The smuggling of drugs on board merchant vessels is far from a new phenomenon. For every load which is caught, countless numbers undoubtedly slip through undetected. This is very much a localised issue within South and Central America. The repercussions of a vessel being caught with drugs stowed will depend on the type, amount and national laws, but may be disruptive and costly. When and if operating in these areas, especially Columbia and Peru, it is advised that: Potential stowage areas such as rudder shafts are denied as far as possible, and/or routinely searched. Access points are closely monitored by a vigilant watch for the duration of the vessel s call at port. Hi-Jack Kidnap Approach/Attack Suspicious Activity Theft 9

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