usnc ~DNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED

Transcription

1 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 1 of 129 r UNTED STATES DSTRCT COURT SOUTHERN DSTRCT OF NEW YORK )( THE NEW YORK TMES COMPANY and CHARLE SAVAGE, - against - Plaintiffs, usnc ~DNY DOCUMENT ELECTRONCALLY FLED DOC#: DATE FLED: _...,.~~----#-- DECSON & ORDER 16 Civ (RMB) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTCE, Defendant )(. Background This Decision & Order resolves the summary judgment motion, dated March 27, 2017, of the United States Department of Justice ("DOJ''), and the summary judgment motion, dated April 24, 2017, of The New York Times Company ("N.Y. Times") and Charlie Savage, a New York Times Reporter ("Savage," and collectively, "Plaintiffs"). The cross-motions concern Plaintiffs' request under the Freedom of nformation Act ("FOA"), 5 U.S.C. 552, for the written threat assessments of Guantanamo Bay detainees ("threat assessments"). The threat assessments were prepared by a task force appointed in 2009 ("Task Force") "to review each remaining [Guantanamo Bay] prisoner" (Complaint, filed Aug. 2, 2016, ii 10). 1 1 DOJ has submitted a memorandum, filed March 27, 2017, in support of its motion ("DOJ Br."), and a reply memorandum, filed May 1, 2017, in further support of DOJ' s motion and in opposition to Plaintiffs' motion ("DOJ Reply"). DOJ has also submitted a total of eight written Declarations from the following individuals: Courtney J. O'Keefe, Attorney-Advisor in the Office oflnformation Policy, United States Department of Justice, dated March 27, 2017 ("O'Keefe Deel."); David M. Hardy, Section Chief, Record/nformation Dissemination Section, Records Management Division, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, dated March 27, 2017 ("Hardy Deel."); Michael G. Seidel, Assistant Section Chief, Record/nformation Dissemination Section, Records Management Division, Federal Bureau oflnvestigation, dated May 1, 2017 ("Seidel Deel."); Mark W. Ewing, Chief Management Officer, Office of the Director of National ntelligence, dated March 24,

2 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 2 of 129 On January 27, 2009, then-president Barack Obama issued Executive Order ("Executive Order") which directed "the executive branch [to] undertake a prompt and thorough review of the factual and legal bases for the continued detention of all individuals currently held at Guantanamo, and of whether their continued detention is in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States and in the interests of justice." Exec. Order 13492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898 (Jan. 27, 2009). The Executive Order called for a "comprehensive interagency review" and appointed as Review Participants the U.S. Attorney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National ntelligence, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ("Review Participants"). d. "To implement the Order, the Attorney General established the Guantanamo Review Task Force and a senior-level Review Panel. The Task Force was responsible for assembling and examining relevant information pertaining to the Guantanamo detainees and making ("Ewing Deel."); Eric F. Stein, Director of the Office oflnformation Programs and Services, United States Department of State, dated March 27, 2017 ("Stein Deel."); Department of Defense, with the declarant's name and biographic information redacted pursuant to 10 U.S.C. 424(a)(2), dated March 27, 2017 ("DOD Declaration"); and Robert C. Moscati, Deputy Chief Prosecutor, Office of the Chief Prosecutor, Office of Military Commissions, dated March 27, 2017 ("Moscati Deel."). DOJ has also submitted ex parte and in camera a (second) Declaration from Hardy, dated March 27, 2017, and an unredacted version of the DOD Declaration. DOJ has also submitted a Vaughn ndex, attached hereto as Attachment A. "A Vaughn index typically lists the titles and descriptions of the responsive documents that the Government contends are exempt from disclosure... The titles and descriptions of documents listed... usually facilitate the task of asserting and adjudicating the requester's challenges to the Government's claims of exemption." N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 758 F.3d 436, (2d Cir. 2014). Plaintiffs has submitted a memorandum, filed April 24, 2017, in opposition to DOJ's motion and in support of Plaintiffs motion ("Opp."); and a reply memorandum, filed May 8, 2017, in opposition to DOJ's motion and in support of Plaintiffs motion ("Pis.' Reply"). Plaintiffs have also submitted the Declaration of David E. McCraw, Vice President and Deputy General Counsel, The New York Times Company, dated April 24, 2017 ("McCraw Deel."). 2

3 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 3 of 129 recommendations on their proper dispositions. The Review Panel, consisting of officials with delegated authority from their respective agencies to decide the disposition of each detainee, reviewed the Task Force's recommendations and made disposition decisions on a rolling basis. Where the Review Panel did not reach consensus, or where higher-level review was appropriate, the Review Participants enumerated in the Executive Order determined the proper disposition of the detainee." (O'Keefe Deel., dated Mar. 27, 2017, if 12.) As part of its work, "the Task Force prepared recommendation memoranda assessing a variety of factors for evaluation by the Review Panel." (d. if 14.) The recommendation memoranda created by the Task Force contained "evaluation[s] of the threat to the national security of the United States posed by an individual detainee. These threat assessments were based upon specific pieces of evidence that Task Force members selected from the larger pool of information that had been compiled for each detainee. This evidence frequently consisted of intelligence reporting or law enforcement information related to a particular detainee. The [threat] assessments included candid evaluations of the reliability and credibility of each particular piece of evidence..." (d. if 15.) "[NJ either the Review Panel nor the Review Participants ever adopted the findings or the recommendations of the Task Force as the final disposition determination; indeed, in some instances, the final disposition determination for a particular detainee differed from the recommendation contained in the Task Force's memorandum." (d. if 16 (emphasis added).) "The final disposition determinations of the interagency review were memorialized in the Guantanamo Review Dispositions chart [("GRD")], which is dated January 22, 2010." (d. if 17; id., Ex. G.) The GRD was publicly released in redacted form by the Office of the Director ofnational ntelligence ("ODN") on March 31, 2016 and is attached hereto as Attachment B. 3

4 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 4 of 129 (sl) The GRD indicates whether the 240 Guantanamo detainees were to be "released, transferred, prosecuted, or detained." (d.) The GRD did not make specific reference to the threat assessments. (See O'Keefe Deel., Ex. G.) On June 13, 2016, Savage, on behalf of The New York Times, submitted to DOJ and to ODN, Freedom of nformation Act requests to obtain and review the threat assessments. (O'Keefe Deel., Ex. A.) Savage's FOA requests sought to obtain "the threat assessments of Guantanamo detainees produced by the six-agency executive order task force appointed in 2009 to review each remaining prisoner." (d.) The FOA deadlines passed with no response from DOJ or ODN (Opp. at 9.) On August 2, 2016, Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint requesting that this Court order DOJ and ODN to produce the threat assessments.2 On October 25, 2016, the Court directed DOJ to "complete [its] 'classification review"' of the threat assessments by February 27, And, on February 27, 2017, DOJ wrote to Plaintiffs' counsel advising that DOJ had determined "that all of th[ e] material should be withheld in full pursuant [to] Exemption 5 of the FOA," and that portions of the material should be withheld pursuant to Exemptions 1, 7(B), 7(D), and 7(E) of the FOA. (O'Keefe Deel., Ex. C at 1.)4 As noted at footnote 1 supra, DOJ has submitted eight Declarations in support of its invocation of the Exemptions, as follows: 2 On February 27, 2017, the Court "so-ordered" the parties' stipulation dismissing ODN as a defendant, leaving DOJ as the sole defendant. 3 According to DOJ, a "classification review" occurs when the relevant agency or agencies "[r]eview[] and process[]... records to determine... the extent to which FOA Exemption [l] applies to them." (Letter to Judge Richard M. Berman from AUSA Christopher Connolly, dated Oct. 18, 2017, at 1.) 4 For a description of these Exemptions, see Attachment C hereto. 4

5 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 5 of 129 The 0 'Keefe Declaration states that "the threat assessments are protected in full by the deliberative process privilege encompassed by Exemption 5 of the FOA." (O'Keefe Deel. if 28.) "DOJ has determined that the threat assessments are protected by the deliberative process privilege because they consist of the Task Force's internal recommendations to the Review Panel of senior-level officials who comprised the ultimate decision-makers for the Task Force's disposition determinations regarding each detainee. The Task Force prepared the threat assessments to succinctly summarize significant issues and present key background information regarding the potential national security threat of individual detainees in a concise format for ease of presentation and review for the Review Panel." (d. if 26.) O'Keefe also states, " am not aware of any... public statement by the Review Panel, nor the Review Participants, adopting the conclusions or rationale of any of the threat assessments." (d. if 28.) Assuming, arguendo, that the Court were to reject DOJ's invocation of Exemption 5, O'Keefe also states that "pmtions of the threat assessments... are... protected under Exemption l." (d. if 30.) n particular, Exemption 1 applies to "[c]ertain threat assessments [that] contain... information that is currently and properly classified." (d.) The Hardy Declaration was submitted "to provide the Court and [P]laintiffs with the FB's justification for withholding its equities within the records pursuant to FOA Exemptions 1,... 7(B),... (7)(D), and (7)(E)." (Hardy Deel. if 4.) As to Exemption 1, Hardy states that "[t]he unauthorized disclosure of information concerning foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States can reasonably be expected to... identify the target, scope, or time frame of intelligence activities of the United States in or about a foreign country, which may result in the curtailment or cessation of these activities; enable hostile entities to assess United States intelligence gathering activities in or about a foreign country and devise countermeasures against these activities; or compromise cooperative foreign sources, which may jeopardize their safety and curtail the flow of information from these sources." (d. if 27.) As to Exemption 7(B), Hardy states that "[p]remature release of the recommendations provided in the threat assessments through the FOA, could unfairly impact ongoing or prospective proceedings and jeopardize the detainee's ability to receive a fair and impartial adjudication." M if 38.) As to Exemption 7(D), Hardy states that the threat assessments contain "information regarding individual sources who are... informants under an express grant of confidentiality." (d. if 54.) As to Exemption 7(E), Hardy states that "database search results" are protected from disclosure because "[ d]isclosure of the printouts or information compiled from these search results, or even the selection of a certain database over another for a particular type of information and its relative usefulness, could enable criminals to employ countermeasures to avoid detection, thus jeopardizing the FB's investigative mission." (d. if 64.) 5 The Stein Declaration explains why Exemption 1 applies to portions of one of the threat assessments. (Stein Deel. if 8.) Stein states that the portions in question 5 The Court has also reviewed carefully in camera Hardy's second Declaration which was submitted ex parte in further support of the FB's invocation of Exemptions 1 and 7(E). 5

6 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 6 of 129 "require[] classification at the SECRET level because [their] unauthorized disclosure reasonably could be expected to cause serious damage to the national security." (d. if 14.) n particular, these "[p]ortions... are being withheld pursuant to Exemption 1 because they contain information relating to foreign govermnent information." (d. if 17.) "[P]rotecting foreign govermnent info1mation, and in some cases even the fact that information has been provided, is important to our relationship and conduct of foreign relations." (d.) The DOD Declaration asserts that Exemption 1 applies to portions of the threat assessments because these portions contain DOD information that is properly classified. (DOD Deel. if 5.) DOD "withheld certain inf01mation in the threat assessments under Exemption 1 because it consists of information that is related to foreign relations or the foreign activities of the United States, and may include confidential sources." (d. if 20.) "The United States govermnent goes to great lengths to maintain effective foreign relations and even greater lengths to protect and maintain its sources' confidentiality because it is an integral part of successful foreign relations policy." (d. if 21.) "f [DOD] were to disclose this information [in the portions protected by Exemption l], it would have a chilling effect on current U.S. foreign relations, and any future relations, inasmuch as potential associations might be precluded for fear of exposure, especially with confidential sources." (d.) The Seidel Declaration was submitted "to further explain and, where necessary, clarify the FB's application offoa Exemptions 7(B), 7(D), and 7(E), to portions of certain records responsive to plaintiffs' FOA request." (Seidel Deel. if 3.) As to Exemption 7(B), Seidel states that "it is more probable than not that disclosure of the information withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(B) would seriously interfere with the impartiality of those ongoing proceedings." (d. if 6.) As to Exemption 7(D), Seidel states that "the protection of these types of confidential source inf01mation is necessary both to protect the sources themselves from potential reprisal, and to ensure that the FB may continue to access vital information through the continued use of confidential sources." (d. if 7.) Seidel also states that "[t]he FB maintains 'source files' for informants who are granted express confidentiality. Each source file memorializes the FB's confidentiality agreement with the source... "(d. if 9.) As to Exemption 7(E), Seidel states that "specific details concerning the databases queried in connection with... FB counterterrorism activities discussed in the responsive records, the number of databases searched, the combinations of databases searched for certain individuals, the information retrieved from those searches, and the ways in which the FB utilizes th[ e] information it obtains from such searches would all reveal unknown law enforcement techniques." (sl if 15.) The Ewing Declaration explains why Exemption 1 applies to portions of the threat assessments. (Ewing Deel. if 11.) "[P]ublic[ly] revealing whether responsive records concerning a particular detainee contain or do not contain information... implicat[ing] the foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States, could itself be reasonably expected to cause serious damage to the national security." (sl if 21.) "The public disclosure that particular intelligence information relating to a particular detainee was gathered (or not gathered) by certain members of the 6

7 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 7 of 129 ntelligence Community through certain means... would indicate to the public and to foreign intelligence agencies how the ntelligence Community is allocating its resources and would provide targets of intelligence collection and foreign intelligence agencies with information on how best to anay their counterintelligence resources." (d.~ 21.) "[T]his information remains currently and properly classified... "(d. ~ 22.) The Moscati Declaration advises that the threat assessments "were compiled, in part, for a law enforcement purpose and readily meet the threshold requirement of Exemption 7." (Moscati Deel.~ 5.) "Law enforcement proceedings for several detainees are ongoing." (d.~ 6.) "[S)ome detainees, regardless of whether they might be prosecuted in either an Article court or a military commission, potentially have value as witnesses in other cases. Release of the information contained in the threat assessments, which may include candid assessments of potential evidentiary weaknesses or other concerns with the viability or feasibility of the potential prosecution of a particular detainee, could either impair the prosecution's case against certain detainees, or might adversely affect the fairness of ongoing or future criminal proceedings. Accordingly, certain information in some of the threat assessments has been withheld... to prevent this type of harm." (d.) On August 1, 2017, the Court directed DOJ to produce the threat assessments for ex parte in camera review. (Order, filed Aug. 1, 2017, at 1.) On August 9, 2017, DOJ submitted 209 threat assessments for Court review. (See Letter to Judge Richard M. Berman from AUSA Christopher Connolly, dated Aug. 9, 2017, at 1.) On August 14, 2017, DOJ submitted 8 additional threat assessments for Court review. And, on September 6, 2017, DOJ submitted the remaining (22) threat assessments. (See Letter to Judge Richard M. Berman from AUSA Christopher Connolly, dated Sept. 6, 2017, at 1.) The Court has carefully reviewed all 239 threat assessments in camera in the course of preparing this Decision & Order. 6 On March 27, 2017, DOJ filed its motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that: (1) all of the threat assessments "fall squarely within the deliberative process 6 One additional detainee (i.e. the h detainee) appears to have been approved for transfer prior to the issuance of Executive Order and was, in fact, transfened to the United Kingdom. (See GRD at 3.) There was no threat assessment for this individual presented to the Court. 7

8 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 8 of 129 privilege" codified in Exemption 5 in that "they are predecisional, deliberative documents that reflect the opinions and recommendations of the Task Force, and were created in order to assist the Review Panel and Review Participants in making final disposition decisions" (DOJ Br. at 8); (2) portions of the threat assessments should be withheld also because they contain "matters that... are specifically authorized... to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy" as codified in Exemption 1 (ill, at 14, 17-18); (3) portions of the threat assessments should be withheld also under Exemption 7(B) because "disclosure... would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication." (d. at 23.) "[D]etainees for whom law enforcement proceedings are ongoing" would have knowledge of types of information that may not already be available through the court proceedings (Seidel Deel. if 5); (4) portions of the threat assessments should be withheld also under Exemption 7(D) because they contain information which "could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a... foreign agency or authority... which furnished information on a confidential basis" (DOJ Br. at 24); and (5) portions of the threat assessments should be withheld also under Exemption 7 (E) because they contain "techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions" (DOJ Br. at 25). Plaintiffs counter that: (1) with respect to Exemption 5, "even if a document is predecisional and deliberative, the deliberative-process privilege gives way where the agency has 'expressly adopted' the document's conclusions and reasoning or incorporated them by reference" (Opp. at 12); (2) with respect to Exemption 1, some "infonnation within the scope of foreign relations and foreign activities information" can no longer be classified because government press releases announcing particular detainee transfers "have... described some of the communications between the two countries in order to facilitate the transfer" (id. at 21 ); 8

9 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 9 of 129 (3) with respect to Exemption 7(B), DOJ's submissions do not show that it is "more probable than not that disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere with the fairness of... proceedings" (id. at 22); (4) with respect to Exemption 7(D), DOJ "fails to make the appropriate showing for the names and identifying data for informants that [the FB] claims to have offered... express... assurances of confidentiality" (Opp. at 23-24); and (5) with respect to Exemption 7(E), DOJ's submissions "fall[] far short of showing how disclosure of the responsive records in this case plausibly would reveal something new about [a law enforcement] technique" (id. at 24-25). Helpful oral argument on the parties' cross-motions was held on September 18, (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017.) For the reasons stated below, DOJ's motion for summary judgment [#23) is granted. Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment [#32) is denied. 7. Legal Standard The Supreme Court has recognized that "the statutory exemptions [to FOA disclosure] are intended to have meaningful reach and application." John Doe Agency v. John Doe Coro., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989). "[T]he burden [is] on the agency to justify the withholding of any requested documents." Associated Press v. U.S. Dep't of Def., 554 F.3d 274, 283 (2d Cir. 2009). 7 Where the "[p]laintiffs have opted not to challenge [the] defendants' claimed assertions of [other] Exemptions" to FOA disclosure, the plaintiffs have waived any argument that the exemptions were improperly asserted, and the Court grants surmnary judgment to DOJ as to those Exemptions. Nat'! Day Laborer Org. Network v. U.S. l.c.e., 811 F. Supp. 2d 713, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). Specifically, Plaintiffs do not oppose the Government's invocations of Exemptions 3, 6, 7(A), and 7(C) (see Opp. at 20 n.7, 25 n.10), and the Court hereby grants summary judgment to DOJ as to those Exemptions. See id.; N.Y. Legal Assistance Grp., nc. v. United States Dep't of Educ., 2017 WL , at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2017) ("Surmnary judgment is granted to [the agency] without further discussion on the portions of documents that [the plaintiff! does not challenge."). 9

10 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 10 of 129 The applicability of a FOA Exemption must be "prove[ n] by a preponderance of the evidence." Nadler v. F.D..C., 899 F. Supp. 158, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), affd, 92 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 1996). "Affidavits or declarations... giving reasonably detailed explanations why any withheld documents fall within an exemption are sufficient to sustain the agency's burden. The affidavits submitted by an agency are accorded a presumption of good faith." Wilner v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 592 F.3d 60, 69 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). The deliberative process privilege (Exemption 5) "covers documents reflecting advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated." Tigue v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 312 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[]ts object is to enhance the quality of agency decisions, by protecting open and frank discussion among those who make them within the Government." d. (internal quotation marks omitted). "[P]roduction of ostensibly predecisional material may be compelled where an agency chooses expressly to adopt or incorporate by reference an intra-agency memorandum previously covered by Exemption 5..."d. at (internal quotation marks omitted). "Mere reliance on a document's conclusions does not necessarily involve reliance on a document's analysis; both will ordinarily be needed before a court may properly find adoption or incorporation by reference." Wood v. F.B.., 432 F.3d 78, 84 (2d Cir. 2005). Where "[t]here is no evidence in the record from which it could be inferred that [the agency] adopted the reasoning of the [predecisional document],... this failure is fatal." d. "[M]inor references to [a privileged document] cannot be said to be an express adoption or incorporation." Tigue, 312 F.3d at

11 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 11 of 129 Where a letter or statement "was not written [or spoken] by a decisionmaker... [it] could not have served as a basis for express adoption or incorporation by reference." Brennan Ctr. for Justice at N.Y. Univ. School of Law v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 697 F.3d 184, 206 (2d Cir. 2012). FOA requires disclosure of "purely factual material appearing in [privileged] documents in a form that is severable without compromising the private remainder of the documents." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 (1973). But, "[i]fthe factual materials are inextricably inte1twined with policy making recommendations so that their disclosure would compromise the confidentiality of deliberative information that is entitled to protection under Exemption 5, the factual materials themselves fall within the exemption." Lead ndus. Ass'n, nc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Admin., 610 F.2d 70, 85 (2d Cir. 1979) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Exemption 1 offoa "is specifically designed to allow government agencies to withhold information that might jeopardize our national security." Milner v. Dep't of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 580 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). "nformation is properly classified... if unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in... harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States." ntellectual Prop. Watch v. United States Trade Representative, 205 F. Supp. 3d 334, 353 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish "official disclosure" of classified information, the "plaintiff bears the burden of showing specific information in the public domain that duplicates [or matches] the information withheld." Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, nc. v. Dep't ofnayy, 891F.2d414, 421 (2d Cir. 1989). To withstand a challenge to the applicability of Exemption (7)(B), "the government bears the burden of showing: (1) that a trial or adjudication is pending or truly imminent; and (2) that it is more probable than not that disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere with 11

12 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 12 of 129 the fairness of those proceedings." Wash. Post Co. v. Dep't of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1988). "FOA Exemption 7(D) protects information compiled for law enforcement purposes where disclosure could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source." Adamowicz v..rs., 402 F. App'x 648, 653 (2d Cir. 2010). "Exemption 7(E) provides categorical protection for [law enforcement] techniques and procedures without need for demonstration of harm..."allard K. Lowenstein nt'! Human Rights Project v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 626 F.3d 678, 681 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).. Analysis 8 Exemption 5 DOJ argues persuasively (and shows by a preponderance of the evidence) that all of the threat assessments "fall squarely within the deliberative process privilege." (DOJ Br. at 8.) That is, the threat assessments are clearly "predecisional, deliberative documents that reflect the opinions and recommendations of the Task Force, and were created in order to assist the Review Panel and Review Participants in making final disposition decisions." (d.) Plaintiffs cannot, according to DOJ, demonstrate "express adoption" or "incorporation by reference" through the various government public statements they cite because "the vast majority of the statements [P]laintiffs cite were not made by decision-makers, but rather by advisors." And, even ifthe statement(s) were made by decision-makers, a "statement by a decision-maker that explicitly 8 The Court addresses Exemption 5 first because the parties' briefs address Exemption 5 first (see DOJ Br.. at 8; Opp. at 11), and also because DOJ has invoked Exemption 5 with regard to all of the threat assessments (in their entirety) (see O'Keefe Deel., Ex.Cat 1). DOJ has invoked other Exemptions to defend against disclosure of portions of some of the threat assessments. (See id.) 12

13 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 13 of 129 approve[ s] the recommendation of a subordinate, without any reference to the reasoning of that recommendation, d[oes] not qualify as express adoption." (DOJ Reply at 3-4.) DOJ also argues that any factual material the threat assessments may contain is "inextricably intertwined with deliberative material such that it cannot reasonably be segregated." (d. at 15.) Plaintiffs counter (unpersuasively) that government officials' "references to the reasoning and conclusions of the [t]hreat [a]ssessments [we]re no vaguer or more perfunctory than those the Second Circuit has found sufficient to demonstrate express adoption." (Pis.' Reply at 5 (citing Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 204.) The deliberative-process privilege gives way where "the agency has 'expressly adopted' the document's conclusions and reasoning" (Opp. at 12) in public statements issued by officials who were "tasked with articulating and defending the [Obama] Administration's detainee policy" (Pis.' Reply at 3). Plaintiffs cite to letters, press releases, and Congressional testimony of government officials, who, they aver, "were exactly the officials tasked with articulating and defending the Administration's detainee policy." (d. at 3, 5-8.) 9 Plaintiffs also argue that "DOJ has not demonstrated that the [t]hreat [a]ssessments consist entirely of 'deliberative' material and must segregate and release the factual portions." (Opp. at 12.) Predecisional and Deliberative The Court finds that the threat assessments are "predecisional and deliberative." See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 194. "An inter- or intra-agency document may be withheld pursuant to the deliberative process privilege... if it is: (1) predecisional, i.e., prepared in order to assist an 9 The parties disagree regarding who is a decisionmaker. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 2-13.) Plaintiffs argue that a speaker is a decisionmaker if the speaker "ha[ s] the hallmarks of being authorized... to make the statement that he or she makes." (d. at 11:15-24.) DOJ argues that a decisionmaker is "either [a] review participant[] or [a] review panel member[.]" (d. at 5:23-24.) 13

14 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 14 of 129 agency decisionmaker in arriving at his decision, and (2) deliberative, i.e., actually related to the process by which policies are formulated." d. (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). The applicability of the deliberative process privilege has been proven by a preponderance of the evidence. See Nadler, 899 F. Supp. at 160. The threat assessments were created for the express purpose of advising and assisting the Review Panel "in carrying out their responsibilities under the [Executive] Order, and were drafted antecedent to any final decisions being made." (O'Keefe Deel. if 23; see also Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 202 (where document "was generated before the adoption of an agency policy" and "the preparer was not the final decisionmaker"); Tigue, 312 F.3d at 80 (document was predecisional where it "was specifically prepared for use... in advising the [agency] on its future policy"); Grand Cent. P'ship. nc. v. Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 483 (2d Cir. 1999) (document "was predecisional in that it was prepared in order to assist an agency decision maker in arriving at his or her decision").) The threat assessments are "deliberative" because they are related to the formulation of policy, i.e. they "includ[ e] express advice and recommendations regarding the proper disposition determination for each detainee." (O'Keefe Deel. if 25.) They also include "the Task Force's determination of which evidence related to a particular detainee was germane to that detainee's potential threat to the United States, and the Task Force's qualitative assessment of the credibility and reliability of those selected pieces of evidence." (d.) The Court's careful in camera review of all of the threat assessments confirmed the description in O'Keefe's Declaration, namely that each threat assessment "includ[es] express advice and recommendations." (d.) "[T]he Task Force's determination of which evidence related to a particular detainee was ge1mane to that detainee's potential threat to the United 14

15 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 15 of 129 States, and the Task Force's qualitative assessment of the credibility and reliability of those selected pieces of evidence." (d.; see also Grand Cent., 166 F.3d at 483 ("Through its in camera review of Document 4, the district court... concluded that Document 4 was deliberative in that it actually related to [the agency's] policy formulation processes."); Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 202 (memorandum was deliberative where "[agency] officials asked the OLC [the Office of Legal Counsel] for advice on the... propriety of [a proposed agency course of action]"); Robert v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 217 F. App'x 50, 51 (2d Cir. 2007) (document was deliberative where it contained "recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental policies [we]re formulated").) Express Adoption and ncorporation by Reference 10 Plaintiffs' principal argument is that "senior government officials have relied repeatedly and publicly on the strength of the reasoning and conclusions of the [t]hreat [a]ssessments to defend the Obama Administration's detainee policy." (Opp. at 13.) Therefore, "the government expressly adopted the [t]hreat [a]ssessments." (d. at 14.) DOJ counters that "the vast majority of O Although DOJ and Plaintiffs each focus their arguments on "adoption" (as opposed to "incorporation by reference") (see DOJ Reply at 2-3; Opp. at 13-14), the parties agreed at oral argument that there is no "meaningful difference" between those terms in the context of Exemption 5 (see H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 28:20-29:5 ("THE COURT: []s there any meaningful difference between 'adoption' and 'incorporation by reference'? The cases seems to use them sort of interchangeably... [PLANTFFS' COUNSEL]: agree they mean the same thing. THE COURT: You as well[?] [DOJ'S COUNSEL]: Yes... ")). Second Circuit case law often analyzes the two phrases as if they were interchangeable. See, e.g., Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 204 ("We conclude that these references taken together establish express adoption or incorporation by reference."); Robert v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 217 F. App'x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2007) ("There is... no evidence in the record that [the agency J expressly adopted or incorporated by reference either of the two undisclosed documents."); Nat'! Council of La Raza v. Dep't of Justice, 411F.3d350, 358 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Mere reliance on a document's conclusions does not necessarily involve reliance on a document's analysis; both will ordinarily be needed before a court may properly find adoption or incorporation by reference." (emphasis added)). 15

16 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 16 of 129 the statements [P]laintiffs cite were not made by decision-makers, but rather by advisors," and that a statement (even by a decision-maker) "that explicitly approve[ s] the recommendation of a subordinate, without any reference to the reasoning of that recommendation, d[ oes] not qualify as express adoption." (DOJ Reply at 3-4.) The Court finds that the following nine statements cited by Plaintiffs (taken together or taken individually) do not adopt or incorporate by reference one or more of the threat assessments, see Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 206; Nat'l Council of La Raza v. Dep't of Justice, 411 F.3d 350, 359 (2d Cir. 2005); Tigue v. U.S. Dep 't of Justice, 312 F.3d 70, 81 (2d Cir. 2002).11 Plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof. See supra at pp The February 1, 2010 letter from John 0. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House of Representatives. (McCraw Deel., dated Apr. 24, 2017, Ex. 9.) This Letter was written on White House and stated in relevant part, Every decision to transfer a detainee to a foreign country during this Administration has been made unanimously by all agencies [i.e. the Review Panel or Review Participants] involved with the review process after a full assessment of intelligence and threat information. This includes the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the Director of National ntelligence, as well as the Departments of State, Justice, and Homeland Security.... During [a] briefing on January 13, [2010,] [United States] Representative [Frank] Wolf [(of Virginia's 10 1 h congressional district)] made allegations that one detainee repatriated to Yemen had been involved in weapons of mass destruction. As it has done in every case, the task force thoroughly reviewed all information available to the government about this individual and concluded that there is no basis for the assertions Representative Wolf made The Court assumes, arguendo, but without deciding, that the nine statements were issued by "decisionmakers" who had the authority to adopt or incorporate by reference the threat assessments. As discussed at footnote 9 supra and at pp infra, the parties in this case disagree about which speakers were decisionmakers and which speakers had the requisite authority to adopt or incorporate by reference the threat assessments. 16

17 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 17 of 129 (Q, at 2.) Representative Wolfs concern appears to have been whether the detainee in question "had been involved in weapons of mass destruction" presumably because "the DOD believed [the detainee] to be closely connected to al Qaeda's anthrax program." (McCraw Deel., dated Apr. 24, 2017, Ex. 8 at E1332.) DOJ argues that Brennan's letter did not adopt the detainee's threat assessment because "Brennan did not identify any of the other facts or analysis that might well have been discussed in the Task Force's threat assessment, nor did he [Brennan] explain the final decision-makers' rationale for transferring the detainee to Yemen." (DOJ Reply at 10.)12 Plaintiffs say that Brennan's "whole letter" (see H'rg. Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 22: 18) adopted the threat assessment because it was made "in direct response to criticism of the Obama Administration's detainee policy in order to justify and defend it," and Brennan's "references to the reasoning and conclusion[] of the [t]hreat [a]ssessment[] [was] no vaguer or more perfunctory than those the Second Circuit has found sufficient to demonstrate express adoption." (Pis.' Reply at 4-5 (citing Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 204).) Plaintiffs were unable at oral argument to point to any specific portion of the Brennan Letter which adopted the threat assessments or incorporated them by reference. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at ) 12 DOJ contends that Brennan was not a decisionmaker in this matter because he was not a member of the Review Panel nor was he a Review Participant. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 4:22-24 ("THE COURT: [Y]ou're saying John Brennan is not a decision maker? [DOJ'S COUNSEL]: He was not a decision maker for purposes of the interagency review.").) Plaintiffs counter that Brennan's "statements serve as evidence of the government's position on the matter." (d. at 9:4-5.) As noted, the Court assumes, without deciding, that Brennan was a decisionmaker for purposes of discussing his letter. 17

18 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 18 of 129 The Comt finds that Brennan's letter did no more than confirm and describe the processes laid out in Executive Order See 74 Fed. Reg. at The Executive Order stated that "the executive branch [would] conduct a prompt and thorough review of the circmnstances of the individuals currently detained at Guantanamo," and "determine... whether it [wa]s possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States." d. Moreover, Brennan's letter makes no mention of the Task Force reasoning or analysis. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. The Letter's reference to "the task force" or to "threat information" cannot be said to be an express adoption or incorporation of the threat assessments. See Tigue, 312 F.3d at 81. And, Brennan's description of the process makes clear that the Review Panel-not the Task Force-made the decision to transfer detainees. (See McCraw Deel., dated Apr. 24, 2017, Ex. 9 at 2.) Brennan confirms that the decision to transfer was consistent with the Task Force work-which does not amount to adoption. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 206 ("Nor does the fact that the agencies acted in conformity with the [privileged documents] establish that the agencies adopted their reasoning."). The Court, following its in camera review, confirms that the threat assessment in question contains no reference to antlu ax, an anthrax program, or to weapons of mass destruction. 2. The June 11, 2009, DOJ press release ("June 11, 2009, Press Release") announcing the resettlement of four Uighur Guantanamo detainees to Bermuda. (Mccraw Deel., Ex. 10.) This press release stated in relevant part, The detainees were... cleared for release this year after review by the interagency Guantanamo Review Task Force. As directed by the President's 18

19 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 19 of 129 (d.) Januaiy 22, 2009, Executive Order, the interagency Guantanaino Review Task Force conducted a comprehensive review of the four, including a threat evaluation, and approved them for resettlement. DOJ argues that the June 11, 2009, Press Release "simply provide[s] a thumbnail sketch of the process by which the transfer decisions were made." (DOJ Reply at ) DOJ also argues that the press release "do[ es] not establish that the final decision-makers adopted the analysis and conclusions contained in each detainee's threat assessment." (d. at 11.) Plaintiffs respond that the June 11, 2009, Press Release states that "the Justice Department relied on the [t]hreat [a]ssessments as justification" for the decision to release the detainees. (Opp. at 6.) The Court finds that the June 11, 2009, Press Release did no more than confirm and describe the process laid out in Executive Order which stated that "the executive branch [would] conduct a prompt and thorough review of the circumstances of the individuals currently detained at Guantanamo," and "determine... whether it [wa]s possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States." 74 Fed. Reg. at , The press release makes no mention of the Task Force reasoning or analysis, refe1ting only to its "comprehensive review of the four [detainees], including a threat evaluation." See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. "Mere reliance on a document's conclusions does not necessarily involve reliance on a document's analysis; both will ordinarily be needed before a court may properly find adoption or incorporation by reference." d. The press release's passing reference to "threat evaluation" does not adopt or incorporate by reference the threat 19

20 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 20 of 129 assessments because "minor references to [a privileged document] cannot be said to be an express adoption or incorporation." Tigue, 312 F.3d at The December 20, 2009, DOJ press release ("December 20, 2009, Press Release") announcing the transfer of 12 detainees. This press release advised that 4 detainees were transferred to Afghanistan; 2 detainees were transferred to Somaliland; and 6 detainees were transferred to Yem en. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 11.) t also stated in relevant part, As directed by the President's Jan. 22, 2009 Executive Order, the interagency Guantanamo Review Task Force conducted a comprehensive review of each of these cases. As a result of that review, which examined a number of factors, including potential threat, mitigation measures and the likelihood of success in habeas litigation, the detainees were approved [by the Review Panel] for transfer. DOJ argues that the December 20, 2009, Press Release "simply provide[s] a thumbnail sketch of the process by which the transfer decisions were made." (DOJ Reply at ) DOJ also argues that the press release "do[ es] not establish that the final decision-makers adopted the analysis and conclusions contained in each detainee's threat assessment." (d. at 11.) Plaintiffs respond that in the December 20, 2009, Press Release "the Justice Departruent relied on the [t]hreat [a]ssessments as justification" for the decision to transfer the detainees. (Opp. at 6.) The Court finds that the December 20, 2009, Press Release confirmed and described the process outlined in Executive Order 13492, i.e. that "the executive branch [would] conduct a prompt and thorough review of the circumstances of the individuals currently detained at Guantanamo," and "determine... whether it [wa]s possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national security and foreign policy 20

21 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 21 of 129 interests of the United States." 74 Fed. Reg. at This press release does not describe or mention the reasoning and analysis upon which the Review Panel relied. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. While the press release indicates that the decision to transfer is consistent with the Task Force work, this does not amount to adoption. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 206 ("Nor does the fact that the agencies acted in conformity with the [privileged documents] establish that the agencies adopted their reasoning."). Although the press release refers to the Task Force's "comprehensive review" of each detainee's "potential threat," such a "minor reference[]... cannot be said to be an express adoption or incorporation." See Tigue, 312 F.3d at The January 21, 2010, DOJ press release ("January 21, 2010, Press Release") announcing the transfer to Algeria of2 detainees. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 12.) This press release stated in relevant part, As directed by the President's Jan. 22, 2009 Executive Order, the interagency Guantanamo Review Task Force conducted a comprehensive review of these cases. As a result of that review, which examined a number of factors, including the potential threat posed by each individual and the receiving country's demonstrated capabilities to mitigate potential threats posed by the individuals in their home country, each detainee was approved [by the Review Panel] for transfer. The transfers were approved by unanimous consent among all the agencies involved in the review - including the Office of the Director of National ntelligence, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Departments of Defense, State, Justice and Homeland Security [i.e. the Review Panel]. DOJ argues that the January 21, 2010, Press Release "simply provide[s] a thumbnail sketch of the process by which the transfer decisions were made." (DOJ Reply at ) DOJ also argues that the press release "do[ es] not establish that the final decision-makers adopted the analysis and conclusions contained in each detainee's threat assessment." (!_ch at 11.) 21

22 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 22 of 129 Plaintiffs respond that in the January 21, 2010, Press Release "the Justice Department relied on the [t]hreat [ a]ssessments as justification" for the decision to transfer the detainees. (Opp. at 6.) The Court finds that the January 21, 2010, Press Release confirmed and described the process of review as set fmih in Executive Order 13492, namely that "the executive branch [would] conduct a prompt and thorough review of the circumstances of the individuals currently detained at Guantanamo," and "determine... whether it [wa]s possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States." 74 Fed. Reg. at The press release does not describe or mention any analysis or reasoning in the threat assessments upon which the Review Panel relied. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. And, the press release's description of the process makes clear that the Review Panel-not the Task Force-made the decisions to transfer detainees. (See McCraw Deel., Ex. 12.) The press release indicates that the decision to transfer is consistent with the Task Force work but this does not amount to adoption. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 206 ("Nor does the fact that the agencies acted in conformity with the [privileged documents] establish that the agencies adopted their reasoning."). And, although the press release refers to the Task Force's "comprehensive review" of each detainee's "potential threat," "minor references to [privileged documents] cannot be said to be an express adoption or incorporation." See Tigue, 312 F.3d at The testimony of Lee Wolosky, Special Envoy for Guantanamo Closure at the State Department, before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 23, 2016 and 22

23 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 23 of 129 July 7, (McCraw Deel., Exs. 1, 2.) On March 23, 2016, Wolosky testified as follows: n , more than 60 career professionals, including intelligence analysts, law enforcement agents, and attorneys, drawn from the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National ntelligence, the Central ntelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of nvestigation, and other agencies within the U.S. government assembled all reasonably available information from across the government relevant to determining the proper disposition of each detainee. The review task force examined this information critically, giving careful consideration to the threat posed by the detainee, the reliability of the underlying information, and the interests of national security. Then, based on the review task force's recommendations, the Departments of Defense, State, Justice and Homeland Security; the Office of the Director of National ntelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously determined the appropriate disposition for each detainee: transfer, referral for prosecution, or continued law-of-war detention. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 1 at 2-3.) On July 7, 2016, Wolosky gave the following (nearly identical) testimony: n , the Guantanamo Review Task Force..., which was composed of more than 60 national security professionals, including intelligence analysts, law enforcement officials, and attorneys, drawn from the Department of Justice, Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National ntelligence, the Central ntelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau of nvestigation, and other agencies within the U.S. government, assembled all reasonably available information from across the government relevant to determining an appropriate disposition of each detainee. The review task force examined this information critically, giving careful consideration to the threat posed by the detainee, the reliability of the underlying information, and the interests of national security. Then, based on the review task force's recommendations, the Departments of Defense, State, Justice and Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National ntelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff unanimously determined the appropriate disposition for each detainee: transfer, referral for prosecution, or continued law-of-war detention. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 2 at 1-2.) 23

24 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 24 of 129 DOJ argues that Wolosky's testimony describes "precisely how the review process worked: the Task Force made recommendations, which the Review Panel or Review Participants considered when making their final disposition determinations. Wolosky' s statements do not demonstrate that the final decision-makers adopted the analyses or the conclusions in the Task Force's threat assessments-indeed, Wolosky never even mentioned the threat assessments" but mentioned only the Task Force's "recommendations." (DOJ Reply at 5.) Plaintiffs argue that Wolosky was "defend[ing] [President] Obama's detainee transfer policy by emphasizing the strong reasoning behind the [t]hreat [a]ssessments' conclusions." (Opp. at 15.) The Court finds that Wolosky' s testimony confirmed and described the process set forth in Executive Order See 74 Fed. Reg. at Wolosky clearly stated that the Review Panel (not the Task Force) determined the appropriate disposition for each detainee. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 1 at 2-3.) While his testimony did refer to the Task Force's "recommendations," i.e. its conclusions, Wolosky made no mention of the reasoning or analysis of the Task Force. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. "Mere reliance on a document's conclusions does not necessarily involve reliance on a document's analysis; both will ordinarily be needed before a court may properly find adoption or incorporation by reference." d. Although Wolosky said that the Task Force "examined" and "consider[ ed]... the threat posed by the detainee" and made "recommendations," he does not specifically refer to the "threat assessments"-in fact, he did not refer to any particular document. See Am. Civil Liberties Union v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 90 F. Supp. 3d 201, (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (where "there [we]re no statements... specifically 24

25 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 25 of 129 referencing particular [privileged] documents," the plaintiff had adduced no "evidence that [the] agency ha[ d] actually adopted or incorporated by reference the [privileged] document at issue"). Even ifthe term "recommendations" were meant to refer to the threat assessments, "minor references to [a privileged document] cannot be said to be an express adoption or incorporation." Tigue, 312 F.3d at The prepared statement of Paul Lewis, Special Envoy for Guantanamo Detention Closure at the Department of Defense, before the House Committee on Armed Services on Feb 12, (McCraw Deel., Ex. 3.) Lewis stated: The determinations made by the 2009 Guantanamo Review Task Force process..., an exhaustive interagency effort that fully examined the impact of transferring individuals from Guantanamo Bay, should be used as the foundational analysis when determining a detainee's current threat. This... process took account of the [Bush Administration's] assessments in the course of a more comprehensive review of U.S. intelligence and other information with respect to each detainee. The [Task Force] determinations, in conjunction with regularly updated information from the intelligence community, provide the most accurate assessment of a specific detainee's current threat level. We believe that any decisions regarding transfers should be based on all current information and individual assessments of detainees. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 3 at ) DOJ argues that "Lewis did not state or suggest that the threat assessments were the 'foundational analysis' of the decisions of the Review Panel and the Review Participants, or any other disposition decision or agency policy. nstead, he was recommending that the threat assessments (in addition to the [Bush Administration's] assessments) be utilized prospectively to help inform future transfer decisions." (DOJ Reply at 8 (emphasis added).) 25

26 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 26 of 129 Plaintiffs counter that Lewis "pointed to the [t]hreat [a]ssessments-not the Review Panel's disposition-as the 'foundational analysis,' in Lewis's words, for all subsequent transfer decisions." (Opp. at 16.) The Court finds that the Lewis statement described the Executive processes during the Obama and Bush Administrations regarding the then-current threat level(s) of detainees and suggested that any information developed should be regularly updated. (See McCraw Deel., Ex. 3 at 29.) Executive Order stated that "the executive branch [would] conduct a prompt and thorough review of the circumstances of the individuals currently detained at Guantanamo," and "determine... whether it [wa]s possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States." 74 Fed. Reg. at Lewis's statement does not indicate that any particular review panel action or decision was--or would bebased (solely) upon the threat assessments. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 205 n.17. Lewis did not say that a Review Panel or Review Participants had relied on any particular reasoning or analysis in the threat assessments. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. He suggested that the Task Force work was the "foundational analysis" and would be used prospectively "in conjunction with regularly updated information from the intelligence community[] [to] provide the most accurate assessment of a specific detainee 's current threat level." (See McCraw Deel., Ex. 3 at 28-29; see also id. at 29 ("We believe that any decisions regarding transfers should be based on all current information and individual assessments of detainees.").) 7. The testimony of Brian McKean, Principal Deputy Undersecretary for Policy at Department of Defense, before the Senate Armed Services Committee on February 5, 26

27 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 27 of (McCraw Deel., Ex. 4.) McKeon's testimony described the work of the Periodic Review Board ("PRB"), created in March of2011 by Executive Order 13567, to "review the status of those [Guantanamo] detainees not currently eligible for transfer." (d. at 4.) His testimony included the following: Key features of the [PRB] process that leads to a decision to transfer include: a comprehensive interagency review and rigorous examination of information regarding the detainee; the security situation in the potential host country; and the willingness and capability of the potential country to implement and maintain appropriate compliance with security measures. Those initial reviews were conducted by career professionals from across the government [i.e. the Task Force]... [E]ach decision [of the PRB] to transfer has been subject to unanimous agreement of six principals: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the Director of National ntelligence, the Attorney General, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and, finally, the Secretary of Defense... f somebody has already been cleared by the 2009 task force, and we find a place to which we can transfer them, and a package is brought to the Secretary [of Defense] to make the determination, we have an updated assessment on the individual. We're not relying solely on the 2009 task force work. (d. at 7-8, ) DOJ argues that "McKean merely characterized the Task Force recommendation memoranda (not just the threat assessments) as one of several '[k]ey features of the process' leading to [detainee] decisions, and he also identified non-threat factors-such as 'the security situation in the potential host country' -on which those decisions were based. Thus, McKean never directly mentioned the threat assessments, much less asserted that the final decision-makers agreed with their reasoning and conclusions." (DOJ Reply at 5 (citation omitted).) McKean described the Task Force work as "initial reviews" (McCraw Deel., Ex. 4 at 42), and stated: "We're not relying solely on the 2009 task force work" to determine "whether [the United States] should continue to hold 27

28 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 28 of 129 [detainees J under Law of War detention or they can be approved for transfer." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 4 at 42.) Plaintiffs counter that McKeon's testimony adopted or incorporated by reference the threat assessments because he "called the [t]hreat [a]ssessments a '[k]ey feature' justifying the Administration's detainee transfer process." (Opp. at 16.) Plaintiffs appear to refer to McKeon's statement that "[k]ey features of the [PRB] process that leads to a decision to transfer include[] a comprehensive interagency review and rigorous examination of information regarding the detainee." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 4 at 7.) The Court finds that McKeon 's testimony describes the Periodic Review Board process after a detainee has been "cleared by the 2009 task force." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 4 at 41.) McKeon specifically states, "We're not relying solely on the 2009 task force work." (d. at 42.) nstead, McKeon said, the Secretary of Defense obtains "an updated assessment on the individual," and then "each decision to transfer has been subject to unanimous agreement of six principals." (d. at 8, 41.) This testimony does not describe or mention the reasoning and analysis of any threat assessments upon which the Review Panel or Review Participants relied. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. While McKeon does refer to the "task force work," such a "minor reference[]... cannot be said to be an express adoption or incorporation." Tigue, 312 F.3d at The joint statement, dated April 24, 2011, of Geoff Morrell, Pentagon Press Secretary, and Ambassador Dan Fried, Special Envoy for Closure of the Guantanamo Detention Facility. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 5.) Morrell and Fried appear to have issued the statement in response to Wikileaks' announced intent to publicize on April 25, 2011 so-called Detainee Assessment Briefs ("DABs") which had been "written by the 28

29 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 29 of 129 Department of Defense between 2002 and early 2009," and which "contain[ed] classified information about current and former GTMO detainees." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 5 at!.) The joint statement included the The Guantanamo Review Task Force, established in January 2009, considered the DABs during its review of detainee information. n some cases, the Task Force came to the same conclusions as the DABs. n other instances the Review Task Force came to different conclusions, based on updated or other available information. The assessments of the Guantanamo Review Task Force have not been compromised to Wikileaks. Thus, any given DAB illegally obtained and released by Wikileaks may or may not represent the current view of a given detainee. DOJ argues that this statement "merely explained that the Task Force's threat assessments[]... agreed with the [DABs] at times and disagreed with them at others." (DOJ Reply at 8.) "Contrary to [P]laintiffs' claim, the joint statement did not emphasize the strength of the reasoning and conclusions of the [t]hreat [a]ssessments to defend the Obama Administration's detainee transfer policy." M (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).) Plaintiffs argue that the joint statement "highlight[ s] the careful reasoning and comprehensive review behind the [t]hreat [a]ssessments." (Opp. at 15.) Plaintiffs also argue that the ''.joint statement [was] issued... to defend the Obama Administration's detainee transfer policy in the wake of the unauthorized disclosure... of the [DABs]." (d. at5.) The purpose of the joint statement was, by its terms, to advise that the work of the Task Force had not been compromised by Wikileaks' intended disclosure of the DABs. t does little more than (very) briefly refer to the work of the Task Force and the DABs. See 74 Fed. Reg. at The joint statement does not reveal the analysis or 29

30 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 30 of 129 reasoning of any threat assessment. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84; Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 206. ndeed, Morrell and Fried made no mention of the Task Force's reasoning or analysis. "[R]eliance on a document's analysis... will ordinarily be needed before a court may properly find adoption or incorporation by reference." See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. The joint statement's mention of the Task Force's "assessments" a "minor reference" to a privileged document and "cannot be said to be an express adoption or incorporation." Tigue, 312 F.3d at The prepared statement and testimony of U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder before the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciaiy on April 14, (McCraw Deel., Exs. 6, 7.) Attorney General Holder's prepared statement included the following: The Guantanamo Review Task Force rigorously reviewed pertinent information regarding 240 Guantanamo detainees, determining their suitability for prosecution or for transfer to another country - or, if neither of those options is available, continued detention under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, consistent with the rule oflaw. Each of these decisions was reached by the unanimous agreement of the agencies responsible for the review - the Departments of Justice, Defense, State, Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National ntelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Mccraw Deel., Ex. 6 at 5.) Attorney General Holder testified as follows: [T]here certainly needs to be a process by which an initial determination is made, and that has already occurred with regard to the task force and in the principals' committee that voted on making the decision to detain... these 48 people... [W]e've now gotten to the point where we have made the determination. That very able task force made its recommendations, unanimously agreed to by the principals, that 48 people should be held in this way... We've identified who those people are. (McCraw Deel., Ex. 7 at 28.) DOJ argues that Attorney General Holder's statement and testimony describe the Executive Order process. (See DOJ Reply at 5.) And, they "do[] not reference the threat assessment portions of the Task Force's recommendation memoranda, let alone indicate 30

31 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 31 of 129 that the unanimous decisions reached by the final decision-makers [the Review Panel and Review Participants] adopted the analyses[, reasoning,] and conclusions contained in those assessments." (d.; see also id. at 9.) Plaintiffs respond that Attorney General Holder's statement and testimony "defend[ ed] the... decision to imprison 48 detainees indefinitely without change[]... on the basis of the Task Force's 'very able' work." (Opp. at 16.) Moreover, Attorney General Holder's statement and testimony "refer to the [t]hreat assessments," "even if [they do J not... use the magic words 'threat assessment."' (Pis.' Reply at 4-5.) The Court finds that Attorney General Holder's statement and testimony confirmed and described the process as delineated in Executive Order 13492, namely that "the executive branch [would] conduct a prompt and thorough review of the circumstances of the individuals currently detained at Guantanamo," and "determine... whether it [wa]s possible to transfer or release the individuals consistent with the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States." 74 Fed. Reg. at Attorney General Holder never identified analysis or reasoning of the threat assessments that was relied upon by the Review Panel. See Wood, 432 F.3d at 84. He did say that the Review Panel agreed with the Task Force's recommendation that the 48 detainees in question should continue to be detained. (See McCraw Deel., Ex. 7 at 28.) That the ultimate decisions by "the agencies responsible for the review - the Departments of Justice, Defense, State, Homeland Security, the Office of the Director of National ntelligence, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff' -were consistent with the Task Force recommendations, does not establish adoption. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 206 ("Nor does the fact that the agencies acted in conformity with the [privileged documents] 31

32 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 32 of 129 establish that the agencies adopted their reasoning."). Holder indicates that the Task Force's role was to make an "initial determination," but he makes clear that the Review Panel-not the Task Force-made the decision(s) to continue detention under the Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub L. No , 15 Stat (See McCraw Deel., Ex. 6 at 5.) While Holder referred to the Task Force "recommendations," he made no specific references to "threat assessments" (see McCraw Deel., Exs. 6-7). See Am. Civil Liberties Union, 90 F. Supp. 3d at (where "there [we]re no statements... specifically referencing particular [privileged] documents," the plaintiff had adduced no "evidence that [the] agency ha[d] actually adopted or incorporated by reference the [privileged] document at issue"). Absence of a Decisionmaker As noted at footnote 9 supra, at oral argument on September 18, 2017, the parties presented differing views as to who is a decisionmaker for purposes of adopting or incorporating by reference predecisional documents. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 2-13.) Plaintiffs argue that a speaker is a decisionmaker if the speaker "ha[ s] the hallmarks of being authorized... to make the statement that he or she makes." Mat 11: ) DOJ argues that a decisionmaker is "either [the] [R]eview [P]articipants or [R]eview [P]anel members," who actually decided whether detainees would be transferred, detained, or prosecuted, under the Executive Order. (d. at 5:23-24.) Only "the relevant decisionmaker... [can] expressly adopt[] or incorporate[] by reference" a privileged document. See N.Y. Times Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 2013 WL , at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2013). Under either definition of decisionmaker, the following five statements and letters, upon which Plaintiffs rely to establish adoption or incorporation by reference of the threat 32

33 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 33 of 129 assessments, cannot be determined to have been made by decisiomnakers, see Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 204 n.15, as follows: 1. The testimony of Matthew Olsen, Director of the Task Force, regarding the work of the Task Force before the U.S. Senate Select Committee on ntelligence on July 26, 2011 and January 31, (McCraw Deel., Exs. 13, 14.) 14 Olsen was not a member of the Review Panel, and he was not a Review Participant. (See DOJ Reply at 6.) n Brennan Center, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that, because the letter there relied upon by the plaintiffs to show adoption was from Daniel Levin, an Office of Legal Counsel official (i.e. the agency that drafted the predecisional memorandum) to Renee Lettow Lerner (the general counsel of HHS), "th[e] letter was neither written by a decisiomnaker nor released publicly by the decisiomnaking agency." See 697 F.3d at 204 n.15. For the same reason, Olsen, the Task Force Director, is not a decisiomnaker and his statements do not aid in establishing express adoption or incorporation by reference. See id. And, Plaintiffs have not shown that Olsen had the "hallmarks" of one authorized to adopt or incorporate by reference the threat assessments. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 11:15-24.) 2. The letter, dated May 7, 2010, of U.S. Representative Frank Wolf (of Virginia's 10 1 h congressional district) and other members of Congress to James L. Jones, National Security Advisor General, requesting that General Jones recommend to the President "an immediate prohibition on the transfer of any detainee out of Guantanamo Bay." (McCraw 14 Olsen described the Task Force's process, including the Task Force's use of the Bush Administrntion's DABs. (See McCraw Deel., Ex. 13 at 74, 89.) He testified that "the results of the review, the recommendations and the analysis [the Task Force] did, resulting in unanimous decisions on 240 detainees, speak for themselves." ilil at 91.) 33

34 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 34 of 129 Deel., Ex. 15 at 1.) The Wolfletter requested the "findings and recommendations for the disposition of each detainee case, since such information is being used as the basis for all decisions being made with respect to each detainee." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 15.) 15 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives were not Review Participants and did not serve on the Review Panel, (see O'Keefe Deel. if 12), and their statements do not aid in establishing express adoption or incorporation by reference. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 204 n.15. And, Plaintiffs have not shown that Representative Wolf-or anyone from the Legislative Branch-had the "hallmarks" of one authorized to adopt or incorporate by reference the threat assessments on behalf of the Executive Branch. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 11:15-24.) 3. The letter, dated June 4, 2014, of U.S. Senator Saxby Chambliss (Georgia) to President Obama "calling for the declassification of intelligence related to the five Afghan nationals who were transferred from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to Qatar." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 16 at 1.) The Chambliss letter stated that President Obama "should immediately declassify each of the[] 2009 assessments" for "five Afghan nationals who were transferred from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba to Qatar" in order "to explain the risks associated with transferring these individuals and why they will never face justice for their past actions." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 16 at 1.) 16 U.S. Senators were not Review Participants and did not serve on the Review Panel, (see O'Keefe Deel. if 12), and 15 Where, as here, "the record contains no evidence that [predecisional] documents were publicly referenced or adopted by agency decisionmakers," Exemption 5 protects the documents from disclosure. See N.Y. Times Co. v. DOJ, 2016 WL , at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2016). 16 Where, as here, "the record contains no evidence that [predecisional] documents were publicly referenced or adopted by agency decisionmakers," Exemption 5 protects the documents from disclosure. See N.Y. Times, 2016 WL , at *15. 34

35 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 35 of 129 Senator Chambliss's statements do not aid in establishing express adoption or incorporation by reference. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 204 n.15. And, Plaintiffs have not shown that Senator Chambliss-or anyone from the Legislative Branch-had the "hallmarks" of one authorized to adopt or incorporate by reference the threat assessments on behalf of the Executive Branch. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 11: ) 4. The letter, dated June 10, 2014, of U.S. Representative Jackie Walorski (of ndiana's 2nd congressional district) to President Obama "urg[ing] [the President] to declassify as much intelligence as possible related to the five Afghan nationals transferred from Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO) to Qatar on May 31, 2014." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 17 at.) The Walorski letter requested that President Obama "declassify, to the greatest extent possible, the 2009 Guantanamo Review Task Force assessments and any other relevant intelligence surrounding the five transferred GTMO detainees" because "the American people need more information to be able to evaluate fully the risk involved in their release." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 17 at 1.) 17 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives were not Review Participants and did not serve on the Review Panel, (see O'Keefe Deel. if 12), and Representative Walorski's statements do not aid in establishing express adoption or incorporation by reference. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 204 n.15. And, Plaintiffs have not shown that Representative Walorski-or anyone from the Legislative Branch-had the "hallmarks" of one authorized to adopt or incorporate by reference the threat assessments on behalf of the Executive Branch. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 11 :15-24.) 17 Where, as here, "the record contains no evidence that [predecisional] documents were publicly referenced or adopted by agency decisionmakers," Exemption 5 protects the documents from disclosure. See N.Y. Times, 2016 WL , at *15; see also O'Keefe Deel. if

36 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 36 of The published statement, dated June 11, 2014, of U.S. Representative Tulsi Gabbard (of Hawaii's 2nd congressional district) criticizing a "prisoner swap to recover Sgt. Bowe Bergdahl" because the five alleged "Taliban terrorists" who were released in exchange for Sgt. Bergdahl "present[ed] a threat to the United States." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 18 at 1.) The Gabbard letter stated, "The recent statements by the administration that these terrorists do not pose a significant threat are preposterous. The President's Guantanamo Review Task Force in 2010 determined that these five were too dangerous to transfer. The task force concluded that each of these five individuals possess a high level of threat that cannot be mitigated sufficiently except through continued detention." (McCraw Deel., Ex. 18 at 1 (internal quotation marks omitted).) 18 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives were not Review Participants and did not serve on the Review Panel, (see O'Keefe Deel. ii 12), and Representative Gabbard's statements do not aid in establishing express adoption or incorporation by reference. See Brennan Ctr., 697 F.3d at 204 n.15. And, Plaintiffs have not shown that Representative Gabbard-or anyone from the Legislative Branch-had the "hallmarks" of one authorized to adopt or incorporate by reference the threat assessments on behalf of the Executive Branch. (See H'rg Tr., dated Sept. 18, 2017, at 11 :15-24.) Segregation of Factual Material DOJ argues that "[t]he threat assessments are protected in full by the deliberative process privilege and do not contain any purely factual material that could be segregated for release." (DOJ Br. at 12.) DOJ contends that "any purely factual material... is inextricably linked to the 18 Where, as here, ''the record contains no evidence that [predecisional] documents were publicly referenced or adopted by agency decisionmakers," Exemption 5 protects the documents from disclosure. See N.Y. Times, 2016 WL , at *15; see also O'Keefe Deel. ii

37 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 37 of 129 explicitly evaluative nature of the records as a whole." Mat 13.) "The threat assessments contain a careful selection of specific infonnation drawn from large quantities of evidence compiled from across the govenunent... and often 'included candid evaluations of the reliability and credibility of each particular piece of evidence."' (d. (quoting O'Keefe Deel. if 15).) DOJ also argues that "the policy-oriented judgment involved in the selection of factual material for evaluation is plain from the nature of the records themselves. The threat assessments are wholly evaluative: they filter the factual material they contain through the prism of the Task Force's appraisal of the potential threat to the national security." (DOJ Reply at 17.) Plaintiffs contend that "DOJ provides only a conclusory explanation for why it is not possible to segregate the fact from the analysis of that fact." (Opp. at 18.) Plaintiffs argue that "the Second Circuit has rejected precisely this kind of ipse dixit declaration and required in camera review to evaluate segregability." (d. (citation omitted).) Plaintiffs also argue that "it is not correct, as DOJ would have it, that anytime a fact is selected it becomes deliberative material. f that were so, it would nullify the factual-material exception..." (d. at 19.) "FOA provides that any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are exempt." N.Y. Times, 756 FJd at 117. Case law in this Circuit includes the following rule: factual segments of a predecisional document are exempt from disclosure under Exemption 5 if: (1) the predecisional document is "submitted to the agency... to assist it in rendering an informed decision upon the... record," and (2) disclosing the factual segments "would reveal the deliberative process... itself by demonstrating which facts in the... record were considered significant." See Lead ndus., 610 F.2d at 83, 85; see also Tigue, 312 F.3d at 74, 82 (where a predecisional report "express[ed] the 37

38 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 38 of 129 views of the [United States Attorney' Office for the J Southern District [of New York]... about tax investigations" and "recommend[ ed] procedures for the nternal Revenue Service," factual information could not be segregated because that "information... provided insight into privileged material"); Local 3, nt'l Bhd. ofelec. Workers, AFL-CO v. N.L.R.B., 845 F.2d 1177, 1180 (2d Cir. 1988) (where "stripping [predecisional documents] down to their bare-bone facts would render them... too illuminating of the agency's deliberative process"). The Court has conducted a thorough in camera review of the 239 threat assessments, including their segregability, and concludes, for the reasons that follow that all of the threat assessments meet the two requirements of Lead ndustries, Tigue, and Local 3. First, all of the threat assessments were, according to the Executive Order, "submitted to the agency [i.e. the Review Panel]... to assist it in rendering an informed decision upon the... record." See Lead ndus., 610 F.2d at 83. O'Keefe states that, "[a]fter completing a thorough review of all pertinent information about each detainee, the Task Force prepared recommendation memoranda [which included the threat assessments J assessing a variety of factors for evaluation by the Review Panel." (O'Keefe Deel.~ 14.) The "threat assessments were based upon specific pieces of evidence that Task Force members selected from the larger pool of information." (.hl, ~ 15.) According to O'Keefe, "the Task Force assessed the universe of information compiled about each detainee, and selected the most prescient issues about which to brief the Review Panel." (d.) The Task Force's work and its responsibility were to select and present facts to aid the Review Panel in making its decisions. See Lead ndus., 610 F.2d at 83; see also Mapother v. Dep't of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1536, (D.C. Cir. 1993) (no segregation of facts required where a report was prepared "to provide the Attorney General with the information... to decide whether [an individual] should be excluded from the United States," and "[t]he staff was to cull 38

39 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 39 of 129 the relevant documents, extract pertinent facts, organize them to suit a specific purpose, and to identify the significant issues they encountered along the way"); Montrose Chem. Corp. of California v. Train, 491F.2d63, 64 n.3, 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (no segregation of facts required where two reports were prepared to assist the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") in his review of the record of a hearing held to determine whether Dichlorodiphenyltrichloroethane ("DDT") was "injurious to man and his environment." "The EPA assistants... were exercising their judgment as to what record evidence would be important to the Administrator in making his decision"). Second, the threat assessments are predominantly deliberative and evaluative. (See supra at pp ) Disclosing factual material within the threat assessments would "reveal the deliberative process of selection" by demonstrating which facts in the record were "considered significant." See Lead ndus., 610 F.2d at 85; see also Tigue, 312 F.3d at 82 ("After de novo in camera review of the original and redacted memoranda, we conclude that the district court properly found that the document is predominantly evaluative... [The] factual material... is too inte1twined with evaluative and policy discussions to require disclosure."). O'Keefe's Declaration supports this conclusion. (See O'Keefe Deel. if 15.) "[T]he Task Force considered the totality of the circumstances related to each detainee, but attempted to focus on certain factors when possible." (d.) "[t] prepared the threat assessments to succinctly SUillillarize significant issues and present key background information regarding the potential national security threat of individual detainees..." (d. if 26.) f the factual portions of the threat assessments were disclosed, those portions would indicate which facts the Task Force found "significant," "key," and worth "focusing" on. See Lead ndus., 610 F.2d at 83, 85; see also Tigue, 312 F.3d at 74, 82 (factual information could not be segregated because that "information 39

40 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 40 of provided insight into privileged material"); Local 3, 845 F.2d at 1180 (no segregation of facts of predecisional documents where "stripping them down to their bare-bone facts would render them... too illuminating of the agency's deliberative process"); Assadi v. U.S. Citizenship & mmigration Servs., 2013 WL , at *3-5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2013) (no segregation where the Fraud Detection and National Security Unit ("FDNS") of the United States Citizenship and mmigration Services ("CS") sought to determine whether an immigration application was fraudulent and to recommend a course of action, and where the reports "contain[ ed] factual information specifically chosen by extracting pertinent factual material from a larger body of factual material"); Shinnecock ndian Nation v. Kempthome, 652 F. Supp. 2d 345, 372 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (where a report was prepared by attorneys in the Office of the Solicitor for the United States Department of the nterior to assist the Solicitor with his decision regarding whether the United States would assist the Shinnecock ndian Nation. The facts in the report were not segregable because "the selection of and presentation of the facts reveal[ ed] the judgment of the author and la[id] the foundation for his recommendation"). The 1982 decision of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in Playboy Enterprises, nc. v. Dep't of Justice, cited in Plaintiffs' opposing brief (Opp. at 19), is distinguishable, and it does not persuade the Court that segregation of factual material in the threat assessments is appropriate. 677 F.2d 931, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1982). n Playboy, the Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's order that the Department of Justice redact "conclusions, recommendations, opinions, or advice" from a report concerning whether FB personnel acted improperly, and "that remaining portions of the [report] be disclosed." d. at 934. Plaintiffs seek to rely upon the following Circuit Court statement: Anyone making a report must of necessity select the facts to be mentioned in it; but a report does not become a part of the deliberative process merely 40

41 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 41 of 129 because it contains only those facts which the person making the report thinks material. f this were not so, every factual repo1i would be protected as a part of the deliberative process. 677 F.2d 931, 935 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The report in Playboy "was prepared only to inform the [U.S.] Attorney General of facts which he in tum would make available to members of Congress." d. at 936. The report in Playboy was not "submitted to the agency... to assist it in rendering an informed decision upon the... record." See Lead ndus., 610 F.2d at 83. The Court in Playboy distinguished Montrose Chemical, 491 F.2d 63, where segregation was not required, because, in Montrose, "summaries were prepared for the sole purpose of assisting the Administrator [of the Enviromnental Protection Agency] to make a complex decision... " Playboy, 677 F.2d at 936. * * * Having determined that the threat assessments are properly exempt from disclosure (in full) under Exemption 5, lli supra at pp , it is not necessary to analyze other exemptions. The Court nevertheless includes the following analysis of Exemptions 1, 7(B), 7(D), and 7(E) to assist the parties-and the public-in understanding the Court's reasoning as to all of the issues which have been presented in the briefs in this case. Exemption 1 DOJ invokes Exemption 1 to protect against disclosure of portions of the threat assessments containing classified infonnation "pertaining to the foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States." (DOJ Br. at ) DOJ argues that "far from disclosing classified information, the press releases on which [P]laintiffs rely [(see infra at pp )] merely provide general assurances that the United States aod the receiving country worked together to facilitate the transfer." (DOJ Reply at 18.) According to the Hardy Declaration, the information withheld under Exemption 1 "concern[ s] sensitive intelligence information gathered 41

42 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 42 of 129 by the United States either abont or from a foreign country." (Hardy Deel. 'if 27; see also Ewing Deel. 'if 21; Stein Deel. 'if 14; DOD Deel. 'if 21.) "The unauthorized disclosure of information concerning foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States can reasonably be expected to... identify the target, scope, or time frame of intelligence activities of the United States in or about a foreign country, which may result in the curtailment or cessation of these activities; enable hostile entities to assess United States intelligence gathering activities in or about a foreign country and devise countermeasures against these activities; or compromise cooperative foreign sources, which may jeopardize their safety and curtail the flow of information from these sources." (Hardy Deel. 'if 27.) Plaintiffs argue that the Government's invocation of Exemption 1 is "too broadly stated." (Opp. at 20.) Plaintiffs cite to three press releases which they contend "raise concerns about... official disclosure." (ML) n these three press releases, according to Plaintiffs, "both the United States and the receiving country have... described some of the communications between the two countries in order to facilitate the transfer." (Opp. at 20.) Plaintiffs do not challenge DOJ's use of Exemption 1 to justify the redaction of three other categories of information: "(l) intelligence sources and methods; (2) foreign government information provided to the United States in confidence; (3) information relating to military and counterterrorism operations, including certain operational details about Guantanamo Bay." (d.) The term "official disclosure" refers to the "limited exception" under Exemption 1 "where the government has officially disclosed the specific information the requester seeks." Halpern v. F.B.., 181 F.3d 279, 294 (2d Cir. 1999). "Classified information that a party seeks to obtain or publish is deemed to have been officially disclosed only if it (1) is as specific as the information previously released, (2) matches the information previously disclosed, and (3) was 42

43 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 43 of 129 made public through an official and documented disclosure." Wilson v. C..A., 586 F.3d 171, 186 (2d Cir. 2009) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The Court, having thoroughly reviewed the threat assessments in camera, finds that Plaintiffs have not met their "burden of showing specific information in the public domain that duplicates [or matches] the information withheld" by DOJ under Exemption 1. See Hudson River, 891 F.2d at 421. None of the three press releases cited by Plaintiffs constitutes "official disclosure" of classified information "pertaining to the foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States" (DOJ Br. at 17-18), as follows: 1. The October 31, 2009, DOJ Press Release announcing the transfer of six Uighur Guantanamo detainees to the Republic of Palau. Dept. of Justice, United States Transfers Six Uighur Detainees from Guantanamo Bay to Palau, No (Oct. 31, 2009). This press release stated in relevant part, Six detainees who are Chinese nationals of Uighur ethnicity have been transferred from the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay to the control of the Republic of Palau... These transfers were carried out under an arrangement between the United States and the Republic of Palau. The United States has coordinated with the Republic of Palau to ensure the transfers take place under appropriate security measures and will continue to consult with the Republic of Palau regarding the individuals.... "[W]e are grateful to the Republic of Palau for its assistance in the resettlement of these individuals," said Matthew Olsen, Executive Director of the Guantanamo Review Task Force. DOJ argues persuasively that this press release "merely provide[ s] general assurances that the United States and the receiving country worked together to facilitate the transfer." (DOJ Reply at 18.) DOJ also contends that, "in connection with the government's application of Exemption 1 to foreign relations and foreign activities 43

44 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 44 of 129 information," the Hardy Declaration "demonstrate[ s] that [Exemption 1] was not applied to the type of information [P]laintiffs describe." (d. at 19.) "The unauthorized disclosure of information concerning foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States can reasonably be expected to lead to diplomatic or economic retaliation against the United States; identify the target, scope, or time frame of intelligence activities of the United States in or about a foreign country, which may result in the curtailment or cessation of these activities; enable hostile entities to assess United States intelligence gathering activities in or about a foreign country and devise countermeasures against these activities; or compromise cooperative foreign sources, which may jeopardize their safety and curtail the flow of information from these sources." (Hardy Deel. if 27.) Plaintiffs argue that the press release constitutes an "official disclosure" because it "describe[ s] some of the communications between the two countries in order to facilitate the transfer." (Opp. at 21.) Plaintiffs also argue that the Hardy Declaration "refer[s] broadly to foreign relations information" and does not "carry [DOJ's] burden." (Pls.' Reply at 8.) The Court finds that the October 31, 2009, DOJ Press Release does not constitute an official disclosure. See Hudson River, 891 F.2d at 421. The press release does not contain, as pointed out in the Hardy Declaration, "sensitive intelligence information gathered by the United States either about or from a foreign country." (Hardy Deel. if 26.) t cannot be said to "duplicate" or "match" any of the information withheld under Exemption. See Hudson River, 891 F.2d at 421. The press release also does not include information about "United States intelligence gathering activities in or about a foreign 44

45 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 45 of 129 country" which could enable others to "devise countermeasures against these activities." (Hardy Deel.~ 27.) 2. The June 22, 2016, Government of Montenegro Press Release annonncing the transfer of one Guantanamo detainee to Montenegro. Gov'! of Montenegro, Montenegro Receives Another Person Within Humanitarian Programme of Re-Socialisation of Prisoners from Guantanamo, Press Release (June 22, 2010). This press release stated in relevant part, As part of a humanitarian programme launched by the Government of the United States with the aim of closing the base in Guantanamo, Cuba, Montenegro took on the responsibility of re-socialisation of another prisoner and his return to his family. t is... a citizen of Yemen who stayed for many years in Guantanamo, and who... does not constitute, according to the assessment of the competent US and Montenegrin security services, a security or any other threat to the country and citizens of Montenegro. Prior to the persons' transfer to third countries, their behaviour and criminal liability are subjects of security assessment and detailed evaluation, according to which the decision on the transfer is made. Re-socialisation of these persons implies control by the relevant institutions of the receiving countries, while ensuring full respect for legality and the policy of humane treatment. DO argues that this press release "merely provide[ s] general assurances that the United States and the receiving country worked together to facilitate the transfer." (DOJ Reply at 18.) DOJ also contends that the Hardy Declaration "submitted in connection with the government's application of Exemption 1 to foreign relations and foreign activities information demonstrate[ s] that [Exemption l] was not applied to the type of information [P]laintiffs describe." (d. at 19.) "The unauthorized disclosure of information concerning foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States can reasonably be expected to lead to diplomatic or economic retaliation against the United 45

46 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 46 of 129 States; identify the target, scope, or time frame of intelligence activities of the United States in or about a foreign country, which may result in the curtailment or cessation of these activities; enable hostile entities to assess United States intelligence gathering activities in or about a foreign country and devise countermeasures against these activities; or compromise cooperative foreign sources, which may jeopardize their safety and curtail the flow of information from these sources." (Hardy Deel. ii 27.) Plaintiffs argue that the press release constitutes an "official disclosure" because it "describe[s] some of the communications between the two countries in order to facilitate the transfer." (Opp. at 21.) Plaintiffs also argue that the Hardy Declaration "refer[s] broadly to foreign relations info1mation" and does not "carry [DO' s] burden." (Pis.' Reply at 8.) The June 22, 2016, Government of Montenegro Press Release carmot constitute an "official disclosure" because it was not issued by an agency or official of the United States Government. See Hudson River, 891 F.2d at 422 ("Officials no[t]... serving with an executive branch department cannot... disclose official agency policy...").also, the press release does not include "sensitive intelligence information gathered by the United States either about or from a foreign country." (Hardy Deel. ii 26.) The June 22, 2016, Government of Montenegro Press Release does not "duplicate" or "match" the inf01mation withheld under Exemption 1 (as described in the Hardy Declaration). See id. at 421. The press release also does not include information about "United States intelligence gathering activities in or about a foreign country" which could enable others to "devise countermeasures against these activities." (Hardy Deel. ii 27.) 46

47 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 47 of The January 19, 2017, DOD Press Release announcing the transfer of one Guantanamo detainee to Saudi Arabia. Dept. of Defense, Detainee Transfers Announced, Release No. NR (Jan. 19, 2017). This press release stated in relevant part, The Department of Defense announced today the transfer of [one detainee] from the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay to the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia... The United States is grateful to the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia for its willingness to support ongoing U.S. efforts to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility. The United States coordinated with the government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to ensure this transfer took place consistent with appropriate security and humane treatment measures. DOJ argues that this press release "merely provide[ s] general assurances that the United States and the receiving country worked together to facilitate the transfer." (DOJ Reply at 18.) DOJ also contends that the Hardy Declaration "submitted in connection with the government's application of Exemption 1 to foreign relations and foreign activities information demonstrate[ s] that [Exemption 1] was not applied to the type of information [P]laintiffs describe." (d. at 19.) "The unauthorized disclosure of information concerning foreign relations or foreign activities of the United States can reasonably be expected to lead to diplomatic or economic retaliation against the United States; identify the target, scope, or time frame of intelligence activities of the United States in or about a foreign country, which may result in the curtailment or cessation of these activities; enable hostile entities to assess United States intelligence gathering activities in or about a foreign country and devise countermeasures against these activities; or compromise cooperative foreign sources, which may jeopardize their safety and curtail the flow of information from these sources." (Hardy Deel. if 27.) 47

48 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 48 of 129 Plaintiffs argue that the press release constitutes an "official disclosure" because it "describe[ s] some of the communications between the two countries in order to facilitate the transfer." (Opp. at 21.) Plaintiffs also argue that the Hardy Declaration "refer[s] broadly to foreign relations information" and does not "carry [DOJ's] burden." (Pis.' Reply at 8.) The Court finds that the January 19, 2017, DOJ Press Release does not constitute an official disclosure. See Hudson River, 891 F.2d at 421. As noted, the Hardy Declaration states that the government withheld "sensitive intelligence information gathered by the United States either about or from a foreign country." (Hardy Deel. ii 26.) The press release contains no such information and does not "duplicate" or "match" the information withheld. See Hudson River, 891 F.2d at 421. The press release also does not include information about "United States intelligence gathering activities in or about a foreign country" which could enable others to "devise countermeasures against these activities." (Hardy Deel. ii 27.) Exemption 7(B) DOJ (on behalf of the FB) invokes Exemption 7(B) to protect against disclosing citations to FB files found in footnotes of six threat assessments (as indicated in the DOJ' s Vaughn ndex, see Attachment A hereto at pp. 47, 49-52) because "disclosure... 'would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication."' (DOJ Br. at 23 (quoting 5 U.S. C. 552(b)(7)(B)).) DOJ contends that "[t]he responsive records include [six] threat assessments of certain detainees for whom law enforcement proceedings are ongoing or are reasonably anticipate[ d]. Premature release of the recommendations provided in the threat assessments through the FOA, could unfairly impact ongoing or prospective proceedings and jeopardize the detainee's ability to receive a fair and impartial adjudication." (Hardy Deel. ii 38.) "Each threat 48

49 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 49 of 129 assessment contains footnotes identifying specific source documents," some of which are FB files that "capture[] interviews of third parties providing information." (d. if 39.) Unless the FB redacts the file numbers (for these FB interviews of third parties), "the detainee would have knowledge of types of information that may not already be available through the court proceedings," including the "targets of investigative activities or a close association with another target of investigation." (d.) This "could indicate that the government has additional testimony or information available." (d.) DO also relies upon the Seidel Declaration which states that "the prior use of the term 'law enforcement proceedings' referred only to trials and adjudications." (Seidel Deel. if 6.) "[A]ll of the infonnation that the FB withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(B) relates to ongoing trials or adjudications" (id.). And, "it is more probable than not that disclosure of the information... would seriously interfere with the impartiality of those ongoing proceedings" (id.). Plaintiffs argue that DO has not carried its burden because "a trial or adjudication must be 'pending or truly imminent'" and "it must be 'more probable than not that disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere with the fairness of those proceedings."' (Opp. at 22 (quoting Wash. Post, 863 F.2d at 102).) Plaintiffs also argue that the Court should "require DO-at the very least through an in camera, ex parte declaration-to describe the specific proceedings at issue and explain the particular harms disclosure would cause." (Pis.' Reply at 9.) The Government has met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Exemption 7(B) protects against the disclosure of citations to FB files concerning interviews of third parties (Seidel Deel. ifif 5-6). See Chiquita Brands nt'! nc. v. S.E.C., 805 F.3d 289, 294, (D.C. Cir. 2015); Washington Post, 863 F.2d at 102. "[T]o withstand a challenge to the applicability of (7)(B) the government bears the burden of showing: (1) that a trial or 49

50 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 50 of 129 adjudication is pending or truly imminent; and (2) that it is more probable than not that disclosure of the material sought would seriously interfere with the fairness of those proceedings." d. This burden can be met by affidavit or otherwise. d. Both Hardy and Seidel confirm in their Declarations that trials or adjudications are ongoing for the six detainees at issue. (See Hardy Deel. if 38; Seidel Deel. if 6.) Ongoing litigation "satisfies the 'pending or truly imminent' judicial proceeding prong ofth[e] test." Chiguita Brands, 805 F.3d at 294. Seidel confirmed that "all of the information that the FB withheld pursuant to Exemption 7(B) relates to ongoing trials or adjudications." (d.; see also Moscati Deel. if 6; Chiquita Brands, 805 F.3d at 294; Washington Post, 863 F.2d at 102.) The Hardy and Seidel Declarations also satisfy the second prong of DOJ' s burden of proof. See id.; Chiguita Brands, 805 F.3d at That is, where, as here, "disclosure through FOA would [also] furnish access to a document not available under the discovery rules and thus would confer an unfair advantage on one of the parties," the document need not be disclosed. Washington Post, 863 F.2d at 102; see also Chiguita Brands, 805 F.3d at (where "one party obtains valuable information from witnesses and other third parties outside the formal discovery process while under no obligation to produce similar information to its adversaries"). Plaintiffs do not dispute that such disclosure "would furnish access to a document not available under the discovery rules," see Washington Post, 863 F.2d at 102; Hardy Deel. if 38; Seidel Deel. ir 5. Exemption 7(D) DOJ (on behalf of the FB) invokes Exemption 7(D) to protect against disclosure of portions of the threat assessments which are "law enforcement records that 'could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a... foreign agency or authority... which furnished information on a confidential basis."' (DOJ Br. at 24 (quoting 5 50

51 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 51 of 129 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(D)). DOJ is concerned about "portions of the responsive documents [containing] information regarding individual sources who are... informants under an express grant of confidentiality." (Hardy Deel., 54.) The file for each confidential source "memorializes the FB's confidentiality agreement with the source, as well [as] other information about the particular source (i.e., suitability, reliability, scope of reporting, payments, etc.). To the extent the FB applied Exemption 7(D) to information pe1iaining to a source who has received express confidentiality, FB procedures require that evidence of that grant of confidentiality would reside in the appropriate source file." (Seidel Deel.,, 9-10.) Plaintiffs argue that "DO J's invocation of Exemption 7(D) is plainly insufficient." (See Opp. at ) Plaintiffs contend that "the FB... fails to make the appropriate showing for the names and identifying data for informants," and "provides only... 'bare assertions' of confidentiality...'" QQ,) Plaintiffs also argue that Seidel's "[D]eclaration says only that some unnamed 'FB procedures' suggest that evidence of express grants of confidentiality 'would reside'-hypothetically-in the source's file." (Pls.' Reply at 9 (citation omitted).) The Court finds that DOJ has met its burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that Exemption 7(D) applies to portions of the threat assessments. t has done so by relying upon the Hardy and Seidel Declarations. When invoking Exemption 7(D), an "agency['s] burden of proof [is] satisfied by [an] affidavit declaring that... assurances of confidentiality are set forth... in the source's informant file..." Halpern v. FB, 181F.3d279, (2d Cir. 1999) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). The Hardy and Seidel Declarations clearly meet this requirement. (See Hardy Deel., 54; Seidel Deel.,, 9-10; see also Halpern, 181 F.3d at ; Ferguson v. FB, 83 F.3d 41, (2d Cir. 1996) (where "the affidavit explain[ed]... that... express assurances of confidentiality were given by the FB to the sources providing the 51

52 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 52 of 129 information, and that these assurances [we ]re set forth... in the source's info1mant file"); Williams v. FB, 69 F.3d 1155, 1158 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (where "the Government submitted an affidavit from [an] FB Special Agent... explaining that the FB withheld... information on the ground that this information was obtained pursuant to express grants of confidentiality").) Exemption 7(E) DOJ (on behalf of the FB) invokes Exemption 7(E) to protect against disclosure of portions of the threat assessments containing "database identities and database search results" (Hardy Deel.~ 64) because that "info1mation... 'would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions'" (DOJ Br. at 25 (quoting 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(7)(E)). "Such techniques and procedures are categorically exempt from disclosure, without any need for inquiry into the harm that would result from their disclosure." (d.) DOJ relies upon the Seidel and Hardy Declarations. Seidel states: [T]he specific selection of a single database among many that could be used, based on the unique factors of a specific investigation, would reveal the specific methodology that the FB employs in the course of counterterrorism investigations. Disclosure of this information, including which database is searched and the unique search parameters used, would provide individuals with insight into how to avoid detection by knowing what factors would trigger discovery. Knowledge of what actions and what characteristics the FB detects through its querying of non-public databases would allow individuals to alter their behavior to avoid detection. Accordingly, the specific details concerning the databases queried in connection with the FB counterterrorism activities discussed in the responsive records, the number of databases searched, the combinations of databases searched for certain individuals, the information retrieved from those searches, and the ways in which the FB utilizes that info1mation it obtains from such searches would all reveal unknown law enforcement techniques. (Seidel~ 15.) The Hardy Declaration states: Disclosure of the printouts or information compiled from these search results, or even the selection of a certain database over another for a particular type of information and its relative usefulness, could enable 52

53 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 53 of 129 (Hardy Deel. if 64.) criminals to employ countermeasures to avoid detection, thus jeopardizing the FB's investigative mission. Plaintiffs "call into question the withholding of database search results" by DOJ. (Opp. at 24.) According to Plaintiffs, the FB "does no more than assert, in entirely general terms, that printouts, info1mation from search results, and information about what database the FB searched might reveal a secret. That falls far short of showing how disclosure of the responsive records in this case plausibly would reveal something new about the technique-the search of a databaseitself" (Opp. at (citation omitted).) "What the FB has failed to explain... is whether the withheld infmmation reveals, for example, types of searches---databases queried, search parameters used, and the like-that are regularly used in counterterrorism cases or whether the information is merely a search that a particular analyst in a particular case decided to make on his or her own." (Pis.' Reply at 9-10.) The Government has met its burden of demonstrating by a preponderance of the evidence the applicability of Exemption 7(E). t has done so by relying on the Hardy and Seidel Declarations. See raqi Refugee Assistance Project v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2017 WL , at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017); Bishop v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 45 F. Supp. 3d 380, 391 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). "Affidavits or declarations... giving reasonably detailed explanations why any withheld documents fall within an exemption are sufficient to sustain the agency's burden." Wilner, 592 F.3d at 69. "The phrase 'techniques and procedures[']... refers to how law enforcement officials go about investigating a crime." Allard K. Lowenstein, 626 F.3d at 682. Exemption 7(E) applies where, as here, the government's Declarations show that disclosure will reveal "which databases [law enforcement] considers in its... process and how such information can lead to the 53

54 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 54 of 129 triggering of additional" investigation. See Bishop, 45 F. Supp. 3d at 391; see also raqi Refugee, 2017 WL , at * 11 (where the plaintiffs challenged the redaction of a document discussing search results from "a law enforcement database"). The Hardy and Seidel Declarations explain that disclosure of database identities and search results would reveal how the FB investigates suspected terrorists, including "the number of databases searched, the combinations of databases searched for certain individuals, the information retrieved from those searches, and the ways in which the FB utilizes that information it obtains from such searches." (See Hardy Deel. if 64; Seidel Deel. if 15.) "Disclosure of this information... would provide individuals with insight into how to avoid detection by knowing what factors would trigger discovery." (d.) V. Conclusion & Order For the reasons stated herein above, DOJ's motion for summary judgment [#23] is granted. Plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment [#32] is denied. Dated: New York, New York September 29, 2017 RCHARD M. BERMAN, U.S.D.J. 54

55 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 55 of 129 ATTACHMENT A The attached Vaughn ndex is a declassified, redacted and public document, which was originally attached as Exhibit H to the O'Keefe Declaration. t was made public by DOJ on March 27, The original, classified version was submitted to the Court in camera.

56 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 56 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 2of18 +op StCRe+//Sl//QRCQl'olf/NQPQRN Ahmed Hassain!Task Force Evaruation Worksheet; (WlP) DOD: 10 u.s.c.. SN:-690 Subse ction of EVilluation Worksheet 424 {WJP) FB (WP) contalning the Tilsk Force's candid FB: 1.4 {b),(c),(d) a.sse-ssment of identjflab!e threat(s) :{WP) FB: so u.s.c. potentially pos.ed by detainee to the 3024\i)[l) {WP) Mohammed Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 DOD: 1.4 (b), 000: so u.s.c. DOi: OPP (WF) DOD(WPJ FB: (7l!C).O),(E) Ahmed Salam Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (c),jd), Jg) {WP) 3024[i)[l); 10 {WP) SN: 689 Subsection of E"v<iluation Worksheet U.S.C. 424 (WP) FBl(WP) FS: 1.4 (c),(d) assessment of identifiable threat{s) (\VP) FB: 5-0 U.S.C. pat-entlalty posed by detainee to the 3024(;)(1) (WP) national secudty of the United States. Fahrni Abdu![ah Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 14 ooo: 1.4 (cj,(g) DOD: 50 U.S.C, 001: OPP (WF) OOD(WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) Ahmed al- Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(;]{1) (WP) (WP) Tawlaqi!SN: Subsect1on of Evaluation Worksheet fbl(wjp) 683 containing the TaS-k Force's candid FB1' 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. assessment of identifiable threat{s) 3024(i)(l) (WP) national security of the Unlte-d States. Abd u1 Aziz Karim Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 6 DOD: L4(o), (g) DOD: 10 U.S.C, DOJ: OPP (WF) OQO(WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) SN: SA*687 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 424 (WP) (WP) Subsection of Evilluation Worksheet FB (WP) containing- the Task force's carndid FB: 1.4 {b),(c) FB: 50 U.S.C assessme nt of ldentifi:able lhrcat(s.} (WP) 3024(1)(1) (WP) potcntialfy posed by detainee to the WP SliCRfi+//Sl//ORCON//PJOFORN 001

57 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 57 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 3 of 18 l'qp S~RiT,l:fS.1/-,'QRbQNf/NQFQR~ Abdel Ghaib Ahmild Hakim SN': 686 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force Evaluatlon Worksheet; Subsectlon of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Task Force's cnndid assessment of identlflablethreat{s) potentially posed by.detafnee to the 9 DOD: l.4(c),(g)(wp) ODS: 1.4 (c ). (di (WP) FB: 1.4 {c)(wp) DDJ: OPP (WF)!DOD (WP) FBJ (WP) FB: (7){C),(E) (WP) Said bin Brahim bin Umran Baku sh SN: AG-685 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force EYaluatton. Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation: Worksheet assessment of identifiable tlireat{s) potentially posed by detainee-to the s OOD: 1.4{c) (WP) DOJ: OPP (WF) Mohammed Tahanmatan SN: WE~6S4 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of EvaluJtlon Worksheet assessment of id-entlflabl.e threat{s} : 1.4 (a), [b), (c), (d), (g) (WP) FB: 1.4 {c) {WP) DOD: so u.s.c. DOJ: OPP (WF) 3024(i){l) (WP) fb: SO U.S.C. 3024(i)!l) (WP)! OD {WPJ FBl(WP) rl: {7J[CJ,{E) (WP) Muhammad Ali Salem Al Zarnuki SN: 6Sl Cove( Page of Guantanamo Review Task force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of EVi!l u;nton Worksheet assessment of identifiabl.e threat(s) porent!alty posed by detainee to, the : 1.4 (c), (g) (\VP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) DOD: SO U.S.C. DDJ: OPP (WF) 3024(i)(l) (WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. l024(i)(l) (WP) OOD(WP) FB ()NP) FS: (7)(C),(E) (WP) O.mar Khalif Mohammed Abu Baker Mahjour Umar 69S SN: LY Cover Page of Guantanamo Rcviev.1 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identifiable threat(s} s 000; L4 (c), (g) (W?) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) ODD: so u.s.c. 100!: OPP \W!F) 3024{i)(1) (WP) rn1: so u.s.c. 3024(i)(l)(W P) FBl(WP) 'FB: (7J(C),(E) (WP) 1'.0P SllCRQ"h'Sl,'/QRCON//MOj;QRN 002

58 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 58 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 4of18 :J'.QP SliGRH,l/Sf.ifQR(;QN,l/PJQFQRfll FawadYahya Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 16 DOD: 1.4 (a), {c), 000: 50 u.s.c. DOl: OPP {WF) DOO(WP) rl: (7)(Q.(D),(E) Ahmed al Rami Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (g)(wp) 3D24{i){l); 10 (WP) SN:-683 Stibsection of Evaluation w.orksheet use 424 (W?) FBl{WJP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) assessment of identifiable threat(s} FB: 50 u.s.c. potentiafly posed by detainee to the 3024(i)il) (WP) national security.of the United States. Emad Abdallah Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 13 DOO: 1.4 {c)(wp) FB: 50 U.S.C. Hassan Task Force Evaluation Wor"sheet; 3024{!)[1) (WP) DOJ: OPP (WFJ 1001 (W?) D01: (7JCJ(WPJ SN: 630 Subsection of Evatuation Worksheet FB: 1.4 jc){wp) OODjWP) FB: (7){C],(EJ (WP) assessment of identifiable thrcat(s} FB (WP) national security of the United :States. Khafrullah Said Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 8 DOD: 1.4 (c) DOD: 50 U.S.C. jdoj: OPP (WF) DOD(WP) FB: {7)(C) {WP) W.ali Khairkhwa Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(1)11) (WP) SN: AF 57:9 Subsection of Evatuation w.orksheet jfb {WJP) containing the Task N:rrce's candid FB: 1.4 (c) [WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. assessment of identifiable threot(s) 3024(1)(1] (WP) Abdul Hamid Cover Pa.ge of Guantanamo Review 9 DOD: l.4(c) DOD: 10 U.5.C. OOJ: OPP {WF) DOO(WP) FB: (7)1C),{E) Sal.am Al Task Force Evaluation Works.heet; (WP) 424 (WP) Ghi:zzawi Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FB (WP) SN: lv.654 containing d"~e Task Force's-c:an-dld FB: 1.4 (c) (WW) FB: 50 U.S.C. <ts$essment of ldentlfiable threat(s} 3D24(i)() (WP) national security nf the United States. Abdul al~azii Cover Pa.ge of Guantanamo Review : 1.4 (c) DOJ: OPP (Wlf) FBl{WlP) FB: (7JC),(E) Abduh Abdullah Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) (WP) Ali Al Suwaydi Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet SN: 578 contain.ng the Task Force's-candid assessment of dentifiable threat(s) national securlty of the United States. TOP SECRE:f,l/Sll/ORCONl}~OFORN oro

59 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 59 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 5of18 +op 5bGRi+#S~t,!QRa)PJ.} 1!NG~O~P Jam<il Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 12 DOD: 1.4 la), lb), DO: OPP (WF) FB (WP) FB: 17JC).(E) Muhamma:d Task Force Evaluat1on Worksheet; lcj, lrl), (g) {WP) (WlP) Alwai Subsection of Evaloatio n Worksheet FB: 50 U.S.C. SN:-577 containing the: Task Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) )11) (WPJ assessment of identifiabte threat(s) national security of the Un'ited States. Z;;iharOm;;ir Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 OOD: 1.4 la); (c), DOD: 50 U.S.C. DOJ: DPP {WF) DODWP) FB: (7)(C),(E) Hamb; bin Task Force Evalu~tion Worksheet; lg] (WP) 3024(;)(1} (WP) WP) Hamdoun Subsection of Ev:alu<Jtion Work-she-et FBl(WP) SN: -576 containing the Task Force 1 s.candid FB: 1.4 (cj (WP) FB: 50 U.5.C. assessment of identifiable threat{s} 3024li)(1J {WP) Saa'd Na$.Ser Cover Page: of Guantanamo Review 8 DOD: 1.4 la), (b), DOD: 10 U.S.C. DOJ: DPP (WF) DOD (WP) FB: l7}{c),(ej Moqbll af Azani Task Force Ev<iluation Worksheet; lcj, (rl) (WP) 424(WP) (WJP) SN:-575 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBllWP} 1 containlng the Task Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) F81: 50 U.5.C. 1,assessment of identifiable threat(s} 3024li}{l) (WP) potentially pos.erl by detainee to thenational.security of the United States. H mood Abdulla \Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 13 DOD: 1.4 (a), {c) FB: 50 U.5.C. DOJ: OPP (WFj DOD (WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) Hamood T11sk Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(i)(lj!WP} WP) 1SN: S74 Subsection of Evaluation W<lrksheet FB1(WP) FB: 1.4 (<) (WP) assessment cf identifiable threat{s} national security of the United States, Safah Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 DOD: 1.4 lb), lcj, DOD: 10 U.5.C. DOJ: OPP WF) DOD{WPj FBJ: {7)(C),E) Mohammad Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; ld)(wp) 424(WP) (WlP) S;alih al Ohabi Subsection. of Evaluation Worksheet FB (WP) SNc-572 FB: 1.4 (c) {WP) FBlc 50 U5.C. assessment of identifiable threat{s) 3024(1){1) {WP po-tent1a11y po-sed by detainee to the TOP SECR:E+J/.Sl,l{O'f~CO~l//~JOFOR~J 004

60 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 60 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 6of18 '+OP SGGRe::i;t,!Sl/fQ'ROON#l!Q~QRfll Sabrl Cover Page of Gu<intanamo ReView 9 DOD: 1.4 [c), [g] DOD: 10 U,S.C, DOJ: OPP [WF) DOD[WP) FB: {7){C),[E) Muhammad Task Force Eva[uation Workshi;!et; [WP) 424[WP) (WP) brahim al Subsection of Evaluation Work$heet FBfiWP) Qurashi containing the Task Force's-candid FB: L4 (c) [WP) FBk 50 U.S.C. SN:-570 assessment of identifiable threat{s) 3024[i)[l) (WP) Mohammad Cover Page of Guantanamo lleview 11 DOD: l.4 (a], [cl DOD: 10 U.S.C. l OJ: OPP {WF) OOO(WP) FB: (7){C),{E) Sulayman Barre Task Force- Evaluation- Worksheet; {WP) 424 (WP) {WP) SN:S0 567 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FB{WPJ containing the Task Force's candid FB: 1.4 {c) {WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. assessment of identifiable thrc.at(s} m:itional security of the United States. 3024[1)[1) (WPJ Mansour Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 6 DOD: 1.4 (a). [b), fb: 50 U.S.C. OOJ: OPP (W!F) DOD(WP) FB: (7)(C) {WP) Mohamed Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (c), (d) (WP) 3024(;}(1) (WP) MutayaAli Subsection of Evaluat~on Worksheet!FB (WP) SN: -566 containing the Task force's candid fbl: 1.4 (c} (WP) assessment of identifiable threat{s} potentially-posed by detainee.to the national -security of the United States. Ja!al Salam Awad Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 8 DOD: L4 [c), (g) OOD: 10 U.S.C. OOJ: OPP (WF) DOD{WP) FB: (7)(C).(E) Awad Task Force Ev<iluation Worksheet: (WP) 424 [WP) lsn: 564 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FB (WP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. assessment of identifi.;ible threat(s) 3024(i)(l) (WP) potentially pos.ed by detainee to the Hoji Wali Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 11 DOD: 1.4 [c) FB: 50 U.5.C. DOJ: OPP (Wlf) DOD(WP) FB: [7)(C),[E) Muhammed!SN: Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; [WP) 3024{i){l) [WP) {WP) AF-S-60 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl[WP) FB: 1.4 (c) [WP) assessment ofldentifiable threat{s} TOPS i.cr'fl//sl//orcon//nqforn 005

61 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 61 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 7 of 18 +op: S t;c;;rs:s:,','sl/,lor(;qpl,f/filq~q;rn Abdel Al Saleh Cover Pag:e of Guantanamo Review 7 DOD: 1.4 (b), [c). FB: 50 U.S.C, OOJ: OPP (Wlfj DOO(WP) FB: (7){C).[D),{Ej SN: 91 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (d){wjp) 3024(;){1) (WP) (WJPj Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WJP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) assessment of identifiabte thrcat(s) potentially posed by detainee to-the' Polad Sabir Oglu Cover P:agc of Guantanamo Review 7 DOD: 1.4 (c) DOD: so u.s.c. OOJ:. OPP {WF) FBJ (WP) FB: (7)(C) (WJPj,Sirajov Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; [WP) (1)(1) (WP)!SN: AJ-89 Subsection oft:vatuation Worksheet containing the Task Force's.- candid FB: 1.4 {c){wp) FB: SQ U.S.C. a:sse-ssment of identifiable thrcat(s) 3024(11(1) (WJP) Aasmi Matruq Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 8 DOD: 1.4 (c} DOD: 50 U.S.C. DOJ: DPP (WF) DDD(WP) FB: (7l{C),(E) Mohammnd Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (WlP) 3024fo)(l) {WJP) (WP) Assa mi Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBJ(WJP) SN: SA 49 containing the: Task Forte's candid FB: 1.4 (c)!wjp) FB: SO U.S.C. assessment of identifiabte threat(s} 3024(i)(l) (WP) potentially posed by detainee to the national security of the United States, Muhammed Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 11 OOD:L4(c) 000: so u.s.c. OOJ: OPP (Wlf) OOD(WP) FB: (7j[C),(E) Rajah Sadiq Abu Task Force Evaluation Worksheet: (WP) 3024(1)(1), D (WJP) Ghanlm Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet U.S.C. 424 (WJP) FBl(WP) SN: 44 containing the Task force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) as!>essment of identifiable :rhreat{s} FB: SO U.S.C. natiorial security of the United States. 3D24(1)il) {WP) Sami:r N<iji Al!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 8 DOD; 1.4 (a), (c), DOD: SO U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (WF) DOD(WJP) FB: (7)(CJ,(E) Hasan Moqbil Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; lg) (WP) 3024!1){1) (WP) (WP) SN: -43 Subsecticn of Ewluation Worksheet FBl(WP) containing the T:ask Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. a'ssessment of identifiable threat{s) 3024[1)(1) {WP) potentially posed by dctalnee to the national security -0f the United States. TOP SECR"if/#Jlh'QR, QPlf/NOFORN 006

62 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 62 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27 /17 Page 8 of 18 TOP SliCRErf/Slh'QRGQPJh 1 POJ:QRP Abd Al Rahman Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 10 DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), 000: 50 u.s.c. DOJ: OPP (WF) DOD(WP 'FB: {7)(CJ,(E) Shalbl sa Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; d), (g) (WP) 3024(i)il) (WP} (WP) Uwaydah Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP) SN:SA-42 containing the Task Force-'s candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) fb: 50 U.$.. C. assessment of identifiable threat(s) 3024(i)(1) (WP) Abdel Qadir Al- Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 7 DOD: 1.4 (c), (g) OOD: 50 U.S.C.! OJ: OPP (WF) DOD(WP) FB: 17l(C),(E) Mudafari Task Force Evaluatlon Worksheet; (WP) 3024(i)(l) (WP) (WP) SN:-40 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP) containing the Task force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. asse:s$-ment of identifiable threat(s) 3024[i){1) (WP) Majid Mahrnud Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 10 DOD: 1.4 (c) DOD: 50 U.S.C. 001: OPP (WF) DOD{WP) 'FB: (7)(C),(EJ Abdu Ahmed Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(;)(1) [WP) (WJP) SN:41 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl{WP) containing the Task For~e's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. assessment cf identifiable threot(s} 3024(i)(l) (WP] potentially posed by detainee ro the Abd AJ Satam Al Cover Page.of Guantanamo Review 9 DOD: 1.4 (a), le), FB: 50 U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (Wlfj DOD(WP) 'FB: (7)((),{Di.(E) Hilah Task Force Evaluation. ~'ark.sheet; (g) (WP) 3024(Q(1} (WPJ (WP) SN:-1463 Subsectlon o! Evnluation Worksheet FBl(WP) contain frig the Task Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP] assessment ofidentifiable threat{s) potentially posed by deta inee to the Abdul Rahman Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 11 DOD: 1.4(a).{c), FBl: 50 U.S.C. 1001: OPP (WtF) DOD(WP) FB: (7](C),{E) Abmed Task Force Evafuatiori Worksheet; (g) (WP) 3024(i)(l) (WP) (WP) SN: -441 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP) containing the Tas_k Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) assessment of identifiable threat(s) pot~ntially posed by detainee to the notional security of the United States. TOP SECR~/}Slf/ORCONHAO=ORN 007

63 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 63 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 9 of 18 :f-op St;,Rr;r.f./Sl 1 l/.oroon//.nofqrfll Ahmed Yaslam Cover Pag.e of Guantanamo Revte w 11 DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), DOD: SO U.$.C OOJ: OPP (WF) JDOD (WP) [FB: (7)(C) {WP) Said Kuman Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (d), fg) {W?) 3044{1)11). 10 SN: 321 Subsection: of Evaluation Worksheet U.$.C. 424(WP)j JFBl{WP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) assessment,of tdentifiable threat{s} lfb: SO U.S.C 3024(1)tl) (WP) Khalid Ahmed Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 DOD: 1.4 {a), (c), DOD: so u.s.c. DOi: OPP (WF} \ OD!WP} FB: {7)!C).[E) Qasim Task force Eva uation Worksheet; {g),(wp) 3024{;1(1) (WP) (WP) SN: -242 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FB (WP) containing the Task Farce's candid FB: 1.4 (c} (WP) FB: 50 U.S.C assessment of identifiable threat{s} 3024(1)!1) {WP) n;:itional security of the United States. Abd nl Rahman Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 DOD: 1.4 (c), (g) 000,50 u.s.c. OOJ: OPP (Wlf) OOD(WP) rl: (7j(C),(O),{E) Sulayman Task Force Evaluatlon Worksheet; (WP) 3024(1)(1) (WP) (WP) SN: 223 Subsection of Evaluatiori Worksheet Fal(WP) containjngthe Task Force's-candid FB: 1.4 (b),{c),(d) FB: SD U.S.C. assessment of identifiable thrcat(s) (WP) 3024(i)(l) (WP) n<ltional -securlty of the United States. Abu Bakr ibn Ali Cover Page of Guantariamo R!!Vle\V 10 DOD: 1.4 (a). (c], FB: SO U.5.C DOJ: DPP {WF) DOD{WP) FB: (7)(C) (WP} Mtthilmmadal Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; {gl(wpj 3024{i){l) {WP) Ahdal Sllbsection of Evatuation Worksheet jfbl{wp) SN: -171 containing the Task '.Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) assessment of identifiable threat(s.j p otential!y posed by detainee to the national :security of the Unlted States. Sharaf Ahmad Cover-Page of Guantanamo Review : 1.4 (b), (c). DOD: 50 U.S.C 1001: OPP {WF) l OD{WP) FBto l7)(c),{ej Muhammad Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (d){wp) 3024(1){1), 10 [WP} Mas'ud Subsection of Evatuation Worksheet u.s.c. 424 FBl{WP) SN: 170 containing the Task fotc:e's candid FB' 1.4 {c) (WP) {W?) assessment of identifiable threat{s) potentf;:illy posed by detain~e to the FB: 50 u.s.c 3024(1)(1) WPJ TOP SiatET/{Sl//QRCON}/NOFfdR N 008

64 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 64 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 10of18 +GP 51!;~R&:fl 1lSfh!QR,QNff~QFQRN Khalid Abrl Al Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 6 j,dod: 1.4 {aj, (c) jdoj: DPP (WF) jdod {WP) Jab bar Task Force Evaluation Worksheet~ {WP) Muhammad Subsection of Ev<:iluation Worksheet UthmanA1 containing the Task force's candid Qadasl assessment of identlfiable threat(s)!sn: 163 Adham Cover Page of GtJantanamo Review 9 DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), DOD: 50 USC.! OJ: OPP {WF) / OD(WP) FB: (7)(C).1 ) Mohamed Ali Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; {dj {WP) 3024(i)il) {WP) {WP) Awad Subsection of Ev.:iluation Worksheet FBl(WP) SN:-llB containin.g the Task Forte's candid FB: 1.4 {c) (WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. assessment of identifiable threat(s) 3024{i)i1) (WP) potentfally-posed by detainee to the national :Security-of the United States. Abdel Malik Cover Page of Guantanamo Review B DOD: 1.4 {a), (cj, /'Bl: 50 USC. DOJ: OPP (WF] DOO{WP) FB1: (7)(C (WP) Ahmed Abdel Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; {g) {WlP) 3024{0(1) {WP) Wahab Al Rahabi Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet SN:~37 contalning th e Task Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) ass.essment of identifiable thre<jt(s) national Sf!CUrfty of the United States. FBl{WPJ brahim Othman Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 11 DOD: 1.4 (a), (c) rl= so u.s.c. DOJ: OPP {WF) l OD {WP) FB: (7){C),(D),(E) brahim dris Task Force Evaluation Worksh-eet; (WP) 302<1(l)(1) (WP) WP) SN:SU-36 Subs.ectl'on of Evalu11tion Worksheet FBl(WP) FB: 1.4 (b),(c),(d) assessment of idetitifiable threat(s) (WP) national security of the United States_ Ahmed Umar Cover Pa.ge of Guanranamo Review Abdullah al- Task Forc-c Evaluation Worksheet; ) (g) (WP) (1) (WP) (WP) Hik.iml Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet SN: 30 contalning the Task Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c)wp) assessm.ent of ideotiflable threat(s) national.security of the Unlted States.. 12 DOD: 1.4 {a), (c), FB: SO u.s.e, DOJ: OPP (WF) FBl(WP) FB: (7)1C),{E) TQP SECRli:rJ/lil,t,'ORl:Glll/#Ol'QRlll 009

65 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 65 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 11of18 :;gp SEGRe+,~!Sl//ORGQPl/J.~POFQRN Mohammed al Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 DOD: l.4 {a). {cl. fbt 50 U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (WF OOO(WP) FB: (7/C),(D),(E) Ansi T.ask force Evaluation Worksheet; (g)(wp) 3024(i](1) (WP) {WP) 15N: 29 Subsection of Evatuation Worksheet FBl(WP) FB: la (cl {WP) assessm ent of identifiable threat{s) Moath Hamza Cover Page of Goantanamo Review : 1.4 (a). (cl rbj: 50 U.S.C. ) OJ: OPP (WF) OOD(WP) FB: (7J(C),(El Ahmed Al~Alwi Task forc:e Evaluation Worksheet; (W?) 3024(iJll) {WP) (WP) SN:-2& Subsection of Cvaluatlon Worksheet FB (WP) containing the Task Force's c;indid FB: l.4 (c) (WPJ.assessment.of ldentifiablethreat(s} potentiauy posed by detainee to the Ulhman Abd a!m Cover Page of Guantanamo Review,g DOD: 1.4 (a), (c) FB: 50 u.s.c. OOJ: OPP (WJF] DOD(WP) FS!: (7)(CJ,(D).!E) Rahim Tusk Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(i)(1) (WP) (WP) Muhammad Subsection of Eva!uatlon Works.heet FBl(WP) Uthm<in containing the. Task Forr:e's candid FB: l.4 (c) (WP) SN: 27 assessment of identlfiable rhreat(s) potent1ally posed by deta'inee to the Al Khadr Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 DOD: 1.4 (a), (c], rl: 50 U'.S.C. l OJ: OPP (WF) l OD(WJP) FB: (7)(C),(D).E) Abdallah Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (g) (WP) 3D24(i)(1) (WP) (WP) Muhammad Al Subs.cction of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(Wl,P) Yafi containing th~ Task Forte's Cilndid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) SN:-34 assessment of id~ntifiable threat{s) Mohammed Al Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 000: 1.4 (c), (g) DOD: 10U.S.C. OOJ: OPP WJFJ OOD(WJP) FS!: (7)(C),(E) Adahi Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 424(WlP) (WP) SN: -33 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP) containing the Task Force's cand!id FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: SO U.S.C. assessment of identifiable thr.eat{5) 3024(11(1) (WP) national security of-the United States. TOP SECRE:r,l/Sl//.QRbGN//PJOFORPl 010

66 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 66 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 12of18 +QP SEGRr;f./.1l!;,l//.Oat:::.QN 1~l~QPORN Faruq AH Ahmed Cover Pag_e of Guantanamo Revi:ew & DOD: L4ic] FB: 50 U.S.C. DOJ: OPP [WF) DOD(WP) FB: [7)(C),(E) JSN:~32 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(1){1) (WP) {WP) Subsection of Eval.uation Worksheet FB {WP) containing the Task force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) assessment of dentifiable threat(s) potent!ally p:os.ed by detainee tc the national securhy of the Un~ted States. Abdul Haq Wasiq Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 15 DOD: 1.4 (c) FB: 50 u.s.c. DDJ: OPP {WF) 1000 (WP) FB: (7)(C).(E) SN: AF-04 Task Forte Evaluation Worksheet; [WP) 3024(i){1) (WP) (WP) Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet asses'sment of identifiabfe threat(s} national security of the Unlted States. FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) FBl(WP) MuLlah Norullah Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 11 DOD: 1.41<) DOD: SO U.S.C. ~ l OJ: OPP (WF) DOD (WP) FB1: {7](C),(D),(E) Noori Task Force Elr.lluafion Worksheet; (WP) 3024(i)il) (WP) (W1P) SN: AF 06 Subsecti-on of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP) containing the Task Force's cnndid FB: 1.4 (c) WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. assessment of identifiable threat{s} 3024(i)(l) (WP) potentially posed by detainee to the Mullah Cover Page of Guanta namo Review 12 DOD: 1.4 (a), (cl DOD: SO u.s.c. DOJ: OPP (WF) OOD(WP) FB: (7)(C],(D),(E) Mohammed Fazl Task torte Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(1)11) (WP) (WP) lsn:af-07 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP) co'ntainlng the Task For:ee's candid FB: 1.4 jc) (WP) FBl: SO U.S.C. assessment -0f identifiable threat{s) 3024{i)(l) (WP) national security of the Unlted States. Fahed Abdullah Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 6 DOD: 1.4 (c)(wp) FB: SO U.S.C. 9 DOJ: OPP (WF) DOD(WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) Ahmad Ghazl Task force Evaluation Worksheet; 3024{iH 1) (WP) (WlP) 1SN:~26 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FB: 1.4 (c )!WJP) FBl(WP) containing the: Task Force's ca11did assessment of 1dendfrable threat(s.) TOP SiC:R'1'}/.Sl//ORCOPJ//NOmR.N 011

67 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 67 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 13of18 lqp SECRE+/ 1 fsl//or,or..l//noforr>j Mahmud Abd Al Cover Page of Guantanamo Revie-\o,i 6 DOD: 1.4 {a), {c), DOD; 10 u.s.c. DOJ; DPP (WF) 1000 (WP) jfb: {7)(C) (WP) Aziz Al Mujahid Task Force Evaluatlon Worksheet; {& (WP) BOb(WP) SN:-31 Subsection of Ev<iiuation Worksheet FBl(WP) FB: l.4 {cl (WP) FB: SD U.S.C assessment of identifiable threat{s') 3024ji)(l) jwp} Tawfiq Nas;ir Cover!'age of Guantanamo Review ll DOD: 1.4 (a). (c), FB: SD U.S.C. DOJ; DPP (WF) DOD{WP) FBl:(7JtC).(E) Awad Al-Bihanl Task Force Evaluation Worksheet: (g)(wp) 3024(i)(l) (WP) {WP) SN;-893 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet, FB (WP) containing the Task Farce's candid FB: l.4 (c) WP) assessment of dentifiable- thre-at(s) national security of the United Stat-es. Abdu'JQawi Cover Page of Guantanamo Re.view 8 DOD: l.4 (c) FB: 50 U.S.C. DOJ; OPP (WF) FB (WP) FB: (7JC).(E)!SN: AF l030 Task Force Evalu;;ition Worksheet; WP] 3024(1)(1) (WP] (WP) Subsection of'evaluation Worksheet FB: l.4 (c) (WP) assessment of identifiable threat(s) Mohammed Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 5 DOD: l.4 (a), (c), DOJ: OPP (WF) Kamin Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (g)wp) SN: Af 1045 Subsectlon of Evaluation Wor!Gheet assessment of ident1fiab1e threar(s) Mohammed rover Page of Guantanamo Review 13 DOD: l.4 (c); jg) DOD: SO U.5.C. DOJ; OPP (WF) DOD(WP) FB: j7}(c),(e Zahir Task Foret? Eval.uation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(i)(1! WP) jwp) l'sn: AF 1103 Sub-"$ection of Ev~luation Worksheet FB (WP} contaln ng the Task Force's candid FB; 50 U.S.C. as.se.ssment of identifiable threat{s} FB; 1.4 (c) (WP) 3024(iJll}{WP) nation.al :security of the- United States. TOP SEGRF:r//-Sl/{.QRCQPJ//MOFORN 012

68 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 68 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 14of18 +GP SEGR~lSl,,CQRc;QpJ 1 f,lfl,ql=qrn A\'1ra)Gul Cover Page of Guantanamo Review H DOD: L4(c) 000: 50 U.S.C. 100J: OPP '{WlF) OOO(WP)!FB: (7J(C) (WP) SN:AF 782 Task Force Evaluation Worl::sheet; [WP) 3024(;)(1) {WP) Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBllWP) containing the, Tas:k Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) fbl: 50 U.S.C. assessment of identifiable threat{s) 30240)(1) (WP) potentfatly posed by detainee to the Mohammad Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 7 DOD: L4(c) 1000:50 U.S.C. jdoj: DPP(WF) DOD{WP) Nabi-Omarl!SN: Task For-ce Evaluation Worksheet; (WlP) 3024{1)(1) {WlP) AF-832 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet contain'lng, the Task Force's candid assessment or identifiable threat{s) potentially posed by detainee to the Mohammed Gover Page of Guantan:amo Rcvi ew & DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), DOD: 50 U.S.C. l OJ: OPP (Wlf) DOD(WP) FBl: (7){C).(E) Abdul Malik Task Force Evaluation Workshe.~t; (g)(wp) 3024(1)11) (WlP) (WP) Baja bu Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl (W!P) SN: KE 1002S containing the: Task Force's <:andtd FB: 1.4 (cj {WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. assessment of identifiable thrcat{s} 3024(1)(1} (WlP) potentially pos.ed' by detainee to the n<itional security of'the United States. lnayatullilh Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 6 DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), DOD: 50 U.S.C.!i DOJ: OPP (WlF) DOO{WP) FBl: p)(c},(e) SN: AF Task force Evaluation Worksheet; {g)(wp) 3024(1)(1) (WlP) (WlP) Subsection_ of Evaluation Worksheet FB (WP] containing the Tas.k Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c} {WP) FB: SO U.S.C. assessment of identiftabl'e threat(s} 3024(1){1} (WlP) potentlalfy posed by detainee to the : TOP SiGR&T/}Sll/OROON//NOFORN 013

69 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 69 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27/17 Page 15of18 +GP SiQ!H,l,4il/, QR~QN,tiNQFQRN Sulaiman Awath Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 DOD: l.4 (a], (c), FB: SO U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (WF) OOO{WP] FB: (7){C).{E) Silaiman Bin Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (g)(wp) 3024(1)(1) (\VP) (WP) Agell Al Nahdl Subsection of Evalu<itlon worksheet FB {WP) SN: Sll containing the Task force.'st:andid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) assessn1ent of identifiable threat{s) potentiallyposed by detainee to the national s-ecurity of the United States. Mohammed Cover?age of Guantanamo Review 7 DOD: 1.4 {a), (b), DOD: 50 u.s.c. DOJ: OPP (WF) \ OD{WP) FB: {7){C),(E) Nasir Yahl Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (c), {d), (g) (WP) 3024(i)(l), l0 (WP) KhussrofKai::a:z Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet U.S.C. 424 (WP) FBl(WP) SN: S09 containing-the Task force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) assessment of identifiable threat(s) FB: so u.s.c. potentlallyposed by detainee to the 3024[i]{l) (WP) national security o.f the United :States. Salman Yahya Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 DOD: l.4 (c). [g) DOD: so U.5.C. DOJ: OPP (WF)! OD{WP) FB: (7){C).(E) Hassan Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(i)(l) (WP) (WP) Mohammad Subsection of Ev;iluation Worksheet FBl(WP) Rabei'i containing the Task Force's candld FB: 1.4 <) (WP) fb: SO U.S.C. SN: S08 assessment of identifiable threat{s) 3024{i)(1) (WP) Mohammed Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 6 DOD: 1.4 (c) DOD: 10 u.s.c. DOJ: OPP {WF) 1 00 (WP) FB: (7)(C),{E) KhaJid Salih al- Task Force EvaltJation Worksheet; {WP) 424 {WP) {WP) Dhuby Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP) isn;~'506 containing the Task force's candid FB: 1.4 {c) (WP) FB: SO U.S.C. as_sessment of identifiable threat{s} 3024(i)(l) (WP) potentfa!jy posed by detainee to the nation-al security of t he United States. +Q.p..S.iCRET//Sl/,'GRCOM//PlOFQRN 014

70 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 70 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27 /17 Page 16of18 +GP SGGREW~1.~ QR,QP,/ilNOa::QRP~ Has<1n Zamlri Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 6 DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), FB: 50 U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (Wlfj!DOD {WP} \FB: (?){C)(WP) SN: AG-533 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (g)(wp) 3024(;)(1} (WP) Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Task force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) {WP) jfbl(wp) assessment of identifiable thrcat(s) potentially posed by detainee to.the nation-al security of the United States. V:assim Qasim Cover Page of Guanta name Review 8 DOD: l.4(n), (c), DOD: SO U.S.C. DOJ: OPP {WF) OOD{WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) Mohammed Task Force Evaluatlon Worksheet; {g)(wp) 3024(1)(1} {WP) {WP) lsmaljqasim Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP)!SN: VM-522 containing the Task force's candid FBl: 1.4 {c) {WP} FB: 50 U.5.C.. assessment of dentifiable threat(s} 3024{1)(1) (WP) potentially posed by detainee t0- the nat.iona! security of the United States. Mahrar RafutA Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Quv;ari Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP)!SN: WE S19 Subsection of EvaJunUon Woi'ksheet assessment ofidentrfiable threat(s} national se curfty cf the United States. 4 DOD: 1.4 (a) jdoj: OPP (WF) jdoo{wp) 1:ahml Salem Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Said A! Asani Task Forte Evahmlion Worksheet; (WP) 3024(1){1) {WP) SN:~ 554 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assess:ment ofid-ent~fiable threat{s} FB: L4 (c) {WP) potentia uy posed by detainee to the n:ationa! security of the United States. 5 DOD: 1.4 (c} FB: SD u.s.c. DOJ: OPP {WF)!FB (WP} FB: {7](C) {WP} +op SECR&+//S~'/ORCOPJ/{PJQFORN 015

71 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 71 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27 /17 Page 17 of 18 +OP SEGRE+,l,41,t/ORGQll/,lNQ>QRP Abdul KhaJed Al Cover Page of Guantanamo Reviev.,r 6 000: 1.4 {a), (c), FB: 50 U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (WF) DOO{WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) Baydani Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; {g)(wp) 3024(1)(1) {WP) {WlP) lsn: SA- 5S3 Subsection of Evafuation Worksheet FB (WP) FB: 1.4 {c) (WP) assessment of identifiable threat{s} potentfajly posed by detainee to the Faez Mohammed Co1J er Page: of Guantanamo Review 10 DOD: 1.4 (a), {c), DOD: SO U.S.C. DOJ: OPP {WF) FBl(WP) FB: (7){C) (WP) Ahmed Al Task Force Evaluation Work!;heet; (g)(wp) 3024(i)[l) {WP) Kandari Subsection ofevafuation Worksheet flsn: KU SS2 containing the T.c:isk 'Fon:e's candid r = 1.4 {c) {WP) FB: so u.s.c. assessment of identifiable threat(s) 3024(1)(1) [WP) potenti.alryposed by detainee to-the Fouad Mahmud Cover Page of Guanta-namo Review 16 DOD: 1.4 {a), {c), DOD: 10 U.S.C. DOJ; OPP {WF) DOO[WP) FB: [7)(C),{E) Hasan Al Rabia Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; {g)(wp) 424(WP) (WP)!SN: KU 5Sl Subsectlon of Evaluation Worksheet FB [WP} containing the Task fon:::e's candid FB: 1.4 {c) (WP) FB: SO U.S.C. assessment of identifi;ible threat(s) 3024(1)(1) (WP) Walid Said bin Cover Page of Guantanamo Revi.ew 7 DOD: 1.4 (c) DOD: SO U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (WF) DOO(WP)!FB: {7){C) (WP} Said Zald Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(1)(1); 10 SN:-550 Subsectlon of Evaluation Work>heet u.s.c. 424 (WP) Jrn1 {WP) containing the Task Force's cand.td FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) a:ssessment of identifiable thr<eat{s} FB: SO U.S.C. potentfal!y posed by detainee to the 3024(1)(1) {WP] ~~ 016

72 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 72 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-8 Filed 03/27 /17 Page 18 of 18 +GP 5E,FUi+f 1 lsl/fqrcgnhnofgrn Umar Said Sa'lim Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 6 DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), DOD: 10 U.S.C. li DOt OPP (WF) DOD(WP) Al Dini Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; {<), (d) (WP) 424 {WP) SN: -549 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet c:ont<1lningthe iask Force's candid assessment of identifiable threat{s} Mohammed Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 6 DOD: 1.4 (al, {c) FB: 50 u.s.c.!i!om OPP (WF) DOO(WP) rl: (7){C),(E) Has.him Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP} 3024(;){1) [WP) (WP} SN:AF-850 Subsection of EWJluation Worksheet FBl(WP) containingth:e Tas.k Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) asst?ssment of klentlfiab!e threat{s) national securlty of the Unfte:d.Stat-e5. HusaynSalim Cover Page of Guantanamo Revtew 6 DOO: 1.4 (a), (c], FB: SO U.5.C DOJ: OPP,(WF) DOO(WP) FB: (7)(C),{E) Muhammad at- Task force Evaluation Worksheet; {g)(wp) 3024F)!1) (WPJ (WP) Matarl Y:afui Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP) lsn:-1015 containing the Tnsk Force's candfd FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) asses~ment offdent1fiabie threat(s) potentially poset: by detain~e to the Mohammad Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), FB: 50 U.S.C. OOJ: OPP (WF) OOO(WP) FB: (7JC),(O) Mustafa Sohail Task Fo-rce Evaluation Worksheet; (c), (d) (WP) 3024(;){1) (WPJ (WP) Bahazada Subsection of f1jaluatton Worksheet FB (WP) lsn: AF-1008 FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) a.ssessment of dentifiable threat(s) nati;onal security of the Unitt"d States. TGP >ECR6+NS1/{GRCGN/,tMGFGRM 017

73 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 73 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 1of18 +op SEGRi;+/fSl,l,QRGOPl/, POFQRP Karim Bostan Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 18 DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), DOD: 50 U.5.C. DOJ: OPP {WF) DOD{WP) FB: (7JC),(El SN: AF 975 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (&) (WP) 3024(1){1) {WP) (WP) Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FB (W!P) FB: 1.4 (c) (WlP) FB: 50 U.5.C. assessment of identifiable threat(s} 3024(1)(1) (WP) potentially posed by detainee too the Sha:rifullah \Cover Page: of Guantanamo Review 15 DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), DOJ: OPP (WJF) DOD(WlP) FB: (7)(CJ (WP) SN: AF 944 Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (g) (WP) SUbsection of Evaluation Worksheet FB (WP) assessment of identffiabfe threat(s} potentfally posed by detainee to the nation.1l security of the United States. 1.Abdul Ghani Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 6 DOD: 1.4 (a).(c), :fb: S) U.S.C DOJ: OPP (WJF) DOO(WJP) FB: (7J(C),(E) tsn: AF 934 Task Force Evalu:ation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(1)11) (WP) (WP) Subsection of Evaruation Worksheet FBl{WP) containing. the Task Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) assessment of idenrifiable threat(s} potentl111ly posed by detainee to the national secufity of the United.States. Khi Ali Gui \Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 DOJ FB; SO U.5.C DOJ; OPP (WlF) DOO(WP) FB: (7)(C) fwp) SN:AF-928 Task force Ev;i,!uati-on \Vorksheet; 3024(i)(l) (WP) Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), FBl(WP) (g)(wp) assessment of identifiable threat(sl potentt;illy posed by detainee to the FB: l.4 (c) (WP) national sect.irity of the United States. TOP SECRi+//Sl}{GRCOfrlf/NOfQRN 018

74 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 74 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27117 Page 2of18 TOP SibRgf.!Sl/-;lQR,QPlf/filQFQRP Shawali Khan Cover Page of Guantanamo Review : 1.4 (a), le), DOD: 50 U.S.C, jdoj: OPP (WF) DOO(WP) FB: (7)(C) (WlP) SN:AF~899 Task force Evaluation Worksheet; lg) [WJP) 3024(illl) (WP) Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet jfb (WP) containing_ the Task Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: SO U.S.C. assessment ofidenlifrabte threat(s} 3024(i)(l) (WP) potentlally posed by detainee to the Ahmld Al Razak Cover Page of Guant<inamo Review 11 DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), FB: 50 U.S.C. 001: OPP (WF) DOD(WJP) FB: (7)(C),(E) SN: AF l119 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (d) (WP) 3024(il(l) (WP) (WP) Subsection of Eva!u.ation Worksheet FB!(WP) contail'ling the Task Force's candid FB: 1.4{c) (WP) assessment of identifiable threat(s} Mohammed Cover Page of Guontanamo Review 11 DOD: 1.4 (c) DOD: 50 U.S.C. DOJ: OPP {WF) DOO{WP) FB: {7j(C) (WlP) Rahim Task Force Eva!uatio-n Worksheet; (WP) 3024(;j{l) (WJP) SN: AF-1104 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBJ (WlP) fb: L4 (c) {WP) FB: SO U.S,C. a-ssessment of1dentifiable threat(s) 3024(1){1) (WP) Haroon al tover Page of Guantanamo Reviev1 9 DOD:lA(c) DOD: 50 u.s.c. DOJ: OPP (Wlf) DOD(WP)!FB: (7){C),(E) Afghani Task For<e Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(1){1) (WlP) {WJP) SN: AF-3148 Subsection of Evaluation Wor'ksheet FBl(WP) FB: L4 (cj (WlP) FB: 50 U.S.C. assessment-of 'identifiab!~ threat(s) 3024(1)11) {WP) 1 'potenttally posed by detainee to the WP S: CR;e+h'Sl/ 1 tqrcon// POF-ORPi 019

75 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 75 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 3of18 Mjuayn A! Din Cover Page of Guanranamo Review Jamal Al Din Abd Task force Evaluation Worksheet; Al Fadhil Abd Al Subsection of Evafuation Worksheet Sattar contalnlng the Task Force's candld lsn: UAE- 309 assessment of identifiable threat(s} national.security of the United States. 8 T-OP SE'-'R&T//Sl//.Q'RGQPl//PQFQRN DOD: (a), (bl, jdoj: OPP (WF) DOD (WP) (<), (d). lg) [WP) FB: SO U.S.C. 3024(1)11) (WP] FB (WP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) fbl: (7)(C),(E) {WP) Fadhel Hussein Saleh Hentif SN:-259 Cover Page- of Guant<inamo Review Task Force Evaluation Workshf!et; Subsection of Evatu.atio:n Worksheet assessment offdentifiable threat{s} potentially posed by deta'inee to the natfona.t s:ecurity of the United States. 5 DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)[wp) FS: 1.4 (c) (WP) DOD: 50 U.5.C, [DOJ: OPP (WF) 3024(i)(l); 10 U.S.C. 424 (WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. 3024(i){l) (WP) DOD(WP) FBl(WP) FB; (7}(C),{E) {WP) Riyad Atiq Ali Abdu A! Haj SN:-256 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review ;Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; 5-ubsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing: the Task Force's candid assessment offdentifiabte threat(s) n-ational seci.jrity of the United States. 7 DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), FBJ: 50 U.S.C. OOJ: DPP (WF) OOD (WP) sl 1w1P <111w1p1 FBl:l.4 {<) (WP) FBl(WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) (WJP Said Muhammad!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Sa11h Hatim Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; SN: N255 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identifiable threat(s) nntiona! security of the United States. 7 ODD: 1.4 (a), (c), FB: 50 U.S.C. )DOJ: OPP (Wlf) DOO (WP) [g) (WPJ 3024(1){1) {WP) FBl:l.4 (c)(wp) FB (WP] FB: (J)(C) (WP) 020

76 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 76 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 4 of 18 TOP SEGRET/lSl/.JQRCGPl//PlQFQRP Muhammad Ali Husayn Khanayna lsn:-254!cover Pag ' of Guantanamo Review Task Force_ Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment o'f identifiable threat(sl potentlally posed by detainee to the 6 DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), FB!: 50 V.S.C. DOJ: OPP (WTF) FB (WP) (g) (WP) 3024\;1{1) (WP) FSl:l.4 (c) (WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) (WP) Muhammad Said Cove:r Pag!;! of Guantanamo Review Salim Bin Salman Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; SN: 251 Subsection ofevalua'tion Worksheet containing the Task For<:e's candid assessment of identifiable threat(s.) potentially posed by-detainee to the national security.of the United States. 5 DOD: 1.4 (a), (c) (WPJ FB: 1.4 (c} {WP} FB: SD V,S,C. 3024(i)[l) (WP) DOJ: OPP (WF) OOD(WP) FBl{W!P) FB: (7J(C) (WJP) Mohammed Ahm ensaid Haider S!N: -498 Cover Page: of Guantanamo Review Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet cont<iining the Task force's candid a-s-se:ssment of identifiable threatlsl potentially posed by d'erain1'!e ro the ntjtjonal security of the United States. 9 DOD: L4(a), (b).1000: ld U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (WF) (cj, d), (gj (WP) 424 (WP) FB: 1.4 (c}(wp) FB: 50 u.s.c. 3024(iJ11J (WP) DOD {WP) FBl{WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) (WP) Abd al Rahman al!cover Page of Guantanamo Review Qyati Task Force Eva[uaHon Worksheet; SN: -461 Subsection of Evalu.at1on Worksheet containing the Task Force's-candid assessment ofidentlfiable threat('s) national security of the United States-. 4 DOD: 1.4 {a), (c), FB: SO U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (WF) jdod (WP) (g) (WP) 3024(1)(1) (WP) FBl(WPl FBl:l.4 {c) (WTPJ FB: (7JC) {WPJ TOP SECRiTf/S:l/lORWNHNOl=ORN 021

77 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 77 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 5of18 +OP SiQUH'./ 1!Slh!QJU;;Qpa 1 t 1 t:;iigfqrpi Muhammad Ali Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 13 DOD; 1.4 (a). (c) DOD; 10 U.5.C. DOJ: OPP (WF)!DOD(WP) FB; (7)[Q (WP) Abdalloh Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 424 (WJP) Muh;immad Subsection of vafuation Worksheet FBl(WP) BwazJr containing the TaSk :Force's candid FB; 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: SOU.SL SN: assessment of identlfiable threat(s} 3024(i)(l) (WP) potentially po sed by detainee to the ~" ""'"'' ~'""'" 1~... ~" Mustafa Abd al Cover Pa;ge of Guantanamo Revie\'V 6 l OD(WP) FBJ; (7)(C),(E) Qawi Abd al-aziz Task Fo.rce Evaluatlon Worksheet; (d) (WP) 024(i)ll) (WP) {W?) al-shamlri Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP) SN: 434 containing the Task Force 1 s candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. assessment of ldentifiabl!'.! thr!at(s) 3024(!){1) (WP) national security of the United States, DOJ; OPP (WF) DOD(WP) FB: {7)(C),(E) Adel F.-.ttough All Cover Page of Guantanamo Review & DOD: 1.4 (a), {c), FB; 50 U-5.C. Algauar Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (g) (WP) 3024(i)(l) (WP) {WP) SN: EG-369 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP) FBl:l.4 (c) (WP) assessment -of ldentifi:able threat(s) potentkally posed by detainee to the natfon;i.j security O fthe United States. Ayman Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 5 000; l.4 (a), (c), \FB; 50 U.S.C. DOJ; DPP (WF) DOD(WP) FB: (7)(C) (WPJ Muhammad Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (g) (WP) 3024(1)(1) (WP) Ah_m ad A! Shur fa Subsectlon of Evaluation Worksheet SN:SA-331 containing the Task force's candid FB; 1.4 (c) (WP) 1 FBl(WP) assessment of id-en~ifiable threat(s} national :security of the United States. un> SECRB-r/-/Sl/.,JORCON//~JOFORN 022

78 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 78 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 6 of 18 TOP Si:(;Ri+J,lil{ 1 '0RCQN/}POFQRN Abdah Muhammad Masom SN:SY-330 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task 'Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Task force's e<1ndfd assessment of ident1fiable threat(s) porentlally pos.cd by de'fainee to the 7 000: L4{o). lcj, )000: 10 U.S.C. jooj; OPP WJF) lg) WtPJ 424 (WP) FBt:l.4 (c) (WP) J FB: so U.S.C. 3024ji)(1) {WtP) OOO(WP) FBJ(WP) FB: (71(Cj {WJP) Abd Al Hadi Omar Mahmoud Faraj!SN: SY-329 Cover Pa_ge of Guantanamo Review Task force EV<lluation Works,hee.t; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identifiable threat(s) potentially pos:ed by detainee to the national ~ecurity of the Unlted Stares. 9 ODD' 1.4 {a), (c) 1000: 10 U.S.C. jdoj: OPP (WF) WtP) 424 (WP) FB: 1.4 fc) (WP) JFB: SO U.S.C. 3024li)(1) (WP) DOD(WP} FBl(WtP) FB: (7)(C),(E) (WP) Ali Huss,eJn Muhammed Shaban tsn:sy-327 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 1 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evafuation Worksheet assessment of dentifiable threat{s} potenti,al1yposed by detainee to the national s ecurlty of the Un ired States. 11 DOD: L4 ( ). {c).,000: lou.s.c. jdoj: OPP (WF) (g) {WtPJ 424 (WP) FBl:l.4 (c) {WP) JFB: SO U.S.C. 3024[iJ(l) {WP) 1000 (WP) FBl WtP} fb: (71(C).E {WtP) Ahmed Adnan Ahjam tsn:sy-326 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 1 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet: Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet a:ss~sment of Jdentiflabte threat{s} potentially posed by dotainee to the national security of the United Stares ; 1.4 fa). (c), 'FB: SOU.S.C. jdoj: OPP (WlF) jooo (W!P) (g) (WJP) 3024(i]{l) {WP) FB!:l.4 (c) (WP) FBJ (WP) FB: (7)[C),(EJ (WlP) TOP SEGRE+/#l#ORCQN//NQFORP 023

79 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 79 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27 /17 Page 7of18 :+OP: 6E'.<;R~fSl 1 t/grwpl 1 l 1 lploi;;qrp Mashur Abdullah Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 DOD: 1.4 (a). (b). DOD: 10 U5.C. OOJ: OPP {Wlf) DOD (WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) Muqbil Ahmed Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (c), (d)(wp) 424(W1PJ (WPJ A!-5abri Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBJ (WP)!SN: --32:4 containing the Task Force's c<indid FB: 1.4 {c) (WP) fb: 50 U.S.C. assessment of identifiable threat(s) 3024(1)(1) (WP) national :security of the United StateS-. Muhammed Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 5 DOD: 1.4 (a]. (c). DOD: 50 u.s.c. DOJ: OPP (WF) 1000 (WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) Abdullah Al Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (g){wpj 3024(1)(1] {WP) (WP) lihamiri Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP) SN: -249.containing_ the T<ts k Force's candid FB: 1.4 jc) (WP) FB: SQ U.S.C. assessmen't of identifiable threat(s} national security of the Unlted StatEs. 3024(1)(1) (WP) Abdul Latif Nasir,Cover Pageof Guantanamo Review 9 DOD: 1.4 (a), (c).,fb: 50 U.S,C. DOJ: OPP (W\F) DOO(WP)!FB: (7)(() {WP) ~SN: M0-244 Task for.ce E11aluation Worksheet; (g) (WP) 3024{1)(1) (WP) Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the-task Foree's candid fbl:l.4 (c) (WP) assessment of identifrable: threat{s) natfon;:il security of the United States. FBl(WP) 'Abdallah Yahya Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 6 DOD: 1.4 (a]. (c), DOO: so u.s.c. DOJ: OPP {Wlf) l OD{WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) Yusif At Shibll Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (g} (WP) 3024(1)(1}: 10 (WP) SN: -240 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet U.S.C. 424 (WP) FB (WJP) fbl:l.4 {c) (WPJ assessment ofidcntlfiable threat{s} FB: 50 u.s.c. natronal security of the United States. 3024(1)(1) (WP) TOP SECRE+//$1,l/-OR~ONl/NOFORM 024

80 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 80 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 8of18 WP SECRE:r//SHQR(QPlf/PlQFQRN Shaker A<lmer SN: SA-239 Cover Page of Go<i.ntanamo Review Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Task force's.candid assessment of identifiable threat{s) m~tional 'Security of the United States. 7 DOD: 1.4 (a), {c), lfb: 50 U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (WF!DOD (WP) {gl (WP 3024{i){ll {WP) FB (WP) FB: 1.4 (cl (WP) fb: (7)(C),(E (WPJ Saeed Ahm-ed Mohammed Abdullah Sa rem Jarabh SN:-235 CoV13( Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identifiable threat(s) poteotialfy posed by detainee to the national security of the Unlted States. 9 DOD: 1.4 (a), (cl, (gl(wp) 3024{i)(l); 10 U.S.C. 424 (WP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP FB: 50 U.S.C. 3024[i){1) {WP) DOD: so u.s.c. DOJ: OPP (WF DOD(WP FBl{WP FB: (7)1C).(E) (WP Abd al Raiaq Muhammed Safih!SN: -233 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task force Evaluation \Vorksheet; Subsection of EvahJation Worksheet assessment of identifiable threat(s} national security of the United States, 8 DOD: 1.4 (al. (cl FB: SO U.S.C. [\VP) 3024(11(11 [WP) FB: 1.4 (cl (WP) DOJ: OPP (WF DOD(WP) FBl(WP) FB: (71(CJ (WP) Abd Al Rahman Abdullah Ati Shabati SN:-224 Cover Page 0-f Guantanamo Review Task Fon:e Evaluation Wonksheet; Subsection of Evnluation Worksheet containing t_he Task Force's candid assessment of identifiable 1hreat{s) 7 DOD: 1.4 (a),(<), FB: 50.U.S.C. (g) (WP) 3024(i)!ll (WP FB: 1.4 (cl (WP) DOJ: OPP {Wlfl FB {WP) iifb: [7)(C),(E (WlP) 025

81 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 81 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 9of18 TOP SEGRH',t/Sl/lgRGgPlf/PlgfQRP Khalid Adullah Mil~had al~ Mutayri!SN: KU-213 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task farce Ev.iluation. Worksheet: Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identifiable threat(s) national security of the United States:. 10 DOD: L4 {a), {b), (c), (d) {WJP) FB: 1.4 fc) (WP) DOD: so u.s.c. DOJ: OPP{WF) 3024(il(l); 10 U.S.C. 424 (WP) FB: SO U.S.C. 3024(i)(l) (WP) OOD(WP) FBl(WP} FB' (7)(C},(E) (WP) Mahmoud Omar Muhammad Bin At cf JSN:-202 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identifiable threat(s} potentially posed by detalnee to the national security of the Unlted States. 6 DOD: 1.4 (a), {b), FB: so u.s.c. (c), {d), (g) (WP) 3024(il(l) (WP) fs: 1.4 {c) (WlP) DOJ: OPP (WF) DOD(WP) FBl(WlP) FBJ: (7){C),{E) (WlP} Sa<1d Muhammad Husayn Qahtan1 SN:SA-200 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Ewluation Worksheet containing the Task force's candid 'assessment ofidentifiabte threat{s) national security of the United State-s. 8 DOD: 1.4 { ), (c), DOD: SO U.S.C. DOJ: OPP {WlF) {g) (WP) 3024(1){1); 10 U.S.C. 424 {WlPj FBl:l.4 ;(c) {WlP} FB: so u.s.c. 3024{i)[l) (WP) l OO{WP) FBl{WJP) FBl: {7)(C),{Ej (WJP.) Mohammed Abd A1 Rahman Al Shumrant l!sn,sa-lss Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force Evaluation. Worksheet; Sub-section of Evaluation Worksheet assessment ofldentifiabfe threat(s) 12 DOD: 1.4(a), (b), DOD: 50 U.S.C. l OJ: OPP {WF) (c), (d), (g) [WP) 3024{i){1}; 10 U.S.C. 424 (WP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: 50 U.5.C. 3024(i)(l} (WP) l OO{WP) FBl(WP) FB: (7){C),(E) {WlP) TOP SE:GRiT/}Sl//OROON/-/NQFORP 026

82 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 82 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 10of18 +GP S''R~!ili1lGR~~/;lMO~ORP Shec;f Fai; AU Al Cove~ Page oiguantanamo Review 5 rod: 1.4 (a), (c), FB: SO U.S.C. DO: OPP {WF) DOD (WP) 'FB: (7){C) (WlP) Mishad Task force Evaruation Worksheet; (g) (WP) 3024(;)11) (WP) SN: EG-190 SubsectJon of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP) contain:ing the Task Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) {WP) assessment of id-entifi';:ible threat(s) 'Salem Abd.u!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 1l DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), DOD: so u.s.c. DOJ: DPP (WF) DOD (WPJ )'Bl: (7)(CJ,(EJ Salam Ghereby Task Force Evaluation Wo:rks.heet; (c), (d), (g) (WPJ 3024(;)11) (WP) (WP) tsn: LY-189 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WlP) co-ntain1ng the Task Force's candid FB: 1.4 {c) (WP) FB: SD U.S.C. assessment of identlflable threat(s} 3024(;)11) (WP) poteritlally posed by deta:lne-e to the national security of the Unlted States. Tariq All Cover Page of Gu;Jntanamo Rcvtew 8 DOD: 1.4 (o}, (c), DOD: 10 U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (WF) DOD (WlP) FB: (7)(CJ,[E) AbduUah Ba TasK Force Evaluation Worksheet; (g}(wp) 424{W!P} (WP} Odah Sub:sectlon of Evaluation Worksheet FBl (W!P) lsn: -178 FBl:l.4 (c) {WP) FB: SD U.S.C. assessment of dentifiable threat(s) 3024[i)(1)(WP) ~potentially po:sed by detainee to the national :security of the United States. Adel Al Hakeemy Cover Page of Gu3ntanamo Review & DOD: 1.4 (a), (c) FB: 50 U.S.C. DOJ: DPP (WJF) DOD (WJP) FBJ: (7)(C),(E) tsn: TS-168 Task Force Evaluation Work5heet; (WP) 3D24(i}i1J (WP) (WP) Subsection of Evaluat1.on Worksheet FB (WP) containing the T<Jsk Force's. candid FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) asscs.:srnent of identifiable threat{s.) national security ofihe United States. TOP SEGRi+l/Sl//OROON,'/PlOFORN D27

83 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 83 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 11of18 Ali Yahya Mahdi \Cover Page of Guantanamo Review SN: ~167 Task Force Evaluation Works-heet; Subsection of Evaiuation. Worksheet. assessment of identifiablethrcat{s} 9 DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), DOD: so u.s.c. JDOJ: OPP (WF) (c), {d), (g) (WJP) 3024{i){1); ld u.s.c. 424 (W Pl FB: 1.4 (c) {WP) FB: SO U.S.C. 3024(;1(1) {WP) JDOD{WJP) FB (WP) FB: {7)(C).{E) {WP) Adil Said Al Haj Ubayd Al- Busayss!SN: -165 Cover Page of Guantanamo Reviev,r Task.i=:orc:e Evaluation Worksheet; Subs ection of Evaluation. Worksheet containing the Task Force's candi:d assessment of identifiable threat{s) :national security of the U'nJted States. 5 DOD: 1.4 (a], (cj, (g){wp) fs: 1.4 (<) (WP) FB: SO U.S.C. 3D24(i)(lj (WP) DOD: 50 u.s.c. OOJ: OPP (Wlf) 3024(;){1) (WP) OOO(WP) FBl(WP) lfb: (7)(C),(E) (WP) Adnan Farhan Abd Al-Latif JSN: 156 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Fon:e Evaluation \Vorksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the: Task Force's c<indid assessment of identifiable threat{sj nationa 1 security of the United States :1.4(a),(c), FBl:SOU.S.C. (g) (WPJ 3024(11(1) {WP) FBl:l.4 (c) {WP)! OJ, OPP (Wlf) DOO(WP) fbl(wp) FBt FJ(C],(E) (WP) Ahmed Abde! Az.iz SN: MR 757 Cover Page of Guant;inamo Review Task Forc:e Evaluation Worksheet; Sohsectlon: of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Task Force's ci:indid assessment of identifiable threat{s} nat!onar security of the United States. 14 DOD: 1.4 (a), (b),,fb: SD U.S.C. (c), d), (g} (WP) 3024(1)11) (WP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) OOJ: OPP (WF) DOD(WP) FBl(WP) FBl: (7JC),(E) (WP) TGP SE,RE+//Sl,LfORCml//NOHlRP 028

84 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 84 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 12of18 TQP SEGRli:rNSH~Rc;oPWNQfQRN Abdul Muhammad N:assir al Muhajari SN: 728 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Tas.k For:c:e Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assf:!ssment -efidentifiable threa.t(s) porenti:auy posed by detainee lo the 7 DOD: L4 {a). (b).1000:. 10 u.s.c.!doj: OPP (WF) le}, (d), (g) (WP) 424 (WlP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) JFB: SO U.S.C. 3024(ij[l) (WP) Jooo (WJP) FBl(WP) FB: {7)(C) (WP) Jihad Deyab SN: LE-722!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Eval.uation Worksheet a-ssessment of identifiabfe threat{s} potentially posed by detalnee to the 6 000: L4 (a), (c), [FB: 50 u.s.c. (g) (WP) 3024[1)(1) (WP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) l OJ: OPP (Wlf) l OD{WP) FBl(WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) (WP) Mohammed A Zahrani tsn: SAw713 Fayiz:Ahmad Yahla-Suleiman SN: 153 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force Eva!utition Worksheet; Subsection of \Tilfuation Worksheet assessment of identifiable threat{s} Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force Evaluation: Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Task Force's candid assessment of identifiable threat{s) potentially posed by det<:1inee to the 6 10 DOD: 1.4 {c) {WP) FB: 1.4\c) (WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. 3024(1)11) (WP) DOD: 50 U.S.C. JDOJ: OPP {WF) 3024{1){1) {WPj DOD: 1.4 {a), (b), [FB: SO U.S.C. OOJ: OPP (WF) (c), (d), (g) (WP] 3024(1)(1) (WP) FB: 1.4 {c) (WP) DOD(WP) lrrn {WP) DOO(WP) FBl{WP) JFB: {7)(C) (WP) FB: (7)(C),(E (WP) TQP SEa!li:r/lSll/ORCQN//NQFQRN 029

85 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 85 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 13of18 +Qp SE(:R'E+//ilif.fQROO~/;iPJQs;:QRP AsimThahit Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 7 DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), DOD: 50 U.S.C. DOJ: DPP (WF) FSJ(WP) FSJ: {7)(C),(E) Abdullah Al- Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (gi{wp) 3024(i)(l) {WP) {WJP) Khalaqi Subsection of EvaJuatlon Worksheet SN: 1S2 'Containing the Task Force's candid FB: 1.4 tel {WP) 1'8'' so u.s.c. assessment of identifiable threat{s} 3024(i)il) (W?) potentially pt'lsed by detainee to the national security of the United States. Salem Ahmad Cover Page of Guantilnamo Review 11 DOD: 1.4 (a). (b), DOD: SO U.S.C. DOJ: OPP {WF) DOD(WP) FB: (7)(C),{E) Hadi Bin Kanad Task For-ce Evaluation Worksheet; (c), {d), (g) {WP) 3024(1){1) (WP) (WlP) SN: Subsection of Evalualio:n Worksheet FBl{WP) containing the Tas.k Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c} (W?) FB: SO U.S.C. assessment of identff1able thrcat{s) 3024(i)(l) (WP) national :security of the United States. Ghaleb Nassa< Al Cover Pog<> of Guan!>namo Review 10 DOD: 1.4 (a}, {c.}. FS: SO U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (WF) FBJ (WP) FB: {7)(C),(D),(E) Bihani Task Force Evaluation Work.sheet; (g) (WP) 3024{i)(l) (WP) (WJP) LSN: ~128 Subsection of Evaluatton Worksheet!FB: 1.4 (c) (WJP) assessment of identifiable thrcatls'j nation<il security of (he tjnited States. Mukhtar Anaje!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 12 DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), ODD: SO U.S.C. DO: OPP (W!F) DOD(WP) FB: (7)(C).(E) SN: ll7 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (rl) {WP) 3024(1)11) (WP) (W!P) Subsectlon of Evatuation Worksheet FB (WP) containing the Task Force's c<1ndld FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: SO U.S.C. assessment of1dentif1:able threat(s) 3024(i)il) (W?) national security of the Un'ited States. :ro?-secret//sl//orgon//pjol=orn 030

86 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 86 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 14of18 +OP S&bR~;t,lSJhlQRbQNlf~Q~gRN Abdul Rahman Cover Page of-guantanamo Review 8 DOD: 1.4 (a), (c}, FB: SO U.S.C. OOJ:. OPP (Wlf) l OD(WP) FB: (7JC),(E) Mohammed Tosk Force Evaluation Worksheet; (g}wp) 3024(i}{l) {WP) {WP) Saleh Nasir Subsection of Eval'uation Worksheet FB1(WP) SN: -115 containlngthe Task force's candid FB: 1.4 {c) (WP) assessment of identifiable threat(s) potentially- po-sed by detainee to the national security of the Unlted States. Abdul Rauf Omar Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 7 DOD: 1.4 (a), {c), 000: 50 U.S.C.! OJ: OPP (WF) DOD{WP) FB: (7}{C),(E) Mohammad Abu Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; {g){wp) 3024(1){1) WP) {WP) Al-Quisln Subsection of Evaluation. \rllorksheet FBl(WP) SN: LY-709 FB: 1.4 (c) {WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. assessment of identifiable threat{s) 3024(i)(l) (WP) s 1000: 1.4 lo), (cl, DOJ: OPP (Wlfl l OD(WP) FB1: (7){C) (WlP) smael Ali Faraj Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Ali Bakush Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (g){wp) lsn: ly-708 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet fbl(wlp) contairfrng, the- Task force's rnndid assessment of identifiable threat{s} potent!ally posed by detalnee to the natlona1 security of the United States. Shakhrukh Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 5 FB' 1.4 (c) (WP) FB' 50 U.S.C. OOJ' OPP \WF) FBl(WP) FBJ: (7)!C) {WP) Hamlduva Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; 3024(i){l) (WJP) SN: UZ-22 Subsection of Evaluation. Worksheet containing: the Task Force's candid assessr:nent of ldentffiable threat(s} TQ'P S~RE+f/-Sl//ORGQPl/-jPHJFORN 031

87 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 87 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27 /17 Page 15of18 :J'.QP Si:bRE+,lfS~9'.QRbGN/JNQFQRP Ahmed Zayid Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 12 DOD: 1.4 (a), (c), DOD: SD U.S.C. JDOJ: DPP {WF) JDDD(WP) JFB: (7JC) {WP) Salim Al Zuhayd Task Forte Evaluation Worksheet; (g) (WJP) 3024(1)(1] (WP)!SN:SA 669 Subsection of Evaluati:on Worksheet JFBl(WP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP} FB: SO U.S,C. assessment of identifiable threat(s) 3D24(i}{l] (WP} potent/ally posed by detainee to the Nagid Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 3 FS: 50 u.s.c. DOJ: OPP (WF} JFB (WP} FB: (7)(C} {WP) DOJ Mohammed Task Force Evalu<Jtion Worksheet; 3024(1)(1) {WP} SN: CH 102 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FSk 1.4(<) (WP) containing the Task 'Force's candid assessment ofidentlfiable threat(s) Arkin Mahmud Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 5 DOD: 1.4 (c) FB: so u.s.c. DOJ: OPP (WF) r!(w!p) lfb: (7}{C),1E)!SN: CH~l03 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(1)(1) (WP) (WP) Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Task Forice's candid assessment of identifiable threat(s) nattom:il security of the United States. FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) Adel Noori Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 3 DOD: 1.4 (c) looj: OPP (Wlf) FBJ(WP) FB: (7)(C) {WP) SN:CH-584 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) Subsection: of Evaluation Worksheet nssessment of identifiable rhreat{s] 032

88 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 88 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 16of18 +QP S 'CRE:r//Sl//ORCOPJil/P.QFQRP Kamalludin Kasimbekov JSN: UZ-67S Cover Page of Guantanamo Revte\v Task-Farce Evaluatipo Worksheet;: Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet contairiing the Task Force's candid a:sses-sment ofldentifiable threat{s} potenrfally posed by detainee to the national security of the United State-:s. 5 DOD: 1.4 {b), (c), lfb: 50 U.5.C. DOJ: OPP!Wlf)!FB (WP) (d) {WP) 3024(i){l) (WP) FBl: 1.4 {cj (WP) FBJ; (7}{C {WP) Aziz: Abdul Naji \SN: AG-744 CO\ler Page of Guantanamo Review Task force. Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Task Force's candld assessment Of identifiable thre:at(sj linatlonal security of the United States. 4 DOD: 1.4 {c) {Wte) FB: 1.4 (c) {WP) DOD: 50 u.s.c. DOJ: OPP {WJF) 3024(1){1); 10 U.5.C. 424 (WP) FB: 50 U.S.C. 3024{i)il) (WP) DDO{WP) FB (WP) FB: (71{C) (WP) Ahmad Tourson Cover Page of Guantanamo Review!SN: CH~201 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Work5heet containi.ng:_the.task Force's candid a:ssessm:ent ofidentifiabfe threat(s) potentfally posed by detaine-e to the natlona security of the United States. 3 DOJ DOD: 1.4 (a), l&l (WP) FB: 1.4 {c) (WlP) FB: 50 U.5.C. 3024{i){l) (WP) DOJ: OPP (WFJ FBl{WPJ!FB: (7\(C)(WPJ Abdul Razak SN: CH 219 Cover Page of Goant.anamo Revlew T.ask force Evaluation: Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identlfiabl'e lhreat(s} national!>ecofity of the United States : 1.4 (a), le), {g){wp) DOJ: OPP (WF) FBl(WP) FB: (7]{Q (WP) 1'.QP SE,Rr.+/./Sl//QRCOPJ/-/PlQfORN 033

89 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 89 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 17of18 TQP' SE:CR'i.:r/-/Sl,l/QRc;;OPJ 1 l/hqfqrfll Huzaifa Parhat Cover Page: ofguant.anamo Revlev1 3 DOD: 1.4 (b). (c],!sn: CH-320 Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (dj (WP) Subsection of Evaluutlon Worksheet DOJ: OPP (WF)!FB (WJP)!FB: [7J!C) {WJP) containing the T.ask Force's candid assessment of ident\fiabte threat(s) n<i-ti'onal security of the United States. Nabil Said Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 4 DOD: 1.4 (o). (c). FB: SO U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (WF) FB (WPJ FB: (7)(C) (WP) HJdjarab Task.Force Ev;iluation WorJq;heet; (g)(wp) 3024(i)(l) (WP) SN: AG-233 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Task Fo-rce's candid FB: 1.4 (c) {WJP) assessment of identifiable threat(s) national :security of the United States. Oibek Cover Page of G uantan:amo Revi:ew s DOD: 1.4 (a). (g) fbj: 50 U.S.C. DOJ: OPP {WF} DOD (WP) FB: (7)(Cl {WP) Jamalad1novkh Task Force EvaJuation Wor'ksheet; (WP) 3024(1)(1) (WP) Jabarov Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FBl(WP) SN: UZ-4S2 FB: L4 (c) (WPj assessment of identifiable threat(s) p-otentially posed by detainee to the national security of the Unlted States. Ahmed \Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 3 DOJ: OPP (WJf) FBl(WP) FB: (7){C) (WlP) Mohamed Yaqub Task f_orre Evaluation Works.heat; SN: CH~.328 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing_ the Task Force's candid assessment ofidentifiable.threat(s} AHsheer Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 5 FBJ: 1.4 (c) [WP) FB: SO U.S.C.!DOJ: DPP (WF) FB (WP) FB: (7)(C) (WP) Hammedulah Task force Evalu;:'ltion Worksheet; 3024(1)11) {WJP) SN: UZ 45S Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identifiabl'e threat(s) l:natio-nal secur1ty of the United S~ates. +GP SECRE::rff$1,t/QROOPl//PJQFORN 034

90 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 90 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 26-9 Filed 03/27/17 Page 18of18 TOP SECRE+//Slfµ)RCQN//NQFQRN Mohammed El Gharanl lsn: C0-269!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review :Task force Evaluation Worksheet; Subse:ctioo of Evaluation Worksheet a5.s~s.sment of identifiable threat{s) natfona! security of the United States. 8 DOD: 1.4 (c) (WP) DOD: so u.s.c. DOJ: OPP (WF) 3024(;)(1) (WP) FB: 1.4 {<) (WP) FB: 50 u.s.c 3024(;)(1) (WP) FB (WPJ FB: (7)(C) {WP) AbdA Rahim Abdul R:a:raq Janka SN: SY-489 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identifiable threat(s) potentially pos:ed by detainee co the 4 DOD: 1.4 (c) (WP) fb: 1.4 {c) (WP) FB: SO U.S.C. 3024{;)(1) (WP) DO): DPP (WJF) DOD(WP) fb {WPJ FB: (7JCJ (WP) Hass.an Anvar SN: CH-250 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force Evalu<ition Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet cont<iiningthe Ti!sk Force's candid assessment of identifiable threat{s) national :security of the-unlted States. 3 DOJo OPP (WF)!FB (WP) FB: (7)(CJ!WP) Yousef Abb.:is SN:CH-275 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subs.ection. of Evaluation Worksheet containing the: Task Force's candid assessment of lde:ntifiable threat{s} potentfally posed by detainee to the n:attona1 securfty of the United States.. 2 OOJ: OPP {WF) +op SliCRETl/Sll/O~CON,9NOFQRP 035

91 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 91 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document Filed 03/27/17 Page 1of20 :f.qp: Slil,';;RST-/,!SlffQRGQP'/PJQFQRN: Bahtiyar Mahnut Cover P<1ge of Guantanamo Revlew 3 DOD: 1.4 (c) DOJ: OPP (WF) DOD(WP) FB: (7)(C) (WP) SN: CH-277 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; {WP) Subsection of Evafuation Worksheet!FB [WP) assessment of identifiabl.e threat(s} national-security of the Unlted States. Abdul Helli Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 4 DOD: 1.4 (c) l OD;SD U.S.C, [DOJ: OPP {WF) [DOD{WP) [FB: (7)(C) (WP) Mamut Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(1)(1) (WP} SN: CH-278 Subsection: of Evaluation. Worksheet [FBl(W!Pl assessment of identifiable threat(s) Abdul Rahman Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 3 OOOo 1.4 l J. lc), FBJ: 50 U.S.C. [DOJo OPP!WF) [FB (WP) [FB: (7)(C) (WJP)!SN:: CH 281 Task Force Evaluation: Worksheet; (g) WP) 3024(ill1J WP) Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the. ~ask Force's candid assessm.ent of identifiable threat{s) jfs: 1.4 {c) (WP) potentlauy posed by detainee to the SaiduUah l<hallk Cover Page of.guantanamo Review 3 DOD: 1.4 (a). le) FB; so u.s.c DOJ: OPP (WF) FB [WP) rl: (7)1C).(E)!SN: CH 2SO Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) 3024(i){1) [WP) (WP) Subsection of' Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identifiable thre-at{s} [FB: 1.4 [c) (WP) potentijjly posed by detainee to. the Hajiakbar Abdul Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Ghuper Task force Evaluation Worksheet; (WP) SN: CH-282 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet )11) (WP) (WP) containing-the Task Force's candid [FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) assessment of lde-ntiflabl'e th-reat(s) potent.k11!y posed by detainee to the national S<:!curfty of the United States. 3 OOD: 1.4 (c) FS!; so u.s.c DOJ; OPP (WF) FBl(WP) FS!: 17J(C),(El TOP SEt:RET// 1//GRCON.//PJOFORM 036

92 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 92 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document Filed 03/27/17 Page 2 of 20 TQP SEC:Rii:r;l,!il//QRbQN//M QFQRfll Ahmed Bin Sa!ell Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Bel Bacha Task force- Evaluation Worksheet; 1-SN: AGw290 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identifiable threat(sl national se:curity of the United States. 5 DOD: 1.4 (c {WP) FB: 1.4 {c) (WP) 000: 50 U.5.C. DOJ: OPP (WF)!FB (WPJ 30240)(1); 10 U.5.C. 424 {WPJ FB: 50 U.S.C. 3024(iJ11J {WP) FB: (7)(C).{EJ (WlP) Jallal Adin Abd Al Cover Page of Guanianamo Review Rahman Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; lsn: CH-285 :Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Task force's candid assessment of identlfia b!e threat(s) potentially posed by detainee to the 3 DOD: 1.4 (aj, (cj (WP) FB: 1.4 {cj (WPJ rl: 50 U.S.C. 3024(1)(1) (WP) 1000: so u.s.c.. DOJ: OPP (WF) 3024(iJll) (WPJ FBl (WPJ FB: (7)(C) {WPJ Eman Abdulahat Covef Pa:ge of Guantanamo Review!SN: CH~295 T<1sk Force Evaluation Workshr::et; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Task force's candid assessment of identifiable threat[s) pot.entially posed by detainee to the 3 DOJ: OPP jwf) FBl{WP) FB: {7)(C) {WP) Muti:a Sadiq Ahmad Sayy.ab SN: AG-288 C<lver Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force EV<iluation Worksheet; Subsection of Eva.tu.ation Worksheet assessment of identifiable threat{s) potentially posed by deta.inee to the 6 DOD: 1.4 fb), (c), FB: 50 U.S.C. DOJ: OPP {WF) (d)(wp) 3024(11(1) {WP) FB: 1.4 {c) {WPl FB (WlP] FB: (7)(C) (WPJ Saiid Farhi SN: AG-311!Cover Page ofguanta,namo Review Ta$k Force- Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Tas:k Force's candid assessment of identifiable threat{s.) national security of ttie United States. 4 DOD: 1.4 (a], (b), FB: 50 U.S.C. (c}, (d}, {g) (WP) 3024{iJ(l) (WP)!FB: 1.4.(c) {WP) DOJ: OPP.{WF) FSl(WJP) FB: {7)(C],(EJ {WP) +Qp SEGRET/ti'l//ORC:ONJ/PJQFQRPJ 037

93 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 93 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document Filed 03/27/17 Page 3 of 20 +Qf.l i'gre+/,qil/i!qr(;qfllf, PQ~QRP Oawut Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 3 DOD: 1.4 (c) FB; 50 U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (WF) FB (WP) FB: (7)(C).(E) Abdurehim Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; {WJP) 3024(;)(1) (WJP) (WJP) lsn:ch-289 Subsectlon of Evaluation Worksheet conta"iningthe Task Force's candid FB: 1.4 (c) {WP) assessment of1dentifiablethreat(s) Sabir lahmar Cover Page Of Guantanamo Review 5 DOD: 1.4 l<l DOJ,: OPP {W!F) fsn:,ag Tas-k Force Evafuation Worksheet; (W?) Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet contalningthe T:tisk Force's candtd assessment of ldentifiabte threat(s] nat!onal security of the United States. Djamel S.a-lld Ali Cover Page of Guantanamo Revlew 4 DOD: 1.4 (c) FB: SD U.S.C. DOJ: OPP {WF) FB (WP) fbl: {7)(C),(E) Ame:ziane Ta.sk force Evaluation Worksheet; (WlP} 3024[1]\1) {WP) (WP) SN: AG-310 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet conti"lining the Task Force's candid FB: 1.4 {c){wjp) l:a:ssessrnent uf ide:ntifiabte. threat{s) Liikhdar,Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 3 DOD: 1.4 (c) 001: OPP (Wlf} Boumedlene Task Force Evaluation Worksheet: (WlP) SN: AG looos Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Tas.k Force's candid assessment-nf identifiable threat{s} natlonal security 'of the United States. fdris Ahmad Abd Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 10 DOD: 1.4 (a). (c). FB: SO U.S.C. s DOJ: OPP (WF) DOD(WlP) FB: (7)(C).{E) Al Qadir ld ris Task force Evaluation Worksheet; {g}(wlp) 3024(11(1) {WlP) (W?) lsn: 3-5 Subsection of Evaluation Wofksheet FBl(WP) FB: 1.4 (c) {WP) assessment of irlentifiab!e threat{s) putentially posed by deta1nee to tne WP SEGR ET//SNORGON,'/~QFORN 038

94 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 94 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document Filed 03/27/17 Page 4 of 20 +QP SE;tRi+,lfSHORt;,QPl,ff Pl0$=~N Fawzi Khalid Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 12 DOD: la {a), (b), FB: SO U,S;C. OOJ: OPP {WF) FB (WPJ FB: {7J(CJ,!El Abdultah Fahad Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (<J, {d), {g)(wp) 3024(i)(l) (WP) (WP) Al Odah Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet SN: KU-232 FB: 1-4 {c) (WP) assessment of identifiable threat{s) national se-ct.:1rity ofttie United States. All Ahmad al- Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 12 OOD: 1.4 (a), (c), OOD: SO U-5,C. 1001: DPP (WF) FS (WP] FS!: {7J(CJ,(E) R;;ihiz-1 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet.; {g) (WP] 3024(<)(1) (WPJ {WP) fsn:-45 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FB: 1-4 [c) {WP) JFB: SO US.C assessment of dentifiable threat{s) 3024(i)(l) (WP) national :security of the United States. Mohammed Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 7 DOD:L4(c) DOD:SOU.S.C. DOJ:DPP (WFJ DOD[WP)!FB: (7)(C) (WP) M-ohammed Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; {W1P) 3024(i)\l) (WP) Hasan Al Odaini Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet!FB [WP) SN: -681 cont'<iinlng the Task Force's c;::mdid FB: la (c) [WP) FB: SO U.S.C. assessment of identifiable threat(s} 3024(i)(l) {WP) potentially pos-ed by detainee to the Omar Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 16 DOD: 1.4(c) DOD: SO US,C.! OJ: DPP {WF) DOD(WP) FB: j7)(c),(e) Mohammed Ali Task Force Evaluation. Worksheet; (WP) 3024(ij(J (WP) (WPJ Al-Ram mah Subsection ofev.aluatfon Worksheet FB [WJP) SN: FB: A (c)wjp) FB: SO U.S,C assessment of identifiable threat{s) 3024(i)(l) {WP) national security of the Unlted States. TOP SiCRiT/Jsl-//ORCOM//NOfORN 039

95 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 95 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document Filed 03/27117 Page 5 of 20 WP SECRE:rffSl/}QROOM}/PlQFQRl>J Younis Abdutrabman lichekkouri SN; M0-197 Cover Page of Guantanamo Rc:vie\'' Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identffiab!e threat(s} potentlaliy posed by detainee to the national security of the Unlted States. 12 DOD: L4 (b), (c), (d) (WP) FB: 1-4 {c) {WP) DOD; so u.s.c. DOJ: OPP (WF) 3024(i](l); 10 U.S.C. 424 (WP) FBJ: 50 U.S.C 3024(1)(1) {WP) DOD (WP) FBl(WP) FB: (7J{C),(EJ (WlP) Abdullah Bin Ali Al Luft] SN:1S-894 Cover Page of G t.1:antanamo Reviev11 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluatton Worksheet containing the Tas.k For.c:e's candid assessment o'f identlfrnbfe threat{s} : 6 DOD: 1.4 (b), {cj, FB: 50 U.S.C. d) {WP) 3024(i){.1J {WPJ FB: 1.4 (c) {WP) DOJ: OPP (WlF) DOD(WP) fbt(wp) FB: (7){C) {WPJ Rafiq: Bio Sashir Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Bin Jalud Al Hami Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;!SN: TS-892 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment ofldentlfiab!e threat{s) national s<?:cucity of the Un ired States. s FS!: 1-4 (c) {WP) FBJ: SD u.s.c. DOi: OPP (WF) (FB {WP) 3024(i)(l) {WP) FB; {7)(C) [WP) Barhumi Riyadh leaver Page of Guantanamo Review Bin Muhammad Task force Evaluation \Vorksheet; Tahir Bin l..akhdir Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet Nas.ri SN:TS-510 assessment of identifiable threat{s) potentially posed by detainee: to the,natronal security of the United States. 1 7 DOD: 1.4 (b), (c), {rl) {WP) FB: 1.4 {c) (WP) DOD: 50 u.s.c. DOJ; OPP (Wtf) 3024(i){1); 10 U.S.C. 424 {WP) FB: 50 U.S.C 3024{i)(l) {WP) DOD[WP) FB {WP) FB: (7){C) (WJP) TOPS E-CRSTl/Sl/./ORCON/JNOFORl>l 040

96 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 96 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document Filed 03/27117 Page 6 of 20 l'qp S!;CRi+/,!$1,t/QROOPlf,'llQFQR! Abdul Bin!Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Mohammed Abls Task force Evaluation Worksheet; Ourgy Subsection of Evaluation Works.heet SNoTS 502 assessment of identifiable threat(s) national security oflhe United States. 7 OOD: 1.4 {c) {WP) OODo 10 U.S.C. DOJo OPP (WF) 424 (WP) FBlo l.4 (c) (WlP) FBlo SO U.5.C. 3024(1)(1) (WP) {DOD (WP) FB {WP) FB: (7){C) (WP) Hall Aziz Ahmed Cpver Page of Guantanamo Review Al-Maythali Task Force Evaluation Worksheet;!SN: 840 Subsection of Evafuation Worksheet assessment of identifiable threat(sl p-otentlaljy posed by detainee to the 7 DODo 1.4 (c) (WP) FBJo 1.4 (c) {WP)!FB: 50 U.S.C. 3024(1)(1) (WJP) DOD:50U.S.C. DOJ: OPP (Wlf) 3024(1)(1) (WP) fb (WJP) FB: (7)(C),(E) '(WJP) Mus ab Omar Ali Cover Pa_ge of Guantanamo Review Al-Mud\\lani Task Force Ev;.i.!uation Worksheet; SN: -S39 Subsection of Evaluation Works.heet containing the Tas.k Force's candid assessment of identifiable threat(s} pote.rnlally posed by detainee to the national security of the UnJtQd Sta"te-s. 10 DODo 1.4 (b), (cj.,dodo 10 U.S.C. DDJo DPP {WF) d) (WP) 424 (WP) FBlo 1.4 (c){wp) FB: 50 U.S.C. 3024(1)[1) (WP) DOO (WP) FBl(WP) FB: (7)(C),{E) (WP) Ayub Murshid Ali Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Salih Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; SN: -836 Subsection of Evatuation-Worksheet cont<1ining the Task Force's candid assessment -of dentifiable threat(s} 9 DOD: 1.4 {c) {WP) OOJ: OPP (WF) l'qp SEGRi+h'Sl/fGRCGN,l/"QFQRP 041

97 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 97 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document Filed 03/27/17 Page 7 of 20 TQp SECRi+//Sl{jQRCON,'}tJOFQR~ Sharqawi Abdu Ali Al Hajj SN: VM-1457 Cover Page ofgu<intanamo Re11iew Task force Evaluation Wor'kshe;;:t; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Task Fort:e's candid assessment of ide ntlfiable threat(s) potentially posed by detainee'to the natlonal security of the United States. s DOD: 1.4 (a). (c), DOO: 50 US.C. DOJ: OPP {WF) (g) (WP) 3024(i)[1) {WPj FB: 1.4 (cl {WP) FB: SO U.S.C. 3024(i)() (WJP) DOD(WP) FBl(WP) FB: (71(C),(E) (WP) Bensayah Belkecem SN: AG Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task: Force Evalu:ation Worksheet; Subsection of Eva[uation Worksheet containing the Task force's candid assessment of identifiable threat{s) - Rldah Bin Saleh Cover Page of Guantanamo Revje\v al Yazidi Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; JSN: TS.-38 Subsection of Evaluation \Vorksheet contalnlng the Task Force's candid ussessment ofldentlfrabte threat(s} po-tentiatly posed by detainee to the nationill security of the United States. 10!O DOD: L4(a). (c), 1 s1: so u.s.c. DOJ: OPP (WFJ 1000 {WP) (g) (WP) 3024(1)(1) (WP) FB (WP) FB: 1.4 [c) (WP) DOD: l.4 (c) (WP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) DOD: 50 U.S.C.!DOJ: DPP (WF) 3D24(iill); 10 U.S.C. 424 (WPJ FB: 50 U.S.C. 3024(i){l) (WP)!DOD (WP) jfb (WP) FB: (7)(C),(E) (WP) FB: (7){C),(E) (WP) Saleh Bin Hadi ruasi SN:TS-46 Cover Page ofguantanamo Review Task force Evaluation. Worksheet; Subsection of Ev.alu.ation Worksheet assessment ofidentlfiable threat{s} potentially posed by detainee 10 the natlona! security of the United States. s DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), FB: 50 U.S.C. / DOJ: OPP (WF) /FBl(WP) (c). (d), (g) (WP) 3024(i)!1) {WP) FB: L4 {c) (WP) FB: (7l(C),(E) {WP) 1-0P SECRE+.'/Sll!Ot:;COPl/lP~ 042

98 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 98 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document Filed 03/27/17 Page 8 of 20 'f'qp SECRG+h!Sl//QRCQN//PQFQRJ'J Suhayl Abdul Anam al Shar<ibi SN:,569 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Forti? Evatuation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluatfon Worksiieet containing the Task Force's candid assessment of identifiable threat(s) potentially posed by detainee to the national security of the United Srates. 6 DOD: 1.4 (aj, (c), (g] (WP) OOJ: OPP (WF) Ayrman Saeed Abdullah 8atarf1 St<: 627 Cover Page of Guantanamo Re\flew Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment ofidentifiable threat{s} natfo:nal security of the United St:ates. 5 OOJ: OPP WF),Yaslr Ahmad All 1 Muh;;unmad raher SN: -679 Cover Page of Guantanamo Revie\'l Task Force Eva!uation Worksheet; Subsecti-on of Evaluation Worksheet containing the: Task Force's candid assessment of identifiable threat{s) national security of the Un1ted States. 13 DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), 1000: 50 U.S.C. OOJ: OPP (WF) (c), d), (g) WP) 3024Pllll {WP} FB: 1.4 (c) (WP)!FB: 50 U.S.C. 3024(i)il) (WP) DDD{WP) FB (WP) FB: (7J(C),(E) {WP) Alla Ali Bin Ali Ahmrd SN: -692 Cover Page: of Guantanamo-Review Task force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluatfon Worksheet containlng the Task Force's candid assessment ofidentifiab!e threat(s) potentlally posed by detah'i.ee to the national security of the United S.tates. 7 DOD: 1.4 [a), (cj WP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) FB; SO U.$.C. 3024(;}(1) (WPJ DOJ, OPP (WF) FBl(WP) FB: (7)(C) (WJP) TQP SEl:iRE:r//Slf/QRCQPll/PQFQRN 043

99 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 99 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document Filed 03/27/17 Page 9 of 20 l'qp SECRET/lSl1~'QRGQl>J/,<PQ~QRN Jabran al QahtanijCover Page of Gu<1ntanamo Review SN: SA-696 Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection ofeva[u.ation \Vorksheet assessment ofidentlflablethreat{s} potentiafly posed by detainee ro the 5 DOD: 1.4 (c) {WP) FB: L4 [c) [WP) FB: 50 U.S.C!DDJ: OPP (Wlf)!FB (WP) 3024(1)(1) (W!P) FB: (7)(C) (WP) Ravil Mingazov!SN: RS 702 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force Eval~iatfon Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment ofidentifrabfe threat{s} national security of the Unlted St<ites. 8 DOD: l,4 (b), (c), (d)(wp) f81: L4 (c) (WP) DOD: 50 us.c DDJ: OPP {Wlf) '3024(1)(1); 10 US.C 424 {WP) FBl:50USC 3024(i)(l) (WP} DOD{WP) FBl(WP) FB1: (7)(C) (WP) Noor Utihman Muhammed SN: :SU 707 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task force Evaluation Work.sheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet con.ta-ini:n:gthe Task Force's candid assessment of identifiable toreat(s) 4 ODD: 1.4 (c) (WP) DO~ OPP (Wlf) jdod (WP) Adil Ma. bro:uk B!n,Cove.r Page of Guantanamo _Revbew H:amlda Task For-c.e Evaluation Worksheet;!SN: TS~148 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Task Force's <:and.id assessment of identifiable threat(s} national.security of the United State.s-. g DOD: L4 (b~ (c), DOD:50U.5.C!OOJ: OPP (WF) d) (WP) 302 (;)(1) {WP) FB:!A {cl (WP) FB: SO U.5.C 'i 3024(1)(1) (WP) ffb!(wp) fbl: (7j(C) (WJP) TOP SECRET//.$1,'1lORCQPl//NQFQR:N 044

100 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 100 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document Filed 03/27/17 Page 10 of 20 TOP 5 bcr~1l/sl/1lqrcopl//pjqforn Hedl Ben Hedili Hammami SN:TS-717 [Cover Page of Guantanamo Review :Task Force Evaluation Worksh-eet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet containing the Tusk Force's candid assessment of identifiable threat{s} 6 DOD: l.4(a), (c) JDOD: 10 u.s.c. looj: DPP (WF) {WP} 424 {WJP}!DOD (WJP) Abdu!Sahir lsn: AF-753 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Tas.k Force Evafuation. Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluntion Worksheet contiiiningthe-task Force's candid assessment of ldentifiablethreat{s) 6 DOD: 1.4(c) (WP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: so u.s.c. DOJ: OPP fwf) 1000 (WP) 3024(i)(l} (WiP) FBl(WP) FB: {7)(C) (WP) Hasham Sin.Ali Om arsllti SN:TS-174 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review ~Task force Eva.!uation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet a.sses:>m"cnt of identifiable threat(s) 7 DOD: 1.4 (a), (b), 1000:.SO u.s.c. DOJ: DPP(WF) (c), (d), {g] (WP} 3024[i){l); 10 U.S.C. 424 (WP) FB: 1A {c) (WP} FB: SD U.5.C. 3024(i)(l) (WP) DOD(WP) FBl(WP) FB: (7)(C) (WP) Kha\ld Muhammed SN:SA-335 Jawad Jabber Sadkhan!SN: lz*433 ro e< Page of Guanlanamo Review Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identifiable threa:t(s) potentially posed by detainee to the n:attonar security of the United States. Cover Page of Guantanamo Reviev1 Task force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identifiable: threat(s) potentially posed by detainee: to the national :security of tl'te United_ States, 3 g DOD: 1.4 (c) {WP) FB: l.4 (c}(wp) DOD: 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: 1.4 (c)wp rbj: SD U.S.C. 3D24(i}(l) (WP) FB; SD u.s.c. 3D24(i}(l) (WP)! OJ: OPP (WF) j OJ: OPP {Wlf) l OD{WP) FB (WP) l OD(WP) FB (WP) 'FB: (7)(C),(E} (WP) 'FB: (7)(C),(D) (WP) WP SECRET,l/Sl//QRGOPJ/fNQFQRN 045

101 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 101 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document Filed 03/27/17 Page 11of20 +OP SECRR'/SJ,!/Ql'lOOPJ//NQFQRPl Yasin Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 4 000: 1.4 (b), (c), rb: 50 U.5.C. Mohammed Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; d) (WP) 3024(1)[1) [WP) DOJ: OPP {W/F) DOD(WP) FB: [7)(CJ (WPJ Basardah Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet /SN: -is2 FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) FBl WPJ assessment of identifiable threat(s) Omaf Cover Page of Guantanamo Review : 1.4 lb). lc), FB: 50 U.S.C OOJ: OPP WF) FBJ(WP)!FB: (7J[CJ,[E) Hamzavavich Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; [d) (WP] 3024(1}11) {W/P) (WJP) Abdu!ayev Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet SN: Tl-257 FBt 1.4 {c) {WP) :assessment of idcntlfiable threat("s} natlonal security of the United States-. Ashraf Salim Abd Cover Page of Guantanamo Review : 1.4 {b), (c), OOO:SO U.S.C. OOJ: OPP (WF) FBl{WP) FB: (?)C) (WPJ al Salam Sultan Task Force Evaluation Work:shee-t; {d) {WP) 3024(1)11) (WPJ /SN: ly-263 Subsection of Evatuation Worksheet FB: L4 (c)(wp) FB: 50 U.S.C. assessment of identifiable threat(:sj 3024(1)(1) [WP) potentiatiy posed by detainee to the national security of the U_nitcd States. Abd al-nlsr rover Page of Guantanamo Review Khantumani T<isk Force Evaluation Worksheet; (d) WP) 3024(1!11) (WP) (WP) /SN: SY-307 Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet FB: 1.4 (c) (WPJ FB/: SO U.S.C.; assessment of identlfiab!e threat{:sj 3024[/1{1) {WlPJ porentlally posed by detainee to the: 8!DOD: l.4(b), (c), 1000: SO U.5.C. o DOJ: OPP {WF) l'bl{wp) )'8'' (7}(C),(E) Muhammad Cover Page of Guantanamo Review 9 DDD: 1.4 {a), (c), /FB: so U.S.C. DOJ: DPP(WJFJ FBl(WPJ FB: l7jc),(ej Khantuman1,Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; (g) (WP). >024(i){1) {WPJ {WP)!SN: SY-312 Subsection. of Evaf uution Worksheet containing the Tas.k Force's. candid FB: 1.4 (CJ {WP) assessment of identifiable threat(s) potentially posed by detainee to- the TOP SEGllET//Sll/<:lRGONf/NOFOllll 046

102 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document 49 Filed 09/29/17 Page 102 of 129 Case 1:16-cv RMB Document Filed 03/27/17 Page 12 of 20 +op S"RE:rl-/.SJ/QROON//PQFQRN Mo:ammar Badawi Dokhan SN: SY-317 Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force Evaluation Worksheeti Subsection of Evaluation Worksheet contalningthe Task Force's CJndid assessment of identlfiable threat(s) natio nal security of the United States, s DOD; L4(c) DOD: 50 us.c. DOJ: OPP (WF) (WP) 3024(i)(l) {WP) FB: 1.4 (c)(wp) FS: 50 U.S.C. 3024(i}(!) (WP) FB (WP) fb: (7)(C) {WP) Mustafa Faraj Cover Page of Guantanamo Review Muhammad Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Masud al~jadid al Subsection-of valuation Worksheet Uzaybi contvi-n1ng the Task Fort:e's candid SN: LY asses>ment :Of ldentlfiable thr~t(s/ potentially pose.d by detainee to the : 1.4 (c) WP)!FB: 1.4 lc) WPJ FB: 50 U.5.C. 3024j;)(1) (WlP) jooj: OPP {WF) FBl(WP)!FB: (7){C) WP) Ali abd a'! Aziz A! SN: PK-1001& :cover Page of Guantanamo Review Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsec:Hon of EvatLiatton: Works:heet cornalnlng the Task Force's-candid asse~sment,of identifiable threat{s) potentlal!y posed by detainee to the 4 DOD: 1.4 {c) FB: 50 U.S.C (WP) 3024[;)(1) (WP) FB: 1.4 (c) (WP) jdoj: OPP (WF) /DOD(WP) F81[WP)!DOD: 7(A) (WP) FB (7){A),(8),(c) (WPJ Guleed Hassan Ahmed SN: Cover Page of Guantanamo Revlew Tas;k force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsection of Evaluation Wo rksheet containlng the Task Force's candid assessment -of identifiable thrcat(s) potentlatty posed by detainee to the national_security Qfthe United States. 9 'DOD: 1.4 (c) (WP) FB: 1.4 (c) (\VP) rl: 50 u.s.c 3024(1){1) (WP) DOJ: OPP {WF) FB WP)!FB: l7)(cj{wp) Moharnedou Ould Slahl SN: MR 760 Cover Page ofguantan;;imo Review Task Force Evaluation Worksheet; Subsectlon of Evaluation Worksheet assessment of identiftable threat(s) potentia1typosed by detainee to the national security-of the United States. 9 'DOD: 1.4(a), (b), SO u.s.c. DOJ: OPP (WF) le), d), lg) (WP) 3024(;)(1) {WP) FB: 1.4 (<) WP) rl: 1 50 u.s.c. 3024(i)(l) (WP) FBl(WP) FS!: (7)(C) (WP) T-OP SE,Rt:T//-Sl//.QRGOPJHPlGFQRfiJ 047