Ippeita Nishida The Tokyo Foundation. Quad-Plus Dialogue Jaipur, India February 14-16, 2016

Transcription

1 Expanding the Toolbox for International Security Cooperation: Will the future see an enhanced role for Japan in the maintenance of international security? Ippeita Nishida The Tokyo Foundation Quad-Plus Dialogue Jaipur, India February 14-16, 2016 Meeting Expectations? On September 19, 2015, the long-debated security bills passed the Diet. It was the last of a series of reforms on security policies by Prime Minister Abe, 1 and is an integral piece to enable his widely publicized policy of Proactive Contribution to Peace based on International Cooperation, or proactive contribution to peace in short. Aside from Prime Minister Abe s greater ambition to revise Article 9 of the constitution, it appears that necessary basic legal and policy conditions to defend the country, to better align with the United States and to engage on international security initiatives are met. Prime Minister Abe himself characterizes this legislation as sweeping in our post-war 1 Shinzo Abe came back to power on December Since then, the last three years were spent mostly on conditioning domestic policy systems; such include but not limited to the establishment of the National Security Council, release of the first National Security Strategy and the revised National Defense Program Guideline, adaptation of the Act on the Protection of Specially Designated Secrets, Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, and revision of the Japan-US Defense Guidelines. 1

2 history 2 and hence he has succeeded in raising high expectations among the international community. Even before the bills were presented to the legislators, Secretary of State John Kerry at the release of the new guidelines for Japan-U.S. defense cooperation stated that we mark the establishment of Japan's capacity to defend not just its own territory but also the United States and other partners as needed. 3 Another close partner bounded by common value, NATO, is keen to advance its security cooperation. In an interview at the Tokyo Foundation last September, Deputy Secretary General Alexander Vershbow modestly noted that we re hopeful that this can give additional impetus to NATO-Japan cooperation. 4 The U.K.'s Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Philip Hammond, sends a more specific expectation, asking that Japan take "an increasingly active part in peacekeeping operations and supporting international efforts to secure peace and prosperity. 5 Even a country like the Philippines that experienced Japanese military occupation during World War II welcomed the new security legislation and expects Japan to contribute further to shared goals of greater peace, stability and mutual prosperity in the international community 6 ahead of mounting strategic challenges posed by China. Against these expectations, it may be debatable how far the security legislation would actually enable Japan to take an enhanced role in maintenance of regional order and security in the Indo-Pacific, especially in cooperation with such partners as the Quad-Plus (Japan, U.S., India, Australia plus ASEAN and other regional partners). To answer this, it might be useful to analyze how this new development can be positioned in the toolbox that Tokyo can employ to further its policy objectives of proactive contribution to peace. Thus this paper will attempt to assess the bilateral policy toolbox that Japan can offer to cooperate with partners on international security, spanning the Indo-Pacific region and other specific geographic domains where interests converge. We will look at the two major components of the proactive contribution to peace, Official Development Assistance (ODA) and defense engagements abroad. ODA comes first because historically it served as a traditional tool that Japan has employed for international security. Then, we will assess the practicability of new security bills as well as new modes of security assistance by the Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Self-Defense Forces (SDF), namely, capacity building and disaster relief. Later, the paper 2 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to a Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress, "Toward an Alliance of Hope, " April 29, 2015, 3 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Press Conference with Secretary Carter, Secretary Kerry, Foreign Minister Kishida and Defense Minister Nakatani in New York, April 27, 2015, 4 The Tokyo Foundation, Benefits of Closer Japan-NATO Cooperation, September 28, 2015, 5 Japan collective defense law draws mixed response, Nikkei Asian Review, September 20,2015, onse. 6 Statement by Phillipines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario, September 18,

3 will see how these foreign assistance and security cooperation tools are preferred options to large-scale SDF engagements abroad, in order to re-adjust the expectation to the right level and to start a realistic debate. Foreign Assistance as a Traditional and Evolving Enabling Tool All that, we shall do to help curb the threat ISIL poses. I will pledge assistance of a total of about 200 million U.S. dollars for those countries contending with ISIL, to help build their human capacities, infrastructure, and so on. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe from a speech delivered in Cairo on January 17, 2015 during his tour to Middle East. 7 Having strict constitutional control over the role of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF), particularly on deployment abroad, post-war Japan has sought hard to advance its diplomatic goals through the Official Development Assistance (ODA). While it was widely noted and criticized in the past that Japan used ODA in a mercantilist manner, security was no exception. In an official document, the 2nd ODA Charter (2004) clarifies its objective as to contribute to the peace and development of the international community, and thereby to help ensure Japan's own security and prosperity. Here, while the link is obscure, aid programs are perceived as an enabling tool to ensure security. 8 A brief look at how ODA has been employed in this particular regard may provide some idea how it may potentially be used for common Quad-Plus interests in the coming future. ODA dates back to Less than ten years after Japan lost the war, the country had joined the Colombo plan and re-started foreign assistance programs. 9 This put Japan on the trajectory to reverse its status from one of the post-war aid recipient countries to one of the donors. Development aid served the purpose of reparation in the early days of post-war Japan and created a new mode of relationship with the countries into which Japan had advanced its militaries. 10 By demonstrating its good-will, Japan sought to regain full-return to the international community 11 and thereby to move out from a marginalized and insecure position. This goal was attained in 1956 when Japan joined the United Nations, a body that was created to uphold the ambition of collective security. 7 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Speech by Prime Minister Abe, "The Best Way Is to Go in the Middle," January 17, 2015, 8 However, it should be stressed that main thrust of Japanese ODA has been moral objectives to advance human society. 9 Self-Defense Forces were created on the same year (July 1 st 1954). 10 It may also be said that experiences from the post-war compensation programs had characterized early stage of the aid to serve as a normalization tool. Such height was the economic treaty with Republic of Korea, following the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. 11 日本の ODA 政策体系の過去と現在と未来 荒木光弥国際問題 No.637, (2014 年 12 月 ), 3

4 Since then, when it comes to Japan s international security cooperation, ODA has often served as a tacit but hopefully effective ways and means of cooperation. Such was the case for ODA money dispersed during the Cold War period to defend the Western bloc by promoting economic growth of countries in Asia. Eyeing the war in Vietnam, Japanese aid to Southeast Asia was thought to be a complementing effort to maintain peace and stability in the region. Japan helped to create the Asia Development Bank in 1966 and supported creation of ASEAN in Later in the 1980s, in the so-called comprehensive security concept, economic assistance was identified as one of the policy tools to sustain and promote a favorable international environment, a phrase that echoes in today s National Security Strategy. It was during this period that Japanese ODA expanded its geographic sphere of interest beyond Asia and started to assist such countries as Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt, the countries which the United States considered important to retain. While doing so, it should be noted that the security factor was never on the forefront as the ODA pursued other more apparent objectives to foster social and economic growth of the recipient countries and to encourage export of Japanese industry. Perhaps coupled with caution about the over-securitization of aid, the Japanese government repeatedly emphasized that it would never pose a military threat to the region. 12 While such conviction is still relevant today and is widely believed by the public, the post-cold War security environment has required Japan to become more active player in international security. In the 1990s, having witnessed widespread state failures and intensive intra-state conflicts around the world, Japan started devising peace-building support through ODA. Although it was largely developmental and risk-averse, many activities have been carried out in countries that experienced severe conflicts. Examples include demining and re-integration support for former soldiers in Cambodia, community rehabilitation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, security sector reform and other assistance totaling $5.8 billion to Afghanistan since 2001, facilitating the peace process through development in Mindanao (Philippines), and building the essential infrastructure and supporting development master plans in South Sudan. Lately, facing more acute security needs both near and away, strategic use of ODA has been voiced in government documents and seen in practice. For example, maintaining secure access through the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) is a vital interest for Japan, and the government has been very active in supporting the regional capacity on maritime safety. In Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia alone, more than 250 coast guard personnel have undertaken training by the Japan Coast Guard. A regional information sharing mechanism 12 Also known as the Fukuda Doctrine. 4

5 (ReCAAP) on piracy control was also established through Japan s initiative, and its success is now being replicated in the western Indian Ocean. Furthermore, to counter an intensifying need to maintain freedom of navigation and overflight in the South China Sea, Tokyo is accelerating the provision of coast guard patrol boats to such countries as Philippines and Vietnam. When it comes to this vital interest, policy makers are eager to deploy available means of collaboration. Also, even when it is not particularly related to vital interests, when the political climate is right, robust use of aid can be effective. Such a case was observed at the time of the Ukraine crisis in On March 24, Japan announced an aid package to Ukraine totaling $1.5 billion and associated support programs, 13 so as to sustain the country s lagging economy and stability. According to MOFA, it was intended to do so as a responsible global participant in the international economy as well as a member of the G7 group when consolidation of the G7 was widely debated. Further, to attend the signing ceremony of the Brtnychi Aeration Station s modernization project in Kyiv, an iconic project amounting to $1.1 billion, Prime Minister Abe himself made a first official visit to the capital, on his way to the G7 summit. While not damaging its relationship with Russia, Japan signaled support based on common values to the U.S. and European partners. Supposedly, Tokyo s intention was to urge Europeans to respond in kind, in the event a similar situation arises with China concerning the Senkaku Islands. As described above, ODA has been a traditional tool to address security issues. Today, it is considered as the largest diplomatic tool that MOFA has, according to Foreign Minister Kishida, and is evolving fast, based on policy direction and bureaucratic creativity, to adjust to the changing security environment. The 2013 National Security Strategy presents guidelines for policies which include ODA and it is expected to seek coordination with defense initiatives and cooperation. As seen in the statement of Prime Minister Abe at the beginning of this section, at least at the level of rhetoric, aid can be directed to countries contending against the threat from ISIL. Perhaps this was a bit too ambitious to be realistic, but in the future, we may see more robust application of foreign aid where the security interests of the Quad-Plus countries merge. Practicability of Large Scale SDF Mission Deployment Unlikely 13 The new JICA, after merging Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and the aid loan division of Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) in 2008 has streamlined administrative structure and enabled Japan to carry out more robust aid disbursements. With the policy direction and supervision by MOFA, the new JICA, the implementation agency, is able to combine technical assistance, grant aid and loans to attain its policy goals. 5

6 The use of Self-Defense Forces was formally added to Japan s foreign engagement toolbox in 1992, when the Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) law was enacted after the Gulf Crisis. 14 Since then, Japan has sent more than 10,000 SDF personnel on 13 peace missions over the last 20 years or so. While Japanese may see these figures as reasonable, those who come from other countries may consider this an inadequate effort from the world s number three (previously two) economy. From its outset, it has been said that the law was too restrictive, making UN peacekeeping the only mission in which SDF could participate. Thus, each time when the government saw a strong need to participate in coalition efforts, a time-limited special measures law had to be submitted to, debated and passed in the Diet. Such were the cases for SDF s reconstruction activities in Iraq and refueling operation in the Indian Ocean. In the government s view, this was inefficient and time consuming, and Japan was not able to supply forces when needed. Even within the PKO law, deployment criteria was old-fashioned, allowing SDF to engage only when all parties had signed peace agreements and relative safety was assured. Thus, SDF was not deployable for robust PKO missions or intra-state conflict. At the mission level, the national caveat demanded that the Japanese contingent restrict use of weapons for their protection only. Thus, in the field, SDF units could only provide minimum security for their own and required force protection by other countries. Also, SDF was not able to take part in patrolling, to actively engage in protection of civilians, and to go to the aid of other forces under attack. Moreover, SDF officers could only take limited roles and functions in mission HQ, like logistics, so as not to engage in decision making on the use of weapons by the UN mission. The PKO law has often been blamed as the cause of Japan s less active contribution to peace. 15 Therefore, where it comes to international security, the security bills were meant to reverse these constraints so that the SDF can be dispatched more flexibly. The new security legislation expands SDF engagements abroad as: to exercise the right of collective self-defense when U.S. or another close partner is being attacked; 16 to advance SDF participation in international peace and security missions outside of the UNPKO (e.g. engaging with EU Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) mission); 14 At the time of the Gulf Crisis, among strong international pressure for Japan to contribute force to the coalition effort, the government only managed to provide a financial support amounting $13 billion. This experience, to some, is recalled as diplomatic failure as Japan felt it won little recognition as a partner. After the war, in 1991, Japan managed to send a unit of MSDF to clear remaining mines in the Gulf, by adapting (interpreting) existing law. 15 There are other types of legal frameworks for SDF deployment abroad that are specifically made for disaster relief and anti-piracy operations. 16 Under the new three conditions: 1. Direct armed attack against Japan or a foreign country in close relation with Japan that pose direct threat to Japan s security; 2. When there is no other appropriate means; 3. Minimum use of force. 6

7 to conduct support activities to the armed forces of foreign countries for collective security matters; to ease its national caveats on the use of weapons and thus broaden the scope of activities (e.g. participation in patrolling, or protection of civilians) in the UNPKO and other missions, to conduct ship inspection operations; to support U.S. operations in peacetime, including co-operation on surveillance and provision of ammunitions; and to conduct rescue of Japanese and non-japanese nationals abroad. Knowing how restrictive the PKO law is, this list of permitted activities is impressive. Reading the bills shows that Japan can now participate in both UN and multinational peace operations with enhanced use of weapons beyond protection of its own forces, and provide logistical and other support to U.S. and coalition forces. In practice, however, while the legislation will be enacted by the end of March 2016, it may take some time for Tokyo to decide what to be done. Already, the government has decided not to widen the mandate of the SDF contingent to United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). It is reported that this would incite a public debate against the ruling LDP-Komeito coalition, ahead of the Upper House election scheduled this summer. Yet, one may speculate that this was because revision of the Rules of Engagement (ROE) is taking time, or training is not complete. In the future, while there is no doubt that policy makers will look for good missions for the SDF to participate in, it might not be robust large scale operations unless there is strong political determination. Given the current security situation at home, it is reasonable to think that MOD/SDF does not want to commit limited defense resources abroad for a long period. In law, international operations are designated as a main task of the SDF. However, within the main tasks, much of the international operations fall in the category of subordinate mission which should not compromise the SDF s primary mission to defend the country. Also, the number of international missions must be limited so that the Joint Staff Office can maintain good control. At the same time, it remains to be seen how MOD/SDF overcomes the zero casualty policy, a unique cultural element that SDF has nurtured and ensured over the last two decades. More important perhaps, the new legislation demands that the government submit the SDF mission plan to the Diet prior to deployment, and it must be accepted. Therefore, it depends on how the Prime Minister at the time is committed to the planned mission and can spare his/her political capital, and on the political composition of the Diet. Of course, these will not rule out the possibility of more active SDF deployments on missions abroad. Yet, unless there is acute need pertaining to national interest, modest public 7

8 support, confidence among the MOD/SDF to carry out the mission, and the political leaders strong commitment and power base, it might be less likely in the short term. Alternatively, we may see active SDF deployments on limited missions like disaster relief, and wider application of defense cooperation programs such as capacity building. Both of these are already trending and are likely to continue to do so with partner countries. More Cooperation on Natural Disaster Relief Activities Among the many uncertainties we face in the future, some can be forecasted with more confidence. Population increase in developing countries (and decrease in advanced economies) is one case. In Africa, population is estimated to double by The Indo-Pacific region will contain about a half of the global population by Many will migrate to the urban centers in search for better access to jobs and public services. If integrated well, they will contribute significantly to economic development. But if not, development of a demographic youth bulge will create stress on local communities and weaken governance. This trend will be coupled with climate change, which is another forecasted factor. Natural conditions, as well as crop harvest patterns, will be affected. Hence, some regions are likely to experience harsh consequences. The frequency and intensity of natural disasters, such as flooding, droughts and typhoons is likely to increase, creating severe humanitarian conditions. Rise of sea-level is another concern. Island states in the Pacific or the Maldives in the Indian Ocean will be challenged for their very existence. Management of migrants and their adaptation may become a high security issue. In addition, large coastal cities in Asia in particular, such as Mumbai, Ho Chi Minh City, and Bangkok may experience disastrous damage to the population and economy. Severe shortage of food and fresh water may trigger massive movement of people across national boundaries, which is certain to cause social unrest. In sum, current trends of demography and climate change are almost certain to cause more frequent and intensive natural disasters in the future. This should be considered as an issue pertaining not only to humanitarian affairs but to regional stability and Japan s own security. Japan, in this regard, has been keen to provide relief. Unlike responses to man-made disasters, or humanitarian support to conflict-related areas, Japan has a record of natural disaster relief both at home and abroad. Since 1979, there have been 138 overseas emergency relief missions completed. The SDF has joined relief activities for large-scale disasters since 1998, providing its assets for logistic support and water and sanitation services. To date, the SDF has been engaged in 16 disaster relief missions, in close collaboration with JICA as the leading agency to carry out emergency relief and rehabilitation. 8

9 Disaster relief is a humanitarian activity, however, increasingly it is being regarded as an effective tool to achieve diplomatic goals. It promotes Japan s positive image among the public and credit to the policy makers of recipient countries. It also allows the SDF to conduct real operations and co-operation with other forces. This increases the SDF s operational experience, provides opportunity to test inter-operability with U.S. and close partner militaries, strengthens bilateral military relations with the recipient and other countries, provides access to and legitimate reasons to be present in the region, and finally is a mission of short duration, not diverting the forces from the core defense duty for more than one month. It is no wonder that disaster relief cooperation often appears as a component of bilateral cooperation and multinational exercises. Such was the case of typhoon Haiyan that hit the Philippines in November 2013 and left deep scars on the land. Receiving requests from Manila, Japan s Ministry of Defense dispatched a SDF response team comprised of 1100 personnel. Not only was it the largest deployment to date, a Joint Task Force was formulated for the first time for disaster relief operation. One of the Maritime Self-Defense Forces (MSDF) recent acquisitions for multi-purpose operations, the flattop helicopter destroyer DDH Ise was also dispatched, making a showcase of cooperation with likeminded countries. For example, U.S. MV-22 Ospreys landed on Ise, demonstrating allied interoperability in the South China Sea. Liaison officers were exchanged with the United Kingdom so as to achieve better coordination. With Australia, the Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA) was applied for the first time on exchanges of services and supplies, and MSDF provided replenishment for an Australian vessel. These high-visibility efforts served their stated purposes. In coming years, it is likely that this type of coordination and complementation of activities become common practice for the SDF, as a new mode of international security cooperation. A non-typical but notable case was the Ebola crisis which greatly affected the lives of people and stability of West Africa in WHO declared an Ebola outbreak on August 8, Given the severity of the infectiousness and distance to the affected area, it was long debated to what extent Japan would provide support. Throughout the crisis, MOFA had provided a series of emergency relief funds which totaled approximately $150 million. Besides that, JICA provided 720,000 sets of personal protective equipment, out of which 20,000 sets were sent by Air Self Defense Forces (ASDF) KC767 tanker aircraft to Ghana. A first for this kind of operation by the ASDF in Africa, the plane stopped over at Malé, the capital of Maldives and at Djibouti, where Japan maintains an anti-piracy aerial surveillance installation. This case was a historic experience for the SDF s external operation and three points should be noted. First, Djibouti served as a multi-role base and proved to be an entry point for SDF 9

10 operations in Africa or in the western Indian Ocean and Middle East. Secondly, it demonstrated to the world that Japan has the capability and will to execute sporadic airlift operations when needed. In the domain of PKO, Prime Minister Abe is also indicating his interest in such operations, saying that Japan will zealously explore other possible contributions such as airlift support for mission rapid deployment. Third, it facilitated collaboration with other countries, but most notably with the United States. The Ebola crisis prompted MOD/SDF to send liaison officers to AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart for further intelligence sharing and security cooperation in the region with the allied partners. Capacity Building: New and Expanding Tool The Ministry of Defense and SDF have been conducting so-called capacity building assistance (CBA) to foreign militaries since It was first introduced as a policy direction in the 2010 National Defense Program Guideline 17 at the time of the short-lived DJP government. The introduction of CBA to the toolbox signified itself as the first military aid by post-war Japan. However, while it was received with much anticipation and careful attention by the international community, there was not much discussion in the Diet nor in the public media. Originally, CBA was mandated for two purposes: first as an effort for regional stabilization in the Asia-Pacific as an extension of bi/multi-lateral defense cooperation, and second as an attempt to better contribute to global security along with such initiatives as arms control and nonproliferation. It should be noted that at this point, it was intended to be a test case, and that MOD was not officially mandated to conduct international cooperation at the time. 18 Also, the direction was given to conduct such CBA in the non-traditional security fields only. It appears that the MOD was careful not to raise the concern of the Japanese public or the neighboring states. Yet, shortly after, such concern seems to have disappeared. In the latest 2013 National Defense Program Guidelines, the word capacity building appears nine times in various contexts and is recognized as a practical tool to deepen bilateral defense cooperation with partner countries and to shape the security environment. At the same time, it no longer is restrained to the non-traditional security fields. To date, MOD/SDF have conducted 55 CBA projects, mostly with the militaries of Southeast Asia such as Viet Nam (13 projects), East Timor (7 projects) and Indonesia (5 projects), but 17 Japan Ministry of Defense, National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2011 and Beyond,, Approved by the Security Council and the Cabinet on December 17, 2010, 18 There was no legal basis for international cooperation in Article 4 of the Act for Establishment of the Ministry of Defense, which defines the roles of MOD. Thus, other definitions were used such as defense and security (para. 1), training (of own personnel) (para. 9), research (para. 18). Later, the act was amended to include paragraph 32 international cooperation and promulgated on June 17,

11 also heavily in Mongolia (11 projects). A recent addition is Myanmar, and MOD/SDF has conducted 7 projects there as bilateral political relations accelerate. Initially, the content of the projects were general subjects such as human development for maritime security and peacekeeping, or sometimes purely technical cooperation such as vehicle maintenance in East Timor. Yet, the recent projects appear to carry more strategic implications, as seen in the repeated seminars on underwater medicine to the Vietnamese Navy for their submarine operation and assisting with chart creation to the Indonesian Navy. While the budget allocated to CBA is small, around $2.6 million, the strategic value of CBA is being widely recognized. CBA is noted in the revised guideline of Japan-U.S. defense cooperation as one of the activities where the two countries cooperate with the objective of strengthening the capability of partners to respond to dynamic security challenges. 19 Besides these initiatives, CBA is now increasingly integrated in Japan s diplomatic agenda. In the domain of UNPKO, having witnessed the great difficulties of African militaries to carry out engineering operations, the government of Japan proposed a creative package to support the Africa Rapid Deployment of Engineering Capabilities (ARDEC) program at the UN Department of Field Support (DFS). In this pilot program, Japan has first provided $40 million to DFS to purchase necessary heavy equipment such as dozers and to cover implementation costs. Then a five-week intensive training course was conducted at the Kenya International Peace Support Training Centre by 11 SDF personnel in fall of Coupled with SDF s contribution to create a standard engineering manual for future UNPKO missions, this opens a new chapter for Japanese peace activities. It is expected that this way of CBA will be carried out in other geographic areas and with partners of shared interests. Down the Road The year 2016 may mark an important year for Japan in advancing its goal of the proactive contribution to peace. The security bills will be enacted by the end of March 20 and we will see how it opens the way for the SDF to play more active role. On the political front, from this January 1st, Japan has re-joined the UN Security Council (UNSC). Representing the Asia-Pacific region along with Malaysia, Japan will serve its 11th time as a non-permanent member. This is an unprecedented record of commitment, and it shows how much value Japan finds in the UNSC. Along the same lines but more focused on global leadership, Japan will chair the 42nd Group of Seven (G7) in Ise Shima on May 26th and May 27th. This will 19 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation, April 27, 2015, 20 The bills were adapted by the Cabinet on May 15, discussed intensively in the Diet and established on September 19th. Promulgation of the bills was made on September 30th, to be enacted within 6 months from the date of promulgation. 11

12 be a test case for Prime Minister Abe s diplomatic position to lead discussions and address a mounting global agenda. Japan also needs to demonstrate itself as a credible actor in the field of development through the 20-year-long process of the TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development). The sixth round will be held on African soil for the first time this summer in Kenya. This series of leadership opportunities will demand that Japan prove what proactive contribution to peace means in an acceptable manner. Leadership for Japan is a wise application of various tools. In the keynote address at the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue, Prime Minister Abe pledged Japan s commitment to maintain freedom of navigation and overflight in the ASEAN region, and he noted: Japan will combine various options within its assistance menu, including ODA, capacity building by the Self-Defense Forces, and defense equipment and technology cooperation, to support seamlessly the capacity of ASEAN countries in safeguarding the seas. 21 The bottom line is that Japan shall never pose a military threat to any country, but creatively coordinate its defense activities with other tools. Currently, the SDF is involved in UNMISS and anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden. Further mission deployment is a possibility that no one can deny, but when it comes to support for coalition forces in particular, it may require a very strong political will and unique circumstances. 22 Nevertheless, the Quad-Plus countries should encourage MOD/SDF to observe on-going missions, involve them in exercises that were not allowed previously, and exchange research and training in order to increase familiarity. Meanwhile, there should naturally occur more collaboration with Quad-Plus players on disaster relief or humanitarian airlift operation, as well as wider applications of capacity building. As for ODA, there is growing understanding among policy makers that ODA is a part of national security. In FY 2016, the ODA budget is likely to increase, and we may see more active use of it, as a tool to address common security concerns. More attention and coordination should be given to the power of development in creating more resilient societies in the Indo-Pacific region. Such is needed for future disaster risk reduction, countering terrorist intrusion, illegal trans-boundary activities and deterring potential aggression to the region. At the same time, caution should be exercised about being too strategically focused, keeping in mind certain principles of aid philosophy, 23 and the issues of fungibility and 21 Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the 13 th IISS Asian Security Summit, Peace and prosperity in Asia, forevermore. Japan for the rule of law. Asia for the rule of law, and the rule of law for all of us, May 30, 2014, 22 Certainly Japan does not want to repeat the Gulf War nightmare, and it would consider seriously dispatching its forces in case such coalition support is needed. 23 It must comply with the basic aid philosophy and four principles (in line with the OECD-DAC regulation): 12

13 potential backlash. Finally, at the political level, Quad-Plus countries should consider utilizing the UNSC and G7. Although U.S. President Barack Obama is leaving office in 2017, these forums provide opportunities for more policy consultation and coordination between Japan and the U.S., alongside bilateral alliance concerns. More discussion should take place on such issues as maritime security, rule of law, and human rights, and consolidation of the G7 needs to be proved. Each of the Quad and the Plus countries may also find it worthwhile to stay engaged in the discussions to advance the common security agenda. 1. Compatibility between preservation of the environment and development 2. Avoidance of the use of ODA funds for military purposes and for purposes liable to inflame international conflicts 3. Monitoring of military spending of developing countries, their activities of developing and producing weapons of mass destruction, and the export or import of weapons 4. Monitoring of activities for the promotion of democratization in developing countries, and their efforts to introduce a market-oriented economy and protect basic human rights and freedoms of their citizens 13