DOMESTIC DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS PLANNING

Transcription

1 NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND TACMEMO DOMESTIC DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS PLANNING MAY 2006 DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED. PRIMARY REVIEW AUTHORITY: COMMANDER, NAVY WARFARE DEVELOPMENT COMMAND URGENT CHANGE/ERRATUM RECORD NUMBER DATE ENTERED BY 1 MAY 2006

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5 CONTENTS Page No. CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 PURPOSE SCOPE ORGANIZATION DISCUSSION Advantages of Sea-based Support Key Considerations in Domestic Disaster Relief Defense Support to Civil Authorities CHAPTER 2 PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR DOMESTIC DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS 2.1 COMMANDER S ESTIMATE DEVELOP SITUATIONAL AWARENESS MISSION ANALYSIS REVIEW LESSONS LEARNED DETERMINE BATTLE RHYTHM INDICATORS CHAPTER 3 COMMANDER S PRINCIPAL CONCERNS AND DECISIONS 3.1 MISSION CLARITY, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, AND POLICIES SITUATIONAL AWARENESS FORCES AND MATERIAL BATTLE RHYTHM COMMUNICATIONS DISASTER RELIEF AND JOINT TASK FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE LIAISON OFFICER, DETACHMENT, AND TEAM DEPLOYMENT TRANSITION/TRANSFER POINTS AND STRATEGY MAY 2006

6 Page No. 3.9 USE OF FORCE METRICS, TERMINOLOGY, LESSONS LEARNED COLLECTION, AND EVENTS RECONSTRUCTION STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES CHAPTER 4 COORDINATION 4.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Coordination Centers Transition or Transfer of Responsibility Requirements Process Professional Contacts Seniority MILITARY Higher Authority Other U.S. Navy, Services, and Joint Service International CIVILIAN Federal Government State and Local Government Nongovernment Organizations CHAPTER 5 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 5.1 INTELLIGENCE REPORTS, MEDIA, AND BRIEFINGS IMAGERY AND OTHER DETAILED INFORMATION LESSONS LEARNED AND RECORDS CULTURAL AWARENESS Culture Language PERCEPTION AND EXPECTATION MANAGEMENT Perceptions Expectations CHAPTER 6 COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, COMPUTERS, AND INTELLIGENCE 6.1 COMMAND AND CONTROL Command Structure MAY 2006

7 Page No Battle Rhythm Air Traffic Control Air Tasking Order and Assignment of Aircraft Rescue Coordination Center Measures and Terminology COMMUNICATIONS Interim Support to Joint Task Force Commander Communications Protocol Telecommunications and Teleconferencing Streaming Video Equipment Portability and Distribution Information Dissemination and Coordination COMPUTERS AND BANDWIDTH INTELLIGENCE CHAPTER 7 LOGISTICS 7.1 DEMAND SIGNAL RESPONSE LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS COORDINATION ARRIVAL PRIOR TO ESTABLISHMENT OF DR INFRASTRUCTURE PREPOSITIONING AND ENABLING STOCKS FORWARD/ADVANCE TEAM(S) SUPPORT TO OTHER AGENCIES CONTRACTING SECURITY AND FORCE PROTECTION SPECIFIC LOGISTICS SUPPORT ASSETS AND ISSUES Harbor and Marine Channel Clearance Military Sealift Command Amphibious Ships and Other Surface Vessels Rotary Wing Aircraft Fixed Wing Aircraft Disaster Relief Supplies Urban Search and Rescue Fuel Communications Support Beach Detachment Support MAY 2006

8 Page No Technical or Maintenance Support Animal Control CHAPTER 8 PERSONNEL 8.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Augmentee Assignment and Tracking Training and Familiarization LIAISON OFFICERS AND DETACHMENTS Liaison Officers Detachments SPECIFIC SKILLS Linguists Subject Matter Experts Engineers Cargo Handlers Air Traffic Controllers Distinguished Visitor and Media Liaison Analysts Public Health Mass Fatality/Mortuary Assistance Religious Ministry Law Enforcement and Criminal Investigation Other Augmentees 8-6 CHAPTER 9 HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT 9.1 SCOPE OF ASSISTANCE HEALTH SITUATION ANALYSIS AND ESTIMATE HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS FORCE HEALTH PROTECTION DEPLOYMENT COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITIES AND INFORMATION MANAGEMENT APPENDIX A EXAMPLES FROM RECENT DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS A.1 FACTORS AFFECTING EMPLOYMENT OF FORCES... A-1 A.2 COMMAND AND CONTROL COORDINATION... A-2 A.3 CULTURAL AWARENESS... A-3 8 MAY 2006

9 Page No. A.4 LOGISTICS... A-3 A.5 STATISITCAL DATA/MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS... A-3 APPENDIX B DISASTER RELIEF TASKS B.1 JOINT/NAVY MISSION-ESSENTIAL TASK LIST (GENERIC)... B-1 B.2 EXAMPLES OF TASKINGS DURING PREVIOUS DR OPERATIONS... B-3 B.2.1 Time Critical Lifesaving Actions (First 72 Hours)... B-3 B.2.2 Immediate Actions to Protect Lives and Prepare for Recovery... B-4 B.2.3 Recovery Support... B-4 APPENDIX C DATA COLLECTION PLAN (SAMPLE)...C-1 APPENDIX D NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN PRIMER...D-1 D.1 NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM... D-1 D.1.1 Incident Command System... D-1 D.1.2 Joint Information System... D-2 D.1.3 Communications and Information Management... D-2 D.1.4 National Incident Management System Integration Center... D-2 D.2 INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM... D-2 D.2.1 Incident Command System Characteristics... D-2 D.3 MISSION ASSIGNMENT PROCESS... D-18 APPENDIX E REFERENCES...E-1 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS... LOAA-1 GLOSSARY... GLOSSARY-1 LIST OF EFFECTIVE PAGES...LEP-1 9 MAY 2006

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11 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Page No. CHAPTER 9 HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT Figure 9-1. Public Health Effects by Type of Disaster APPENDIX D NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN PRIMER Figure D-1. Major Management Functions... D-4 Figure D-2. Incident Command System Structure... D-6 Figure D-3. Examples of Corresponding Functions on Navy and ICS Interagency Staffs... D-7 Figure D-4. Incident Management Coordination Structure... D-12 Figure D-5. Joint Field Office Organizational Structure... D-14 Figure D-6. National Response Plan Coordinating Structures... D-16 Figure D-7. Emergency Support Functions Coordination Sites... D MAY 2006

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13 CHAPTER 1 Introduction 1.1 PURPOSE To assist Navy strike group staffs, squadron staffs, ships, and expeditionary shore units tasked with providing support in disaster relief (DR) operations in the United States (U.S.) and its territories. 1.2 SCOPE The intent of this tactical memorandum (TACMEMO) is to guide a Navy commander and staff in the thought process, planning, and course of action development needed to prepare for and conduct domestic disaster relief operations. Each disaster and associated response operation will be unique due to differences in scale, environmental factors, geography, local government relationships, etc. The basic planning considerations and thought processes, however, will remain the same. While some considerations and resources reflect a worse-case scenario response to a major regional catastrophe, they should be considered for scaled-down applicability in other cases. NWDC TM addresses foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) in DR operations. 1.3 ORGANIZATION This TACMEMO incorporates lessons learned and observations recorded during DR operations, including those from the 2005 tsunami relief effort Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, and those associated with the 2005 hurricanes Katrina and Rita along the Gulf Coast. Chapters 2 and 3 contain general initial planning considerations and outline the operational commander s principal concerns and decisions. Subsequent chapters and appendixes provide more detail. This TACMEMO was not created to provide an all-inclusive checklist, but rather a bulleted guide of things to assist a commander and staff in planning domestic DR operations. 1.4 DISCUSSION Advantages of Sea-based Support Speed to execution is key to saving lives and reducing suffering in the early stages of a DR operation. Unique Navy capabilities (primarily robust command and control (C2), lift, reconnaissance, and use of sea lines of communication) provide an important bridge in DR efforts until civilian agencies can organize, establish operations in the disaster area, and take over the operation. Naval forces are ideally suited to cover the gap by establishing a sea base as close to the operation as possible. They are able to arrive with critical mass quickly, commence relief support immediately, and sustain those operations indefinitely. Additionally, naval forces: 1. Are not reliant on shore infrastructure, much of which is likely damaged or destroyed in the relief area. 2. Arrive with a robust C2 capability that does not need to be replicated ashore. 1-1 MAY 2006

14 3. Alleviate concerns that may be raised by a large footprint ashore. 4. Reduce force protection concerns by minimizing presence ashore. 5. Bring significant relief capabilities for initial relief efforts (including, but not limited to, harbor and marine channel clearance, aircraft and watercraft operations to deliver aid and conduct search and rescue (SAR) operations, air and water traffic control, medical assistance, and various support for first responders) Key Considerations in Domestic Disaster Relief Disaster relief operations in the United States and its territories are significantly different from those conducted in a foreign setting. Additional statutory and policy restrictions must be considered and different agencies play key roles. Some of the key considerations are broadly addressed below and discussed further later in this publication. The joint, Navy, Department of Defense (DOD), and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) publications in Appendix E provide a comprehensive discussion Statutes and Restrictions The Stafford Act (Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act) includes the process for state and territorial governors to request federal disaster and emergency assistance from the President of the U.S. (POTUS). The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits use of the Army or Air Force (extended to include the Navy and Marine Corps by DOD policy) for law enforcement purposes, except as otherwise authorized by the Constitution or statute. Primarily, this prohibits active duty personnel (including Reservists on active duty and National Guard personnel in federal service) from direct involvement in traditional law enforcement activities (e.g., interdiction of a vessel, vehicle, or aircraft, directing traffic except where conducted for purely military purposes, search and seizure, arrest, apprehension, stopping and frisking or similar activity, surveillance or pursuit of individuals, and acting as undercover agents, informants, investigators, and interrogators). Additionally, there are executive order and DOD policy prohibitions against intelligence collection activities and handling of information concerning U.S. persons. As federal law enforcement agents, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) personnel are not bound by either the Posse Comitatus Act or U.S. persons proscriptions. The Insurrection Act provides an exception, whereby POTUS may direct the armed forces to restore order, prevent looting, and engage in other law enforcement activities to suppress insurrections and domestic violence. U.S. Code Title 10 vs. Title 32 issues refer to the statutory authority under which the Navy, Marine Corps, Army, Air Force, and National Guard (when federalized) operate (i.e., Title 10), as opposed to that under which the National Guard operates when activated by a governor under Title 32 or to state active duty status. Title 10 forces cannot command Title 32 forces and vice versa. Additionally, the Posse Comitatus Act prohibitions apply when operating under Title 10 authority. There have been recent cases (non-dr) where a National Guard officer has been given a dual-hatted command in order to preserve unity of command. Theoretically, an active duty officer could be sworn into a State s National Guard with concurrence of the State s governor, and similarly exercise command. 1-2 MAY 2006

15 The Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) is a congressionally ratified mutual aid agreement between states and territories (except Hawaii, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands). It facilitates movement of almost all resources including National Guard units and medical resources, between members upon the impacted State, or territorial governor s disaster declaration and request for assistance. Operationally, EMAC is a phone and computer network linking members to a central database. It is run by the nonprofit National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA). DOD and Navy intelligence oversight programs and processes are designed to ensure intelligence, counterintelligence, and intelligence-related activities are strictly regulated. The use of intelligence assets in disaster response is conducted in accordance with applicable Federal law, Presidential executive orders, and DOD and Navy directives, protecting the statutory and constitutional rights of persons. Intelligence oversight focuses on prevention of violations through training and awareness and, when prevention fails, identification, investigation, and reporting of violations and implementation of corrective actions Response Structure The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is the doctrinal framework for incident management at all jurisdictional levels (i.e., Federal, State, and local), regardless of cause, size, or complexity. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-5, Management of Domestic Incidents, requires all Federal departments and agencies to adopt the NIMS and use it in their individual domestic incident management and emergency prevention, preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation activities, as well as in support of all actions taken to assist State or local entities to ensure a coordinated, effective, and efficient response. One key component of the NIMS is its incident command system (ICS) which consists of a standardized incident management organizational structure with five functional areas for management of all major incidents: command, operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. See Appendix D for more detail. The National Response Plan (NRP) is a NIMS-based structure and process for national level policy and coordination for Federal assistance in domestic incident management. It may be partially or fully implemented in anticipation of, or in response to, a significant event (e.g., a natural or man-made disaster). The NRP designates lead and support agencies, and delineates associated policies, responsibilities, concept of operations (CONOPS), organization, and action. It uses 15 emergency support functions (ESFs) to group the capabilities of Federal departments, agencies, and the American Red Cross (ARC) to provide the planning, support, resources, program implementation, and emergency services that are most likely to be needed during incidents of national significance. See Appendix E for more detail Organizations The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) may establish an Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) at the Federal headquarters level to facilitate domestic incident management. Membership may include senior representatives from DHS components, other Federal departments and agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The DHS s Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is generally the lead Federal agency (LFA) coordinating Federal government support to State and local governments. The Department of State (DOS) s Agency for International Development (USAID) s Office of 1-3 MAY 2006

16 Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the LFA in foreign humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (FHA/DR) operations, is in the supporting role of coordinating foreign government assistance to the U.S. The Director of FEMA, under POTUS-delegated authority, appoints a Federal coordinating officer (FCO), and for larger scale disasters possibly a principal Federal official (PFO), to coordinate Federal agency efforts in the affected area. FEMA officials frequently serve as FCOs and PFOs, however, these positions may be filled by individuals from other agencies (e.g., Coast Guard. (USCG)). The American Red Cross serves as the primary support agency to DHS for coordinating mass care support with other NGOs Defense Support to Civil Authorities Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA), formerly known as military assistance to civil authorities (MACA) and its subset military support to civil authorities (MSCA), includes activities and measures taken by DOD components to foster mutual assistance and support between DOD and civil government agencies in planning, preparation for, or in response to consequences of civil emergencies such as natural and man-made disasters, plus DOD assistance for law enforcement and other designated functions. Except in cases where immediate response is required (see Section 4.3.1), DSCA is normally provided in response to an official request for assistance (RFA) from the LFA or under the direction of POTUS or the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) when local, State, and other Federal resources are overwhelmed. Federal, State, and local environmental regulations apply and are an integral part of mission planning and operational decision making. Key first response positions with subject matter expertise in DSCA operations are listed below: 1. A joint field office (JFO) or a joint field office coordination group will generally be established to perform the functions that a civil-military operations center (CMOC) performs in FHA. 2. A defense coordinating officer (DCO) functions as single point of contact for DOD support to other agencies operating in the disaster area. Depending on the size of the disaster, the DCO may be the joint task force (JTF) commander. The DCO is under the operational control (OPCON) of the designated supported combatant command (COCOM), e.g., Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) or Pacific Command (USPACOM), or the JTF commander. USNORTHCOM s joint regional medical planners (JRMPs) work closely with the DCO on medical support matters. The DCO does not have OPCON of the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), which performs emergency support under flood control authority provided in public law, or National Guard personnel when they are on active duty under State or Title 32 authority. 3. Commanders, Fleet Forces Command and Pacific Fleet serve as principal planning agents (PPAs), planning, coordinating, and executing Navy civil emergency management responsibilities within their assigned areas. They are assisted by Navy regional commanders designated as regional planning agents (RPAs). 4. National Guard personnel are generally the first military responders. They are usually activated under State control and funding, remaining under State control in Title 32 status, or possibly shift to Federal funding and control under Title 10 later. 5. Navy emergency preparedness liaison officers (NEPLOs) are Navy Reservists with special training in domestic DR and familiarity with the local area. They are called to active duty to assist in civil emergency planning and coordination. NEPLOs represent the 1-4 MAY 2006

17 RPAs and are stationed at FEMA national and regional headquarters, State adjutant general s headquarters, and elsewhere. Note The 50 States and the District of Columbia are hereafter referred to as States. Territories include the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, and American Samoa. References to local government include State, municipal (city, town, or village), and tribal governments. 1-5 MAY 2006

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19 CHAPTER 2 Planning Considerations For Domestic Disaster Relief Operations Note This chapter is derived from initial planning considerations that are common to any operation with modifications that address the civil support mission area. Amplification is provided in subsequent chapters and appendixes. Consult NWP 5-01 and NWDC TM , JP 3-0, JP 5-0, JP , and JP for comprehensive guidance on the maritime planning process. Appendix J in JP lists planning factors for FHA operations, and Appendix D in JP contains planning considerations for noncombatant evacuation operations, many of which have applicability in domestic DR operations. 2.1 COMMANDER S ESTIMATE The commander s estimate is the first and most critical phase in the operation planning process. It is conducted at all command echelons: tactical, operational, and strategic theater. The commander s estimate of the situation encompasses the assigned area of operations and the commander s area of interest. 2.2 DEVELOP SITUATIONAL AWARENESS Note Any intelligence collection activities and handling of information concerning U.S. persons must adhere to the restrictions and requirements of Executive Order and DOD Regulation R. Additional information is available at In domestic disaster response by the DOD the development of situational awareness (SA) mimics the IPBS process within the commander s estimate. Define the Operational Environment and Disaster Impacts: Identify area geography/topography (natural and man-made features, such as terrain, roads, ports, airfields, cities/villages, displaced persons camps, reservoirs, power grids, environmental waste/pollution, navigation aids, etc.). Identify environmental conditions and other factors affecting operational planning, establishment of command, control, and employment of forces in the area of operations. 2-1 MAY 2006

20 Determine meteorological conditions (climate, weather, atmospheric conditions, etc.) and oceanography/hydrography (water depth, currents, temperature, etc.). Identify factors affecting area access to include supply and resupply of material to the right place at the right time, (e.g., positioning of the sea base to maximize air routes and water routes, etc.). See Section A.1 for examples of specific application to disaster relief operations. Determine communications connectivity and communications capabilities within the area of operations (AO). Identify capabilities and limitations of other participants. Identify Federal, State and local limitations on activities driven by national policy, public affairs guidance, or legal restrictions. Identify cultural environment factors affecting the situation (including socioeconomic conditions, local history, traditions, customs, crime, intergroup tensions, etc.). Identify existing restrictions on force employment and the rules for the use of force (RUOF) (types of operations prohibited, forces or platforms that may not be used, allowable force protection measures, etc.). Conduct health situation estimate: Health status of population. Determine the Force Health Protection requirements (force immunization requirements, etc.). Determine the availability of primary and emergent medical care. Identify remaining healthcare infrastructure and its capability. See section 9.2 for further discussion. 2.3 MISSION ANALYSIS Identify source(s) of the mission. Determine supported and supporting commanders. Analyze higher commander s mission. State the higher commander s intent. Identify externally imposed limitations. Analyze available forces and assets. 2-2 MAY 2006

21 Identify planning assumptions. Identify steps to mitigate and manage risks. See OPNAVINST B and NTTP for a full discussion on operational risk management (ORM), including associated processes and tools. Restate mission as assigned by the commander. Determine essential tasks in support of the mission. See Appendix B for a draft list of essential tasks to accomplish the mission. As discussed in NTTP 1-01, such lists enable a commander to quantify both the level and scope of effort needed to achieve mission objectives. Section B2 provides examples of tasking assigned to Navy commanders in recent DR operations. 2.4 REVIEW LESSONS LEARNED Review operational lessons/observations recorded in the Navy Lessons Learned System (NLLS) database and after action reports (AARs). Review exercise lessons/observations recorded in the NLLS database and AARs. Review applicable lessons/observations from other Services, recorded in their lessons learned databases and AARs, and from other nations that are participating in this relief effort (or have participated in similar ones), if available. See Appendix A for examples of lessons or observations contained in the NLLS or recent AARs. 2.5 DETERMINE BATTLE RHYTHM INDICATORS Identify key readiness factors. Identify operational and training requirements. Identify higher and supported headquarters requirements for reports, meetings, video teleconferencing (VTCs), etc. Determine higher and supported headquarters decision making processes. Identify other recurring requirements for coordination with subordinates and other agencies/organizations. 2-3 MAY 2006

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23 CHAPTER 3 Commander s Principal Concerns and Decisions Note Key considerations from the commander s perspective are discussed below. Amplification is provided in subsequent appendixes and chapters. Consult the regional combatant commander s functional plan (FUNCPLAN) or concept plan (CONPLAN), JP 3-57, and JP for more comprehensive guidance. 3.1 MISSION CLARITY, COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS, AND POLICIES The commander must have a clear understanding of the mission and how the military, Federal, State, and local governments, and other participants in the DR operation will interact in accomplishing the mission. The key considerations listed below relate to mission clarity, command relationships, and policies: Determine and clearly publicize mission requirements. Publicize the end state, including the intended scope and duration of military aid, to all participants early in order to avoid unreasonable expectations and mission growth. Assess relationships to (or impact on) other operations, policies in effect, preplanned responses (to possible events), and the operational command structure (e.g., headquarters, command centers, and other C2 nodes, task organization, direct liaison authorizations, etc.). Issues to consider include: On-Scene Versus Distant Headquarters: A natural tension may occur between the commander on the scene and distant headquarters as warfighting command structures adapt to meet unique requirements under domestic crisis conditions. Those at the scene have a great need for agility in addressing rapidly changing conditions and local working relationships that may not be apparent to those at the distant headquarters. Those at headquarters focus on different issues than does the commander on the scene, including moving the bigger blocks in the operation. It takes a considerable amount of time and information to stand up a headquarters, while those at the scene are likely fully tasked meeting daily DR operational requirements. It is incumbent upon the on-scene commander to assist the headquarters in developing its situational awareness and to speak emphatically, when necessary, to advise superiors if decisions run contrary to what is needed on scene to accomplish the mission or if assets 3-1 MAY 2006

24 on scene are insufficient to meet the requirements levied by higher headquarters. See Section A.2 for illustration. The Command s Relationship With Civilian and Other Military Participants: For example, other Services, FEMA, National Guard, Coast Guard, coalition partners, nongovernment, and other international entities). All military participants must clearly understand the supporting role of military to civilian agencies including state entities. See joint doctrine publications JP 0-2 and JP 3-0 for a discussion on command relationships. Supported/supporting subordinate unit relationships. In some cases subordinate units will require considerable logistical, planning, or operational support from their parent command, and a supported/supporting relationship between commanders may be more effective and appropriate than shifting operational or tactical control (TACON) of subordinate units. Public law issues. There are issues related to U.S. public law that must be addressed: U.S. Code Title 10 versus Title 32 responsibilities and authority that govern employment of forces (see Sections 1.4.2, 6.1.4, ). Posse Comitatus Act restrictions (see Sections 1.4.2, 4.3.2, ). Force Protection (see Section 7.9). Focus on attaining transition decision points and higher authority. The commander should focus on transferring new requirements to civilian organizations later in the response unless continued military support is absolutely necessary. 3.2 SITUATIONAL AWARENESS Good SA is critical to properly focus the force s efforts. (See Sections 5.1 through 5.4 for additional suggestions.) The key considerations listed below relate to maintenance of good situational awareness: Ensure sufficient forces are assigned and/or tasked to develop and maintain a robust awareness of the situation. Get as much information as possible, as early as possible, from as many sources as possible. Verify that common operational picture (COP) details are disseminated widely enough to ensure unity and efficiency of effort. Keep the chain of command informed in order to adjust resource allocation and deployment. Determine safety concerns, including: safety of navigation, air traffic control, locations of hazardous materials including hazardous waste sites, and Force protection issues. 3-2 MAY 2006

25 Employ Subject Matter Experts (SMEs): Include SMEs from recent operations or exercises, the COCOM or fleet headquarters, and military Service emergency preparedness liaison officer (EPLO) programs as part of the force s extended network. Additional sources of SMEs include DHS or other federal agencies, academic institutions, the retired joint flag officer community, UN sources, and industry. Fleet and COCOM staffs may be able to assist in accessing these groups. Request that SMEs be attached for duty, if possible. Recent direct experience in domestic DR is the essential criterion. See Section for further discussion. Determine other agencies missions, requirements, relationships and expectations, and assist their situational awareness by communicating the military role and transition plan. 3.3 FORCES AND MATERIAL Ensure required forces and material are on board or en route and available for tasking at the initial indication that DR operations may be required. Having the right forces in the right place at the right time is one of the key challenges that the commander must meet. Recommended actions related to forces and material include the following: Logistics: Meet the Demand Signal: Get the logistics train moving as soon as possible. It does no good to arrive on station without the needed supplies, equipment, and skills, or the capacity to deliver or apply them. Ensure proper management of the demand signal that the crisis generates in order to avoid excess capacity, as well as shortages (see Section 7.1 for more on this dynamic): Reflect LFA desires and emergent needs in aid prioritization. One way to accomplish this is to establish a procedure in which the LFA provides a daily list of requirements which may be expanded to reflect situational awareness gained while meeting those requirements. Alternatively, the LFA may prioritize a list drawn up by local officials and other responders at the scene or provide broad guidance for their use in prioritization and meeting emergent needs. Maintain a continuous chain of command dialog. Forward recommendations on support, relief supplies, etc. up the chain of command as soon as possible and maintain a continuous dialog to effect changes as conditions evolve. Ensure that an efficient, well-planned distribution plan is in place. It does no good to create a mountain of supplies and material on the beach with associated protection and shelf-life concerns, if they can t be delivered where they are needed. Preserve availability of air assets and flexibility in their tasking from the sea base. Short notice requirements for assessment or delivery are common in DR operations. 3-3 MAY 2006

26 Track costs from the start. Typically, relief efforts commence before funding is identified. Documentation will likely be required for reimbursement. Seek guidance on reimbursement procedures if not provided by higher headquarters. Provide logistics assistance to other agencies. Other participants, such as NGOs or Federal, State, and local government agencies may not give logistics matters due consideration and the military may be called upon to assist. Establish Procedures for Force Protection and Security of Material. Depending on local sensitivities, legal considerations, and availability of law enforcement personnel, this may entail significant risk: Force protection. Coast Guard, National Guard (under state authority), NCIS, or State or local law enforcement agency personnel may be needed to provide force protection or security units to accompany teams sent ashore, secure landing zones (LZs), or guard supplies. Presence ashore versus personnel security. Commanders may decide to keep the footprint ashore small as a security measure. Whether such a decision is made for that purpose, or due to another reason (e.g., local government desire), there is an associated overhead or opportunity cost (i.e., a tradeoff in airlift and sealift used for this purpose, as opposed to delivering aid) in building and collapsing a presence ashore each day. Risk assessment. Risk (to mission and/or personnel) is inherent in any operation. Identification and mitigation or management of risk is a key element in joint and maritime planning processes that must be addressed in course of action development. OPNAVINST B and NTTP contain a comprehensive discussion on risk management (RM) processes and tools. Presence ashore: Indirect law and order effect. An alternative consideration regarding size of presence ashore is that the mere presence of military personnel ashore may be enough to prevent lawlessness, despite legal restrictions on employing them for law enforcement purposes. Personnel Issues: Combat efficiency. Develop a plan to maintain/regain combat efficiency and advise higher headquarters of expected deficiencies. Maintaining combat readiness can be difficult, particularly in extended operations or if deck space, policy, or legal restrictions preclude certain activities. See Section for an example. Stress. Establish a stress management program and monitor personnel for signs of stress. Extensive relief efforts may stress the physical, spiritual, and emotional capabilities of personnel directly participating in a relief effort. Additionally, there are stresses on families back home. Ombudsmen and public affairs officers (PAOs) can assist in providing information and reassurance. Personnel who have family members in the disaster area may also require assistance. Affected military personnel and their families. First responder units based in the affected area should assess the potential impact of the disaster on personnel and their families and develop a plan to meet their additional needs for information and other assistance. 3-4 MAY 2006

27 Redeployment of U.S. Military Assets: Redeploy U.S. military assets, or have their emergency deployments cancelled, as the Federal, State, and local governments and civilian agencies gain control of the situation. These forces may be needed elsewhere. There are also morale and logistic reasons for avoiding situations in which forces are underemployed. 3.4 BATTLE RHYTHM Events must be synchronized at the earliest opportunity for effective coordination. Design a battle rhythm that includes meetings, reports, key events, etc., to provide effective coordination between own force and other agencies while supporting higher and supported headquarters requirements: Establishing and maintaining a battle rhythm poses a significant challenge, particularly in the earliest stages of an operation. Numerous entities, operating in different time zones, may place demands on the commander and staff around the clock. See Section for additional discussion. Weekend and holiday routines can affect availability of key personnel in some organizations, posing coordination challenges or an impetus to accelerate or delay timelines. The commander should be prepared to address what his staff can reasonably do to accommodate the requirements, desires, and battle rhythms of outside agencies. 3.5 COMMUNICATIONS Effective communications are essential to coordination. Key considerations should include: Determine the primary C2 medium. Consider using unclassified to facilitate participation by all agencies. Lack of terminals and bandwidth aboard ship will be a limiting factor. Identify and, if necessary, obtain required communications assets. Minimum required capabilities include radios, telephones (preferably satellite), secure and nonsecure Internet, and VTC. The media will likely desire streaming video capability and may not have the necessary assets with them. Prioritize establishment of ship to shore communications between the sea base and logistic sites (e.g., airheads and ports). Manage expectations of what communications support will be available or provided to the media by clearly articulating capabilities at first contact and as media personnel arrive. Leverage use of civilian media assets, where possible. 3.6 DISASTER RELIEF AND JOINT TASK FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE Naval forces are well suited to DR operations and will often be the first to respond, possibly arriving prior to establishment of the DR and JTF infrastructure. Speed to execution is essential, not only to save lives and mitigate human suffering, but to provide an effective supply 3-5 MAY 2006

28 bridge until others can take over the operation. Recommended FHA/DR and JTF infrastructure-related actions include: Establish the sea base as close to the disaster relief site(s) as practical in order to speed delivery of supplies. Use the sea for maneuver space and leverage force mobility to focus efforts where they are needed most. Establish the command element at the most robust C2 node in the sea base. This will facilitate integration with the JTF and other agencies and command of the JTF, if a JTF is established, and provide the most reachback capability to facilitate transition to the JTF or other command structure as it is established. See Sections and A.2 for additional discussion. Consider distributed staff options for optimal placement of key personnel for assessment and response. Communications capabilities, impact on infrastructure, force protection concerns, and LFA or state/local desires may prohibit this option. Obtain local and Federal agency (e.g., harbormaster or port captain and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)) permission to operate watercraft and rotary wing aircraft at the earliest opportunity. These assets can access surviving population concentrations, requiring little infrastructure to deliver needed supplies or conduct SAR in the austere environment resulting from the disaster. Commence operations to minimize additional loss of life if arriving before joint or interagency C2 has been established, and keep superiors informed. Be prepared to take the lead in coordinating arriving U.S. forces. U.S. military assets may initially be the sole capability for delivery of relief supplies. Focus on subsequent actions should focus on transition of C2 functions to the appropriate authority (e.g., JTF commander), if a military organizational structure is established. 3.7 LIAISON OFFICER, DETACHMENT, AND TEAM DEPLOYMENT Liaison officers, detachments, and teams are force multipliers, facilitating access to key individuals and other agencies and promoting effective coordination: Designate and deploy LNOs as early as possible to get eyes on target and coordinate efforts with other agencies. Consider stationing SME LNOs with other Services, government officials, and other Navy elements. Stationing LNOs including NEPLOs with the LFA base of operations, as well as with the JTF headquarters and forward elements, is particularly important to advise decision makers on sea based capabilities and contributions. Consider LNO seniority, particularly in higher headquarters. Establish beach detachments to supervise flight operations and coordinate logistic matters, as required. Other teams can be deployed for coordination with media, distinguished visitors (DVs), and other agencies, to conduct assessments, and to make necessary infrastructure repairs to enable delivery of supplies, etc. 3-6 MAY 2006

29 3.8 TRANSITION/TRANSFER POINTS AND STRATEGY Military support in DR operations is intended to be short duration to minimize human suffering and stabilize the situation (i.e., support during the crisis stage, such as SAR and recovery efforts). Once the situation has stabilized, the state and local governments or NGOs should assume those functions the military initially performed. Key actions related to Transition/Transfer Points and Strategy include: Plan for transition. JP 3-57 contains joint doctrine for civil-military operations, including a discussion on transition metrics and sample checklists for transition and termination planning. JP provides joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) for foreign FHA/DR, including a four-phased transition model that may be applied to domestic DR. Address the transition to civilian performance of tasks at the initial meeting(s) with other participants and keep the military-civilian team focused on this critical path. Update all concerned on the status of transition as often as possible. Identify key niche functions that must be provided by other means early and ensure there is a plan to transfer them to the appropriate organization. Essential functions, such as air control, are critical to transition. Beware of requests for assistance in reconstruction efforts. No new tasks should appear unless absolutely necessary and there should be an acceptable transition plan. Require civilian agencies to contribute to the operation with all available assets as they arrive in the operating area, rather than being allowed to wait until all of their assets are on station and their normal support architecture is fully in place. Other agencies readiness and willingness to assume DR functions are key to effective transition. 3.9 USE OF FORCE In addition to the force protection and material security concerns mentioned in Section 3.3, the legal authority the command is operating under may limit actions that may be taken to compel civilians who do not wish to comply with actions directed by competent authority (e.g., the governor s order to evacuate) or to prevent or stop illegal acts (e.g., looting). Personnel must understand this limitation and that their recourse is to report the incident to law enforcement authority. See Section A.2 for an example. Key actions related to use of force include: Review the rules for the use of force contained in the mission s execute order (EXORD) and subsequent orders and ensure personnel understand them, as well as legal and/or policy considerations they are based upon (i.e., Title 10, Title 32, Posse Comitatus Act, DOD directives, etc.). Ensure reporting procedures for incidents of lawlessness or noncompliance with evacuation orders are in place prior to placing military personnel in such situations METRICS, TERMINOLOGY, LESSONS LEARNED COLLECTION, AND EVENTS RECONSTRUCTION Commonality in measures and terms is essential to coordinating and assessing participant performance in an operation. It is also essential that the Navy learn from its experience in order to 3-7 MAY 2006

30 continue to improve performance, therefore documentation of the success, or problems with procedures needs to be adequately recorded. Key issues to consider include: Use of Terms. Some terms can hamper coordination with State and local officials, NGOs, or international organizations because of certain connotations they may have: The media and other entities may use certain terms (e.g., refugees as opposed to the more correct displaced persons or evacuees ) loosely. Such terms may have legal connotations and incorrect use should be avoided. Every effort should be made to use commonly understood terminology, such as that found in Federal agency (particularly DOD) directives and joint doctrine to avoid confusion. Determine, analyze, and report appropriate metrics: Develop a standard set of relevant metrics and appropriate terms and train personnel in their use. Metrics are important in assessing progress toward transition/transfer of activities to another agency, or terminating those activities no longer necessary. See Sections 3.10, A.5, 6.1.6, JP 3-57, and NWP 3-07 for more on metrics and measures of effectiveness. Establish and follow a plan to collect data to meet specified and anticipated reporting requirements, reconstruct events, and provide lessons learned for those who will conduct this type of operation in the future: Dedicate personnel to collect this data. Consider using analysts, if embarked, and requesting a Navy lessons learned (NLL) collection team for assistance in large operations. A sample data collection plan is provided at Appendix C STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES Specialized disaster relief SOPs (e.g., ship s instructions and/or notices) to address specific unit level procedures for receiving and processing evacuees and other activities associated with DR may be necessary to ensure effective and efficient unit level execution of certain functions. Similar commands (or platforms) may be able to provide the guidance they used during recent operations to assist in developing command SOPs. 3-8 MAY 2006

31 CHAPTER 4 Coordination Note The intent of this chapter is to provide the commander with a general appreciation of considerations in coordinating DR activities with other participants. Subsequent chapters provide amplification. 4.1 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS Coordination Centers The LFA may establish interagency coordination centers to facilitate coordination of civilian and military activities. See Section and Appendix D for further discussion. JP 3-57 contains joint doctrine on CMOCs, essentially the foreign DR equivalent of a JFO, and related COCOM, interagency, or international coordination centers. JP provides joint TTP. The federal government coordinates its efforts through national, regional, and local centers, which are addressed in detail in the NRP including: 1. National level: Homeland security operations center (HSOC) and national response coordination center (NRCC) 2. Regional: Regional response coordination center (RRCC) 3. Local: Joint Field Office (JFO) Transition or Transfer of Responsibility The plan to transition functions from military to civilian agencies must be decided early and addressed throughout the operation. Involving other agencies in developing transfer assessment criteria can be helpful, particularly in developing easily understandable assessment criteria (i.e., stoplight style red, yellow, and green). However, other agencies may be hesitant or want to wait until all assets are available before accepting responsibility from the military. This is counterproductive and every effort should be made to integrate services and increase involvement where possible. Their involvement in the operation will promote the necessary thought process to plan and execute transfer of functions as soon as the conditions can support it. Military forces are well suited to facilitate the necessary interaction among the various agencies in the operation. The sooner this occurs the sooner transition can take place Requirements Process Failure to understand or adhere to the accepted requirements determination process may cause operational and logistical problems. State or local governments generally drive this process, 4-1 MAY 2006

32 requesting specific assistance provided by Federal agencies. Failing that, it is an LFA (generally FEMA) responsibility. 1. Commander Fleet Forces Command plans and conducts incident relief operations in either the CDR USNORTHCOM or CDR USSOUTHCOM areas of responsibility (AORs). 2. JP 3-08 contains a discussion on the interagency process and foreign DR, while JP (currently in draft) will specifically address domestic DR. OPNAVINST C provides a comprehensive discussion on Navy policy. 3. USAID, the lead agency in foreign DR, serves in a supporting role as coordinator for international aid contributions in domestic DR Professional Contacts Professional relationships established during regional forums and exercises (e.g., medical conferences or exercises) may be leveraged to facilitate external relations. Similarly, relationships built by allies and partners may be helpful in this regard Seniority Rank equivalency can be important in gaining and maintaining credibility and access to counterparts in other agencies. Where this is not possible, a senior officer of commensurate rank or position (e.g., a flag officer or commanding officer, as appropriate) may need to occasionally open the door for a more junior official. 4.2 MILITARY Higher Authority Develop a means to keep higher authority informed of all activities. They will have a strong desire for information and this must be fulfilled as a matter of routine. Understand that in the early stages C2 will provide several avenues for a higher authority to request information. Establish and educate subordinates on procedures for handling requests centralizing the flow as early as possible Other U.S. Navy, Services, and Joint Service The Service and joint doctrine noted in the references delineate command and working relationships with other military participants (e.g., functional component commands, area commanders, planning agents, National Guard, Coast Guard, etc.). However, these relationships vary with the type, size, and scale of operation and must be clearly understood in order to coordinate effectively (e.g., how to best coordinate activities in adjacent areas or within each other s assigned areas). 4-2 MAY 2006