MILWAUKEE CO UNTY, w1sconsin COURT FACILITY SECURITY AUDIT

Transcription

1 MILWAUKEE CO UNTY, w1sconsin COURT FACILITY SECURITY AUDIT

2 THE AMER~NIVERSITY WASHINGTON. DC School of Public Affairs Justice Programs Office Thl.: (202) FAX: (202) 885-2&85 TechnicHI Assistance Report No MIL,VAUKEE COID.'TY, '"'ISCONSIN COURT FACILITY SECURI'TY AUDIT February 1991 Consultant: Lawrence Siegel COURTS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT Services to State and Local Courts Under a Grant From the State Justice Institute Brandywine Building, Svite Massachvsetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, O.C

3 COURTS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT ASSIGNMENT DATA SHEET Technical Assistance No.: Requesting Jurisdiction: Requesting Agency: Requesting Official: Milwaukee County, Wisconsin First Judicial District Court Hon. Patrick T. Sheedy, Chief Judge Dates of On-Site Study: February 25-28, 1991 Consultants Assigned: CTAP Staff Coordinator: Central Focus of Study: Mr. Lawrence Siegel Joseph A. Trotter, Jr. Court Facility Security Audit This report was prepared in conjunction with the Cowts Technical Assistance Project, which is conducted under a grant from the State Justice Instituie to The American Univerriiy. The points of view expressed do not necessarily represent the official position or po/ides of the State l ustice Institute. ii

4 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION 1 TI. GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE COURT SECURI1Y 3 III. MAJOR FACILITY-SPECIFIC SECURITY PLANNING ISSUES Children's Court Center Immediately Significant Recommendations Near-Future Significant Recommendations 5 7 B. c. D. Courthouse 1. Staffing and Operations 2. Juror Badges 3. Secure Courtroom Design 4. Prisoner Elevator 5. Long-Range Space Needs Courthouse Annex Criminal Justice Center IV. MAJOR SYSTEM/COMPLEX-WIDE SECUR11Y PLANNING ISSUES 14 A. B. c. D. E. Appendix Security Personnel Keys and Key Control Alarms Weapons Screening Security Clearing House iii

5 MILWAUKEE COUNTY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE COURT FACILITY SECURITY AUDIT I. INTRODUCTION At the request of Milwaukee County's Chief Circuit Court Judge Patrick T. Sheedy, the Courts Technical Assistance Project provided technical assistance in the form of a security audit, by sending Mr. Lawrence Siegel to Milwaukee during the period February 25-28, Mr. Siegel is a court and criminal justice facility planning and security consultant who has been providing such technical assistance for many years. A listing of the Court and County officials interviewed and the locations reviewed in the course of Mr. Siegel's site work in Milwaukee County appears in the Appendix. The security audit had two purposes: l. To audit security in the Courthouse, Safety Bldg., and Children's Court Center and to review plans of new Criminal Justice Center by visiting these buildings and interviewing key people. 2. To review the Draft RFP for Five Year Security Program prepared by the Professional Services Division of DPW and recommend scheduling priorities and additions, if necessary. This report recommends ideas for the Draft RFP (shown in italics) together with a few other comments and observations drawn from the site visit and past experience in other jurisdictions. It does not attempt to solve the many-sided security issues in the Milwaukee County courts; that is the purpose of the security program to be solicited by the RFP. The recommendations are based on the site visit's discussions, observations, and document reviews and are intended simply to amplify and set some time priorities for the RFP and the proposed five-year security program. Within the report, the phrase "security study" is used to refer to the scope of work to produce the five-year program. The Draft RFP is supported by a funding authorization and the agreement of the county's executive, legislative, and administrative departments to undertake security improvements. It presents officials with an opportunity to coalesce the findings of the Security Task Force and start serious implementation of its recommendations. Our recommendations are intended to endorse and assist the departments to carry forward the work which has brought the county to this point.

6 Court security is an issue made to order for the good luck syndrome: if it ain't happened yet, it ain't going to happen. Waiting until it does happen before taking elementary precautions is a prescription for trouble. The site visit made quite clear the nature and extent of the dangers waiting to happen in the courts of Milwaukee County, dangers kept in check so far by those security measures already in place; it also made quite clear that good luck alone will not suffice much longer. The five-year security program is a vital step in the right direction. 2

7 II. GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE COURT SECURITY The triad of court security features is architecture, personnel/ operations, and technology. Ideally, a facility's design would include a number of architectural security features, including separate secure, restricted, and public circulation (corridors, stairs, elevators) and spaces. Then, security personnel would be added and security procedures would be instituted to provide an adequate level of security, in refle.ction of the design, remembering that various situations in courtrooms and elsewhere have minimum security needs that can only be met by personnel and procedures. Finally, security technology (alarms, radios, weapons screening equipment, etc.) could be added to supplement and amplify the capabilities of the personnel. Let us separate prisoner custody from the other courthouse security topics because its needs and liabilities are well known to all Sheriff's Department from constitutional, statute, and case law, whereas other court security responsibilities may be Jess clearly established. If we subtract custody operations, what is left and who is responsible? This is another three-part topic; the goals of effective security are: Deterrence - to prevent security problems from happening; Detection - to discover security problems that do occur and alert authorities of their nature and location; and Damage Limitation - to limit the spread of disturbances and minimize their physical and fiscal harm. To deter security problems, uniformed and authoritative security officers are assigned to duties throughout the facility where they are apparent to visitors and staff and represent a security presence. Their assignments include maintaining order in courtrooms and other public spaces, escorting jurors and ensuring the privacy of jury deliberations, keeping unauthorized persons from entering restricted spaces, etc. To detect security problems and alert authorities, security personnel may conduct searches of visitors and spaces, maintain control of locks (for example, locking courtrooms which are not in use), and notify the sheriff's office when problems occur 3

8 (using telephones, radios, alarm circuits, etc.) Among the situations that may need their attention are medical emergencies, as well as outbreaks of violence or attempts at intimidation. To limit damage, security personnel may respond to emergencies which they observe or to which they are directed, taking such action as is warranted. 4

9 III. MAJOR FACILI1Y-SPECIFIC SECURI1Y PLANNING ISSUES The topics discussed below and in the following section of the report dealing with complex-wide security issues can be reflected in the RFP both to include them in the work scope as specific items to be considered and to establish time frames for delivering certain recommendations. A Children's Court Center Three projects are being considered by the court and county which significantly influence security planning. In order of time imminence they are: 1. Enlargement of Public Waiting Room into area now occupied by Court Reporters. Immediate si~nificance. 2. Development of a fourth courtroom. Near-future significance. 3. Major renovation and expansion of existing facility or relocation to another (downtown) location. Post-election (probabl0 significance. The Children's Court Center presents the most dangerous court security situation in the county. In simple terms, this is because of: o o o o o o the high caseloads, the large numbers of juveniles and adults present in the building for hearings and probation interviews, the well-known volatility of juveniles and juvenile proceedings, the high likelihood (approaching certainty) that visitors are carrying serious weapons into the facility, the lack of architectural security features such as separate public, private, and secure corridors; and the confusion and uncertainty that attend the movement of people and cases through the building. l. lmmediatelv Significant Recommendations Security improvements in this facility are immediately needed. Bailiffs' 5

10 currently are stationed in closed rooms which keep them from adequately seeing and being seen by the clientele. The offices should be substantially redesigned and relocated as part of the proposed waiting room expansion project, so that the bailiffs can oversee the new space completely and can make their security presence known, while still remaining somewhat separated and protected. The larger waiting room will be occupied by a larger number of persons and will require the assignment of additional security personnel to keep a critical ratio of public to officers from developing and to maintain an adequate level of safety and order. From my brief observation, it seems possible that the Children's Court bailiffs may be reacting to a high stress environment by relying on their offices to close them away from the waiting room public. The RFP should look into this situation with the idea of altering the duty assignments to reduce that stress by such means as reducing the shift to, say, four hours, alternating days or weeks of assignment, or other administrative devices.. Additionally, the projed designers should be asked to include improvements in the cirr:ulation of public and staff, attempting to create one-way streets to and from the waiting room and to and from the courtrooms. My exit briefing recommended that weapons screening should be installed in the front door of the facility and that all access doors should be controlled so that public access is provided only through that one location. (Subsequently, we were informed that a plan bas been presented for installing a weapons screening station at the detention center vistors' entrance.) The installation of the court security equipment and the development of a comprehensive plan for the control of access; the duties, stations, and number of bailiffs; and other security/ spatial changes must be coordinated. Past experience in Milwaukee County shows that the cooperation of the court and related agencies, the Sheriff's Department, the County Supervisors, the County Executive, and the county departments with participating responsibilities are necessary for success in these trans-departmental projects. Time is short, but the security RFP presents the only viable hope of achieving permanent and workable gains. Thus a set of guidelines for weapons screening and access control should be made the first output of the proposed study and should be developed 6

11 within the framework of the waiting room expansion, because the use of security personne4 the cirr:ulation of public and staff through the building, and the need for an information statir;n at the entrance all are closely related. 2. Near-Future Significant Recommendations Adding one judge to Children's Court really means adding one case processing unit (CPU) and substantially increasing the total number of square feet needed in the facility. The CPU will include the personnel, spaces, and equipment needed to support one courtroom and judge in an already-crowded building containing only four CPU's (centered on four judicial spaces). In round numbers, the space needs might increase by about 10,000 gross square feet, perhaps more, representing an increase of twenty to twenty-five percent over the existing area of courtroom, chambers, case-workers, district attorneys, clerical, public, records, staff, and other spaces. To add one CPU is not a trivial problem unless more space is made available in the facility. The circular building has two major space resources: 1) the unsupervised and (correctly) unused waiting spaces in six separate suites of probation offices and 2) the basement. Unfortunately, the area of the six waiting rooms is not usable without a major interior renovation, because each is in a different location. Making use of the basement also implies major interior renovations on both floors, as well as removing whatever obstacles may have been cited by OSHA and Fire Marshal surveys. My inference is that these questions really collapse into the longer-range issue of whether to make a major on-site expansion or to relocate Children's Court. In reference to the RFP, this issue goes so far beyond the scope of security problems thai specific recommendations must wait on the underlying decisions, but the security staff and equipment implications of adding one CPU should be examined and factored into those decisions. B. Courthouse Except for several holding cells and the private corridors leading to most judges' chambers, the Courthouse does not contain the separated groups of secure, restricted, 7

12 and public circulation and spaces which a new courthouse should provide. The primary rule of good security systems operating in the absence of these essential architectural features, is that personnel and equipment should be used in numbers large enough to provide equivalent security. Here, this has not been done; most security personnel are diverted to prisoner custody as primary duties. 1. Staffing and Operations The Sheriff accepts court security as well as prisoner custody as a fundamental responsibility of bis office, but bas not been budgeted to provide the number of security personnel to effectively carry it out. The department states that the most important need is to provide an adequate number of personnel. Standards, as such, do not exist for the number of court security officers in a given facility, but tbere are guidelines. My guidelines start with a minimum of one security officer in every courtroom while it is in session, increasing depending on: o the nature of the proceedings in each courtroom o the size of each courtroom o the attendance of spectators and litigants in each courtroom, and o whether officers have custody and courtroom security responsibilities both My guidelines continue with additional officers on patrol and evident throughout the building, to maintain the presence of security and indicate that officials intend to maintain safety and security for all persons. Other sources of guidelines are the National Sheriff's A~sociation, the U.S. Marshal's Office, and the Office of Court Administration in New York State. Other possible sources are the California AOC and the AOIC in Illinois. In general, once the prisoner custody staffing is established, the court security staffing is determined in reference to the type of proceedings (criminal, civil, or family) and the spaces in which they occur. Within the Courthouse, Family Court is probably the most urgent location. Its proceedings are historically the most volatile, do include persons in custody, and are 8

13 very stressful. The spaces have been well designed for security management, however, compared to spaces inherited from older design concepts. The RFP could identify this as a location for which specific staffing recommendations should be made, with the purpose of con!uwirzg the presence of bailiffs in the waiting rooms, perhaps increasing them by one or more bailiffs with a regular patrol route through and outside the suites, and adding addirionaj bailiffs towards the goal of one officer in each active hearing room. Criminal courtrooms should have at least one bailiff on duty at au times, aside from custodial needs. Th.is could mean three bailiffs assigned to some courtrooms at some times, including both courtroom and custodial duties. Civil courtrooms generauy would not need more than one bailiff in attendance, with some exceptions, depending on the nature and size of the proceedings. Particularly contentious issues which attract large numbers of spectators and participants should receive more attention as perhaps sbould probate courts during competency and some other hearings. The Small Claims courtroom is a special situation. Both the courtroom and the number of persons attending are large, standing-room-only is common, and some litigants often have to wait in the public corridor. Security staffing is provided by two Bailiffs with the sometime assistance of "Courthouse One", the floor patrol Bailiff. Fights, sometimes with weapons, are common. Contested cases are heard in the two interior hearing rooms and are not attended by Bailiffs. Volatile issues and hot tempers are the rule in this (and all) small claims proceedings. The security study should itemize the small claims process for spedfic attention, inchlding the rwmber of Bailiffs, how to deal with corridor waiting, and standard procedures to minimize volatility and deal with fights and other outbreaks. A question was raised about whether weapons screening stations using metal detectors and X-ray equipment would change the number of officers needed in courtrooms. Perhaps it is best answered as follows. If the number of officers assigned to courtroom and other court security duties was at a level adequate to deal with weapons, it probably would be higher than needed if weapons screening were established to prevent weapons from being brought into the facilities. We should remember, however, 9

14 that staffing in Milwaukee County is not at such levels and so would not be reduced by the installation of screening stations. Metal detectors and X-ray equipment are not necessary screening station components; stations can successfully operate with security personnel conducting au searches. The equipment does avoid some embarrassment, however, simplifies the need to assign male and female officers to all stations, and allows faster processing than hand searching. Also, X-rays are less intrusive means of searching packages and briefcases, especially to attorneys who sometimes have objected to court employees examining tbe private papers contained in their bags. The RFP already requires the security consultant to research staffing issues and propose responsible guidance for staffing levels. It should direct the consultant to separate the problem for each building and define the constraints and guidelines which should apply to the categories of spaces in each. 2. Juror Badges This next item need not wait for the RFP, but should be dealt with expeditiously. While in the Courthouse I noted that many jurors wear their juror badges when they are going to and from lunch or at other times when they are not in transit as a panel or in courtrooms. This makes them potential targets for interference or intimidation outside courtrooms and jury assembly. For their own protection as well as that of the judicial process, they should be directed to wear the badges only in the assembly rooms, courtrooms, and jury rooms. 3. Secure Courtroom Design In addition to the new Criminal Justice Center courtrooms, several courtrooms in the Safety Building have been renovated to include transparent (plastic) barriers between the public and judicial area. It is not clear that a full analysis of the design needs was carried out, given the problems noted by several persons. Functional guidelines for seave courtroom design should be deveu>pe4 in the security study to resolve the security, acoustic, and other difficu/jies of the cu.rrent Safety Building examples. 10

15 4. Prisoner Elevator One weakness in security and propriety of which everyone is aware is the long public route for moving prisoners between the jail and tbe courtrooms in the Courthouse. The bullpens themselves are secure, although the women's cells have poor supervisory visibility and lack toilets, but tbey are reached through private, rather than secure, corridors which in tum are reached through public corridors and the public/freight/ prisoners' elevator. The remainder of the route between the Safety Building and Courthouse, through the garage and its basement connections, or through MacArthur Square, is entirely public. Plans for the new Criminal Justice Center do not offer relief for this public exposure. The RFP should consider itemizing the freight elevator by asking for an early recommendation about denying ijs use as a public elevator and, perhaps, installing a signalling system which would warn that it is in use or approaching a floor where it will open. Overall, the prisoner-handling difficulties of the courthouse are inherent in its design and are unlikely to be significantly improved without a major and expensive renovation. Current plans for the new complex do not offer any remedy, either. The site of the safety building seems the most likely place for attacking the issue of removing criminal courtrooms to a more secure facility. Two options have been considered once the new complex is in operation, re novating the facility or replacing it with a new criminal courthouse. Obviously, these are not issues that can be explored within the context of the security RFP, but the wng-range security plan should describe the requirements for secure cin::ulati.on and spaces that any sobdion should use as a guideline. 5. Long-range Space Needs In view of the developing Criminal Justice Center, the related questions about future use of the Courthouse and the Safety Building, and the anticipated near-future addition of felony courtrooms in the Courthouse, it is appropriate to look at 11

16 comprehensive security implications in the context of the court expansion potential of the two facilities. The Courthouse is very large, but mucb of its size lies in its floor-to-floor height and mezzanines which are not readily exploitable to obtain additional useful space. If renovations were at all feasible to convert mezzanine spaces to additional courtrooms and related spaces, they likely would be quite expensive. Adding courtrooms (actually case processing units) within the building probably means expanding the court floors downward into the current county government offices; adding courtrooms outside the building probably means renovating or replacing the existing Safety Building. If additional court spaces are developed within tbe courthouse, where do the displaced occupants go? Alternatively, the courts might vacate the building in favor of a new courthouse elsewhere, but then what happens to the approximately 400,000 square feet of space they now occupy? These are not security issues, but they are likely to come under serious study relatively soon and the security issues should be developed in the security study. C. Courthouse Annex The security study shordd examine the is.sues of parking and security of movement between parking lats and the Courthouse Anna for staff, public, and jw'ors. It shordd recommend improvements which can. be readily implemented without the relatively slaw or expensive need for facilijy changes. Such recommendations also might tie inio the near-future opening of the new first-floor jwy assembly room and show a commitment to jw'ors' safety and other concerns. The distant expressway lot is tbe main parking available for jurors, but currently there are no direct or indirect escort provisions. Jurors are subpoened to the courthouse and their safety should be given consideration, both as citizens and as participants in deciding trial outcomes. Other counties, such as Pierce County, Washington, including the city of Tacoma, where staff and juror parking also are removed from the courthouse, although nor as far as in Milwaukee, have provided roving foot and vehicular patrols throughout the work day and for juries held after hours on court business. 12

17 D. Criminal Justice Center The plans of the new Criminal Justice Center reveal one potential security problem in relation to court operations. An elevator, designated Sl, and its associated lobbies are to be used by judges, staff, and juries in the High Security Court on Level One, and by judges and staff in the Preliminary Court on Level Two. On Level Two the lobby opens directly on to the public skywalk, which is the public and staff entrance to the court spaces in the Center. On Level One, the lobby opens on to the secure skywalk, which will be shared by judges, staff, and juries for the short walk to the High-Security Court suite. The elevator also is a prisoner elevator for the holding cells associated with those two courts and for access, via the secure skywalk, to the existing Safety Building. This is the heart of the problem and must be monitored in the security study. The nature of the problem already has been communicated to the Project Architect, to Mark Hipp, and to Mary Cannon who exercises project management responsibilities for the Criminal Justice Center. It has two dimensions; one is the likelihood of confrontations between prisoners and judges, staff, and jurors in the elevator lobbies and the other is the public access to and visibility of prisoners in the second-floor lobby. More than written procedures are required to eliminate the disastrous potential here; either architectural design changes or positive lockouts are needed to preclude confrontations, escapes, mistrials, intimidations, or other consequences. A positive lockout would be some combination of signals and key card interfaces which absolutely prevents 1) the public skywalk doors from opening while prisoners are in the second-floor lobby, 2) prevents prisoners from entering the lobby when the public doors are open or court personnel are in the lobby, and 3) prevents prisoners from entering either lobby when the elevator is in use by court personnel. The problem and solution are not within the scope of the security study, but the study should provide that the situation is monitored and a solution satisfactory to court seavity is developed. 13

18 IV. MAJOR SYSTEM/COMPLEX-WIDE SECURITY PIANNING ISSUES A Security Personnel Clearly the most argumentative security issue is that of personnel: What qualifications, What cost, What organizational affiliation? Throughout this report I have tried to use the terms bailiff or security officer to refer to the people who constitute the court security staff. This usage is in deference to the strong points of view expressed by representatives of the Sheriff's Department, the deputies' union, the county, and the court. In the exit briefing I described the staffing methods in several other states, including New York, California, and Illinois, which each are somewhat different. New York uses security officers who are part of and are paid by the court system and who follow a career path and pay lines paralleling deputy court clerks. California relies principally on Sheriff's and Marshals Departments. Illinois is interesting because it has instituted a court security fee, currently maximized at $15, as one of the case filing fees and authorizes counties to use it for hiring court security officers. How they are hired, paid, trained, and controlled generally is left to the jurisdictions, themselves. Counties which hire security officers generally pay below the scale of deputy sheriffs and expect to attract recent law-enforcement retirees. Generally, these positions are not directly responsible for the custody of prisoners and are not sworn, although they usually are peace officers licensed and trained to carry arms. They are uniformed, usually in blazers with county patches. It might be well advised for the RFP to request a study of personnel options and a recommended model B. Keys and Key Control The securijy study should look at the advantages of installing a comprehensive l.ock and key i;onttol system for the entire romp/ex, stressing the feasibility of a card-key system. This offers the opportunity to combine identification cards with keys, keep an accurate, computer-based record of keyholders, and establish comprehensive and timely con/to/ over which employees have access to which spaces. 14

19 Because of the number of different keys still in use in the complex--even after a serious attempt to reduce and control the number--and the difficulty of controlling access to keys, the computerized alternatives should prove to be attractive. Prospectively in the new Criminal Justice Center and currently in several other locations, smaller card-key systems are in use. Extending the concept throughout the complex should not be too difficult. C. Alarms Related to the issue of locks and keys is that of emergency alarms. The system currently in use adapted an existing, aging, hard-wired system to a computerized controller, but with some omissions. Currenlly, when an alarm button is actuated, it signals in the Sheriff's Dispatch Center, but the display does not show the telephone number of the signalling location. Apparently, the means of keeping up with changing numbers (as judges move from one courtroom to another) required the services of a contract technician tn reprogram the cnmputer. The county plans to replace the contract technician with its own employee. It is urged that the ability to update the current system with phone number displays should be included in this employee's job description. The security study should examine the entire subject of alanns to see whether the curreni system should be upgraded or replaced with more reliable equipment and whether an audio or video infonnation component should be part of the alarm system. D. Weapons Screening As mentioned earlier, we recommend installation of a weapons screening station at the main access door of the Children's Court Center. This recommendation is made only with the proviso that the plan be developed jointly by the security consultant, the Sheriff's Department, County Supervisors, County Executive, and the other county departments with participating responsibilities. This report is not taking a position on the need for weapons screening in the Courthouse as an issue, but it does comment on the proposal offered by the Sheriff's 15

20 Department as a means of establishing such an operation. That proposal actually covers both the Courthouse and the Safety Building and responds to the difficulties presented by the large number of access doors to each building. The proposal appears to have merit as to its method and should be reviewed in the security study in reference to the iv1y upuuuu l> 1mu we -'<ue1y DUllUlug c. a UKe1y <.:auu1ua1e w1 weapuus ><.:reelllllg; indeed it was strongly urged by the District Attorney. Opinions about the courthouse are divided, but the Sheriff's proposal would locate the station on the fourth floor where it would bypass the question of denying open access to the lower floor county offices. The security study should make a comparative analysis of weapons screening in the cozuthouse and SafeJy Building and develop guidelines, an impact analysis, and spedjic recommendations. This effort might follow the Children's Cozut study so as not to delay implementation at that location. E. Security Clearing House One further overall recommendation is based on my observation that court security responsibilities are diffused throughout the several departments having security duties or interests. The Security Task Force, as I understand it, does not have any staff but depends for its accomplishments on the time availability of its members, each an employee of an operating department. My recommendation is that someone in county government be designated as a security clearing point for the task force and given enough time to see that information is collected and disseminated among appropriate persons and departments. This person should be made aware of all court security-related activities, proposals, and problems and be given the responsibility for seeing that court security is considered when related activities take place (renovations, for example) and that security problems which have been brought to the attention of the task force (as mentioned in the next section, for example) are dealt with. 16

21 Appendix LIST OF PERSONS INTERVIEWED AND LOCATIONS VISITED Primai:v Contacts/Expediters Mark Hipp, Professional Services, DPW Ronald Witkowiak, Court Administrator Interviews Patrick T. Sheedy, Chief Judge Ronald R. Witkowiak, District Court Administrator Michael D. Guolee, Judge Michael Malmstadt, Judge Ronald Goldberger, Judge Michael McCann, District Attorney Richard Artison, Sheriff Gary Barczak, Clerk of Circuit Court Dorothy K Dean, Supervisor Tom Cooper, Small Claims Court Commissioner Phyllis De Carvalho, Attorney Thomas G. Cannon, Attorney Kathy Malone, Chief Probation Officer, Children's Court John Rath, Risk Manager Dennis Dietscher, Employee Safety Supervisor William Heinemann, Director of Architecture, DPW Thurman Dansby, Deputy Director, DPW James F. Klopp, Sheriff's Sergeant Michael J. Mac Gillis, Sheriff's Lieutenant Bernard J. Tessmer, Sheriff's Department Administrator Roderick Wiggins, Dispatch Center, Sheriff's Sergeant Mary C. Cannon, Consultant Lou Stippich, Project Architect for Criminal Justice Facility Robert Erdmann, Deputy Clerk of Circuit Court, Criminal Division Thomas Oelstrom, Accountant, Clerk of Circuit Court, Criminal Division Lawrence G. Lauer, Operations and Maintenance Superintendant Locations Visited Courthouse, seven floors and Clerk's Mezzanine Courthouse Annex Safety Building, including portions of Jail Children's Court Center Underground (MacArthur Square) route of prisoner transport between Safety Bldg. and Courthouse