Science, Technology, and Attack Tactics Relevant to National Missile Defense Systems

Size: px

Start display at page:

Download "Science, Technology, and Attack Tactics Relevant to National Missile Defense Systems"

Darrell Lyons
5 years ago
Views:

1 MIT Security Studies Program Science, Technology, and Attack Tactics Relevant to National Missile Defense Systems Theodore A. Postol Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Voice: ; FAX: ; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Washington, D.C. Monday June 18, 2001 Slide 1

2 Boost-Phase, Mid-Course, and Reentry Phases of Ballistic Missile Flight Slide 2

3 Boost-Phase, Mid-Course, and Reentry Phases of Ballistic Missile Flight Location of Objects Shown Every 20 Seconds q =22.55 degrees 0 V 0=7.177, , and 7.21 km/s Altitude (Kilometers) Altitudes Where ICBM is in Powered Flight (200 to 300 seconds) Altitudes Where Reentry Effects May Be Observable (60 to 90 seconds) Range (Kilometers) Slide 3

4 Mid-Course Missile Defense Issues and Concepts Slide 4

Ground-Based Interceptor and Raytheon and Boeing Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles Kill Vehicle

EKV Angular Resolution Roughly 150 to 300 microradians.

150 and 300 meters, and even at 10 kilometers range, the resolution will be roughly 1.

5 Ground-Based Interceptor and Raytheon and Boeing Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles Kill Vehicle Length 55 inches Diameter 23 inches Weight 121 pounds Silicon Focal Plane Array Raytheon EKV EKV Angular Resolution Roughly 150 to 300 microradians. This means that the resolution of the EKV against objects at 1000 kilometers range is between 150 and 300 meters, and even at 10 kilometers range, the resolution will be roughly 1.5 to 3 meters. At 100 kilometers it will be 15 to 30 meters. Mercury Cadmium Telluride Focal Plane Array Boeing EKV Silicon Focal Plane Array Slide 5

6 Launch from North Korea, China, or Russia to US Followed by Intercept (10 to 13 km/sec Closing Speed) Shemya Track Initiation (150+ Seconds) Intercept Point Interceptor Launched Initial Clear Acquisition Initial Shemya Acquisition Slide 6

Targets are Identified by Their Brightness in Two Infrared Wavelength Bands Targets As They Might Be Seen at 200 kilometers range ~20 seconds to impact, lateral separation ~3.5 km?, total divert ~.

7 Targets are Identified by Their Brightness in Two Infrared Wavelength Bands Targets As They Might Be Seen at 200 kilometers range ~20 seconds to impact, lateral separation ~3.5 km?, total divert ~.5 km/sec? Target 1 Observed Brightness Target 2 Observed Brightness Target 6 Observed Brightness Target 7 Observed Brightness Target 5 Observed Brightness Target 8 Observed Brightness Target 3 Observed Brightness Target 9 Observed Brightness Target 4 Observed Brightness Target 10 Observed Brightness Slide 7

8 Some Photos of Objects that Could Appear Like Warheads Large Balloon 2.2 Meter Diameter Balloon Balloon With White Coating With Reflecting Coating With Black Coating Light Rigid Replica Decoy Minuteman Inflatable Decoy Minuteman Warhead Slide 8

9 Some Photos of Objects that Could Appear Like Warheads Chinese Space-Balloon Launched in 1990 for Upper Atmospheric Satellite Drag Measurements Slide 9

10 atement Indicating that Top Management of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization Knew About Discrimination Problems Identified in the IFT-1A Experiment "So the decoy is not going to look exactly like what we expected. It presents a problem for the system that we didn't expect," Statement of Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, while being filmed by 60 Minutes II after learning that the 2.2 meter balloon misdeployed (did not inflate properly) during the IFT-5 experiment Slide 10

11 Constraints on Kill Vehicle Divert Capability and Field-of-View During Discrimination and Homing Decoy Lateral Divert Velocity Kill Vehicle to Get 10 km Spread Maximum Lateral Divert 20 Minutes After ICBM Launch = 8.4 m/s (19 mph) 15 Seconds Prior to Flyby 60 seconds to Flyby = 440 km 10 km 15 seconds to Flyby = 110 km Early time discrimination is essential for successful homing Kill Vehicle has limited divert capability Kill Vehicle has limited sensor field-of-view Many seconds of data needed for target ID Only small number of objects are simultaneously viewable at short range 15 seconds prior to flyby ª 110 to 200 km range 60 seconds prior to flyby ª 440 to 800 km range Censored data from 1721 to 1751 seconds and 1768 to 1784 seconds Kill Vehicle Field of View 15 Seconds Prior to Flyby Slide 11

12 Why the Discrimination Requirement on the EKV is Critical to Overall Performance of the System Slide 12

13 Even if the Radar Were to Succeed at Discrimination, the Radar Track Data Would Still Need to Be Sufficiently Accurate for Successful Handover to the Kill Vehicle Radar May, or May NOT, be Able to Tell Warhead from Decoys? Even if Radar Can Succeed at Discrimination, the Radar Track Data Must Be Sufficiently Accurate for Handover to the Kill Vehicle Slide 13

14 Why the Kill Vehicle Must Identify the Lethal Object Without Help From the Radar Slide 14

15 Rigging of the Test Program to Avoid the Simplest of the Baseline Threats Scintillating Stripes Removed Scintillating Stripes Removed Scintillating Targets Removed from Test Program Strongly Scintillating Tumbling Warhead Slide 15

Defense Threats All Properly Included Tumbling Warheads,

Missile Defense Test Program Was Carefully Designed to Reach

16 Rigging of the Test Program to Avoid the Simplest of the Baseline Threats The Highest Priority National Missile Defense Threats All Properly Included Tumbling Warheads, Including Tumbling Warheads Accompanied by Decoys Yet the Missile Defense Test Program Was Carefully Designed to Reach Deployment While Avoiding Tests Against Tumbling Warheads with Decoys Slide 16

17 Why A Mid-Course Defense Could Be Seen As Aimed at Russia and China Slide 17

18 Attack Trajectories from North Korea, Iran, China, and Russia North Korea China Russia Iran Slide 18

19 Why A Mid-Course Defense Could Look Like It Is Rapidly Expandable Slide 19

20 Basic Functional Architecture of a Baseline and Expanded National Missile Defense Estimated Trajectory from Early Warning Radars THAAD Ground-Based Radars Communication Lines Early Warning Radars NMD or THAAD Interceptors Slide 20

21 Ground-Based Interceptor and Raytheon and Boeing Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicles Proposed C1 National Missile Defense Slide 21

22 C2 Configuration of the National Missile Defense System Proposed C2 National Missile Defense Slide 22

23 C3 Configuration of the National Missile Defense System Proposed C3 National Missile Defense Slide 23

24 Reentry Phase Missile Defense Issues and Concepts Slide 24

25 Boost-Phase, Mid-Course, and Reentry Phases of Ballistic Missile Flight Location of Objects Shown Every 20 Seconds q =22.55 degrees 0 V 0=7.177, , and 7.21 km/s Altitude (Kilometers) Altitudes Where Reentry Effects May Be Observable (60 to 90 seconds) Altitudes Where ICBM is in Powered Flight (200 to 300 seconds) Range (Kilometers) Slide 25

26 Boost-Phase, Mid-Course, and Reentry Phases of Ballistic Missile Flight Location of Objects Shown Every 20 Seconds q =22.55 degrees 0 V 0=7.177, , and 7.21 km/s Altitude (Kilometers) Altitudes Where Reentry Effects May Be Observable (60 to 90 seconds) Altitudes Where ICBM is in Powered Flight (200 to 300 seconds) Range (Kilometers) Slide 26

27 Defended Perimeters for THAAD-Like Interceptor When No Decoys Are Present Michigan New York Albany New Hampshire Massachusetts Boston Connecticut Cleveland Pennsylvania Rhode Island Ohio Pittsburgh Direction of Approaching Missiles Philadelphia New York City Launch Maryland New Jersey Baltimore West Virginia Washington Delaware Richmond Defended Perimeters Against Strategic Ballistic Missiles Virginia Norfolk Raleigh North Carolina South Carolina Georgia Distance in Kilometers Slide 27

28 Defended Perimeters for THAAD-Like Interceptor When No Decoys Are Present New York Albany Massachusetts Boston Connecticut Cleveland Pennsylvania Rhode Islan Ohio Pittsburgh Direction of Approaching Missiles Philadelphia New York City Launcher Maryland New Jersey Baltimore West Virginia Washingto Delaware Richmon Defended Perimeters Against Strategic Ballistic Missiles Virginia Norfolk Raleig North Carolina Slide 28

29 Defended Perimeters If Decoys Effective to 115 Kilometer Altitude New York Albany Massachusetts Boston Connecticut Cleveland Pennsylvania Rhode Islan Ohio Pittsburgh Direction of Approaching Missiles Philadelphia New York City Launcher Maryland New Jersey Baltimore West Virginia Washingto Delaware Richmon Defended Perimeter Against Strategic Ballistic Missiles Virginia Norfolk Raleig North Carolina Slide 29

30 Defended Perimeter for Interceptor Launch When Target is at 180 Kilometers b Warhead =2000 PSF Warhead Positions Shown at 2 Second Intervals 40-Kilometer Minimum Intercept Altitude Alt Altitude (km) Ground-Based Interceptor Launched When Attacking Warhead is at 180 Kilometers 40 km minimum intercept altitude sec 50 sec 60 sec Range (km) Slide 30

31 Defended Perimeter for Interceptor Launch When Target is at 115 Kilometers b Warhead =2000 PSF Warhead Positions Shown at 2 Second Intervals 40-Kilometer Minimum Intercept Altitude Altitude (km) Alt Ground-Based Interceptor Launched When Attacking Warhead is at 115 Kilometers 40 km minimum intercept altitude sec 50 sec 60 sec Range (km) Slide 31

32 Reentry Trajectories of Heavy Warheads and Light Decoys Light Decoys Can Defeat Ground-Based Low-Altitude Interceptors By Leaving No Time for Interceptors to Flyout b Warhead =2000 PSF Warhead Position Shown at 2 Second Intervals bdecoy Chaff Characteristics 2.6 PSF 2,000 dipoles/lb PSF 770,000 dipoles/lb PSF 20,000,000 dipoles/lb Alt Altitude (km) Decoys Warhead THAAD Launch? Decoys Warhead Path Intercept? sec 50 sec 60 sec Minimum Intercept Altitude of THAAD? Decoy Path Warhead and Decoy Positions Shown at 2 Second Intervals Warhead Locations Decoy Locations Range (km) 4 Slide 32

33 Examples of Interceptors that Can Be Used in Strategic Missile Defenses Slide 33

34 US Navy Deep Reentry Active-Electronic Decoy Slide 34

35 Russian Deep Reentry Active-Electronic Decoy Slide 35

36 Required Patriot Maneuvers During Homing Spiral Lateral Maneuvers of Al Husayn Due to Wobble and Body Lift High Angle of Attack Maneuvers Required by Patriot Interceptor as it Homes on the Al Husayn Slide 36

Movements Spiraling Motion prior to Breakup Scud Breakup Scud Warhead Spirals

37 Maneuvering of Attacking Missiles at Lower Altitudes Tel Aviv 9 February 1991 Riyadh 26 January 1991 Lateral Acceleration prior to Breakup Sudden Jinking Movements Spiraling Motion prior to Breakup Scud Breakup Scud Warhead Spirals Towards Ground After Breakup Scud Warhead Scud Warhead Scud Breakup Multiple Targets Slide 37

38 Boost-Phase Missile Defense Issues and Concepts Slide 38

Arms Control Today. U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance

Arms Control Today. U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance U.S. Missile Defense Programs at a Glance Arms Control Today For the past five decades, the United States has debated, researched, and worked on the development of defenses to protect U.S. territory against