PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS Coordination Mechanisms in UN Peacekeeping Missions. DPKO/DFS Comparative Study and Toolkit

Transcription

1 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms in UN Peacekeeping Missions Comparative Study and Toolkit

2 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms in UN Peacekeeping Missions Comparative Study and Toolkit United Nations New York, 2012

3 Contents LIST OF ACRONYMS FOREWORD iv v I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 II. FINDINGS 5 III. FUNDAMENTAL TASKS OF POC COORDINATION 10 Supporting Vision and Policy 11 Clarifying Roles and Responsibilities 12 Supporting Joined-up Operational and Forward Planning 13 Supporting the Field 13 Supporting Effective Early Warning and Situational Awareness 15 Working with International Partners 17 Engaging with Local Communities 19 Engaging with National Authorities 21 Supporting Follow-up and Review 24 Supporting Training 25 iii IV. THE PROTECTION COORDINATOR 26 POC Advisers as POC Coordinators 28 Substantive Sections as POC Coordinators 28 Groups as POC Coordinators 29 Heads-of-Mission as POC Coordinators 30 CHARTS: THE POC COORDINATOR MODELS 32 V. AUTHORITY AND RESOURCES FOR POC COORDINATORS 34 VI. PROTECTION COORDINATION FORUMS 39 UNMISS Operations Coordination Working Group 41 MINUSTAH Joint Operations and Tasking Centre 42 The MONUSCO POC Coordination Architecture 44 VII. TOOLKIT 46 Tool 1: Entry Points for Improving Coordination 46 Tool 2: Checklists for POC Coordination Tasks with Remedial Measures 48 Tool 3: Roles of Mission Components and Lessons Learned 53 Tool 4: Sample Terms of Reference for POC Coordination Forums 62 Comparative Study and Toolkit TABLE OF CONTENTS VIII. ANNEX: METHOD 65

4 List of acronyms ACRONYMS iv PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms AOR CLA CMT CSB DDR DFS DMS DPA DPKO DSRSG (RC/ HC) FARDC FC FPU HCT HOM HOMC HOO HOPC HQ JMAC JLOC JOC JOTC JPT JSC JSOC MINUSTAH MLO MONUC Area of Responsibility Community Liaison Assistant Crisis Management Team County Support Base Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration Department of Field Support Director of Mission Support Department of Political Affairs Department of Peacekeeping Operations Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General (Resident Coordinator/ Humanitarian Coordinator) Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo Force Commander Formed Police Unit Humanitarian Country Team Head of Mission Head of Military Component Head of Office Head of Police Component Headquarters Joint Mission Analysis Centre Joint Logistics Operations Cell Joint Operations Centre Joint Operations and Tasking Centre Joint Protection Team Joint Security Committee Joint Security Operations Centre United Nations Stabilisation Mission in Haiti Military Liaison Officer United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo MONUSCO United Nations Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo OCHA OCWG OHCHR POC PC PWG ROL SMGP / SMGP-P SPLA SRSG SSR UNAMID UNCT UNDP UNDSS UNHCR UNIFIL UNISFA UNMIL UNMIS UNMISS UNMO UNOCI UNPOL United Nations Office for the Coordination for Humanitarian Affairs Operations Coordination Working Group United Nations Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights Protection of Civilians Police Commissioner Protection Working Group Rule of Law Senior Management Group on Protection/ SMGP-Provincial Sudan People s Liberation Army Special Representative of the Secretary General Security Sector Reform African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur United Nations Country Team United Nations Development Programme United Nations Department of Safety and Security United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei United Nations Mission in Liberia United Nations Mission in Sudan United Nations Mission in South Sudan United Nations Military Observer United Nations Operation in Côte d Ivoire United Nations Police

5 FOREWORD Three years ago this month, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs jointly undertook an independent study on the protection of civilians, which brought to light a number of the challenges in our peacekeeping missions work on this most critical of mandates. The intervening years have witnessed a renewed focus and commitment to protection of civilians in UN peacekeeping. Today, the Security Council has expressly prioritised the protection of civilians mandate in five of our largest peacekeeping missions, and more than 90 per cent of peacekeeping personnel work in missions charged with civilian protection. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support have worked hard to demystify the protection of civilians mandate, and assist our peacekeeping operations mandated with the task to improve their performance in this area. A number of conceptual and operational tools have been developed in consultation with the missions to ensure that the protection of civilians is understood as a whole-of-mission mandate and not simply the responsibility of the uniformed personnel. We have also worked to identify the resources and capabilities required by peacekeeping missions for protection of civilians activities. The present study explores a critical element of our operational response to the protection of civilians. It takes a detailed look at the challenge of coordinating protection of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping. As highlighted in the DPKO-OCHA Independent Study, one of the greatest obstacles to implementing POC mandates was a basic challenge of coordination: how do missions with thousands of civilian and uniformed personnel who come from a variety of professional and national backgrounds, and work in often fast-paced, unstable environments achieve a whole-of-mission approach to protecting civilians? The findings are promising. While many missions still face numerous challenges in effecting their civilian protection mandates, missions have also displayed creativity and innovation in overcoming the hurdles of effective coordination. This study provides an examination of these innovations, so that v Comparative Study and Toolkit FOREWORD

6 current and future missions charged with the protection of civilians can learn from the experience of others. The study offers a practical analysis to guide missions through their thinking on this important issue. I would like to express my gratitude to all who have contributed to this study. In particular, my thanks go to the many staff in the peacekeeping missions reviewed, as well as their humanitarian and development colleagues, who took time from their busy schedules to support this important exercise. Edmond Mulet Assistant Secretary General for Peacekeeping Operations vi FOREWORD PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms

7 UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti 1 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Introduction In United Nations Peacekeeping, the protection of civilians is not just a soldier s responsibility. The notion that protecting civilians from the threat of physical violence was primarily a military function in UN peacekeeping operations is now understood as an anachronism, and there is widespread recognition that protecting civilians is necessarily a whole-of-mission effort. The shift to a whole-of-mission approach to the protection of civilians (POC) has been driven by several factors. Missions experience in the field has highlighted the need for a wide range of capacities to be brought to bear on the POC mandate. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Field Support (DFS) and the eight peacekeeping operations with POC mandates have placed increased emphasis on their implementation of this task. The heightened engagement and expectations of the Security Council with regard to POC in peacekeeping have helped enhance the focus on these efforts. In recent years, the Council has identified POC as the priority mandated Comparative Study and Toolkit EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

8 UN Photo/Basile Zoma EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms task for certain missions, has asked that missions with POC mandates develop comprehensive strategies to implement the task, and has stated that POC should be given priority in decisions concerning the use of available capacity and resources. The Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations has also increasingly engaged in policy issues, surrounding the implementation of POC mandates, in peacekeeping operations. The recognition that POC requires the active participation of all mission components military, police, substantive civilian and support is alone not sufficient to effect a substantive change in the way that peacekeeping operations orient themselves towards the task. Protecting civilians, arguably peacekeeping s most challenging mandate, requires more than a conceptual shift. Applying a multidisciplinary effort towards any single peacekeeping objective necessitates a unified and coordinated approach. Peacekeepers are well aware of the challenges involved with coordinating their efforts in large, multidimensional operations. The working cultures of the military, police, and civilian components are distinct from one another, and their autonomy to act and make decisions differs greatly between each component. Troops and police often rotate quickly, such that joint action based on the strength of relationships can be short lived. The range of views and interests among the various elements of the civilian component can also be difficult to square, sometimes leading to frustration among the uniformed

9 components. These are but a few of the issues that missions wrestle with as they endeavour to undertake a coordinated approach to a particular issue. When we add the complexities of POC to the general challenge of intra-mission coordination, it becomes clear that a great deal of thought and planning is required to ensure a unified endeavour. Coordinating the efforts of all components at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of the mission requires structures that facilitate communication, information sharing, analysis, and decision-making, and which ultimately inform joint action to prevent or respond to protection of civilians concerns. This study focuses on the structures that peacekeeping operations implementing POC mandates have utilised or established towards that end. It provides an analysis of the comparative advantages of different approaches that missions have taken, while taking note of the specific contexts in which they operate. The ultimate objective of this study is to identify where POC coordination has been successful within missions so that existing and future peacekeeping operations with POC mandates might utilise those practices where appropriate. Findings The study compares the advantages and disadvantages of various coordination models, recognising that each may be appropriate in different circumstances. It also highlights factors, such as established persons or offices for POC coordination that were vital to some missions success. This study s findings can, therefore, be applied in the wide range of current and potential peacekeeping contexts. Fundamental Coordination Tasks: The study identifies a set of 10 fundamental coordination tasks for POC, such as supporting the articulation of missionspecific policy, joining up operational and forward planning, engagement with local communities and national authorities, and supporting the conduct of POC training; these are set out in section III. Protection of Civilians Coordinators: The study also found that a POC Coordinator, a person, group of people or section, was an important factor in effective POC mandate implementation. No one model is singled out for the POC Coordinator(s), though a typology of models is identified, and their strengths and weaknesses are examined. It is notable that two such models both employ Protection of Civilians Advisers and that placing a substantive section in charge of POC coordination has faced challenges in some missions. POC Coordinators are further discussed in section IV. Coordination requires sufficient authority, resources and expertise: The study also recognises that effective POC mandate implementation requires strong leadership and political will, sufficient resources and capabilities, 3 Comparative Study and Toolkit EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

10 regular training on POC for all components, development of comprehensive POC strategies, and close work with partners. The study has sought to describe ways in which a coordination system influences or multiplies the effects of these aspects, highlighting the role of coordination elements to support both senior management and field staff. The study found that the POC Coordinators, described above, required sufficient authority, resources, and expertise to effectively undertake coordination tasks. This topic is further discussed in section V. Coordination forums are required at different levels of mission management: Many peacekeeping missions are large and complex, and the study found that missions that had established architecture for coordination forums where POC could be discussed at different levels of mission management were better at implementing a whole-of-mission effort. These forums are discussed in more detail in section VI. Tools for Practitioners 4 The study then builds on the above findings to deliver a set of tools to assist practitioners. These tools, including a checklist, sample terms of reference, and basic organograms, are aimed at POC focal points in missions, planners in mission and headquarters, and others who may support a mission s POC work. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms Acknowledgements This report was researched and drafted by Vance Culbert, Ralph Mamiya, and Protection of Civilians Team: Michael Heller Chu, Aurelie Proust, Kyoko Ono and Marie-Claudine Villacorta. In addition to desk studies, visits were made to five missions, MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNISFA, and UNMISS, after which an initial draft of the report was shared with POC focal points from seven missions at a workshop in Entebbe, Uganda. (The full methodology is detailed in the annex). The comments received at this workshop, as well as those of New York and Geneva-based colleagues, were of great value. Our thanks must go foremost, however, to the field staff in the missions visited, who made time during their busy days to speak with us. We are also supremely grateful for the warm hospitality of the many mission staff who welcomed us in their oft-inhospitable field sites. From the gracious support of senior mission leadership to the thoughtful attention from military, police, civilian and NGO and humanitarian actors, this report owes its form and substance to the field worker s quiet pedagogy. We hope that this study and its tools will introduce mission actors to successful models and ultimately enhance our collective efforts to protect civilians from physical violence.

11 UN Photo/Tim McKulka II. FINDINGS 5 In studying nine current and past peacekeeping missions with protection of civilians mandates, 1 the study concluded that missions which dedicated attention and resources to POC coordination showed improved POC mandate implementation; this included increased joint action by mission components, greater awareness of the mission s vision for POC in the given context, improved knowledge of how to operationalise the POC mandate, and stronger relations with communities and the host government on protection-related issues. The study does not advocate or recommend a single model or template for POC coordination. Peacekeeping missions with POC mandates are extremely varied, with a wide range of protection concerns, political and security contexts, and mission structures and sizes. Developing mission-specific POC approaches and strategies is one of the most important aspects of POC mandate implementation. This study seeks to support such mission-specific processes with tools to assist planners and operational coordinators, not to limit innovation. Comparative Study and Toolkit FINDINGS 1 The missions studied were MINUSTAH, MONUSCO/MONUC (counted as a single mission), UNAMID, UNIFIL, UNISFA, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNMISS (counted separately from UNMIS), and UNOCI.

12 The study can be broken down into four main findings: a. Effective POC coordination entails a set of fundamental coordination tasks; b. Carrying out the fundamental coordination tasks requires people, POC Coordinators, whether an individual, small group, or full section; c. To be effective, POC Coordinators must be provided sufficient authority, and must have sufficient expertise and resources to coordinate across the entire mission; d. Carrying out the fundamental coordination tasks also requires appropriate coordination forums at different levels of mission management. This section describes these four findings in greater detail and each finding is expanded upon in a subsequent section of the study. FINDINGS 6 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms A. Effective POC coordination entails a set of fundamental coordination tasks. While there is no single model or template for POC coordination, there is a set of basic coordination tasks that any coordination system addressing POC should be able to fulfil. These baseline tasks are an application of fundamental principles of coordination employing the inherent strengths of mission components to avoid the duplication of effort and enable the use of resources to contribute to a common end state 2 to the context of POC mandate implementation. While many of these baseline tasks touch upon larger issues of mission management, such as command and control, this report specifically focuses on a discrete set of coordination tasks of principal importance to POC. Discussed at greater length in sections below, these tasks are as follows. 1. Supporting Vision and Policy 2. Clarifying Roles and Responsibilities 3. Supporting Joined-up Operational and Forward Planning 4. Supporting the Field 5. Supporting Effective Early Warning and Situational Awareness 6. Working with International Partners 2 Refer to Policy on Civil-Military-Coordination in Peacekeeping Missions (October 2012), para

13 7. Engaging with Local Communities 8. Engaging with National Authorities 9. Supporting Follow-up and Review 10. Supporting Training B. Carrying out the fundamental coordination tasks requires people, POC Coordinators, whether an individual, small group, or full section. The human element in a coordination system is essential. While effective use of mission staff is, broadly speaking, the goal of a coordination system, strong coordination processes also require appropriate staff at their core. The appointment of a POC Coordinator within the mission ensures that the issue is receiving the day-to-day attention that it requires. In this study, a POC Coordinator refers to an individual, group or fully staffed section that serves as a designated focal point for POC issues and works primarily on POC, substantively contributing to POC policy, coordination, and field support. Some missions have POC focal points, such as a Special Assistant to senior management, who may conduct reporting and other POC-related tasks. A POC Coordinator can be distinguished from these by their focus, expertise and substantive contribution. A main finding of this study is that appointing a POC Coordinator is a preferable method of staffing a POC coordination system. POC Coordinators assist mission components in understanding where the centre of gravity for POC lies within the mission, allowing them to access the coordinator as a resource and contribute their views on POC implementation as necessary. The value of a POC Coordinator is in acting as a hub that brings mission components together, rather than serving as a cloistered specialist. At the same time, the POC Coordinator provides a place to establish POC expertise within the mission and an energy source to cultivate POC capacity across mission components. As discussed below, the POC Coordinator can be a substantive section; individual(s) such as a POC Advisor; a combination of these two models, where a POC Adviser works closely with a section that is dedicated or partially dedicated to POC (called a POC Coordination Group model herein); or a Head-of-Mission model, where coordination tasks are centralised with the head of mission. While the POC Coordinator may take different forms, the study found that missions with POC Coordinators showed improved outcomes in all of the above fundamental POC coordination tasks. 7 Comparative Study and Toolkit FINDINGS

14 C. To be effective, POC Coordinators must possess sufficient authority, expertise, and resources to coordinate across the entire mission. Merely appointing a POC Coordinator, however, is not sufficient to improve POC coordination. The study found that POC Coordinators must possess a set of attributes to support effective coordination, including the authority or standing to bring together mission components and forge consensus. Such authority can be built upon many factors, including seniority and expertise, but the confidence and support of senior mission leadership is essential. 8 FINDINGS PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms UN Photo/Albert Gonzalez Farran

15 POC Coordinators must also have the expertise in POC policy and practice, in order to support senior management decision-making, operational planning, and guidance and training for the field. Missions derive significant value from investing in POC expertise, such as strengthened POC analysis, ability to develop new and innovative approaches to protecting civilians in the mission s context, understanding of POC resource and capability requirements, and ability to evaluate mission response to POC issues and crises, among many others. There now exists a number of tools available to missions to assist them in implementing their POC mandates, particularly with respect to planning, applying resources, POC training, etc. There is also a POC Team in the Division of Policy, Evaluation, and Training in whose purpose is to support missions with POC mandates. Missions should encourage their POC Coordinator(s) to draw upon these resources where relevant. POC Coordinators also require sufficient staffing resources to support effective coordination. As discussed further below, there are different models for POC Coordinators, each with advantages and disadvantages, which call for varying levels of staff. Regardless of the model chosen, however, staffing must be a consideration for effective resource for POC Coordinators. D. Carrying out the fundamental coordination tasks also requires appropriate coordination forums at different levels of mission management. The study also identified the importance of coordination forums for POC. Whether through a comprehensive system of POC-specific working groups, or a structure of general coordination meetings, cross-component engagement on POC is essential; gaps were noted in missions where effective coordination forums did not exist. The study found that, in implementing POC mandates, missions benefited from cross-component coordination forums that targeted decision-makers at the strategic (senior leadership), operational (senior working level and/or field management) and tactical (field management and/or field sub-office) levels. This benefit was particularly strong in larger missions, where an absence of cross-component coordination at the field level or an inconsistent focus on POC at the strategic level could result in challenges. As with other aspects of POC coordination, however, the study does not recommend a template for coordination forums that all missions should follow. 9 Comparative Study and Toolkit FINDINGS

16 UN Photo/Marie Frechon FUNDAMENTAL TASKS 10 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms III. FUNDAMENTAL TASKS OF POC COORDINATION Recognising that coordination is important to POC mandate implementation and that the POC work of many components could be strengthened through improved coordination, the study team sought to develop a normative framework through which to better define the broad concept of coordination, as used in this paper. Internal coordination in peacekeeping missions is, regrettably, a little-studied topic. Although peacekeeping missions are billion-dollar operations with tens of thousands of personnel, relatively little time is spent on studying their inner workings. To examine coordination in peacekeeping from a more practical perspective, the study developed a set of 10 fundamental tasks that a coordination system should achieve to promote effective POC mandate implementation. Many, if not all, of these tasks would be carried out continuously as part of a mission s regular functioning, though the pace of activity in each category may change. Further, it should be highlighted that these are tasks of a system,

17 not a single actor or component, and that many tasks rely upon structural relationships. It should also be noted that most missions engage in all of the below tasks on a regular basis, though many do so only in a limited fashion and few appeared to implement them to the mission s fullest potential. The goal of this study is not to evaluate mission s performance, but rather to identify common achievements and challenges, as well as to note possible success factors. Supporting Vision and Policy: Effective POC coordination supports senior leadership to develop a strategic vision and establishing mechanisms for senior-level policy decisions and POC planning. High-level decisions are essential to strong POC coordination and the study found that such decisions were facilitated when the mission had a core of POC expertise and support. Strategic vision on the place and nature of POC within the overall mission mandate provides the tone and guidance that all mission components, from military and police to substantive sections and mission support, will rely on to plan, prioritise, carry out operations, and direct their staff. This vision should also be reflected in key mission planning documents, including the Military and Police Concepts of Operations, the Results-Based Budget, and operational documents, such as Rules of Engagement. Senior-level policy bodies are also essential for POC coordination. These senior-level decisions may concern identifying POC issues and trends at the strategic level, such as the UNMISS Senior Leadership s prioritising of the emerging inter-communal conflict in Jonglei State in late High-level policy decisions also encompass providing strategic direction on planning and operational issues, such as the allocation of major mission assets to POC activities. MONUSCO s Senior Management Group on Protection, for instance, makes decisions on force deployment when protection concerns so dictate. Related to this, MONUSCO has released two Force Commander s Directives on Protection of Civilians, providing clear strategic guidance for the military component. Senior policy decisions may also include developing standards and plans on approaching specific issues. The UNMISS Protection Working Group, for instance, developed policy positions on POC-related issues including civilian disarmament and application of the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. Some missions do not have a dedicated POC policy body, preferring to develop POC policy through regular, general forums, such as daily Senior Management Meetings. The importance of a dedicated POC policy body will, of course, depend on the frequency with which the mission deals with POC issues and the complexity of those issues. MONUSCO and UNMISS, for instance, both have a range of POC concerns and liaise closely with host-state 11 Comparative Study and Toolkit FUNDAMENTAL TASKS

18 security forces and have developed standing senior policy bodies; smaller missions, such as UNISFA or UNIFIL, rely on their regular senior management forums. Many missions, including those with a dedicated POC policy body, utilise the Crisis Management Team (CMT) forum to make strategic/policy and operational decisions on POC issues in exigent circumstances. Use of the CMT in emergency situations is a natural and effective response. The study did find, however, that CMTs address POC issues most effectively when there is a pre-existing POC dialogue to draw upon. For instance, although much of UNMISS s POC work in Jonglei during late 2011 was coordinated through the CMT, interlocutors within the mission reported that a key success factor to the mission s POC efforts was the established knowledge base of the area and its protection concerns. Mission actors at the senior working level had a strong understanding of POC issues, such as the vulnerabilities of civilians and the intent and capabilities of attackers, and were able to advise the senior leadership effectively. FUNDAMENTAL TASKS 12 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms Clarifying Roles and Responsibilities: An effective POC coordination system ensures that POC roles and responsibilities at all levels are clearly delineated and understood. Clearly defined roles and responsibilities make actors more efficient (by avoiding duplication of tasks) and more competent (by allowing actors to focus and develop their priority areas); establishing such clarity is the foundation of any coordination system. The development of Protection of Civilians Strategies, which the Security Council has requested for missions with POC mandates in Resolution 1894, is a first and essential step in this process. The study found, however, that while official designation of roles and responsibilities generally took place through the POC Strategy and decisions from senior management, this process was greatly facilitated where discussions were held and consensus was reached at the senior working level. The study also found that a clear POC Coordinator could act as a centre of gravity to bring together different components to develop this consensus. In MONUC (later MONUSCO), for instance Civil Affairs, which acted as a kind of de facto POC Coordinator, brought together the Offices of the DSRSGs, the Joint Human Rights Office, Child Protection, senior military staff officers, UNPOL, humanitarians OCHA and UNHCR, and JMAC to discuss the contributions of each component to the mission s POC effort. This group, initially called the Rapid Response Cell, would, with the support of senior management, drive development of MONUSCO s comprehensive POC coordination architecture.

19 Supporting Joined-up Operational and Forward Planning: An effective POC coordination system ensures that operational and forward POC planning benefits from the expertise of all mission components While identifying roles and responsibilities is essential to avoiding duplication, an effective coordination system must also create synergies between different components, not merely avoiding inefficiencies, but also increasing the effectiveness of each component s efforts. With respect to POC-related planning, the study found that one of the most important areas for such synergy is between the civilian substantive components and the military. 3 Specifically, the researchers noted that applying civilian expertise on POC issues to military, operational, and forward planning had considerable coordination benefits, and vice-versa. As noted above, the military is not the sole, nor necessarily the primary, actor in POC activities, but they remain fundamentally important due to both their foundational position in most peacekeeping missions, as well as because many of the highest profile POC activities rest upon their shoulders. Supporting the military to carry out its elements of the POC mandate is thus essential and has become a main focus for many POC Coordinators. Likewise, sharing military plans through appropriate channels can create opportunities for improved POC response. In MONUSCO, for instance, the POC Advisers work closely with the chief of military planning (J5) in Kinshasa to review threats to civilians in the mission and plan the use of military resources accordingly. MONUSCO s Senior Management Group on Protection at the Provincial level (SMGP-P) is co-chaired by the province s civilian head of office and its brigade commander, providing space for frank discussion on POC issues. In North Kivu, the MONUSCO military shared an outline plan for upcoming joint operations with the Congolese army (FARDC) against local militia groups and requested advice and input from civilian colleagues, including Civil Affairs, Human Rights, and Child Protection. Supporting the Field: An effective POC coordination system provides support, guidance, and delegated authority to field offices on POC planning and operations. While senior policy decisions and strategic vision are essential, effective POC implementation requires coordinated support at all levels, particularly in field 13 Comparative Study and Toolkit FUNDAMENTAL TASKS 3 The police may also be included here, though the study generally found that the military often played a more active role in POC (particularly physical protection activities) and also that substantive civilians and police more regularly communicated in areas of mutual concern. In missions with large police components, however, such as UNAMID and MINUSTAH, the above comments with respect to military-civilian relations can apply equally to the police.

20 offices. In large missions with many field offices, effectively supporting military, police and civilian staff can be a challenge. Such frontline personnel are the eyes, ears, as well as the first responders in a mission, and ensuring that they have the information, guidance and skills required to do their jobs is essential. FUNDAMENTAL TASKS 14 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms The systems by which missions communicate and support their field offices varied considerably across the missions studied, in no small part because mission sizes and country contexts varied. One main variable in mission structure is the degree of autonomy and decision-making power delegated to military commanders or civilian chiefs in field offices, frequently referred to as the degree of decentralisation. The study found that decentralisation generally improved POC coordination by increasing the cohesiveness of field office operations and empowering field staff to carry out many fundamental coordination tasks at the field level. Decentralisation, in devolving more decision-making authority to field staff, enables those staff to coordinate with staff from other components, rather than looking to headquarters for cross-component guidance. Field-level coordination and communication may also improve a mission s capacity to develop common analyses and to engage with local communities. In MONUSCO, for instance, the decentralised provincial offices of Goma, Bukavu and Bunia enabled strong coordination between civilian actors (including community liaisons), mission military brigades, and members of the Protection Cluster. Given each actor s delegated authority, MONUSCO s provincial offices are able to effectively gather and analyse protection-related information, and engage in preventive action through military or civilian deployments. Decentralisation requires guidance from the mission headquarters to ensure strategic consistency; however, it can create coordination challenges when the level of delegated authority is inconsistent. In UNMISS, for instance, the mission s State Coordinators were provided with substantial delegated authority, but the mission military component could not provide the same level of delegated authority where an officer of insufficient rank was stationed alongside the State Coordinator. In many cases, moreover, a higher-ranking officer could not be moved to the state office without an increase in the number of troops she oversaw. This has created a degree of tension between the military and civilian sides of the mission in planning and carrying out protection-related operations, with State Coordinators substantially independent but their military counterparts reliant on orders from headquarters. Regardless of the level of decentralisation, however, the senior working level of a POC coordination system should be able to provide field offices with guidance on the mission s strategic direction for protecting civilians, and technical expertise or training with regard to identifying risks to civilians and planning joint responses. Where applicable, the senior working level may also support the development of POC-specific mechanisms at the field level, mechanisms that should also feed field inputs into the decision making process at mission

21 UN Photo HQ. UNMISS and MONUSCO, for instance, have developed POC coordination forums at the field office-level to coordinate protection activities. Promoting a multi-component approach to POC activities at the field level is an important, related factor in effective POC implementation. This is challenging in many missions, where the military component has a much broader reach. In some missions, such as MONUC and UNAMID, the vast majority of mission presence was essentially military, with most civilian staff based in a relatively small number of locations. This created challenges for the missions understanding of local dynamics, situational awareness and early warning capacities. MONUSCO has adopted a successful approach to this problem through its use of Community Liaison Assistants, national staff with local knowledge who support military commanders in remote locations. MONUSCO also utilises Joint Protection Teams, groups of substantive professionals who visit priority areas and develop local protection plans for implementation by the mission military and other staff based in the area. UNAMID and UNOCI are also working to further decentralise its civilian staff to better support deep field military and police bases. Supporting Effective Early Warning and Situational Awareness: An effective coordination system must include early warning and situational awareness on POC issues. Prevention is one of the most important aspects of protecting civilians, and early warning is essential to preventive action. Early warning systems generally 15 Comparative Study and Toolkit FUNDAMENTAL TASKS

22 FUNDAMENTAL TASKS 16 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms refer to systems of information management including information collection, analysis, and dissemination designed to predict threats. It is important for both political engagement as well as military response, though the nature and timeliness of information may be different. Early warning and situational awareness are particularly important for physical protection, including physical deterrence actions, and must link information management about imminent threats to rapid response mechanisms. All missions endeavour to conduct early warning and maintain situational awareness, whether through the analysis of JMAC and Military J2, the JOC current operations reporting, or the regular reports of Military Observers and substantive civilian staff. Effective POC coordination will harness these existing systems, focusing them or adding value to them where necessary, to ensure that the mission has a solid understanding of the threats to and vulnerabilities of civilians. A great deal of MONUSCO s POC architecture, for instance, was developed in response to concerns that the mission lacked effective situational awareness and early warning. In 2008, a militia in the town of Kiwanja massacred more than 100 civilians despite the presence of 180 MONUC peacekeepers barely a kilometre away. Incidents such as the Kiwanja massacre highlighted the fact that, despite a relatively well-equipped military force, the mission could not effectively protect civilians without a much stronger understanding of the situation in its area of operations and better means of communicating with the local population. As a result, the mission developed a series of innovative POC practices, including establishing a network of Community Liaison Assistants, and developing a Protection Matrix system for information sharing with other protection actors (discussed further on page 44). Sharing information in a manner that effectively channels it for use in strategic and operational decision-making can, however, be a challenge in large missions. Stove-piped reporting, where individual sections or components seek to collect and manage their own information, is well documented, and its negative effects on all aspects of POC coordination, particularly POC-related early warning, can be acute. While most missions have standard operating procedures ensuring that some mission components, such as JOC and JMAC, have access to all or most mission reports, these bodies cannot always translate such a mass of information into POC action points (i.e. JMAC, for instance, is a purposefully non-operational body). UNMISS sought to overcome the hurdle of effective information sharing through its Operations Coordination Working Group (discussed above), a JOC-chaired body that brings together senior working level staff from different components to share information and coordinate tasking through their respective command chains. At the field level, UNMISS is also recruiting dedicated

23 reporting officers to support State Operations Centres (i.e. field-based JOCs), which will ensure sharing and consistency of information at the field level. UNOCI is also implementing field-based JOCs in some locations. Each of the above solutions to the problem of stove-piping has relied on firm support from senior mission leadership to enable a common analysis of threats at the field level and avoid multiple reporting channels. Working with International Partners: An effective mission POC coordination system complements the work of the Protection Cluster, UN Country Team, and Humanitarian Country Team in a mutually beneficial relationship. This study focuses primarily on internal coordination of POC activities within peacekeeping missions but also found that an essential element of effective coordination involves external partners as well. Non-governmental organisations, as well as UN Agencies, Funds and Programmes, work in conflict countries before peacekeeping missions arrive and will often remain long after they depart. These organisations often have relationships with local communities, and may have expertise in areas relevant to protection, such as counselling, IDP camp management and medical support. Strong relationships with these partners are thus felicitous for any mission, but especially important for missions involved in protecting civilians. Fortunately, most countries in which POC-mandated missions operate have a protection cluster, a globally standardised forum for humanitarian protection actors, which can serve as a point of liaison for missions. 4 However, the need among humanitarian actors to maintain a degree of distinction, both real and perceived, can mean that engagement with the mission is more limited or nuanced. Peacekeeping missions are often deployed into challenging circumstances, navigating fraught political contexts and nonpermissive security environments in support of a range of early peacebuilding measures. As such, they may be engaged in political processes with one or several parties to a conflict that lacks popular support, or they may be tasked to support a government the institutions of which are responsible for threats to or violations against civilians; missions may also be obliged to take up offensive military postures. All of these circumstances, circumstances that peacekeepers never wish for but the burdens of which they unflinchingly bear, can strain mission-humanitarian coordination. 17 Comparative Study and Toolkit FUNDAMENTAL TASKS 4 The Protection Cluster is part of the humanitarian cluster approach, which establishes a lead UN agency for a variety of thematic areas, promoting predictability and accountability of response. Protection Clusters bring together humanitarian UN agencies, NGOs and other partners in a given country. Protection Clusters are established in countries with humanitarian protection need, with a Global Protection Cluster in Geneva that supports policy.

24 UN Photo/Logan Abassi FUNDAMENTAL TASKS 18 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms The study found considerable variation in the means and the results of mission interaction with humanitarian counterparts. This results in part from the variety of the integration models used in the missions studied, with three of the missions reviewed utilising the both feet out model (no triple-hatted DSRSG/RC/HC). Perhaps, unsurprisingly, missions POC-related coordination with the protection cluster was generally better in missions with triple-hatted DSRSGs. The development of a shared understanding of protection risks was a key factor in both missions effectiveness in implementing their mandate, as well as in promoting strong relationships between the mission and other protection partners. (Consultation with the UNCT and humanitarian partners is, for this reason, highlighted in the Framework for Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies). Humanitarian actors can also complement mission efforts to understand the motivations and capabilities of non-state armed groups. Coordination with the protection cluster and other actors was strongest in missions where coordination or liaison focal points were present at all levels of the mission. One challenge in mission-humanitarian coordination is that missions are generally much larger, with many more layers of hierarchy, than their UN agency or NGO partners. This may present dilemmas, if mission humanitarian coordination focal points work only at headquarters

25 level and mission field staff are not conversant with humanitarian priorities and principles. In MONUSCO, the POC coordination architecture creates a space for coordination with humanitarians at all levels. Beginning at the headquarters level, the Integrated Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC includes not only staff from the mission and UNDP, but also a representative from OCHA. The mission s Protection Working Group includes OCHA and UNHCR, as well as a range of mission actors. Moving to the provincial level, OCHA and UNHCR take part in the Senior Management Group on Protection at the Provincial level (SMGP-P), where the protection cluster s Protection Matrix is submitted for incorporation into mission planning. Coordination between missions can also be an important aspect of POC implementation with other UN partners. Missions such as UNMIS, UNAMID, and MONUSCO have conducted inter-mission coordination on combating the Lord s Resistance Army, for instance. UNOCI and UNMIL have also coordinated on POC issues across the shared Liberia Côte d Ivoire border. Engaging with Local Communities: An effective POC coordination system will promote engagement with local communities on their protection concerns. The importance of missions developing and sustaining a dialogue with local communities on protection of civilian issues cannot be understated. Only through routine interaction with the local populace, from organised civil society to individuals in remote areas, will the mission be able to understand the full range of threats that civilians face, their particular vulnerabilities to those threats, and any self-protection measures that they may have in place. Regular outreach to the local community is also crucial for early warning of protection threats. All missions engage with local communities to some degree and the study found that these engagements were most effective when formalised through a strategy. Rather than viewing community engagement as a wholeof-mission effort, contacts between community members and the mission often take place within the silos of mission sections or components, with, e.g. Civil Affairs Officers unaware of community contacts made by Military Observers or Human Rights Officers. This can create challenges for the mission s ability to achieve strategic goals through its engagement, and can result in mixed messages delivered to communities. Developing an engagement strategy for POC is particularly important because many interlocutors with local communities may not be POC experts. A number of examples of strategic approaches to community engagement mechanisms are described in greater detail below. 19 Comparative Study and Toolkit FUNDAMENTAL TASKS

26 UNISFA Joint Security Committees UNISFA s Joint Security Committees are a tool that the mission uses to engage communities and maintain situational awareness of protection concerns. The Joint Security Committees are composed of a UNISFA Liaison Officer, who facilitates the meeting, and leaders from a local community; currently, 17 JSCs meet regularly in 17 different communities. JSCs discuss the community s security concerns, a particularly important dialogue in the Abyei Area, where the vast majority of civilians are either nomads or returnees. The JSCs enable the mission to maintain an awareness of the numbers, intentions, and concerns of migrating Misseriya and returning Dinka groups in Abyei. FUNDAMENTAL TASKS 20 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms MONUSCO s Community Liaison Assistants MONUSCO (previously MONUC) has developed a system of Community Liaison Assistants (CLAs), who are national staff managed by Civil Affairs, and work alongside remotely based military commanders. CLAs assist the military commanders, who frequently do not speak local languages and lack a deep understanding of the culture and local politics, helping the commanders to understand protection and security concerns in his or her AOR. CLAs are particularly useful in MONUSCO where they are commonly the only civilian presence in the mission s military bases, and can serve as a constant interface for community partners while troop contingents rotate. It is notable that the CLA programme was developed through the innovative use of language assistants; the first CLAs were mostly Language Assistants who were provided special training by Civil Affairs and Human Rights. Support from Civil Affairs officers and other substantive sections, located far from the remote military outposts, remains a critical and challenging aspect of the CLA programme. MONUSCO Community Perception Surveys In MONUSCO, the mission and UNDP have developed a peacebuilding and reconstruction data collection project, which will include community perception surveys on protection of civilians. These surveys, when funded, will be conducted amongst local communities to obtain feedback and monitor perceptions of the effectiveness of protection efforts by MONUSCO and Congolese authorities. The mission s Community Liaison Assistants will carry the surveys out over 18 months, receiving special training for the assignment.

27 UN Photo/Albany Associates/Stuart Price 21 UNMISS County Support Bases UNMISS s County Support Bases (CSBs) are a network of light-footprint offices and accommodation for mission staff in rural areas, designed to expand the mission s presence and facilitate the work of the UN Country Team into otherwise remote parts of the country. The CSBs are a natural solution to a number of factors, including the logistical challenges created by the vast distances and poor infrastructure of South Sudan, as well as the mission mandate s stress on recovery activities. It is envisioned that CSBs will be staffed by members of UNMISS substantive sections, Military Liaison Officers, and UN Police Advisers, with UN Agency and NGO welcome as well. The development of CSBs is at an early stage, however, so it was difficult for the study to assess their effectiveness, though they remain an innovative approach. Engaging with National Authorities: An effective POC coordination system promotes engagement with national authorities to support the host nation s fulfilment of its protection responsibilities. The primary responsibility to protect civilians always lies with host nations, and an essential POC activity for any mission will be to support the government to protect its own populace. Such support requires the development of relationships Comparative Study and Toolkit FUNDAMENTAL TASKS

28 UN Photo/Isaac Billy FUNDAMENTAL TASKS 22 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms and dialogue between the mission and the government on protection issues. All missions engage with host authorities in a variety of ways, often through the Political Affairs, Human Rights, Civil Affairs, Rule of Law, Police, and Military components. A strong POC coordination system will ensure that such forums are leveraged to promote government action on POC. Notably, government action on POC, like mission action, is not simply about deploying troops, but may also involve the government using its own political processes to mitigate conflict or develop rights-based training for its security forces. Bringing a POC lens to engagement with national authorities is important, both to provide POC-specific messaging to governments and to understand the government s own views and priorities with regards to risks to civilians, as well as their capacities to address those risks. Government engagement forums can also be key points for the exchange of information on early warning with regard to POC. The existence of channels with government is particularly important where the host government is unwilling to protect its own civilians or where its security forces have become an active threat to civilians. The study generally found that all missions engage with host authorities to some degree, but POC mandate implementation was best effected where such engagement was coordinated as part of an overall strategy that recognised the host nation s principal role in protection and focused on supporting the government to fulfil that role. UNMISS, for instance, has articulated a clear framework

29 for engagement with the SPLA at all levels of command, from the most senior commanders to rural outposts. Though this system is new, the mission has used it a number of times to raise POC concerns with the South Sudanese government. MONUSCO has also developed a wide-reaching, mandate-driven system of liaison with Congolese military and police forces, a system that includes implementation of the mission s Conditionality Policy and the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. UNISFA has developed a broad political engagement strategy with governors in South Sudan to negotiate access for Misseriya nomads, thereby mitigating conflict and promoting civilian protection in the Abyei Area. UNMISS Liaison Structures UNMISS, which has a mandate that focuses on support to the host government, has developed a structure for coordination between the mission and the Government of South Sudan beginning at the highest levels and extending to rural field offices. The work of UNMISS s Military component is premised on a strong partnership with the SPLA, and the mission has established a coordination framework with the SPLA to serve as an important channel both to support SPLA efforts to fulfil their protection responsibilities, as well as to raise issues of SPLA abuses. The framework document for this coordination system envisions direct coordination at the political, national, state and county levels. UNMISS and the SPLA have agreed on a series of forums at both the national, state and county levels. These include: 23 The Political Decision Committee: A strategy-level meeting between the President of South Sudan and the SRSG. The National Coordination Committee: A meeting between the SPLA Deputy Chief of General Staff for Operations and the Force Commander The National Technical Coordination Working Group: A daily meeting between senior SPLA officers and senior Military Liaison Officers. At the state level, the SPLA Division or Brigade Commander meets with the Senior MLOs and other commanding officers. A County Technical Coordination Working Group has also been proposed for MLOs and SPLA at the county level. UNMISS s cooperative approach is highlighted by the use of MLOs, rather than UN Military Observers. The MLOs are chosen and tasked specifically to develop relationships with SPLA commanders at the national, state and county level. Military Liaison Officers, while not fulfilling the eyes and ears function that is often considered the heart of Military Observer work, are viewed as having a primary role in advising and liaising with the local military. Comparative Study and Toolkit FUNDAMENTAL TASKS

30 UNAMID Joint Security Operations Centre Darfur remains a challenging environment, and staff safety and security is a priority for the mission. UNAMID Security has thus developed a new Joint Security Operation Centre (JSOC) in El Fasher with the Sudanese Government, a pilot project that may be extended to Nyala, Geneina and Zalingei. The JSOC consists of a 24/7 operations room staffed by UNAMID Security Officers, UN Police, UNAMID Military, and Government of Sudan Police, and can be used to jointly mobilise UNAMID Formed Police Units and Sudanese police convoys to respond to staff security incidents anywhere in El Fasher in less than 10 minutes. While this system focuses on staff security, it is an interesting development that may have broader applications. Its use for POC activities may not be appropriate, however, in contexts where government security forces are likely perpetrators of human rights violations against particular communities. FUNDAMENTAL TASKS 24 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms Supporting Follow-up and Review: An effective POC coordination system follows up on POC concerns and reviews POC action to improve POC outcomes. An effective coordination system will also contain mechanisms that ensure follow up and review of POC action, particularly in large and complex missions. Follow-up is important as POC operational and tactical plans may require updating to meet changes in conflict dynamics, civilian population movements and livelihoods, and changes in the intent and capabilities of perpetrators of attacks on civilians. Following up on the reports and recommendation of regular patrols, meetings and other activities is an important but often overlooked link in the POC mandate implementation chain. Review of POC action is also essential, particularly because many POC activities have a preventive aim that is challenging to measure. Such reviews may include traditional After Action Reviews of POC incidents, but even more importantly will include regular evaluation of a mission s routine POC-related preventive measures. Many missions, for instance, use regular patrolling by military, police and civilians to show presence and deter potential threats. However, reviewing the effectiveness of such patrols in a meaningful way often requires the establishment of follow-up structures. UNAMID s firewood patrols and MONUSCO s Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) are both examples of regular activities specifically designed for preventative effect. An advantage of MONUSCO s JPT, however, is that it is part of a larger POC coordination framework. At the field level, the MONUSCO Senior Management Group on Protection at the Provincial level (SMGP-P) oversees JPTs, planning their deployments in advance and then following up their

31 recommendations. This allows the mission to continually adjust its POC activities in response to changing conditions on the ground. Regular interactions with protection actors and the protection cluster are also opportunities to receive realistic and concrete feedback on the pertinence and effectiveness of the mission s POC activities. For example, the Protection Cluster in DRC is actively engaged in the development of protection matrices that inform mission deployments. Supporting Training: An effective POC coordination system ensures relevant training of all mission components. Effective POC coordination requires that all relevant mission actors are informed of their POC roles and responsibilities. This involves both general POC knowledge and familiarity with the mission s specific POC mandate, priorities and strategies. Actors must also be aware of the existent POC coordination structures and their roles within them. Mission-specific POC training is particularly challenging for police and military contingents which are constantly rotating personnel. Training structures should be established in such a way as to promote inter-component coordination despite different rotation cycles. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations is making progress in promoting POC training. A set of POC-specific training modules have been developed, directed partly at training troop and police contingents before they deploy, and mission-specific scenarios are currently underway. In-mission training on POC through the Integrated Mission Training Centres also currently exists for some missions. An effective POC coordination system will harness these existing training tools and contribute to the development of new materials. Conducting POC-related exercises is also vital because mission-wide coordination which can often only be taught through scenario-based exercises is essential to POC mandate implementation. These exercises can involve scenarios presented to senior management to highlight where a mission might have policy blind spots, and draw out where operational preparedness might be lacking. POC exercises can involve actual deployments to test a mission s rapid response capacity. UNMIS, for instance carried out an exercise called Operation Swift Shield in preparation for potential protection challenges during vote on South Sudan s referendum for independence. During this exercise, field offices were provided with protection scenarios to which civilian and military staff had to respond, including the deployment of troops to specified locations. 25 Comparative Study and Toolkit FUNDAMENTAL TASKS <No intersecting link>

32 UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti PROTECTION COORDINATOR 26 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms IV. THE PROTECTION COORDINATOR Mission substantive sections are generally structured in response to specific mandated activities. A mission s design will include a Human Rights Section where it has a human rights mandate, a Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Section where the Security Council mandates a mission to support such a process, or a Rule of Law Section when a justice support mandate is provided. Yet even though protection of civilians mandates have been issued since 1999, only recently have several missions established focal points for POC, and only two missions have been designed with dedicated POC Sections. There are reasons for this apparent discrepancy. First, in the past, POC in a peacekeeping context was viewed as a military task, seeming to require little civilian involvement. Second, the development of guidance and tools for POC in peacekeeping is fairly recent, with substantial contributions made in only the last three years. Perhaps most importantly, however, few missions have established a clear home for POC because the mandate is, by its nature, mission-wide, calling upon the Military, Police, and Civilian components.

33 The study found, however, that there is tremendous value in having a designated coordination capacity for POC. As noted above, this study uses the term POC Coordinator to refer to a range of possible staffing mechanisms that fill the human element of coordination. These staffing mechanisms can vary, including an individual who facilitates coordination, a small group who collectively act as a coordinating body, a section with staff at various levels and locations within the mission, or a coordination system where the Head of Mission drives the agenda. Regardless of the staffing structure used, a POC Coordinator (a term used here to encompass all of those staffing models) provides a locus within the mission around which discussion on POC policy, training, and activities can coalesce. The POC Coordinator also creates the opportunity for the sourcing of expertise and the staffing to support POC-related planning. As indicated below, the study recognises that some smaller missions successfully conduct POC activities without a designated coordinator. For the majority of peacekeeping missions with POC mandates, however, particularly the larger missions characteristic of modern peacekeeping, a designated coordinator has great value. The value of a POC Coordinator can be seen when comparing missions with such a coordinator to missions without. MONUSCO has developed a strong POC coordination architecture, with joined-up effort between the military, substantive sections, and mission support, as well as a productive dialogue with humanitarian partners. The POC Coordinator (i.e. a joint arrangement involving two POC Advisers in the offices of the DSRSGs, with support from Civil Affairs, Human Rights and the Military component) has driven the development of this architecture and the creation of POC-focused tools, including Joint Protection Teams, Community Liaison Assistants, and the Protection Matrix system (discussed on page 44 in greater detail). The study found a number of models for POC Coordinator in the missions studied. These models, explained in detail below, can roughly be categorised into three groups: the POC Adviser Model, the POC Coordination Section Model, the POC Coordination Group Model, and the Head-of-Mission Coordination Model. This categorisation is not meant to be exhaustive; indeed, there may be as many different kinds of POC coordination models as there are contexts for peacekeeping. Such categorisation is, however, a useful tool in considering current and future practice. The study did not find, however, that current and past mission practice provides sufficient data to recommend one model of POC Coordinator over another. Rather than categorising to define a best model, the study seeks to clarify the advantages and disadvantages of each and the mission contexts where they may be most appropriate. 27 Comparative Study and Toolkit PROTECTION COORDINATOR

34 POC Advisers as POC Coordinators UNMISS relies upon POC Advisers as its primary coordinators on protection of civilians issues. These advisers are staff dedicated to POC work full-time, though they are generally few in number. UNMISS has one Senior POC Adviser (P-5) in the Office of the SRSG, supported by three POC Advisers (P-4) in priority field locations (under recruitment at the time of writing). An important facet of the POC Adviser model is that the senior POC Adviser has access to senior mission leadership; UNMISS Senior POC Adviser sits in key forums with the SRSG. This allows a POC Adviser to effectively support senior management in the development of POC vision and policy, the identification of roles and responsibilities, and promote POC-related training, follow-up and review. The POC Adviser, through his or her facilitation skills and substantive expertise in POC, can support operational and forward planning, work with international partners, enhance early warning capacities, and assist the development of POC training materials. PROTECTION COORDINATOR 28 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms The POC Adviser model is also flexible: POC Advisers may be appropriate for large missions such as UNMISS (assuming they are supported by senior management and colleagues), or in a smaller or primarily military mission, where the POC Adviser could quietly advise colleagues and work with other partners. The POC Adviser model also has the advantage of a generally low staffing requirement (one or perhaps a handful of dedicated staff posts) when compared with the POC Coordination Section model. The advisory system, however, does not provide the POC Advisers with substantial field staff, nor with an operational or implementation role. This has the advantage of freeing the Advisers to focus on policy and planning work, but may also limit their access to, or capacity to process, information on day-to-day concerns in the field. While POC Advisers can provide their expertise in POC on issues such as operational and forward planning and early warning, it is unlikely they will have the time or staff to become deeply involved in work on these issues. Similarly, POC Advisers may lack the staff capacity to directly support field offices or engage with communities. Substantive Sections as POC Coordinators Some missions have also chosen to designate a substantive section as the POC Coordinator. UNMIS and UNAMID each developed POC-specific Sections, with UNAMID s Humanitarian Protection Coordination Directorate also taking on a substantial humanitarian liaison role. Also, in MONUC, Civil Affairs served as a de facto POC Coordination Section in the early years of the mission s POC development. Appointment of a substantive section to lead POC coordination

35 has the appeal of placing POC within the more traditional mission framework of stand-alone substantive sections. Fully staffed sections also offer greater human resources to draw upon, allowing the head of a POC Coordination Section to have staff in field locations and conduct operational work, such as having substantive staff accompany joint patrols with mission components or humanitarian actors. A dedicated POC section has the risk, however, of compartmentalising POC, a situation where other mission actors viewing POC as only the work of that unit. Former UNMIS staff reported, for instance, that the establishment of a home for POC in the POC Section had the unintended effect of marginalising POC activities and occasionally creating barriers to reaching consensus on POC actions. A second, similarly unintended effect was competition for resources between sections with protection-related activities. Because POC work is crosscutting by nature, a full substantive section dedicated strictly to POC activity may also run a high risk of duplicating the work of other sections, such as Civil Affairs and Human Rights. POC Coordination Sections can also face the opposite problem: the time and staff hours spent facilitating various coordination processes can be considerable and strain the resources of a section that is budgeted to carry out other mandated tasks. In MONUC, for instance, the transfer of the de facto lead on POC from Civil Affairs to the Office of the DSRSG-Rule of Law was partly prompted by the Civil Affairs Section itself, because they lacked the staff and resources to carry out POC coordination along with their other activities. 29 Groups as POC Coordinators POC Coordination Groups can be considered a combination between the POC Adviser and the POC Section models. In such a model, a POC Adviser at the senior working level is supported by a section that dedicates a substantial amount of staff time to dealing with POC issues. This allows for strong POC coordination at both headquarters and the field (where the designated section can fulfil a coordination role), filling potential gaps in the POC Adviser and POC Coordination Section Models. Thus, if the relationship between the substantive section and advisers in a Group Model is designed with the fundamental coordination tasks in mind, it has the best potential to carry out those tasks, amongst the models here outlined. The POC Coordination Group model can be complex to manage, however. Reporting lines may differ between the POC Adviser and the designated section, and the designated section may have competing objectives within its portfolio. The study only noted one example of the POC Group Coordination Model, in MONUSCO (described below), but there are potentially many combinations Comparative Study and Toolkit PROTECTION COORDINATOR

36 of advisers and sections (or parts of sections) that missions could employ to coordinate POC. Some of these combinations would likely work better than others, though at present the data is scarce. MONUSCO had the advantage that its model developed organically over a number of years, and its combination of Advisers and section participants is based on partnerships built over time. MONUSCO utilises a POC Coordination Group model, with a Senior POC Adviser (P-5) in the Office of the DSRSG-Rule of Law and a POC Adviser (P-4) in the Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC. 5 These POC Advisers, however, are supported by substantive sections, particularly the Civil Affairs Section, which has a substantial number of staff dedicated to POC work, as well as Human Rights, Child Protection and JMAC; Civil Affairs and Human Rights also serve as secretariat to the POC coordination bodies at the provincial level in many locations. PROTECTION COORDINATOR 30 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms Heads-of-Mission as POC Coordinators Some missions, rather than coordinating POC mandate implementation through a designated coordinator, centralise responsibility with the Head of Mission; the study will describe this model of coordination, to distinguish it from other models that rely on a distinct coordinator role, as a Head-of-Mission Coordination model. In UNISFA, for example, the Head of Mission has direct oversight of POC activities (described further below). The Head-of-Mission Coordination model may work well in smaller missions or missions with extremely low levels of POC-related activity, where staffing levels do not allow for dedicated POC capacity. The demands placed upon the Head of Mission in following POC activities, however, are not likely to be appropriate for large or even mediumsized missions. The Head-of-Mission Model has the important advantage of providing a HOM a set of tools to implement his or her vision of POC. Placing the HOM at the centre of POC coordination can make POC coordination more effective and also engage the HOM on POC issues. This can benefit fundamental coordination tasks such as supporting vision and policy, engaging with national authorities, and supporting follow-up and review. A Head of Mission, however, will rarely have the time to devote attention to all fundamental coordination tasks. Operational and forward planning, support to the field, engagement with local communities, and training are all coordination tasks that a HOM can promote as important, but will realistically have little time in which to become involved. 5 The Senior POC Adviser is currently under recruitment. During the research team s visit, a representative from the Office of the DSRSG-Rule of Law was covering this position.

37 UNISFA Head of Mission s direct oversight over POC UNISFA is a relatively small mission that is composed almost entirely of Ethiopian military and is headed by an Ethiopian General. This unique design facilitates a centralised oversight of the mission s POC activities by the Head of Mission and his senior staff. The primary coordination forum for the mission is the daily briefing, chaired by the Head of Mission, which is attended by the UNISFA senior staff offices, the two UNISFA substantive staff, the Chief of Mission Support, and the UN agencies co-located with UNISFA. The Head of Mission also meets on a weekly basis with the UNISFA Liaison Officers who monitor the movements of Misseriya and Dinka Ngok groups in the area and are focal points for reporting POC concerns. The Head of Mission has also engaged in POC-related negotiations to secure migration for Misseriya groups with governors in South Sudan. This direct oversight of POC activities by the Head of Mission is unusual in peacekeeping, but appears to be effective given UNISFA s unusual structure. The taut efficiency of a homogenous military command has, however, created some tensions with other UN partners, who find the mission less open and accessible. 31 UN Photo/Martine Perret Comparative Study and Toolkit PROTECTION COORDINATOR

38 The POC Coordinator Models POC Adviser Senior Management Senior Working Level Field Level DSRSG Substantive Sections Field Staff DSRSG SRSG DMS FC PC Substantive Sections Field Staff POC Adviser JOC Head of Office MSD Field Staff Military UNMOs Force Police Police Advisers FPUs POC Adviser develops policy options for senior management and facilitates agreement between mission components. Existing joint bodies such as JOC and Heads of Office facilitate the POC Adviser in developing joint operational planning. 32 POC Adviser primarily relies on other sections and relations with field heads of office for information flow from and operations in field carried out at the field level PROTECTION COORDINATOR PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms Senior Management Senior Working Level Field Level DSRSG Section as POC Coordinator Substantive Section as POC Coordinator Field Staff dedicated to POC coordination DSRSG SRSG DMS FC PC Other Sections Other Substantive Field Staff JOC, JMAC Head of Office POC Coordinator Section coordinates POC across components. Substantive sections have faced challenges, however, in filling this coordination role. At field level, the POC Coordinator Section can rely on its own staff to facilitate information flows and operational coordination at the field level. MSD Field Staff Military UNMOs Force Police Police Advisers FPUs

39 POC Coordinator Group Senior Management Senior Working Level Field Level DSRSG Section with substantial dedication to POC Field Staff dedicating substantial time to POC DSRSG SRSG DMS FC PC Other Sections Other Substantive Field Staff POC Adviser MSD POC Coordinator Group Head of Office Field Staff Military UNMOs Force Police Police Advisers FPUs A POC Coordinator Group brings together a POC Adviser with one or more substantive sections that devote substantial time to POC. At field level, the members of the POC Coordinator Group can task along the lines of their own authority and support their field components with guidance. 33 Senior Management Senior Working Level Field Level HOSC* Substantive Sections Field Staff Head of Mission directly coordinates a broad range of POC-related activities, includin policy development, plans, and priorities, at the senior management level. Head of Mission will receive reports and issue general orders through regular channels, but will have limited contact with field operations. * HOSC = Head of Substantive Component Head of Mission as POC Coordinator Substantive Sections Field Staff HOM DMS HOMC HOPC JOC MSD Military Police Head of Office Field Staff UNMOs Force Police Advisers FPUs Comparative Study and Toolkit PROTECTION COORDINATOR

40 UN Photo/Marco Dormino AUTHORITY AND RESOURCES 34 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms V. AUTHORITY AND RESOURCES FOR POC COORDINATORS While a designated POC Coordinator can improve POC coordination, they will require certain authority and resources to carry out coordination tasks. This section reviews these resources. The POC Coordinator should have access to senior mission leadership. A POC Coordinator should have regular access to senior mission leadership. Such access will allow the POC Coordinator to raise issues of importance with senior leadership, to facilitate their placement on the agenda of general mission leadership meetings, and to more effectively develop appropriate mission-strategic policy options (an often-sensitive yet important activity). These factors are essential to carrying out many fundamental coordination tasks, such as support to vision and policy, clarifying roles and responsibilities, joining up operational and forward planning, work with international partners and supporting follow-up and review.

41 The Head-of-Mission Coordination Model clearly has an inherently strong advantage with respect to this category, but senior POC Advisers or heads of substantive sections (who may be at the Director level) may be well placed as well. This important aspect of POC Coordinator, however, argues against junior staff taking a leading role on POC coordination. The POC Coordinator should have the authority to bring together senior members of all mission components. The study also found that, because POC policy, planning and operations are necessarily multi-disciplinary (including substantive, military and mission support aspects), the POC Coordinator should have the standing and authority to engage with senior members of the respective components in developing policy options, coordinating plans and ensuring response to POC issues. These capacities are important in carrying out fundamental coordination tasks such as clarifying roles and responsibilities, joining up operational and forward planning, support to the field and training. The standing to facilitate dialogue between mission components is also essential when creating synergies between uniformed and civilian actors, as well as supporting follow-up and evaluation of mission POC activities. MONUSCO Protection Advisers, for instance, meet regularly in the Protection Working Group with the chief of Military Planning (G5), the Joint Human Rights Office, and the Civil Affairs Section. The POC Adviser Model and POC Group (including Advisers) can make effective facilitators, given their neutral advisory roles within the mission. Heads of substantive sections may also have this authority, but experience from UNMIS and UNAMID indicate that substantive sections can face challenges in acting as neutral facilitators. There is not, however, anything inherent to substantive sections that would prevent effective facilitation, but may require clear direction from senior leadership and strong facilitation skills from the substantive section. Heads-of-Mission, of course, have a high degree of authority and can easily bring together senior staff from all components. The POC Coordinator should have expertise in protection of civilians practice. No single person or professional profile will encompass all of the skills or expertise required to guide implementation of a protection of civilians mandate, but there is a substantial and growing body of guidance, good practice, 35 Comparative Study and Toolkit AUTHORITY AND RESOURCES

42 AUTHORITY AND RESOURCES 36 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms and lessons learned that form the heart of POC practice. A POC Coordinator should have, and have the opportunity to develop in others, expertise in this area. POC coordinators should have relevant specialist knowledge and a good understanding of UN policies applying not only to POC but also related subjects such as human rights, sexual violence and child protection in peacekeeping settings. This expertise is required to support senior management, coordinate with other mission components, and provide guidance and training to the field. POC expertise, as discussed in this paper, builds on the policies and lessons learned of for the protection of civilians in peacekeeping, allowing the POC Coordinator to identify threats to and vulnerabilities of civilians and the roles that mission components can play in protecting them. A POC Coordinator without protection of civilians expertise can be detrimental to the mission s POC mandate implementation. For instance, the POC work of both MONUC and UNMIS (post 2010) was led by Civil Affairs (informally in the former case, formally in the latter). Civil Affairs in MONUC developed a strong pool of POC expertise, whereas in UNMIS, POC was mainstreamed in the mission and Civil Affairs became the lead coordinator, but with no additional capacity or expertise to support its new role. As a result, UNMIS Civil Affairs ability to coordinate the mission s POC efforts was limited, and partially contributed to the marginalisation of the POC mandate in the mission. The POC Adviser or POC Group Coordination Models may be best suited to developing POC expertise. Heads of Mission will likely not have the time to learn new areas in-depth, and while they may develop a practical understanding of POC, they will likely need to rely on expert advisers. POC Section Coordination can also develop POC expertise, but their perspective on POC may be strongly influenced by their professional backgrounds. In UNMIS and UNAMID, for instance, POC activities took on a strongly humanitarian flavour because their POC Coordinator Sections were drawn primarily from humanitarian profiles. The POC Coordinator should have a role in the mission s information and analysis components. To promote POC early warning, and effectively support the related fundamental coordination task, a POC Coordinator should have a role in the mission s information and analysis mechanisms. This role may be enmeshed in the mission s joint operational planning or analysis components, such as in UNMISS (where the POC Adviser attends the JOC-chaired Operational Coordination Working Group), or it may be a distinct POC planning exercise in which mission analysts take part, such as in MONUSCO s PWG (which JMAC attends). Such a role should not be interpreted as displacing professional analysts, but rather as supplementing

43 UN Photo/Logan Abassi existing information collation and analysis processes with the POC Coordinator s expertise on evaluating threats to and vulnerabilities of civilians. If properly arranged through existing structures, this capacity can easily be established through the POC Adviser, POC Group, or POC Section Coordination Models. Allowing the Adviser or a substantive section member to work closely with JOC or JMAC and contribute to trend analysis can be a simple way to establish this capacity. Heads of Mission, however, may be constrained in the amount of time that they can devote to this area, though they can prioritise it for their staff. The POC Coordinator should have sufficient human resources to support senior management, coordinate POC at the senior working level, and provide guidance to the field. While this study does not necessarily recommend a fully staffed section over an adviser (or a combination of the two) to lead POC coordination, it does find that the POC Coordinator should have sufficient human resources to carry out fundamental coordination tasks. As reviewed above, POC coordination is a process that touches on many levels of the mission, from strategy and policy, to operations and planning, to field support. The number of staff required to accomplish such tasks will vary, with small or highly consolidated missions requiring less coordination support than large, decentralised missions. 37 Comparative Study and Toolkit AUTHORITY AND RESOURCES

44 The POC Coordinator needs to be able to engage in productive dialogue with humanitarian partners. As discussed above, links with the protection cluster and other partners are vital for POC, and it is essential that the POC Coordinator be able to engage constructively with these partners. The above noted capacities of access to mission leadership, expertise in POC (including some knowledge of humanitarian principles), and the standing to bring disparate groups together should enable most POC Coordinator to undertake this task effectively. Issues of humanitarian liaison do raise some lessons learned, which are reviewed below. AUTHORITY AND RESOURCES 38 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms The experience of the UNMIS POC Section strongly argues that POC Coordinator should not try to coordinate humanitarian protection activity. In Sudan, the UNMIS POC Section was charged with coordinating mission as well as humanitarian protection activities (as co-chair of the Protection Sector Working Group, predecessor to the Protection Cluster). Mission sections are generally ill-suited to conduct humanitarian coordination, and the POC Section s dual role strained its relations with both mission colleagues and with humanitarian partners. UNAMID s Humanitarian Protection Coordination Directorate has faced similar challenges, though the study found that relations between humanitarians and the mission in Darfur have improved when compared with previous years. Issues of liaison with humanitarians often raise the question of which pillar a POC Coordinator should sit under the political pillar, headed by the DSRSG-Political, or the integrated pillar, headed by the DSRSG/RC/HC or a more central location, such as the Office of the Chief of Staff or the Office of the SRSG. The study did not find enough evidence to conclusively recommend any of these options. MONUSCO s highly successful POC coordination system, for instance, began under the DSRSG/RC/HC and was later moved to the DSRSG- Rule of Law, though still with strong support from the integrated pillar. In UNMIS, however, the POC Section under the integrated pillar faced significant challenges in a mission that was dominated by the issues of political negotiations between parties to a peace agreement. UNMISS appears to have found a good formula with a Senior POC Advisor sitting in the Office of the SRSG, though it is also early to fully assess the effectiveness of this aspect of the UNMISS system. UNAMID, on the other hand, has no DSRSG/RC/HC, and its POC Coordinator reports to the DSRSG-Political, yet the UNAMID POC Coordinator also serves as a humanitarian liaison.

45 UN Photo/Martine Perret VI. PROTECTION COORDINATION FORUMS In addition to adequately resourced POC Coordinator, the study found that missions (particularly large missions) require forums for effective POC coordination. These may be dedicated POC meetings or they may be more general meetings, such as Senior Management Group meeting or a field-level management meeting. The study found that forums dedicated to POC worked well in missions in which they were employed. Even more importantly, the study found that a series of cross-component coordination and decision-making bodies at the senior management, advisory/senior working level, and senior field level can greatly facilitate POC policy, planning and operations. This finding is just as important for a mission that coordinates through a single POC Adviser as it is for a mission with a Section or Group Coordination for POC. Regardless of where the mission s POC centre of gravity is, a set of coordination forums is essential to carrying out the coordination tasks listed earlier. 39 Comparative Study and Toolkit COORDINATION FORUMS

46 Whether a mission requires forums on, e.g., early warning or operational planning, will vary considerably. It is nonetheless important that there is a space for cross-component discussion on each of the fundamental coordination tasks, whether that discussion takes place at headquarters, at a field office, or somewhere in between. Dedicated or multi-level coordination systems may not be needed for all missions, but large, complex missions with POC mandates should consider them carefully. Specifically, a mission s POC coordination forums should account for the following factors. COORDINATION FORUMS 40 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms The level of POC activity: Missions in situations of active conflict or where conflict is likely, such as South Sudan and eastern DRC, may face a higher tempo of POC activity. The need to anticipate and respond to POC threats in such situations argues in favour of dedicated POC forums, ensuring that POC issues are being examined, addressed and followed up. The level of POC activity is, of course, a fluid scale, and thus the level of dedicated POC coordination can also be graduated. For instance, in missions that do not regularly face threats to civilians but where such threats remain possible, a single, dedicated POC meeting at the senior level may be sufficient, as opposed to POC-active missions that may have regular POC-focused meetings at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. The size of the mission: Bringing together multiple components in a large mission is a considerable challenge, and thus large missions require more fully developed POC coordination forums. Coordination forums at different levels of the mission senior leadership, senior working level, field office, and field sub-office should be considered. While POC dedicated mechanisms at all of these levels may not be needed, large missions generally benefit from joined-up coordination forums at all of these levels. Composition of the mission: Missions that are composed primarily of a single component, such as primarily military missions, may have less need for coordination forums than multi-component missions. A main purpose of coordination forums is to ensure synergy between mission components and thus the need for these forums decreases as the number or size of other components decreases. No mission, however, is purely homogenous, and general coordination forums should exist for at least senior staff. In considering the structural elements of a mission s POC coordination forums, the study found two important elements: (1) coordination forums should be cross-component, and (2) that the forums should target decisionmakers, senior advisers and operational planners at the levels of the mission

47 at which they operate. This latter element implies that it is not sufficient for large missions only to discuss POC at the senior management level; rather, different mission component should be discussing POC issues at all levels at which decisions are being made, including the senior working level and field management level. Standard Mission Coordination Forums Many missions coordinate POC and other activities through a set of multipurpose forums. Senior Management Team meetings, Joint Operations Centres, and other standardised mission mechanisms are all forums where POC-related discussion can and do take place. Indeed, missions most urgent and highprofile POC work will often engage Crisis Management Teams, a standardised coordination tool. As with POC-specific coordination forums, the study found that these general mechanisms could contribute substantially to POC coordination if they facilitated cross-component discussion and decision-making. Some of the most innovative, general operational coordination structures come from UNMISS and MINUSTAH, which have used the Joint Operations Centre structure as a basis for cross-component operations coordination. Traditionally, the JOC is only used as an information hub, but these missions have made modifications to use the JOC as a facilitator of joint operational planning and execution. UNMISS Operations Coordination Working Group Like the MINUSTAH JOTC, the UNMISS Operations Coordination Working Group (OCWG) brings mission components together to reach consensus and facilitate joint action, though it lacks actual tasking authority and is more of a discussion forum. The UNMISS OCWG is chaired by the Chief JOC and attended by working-level senior mission members, including the Senior POC Adviser, the Chief of the Military Operations Centre, deputy chiefs of Civil Affairs, Human Rights, Public Information, representatives from the offices of both DSRSGs, other substantive sections and the Joint Logistics Operations Centre; representatives from OCHA and UNHCR are also regular attendees. The seniority of the group also allows members of the OCWG to task their respective components even though the Working Group does not have tasking authority itself. On a daily basis, the Operational Coordination Working Group assembles to review the previous day s reports and follow up on past activities. Given the seniority and knowledge base of the Working Group, discussion is a mix of information sharing and near-term analysis, with a focus on operational follow-up of reported incidents. Many operational POC issues, such as priorities for patrols, Integrated Team deployments, or aerial reconnaissance flights, are planned and followed up by the OCWG. 41 Comparative Study and Toolkit COORDINATION FORUMS

48 MINUSTAH Joint Operations and Tasking Centre 42 The MINUSTAH Joint Operations and Tasking Centre was established in the aftermath of Haiti s devastating 2010 earthquake to support the delivery of humanitarian relief in emergency circumstances. Recognising the need for both mission-wide information awareness and operational support to humanitarians, the JOTC developed two cells, a reporting cell (carrying out traditional JOC functions) and a plans coordination group, which served as a coordination forum between substantive civilians, humanitarians (OCHA attended meetings), mission support, military and police. Despite its name, the Joint Operations and Tasking Centre did not have real tasking authority: neither the facilitator of the plans coordination group nor the Chief of JOTC could order staff or utilise mission assets (In recognition of this, the JOTC recently changed its name simply to the Joint Operations Centre). But the Plans Coordination Group served as a consensus-based expediter for humanitarian support operations by convening a small group of component members who could task and mobilise resources along their own chains of command and within understood limits. The JOTC in MINUSTAH was not used for POC operations per se, but, as evidenced by the UNMISS OCWG, it serves as a model easily adapted to POC contexts. The JOTC has been controversial amongst some mission components, particularly uniformed components, which view it as interfering with their chain of command. Other actors, however, have supported the JOTC s operational authority, finding it particularly valuable in exigent circumstances, as faced in postearthquake Haiti. COORDINATION FORUMS PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms POC-specific Coordination Forums A number of missions have established or begun to establish POC-specific coordination forums. As noted above, the study found that where these existed, they added clear value to POC implementation. Similar to general coordination forums, however, the study also found that POC-specific forums should facilitate cross-component (civilian, military, police, and support) discussion at multiple levels of authority. MONUSCO has a strong example of dedicated POC coordination forums. This system was developed over a number of years, years which saw great violence against civilians in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and thus MONUSCO s POC forums evolved in response to the protection challenges it faced. MONUSCO s POC coordination system, described in greater detail below, is built on the following factors. 1. Decision-making groups dedicated to discussing POC issues at the senior management and field office levels. (It is notable that field offices in eastern DRC are very large and have substantial autonomy

49 in operational matters). This ensures that mission leadership is seized of POC issues and that POC policy, planning and operations are addressed at the appropriate levels. 2. An advisory group composed of experts who develop consensus on POC issues, called the Protection Working Group. Located at HQ level, the advisory group is not a decision-making body but can advise senior mission leadership and field heads of office/commanders on POC policy, planning and operations. This group is also tasked with projects such as the development of POC training materials. 3. Each of the coordination groups brings together actors from all components of the mission, including civilian, military and police (Mission support is also present at the decision-making forums, though generally not at the advisory group). This enables consistent action at the field level, where the civilian head of office and the military brigade commander (co-chairs of the provincial forum) can each task along their respective lines of authority. If such a forum did not exist, civilian POC plans may not have military backing, or vice-versa. 4. A strong relationship has also been developed with the UN Country Team, promoted by the active involvement of the Office of the DSRSG/RC/HC on POC issues. The dedicated POC coordination system in MONUSCO has been successful, and similar models piloted in UNMISS, UNAMID and UNOCI show promise as well. The importance of POC coordination structures, consonant with the mission s context and composition, is illustrated by comparing MONUC/MONUSCO and UNAMID. MONUC faced a series of challenging POC incidents in the mid-2000, discussed above in the section on early warning. These incidents revealed that the mission s focus on POC was inconsistent and that information wasn t being effectively shared. These lessons informed the development of MONUSCO s POC coordination architecture, which includes dedicated POC forums at the senior management level, senior working level, and field office management level. UNAMID, like MONUC/MONUSCO, has also faced a particularly challenging POC environment and a protection/humanitarian liaison section has led UNAMID s POC efforts. However, UNAMID s only dedicated POC forums during the research period were the Protection Cluster and the related POC Working Group for the Integrated Strategic Framework; both of these forums focus more on mission-unct relations than on intra-mission coordination. This has resulted in some challenges in developing a consistent 43 Comparative Study and Toolkit COORDINATION FORUMS

50 understanding of POC in UNAMID and concerted efforts by all actors. UNAMID is, however, currently revising its structures to ensure that POC coordination forums exist at the HQ and field office level. COORDINATION FORUMS 44 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms The MONUSCO POC Coordination Architecture Senior Management Group on Protection: The Senior Management Group on Protection (SMGP) is the apex of MONUSCO s POC coordination edifice. The SMGP is designed to address the most senior policy issues and is intended to meet monthly. Protection Working Group: The Protection Working Group (PWG), co-chaired by advisers from each DSRSG s office, is the mission s senior working-level body and brings together the POC Adviser from the Integrated Office, the DSRSG-ROL Senior POC advisor and representatives from Human Rights, Civil Affairs, JMAC, Child Protection, and military staff officers, OCHA and UNHCR. The PWG meets weekly to examine operational aspects of the mission s POC posture with an outlook that provides it an optic on cross-provincial threats, emerging security issues and other POC concerns. The PWG further provides support and advice to the provincial protection actors, including POC training. Provincial Senior Management Groups on Protection: MONUSCO field offices in North Kivu, South Kivu and Province Orientale have Provincial Senior Management Groups on Protection (SMGP-Ps). The meetings of these groups are co-chaired by the Head of Office and the Brigade Commander and are attended by Civil Affairs and Human Rights Sections, Military Observers, and other substantive sections. The SMGP-P oversees the provincial POC activities, including anticipating threats, planning the deployment of Joint Protection Teams (JPTs) and following up on JPT recommendations. MONUSCO s POC coordination structures promote oversight, follow-up, and senior-level guidance. Joint or integrated teams involving multiple professional specialties exist in most large peacekeeping missions. What makes the JPTs unique is the formalised superstructure around them. The Protection Matrix: The SMGP-P also reviews the Protection Matrix, a document produced by or with input from the humanitarian protection cluster to recommend areas that should be prioritised in MONUSCO s force deployments. The humanitarian protection actors classify locations as must protect, should protect, and could protect based on their understanding of where the greatest risks to civilians exist or are likely to develop. The matrix is a tool that can be used to help inform deployments of patrols or operating bases.

51 POC Coordination Forums at Different Levels of the Mission Senior Leadership Level Senior Working Level Mission HQ Senior mission leadership forum decision-makers from all components should be present Forum for discussion and decision on policy and strategy Forum to prioritise critical incidents, activate the Crisis Management Team Forum for Senior POC experts and senior working level from other components (Senior Staff Officers, deputy section heads, etc.) Forum to identify upcoming issues and trends At senior leadership request, develop policy options Forum to develop training and provide guidance to field Field Level Management Tactical Level Field Locations Forum for senior field staff, including civilian, military and police Forum for decision-making at the field level, particularly regarding operational priorities Key opportunity to bring together information and develop common plans Forum for field staff in more remote locations; should include all components where they are present Forum for operational planning and information sharing at the deep field level 45 Comparison of UNMISS and MONUSCO POC Coordination Forums Senior Leadership Level Senior Working Level Field Level Management UNMISS Coordination Forums Protection Working Group (chaired by DSRSG) Technical Working Group on Protection (chaired by POC Adviser) State Protection Task Force (chaired by the State Coordinator MONUSCO Coordination Forums Senior Management Group on Protection (chaired by SRSG) Protection Working Group (chaired by O/DSRSG) Provincial Senior Management Group on Protection (co-chaired by Head of Office and Brigade Commander) Comparative Study and Toolkit COORDINATION FORUMS Tactical Level County Support Base (civilian, military and police co-located) Field Commanders supported by Joint Protection Teams and Community Liaison Assistants

52 UN Photo/Sylvain Liechti TOOLKIT 46 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms VII. TOOLKIT With an aim to provide practical guidance to missions in refining their POC coordination mechanisms, the following pages comprise a toolkit for mission staff. Tool 1 sets out a set of entry points for improving coordination. Tool 2 is a checklist, organised by the ten fundamental coordination tasks, listing questions/challenges and possible remedies. Tool 3 provides a general overview of the roles of various mission components in POC, and lessons learned in the course of the study. Tool 4 comprises a set of sample terms of reference for the POC coordination described in this study. Tool 1: Entry Points for Improving Coordination Coordination across mission components necessarily involves approval from a variety of actors, often at the highest levels; for this and other reasons, it can be a daunting task. There are, however, a number of key times when actors in mission or HQ can seek to improve a mission s basic POC coordination tasks.

53 Integrated Mission Planning Process: Developing a mission-specific vision for POC begins at the mission planning stage. Important times to include thinking on POC include (1) the Strategic Assessment, (2) the Technical Assessment Mission, (3) the Mission Concept, potentially including a Protection of Civilians Concept of Operations (as developed in the UNMISS mission planning process), (4) the Results-Based Budget, which, through setting staffing posts and structures, may effectively decide the model of POC coordination utilised by the mission in its first days. Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategy: The Framework for Drafting Comprehensive POC Strategies lays out this process in greater detail, however it is important to highlight in the present context. Development of a POC Strategy in a mission is an important opportunity to develop a clear mission vision on POC, establish coordination structures (including POC forums, if desirable, as in UNOCI s 2012 POC Strategy), and sensitise or train all mission components on what protecting civilians means in the mission context. Integrated Strategic Frameworks and UNCT Coordination: The Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) provides an opportunity for the UN system in a post-conflict context to identify its shared priorities and ensure that its efforts in that respect are working in support of one another. The development of an ISF can also present important opportunities to improve the mission s and humanitarian partners understanding of protection priorities and concerns, including those regarding humanitarian space. It is important to note, however, that the ISF is not the appropriate vehicle for a detailed POC risk analysis or workplan, which identifies the roles and responsibilities of mission components and humanitarian partners; these elements should be included in a comprehensive POC strategy. The ISF is designed to provide a higher level look at the UN system s shared priorities in a given context, whereas a comprehensive POC strategy should go into greater detail regarding threats and vulnerabilities to civilians, and the measures the mission and its partners will undertake to address them. Reviews and Transitions: As situations change, the mission may reassess one or more facets of its operations. Because POC is a cross-mission mandate, all such reassessments should be examined with a POC lens and may have an impact on the POC Strategy. The regular reviews that missions undertake, therefore, may serve as entry points to re-examine how the mission coordinates its POC mandate implementation. 47 Comparative Study and Toolkit TOOLKIT

54 Tool 2: Checklists for POC Coordination Tasks with Remedial Measures Supporting Vision and Policy: Effective POC coordination requires support to senior leadership to facilitate the development of strategic vision and the establishment of mechanisms for seniorlevel policy decisions and strategic POC planning. Question Possible remedy Does senior mission leadership have expert advice and support in developing a strategic vision for protection of civilians mandate implementation? Does senior mission leadership have a clear understanding of what protection of civilians mandate implementation means in the given mission context? Is there a forum(s) where senior mission leadership meets to make strategic and policy decisions on protection of civilians? This is a major gap in the mission s capacity to implement its POC mandate. While a there no specific remedy for this situation, working with senior management to address this gap should be a priority of the POC Coordinator or NYHQ. A Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategy, called for in Security Council Resolution 1894 for all missions with POC mandates, can assist in clarifying the strategic vision for POC. POC should feature as at least an occasional topic in Senior Management Group meetings; in missions with a higher pace of POC activity, a dedicated senior POC group should be considered. TOOLKIT 48 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms Clarifying Roles and Responsibilities: An effective POC coordination system ensures that POC roles and responsibilities at all levels are clearly delineated and understood. Question Possible remedy Is there a Protection of Civilians Strategy, approved by mission leadership, that provides a framework for the roles and responsibilities of mission components with regard to POC? Is there a forum where the roles and responsibilities of mission components with regard to POC can be discussed, disseminated, fleshed out, and adjusted? Are the roles and responsibilities of each component being effectively communicated to their field officers? Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies are strongly encouraged by the Security Council, as well as DPKO and DFS. For guidance in developing a POC Strategy, consult the Framework for Drafting POC Strategies or contact the POC Team in DPKO-HQ. The Senior Working Level is well positioned to address these issues, which are often more technical than issues dealt with at the mission leadership level. The Protection Working Group in MONUSCO is an example of such a forum. Regardless of whether the forum is dedicated to POC, however, it should include senior representatives from all components, including civilians, military, police and mission support. Training, whether in induction or within components, is essential for communicating defined roles and responsibilities. Training for field commanders and civilian heads of field offices is particularly important.

55 Supporting Joined-up Operational and Forward Planning: An effective POC coordination system ensures that forward and operational POC planning benefits from the expertise of all mission components. Question Possible remedy Are threats to civilians, including analysis of the intent and capabilities of potential perpetrators, considered in conducting forward and operational planning? Does the mission have an agreed analysis of threats to civilians? Has the mission engaged external actors in developing their understanding of the context? Are vulnerabilities and resiliencies of civilians, including risks to women and children as well as community self-protection measures, considered in conducting forward and operational planning? Does the mission have an agreed analysis of vulnerabilities and resiliencies of civilians? Has the mission engaged external actors in developing their understanding of the context? Do forums exist to share information between components in forward and operational planning? Do military and police planners regularly consult civilian counterparts in developing patrolling schedules and other POC-related strategies? Do civilian substantive sections regularly consult military and police planners in developing POC-related activities? Is there a forum that ensures information and knowledge from the UNCT and other partners can be incorporated? Joint operational and forward planning between military and civilian components can greatly assist in ensuring that POC concerns are addressed in a mission-wide manner. An agreed analysis of threats to civilians and vulnerabilities and resiliencies of civilians is an important element of this that can be furthered through the development of a Comprehensive POC Strategy. The views of all mission components, including Human Rights, Child Protection, Gender and Sexual Violence colleagues, are particularly important. Engage with external actors, such as the UNCT and Protection Cluster, to agree upon, or at least understand their perspective of, the context. The Senior Working Level is an important level at which to share planning information between components. JOC and JMAC are important partners in this, as well as Military J3 and J5. Consultation and information sharing in operational and forward planning is fully consistent with standard command and control. The UNMISS Operations Coordination Working Group is an example of a joint operational planning forum. (OCHA and UNHCR attend the Working Group as well). 49 Comparative Study and Toolkit TOOLKIT

56 50 Supporting the Field: An effective POC coordination system provides support, guidance and delegated authority to field offices on POC operational planning, prioritisation, and training. Question Possible remedy Are field offices supported with guidance on operational planning for POC? Are field offices supported with guidance on identifying POC priorities in their AOR? Are field offices supported in training on POC? Do field offices have sufficient delegated authority? Do military, police and civilian components have compatible levels of delegated authority? A Protection of Civilians Strategy is a vital document to outline the mission s overall POC priorities, relevant to the field as well as mission headquarters. The Framework on Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies provides guidance on this matter. The POC Coordinator can take a leading role in ensuring that the priorities contained in the POC strategy are disseminated, provide further guidance where necessary, and support the development training materials if needed. Frequent contact with heads of field offices may be required to effectively provide guidance on planning and prioritising POC activity. The UNMISS POC Adviser, working with the Field Support Office of the Chief of Staff, carries out such contact. Uniformed components should also be involved in supporting the field, particularly with regard to incorporating POC priorities into Fragmentary Orders and training. Decentralisation and delegated authority allow more independent work at the field level, which can imply a greater degree of cooperation and joint action at the field level. These are frequently important to effective POC action. Decentralisation is a structural issue and decisions on decentralisation are the province of senior management, in dialogue with NYHQ. To the extent possible, however, the POC Coordinator may seek to promote decentralisation if the mission context is appropriate. TOOLKIT PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms Supporting Effective Early Warning and Situational Awareness: An effective coordination system will promote early warning and situational awareness on POC issues. Question Possible remedy Does the mission have a strategy for information management or early warning that incorporates protection of civilians concerns? Does each mission component understand their role with regard to information collection? Are there common or shared reporting channels to avoid the stove-piping of information? Does the mission incorporate an analysis of threats and risks to civilians when analysing information? The mission s strategy for information management/early warning should clarify the types of information to be collected to conduct POC activities as well as the roles of each mission component in collecting such information. Where no mission information management/early warning strategy exists, the Comprehensive POC Strategy may be used to establish an information framework for POC. Standard Operating Procedures on Reporting are a key tool to improve information sharing. Common reporting channels, whereby reporting from different components is compiled, consolidated and triangulated at the field level is an important tool to prevent stove-piped information. A foundational risk analysis for threats to civilians can be provided through the POC Strategy, and this should be utilised by the mission s analysis offices. Whether analysis is conducted by JMAC, Military J2, or other components, an analysis of threats to and vulnerabilities of civilians (which directly impact upon the mission s POC mandate) should be clearly examined and delineated in analysis products. More detailed risk analysis can and should be prepared with input from field offices.

57 Working with International Partners: An effective POC coordination system complements the work of the Protection Cluster, UN Country Team and Humanitarian Country Team in a mutually beneficial relationship. Question Possible remedy Do the mission and the UNCT/HCT share a common analysis of the risks to civilians? Does the mission communicate regularly with UNCT/HCT partners on POC issues? Does the mission have a focal point for such communications? Do mission representatives attend the Protection Cluster? Do UNCT/HCT members attend mission-based meetings on POC? Are there mechanisms for UNCT/ HCT partners to provide input on mission POC actions? Is the mission aware of UNCT/HCT concerns with humanitarian space in the mission context? Is POC or protection (more broadly defined) a part of the Integrated Strategic Framework or other joint planning document? A common understanding of the risks to civilians is essential. The mission should work with UN and humanitarian partners to develop this, as outlined in the Framework on Drafting Comprehensive Protection of Civilians Strategies. Defining clear points of contact for humanitarians to engage the mission on POC-related issues is an important step; such a point of contact may be issue-specific (such as Military J9 for militaryrelated issues or Civil Affairs for mission/community issues). Cross-representation at humanitarian and mission forums should be considered, including mission representatives in the Protection Cluster and humanitarian representatives in POCspecific mission forums, as appropriate to the country context. Formal communication mechanisms for UNCT/HCT input in to mission plans may facilitate work with UN partners. One example of this is the Protection Matrix used by MONUSCO and the DRC Protection Cluster. The Mission and UNCT should clearly articulate the integration model applicable to the country context (generally decided upon at the NYHQ level), inclusive of any underlying concerns or caveats, and ensure that this is disseminated among mission s staff. The Comprehensive POC Strategy may be an opportunity for this, as are POC training materials. Including POC or protection in joint planning documents can improve strategic consistency. Engaging with Local Communities: An effective POC coordination system will promote engagement with local communities on their protection concerns. Question Does the mission have a strategy for engaging communities and civil society organisations with regard to POC issues, particularly for understanding threats to and vulnerabilities of a community, gathering early warning information, and understanding the community s own protection measures? Does the mission s strategy for engaging community ensure that communities understand what the mission can and cannot be expected to do with regards to protection of civilians, including a realistic understanding of the mission s rapid response capacities? Possible remedy The mission should strongly consider the development of a community engagement plan, particularly with regard to POC. Civil Affairs may be an appropriate lead for this exercise, but UN Police, Human Rights, Child Protection, JMAC, and UN partners may also be important stakeholders. The mission should ensure that senior leadership and Public Information work with other components in developing clear messaging for communities that ensures realistic expectations and promotes a do no harm approach. 51 Comparative Study and Toolkit TOOLKIT

58 Engaging with National Authorities: An effective POC coordination system will promote engagement with national authorities to support the host nation s fulfilment of its protection responsibilities. Question Does the mission have a strategy or framework for engaging with national authorities? Are mission points of contact for issues, portfolios or host nation counterparts clearly defined? Does the mission have an agreed set of messages for the host government? Does the mission s strategy for engaging host government ensure that expectations are managed? Possible remedy As with community engagement, the mission should seriously consider the development of a strategy or framework for engaging with national authorities. This may include but is not limited to engagement through the military component, the Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform component, and the UN Police. The mission should ensure that senior leadership and Public Information and/or Political Affairs works with other components in developing clear messaging for national authorities on POC issues that ensures realistic expectations, promotes the host nation s efforts to uphold its responsibilities to protect civilians, and promotes a do no harm approach. TOOLKIT 52 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms Follow-up and Review: An effective POC coordination system follows up POC action and reviews it to improve POC outcomes. Question Does the mission have a system in place to follow up the reports, recommendations or findings from POC-related activities? Does the mission have sufficient operational or tactical oversight, such as a field-based review of patrol activities, to plan and track POC-related activities? Do joint patrols or related activities issue a consolidated report to facilitate follow up? Is there accountability when follow up does not take place? Does the mission have a system for regularly or systematically reviewing protection of civilians activities, particularly routine POC-related activities? In designing POC activities, are the standards for success clearly defined? Does the mission consistently and accurately measure its activities against these standards? Does the mission adjust its POC activities where appropriate? Possible remedy The missions should seek to establish mechanisms that ensure the follow up of field reports, facilitate the planning of field activities, and review the efficacy of implemented activities. MONUSCO s Provincial Senior Management Group on Protection, which regularly plans and follows up on Joint Protection Patrols, is an example of such a mechanism. Joint field missions or joint patrols undertaken by multiple components should issue a single, consolidated report that is agreed upon by all components of the field missions. This facilitates field-level oversight and improves information sharing. The POC Coordinator may also seek, in collaboration with relevant implementing actors, such as the military, to develop a mechanism for evaluating the effectiveness of POC-related activities. This may include the development of indicators and the use of community perception surveys. External actors, such as UN Agencies and the Protection Cluster, can also provide useful feedback on the impact of mission POC activities and/or community perceptions.

59 Supporting Training: An effective POC coordination system ensures relevant training of all mission components. Question Possible remedy Does the mission have POC-specific training materials for the induction of all relevant staff? Does the mission have POC training materials specifically designed for the military component? Does the mission have joint training on POC that brings together different mission components? Does the mission conduct POC exercises? Does the mission have trainers qualified to provide POC training in the field? The POC Coordinator, along with the Integrated Mission Training Centre, should support the development of mission-specific POC training materials for induction, POC training materials focused on particular components (such as the military), and POC training materials focused on joint, multi-component training. Conducting POC exercises may be an involved process, often requiring the committed participation of a cross-component group, but can substantially improve a mission s POC performance and are highly recommended. If support is needed on training issues, including developing POC exercises, the POC Team and the Integrated Training Service at HQ always stand ready to assist. Training of Trainers courses can be supported to ensure that the mission has qualified POC trainers. The POC Team at DPKO HQ can also be called to provide surge capacity. 53 Tool 3: Roles of Mission Components and Lessons Learned In developing coordination structures, it is essential to define the roles of mission components in implementing the POC mandate. To better equip POC practitioners and mission planners, the following annex provides an overview of existing practice with regard to the roles mission components and the lessons that have been drawn. Not every mission component displayed the strengths or challenges highlighted in these descriptions, but the below trends were observed frequently enough to merit attention. Comparative Study and Toolkit TOOLKIT Civil Affairs Civil Affairs plays a central role on POC in many missions. Civil Affairs role as the civilian backbone of the mission frequently makes them a central actor with the standing to bring together mission components. Their field presence and mandate to engage with communities and local government also make them key actors in delivering early warning and building local capacities. These facets

60 UN Photo/Albert Gonzalez Farran TOOLKIT 54 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms have made Civil Affairs one of the most consistently valuable civilian sections in peacekeeping. In MONUC, many of the mission s innovative POC mechanisms were developed through the work of Civil Affairs. At the same time, the wide spectrum of Civil Affairs activities means that POC issues can be lost among competing priorities. Lessons Identified: Civil Affairs is a consistently valuable section for POC work, particularly with regard to engagement with local communities and national authorities. Human Rights Human rights concepts are integral to the protection of civilians from physical violence and Human Rights components are consistently central POC actors in missions. UNMIL has developed a Human Rights and Protection Section as its POC Coordinator. Human rights officers regularly work to prevent and respond to human rights violations, engage with communities and host country authorities, and support to analysis on trends and risks of violence. The study found, however, that effective coordination requires clarifying the points of commonality and complementarities between mission mandates on POC and human rights. The POC Strategy is a clear entry point for such discussions, though they may need to be further developed at the senior working level and field level.

61 The study found that confusion between human rights and POC existed amongst some mission actors. Some treated human rights and POC issues as identical; others, including some Human Rights Officers, felt that a strong focus on POC undermined traditional human rights activities by overly prioritising physical protection. The Operational Concept on POC recognises the strong relationship between human rights and POC, and human rights officers to frequently play important roles with regard to the three tiers around which the concept is organised. In addition, the Joint DPKO/OHCHR/DPA/DFS Human Rights Policy in UN Peace Operations provides guidance for human rights actors supporting implementation of protection of civilians mandates. Clarifying the mission s strategic vision of POC and human rights, and implementing that vision at working levels, is thus essential to effectively coordinating both mandates. Human Rights components are also key participants in the Protection Clusters in most countries where missions operate. MINUSTAH s Human Rights Section was the lead for the Haiti Protection Cluster until its closure and MONUC s Human Rights and Civil Affairs also previously co-chaired the protection cluster along with UNHCR in the DRC. Lessons Identified: Human Rights components are central actors in the implementation of mission-wide POC mandates. Missions should clarify their strategic vision for implementation of their POC and human rights mandates to ensure complementarity. 55 DDR, Rule of Law/SSR, Child Protection and Gender/Women s Protection Substantive sections, particularly including DDR, Rule of Law, SSR, Child Protection, Gender and Women s Protection all have important expertise to draw upon. These sections will also often have strong relationships with a variety of national counterparts and communities. With regard to coordination, the study generally found that many of these sections, particularly those concerning gender/sexual violence and child protection, generally had their own well established coordination structures that linked mission actors to UN Agencies, NGOs and other partners. These structures, such as the Child Protection and Gender Based Violence Sub-clusters, frequently have non-mission leads. In addition, both specialties encompass areas of psychosocial and medical support, as well as issues such as child demobilisation, that are outside the remit of protection from physical violence. The mission actors involved in these areas are often involved in the mission s prevention of and response to imminent physical threats to civilians, however, and played integral roles in some missions. In MONUSCO, for instance, Child Protection and DDR Officers were important actors in the protection response that the mission developed in the wake of joint FARDC/MONUSCO Comparative Study and Toolkit TOOLKIT

62 military operations. Sexual violence and child protection, while generally treated outside of the POC coordination mechanisms established within the mission, remain important elements to consider within existing POC frameworks and missions are encouraged to seek synergies in coordination and joint planning. Lesson Identified: Substantive sections are key actors in POC, though particular roles will vary depending on mission context; the particular added value of substantive sections to POC implementation should be considered in the context of the POC Strategy. TOOLKIT 56 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms The Military Component The military component is clearly a vital POC actor. A full examination of the military s role and its methods of coordination, particularly its internal coordination, were not possible in the scope of the study. Some brief observations, however, are included below. Military Force Contingents play a clear and important role in physical protection. The study noted varying levels of comfort or understanding amongst military commanders with POC principles and practice. The study found that the military component appeared most comfortable with POC activities in missions where the military leadership was fully engaged in POC planning and policy at the headquarters level. In MONUSCO, for instance, the Force Commander is a member of the Senior Management Group on Protection and a number of staff officers, including the Chief of Forward Planning (J5), attend the Protection Working Group. The study also found that regularising military directives on POC supported stronger POC coordination and mandate implementation. MONUSCO s Force Commander s Directive on Protection of Civilians, for instance, provides commanders and contingents with clear strategic vision. In UNMIS, the military also produced Fragmentary Orders on POC-related topics, such as how the military (and civilian components) should react if civilians seek shelter in a mission base. Clear instructions from the military force leadership such as these greatly facilitate POC coordination when working with mission military. Military Observers also have the potential to play a strong role in early warning and situational awareness with regard to POC. In UNISFA, for example, Military Observers are instrumental in tracking movements of Misseriya and Dinka Ngok groups, ensuring that the mission maintains a strong understanding of its AOR. The study found, however, that Military Observers were most effective where the mission leadership clearly identified a role for them to fill. While Military Observers are the eyes and ears of a traditional peacekeeping mission, modern missions have many more antennae. It may be tempting to task Military Observers to report generally on security dynamics, but this can easily lead to a

63 lack of clarity and focus. The study found a number of missions where Military Observers lack of clear reporting focus led to inconsistency in their reporting themes, making the information collected more difficult to use as it moved up the command chain. Both the Military Force Contingents and Military Observers may also play an important role with respect to liaising with national authorities. UNMISS has changed from a Military Observer model to a Military Liaison Officer model to fully leverage this strength of senior, unarmed military officers. Lessons Identified: Involving and engaging the mission s military leadership on POC issues will generally improve coordination. Promoting the development of military guidance on POC, such as Force Commander s Directives, Operational Orders, Fragmentary Orders, and other POC-related plans should be strongly encouraged by senior mission leadership. Clearly defining the roles of Military Observers improved their utility in supporting early warning and situational awareness. UN Police The UN Police, both unarmed Police Advisers and armed Formed Police Units, are important actors in peacekeeping and potentially important actors in protecting civilians. As police officers with years of experience and training in promoting security and safety in their home countries, the UN Police arguably have the greatest direct experience in civilian protection. The study found, however, that the UN Police were the component that had the most frequent coordination challenges, often undertaking their specialised capacity building activities without taking into account the work of other sections or other aspects of the mission s mandate. Indeed, some Police components expressed the view that the only part of the mission mandate that applied to them was language on support to the host nation police. Viewing police capacity building through a POC lens and creating linkages with other components is thus highly important for the UN Police. UN Police Advisers, through their capacity building and co-location activities, have the potential to play a strong role in early warning, situational awareness, and community engagement. In addition, UN Police can be important liaisons with local security and law enforcement groups. As with Military Observers, the study noted that defined roles with respect to POC were important for Police Advisers, particularly where they undertake independent activities. In UNAMID, for example, the UN Police did an admirable job in patrolling IDP 57 Comparative Study and Toolkit TOOLKIT

64 UN Photo/Albert Gonzalez Farran TOOLKIT 58 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms camps, though a lack of coordination between the UN Police and Human Rights sections occasionally led to survivors of sexual violence being unnecessarily re-interviewed by UNPOL officers. The UN Police can also use their capacity building and support activities to target POC concerns. In UNMISS, for example, the UN Police are supporting the development of Livestock Patrol Units, specialised units of the South Sudan Police designed to stop cattle raiding (a major criminal activity in South Sudan that can drive violence against civilians). In DRC, the MONUSCO Police and UNDP supported the Congolese Police to deploy 60 officers to Luvungi in the wake of brutal militia attacks to stabilise the area. Formed Police Units, like Military Force Contingents, also play a clear and important role in physical protection and deterrence, particularly in urban environments. As with unarmed police advisers, defining the roles of FPUs with respect to POC is important. UNAMID is an example of a mission where FPUs have been provided with clear POC responsibilities (patrolling IDP camps). Strong coordination with military is also important, however, as there have been instances where FPUs and military contingents have duplicated tasks. UNAMID, which also noted this challenge, has taken steps to address this issue through the creation of Joint Operations Centres at the Team Site level, where military and police components can jointly plan patrols, force escorts, and other activities.

65 Lessons Identified: Clearly identifying the role of UN Police Advisers, vis-à-vis other components, with regard to community and host authority engagement is important to promoting the utility of UNPOL reporting. Approaching police capacity building through a POC lens can be important to build host state capacity in areas needed to address risks to civilians. The role of Formed Police Units should be coordinated with and distinguished from the military contingents. Joint Operations Centre The importance of Joint Operations Centres (JOCs) to POC activities varied in the missions studied. In some missions, such as UNMISS, the JOC (and the Operations Coordination Working Group that the JOC chairs) played a central role in bringing components together to discuss operational planning; often this planning directly concerned POC issues, even though the Operations Coordination Working Group did not have an explicit POC focus. In other missions, such as MONUSCO and UNAMID, the JOC was primarily a reporting mechanism and did not play a large role in supporting joint planning or action on POC. Other missions, such as UNISFA, were too small to have a recognisable JOC. The Policy provides JOCs with a relatively limited role with regard to POC, and their main mandate is to serve as an information hub. Although JOCs are labelled an operations centre, the JOC policy does not create a role to encourage or facilitate operational coordination. The study found that those JOCs which did take up such role, including the UNMISS JOC, generally had a stronger role in POC and were able to fill an important gap in POC operational coordination. The study also found, however, that the JOC s operational coordination role was most important in missions with limited military or logistical resources. Missions with more ample militaries, such as MONUSCO and UNAMID, are large enough that operational planning takes place primarily at the field level. (In MONUSCO, for instance, each eastern province is commanded by a Brigadier General; in many of the states in South Sudan, by contrast, the highest UNMISS military officer is a major). It is also notable that the JOC Policy provides the JOC a role in supporting the Crisis Management Team when it is activated; the study found that JOCs in UNMISS and UNAMID have played an important role regarding POC during crises. Ultimately, the study found that JOCs multi-component design and nominal operational coordination role provide great potential to support many of the coordination tasks outlined above. In those missions where the JOC reached 59 Comparative Study and Toolkit TOOLKIT

66 beyond its traditional information hub role, such as UNMISS and MINUSTAH (see page 41) this potential was more fully realised. Lessons Identified: The JOCs multi-component composition makes them well placed to support POC operational coordination. JOCs that have reached beyond acting solely as an information hub, such as UNMISS, have contributed to POC coordination. JOCs have an important and established role in supporting Crisis Management Teams, particularly with regard to POC. TOOLKIT 60 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms Joint Mission Analysis Centre Joint Mission Analysis Centres have clear and established roles in predicting and analysing threats to the mission mandate, potentially including issues that relate to risks to civilians. JMACs are missions only dedicated analytical capacity and if JMAC is not producing analyses of risks to civilians, this important task may go unfulfilled. The study generally found, however, that although many JMACs do provide analysis of POC-related issues, such analysis is often not carried out with a POC lens. For instance, while many JMACs engaged in analyses of the intent and location of militia groups, few examined the communities those militia would come into contact with and whether and to what extent the communities would be at risk of attack. The study found, however, that missions were able to harness JMACs analytical capacity for POC where senior leadership supported such a focus. In MONUSCO, JMAC is a member of the PWG and assists in forward planning. In UNMISS, the SRSG specifically tasked JMAC to develop contingency scenarios on POC issues. Lessons Identified: JMAC has an essential role to play in analysis on and early warning of POC issues, but the breadth and nature of JMACs mandates often result in analysis that is of limited use to POC planning. With the support of senior mission leadership, JMACs capacities can be harnessed to support POC. Heads of Field Offices Civilian heads of field offices were also noted as important POC actors. While such positions may not exist in every mission, in many medium- or large-sized missions these staff play vital roles in managing day-to-day operations and

67 conducting the initial information gathering and analysis of political, security and protection concerns. As many POC responses take place at the field level, effective field-based coordination structures are important. Field Heads of Offices (who have a variety of names in different missions) can be central actors in ensuring this level of coordination. The study found that the effectiveness of Heads of Regional Offices can depend upon several factors, including how much decision-making authority is delegated to them and the resources that they have to fulfil their roles. Lessons Identified: Heads of field offices have an important role to play in coordinating at the field level, including creating a unity of purpose amongst civilian sections and in supporting effective joint action with mission uniformed components at the field level. Mission Support Division Mission support is an integral actor in ensuring effective POC response. Inclusion of mission support is essential to effective POC coordination, starting from initial strategic planning. Throughout the study, mission support colleagues noted the importance of communicating the relative priority of POC-related tasks. This highlights the value of having an overarching POC strategy and the continued review of POC issues by senior mission leadership, including clarifying for mission support the importance of emerging POC issues. The presence of representatives from the Joint Logistics Operations Centre (JLOC) at other cross-component coordination forums, such as operational planning groups, was also important. Lessons Identified: Mission Support personnel highlighted the importance of clear guidance and priority-setting from mission leadership on the use of mission assets. Where such guidance and priorities were clear, mission actors within and outside of the Support Component felt that POC-related activities ran more smoothly. The presence of Mission Support actors, such as JLOC or (DMS at higher levels), in POC discussions frequently facilitated POC planning and operations. Preventive and responsive action on POC often requires the deployment of civilian or military staff, the use of air assets, and other steps with mission support implications. 61 Comparative Study and Toolkit TOOLKIT

68 Tool 4: Sample Terms of Reference for POC Coordination Forums Senior Management Level (Headquarters) Participation:»» Chair: SRSG/HOM is strongly preferred, as only the SRSG/HOM is capable of directing all mission components at the missionstrategic level.»» Attendees: Senior Management Group members (DSRSGs, COS, DMS, FC, PC), relevant heads of Political Affairs, Human Rights, Civil Affairs, JMAC, JOC. Forum should have a foundation of senior expertise but be small enough for confidential discussion.»» Partners: Participation by Country (or Regional) Directors of UNHCR and OCHA (possibly others) is encouraged to ensure that key humanitarian actors understand and can contribute to POCrelated policy decisions. TOOLKIT 62 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms»» Secretariat: Select members of the Senior Working Level (may include the POC Adviser or a group of POC focal points from different sections/offices) Function: Ensures the overall implementation of the strategy, makes POC policy decisions, determines POC issues to be raised at the national level; generates recommendations for advocacy by the Mission leadership, responses to threats that have been raised by the Senior Working Level; reviews progress towards the mission s implementation of the POC strategy; makes decisions on conditionality against national commanders or units, as per the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy. Meets monthly. Senior Working Level (Headquarters) Participation: Chair: May vary depending on the seniority of the group. The Senior Working Level group should be able to devote significant time to technical issues (e.g., the POC Adviser, Force Chief of Staff/ Chief of Operations, Chief of JOC/JMAC or Chief of another section); a high-level (e.g., DSRSG) chair may be advisable to facilitate cross-component decision-making, however. Attendees: As above, may vary, but chief or deputy chief may be appropriate. Senior Working Level may bring together a broader group,

69 including representatives from the Senior Leadership Level as well as Women Protection Advisers, DDR, SSR, ROL Child Protection, Gender, HIV/AIDS Section, UNDSS. The military and police should definitely be represented.»» Partners: OCHA, UNHCR, Protection Cluster Coordinator, others as needed.»» Secretariat: Flexible. Function: Ensures implementation of decisions taken by the Senior Management Level, serves as advisory body to Senior Management; provides guidance to POC Working Groups at the field level on POC implementation; considers recommendations provided by the field POC Working Groups, forwards to Senior Management issues to be addressed by senior mission leadership, develops tools to assist mission components to perform POC tasks in a culturally sensitive manner, measures impact on POC implemented measures. Meets weekly or once every two weeks. Field Management Level (Regional/ State/ Sector Offices) Participation:»» Chair: May be jointly chaired by civilian and military heads (Head of Office and Brigade/Battalion/Company Commander). Joint chairing allows for civilians and military to maintain separate chains of command while still reaching decisions together.»» Attendees: UNPOL and UNMO Commanders, CA, HR, DDR, ROL, Mission Support, UNDSS, other sections as required.»» Partners: May vary depending on the field site. In some locations, non-un partners such as NGOs may be suitable.»» Secretariat: To be determined by HOO. Function: Makes decisions on operational responses to threats against civilians at the local level; identifies, reviews, analyses and prioritises POC local threats to inform the Senior Management Level of (a) issues requiring national level attention and (b) actions taken at the local level to address them; ensures that a community-based approach applies to POC activities, including through the establishment of a local early warning system; reports to and makes policy recommendations to the Senior Management Level on POC for further Senior Management consideration; ensures that the POC Strategy is operationalised through the plans of the military, police, and substantive components. Meets weekly or once every two weeks. 63 Comparative Study and Toolkit TOOLKIT

70 Tactical Level (to be aligned with field structure) Participation: Structure of the Field Management Level forums should be maintained to the degree possible, with as many components represented as possible. At the Tactical Level, it is important to ensure that information is being shared between components: Higher offices should not be receiving extremely different accounts of the same incident merely because one report comes from a civilian staff member and another from a military officer; these differences, to the degree possible, should be ironed out at the tactical level. At this level, it is also important to develop a common understanding of each component s role and their operational plans, whether that means conducting patrols or reaching out to communities. 64 Function: Makes decisions on operational responses to threats against civilians at the local level; identifies, reviews, analyses and prioritises POC local threats to inform the Field Management Level of (a) issues requiring national level attention and (b) actions taken at the local level to address them; ensures that a community-based approach applies to POC activities, including through the implementation of local aspects of the early warning system; reports to and makes policy recommendations to the Field Management Level on POC for further consideration; ensures that the POC Strategy is operationalised through the plans of the military, police, and substantive components. Meets weekly or once every two weeks, or may be combined with other regular meetings. TOOLKIT PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms

71 UN Photo/Albert Gonzalez Farran VIII. ANNEX: METHOD 65 The findings of the study are based upon more than one hundred and fifty interviews with mission and headquarters staff, representing all mission components and all levels of mission management, as well as desk reviews. The humanitarian and non-un protection community have also been widely consulted, with interviews conducted with Protection Cluster members in all countries visited and drafts of this consulted with OCHA, UNHCR, and OHCHR. As noted in the introduction, the study team visited five missions (MINUSTAH, MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNISFA, and UNMISS), with at least two weeks spent in each mission (with the exceptions of UNISFA and MINUSTAH, which had shorter visits). At least two field locations were visited in each mission and, with the mission s support, eight field sites were accessed in MONUSCO. Combined with desk reviews of previous research (including the DPKO-OCHA Independent Study on Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping), past and current internal mission guidance (standard operating procedures, terms of reference), and publicly available records (Security Council Resolutions, Secretary General s Reports), this provided a substantial body of information from which to draw conclusions. Comparative Study and Toolkit METHOD

72 METHOD 66 PROTECTION Coordination Mechanisms After preparing an initial draft of the report, the study team held a workshop in Entebbe, Uganda with civilian, military and police personnel from MONUSCO, UNAMID, UNIFIL, UNISFA, UNMIL, UNMISS and UNOCI. Representatives from New York took part as well, including staff from DPKO s Office of Operations, Office of Military Affairs and Police Division, as well as OCHA and OHCHR. This workshop provided an opportunity for POC practitioners from the field to review the report s initial findings, make recommendations or clarifications, further develop original ideas, and suggest ways to make the study a more practical tool. This study remains, however, part of an ongoing process to develop and improve missions POC implementation. Protection of Civilians in peacekeeping, like the field of humanitarian protection, remains a challenging area to evaluate. Many missions achieve POC successes through preventive action, resulting in the absence of violence against civilians but rarely leaving other measurable marks. Further, where missions respond proactively to protect civilians, simple metrics (number of patrols conducted, number of civilian casualties) are rarely useful indicators of a mission s POC performance. Monitoring, reporting, and evaluating mission s POC performance remains a topic of continued guidance development and interest from international partners. This study relied primarily on qualitative evaluations of missions POC activity, including reflections from current and former mission staff across all mission components and seniority levels, as well as UN and non-un partners who worked alongside the mission on related issues. When combined with structural assessments of the mission s POC implementation architecture (whether a stand-alone system or the incorporation of POC within the regular activities of mission components), the study team developed a substantial body of information upon which to draw its findings.

73 Cover photo: UN Photo/Logan Abassi Protection of Civilians Team Policy and Best Practices Service Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support Designed by the Graphic Design Unit, DPI, United Nations