COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA: FROM LA VIOLENCIA TO PLAN PATRIOTA. Román D. Ortiz Manager December 18, 2006

Transcription

1 COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA: FROM LA VIOLENCIA TO PLAN PATRIOTA Román D. Ortiz Manager December 18, 2006

2 Contents I. Colombia s Military Tradition. II. III. IV. Confronting La Violencia: The birth of Colombian Counterinsurgency style. Colombia s Modern Insurgents. The deficiencies of the Colombian style: the Lleras Doctrine. V. The deficiencies of the Colombian style: Looking for the decisive battle. VI. VII. Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine. Developing a nation-wide COIN capability. VIII. Conclusions.

3 Colombian Military Tradition - I Colombian Army was a very young institution: The army became truly national and a professional general staff was set up in the 1910 s. Scarce time and operational experience as unified structure and untested officer corps Organizational youth made it maleable to change. Colombia s military at the turn of the 20th century had limited experience in: Internal security operations: Bananeras strike supression, External defense: War with Perú over Leticia, 1932.

4 Colombian Military Tradition - II Military professionalization were carried out under de guidance of several Chilean military missions: Prussian tradition in the Army s organizational culture. Doctrinal influence of Jomini and Moltke: Victory through decisive battle.

5 Confronting La Violencia - I La Violencia was sparked by the assassination of liberal party leader Jorge Eliécer Gaitán on May 9th, Conservative Government success in restoring order in urban centers pushed radical liberal militants to the countryside, where they organized into guerrillas. The government s inability to put a stop to political violence set the stage for a bloodless coup by General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla in 1953.

6 Confronting La Violencia - III Rojas campaign combined for the first time in Colombia the key elements of counter-insurgency: Military: Operational concepts (cordon and search operations), Creation of irregular warfare training center. Army growth from to b/w 1950 and 1955, Police forces unification Creation of intelligence agency Economic and social assistance channeled to theaters of operation to erode the guerrillas social support. An amnesty offering for the guerrillas. Sectarian violence decreased significantly during the Rojas era.

7 Colombia s Modern Insurgents Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) founded in 1964 and inspired on Ernesto Guevara s Foco strategy. Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) founded in 1966 embraces the Vietnamese version of People s Warfare (Interlocking Warfare). Ejército de Liberación Popular (EPL) founded in 1968 followed the orthodox Maoist concept of People s War. Movimiento 19 de Abril (M-19A) founded in 1973 and based on Carlos Marighella s concept of urban guerrillas.

8 The deficiencies of the Colombian style: The Lleras Doctrine I In 1958, the newly-installed civilian government, under Alberto Lleras Camargo, put forth a new doctrine of civil-military relations: The military was not to interfere in civilian matters. Civilians were not to interfere in security issues. Though understandable given the recent transition from a military regime, the Lleras doctrine meant a great difficulty in implementing a counterinsurgency strategy understood as an integrated political-military effort. Templer: The shooting side of this business is only 25 per cent of the trouble and the other 75 per cent lies in getting the people of this country behind us.

9 The deficiencies of the Colombian style : The Lleras Doctrine II The Lleras doctrine caused the removal of General Alberto Ruiz Novoa from command of the military by president León Valencia in Ruiz Novoa had designed to implement a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy, the Plan Lazo, based on two principles: Need of resolving social grievances. Irregular warfare operational concepts.

10 The deficiencies of the Colombian style : The Lleras Doctrine III The Plan Lazo brought about a set of innovations. Military: Operational concepts ( area control ). Local intelligence networks. Small infantry units specialized in counter-guerrilla. Psychological operations. Social development: Social programs organized through a national civic-military action board with permanent regional branches.

11 The deficiencies of the Colombian style : Looking for the decisive battle I Near-impossibility of pursuing a comprehensive counterinsurgency campaign because of: Lleras Doctrine which blocked the possibility of a political military integrated strategy. The lack of resources to sustain a nation-wide campaign. The trend to search victory through a decisive battle following doctrinal principles based on Jomini and Moltke views of war.

12 The deficiencies of the Colombian style : Looking for the decisive battle II Given the near-impossibility of pursuing a comprehensive campaign, the military opted for the pursuit of tactical victories designed to provoke strategic consequences. Examples of this type of campaign were: Anori against the ELN in 1974 Cauca against the M-19A in the late 80 s

13 The deficiencies of the Colombian style : Looking for the decisive battle III Operation Anorí (1973): Based on massive troop deployments and intelligence gathering, the ELN suffered heavy casualties but a small group of guerrillas could escape and rebuild the organization. Military Campaign in Caquetá and Cauca (late 80 s): The army s presence in Caquetá, Cauca and Valle was strengthened through middle 80 s and eventually, military pressure forced the group to the negotiating table during Virgilio Barco administration ( ). Civilian negotiators did not use military pressure to their advantage and the military did not carry out its operations in support of ongoing negotiations.

14 The deficiencies of the Colombian style : Looking for the decisive battle IV Anorí in 1973 and Cauca-Caquetá in the late 80 s demonstrated the two main limitations: Lack of an integrated political-military strategy. Military s inability to carry out sustained, national-level operations. Both campaigns bore results in good measure because the insurgents were concentrated in limited geographical areas, allowing the military to locate them and destroy them. When the insurgents put into practice a nation-wide strategy, the military proved unable to deliver significant successes.

15 Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - I Changes in civilian-military relations in the early 90 s. New Constitution drafted in 1991: Money earmarked for social spending and new wave of decentralization limited government ability to develop integrated security strategy. Restoration of government legitimacy and democratic credibility.

16 Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - II Civilian appointed as Minister of Defense: Opened possibility for effective civil-military coordination. Improved resource management. Pushed forth joint operational capabilities. Elaboration of a national pacification strategy (Estrategia Nacional Contra la Violencia, ENCV ): Policy framework that integrated political measures, civic action programs, counter-finance measures and military efforts to pacify the country.

17 Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - III Successful campaign against the EPL. The Army launched a successful operation against EPL in Córdoba. The government could negotiate in a strong position as a consequence of the military weakening of the EPL. Better coordination of military pressure and political negotiation got a demobilization agreement with the EPL in The military s success had much to do with the insurgents concentration of their forces in a limited area. The military continued showing two limitations: It lacked the ability to conduct a sustained, national-level campaign. The government still lacked the ability to consolidate its control over cleared areas.

18 Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - IV The civil-military relations crisis under Samper administration. Weakness of the president under accusations of corruption. Attempt of a sector of military to reverse the increase of civilian control in the elaboration and execution of the security strategy. The strategic leap of FARC to mobile warfare and the chain of defeats suffered by the Army in the Southeast weak the political clout of Military. The Military fails to regain a dominant influence on the elaboration and execution of the security policy.

19 Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - V The Pastrana administration: the Lleras Doctrine in geographical mode. Pastrana government consider military pressure and political negotiations as excluding alternatives instead of complementary tools to deal with guerrillas. Pastrana administration is skeptical about the ability of military to defeat guerrillas. President Pastrana guarantee to FARC a km2 safe heaven in El Caguan as stage for negotiations. Free-hand is given to military to act in the rest of the country, if the operations don t interfere in the peace process. A geographical mode of the Lleras doctrine: Civilians make peace in El Caguan and military make war in the rest of the country.

20 Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - VI The Uribe administration: Toward a comprehensive pacification strategy. Strong leadership of the president on the security policy. Development of a comprehensive pacification program: Democratic Security and Defense Policy (Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática, PDSD). Increase of the role of civilians in the control of the defense budget and personal matters. Developing the political component of counterinsurgency: programs on demobilization of illegal combatants and civic action. Creation of civilian-military coordination bodies in matters as public information or civic action.

21 Overcoming the Lleras Doctrine - VI The remaining challenges in civilian-military relations. The empowerment of the Minister of Defense as a critical linchpin in the chain of command charged with the elaboration and control of the security policy. The empowerment of the Armed Forces General Command as the critical body for planning and execution of military operations. The development of Joint Territorial Commands The rationalization of the Ministry of Defense structure. The integration of military operations, civic action programs and public communication strategy at local level.

22 Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- I Developing a capability for offensive counterinsurgency operations under Gaviria administration. Intelligence gathering was upgraded from a battalion-level organization to a full brigade. Counter-guerrilla battalions were grouped into light infantry mobile brigades.

23 Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- II Stagnation in the development of counterinsurgent capabilities under the Samper government: The US-Colombia military cooperation is paralyzed after the scandal provoked by the infiltration of drug money in the Samper presidential campaign. The Colombian National Police reduces its presence in the rural areas under the increasing pressure of the guerrilla. Security crisis provoked by a chain of mobile warfare operations launched by FARC. Limited steps for military modernization: Creation of the Army s Aviation Brigade. Plans for professionalization of the Army.

24 Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- III The Pastrana Administration: Developing nation-wide power projection tools Development of national plan to modernize military capabilities to confront FARC mobile warfare operations. Reforms were bounded to detect large guerrilla concentrations and counter them. US cooperation was increased through the military component of the Washington-Bogota cooperation scheme Plan Colombia.

25 Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- IV Main steps in military modernization during Pastrana administration: Significant upgrades in intelligence (SIGINT and IMINT technical systems acquired). Personnel structure reformed (volunteer force increased from a few thousand to by 2002). Creation of a division-size rapid deployment force called FUDRA (Fuerza de Despliegue Rápido). Creation of new Mountain Battalions to control highland strategic point. Launching of a program to increase road security called Plan Meteoro. Launching of regional search and destroy operations as Gato Negro or Berlin in 2001.

26 Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- VI The Uribe administration: Looking for capabilities to hold after clearing Not many conceptual innovations per se, but better organization and more resources for existing ideas Principle of area control considered as critical to defeat guerrillas and applied in key strategic areas of the country (Cundinamarca, Antioquia) But the geographical scope of the country makes impossible a systematic application of the area control concept all over the national territory. The strategic culture of the Colombian military incentives the search of a decisive battle to get a quick victory.

27 Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- VI Main military modernization steps under Uribe administration: Meaningful increase of the armed forces size. Deployment of National Police detachments in all Colombian Municipalities. Creation of the detachments of Peasant Soldiers (Saldados Campesinos) as local security forces. Increase of the number of Mobile Brigades and Mountain Battalions. Increase of the air support and air mobility assets (helicopters and turboprop aircrafts).

28 Developing a nation-wide COIN capability- VI Launching of an offensive against the strategic rearguard of FARC using a division-size formation ( soldiers) called TF Omega. The goal is to draw FARC into a decisive battle where the Army could destroy the guerrilla main force. But FARC elude the battle, abandon logistical infrastructure and redeployed its units in other parts of the country avoiding complete destruction. In this sense, FARC avoid a frontal confrontation following the principles of prolonged people s warfare.

29 Conclusions I In the case of Colombia, the development of a COIN strategy demanded: The integration of military, political and social program under civilian leadership. The amassing of resources to be able to develop sustained nation-wide operations. To evolve from a strategy based on the search of decisive encounters designed to defeat insurgents to a model of continuous politicalmilitary attrition (a war without battles).

30 Conclusions II Colombia resolved the two first issues during the 90 s and given meaningful steps in the direction of developing a strategy of political-military attrition to defeat guerrillas. But political imperatives and strategic culture have maintained a trend to search victory through a decisive battle. Defeating guerrillas particularly FARC- demands an approach focus on the long term political-military attrition of insurgents Finally, this kind of cultural change are the most difficult to perform in Army but also the most important.

31 COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN COLOMBIA: FROM LA VIOLENCIA TO PLAN PATRIOTA Román D. Ortiz Manager December 18, 2006