Standards of Response Cover Study for the Butte County Fire Department

Transcription

1 Folsom (Sacramento), CA Management Consultants Standards of Response Cover Study for the Butte County Fire Department Volume 1 of 3 Main Report November 30, East Bidwell St., Ste #100 Folsom, CA (916) Fax: (916)

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3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page VOLUME 1 of 3 Main Report (this volume) Executive Summary... 1 Policy Choices Framework... 1 Citygate s Overall Perspective on the State of Butte County s Fire Services... 2 Main Challenges... 3 Challenge 1: Field Operations Deployment (Fire Stations)... 3 Challenge 2: Volunteer Fire Services... 7 Challenge 3: Administrative and Headquarters Support Services... 9 Master Plan Phasing and Costs Priority One Priority Two On-Going Proposed Priority Plan with Costs Concluding Thoughts Section 1 Introduction and Background Report Organization Background Butte County Project Approach and Research Methods Butte Fire Department Background Information Newer Legal Changes and Challenges to the Provision of Fire Services Negative Pressures on Volunteer-based Fire Services Section 2 Standards of Response Cover (Deployment) Analysis General Fire Deployment Background Information Butte County Outcome Expectations What is Expected of the Fire Department? Butte County Community Risk Assessment Building Fire Risk Special Hazard Risks Desired Outcomes Table of Contents page i

4 2.4 Staffing What Must Be Done Over What Timeframe to Achieve the Stated Outcome Expectation? Offensive vs. Defensive Strategies in Structure Fires Based on Risk Presented National Deployment Best Practice Recommendations Staffing in the Butte County Fire Department Staffing Discussion Crew Critical Task Time Measures Critical Task Measures Evaluation Current Station Location Configurations Proposed Station Location Configurations Mapping Measures Evaluation Current Workload Statistics Summary Incident Types Department Response Times Response Time Component Measurements Simultaneous Call Measurements Volunteer Company Response Time Analysis Total Response and Travel Time Response Time Statistics Discussion Timing of Fire Stations and Staffing Strategies Suburban Structure Fire Greater than 1,000 People per Square Mile Emerging Suburban Structure Fire 500 to 1000 People per Square Mile Rural Structure Fire Less than 500 People per Square Mile Wildfire/Specialty Populated Areas Wildfire/Specialty Remote and Wilderness Areas Casino Impacts Field Deployment Command and Control (Battalion Chiefs) Integrated Fire Station Deployment Recommendations Section 3 Volunteer Program and Administrative Support Review for Field Deployment Volunteer System Background Table of Contents page ii

5 3.2 Volunteer System Observations and Findings Volunteer Occupational Safety and Health Volunteer Fire Company Recommendations Section 4 Administrative Support for Field Deployment Management Team Organization and Duties Fire Department Level Finance Systems Fire Department Internal Personnel Administration Facility Maintenance Apparatus and Equipment Readiness Pre-Incident Plans Special Operations Responses Training Systems Dispatch System Section 5 Fiscal Analysis Costing of Added Services Component Costs Personnel Fiscal Impacts Discussion Section 6 Recommended Solutions and Phasing Plan Integrated Deployment Plan Findings and Recommendations Volunteer Findings and Recommendations Administrative Support System Findings and Recommendations Priorities and Timing Priority One Priority Two On-Going Proposed Priority Plan with Costs VOLUME 2 of 3 Map Atlas (separately bound) VOLUME 3 of 3 Statistical Appendix (separately bound) Table of Contents page iii

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7 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Butte County Fire Department retained Citygate Associates, LLC to conduct a Standard of Response Cover planning analysis (fire station and crew deployment study) along with a review of the Volunteer Fire Company program and the resultant headquarters support functions for these program areas. This comprehensive study is presented in several sections including: this Executive Summary summarizing the most important findings and recommendations; the deployment analysis supported by maps and response statistics; the volunteer programs and supportive administrative functions review. The final section integrates all of the findings and recommendations presented throughout the report and concludes with priorities and macro fiscal impacts. Planning for the Butte County Fire Department (Department) involves two stages of effort: (1) a short-range plan that addresses current service delivery needs in light of the County s economic situation; and (2) a longer range plan that addresses fire services delivery as the County continues to evolve. Thus, Citygate made recommendations and designed solutions that will maintain the Fire Department s capabilities in the near term while providing a firm foundation upon which the Department can evolve over the longer term. Due to the contract-for-service partnership with CAL FIRE, Butte County has a blended staffing plan that takes cost-effective advantage of four methods of providing and paying for firefighters: 1. Butte County, Biggs and Gridley contract with CAL FIRE for career firefighters assigned to thirteen (13) year-round units spaced in twelve (12) fire stations across the more densely populated areas of the County; 2. Butte County contracts for additional staffing in six (6) units by holding over some fire season CAL FIRE personnel during the wintertime (called an Amador Contract). Under this contract the staffing cost of the unit is shared by the County and CAL FIRE; 3. CAL FIRE staffs sixteen (16) fire season units, including the six (6) mentioned above; 4. Butte County has nineteen (19) volunteer fire companies. POLICY CHOICES FRAMEWORK First, the Butte County leadership must understand there are no mandatory federal or state regulations directing the level of fire service response times and outcomes. Thus, communities have the level of fire services that they can afford, which is not always what they would desire. However, the body of regulations on the fire service provides that if fire services are provided at all, they must be done so with the safety of the firefighters and citizens in mind (see regulatory discussion on page 19). Given this situation, the overall challenge for Butte County is to design fire services within the fiscal constraints that limit its ability to staff, train and equip a safe and Executive Summary page 1

8 effective fire/medical response force in a community experiencing slow growth and negative pressures on operating volunteer fire services. CITYGATE S OVERALL PERSPECTIVE ON THE STATE OF BUTTE COUNTY S FIRE SERVICES In brief, Citygate finds that the challenge of providing fire services in Butte County is similar to that found in many California counties: providing an adequate level of fire services within the context of limited fiscal resources, competing needs, growing populations and uncertainty surrounding the exact timing of future development. Citygate evaluated several aspects of the Department during the preparation of this deployment study and volunteer program review and three critical challenges for Butte emerged. To address these challenges, there are other findings and recommendations that deserve specific and particular consideration. Finally, the remainder of the recommendations only requires the regular, ongoing attention they currently receive. Throughout this report, Citygate makes observations, key findings and, where appropriate, specific action item recommendations. Starting in Section 6 on page 107, all the findings and recommendations are presented together, in order. Overall, there are 40 key findings and 14 specific action item recommendations. It needs to be stated at the front of this study that Citygate Associates team members who spent time in Butte found the fire staff at all levels very cooperative and helpful. They are committed to their county, agency, and mission. Given the struggle to keep pace in the Department and County to cope with tight revenues, there is pride and on-going effort to deliver the best customer service with the currently available resources. Fires are being attended to with successful outcomes and medical calls are being answered with excellent patient care. It is imperative that the reader of this study understands that while there are issues to be planned for and improved upon in the Department, there is not a problematic, won t do it, can t do it culture to be overcome. Both the career and volunteer staff are always willing to work going forward to improve their department. Overall, there is one large policy issue weaving through several findings and recommendations that the County and Fire Department leaders need to deal with. Briefly stated, it is inconsistent fiscal support to the Volunteer Fire Company program. This is a result of decades of differing County policy or lack of clear policy governing the fiscal support for volunteer stations, apparatus and equipment. Also, in recent years, the ability for the volunteer fire companies to raise sufficient funds by themselves to safely operate is increasingly limited, and very different by company areas. In 2007 there exists a mixture of County and volunteer ownership of the facilities and some equipment. This presents increasing concern to Citygate as to County liability and responsibility should safety standards not be met. The County has, to a large extent, already become responsible for the volunteer fire companies, considering them as County volunteers and funding many, but not all aspects of volunteer fire services. Presently, the relationship is really a loose partnership and differs by volunteer area. Given the significant service the volunteers provide the County with just their time to a dangerous occupation, the declining ability to fund raise even to minimum levels, and the Executive Summary page 2

9 increasing expense of providing fire service due to safety mandates, Citygate suggests the County: Identify the full cost of supporting the technical needs of the volunteer companies to a baseline level; Set forth policy providing clear direction on the provision of volunteer fire services; Phase complete fiscal responsibility for volunteer fire services in over the years as revenue allows. In this Executive Summary, instead of citing all the findings and recommendations, Citygate will highlight the most critical ones across three challenges: MAIN CHALLENGES One can summarize the fire service challenges that face Butte County in three challenges: insufficient revenue for deployment of more fire stations and firefighters; negative pressures on volunteer fire services; and insufficient headquarters and or fiscal support in certain areas. Because of slow growth of revenue over the past decade due to recessions and state revenue policies towards the counties, the Department has not been able to add as many career staffed resources as would be desirable, nor fully support the costs of totally absorbing the cost of the volunteer fire company operations. At the same time, the volunteer organizations are undergoing some significant challenges. Challenge 1: Field Operations Deployment (Fire Stations) Fire department deployment, simply stated, is about the speed and weight of the attack. Speed calls for first-due, all risk intervention units (engines, trucks and ambulance companies) strategically located across a department. These units are tasked with controlling everyday average emergencies without the incident escalating to second alarm or greater size, which then unnecessarily depletes the department s units and personnel as multiple requests for service occur. Weight is about multiple-unit response for significant emergencies like a room and contents structure fire, a multiple-patient incident, a traffic collision with extrication required, or a complex rescue or wildfire incident. In these situations, departments must assemble enough firefighters in a reasonable period in order to control the emergency safely without it escalating to greater alarms. In Section 2 of this study, Standards of Cover (Deployment) Analysis, Citygate s analysis of prior response statistics and use of geographic mapping tools reveals that Butte County has a weight of attack problem. There are not enough total on-duty firefighters to handle more than two serious fire events or several less serious emergencies at once, particularly if the volunteers cannot provide an immediate response to fill out the necessary staffing. In addition, while there are fire stations in the more populated areas, overall, given the light staffing at each station, serious emergency multiple-unit support must come from great distances. To partially offset this, the County has contracted fire services with CAL FIRE, which also operates year-round and fire season fire stations. This co-joined administrative and field deployment operation is cost effective to the County taxpayer. A totally separate County fire Executive Summary page 3

10 department would require more overhead personnel and logistical support functions such as a dispatch center. In a CAL FIRE contract, many of the overhead positions and support costs are expensed to both the County needs and the broader CAL FIRE wildfire mission. Given CAL FIRE s resources in the County, especially during fire season, however likely, gives the County leadership a false sense of security that there are a lot of firefighters available. The reality is that CAL FIRE firefighters can be deployed anywhere on wildfires, and until backfilled with other resources, the structure firefighting ability of the remaining Butte County force is marginal for anything more than a small one-room fire in a single-family residence. The maps in Volume 2 and the corresponding text explanation beginning on page 42 of this volume show that Butte County is staffed for two serious fire events at a time or several emergency medical calls for service. This model has served the community well over its growing years, but is now increasingly strained to handle more than one serious event and to provide equitable coverage in all of the suburban population density neighborhoods. The County is no longer a quiet farming and recreational only area. Butte County should grow its fire defenses commensurate with the risk and call-for-service growth. Summarized in priority order, Butte has two fire deployment deficits that need improvement: 1. There are not enough career firefighters on duty on all engines to provide the weight of response to serious and/or multiple emergencies since the volunteer response is uncertain. 2. The career County dedicated stations in and near the suburban population areas with 500 people per square mile and greater should have their staffing increased to 3 firefighters per day year-round as soon as revenue allows. Citygate s recommendations are designed to improve these issues as fiscal resources allow. By increasing staffing on the current number of career companies, there will be more firefighters and more fire attack units on the street. More attack units are achieved without adding more engines. With more staffing per crew, it is less likely that moderate emergencies will draw in more understaffed units to make up an effective response force. This leaves more uncommitted engines for simultaneous emergencies. The County needs to adopt two service level measures for its fire services suburban and rural. While it makes sense that many of the rural residents know and accept the fact they moved out beyond the reach of urban fire, police and ambulance services, the reality is many do not. Increasingly, many residents are newcomers from urban areas and/or only reside in the County part-time in second homes. Yet the County has a mix of pockets of higher density population where at least suburban levels of fire service make sense given the risks present. To make a cost effective allocation of resources, Citygate recommends Butte County adopt two service goals that are sensitive to these differences so the public knows what to expect from their tax dollar. Thus, Citygate s key deployment findings and recommendations are summarized below. For reference purposes, the findings and recommendation numbers refer to the sequential numbers in the main body of the report. Note that not all findings and recommendations that appear in this report are listed in this Executive Summary. Finding #1: The County lacks a Board of Supervisors directed fire deployment measure that includes a complete response time measure definition starting at the time of call receipt at 911, plus risk and outcome expectations. The deployment measure Executive Summary page 4

11 should have a second part to define multiple-unit response coverage for serious emergencies. Making these changes will meet the best practice recommendations of the Commission on Fire Accreditation International and drive future policy decisions on the level and costs of fire services. Finding #2: With minimum staffing of only two firefighters on all thirteen County dedicated year-round units, the tactical work that any one unit can do is very limited. This can be seen in the slow critical task completion times. On serious emergencies this draws in more units to make up an effective response force. This is costly for two reasons: (1) it drains more units than necessary; and (2) the farther out units do not have a timely response. The more typical staffing for suburban population density areas of the County would be three firefighters responding on an engine. Finding #3: With only 26 to 38 County dedicated line career firefighters on duty plus volunteers and fire season CAL FIRE firefighters and two chief officers as incident commanders, the County s response system is spread thin and does not have the weight of response in all the areas that already contain over 500 people per square mile. Yes, there are also the additional CAL FIRE specific wildfire units during fire season, and although they respond when available, they are not dedicated to County structure fires and medical calls. Finding #4: Finding #7: The mapping analysis overall for the 4-minute travel time area for career fire crew staffing and the 10/14-minute volunteer travel time maps demonstrate that the basic fire station locations themselves are good in that they cover most of the more built-up road network in the County. However, as the critical tasking section of this report points out, fire stations do not put out fires or handle medical emergencies -- firefighters do. The area north and west of Chico is too large for a single fire station. It would be better to re-locate old Station #41 and add a station west of Chico as Map #19 measured. Likewise, Station #44 could be further south of Chico, outside the city to serve County residents. Finding #8: Multiple-unit coverage is thin in Biggs, Gridley, and Upper Ridge due to the single-station coverage and the distances between stations. Finding #12: The shortage of battalion chiefs, due in part to the high incident workload of the County operation and due in part to a state mandated change in the battalion chief workweek, produces a situation where neither the required administrative or operational supervision occurs as it should. Finding #13: Having an insufficient number of field battalion chiefs can have serious consequences to oversight at emergencies. This also affects the relationship between the career and volunteer firefighters. Finding #14: Improving the field battalion chief staffing would be an opportunity to make serious inroads into fixing the issues affecting the volunteers. Executive Summary page 5

12 Citygate s deployment recommendations are designed to improve these issues. As the phasing section of this report explains in detail in Section 6, achieving improved fire station coverage in Butte County will take even more time and fiscal resources than the County immediately has. However, it must be understood that not all areas today receive an equal opportunity (not guaranteed, due to prior emergencies, etc.) of a timely fire response. The County needs to address this situation as it continues to slowly grow. Based on the above findings and observations, Citygate makes the following field deployment recommendations to Butte County: Recommendation #1: The County should adopt revised fire unit deployment performance measures based on population density zones to direct fire station location and crew size planning. The measures should take into account a realistic crew turnout time of 2 minutes and be designed to deliver outcomes that will save patients medically salvageable upon arrival; and to keep small, but serious fires from becoming greater alarm fires. Citygate recommends these measures be: 1.1 Distribution of Fire Stations for Built-up Suburban Areas of Greater than 1,000 People per Square Mile: To treat and transport medical patients and control small fires, the first-due unit should arrive within 7 minutes, 90 percent of the time from the receipt of the 911 call. This equates to 1-minute dispatch time, 2 minutes crew turnout time and 4 minutes travel time spacing for single units. 1.2 Effective Response Force for Built-up Suburban Areas of Greater than 1,000 People per Square Mile: To confine fires near the room of origin, to stop wildfires to under 5 acres when noticed promptly and to treat up to 5 medical patients at once, a multipleunit response of at least 15 personnel should arrive within 11 minutes from the time of 911 call receipt, 90 percent of the time. This equates to 1-minute dispatch time, 2 minutes crew turnout time and 8 minutes travel time spacing for multiple units. 1.3 Emerging suburban areas of 500 to 1,000 people per square mile should have first-due fire unit travel time coverage of 10 minutes; for rural areas this should be 14 minutes. Emerging suburban areas should receive the full first alarm within 18 minutes from the 911 call. Recommendation #2: Butte County should adopt fire deployment measures for different service areas based on population density per square mile ranging from rural to emerging suburban to wildfire based, along the lines proposed in this table, which are consistent with national recommendations as discussed earlier in this section of the report: Executive Summary page 6

13 Citygate s Proposed Deployment Measures Based on Butte Population Densities Structure Fire Suburban/ Urban Area Structure Fire Emerging Suburban Area Structure Fire Rural Area Wildfires Populated Areas Remote Areas* >1,000 people/sq. mi ,000 people/sq. mi. <500 people/sq. mi. Permanent open space areas 1 st Due Travel Time Total Reflex Time st Alarm Travel Time st Alarm Total Reflex *CAL FIRE or Forest Service Responsibility Lands Recommendation #3: Recommendation #4: The County should increase the staffing on the year-round units staffed with only two firefighters to 3 firefighters to improve initial attack and first alarm effectiveness. The County cannot continue to be so heavily dependent on fire season CAL FIRE crews and/or the volunteers who are not always immediately available. Given population density, risks and calls for service volumes, Citygate recommends this priority order for increasing staffing: 1. Station #72 Palermo 2. Station #64 Kelly Ridge 3. Station #41 Nord 4. Station #33 Magilia 5. Station #73 Biggs 6. Station #42 North Chico 7. Station #44 South Chico 8. The remaining stations based on funding and call-for-service levels. When funding is available, consider the County funding two additional field battalion chief positions. This would be in line with the CAL FIRE deployment measures and greatly reduce the reliance upon staff battalion chiefs for line assignments. Thus both field supervision and administrative program management is improved. Challenge 2: Volunteer Fire Services This report and study effort will point out the significant challenges the volunteer fire company officers and the County face in fielding an available, safe and well-trained force under today s very strict state and federal regulations on firefighting. These regulations, when combined with an increasingly two-income commuter-based economy, second home residents, and more Executive Summary page 7

14 acreage converting to viticulture, means the quantity of available volunteers is rapidly diminishing. The County cannot afford to provide fire services without volunteers, nor can it afford to lose them over partial, inadequate support and regulatory liability issues. The era of operating simple volunteer fire services via local fundraisers is drawing to a close given the expensive and technical nature of the modern fire service. For the overall volunteer firefighter program, Citygate s key findings are: Finding #17: There is incomplete integration of the volunteers into the fabric of the organization and incomplete integration of the career staff into the volunteer organization. This then disconnects the roles and responsibilities of the volunteer staff and the career staff in some locations and circumstances. Finding #18: There is a need for a comprehensive recognition program for the volunteer firefighters that includes safety apparel, uniforms, service awards, identification cards, and other means. Finding #19: The County financial support of the volunteers is incomplete, and has grown over time without a plan or end point. As such, there is limited coordination of County budgeted items, volunteer fund raising and program needs. Finding #22: Citygate finds that some of the volunteers do not fully comprehend the full implications of the legal mandates for training and certification, nor the liability that it places on the fire chief and County. Finding #23: While some safety program requirements are being complied with in the volunteer fire companies, there is limited safety orientation and training beyond that required for new volunteer firefighters. Finding #24: There is an underlying assumption that the CAL FIRE safety program will incorporate the volunteers; while this is true, it needs clearer articulation through the officer training program of both volunteer and career officers. Finding #25: The volunteer system does, can, and will work going forward where people can be found with the time to give to training as well as emergency responses from work and home. Finding #26: The volunteer command, control and fiscal support system needs a complete overhaul into one integrated department that makes the volunteers wholly part of the Butte County Fire Department. To address these and other related findings, Citygate recommends: Recommendation #5: The fire chief should consider a series of facilitated workshops to listen to the volunteer officers and develop a list of needs, develop an ongoing process of working on those needs and commit to additional workshops as needed to maintain dialogue and momentum. Executive Summary page 8

15 Recommendation #6: Recommendation #7: Recommendation #8: Volunteer-owned stations and equipment are a source of pride and consternation to the volunteers. The County needs to develop a system to pay for the maintenance, repair, and replacement costs of these facilities and equipment. The County needs to establish a program to evaluate the stations and equipment currently in volunteer control, develop a method of cost of absorption as County property, and assume responsibility for maintenance and replacement over a reasonable timeline. After completion of the survey, the County needs to develop a County-funded capital improvement program to rehabilitate, remodel, upgrade, or replace the volunteer-owned fire stations. When funding is available, consider establishing a division or battalion chief position to support the volunteer program and provide clear lines of communication between the volunteers and the fire chief. A revised organizational system should integrate the volunteer firefighters into a system that values and has a deep appreciation for, understanding of, and true support for the 184 volunteers; they cannot be treated as a secondary system to wither away. Challenge 3: Administrative and Headquarters Support Services The County has a contract relationship with CAL FIRE as its fire services contractor. The County benefits from the depth of resources that CAL FIRE can provide and the joint use of fire season units. Additionally, CAL FIRE does not charge the full cost of all overhead personnel to local government contracts, as these positions are cost shared between the broader area CAL FIRE mission and the local area County contract. However, the Butte County Fire side of the partnership faces headquarters support challenges resulting from integration of the volunteerstaffed system with the career-staffed portion of the Butte County Fire Department. Combination fire departments all face these same challenges to a greater or lesser extent depending on their history, geography, culture, and most importantly, the funding support from the jurisdiction. Butte County needs to address each of these challenges to have an effective and safe fire department operation. To a lesser extent, these challenges are the products of the dramatic changes that have come over the fire service in the last decade from increases in regulation. For the overall headquarters support program, Citygate s key findings are: Finding #29: The volunteer program needs logistical and clerical support on the weekends when the volunteers have time to take care of their own needs. Finding #30: The County does not have a clear policy on absorbing the cost of the volunteer stations. Some of the volunteer-owned stations need roof replacements and other expensive repairs, or will very soon. Executive Summary page 9

16 Finding #31: The College Training Facility is adequate to meet the Department s needs for now; having a staffed station to protect the college and cooperate with the fire protection training and education program of the college would enhance both operations. Finding #32: The Butte County Fire Department does not have an adequate repair shop. The shop is inadequate to handle this size fleet. It lacks floor space, lifts, specialized equipment and overhead height. With the huge investment in apparatus and the need to properly maintain it, this is an essential component of the Fire Department s facility program. Included in the shop should be a fire pump test pit; this is an essential component. Finding #34: There is not a volunteer firefighter training program with progressions through the various levels: firefighter, driver operator, officer, and chief officer. Under AB 1127, this program should mirror the development program for career staff wherever there is a mandatory requirement. Finding #39: The Emergency Command Center (ECC) staffing with at times more than one Fire Captain on-duty, may not be as cost effective as having one Captain as a supervisor (not directly dispatching) and adding at least four more communication operator positions spread across the shifts. This would seem more cost and work assignment effective. This will require more detailed study and input from the ECC staff. To address these and other related findings, Citygate recommends: Recommendation #10: Recommendation #11: Recommendation #12: Recommendation #13: The County should consider funding the fire station at the college location. The County should establish a clear policy for absorbing the cost of the remaining volunteer stations over a reasonable time as funding permits. The County needs to program funding jointly with CAL FIRE to replace the fire apparatus repair function under one roof. This should be a shop that will meet the needs of both departments now and in the future. Butte County s fire officers, both career and volunteer, need to have career development training, mentoring plans, and the fiscal support for such training. This will ensure that they have the skill sets necessary to safely and effectively lead the Department. The training program, both volunteer and career, needs to be contemporary, robust, and deliver verifiable ongoing realistic training The training bureau needs an additional training officer to provide continuity and a robust program for the volunteer firefighters and the career force as well. Executive Summary page 10

17 13.2 The Butte County Fire Department needs to develop a cohesive training plan for the volunteer firefighters that mirrors the mandated requirements of the career staff; this is required by statute. This plan should include a career path oriented training plan and an initial task book type orientation/basic training program for applicants and new volunteers When a new volunteer completes the orientation task book, the fire chief should hold a badge pinning ceremony and mark the occasion with appropriate ceremony and publicity. Recommendation #14: An in-depth separate workload study should evaluate the need for additional technical and communications operator positions in the Emergency Command Center (ECC). It should be determined what the full count of dispatchers and supervisors should be and then ECC costs should be cost allocated on a per-call basis to the subscribing agency. MASTER PLAN PHASING AND COSTS Given the likely near-term growth, the following costs are estimated in current dollars to show the order of magnitude of what is ahead for Butte County s fire services in the near to mid term. While all the recommendations can be worked on in parallel and some will take several fiscal years both in time and funding, Citygate recommends the following priorities: Priority One Absorb the policy recommendations of this master deployment plan and adopt revised fire department performance measures to drive the location and timing of fire stations; The Board of Supervisors should make the policy decision on completely making the volunteers part of the County. If they do so, they can direct staff to work aggressively on an implementation plan with the volunteer company officers; County staff needs to further study the recommended needs for the additional battalion chief and volunteer program chief positions identified in this report; If the Board of Supervisors chooses to increase career year-round firefighter staffing on some or all of the 2-firefighter units, the Board can direct staff to prepare a final cost and timeline plan; County staff can assess the cost of absorbing the volunteer fire companies and remaining mobile and real property as County assets; When the volunteer conversion plan, its costs and the recommended headquarters positions are fully understood, staff can make the appropriate budget requests; County staff can further review the staffing needs of the fire dispatch center and, as appropriate, request additional positions. Executive Summary page 11

18 Priority Two On-Going Add the resources as directed by the Board of Supervisors; Continue to implement the volunteer program conversion plan; Continue to program the resources for the replacement of fire stations and the fleet repair facility. Continue to add personnel per the master plan as fiscal resources allow. Proposed Priority Plan with Costs If the County decides to begin adding staff to the stations as recommended by Citygate, the table below provides an illustration or sample of how this might be phased in over several years and the associated annual estimated cost in FY 07/08 dollars. Any final phasing and costs per fiscal year cannot be prepared until after the Board sets forth the appropriate policy direction. Sample Priority Plan Priority Item Operating Cost Capital Cost One Detailed study and costing of Master Plan Recommendations Staff Time Two Increase Staffing to 3-FF on Three (3) Crews Add 3 rd position on the Gridley Ladder Truck (City of Gridley pays for 2 positions) Add Two County Funded Battalion Chiefs Add an Asst. Chief as Vol Fire Coord. $ 687,000 $ 229,000 $ 352,650 $ 183,704 Subtotal: $1,452,354 Assessment of Volunteer Stations and Immediate Repairs: $100,000 Increase Staffing to 3-FF on Three (3) Crews $ 687,000 Three Add CAD/RMS Specialist $ 94,094 Add a Training Captain $ 122,780 Subtotal: $ 903,874 Four Increase Staffing to 3-FF on Three (3) Crews $ 687,000 Five Increase Staffing to 3-FF on Three (3) Crews $ 687,000 Five Phase Totals: $3,730,228 $100,000 Concluding Thoughts With regard to Butte County s fire services, County residents need to know that they do have a caring, committed, fire department. However, it must continue to evolve with the changing demands for service, develop an appropriate distribution of fire stations, and maintain a viable volunteer force and a support organization adequate for the Department. The Department needs Executive Summary page 12

19 the support of the community to acquire the additional resources to perform emergency services in an equitable and timely manner for all the residents and visitors in Butte. The continuing long standing contract relationship with CAL FIRE should be continued. However, Butte residents and leaders have to understand the state resources are not present in the County to just protect Butte. The Butte County Fire Department has to develop its own capabilities, in addition to being cost effectively led by CAL FIRE staff. Executive Summary page 13

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21 SECTION 1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 1.1 REPORT ORGANIZATION This report and future planning document is structured into the following sections that group appropriate information together for the reader. This Volume (Volume 1) includes: Section 1 Introduction and Background: Background facts about Butte County s current fire services. Section 2 Standards of Response Cover (Deployment) Analysis: An in-depth examination of the Fire Department s deployment ability to meet the community s risks, expectations and emergency needs. Section 3 Volunteer Program Review: An assessment of the volunteer fire company organization. Section 4 Administrative Support for Field Deployment: A brief assessment of the Fire Department s non-emergency headquarters functions to support adequate field crew deployment and volunteer fire programs. Section 5 Fiscal Analysis: An outline of the costs of the deployment and volunteer program plan recommendations. Section 6 Recommended Solutions and Phasing Plan: An integrated findings, recommendations and suggested phasing section. Separately attached: Volume 2 Response Coverage Geographic Maps Volume 3 In-depth Response Statistics Appendix. As each of the sections mentioned above impart information, this report will cite findings and make recommendations, if appropriate, that relate to each finding. There is a sequential numbering of all of the findings and recommendations throughout the first four sections of this report. To provide a comprehensive summary, a complete ordered listing of all these same findings and recommendations is presented in Section 6. Finally, attention will be brought to the highest priority needs and possible timing of those needs. This document also provides technical information about how fire services are provided, legally regulated, and how the Butte County Fire Department currently operates. This information is presented in the form of recommendations and policy choices for the Butte County leadership and community to discuss. The result is a solid technical foundation upon which to understand the advantages and disadvantages of the choices facing the Butte County leadership and community on how best to provide fire services, and more specifically, at what level of desired outcome and expense. In the United States, there are no federal or state regulations on what a minimum level of fire services has to be. Each community, through the public policy process, is expected to Section 1 Introduction and Background page 15

22 understand the local fire risks, their ability to pay and then to choose their level of fire services. If fire services are provided at all, the federal and state regulations specify how to do it safely for the personnel involved. While this report and technical explanation can provide a framework for the discussion of fire services for Butte County, neither this report nor the Citygate consulting team can make the final decisions or cost out in detail every possible alternative. Once final deployment and volunteer program plan choices are given policy approval, staff can conduct any final costing and fiscal analysis. 1.2 BACKGROUND This project involved the development of a fire services deployment plan and volunteer program and resultant administrative services review. This effort involved the study of the fire services risk within the County of Butte. In this report, the term Department will be used when referring to the fire agency itself, and the term County will be used when referring to the County of Butte. The County commissioned this study and resultant planning recommendations to evaluate the current capacity of the Department to respond to emergency fire, rescue, and medical incidents within its area, review other related operational issues within the context of very limited revenue to support all service needs Countywide. In its entirety, this analysis and corresponding findings and recommendations will allow the Board of Supervisors to make informed policy decisions about the level of fire, rescue, and emergency medical services desired and the best method to deliver and fund them. The challenges facing the community and County leadership are not unique. Growing communities in California all face the dilemma of how to provide public safety services, while prior to the build-out of an area, there is usually not enough growth rate in General Fund revenue sources to build up fire services as fast as the community would prefer. 1.3 BUTTE COUNTY PROJECT APPROACH AND RESEARCH METHODS Citygate used several tools to gather, understand, and model information about the County and Fire Department for this study. We started by making a large document request to the Department to gain background information on costs, current and prior service levels, the history of service level decisions and what other prior studies, if any, had to say. In subsequent site visits, Citygate team members followed up on this information by conducting focused interviews of fire management team members and other appropriate County staff. We reviewed demographic information about the County, proposed developments, and managed growth projections. As we collected and understood information about the County and Department, Citygate obtained electronic map and response data from which to model current and projected fire services deployment. The goal was to identify the location(s) of stations and crew quantities required to serve the County as it evolves. Once Citygate gained an understanding of the Department service area with its fire, rescue, and EMS risks, the Citygate team developed a model of fire services that was tested against the mapping and prior response data to ensure an appropriate fit. This resulted in Citygate being Section 1 Introduction and Background page 16

23 able to propose an approach to improving fire services in the Department that would also meet reasonable expectations and fiscal abilities of the County. Once Citygate had a preliminary understanding of fire services in the County, we obtained questionnaire information from the volunteer company officers and career fire management staff. We then met with the volunteer company captains and had a meaningful listening session on their needs and the meaning of the emerging viewpoints of the Citygate team. 1.4 BUTTE FIRE DEPARTMENT BACKGROUND INFORMATION Butte County covers a total of 1,676 square miles of which 66 square miles are in the incorporated cities. The Butte County Fire Department provides protection for the unincorporated areas. Additionally, the cities of Biggs and Gridley contract with CAL FIRE for full firefighting services. As such, the CAL FIRE County Fire operation seamlessly integrates protection for these two contract cities with the unincorporated areas. The analysis sections of this study will review the County Fire Department operations as one integrated department for the combined unincorporated and contract city areas. Chico, Oroville and Paradise have separate fire departments, which coordinate closely with the Butte County Fire Department. There is also the El Medio Fire District that protects a small area south of Oroville. The total assessed valuation of real property is in excess of $13 billion dollars and the 2007 estimated population is 89,800 in the unincorporated areas plus another 1,769 in Biggs and 5,914 in Gridley. The population figure does not take into account the County s mobile population of visitors and employees. While, to date, growth in the County has been modest, there is rising interest as housing economic factors in the Sacramento basin push housing demand further into the outlaying counties. Under current zoning the County could see by 2030 its unincorporated population grow to 115,000. By 2030 Biggs could add another 2,000 residents and Gridley could double by adding another 7,000 residents. While much of the population growth is forecast for the current suburban areas due to water and sewer availability issues, there could well be a trickle of growth in the outer areas. Some growth cannot be predicted today. Ten years ago the growth of Indian gaming for one example was not even foreseen. What can be forecasted is that population in general drives the call-for-service workload for fire and emergency medical services. The County is well aware of its continuing attractiveness to tourists. Because of this, the risk challenge for County Fire is somewhat more unique as compared to other lightly populated, largely agriculture California counties. The Butte County Fire Department exists through a contract between Butte County and the California Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (CAL FIRE). In addition, over a number of years, oversight and training of the formally independent volunteer fire departments was consolidated into the County Fire Department. This eventually consolidated the administrative, training, purchasing, warehouse, and other functions of all the County volunteer departments through a single source within the County Fire Administration. Funding for apparatus and County Fire career employees is generated from property taxes, although many of the volunteer companies still put on fund raising activities and campaigns to pay for items or programs within their own service areas. Section 1 Introduction and Background page 17

24 The Butte County Fire Department also has automatic aid mutual response agreements with the city fire departments and adjacent fire agencies outside Butte County. All fire departments in the County share in a Hazardous Materials Response Joint Powers Authority (JPA) as well as provide a coordinated technical rescue system to spread costs and staffing across the greater area for what is a very low volume of calls for service. Over the last several years the Department has also drafted a master plan and other technical studies. Several of the master plan s objectives centered on identifying a formal fire deployment set of polices sensitive to the risks present in the County and to work on continuing to support the volunteer fire services. Because of this on-going planning process, the County commissioned this study to assist staff with factual data upon which to build improved deployment polices, to update the volunteer program and to determine the headquarters staffing needs for the Department. 1.5 NEWER LEGAL CHANGES AND CHALLENGES TO THE PROVISION OF FIRE SERVICES In addition to restrictions on local government finance, there have been a number of new state and federal laws, regulations, and court cases that limit the flexibility of counties, cities and fire districts in determining their staffing levels, training, and methods of operation. These are given an abbreviated overview below: OSHA Staffing Policies Federal OSHA applied the confined space safety regulations for work inside tanks and underground spaces to America s firefighters. This requires in atmospheres that are IDLH (Immediately Dangerous to Life and Health) that there be teams of two inside and two outside in constant communication, and with the outside pair equipped and ready to rescue the inside pair. This situation occurs in building fires where the fire and smoke conditions are serious enough to require the wearing of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA). This is commonly called the 2-in/2-out policy. This policy requires that firefighters enter serious building fires in teams of two, while two more firefighters are outside and immediately ready to rescue them should trouble arise. While under OSHA policy one of the outside two-out personnel can also be the incident commander (typically a chief officer) or fire apparatus operator, this person must be fully suited-up in protective clothing, have a breathing apparatus donned except for the face piece, meet all physical requirements to enter IDLH atmospheres, and thus be ready to immediately help with the rescue of interior firefighters in trouble. 2. May 2001 National Staffing Guidelines The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard on Career Fire Service Deployment was issued five years ago. While advisory to local governments, as it starts to become locally adopted and used, it develops momentum, forcing adoption by neighboring communities. In substantially career fire departments, NFPA 1710 calls for fourperson fire crew staffing, arriving on one or two apparatus as a company. The initial attack crew should arrive at the emergency within four minutes travel time, 90 percent of the time, and the total effective response force (first alarm assignment) shall arrive within eight minutes travel time, 90 percent of the time. Section 1 Introduction and Background page 18

25 In substantially volunteer departments, the NFPA recommends the initial response is 6 firefighters in 14 minutes, 80 percent of the time. These guidelines will be explained and compared to Butte in the deployment measures section of this document. 3. The on-scene Incident Commanders (battalion chiefs) at Hazardous Materials Incidents must have certification compliant with NFPA 472, Standard for Emergency Response to Hazardous Materials Incidents. This is also now an OSHA requirement. 1.6 NEGATIVE PRESSURES ON VOLUNTEER-BASED FIRE SERVICES While Butte County does not operate a pure volunteer firefighter system, a common question is why not solve some or all of the fire staffing needs with volunteers? To pre-address this question, here is a brief overview of the state of depending on volunteer firefighters: All volunteer-based fire departments are under great pressure today to maintain an adequate roster. The reasons for this are not unique to any one type of community and are placing pressure on small community volunteer systems across the state and nation: 1. Economic pressures result in more two-income families and less time to volunteer. 2. In a commuter economy, more jobs are clustered in metropolitan and dense suburban areas. Rural communities like Butte County increasingly have residents who work elsewhere, and many of the younger age people who would consider volunteering are just too busy. Several of the volunteer company officers in Butte County also explained that they are seeing more older, second home homeowners that either are not present year-round, or unable physically to volunteer. Many of the local businesses have employees who have to live outside the County and thus, given work and commute schedules, are not able to volunteer. 3. Due to the growth in society of complex systems and technology, the fire service was given more missions, like emergency medical services, hazardous materials response, and technical rescue. This dramatically increased the legally mandated training hours for volunteers, causing many to drop out as the time commitments became unbearable. 4. Early in this decade, due to rising firefighter injuries and deaths, especially in the volunteer ranks, more safety regulations and training minimums were placed on all firefighters: January 2004 California Volunteer Firefighters New laws (Assembly Bills 2118 and SB 1207) require volunteer firefighters to receive the same level of training that the full-time staff receives. AB 2118 was Chaptered in 2002, and was delayed to In part it provides that the California Occupational Safety and Health Act applies to volunteer firefighters. Equipment and training for volunteers to meet the same requirements as regular firefighters. Section 1 Introduction and Background page 19

26 This change, coupled with all the other factors, means that volunteer firefighter programs dry up due to lack of members. Additional training and additional responses mean a significant time commitment for true volunteers, who are serving for love of community and to give something back. Most departments feel that it takes 80 to 120 hours of training per year to meet safety minimums, and this time is before a volunteer goes on a single emergency call. In addition, most employers today are unwilling to allow volunteers to leave their jobs to respond to an emergency dispatch. Across the fire service, volunteer programs have been changing and adapting to a different model. The current model understands the commitment needed, and usually includes two types of volunteers: the first is the usual community-based person; the second is a younger person who desires to be a career firefighter. While the younger person is going through community college fire science classes, after obtaining basic firefighter certification, they work part-time for shift stipend or for an hourly wage, without benefits. These personnel are used successfully to increase daily station staffing and are called reserve firefighters or part-time firefighters. They do not need to live in the community they serve, as they are often not needed to respond from home with quick travel times. Community-based volunteers can be used from home for major emergencies, within their limited training as they gain certifications and experience. Once they meet state minimums, they also can be used for per diem shifts. As this report will explain in detail, Butte County Fire services are already spread thin and understaffed for field deployment and some headquarters functions. In Citygate s opinion, the needs of the Butte County Fire Department far outweigh what an increased volunteer or per diem apprentice firefighter program could solve. Section 1 Introduction and Background page 20

27 SECTION 2 STANDARDS OF RESPONSE COVER (DEPLOYMENT) ANALYSIS This section serves as an in-depth analysis of the current Butte County Fire Department s ability to deploy and meet the emergency risks presented. During this analysis, the Fire Department will be compared and contrasted to fire services recommended best practices for a community of Butte County s size. The response analysis will use prior response statistics and geographic mapping to help the Board of Supervisors and community visualize what the current or a possible response system can and cannot deliver. 2.1 GENERAL FIRE DEPLOYMENT BACKGROUND INFORMATION The Commission on Fire Accreditation International recommends a systems approach known as Standards of Response Coverage to evaluate deployment as part of the self-assessment process of a fire agency. This approach uses risk and community expectations on outcomes to assist elected officials in making informed decisions on fire and EMS deployment levels. Citygate has adopted this methodology as a comprehensive tool to evaluate fire station location. Depending on the needs of the study, the depth of the components can vary. Such a systems approach to deployment, rather than a one-size-fits-all prescriptive formula, allows for local determination of the level of deployment to meet the risks presented in each community. In this comprehensive approach, each agency can match local need (risks and expectations) with the costs of various levels of service. In an informed public policy debate, a Board of Supervisors purchases the fire, rescue, and EMS service levels (insurance) the community needs and can afford. While working with multiple components to conduct a deployment analysis is admittedly more work, it yields a much better result than any singular component can. If we only look to travel time, for instance, and not look at the frequency of multiple and overlapping calls, the analysis could miss over-worked companies. If we do not use risk assessment for deployment, and merely base deployment on travel time, a community could under-deploy to incidents. The Standard of Response Cover process consists of eight parts: 1. Existing Deployment each agency has something in place today. 2. Community Outcome Expectations what does the community expect out of the response agency? 3. Community Risk Assessment what assets are at risk in the community? 4. Critical Task Time Study how long does it take firefighters to complete tasks to achieve the expected outcomes? 5. Distribution Study the locating of first-due resources (typically engines). 6. Concentration Study first alarm assignment or the effective response force. 7. Reliability and Historical Response Effectiveness Studies using prior response statistics to determine what percent of compliance the existing system delivers. 8. Overall Evaluation proposed standard of cover statements by risk type. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 21

28 Fire department deployment, simply stated, is about the speed and weight of the attack. Speed calls for first-due, all risk intervention units (engines, trucks and ambulance companies) strategically located across a department. These units are tasked with controlling everyday average emergencies without the incident escalating to second alarm or greater size, which then unnecessarily depletes the department s units and personnel as multiple requests for service occur. Weight is about multiple-unit response for significant emergencies like a room and contents structure fire, a multiple-patient incident, a traffic collision with extrication required, or a heavy rescue incident. In these situations, departments must assemble enough firefighters in a reasonable period in order to control the emergency safely without it escalating to greater alarms. Thus, small fires and medical emergencies require a single- or two-unit response (engine and ambulance) with a quick response time. Larger incidents require more crews. In either case, if the crews arrive too late or the total personnel sent to the emergency are too few for the emergency type, they are drawn into a losing and more dangerous battle. The art of fire crew deployment is to spread crews out across a community for quick response to keep emergencies small with positive outcomes, without spreading the stations so far apart that they cannot amass together quickly enough to be effective in major emergencies. Given the need for crews to be stationed throughout a community for prompt response instead of all crews responding from a central fire station, communities such as Butte County are faced with neighborhood equity of response issues. When one or more areas grow beyond the reasonable travel distance of the nearest fire station, the choices available to the elected officials are limited to adding more neighborhood fire stations, or allowing certain segments of the community to have longer response times, even if the type of fire risk found is the same as in other areas. For the purposes of this fire services study, Citygate used all eight components of the Standard of Response Cover process (at varying levels of detail) to understand the risks in Butte County, how the Department is staffed and deployed today, and then modeled those parameters using geographic mapping and response statistical analysis tools. The models were then compared to the possible growth in Butte so that the study can recommend changes, if any, in fire services to the Department s service area. Thus, Citygate tailored the deployment recommendations in this report to Butte County s unique needs, and did not use one-size-fits-all national recommendations. The next few subsections in this section will cover the Butte County area factors and make findings about each component of the deployment system. From these findings of fact about the Butte County fire deployment system, the study is then able to make deployment change recommendations. 2.2 BUTTE COUNTY OUTCOME EXPECTATIONS WHAT IS EXPECTED OF THE FIRE DEPARTMENT? The next step in the Standards of Response Cover process is to review existing fire and emergency medical outcome expectations. This can be restated as follows: for what purpose does the current response system exist? Has the governing body adopted any response time performance measures? If so, the time measures used by the County need to be understood and good data collected. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 22

29 In Citygate s experience, in suburban areas when community members are asked what level of fire protection they desire, they typically expect that fires be confined to the room or nearby area of fire origin, and those medical patients salvageable upon arrival have their injuries stabilized and be transported to the appropriate care location. Thus, the challenge faced by the Department is to maintain an equitable level of fire service deployment across the entire County area without adding significantly more resources as demand for service grows and traffic congestion increases, slowing response times. This is a dynamic, complex problem in a county like Butte. While population clusters exist like Biggs and Gridley, where many residents might expect suburban levels of service, the outer, more rural areas may well have homeowners who know they have moved beyond the reach of fast response time safety services. Some of the agri-businesses may well depend more on builtin protection and fire insurance, rather than a rapid fire department response. Yet, the Board of Supervisors problem is that for every person or business that will accept rural fire services, they likely have neighbors who would not. The Insurance Services Office (ISO) Fire Department Grading Schedule in areas with fire hydrants would like to see fire stations spaced 1.5 miles apart, which, given travel speeds on surface streets, is a 3 to 4-minute travel time. The newer National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) guideline 1710 on career fire services deployment suggests a 4-minute travel time for the initial fire apparatus response and 8 minutes travel time maximum for the follow-up units. In substantially volunteer departments, the NFPA recommends the initial response is 6 firefighters in 14 minutes, 80 percent of the time. More importantly, within the Standards of Response Coverage process, positive outcomes are the goal, and from that crew size and response time can be calculated to allow efficient fire station spacing. Emergency medical incidents have situations with the most severe time constraints. In a heart attack that stops the heart, a trauma that causes severe blood loss, or in a respiratory emergency, the brain can only live 4 to 6 minutes maximum without oxygen and brain death occurring. Not only heart attacks, but also other events can cause oxygen deprivation to the brain. Heart attacks make up a small percentage; drowning, choking, trauma constrictions, or other similar events have the same effect on the brain and the same time constraints. In a building fire, a small incipient fire can grow to involve the entire room in a 4- to 5-minute time frame. The point in time where the entire room becomes involved in fire is called flashover when everything is burning, life is no longer possible, and the fire will shortly leave the room of origin. If fire service response is to achieve positive outcomes in severe EMS situations and incipient fire situations, all the crews must arrive, size-up the situation and deploy effective measures before brain death occurs or the fire leaves the room of origin. Given that the emergency started before or as it was noticed and continues to escalate through the steps of calling 911, dispatch notification of the crews, their response and equipment set-up once on scene, there are three clocks that fire and emergency medical crews must work against to achieve successful outcomes: 1. The time it takes an incipient room fire to fully engulf a room is 4 to 5 minutes, thus substantially damaging the building and most probably injuring or killing occupants. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 23

30 2. When the heart stops in a heart attack, the brain starts to die from lack of oxygen in 4 to 6 minutes and brain damage becomes irreversible at about the 10-minute point. 3. In a trauma patient, severe blood loss and organ damage becomes so great after the first hour that survival is difficult if not impossible. The goal of trauma medicine is to stabilize the patient in the field and get them to the trauma surgeon inside of one hour. Somewhat coincidently, in all three situations above, the first responder emergency crew must arrive on-scene within 5 to 7 minutes of the 911 phone call to have a chance at a successful resolution. Further, the follow-on (additional) crews for serious emergencies must arrive within the 8 to 11-minute point. These response times need to include the time steps for the dispatcher to process the caller s information, alert the stations needed, the crews to then don OSHA mandated safety clothing and drive to the emergency. The sum of these three time steps dispatch, crew turnout and travel time comprises total reflex, or response time. Thus, to get the first firefighters on-scene within only 5 to 7 minutes of the 911 call being answered is very challenging to all parts of the system, as this study will describe later in detail. The above response times form the foundation for an urban-suburban level of outcome where the community can afford a deployment system to provide the best chance of a positive outcome in serious situations. In rural areas, medical patients with problems that have already stopped their heart or have caused catastrophic bleeding may not survive. Houses on fire may burn to the ground and success may be defined as the house fire being stopped before a wildfire can start and spread rapidly to adjoining properties. The three event timelines above start with the emergency happening. It is important to note the fire or medical emergency continues to deteriorate from the time of inception, not the time the fire engine actually starts to travel the response route. It is hoped that the emergency is noticed immediately and the 911 system is activated. This step of awareness calling 911 and giving the dispatcher accurate information takes, in the best of circumstances, 1 minute. Then crew notification and travel take additional minutes. Once arrived, the crew must walk to the patient or emergency, size-up the problem and deploy their skills and tools. Even in easy to access situations, this step can take 2 or more minutes. It is considerably longer up long residential driveways, apartment buildings with limited access, event center complexes or shopping center buildings such as those found in parts of the County service area. Butte County has not formally adopted a fire services response set of polices for the diverse risks across the County. One of the deliverables in this study is to recommend such a set of policies. The 1977 County General Plan does have in its Safety Element suggestions for fire services, but nothing as to what the capability of the response system should be. In 1977 all that could be said was to attempt to upgrade fire services where economically feasible. Additionally, the General Plan called to promote the formation of volunteer fire companies in remote areas and to construct additional facilities as desired by area residents and as economically feasible. The problem with such broad goals is that today as development occurs, applicants and existing residents desire to know when additional services should be required and on-line. In 2002 Butte County Fire was directed by the CAO to prepare a comprehensive master plan. The draft plan was completed and returned as an information item with no further formal action Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 24

31 having occurred. On pages of the plan, the following deployment performance goals were proposed: Emergency Response - The First due engine company shall respond to and arrive at scene of all calls for emergency assistance within six (6) minutes, 90% of the time in the hydrant zones (ISO Class 4) areas of Butte County as tracked on the Computer-aided-dispatch system. Propose changes to the distribution of resources as necessary to rectify the deficiencies. Emergency Response - For Structure fires. Resources beyond the first engine shall respond to and arrive at scene of all calls for emergency assistance within twelve minutes, 90% of the time in the hydrant zones (ISO Class 4) of Butte County as tracked on the Computer Aided Dispatch system. Propose changes to the distribution of resources as necessary to rectify the deficiencies. Emergency Response - The first due Engine Company shall respond to and arrive at scene of all calls for emergency assistance within ten minutes, 90% of the time in the water tender zones (ISO Rural Class 8) of Butte County as tracked on the Computer Aided Dispatch system. Propose changes to the distribution of resources as necessary to rectify the deficiencies. Emergency Response - For structure fires, resources beyond the first engine shall respond to and arrive at scene of all calls for emergency assistance within five minutes of the first engine, 90% of the time in the water tender zones (ISO Rural Class 8) of Butte County. In addition, they will supply a continuous fire flow of 200 gallons of water per minute for twenty minutes. Propose changes to the distribution of resources as necessary to rectify the deficiencies. Emergency Response - Phase in over a five-year period Advanced Life Support paramedics, at least one per engine on engines staffed year- around. During FY , commence random staffing paramedics on engines that currently have paramedics routinely assigned. In FY fund the paramedic bonus for all qualified paramedics in the Fire Department operation. However, the above 2002 master plan goals were still not specific in term of measurement points, desired outcomes and population density differences across the County that drive calls for service. As such, the above deployment goals have not been used at the Board policy level to drive fire station and fire crew size planning. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 25

32 Finding #1: The County lacks a Board of Supervisors directed fire deployment measure that includes a complete response time measure definition starting at the time of call receipt at 911, plus risk and outcome expectations. The deployment measure should have a second part to define multiple-unit response coverage for serious emergencies. Making these changes will meet the best practice recommendations of the Commission on Fire Accreditation International and drive future policy decisions on the level and costs of fire services. Current best practice nationally is to measure percent completion of a goal (i.e., 90 percent of responses) instead of an average measure. This is because the measure of average just identifies the central or middle point of response time performance for all calls for service in the data set. From an average statement, it is impossible to know how many incidents had response times that were considerably over the average or just over. For example, if a department had an average response time of 5 minutes for 5,000 calls for service, it cannot be determined how many calls past the average point of 5 minutes were answered in the 6 th minute or way out at 10 minutes. This is a significant issue if hundreds or thousands of calls are answered much beyond the average point. Thus, from the time of 911 receiving the call, an effective deployment system is beginning to manage the problem within 7 to 8 minutes total reflex time. This is right at the point that brain death is becoming irreversible and the fire has grown to the point to leave the room of origin and become very serious. Therefore, the Butte County Fire Department s first-due response goal could be designed for suburban areas in a time range to give the situation hope for a positive outcome. Yes, sometimes the emergency is too severe even before the Fire Department is called in for the responding crew to reverse the outcome; however, given an appropriate response time policy and if the system is well designed, then only issues like bad weather, poor traffic conditions or a significant number of multiple emergencies will slow the response system. Consequently, a properly designed system will give the citizens hope of a positive outcome for their tax dollar expenditure. 2.3 BUTTE COUNTY COMMUNITY RISK ASSESSMENT The County mostly contains a mix of single- and multi-family dwellings, small and larger businesses, retailers, recreation areas, major agricultural processing industries, plus the hospitality and casino industries. There is also some light manufacturing. Major highway and rail corridors traverse the County. Both newcomers to the community, as well as long-term residents, may not realize the community assets that are at risk today in such a vibrant and diverse community. The Department is charged with responding to a variety of emergencies, from building and wildfires to emergency medical calls to special hazards and cargo transportation emergencies. Here is a partial inventory of the types of risk demographics in addition to the visible homes and business buildings: Some hazardous materials storage, use, and release, including industrial and transportation on the highways and railroads; Wildfires in the interface area containing homes and structures; Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 26

33 The tourist industry, particularly in the summer with water sports activities; The protection of the watershed around sensitive areas; Aging agricultural/forest industry buildings; Wintertime flooding in the low-lying areas of the County. The significance of the above information is that the Butte County Fire Department must be staffed, equipped, and trained to deal with (at least through the first alarm level prior to automatic or mutual aid) most any type of emergency faced by a United States fire department. True, the County does not have multiple, very tall high-rise buildings, an international airport, or an oil refinery, but that is about all the Department does not experience in its calls for service. Most recent building fires in Butte have started small and allowed the available on-duty force to catch them. The reasons for this can range from the fire being still small upon being reported, to the fire having occurred close to a fire station in an area that has one to begin with combined with the newer age of some of the housing stock. In order to understand the importance of response time in achieving satisfactory outcomes, the deployment of resources must be based upon assessment of the values at risk. There are actually many different types of values at risk depending upon the nature of the emergency. At a very basic level, a fire in a structure is among the most frequent event with a measurable outcome. A single-patient medical emergency is a different event, and while it is the most frequent, it is normally not as threatening to life and property as the structure fire since the structure fire can spread and eventually become a conflagration. From a hazard, risk and value perspective, the number of structural fires is usually linked to the distribution and concentration of different building types in the community. As is expected in an urban-suburban area, communities have a very specific growth and development pattern consistent with past decisions on land use. As would be anticipated, there are pockets of various densities of housing stock ranging from low-cost, high-density housing to high-cost, mediumdensity neighborhoods. There is a distribution of neighborhood retail and commercial facilities. Along the main transit routes are typical commercial, mixed and public uses. Then, of course, there are clusters of high concentration of values that exist in the traditional downtown area. These are the locations of many job provider and sales tax businesses. Citygate reviewed the Department s response performance information, its operational plans, County zoning, interviewed Fire Department members and drove through some of the County. As is expected in a California county, much of the County consists of low- and medium-density residential housing. There are some pockets of higher density residential housing and newer commercial development. Retail/commercial/industrial development zones, of course, compliment housing areas. Also spread throughout the County are the agriculture and open space areas. The challenge to protect these risks in Butte County is that a limited road system connects noncontiguous pockets of suburban development. Where developed areas have a fire station, that is satisfactory for a single-unit response, but when multiple units are needed for serious fires, then the other needed units have to travel considerable distances, at times over one or two very congested highways. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 27

34 2.3.1 Building Fire Risk In a Standards of Response Coverage study, building fire risk can best be understood by looking at types of zoning and the quantity of different zoning types in a community. In addition to the various types of zoning that the County is already familiar with, as an additional risk assessment step, Citygate and the Department asked the national Insurance Services Organization (ISO) to provide its risk data on the County of Butte. The ISO evaluates fire departments for the insurance underwriting industry. One of their methods is to send an evaluation engineer to assess significant buildings in a community to determine their risk of serious fire. In the unincorporated area, and the CAL FIRE contract cities of Biggs and Gridley, the ISO assessed over 538 buildings in all. There are 232 buildings where the calculated required fire flow is 1,500 gallons per minute or greater if the building was heavily involved in fire. There are 44 buildings with a fire flow over 3,000 gallons per minute and 3 large properties with fire flows over 5,000 gallon per minute. When square footage is compared, there are 11 buildings over 40,000 square feet. It should be understood that 1,500 gallons of firefighting water per minute is a significant amount to deploy, and a major fire at any one of these larger buildings would outstrip the onduty Butte County staffing and even immediate area mutual aid staffing from cooperating fire agencies in Butte County. Using the generally accepted figure of fifty gallons per minute per firefighter on large buildings, a fire in a building requiring 1,500 gallons per minute would require 30 firefighters, almost the entire year-round career on-duty staffing (36 total) of the Butte County Fire Department. Even if the fire were in the very center of the County, engine companies would have to respond from as far away as 20 miles (30 minutes travel time) or more. Serious building and wildfires require an effective response force. It is through the deployment of multiple units (pumpers, ladder trucks and incident commander) arriving closely enough together that combats serious fires and keeps them to less than greater alarm, mutual aid size. This refers back to the earlier points in this report on speed and weight of attack. The massing of units in a timely manner (weight) must be such that serious fires do not typically become larger. Since Butte County zoning permits the placing of buildings throughout the County, this places additional pressure to have a multiple-unit effective response force of pumpers and, also importantly, ladder trucks throughout much of the County Special Hazard Risks Butte County has some businesses that use or re-sell hazardous materials. Examples are gasoline stations, dry cleaners, agricultural chemical storage and the transportation of hazardous materials. These businesses are highly regulated by the building, fire and environmental codes. The County of Butte handles the enforcement of advanced hazardous materials state regulations. The Butte County Fire Department participates in a regional, multi-fire department Hazardous Materials Response Team. Because of the high volume of tourism and hazardous industries such as agriculture and construction, the Department routinely responds to all manners of technical rescues. As a member of the countywide technical rescue group the Department enjoys the capability to do this type of work safely and following best practices. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 28

35 2.3.3 Desired Outcomes Once policy makers choose outcomes, then the response system can be designed with staffing and station locations to accomplish the desired outcomes. An outcome example is, confine a residential fire to the room of origin. That outcome requires a more aggressive response time and staffing plan than confine the fire to the building of origin, to keep it from spreading to adjoining structures. In a similar sense, wildfires should be controlled when they are still small to keep conflagrations from starting. 2.4 STAFFING WHAT MUST BE DONE OVER WHAT TIMEFRAME TO ACHIEVE THE STATED OUTCOME EXPECTATION? The next step in the Standards of Cover analysis process is to take the risk information above and review what the firefighting staffing is, and what it is capable of, over what timeframe. Fires and complex medical emergencies require a timely, coordinated effort in order to stop the escalation of the emergency. Once the tasks and time to accomplish them to deliver a desired outcome are set, travel time and thus station spacing can be calculated to deliver the requisite number of firefighters over an appropriate timeframe. For an extreme outcome example, to confine a fire to one room in a multi-story building requires many more firefighters than in a single-story family home in a suburban zone. The amount of staffing needed can be derived from the desired outcome and risk class. If the community desires to confine a one-room fire in a residence to the room or area of origin, that effort will require a minimum of 14 personnel plus an incident commander. This number of firefighters is the minimum needed to safely conduct the simultaneous operations of rescue, fire attack, and ventilation plus providing for firefighter accountability and incident command in a modest, one fire hose line house fire. A significant fire in a two-story residential building or a one-story commercial or multi-story building would require, at a minimum, an additional two to three engines and an additional truck and chief officer, for upwards of 12 plus additional personnel. As the required fire flow water gallonage increases, concurrently the required number of firefighters increases. Simultaneously the travel distance for additional personnel increases, creating an exponential impact on the fire problem. A typical auto accident requiring multiple-patient extrication or other specialty rescue incidents will require a minimum of 10 firefighters plus the chief for accountability and control Offensive vs. Defensive Strategies in Structure Fires Based on Risk Presented Most fire departments use a strategy that places emphasis upon the distinction between offensive or defensive methods. These strategies can be summarized: It is important to have an understanding of the duties required at a structural fire to meet the strategic goals and tactical objectives of the Fire Department response. Firefighting operations fall in one of two strategies offensive or defensive. We may risk our lives a lot to protect savable lives. We may risk our lives a little to protect savable property. We will not risk our lives at all to save what is already lost. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 29

36 Considering the level of risk, the incident commander will choose the proper strategy to be used at the fire scene. The incident commander must take into consideration the available resources (including firefighters) when determining the appropriate strategy to address any incident. The strategy can also change with conditions or because certain benchmarks are achieved or not achieved. For example, an important benchmark is all clear, which means that all savable persons have been removed from danger or placed in a safe refuge area. Once it has been determined that the structure is safe to enter, an offensive fire attack is centered on life safety. When it is safe to do so, departments will initiate offensive operations at the scene of a structure fire. Initial attack efforts will be directed at supporting a primary search the first attack line will go between the victims and the fire to protect avenues of rescue and escape. The decision to operate in a defensive strategy indicates that the offensive attack strategy, or the potential for one, has been abandoned for reasons of personnel safety, and the involved structure has been conceded as lost (the incident commander makes a conscious decision to write the structure off). The announcement of a change to a defensive strategy means all personnel will withdraw from the structure and maintain a safe distance from the building. Officers will account for their crews. Interior lines will be withdrawn and repositioned. Exposed properties will be identified and protected. For safety, federal and state Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations mandate that firefighters cannot enter a burning structure past the incipient or small fire stage, without doing so in teams of 2, one team inside and one team outside, ready to rescue them. This is the so-called 2-in/2-out safety law. This totals a minimum of 4 firefighters on the fireground to initiate an interior attack. The only exception is when there is a known life inside to be rescued. This reason, along with the fact that a 4-person crew can perform more work simultaneously than a 3-person crew, is why NFPA Deployment Standard 1710 for substantially career fire departments recommends 4-person crew staffing on engines (pumpers) as well as on ladder trucks. For rural fire services, the deployment recommendation in NFPA Deployment Standard 1720 is fewer firefighters over a longer response time reflects the realities of the volunteer fire service, but volunteers must still follow the 2-in/2-out safety law National Deployment Best Practice Recommendations Many fire department deployment studies using the Standards of Response Coverage process, as well as NFPA guidelines, arrive at the same fact that an average (typically defined by the NFPA as a modest single-family dwelling) risk structure fire needs a minimum of 14 to 15 firefighters, plus one on-scene incident commander. The NFPA recommendation for substantially career departments is that the first unit should arrive on-scene within 6 minutes of call receipt (1-minute dispatch, 1-minute crew turnout, and 4-minute travel), 90 percent of the time. The balance of the units in an effective response force for serious emergencies (first alarm) should arrive within 10 minutes of call receipt (8-minute travel), 90 percent of the time, if they hope to keep the fire from substantially destroying the building. (The NFPA recommendation of 1-minute dispatch time is generally attainable; the 1- Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 30

37 minute crew turnout time is generally unattainable considering the time it takes firefighters to don the required full personal protective equipment.) For substantially volunteer departments, the NFPA 1720 recommendation is based on population per square mile: NFPA 1720 Recommendations for Substantially Volunteer Departments Zone Demographics Staffing and Response Time (FF/Minutes) Percentage of Completion Special risks As needed 90 Suburban/Urban >1000 people/mi. 2 15/9 90 Emerging Suburban /10 80 people/mi. Rural <500 people/mi. 2 6/14 80 Remote Travel dist > 8 mi. 4/anytime 90 This table in Butte County s case does not always apply given the high tourism brought in by the lake area for example. Thus, the Fire Department is faced on popular weekends and holidays with large influxes of people that will generate more calls for service, which in some cases can exceed the Department s normal response capacity. This strain is further aggravated by the traffic congestion caused by limited roadways during periods of high visitation which slow fire apparatus response times from fire stations that, given the size of the County, are very widely spaced apart. Insurance Services Office ISO Classification Currently the County enjoys an ISO Class 4 in those areas within 1,000 feet of a fire hydrant. Those areas that meet the rural classification 8B are described below. The 8B classification is in large part due to the water tender program supported by the volunteer firefighters that covers most of the built-up areas of the County. The remaining remote areas beyond the reach of Class 8B are Class 9. Insurance Service Office ISO - Rural Classification 8B The Insurance Services Office (ISO) Fire Department Grading Schedule would like to see fire stations spaced in suburban areas 1.5 miles apart in areas covered by fire hydrants, which given travel speeds on surface streets, is a 3- to 4-minute road travel time. The ISO evaluates fire protection on a 10-point scale with a Class 1 department being the best (Stockton) to Class 10 being no appreciable fire response at all. In rural areas, the ISO for Class 8 protection requires a 5-mile road response distance 85 percent of time for the first-due engine and the staffing ability to deliver fire streams of 200 gallons per minute continuously for 20 minutes within five minutes of arrival. With an adequate distribution of water tenders, much of the rural area of Butte County lends itself to an Insurance Service Office (ISO) Class 8B rating. This class, if applied, reduces premiums plus losses from about $0.65 per $1,000 insured to about $0.50, according to ISO. To Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 31

38 be eligible for Class 8B, a community must meet the fundamental requirements for a classification better than Class 9. The community must have: an adequate number of wellorganized and properly trained firefighters; reliable fire alarm facilities; adequate fire-station facilities; and operational records. However, the community does not need to meet the watersupply requirement of 250 gpm for two hours necessary for Public Protection Classification (PPC) Class 8 or better. Specifically, to get a rating of Class 8B, a community must meet these requirements: It must meet the minimum requirements defined in Fire Suppression Rating Schedule (FSRS) Section 106, "Minimum Facilities for Applying This Schedule." It must be eligible for at least 5 points in FSRS Section 400, "Receiving and Handling Fire Alarms." It must be eligible for at least 20 points in FSRS Section 500, "Fire Department." An average of at least six firefighters must respond on first alarm responses to structure fires. For active firefighters, it must conduct a minimum of 24 hours per year of training in fighting structure fires. The water supply must be able to deliver an uninterrupted minimum fire flow of 200 gpm for 20 minutes. The minimum fire flow must be able to start within five minutes of the arrival of the first engine company. The primary responding fire department and all automatic-aid fire departments must be able to deliver the minimum fire flow. The departments must be able to deliver the minimum fire flow to at least 85 percent of the built-upon areas of the community within five road miles of a recognized fire station. Butte County Fire operates fire service water tenders to support the rural Class 8B water supply requirements for structure fires. During its next ISO evaluation, the Department should continue to meet the requirements of the ISO Class 8B in those areas that fall within the NFPA 1720 Rural criteria through training and staffing of the water tenders Staffing in the Butte County Fire Department Due to the contract-for-service partnership with CAL FIRE, Butte County has a blended staffing plan that takes cost-effective advantage of four methods of providing and paying for firefighters: 1. Butte County, Biggs and Gridley contract with CAL FIRE for career firefighters assigned to thirteen (13) year-round units spaced in twelve (12) fire stations across the more densely populated areas of the County; 2. Butte County contracts for additional staffing in six (6) units by holding over some fire season CAL FIRE personnel during the wintertime (called an Amador Contract). Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 32

39 Under this contract the staffing cost of the unit is shared by the County and CAL FIRE; 3. CAL FIRE staffs sixteen (16) fire season units, including the six (6) mentioned above; 4. Butte County has nineteen (19) volunteer fire companies. This can be a confusing system for someone outside the Department to understand, as not all of these contract units are guaranteed for Butte County use only for structure fires and medical emergencies. In the wintertime, the Amador contract units are a very cost-effective blend of state and County dollars to keep more fire crews on the street. They have a dual-role County and state mission, but given the low number of wildfires in the winter, they are largely available for structure fire and medical emergency responses. However, during fire season, these units, along with the additional fire season CAL FIRE units are not dedicated to Butte County structure fires and medical calls. Their primary mission for the state is the suppression of wildfires in Butte County first, and then elsewhere as assigned. As such, while Butte County Fire can send these fire season units to structure fires or medical emergencies, there is no guarantee of their availability. Thus, the tables below display the different types of staffing so the Board of Supervisors and the public can understand what is the minimum and guaranteed level of staffing that the County taxpayer is providing: County Fire Paid For Year-Round Units and Daily Staffing Plan Per Unit Extended Year-round County Dedicated: 12 2* Firefighters/day 24 1 Ladder 2** Firefighters/day 2 Subtotal: 26 6 Amador 2 Firefighters/day 12 Total year-round firefighters 38 2 Battalion (The County funds 3 of the 7 field battalion chief positions) 1*** Per day for command 2 Minimum Total year-round F/F: 40 * If on-going gaming grant applications are successful, two engines are staffed with 3 F/F using Tribal Gaming Funds. The amount awarded as a grant varies from year to year. In 2007 each engine was staffed with 3 F/F 90% and 45% of the time respectively. ** Funded jointly by Biggs and Gridley. *** A 3 rd battalion chief is provided during fire season. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 33

40 Fire Season CAL FIRE Units and Staffing Daily Plan Per Unit Extended 16 Wildfire 3 Firefighters/day 48 1 Battalion Chief 1 1 Subtotal Seasonal: 49 Plus Year-round Staffing less the Amador engines: 28 Total 24/hr Personnel: 77 Butte County Volunteer Staffing Plan Per Unit Volunteer Fire Crews 19 Volunteer Companies w/ 18 engines, 12 rescue squads, 17 water tenders, 8 utility and special units Authorized = 405 Active in 2007 = 184 Extended Varies Staffing Discussion If the County provides fire services at all, safety of the public and firefighters must be the first consideration. Additionally, the chief officers, as on-scene incident commanders, must be well trained and competent, since they are liable for mistakes that violate the law. An under-staffed, under trained and/or under-led token force will not only be unable to stop a fire, it also opens the County up for liability should the Fire Department fail. As stated earlier in this section, national norms indicate that 15 or so firefighters within 11 minutes or so of the 911 call, including an incident commander, are needed at significant building fires if the expected outcome is to contain the fire to the room of origin and to be able to simultaneously and safely perform critical tasks. The reason for this is that the clock is still running on the problem after arrival, and too few firefighters on-scene will mean the fire can still grow faster than the efforts to contain it. Chief officers also need to arrive at the scene in a timely manner in order to intervene and provide the necessary leadership to the organization. In theory the County operates with enough year-round firefighters per day to field two alarms (teams) of firefighters to building fires because the Amador wintertime crews increase County staffing from 26 to 38 firefighters (plus the chiefs). However, this count assumes all the personnel are available and can be committed to serious building fires. In both the winter and the summertime there is the risk the Amador contract units will not be available due to CAL FIRE responses (they are a shared cost item with CAL FIRE), so the minimum structure fire attack force could be only the 26 County contract firefighters plus available volunteers that are spaced across a very large area. Combining the wintertime and fire season staffing thus can be misleading as the Department s capability for a timely weight of attack is not all dedicated structure fire/ems staffing and this staffing is spread out across a large area of the County. Equally important, as will be reviewed in the next section, most of the year-round units are only Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 34

41 staffed with two firefighters so they cannot begin interior fire attack at a structure fire until the second-due unit arrives from a distance in order to comply with the 2-in/2-out rule. Given the low occurrence of building fires in the County, the blended contract staffing plan plus the volunteer system and the strong mutual aid unit support from the neighboring cities and fire departments, Butte County can typically field enough firefighters at a serious fire, but not within timeframes for aggressive outcomes even in the suburban areas. Even so, such a fire attack also only works when there are no simultaneous other fire or medical emergency calls that have taken fire units out of service. This means that during periods of medical emergency calls or the fire season staffing is not available, the County really cannot field a force to two major events at once without waiting for mutual aid to arrive Crew Critical Task Time Measures In order to understand the time it takes to complete all the needed tasks on a residential moderate risk fire and a common two-car auto accident emergency medical rescue, the Department conducted several timed trials using their standard operating procedures to demonstrate how much time the entire list of operations take. The following tables start with the time of fire crew notification and finish with the outcome achieved. There are several important themes contained in the tables below: 1. These results were obtained under best conditions, in that the day was sunny and moderate in temperature. The fire test building was a building that the crews are familiar with. 2. It is noticeable how much time it takes after arrival or after the event is ordered by command to actually accomplish key tasks to arrive at the actual outcome. This is because it requires firefighters to carry out the ordered tasks. The fewer the firefighters, the longer some task completion times will be. Critical steps are highlighted in grey in the table. 3. The time for task completion is usually a function of how many personnel are simultaneously available so that firefighters can complete some tasks simultaneously. 4. Some tasks have to be assigned to a minimum of two firefighters to comply with safety regulations. An example is two firefighters would be required for searching a smoke filled room for a victim. The following duties are taken from the Department operational procedures. This set of needed duties is entirely consistent with the usual and customary findings of other agencies using the Standards of Response Cover process and that found in NFPA 1710 for career staffed agencies. Scenario: Single-family dwelling fire with normal access to the rear of the structure. Heavy smoke and fire conditions exist with 1,000 square feet of involvement. No condition exists to override the OSHA 2-in/2-out policy. The response force consists of: 1 Battalion Chief 1 Safety Officer 4 Engines Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 35

42 1 Squad or Rescue 2 Water Tenders 2 Volunteer Companies Total Force = 14 Shown below are the critical tasks for the structure fire: (table continued on following page) Critical Tasks Structure Fires Task Description Staffing Clock Time Elapsed from Time of Call Time of Call 00:00 00:00 Dispatch 01:30 01:30 Turnout & Travel to on-scene 13:00 13:00 Total Response Time 14:30 First engine at Scene 2 FF 00:00 Report on conditions / Assume Incident Command Stretch attack line 1: degree walk around 2:18 00:30 15:00 Secure Utilities 2:29 16:59 Second Engine at Scene 2 FF Establish 2 in 2 out 7:44 Change Command to Batt Chief 1 BC 8:52 Attack line advanced to interior 9:11 23:41 Lay Water supply to pumping engine 9:50 Water Tender 1 Arrival 2 FF 10:45 Squad Arrival 2 FF 11:01 Third Engine at Scene 2 FF Back up line pulled 11:01 Primary Search Completed 11:14 25:44 Ladder to roof for ventilation 11:16 Fourth Engine at Scene Establish Rapid Intervention Team 2 FF 12:44 Ventilation complete 16:03 30:33 Safety Officer Arrives 1 19:57 Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 36

43 Task Description Staffing Clock Time Elapsed from Time of Call Fire Under Control 20:08 Total Staffing: 14 (10 Career and 4 Volunteer) Total Time: 20:08 34:38 The above duties grouped together to form an effective response force or first alarm assignment. Remember that the above discrete tasks must be performed simultaneously and effectively to achieve the desired outcome. Just arriving on-scene does not stop the escalation of the emergency. Firefighters accomplishing the above tasks do, but as they are being performed, the clock is still running, and has been since the emergency first started. Fire spread in a structure can double in size every minute of its free burn period. Many studies have shown that a small fire can spread to engulf the entire room in less than 4 to 5 minutes after open burning has started. Once the room is completely superheated and involved in fire (known as flashover) then the fire will spread quickly throughout the structure and into the attic and walls. For this reason it is imperative that fire attack and search commence before the flashover point occurs, if the outcome goal is to keep the fire damage in or near, the room of origin. In addition, flashover presents a serious danger to both firefighters and any occupants of the building. Here again is the Butte County year-round firefighter staffing plan: County Fire Paid For Year-Round Units and Daily Staffing Plan Per Unit Extended Year-round County Dedicated: 12 2* Firefighters/day 24 1 Ladder 2** Firefighters/day 2 Subtotal: 26 6 Amador 2 Firefighters/day 12 Total year-round firefighters 38 2 Battalion (The County funds 3 of the 7 field battalion chief positions) 1*** Per day for command 2 Minimum Total year-round F/F: 40 * If on-going gaming grant applications are successful, two engines are staffed with 3 F/F using Tribal Gaming Funds. The amount awarded as a grant varies from year to year. In 2007 each engine was staffed with 3 F/F 90% and 45% of the time respectively. ** Funded jointly by Biggs and Gridley. *** A 3 rd battalion chief is provided during fire season. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 37

44 Fire Season CAL FIRE Units and Staffing Daily Plan Per Unit Extended 16 Wildfire 3 Firefighters/day 48 1 Battalion Chief 1 1 Subtotal Seasonal: 49 Plus Year-round Staffing less the Amador engines: 28 Total 24/hr Personnel: 77 Butte County Volunteer Staffing Plan Per Unit Volunteer Fire Crews 19 Volunteer Companies w/ 18 engines, 12 rescue squads, 17 water tenders, 8 utility and special units Authorized = 405 Active in 2007 = 184 Extended Varies If Butte County commits 14 personnel (10 career and 4 volunteer) as discussed above to one building fire in the wintertime, it only has 14 career personnel available for other emergencies; mutual aid units requested will provide any additional coverage of emergencies, if they are available. Also, the quantity and response time of volunteer units is never guaranteed. It is more likely that a serious fire will quickly consume another few units so the incident has at least 15 to 20 firefighters. When this happens, County staffing is consumed and other emergencies depend on the volunteers (if available), CAL FIRE units (if available), and mutual aid. What this means is that Butte County currently is only fielding the capacity for two serious incidents at a time. Multiple fires or a singular large fire will quickly exhaust the County s resources and draw aid from across the area. Because of the long response distances, the Department often calls on closer mutual and automatic aid companies to fill out alarms and then moves County units in to cover those vacancies. For comparison purposes, the critical task table below reviews the tasks needed on a typical heart attack medical call that requires one fire unit and one ambulance unit using 4 personnel total: (table continued on following page) Critical Tasks Heart Attack Task Description Staffing Clock Time Elapsed from Time of Call Time of Call 00:00 00:00 Dispatch 01:30 01:30 Turnout & Travel to on-scene 13:00 13:00 Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 38

45 Task Description Staffing Clock Time Elapsed from Time of Call Engine at Scene Total Response Time 14:30 2 FF Determine Full Cardiac Arrest 00:28 Begin CPR 00:56 Defibrillation (if needed-up to 3 times) 1:30 16:00 Ambulance At Scene 2 EMS Defibrillation (if needed-1 time) 5:42 Intubation 6:58 21:28 Intravenous line access 8:20 22:50 First round of Epinephrine 8:49 Defibrillate (if needed- 1 time) 9:55 Give Atropine, Amiodarone, or Lidocain 10:18 24:48 PT loaded on backboard 11:00 PT loaded into Medic Unit 12:50 27:20 Total Time 12:50 27:20 Total Personnel Critical Task Measures Evaluation What does a deployment study derive from a response time and crew task time analysis? The total completion times above to stop the escalation of the emergency have to be compared to outcomes. We know from nationally published fire service time vs. temperature tables that after about 4 to 5 minutes of free burning a room fire will grow to the point of flashover where the entire room is engulfed, the structure becomes threatened and human survival near or in the fire room becomes impossible. We know that brain death begins to occur within 4 to 6 minutes of the heart having stopped. Thus, the effective response force must arrive in time to stop these catastrophic events from occurring. In the structure fire task example above, due to long response times and the light staffing of eight (8) career firefighters plus hopefully four (4) volunteers, instead of a more suburban normal of 14 to 15 total, the critical completion times to access, search, provide ventilation and water on the fire are double what it would take with a 14 to 15-person response force. Thus, in this situation, the fire would likely consume the building of origin and the victim would likely not survive. There are not even four (4) firefighters on-scene to begin interior fire attack until minute 22 from the time of call, by which time the fire will have left the room of origin, if it was free burning at or near the time of the phone call. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 39

46 The response and task completion times discussed above show that the citizens of Butte County are not able to expect good outcomes and only a moderate chance of survival in a modest fire or medical emergency. The responding units are too spread out and the career County engines are thinly staffed with only two firefighters each. On the heart attack situation, the outcome times are better since the only two 2-person crews were used. Two (2) firefighters are able to handle this type of call; only if the access to the patient is easy. If the patient were upstairs or confined in a small space, care would take even longer. In this example, the patient care times on-scene are good, but due to the long initial response time, if the patient s heart was truly stopped at the time of the 911 phone call, survival would be unlikely. The EMS times above would be adequate in a trauma patient type of incident. The point of the tables above is that mitigating an emergency event is a team effort once the units have arrived. This refers back to the weight of response criteria. If too few personnel arrive too slowly, then the emergency will get worse, not better. Control of the structure fire incident took 35 minutes after the time of receipt of the 911 calls, which is too long if the outcome goal is to save the house and contents from total destruction. If the outcome goal is to protect adjacent structures from exposure fire or to prevent the structural fire from becoming a vegetation conflagration, this time may be adequate, particularly since during the fire season CAL FIRE augments this response if they are available. Fires and complex medical incidents require that the other needed units arrive in time to complete an effective intervention. Time is one factor that comes from proper station placement. Good performance also comes from adequate staffing. On the fire and rescue time measures above, the Department can only do a good job, in terms of time, on small fires and routine medical calls. This is typical of departments that staff 2-person crews or very widely spaced 3- person crews for average, routine emergencies and rural outcomes. However, serious fires and medical emergencies where the closest unit is not available or is understaffed for the seriousness of the emergency will challenge the Department response system to deliver good outcomes. This factor must be taken into account when we look at fire station locations. Previous critical task studies conducted by Citygate, the Standard of Response Cover documents reviewed from accredited fire departments, and NFPA recommendations all arrive at the need for 15+ firefighters arriving within 11 minutes (from the time of call) at a room and contents structure fire to be able to simultaneously and effectively perform the tasks of rescue, fire attack and ventilation. If fewer firefighters arrive, what from the list of tasks mentioned would not be done? Most likely, the search team will be delayed as will ventilation. The attack lines only have two firefighters, which does not allow for rapid movement above the first floor deployment. Rescue is done with only 2-person teams; thus when rescue is essential, other tasks are not done in a simultaneous, timely manner. Remember what this report stated in the beginning: effective deployment is about the speed (travel time) and the weight (firefighters) of the attack. Yes, 9 initial (3 engines, 1 truck, 1 chief) firefighters can handle a low to moderate-risk house fire (especially on the first floor), but only if they do not need, at the same time, to perform rescue, fire attack and ventilation. An effective response force of even 15 will be seriously slowed if the fire is in a low-rise apartment building or commercial/industrial building. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 40

47 Thus, today, the Butte County Fire Department has just enough on-duty personnel to handle two low to modest one- to two-room building fires in a single-story building at a time, or a few medical incidents occurring at the same time. The Department would be seriously challenged to handle three working building or vegetation fires at the same time it was handling more than a couple of EMS incidents. When the on-duty staffing is stretched thin, the Department can bring in automatic or mutual aid equipment, but from a distance and under the assumption that the aiding department is not already busy. The other career departments in the County have a very effective working relationship with the Butte County Fire Department. These units do respond to assist with County calls, if they are available. However, they also have very large areas of their own that they are responsible for. Finding #2: With minimum staffing of only two firefighters on all thirteen County dedicated year-round units, the tactical work that any one unit can do is very limited. This can be seen in the slow critical task completion times. On serious emergencies this draws in more units to make up an effective response force. This is costly for two reasons: (1) it drains more units than necessary; and (2) the farther out units do not have a timely response. The more typical staffing for suburban population density areas of the County would be three firefighters responding on an engine. 2.5 CURRENT STATION LOCATION CONFIGURATIONS Butte County is served today by 12 career-staffed fire stations with dedicated Butte County staffing. Additionally there are 6 winter season contract stations operated with CAL FIRE. In the summertime, these winter contract stations are for CAL FIRE primary use in fire season and are not dedicated to Butte County. Then there are the nineteen (19) volunteer fire companies. The following table does not list CAL FIRE stations and/or equipment, except where dedicated County resources are co-located at a CAL FIRE station: (table continued on following page) 12 Station Number Address Equipment Type Staffing Skyway, Stirling City E12, Sq12, WT12 Volunteer Skyway, Magalia E33, E233 County Career Skyway, Magalia E31, WT31, S31 Volunteer 35 Cal Fire 1464 Forest Service Rd., Paradise E2186 Winter time 13 Cal Fire 7882 Quartz St, Stirling City E2162 Winter time Humboldt Rd., Butte Mdws. E10 Volunteer Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 41

48 Station Number Address Equipment Type Staffing 22 Cal Fire 23 Cal Fire Cohasset Rd., Chico 5362 Platte Mtn. Rd., Forest Ranch Nopel Rd., Forest Ranch 1726 Honey Run Rd., Chico Centerville Rd., Chico 3487 Durham Pentz Rd., Oroville E221, WT21, Sq21 Volunteer U2123 E2184 Winter time E224, Sq24, WT24 Volunteer E26, Sq26 Volunteer E27, WT27 Volunteer E25, WT25, Sq25 Volunteer 36 Cal Fire Hwy. 70, Oroville U2136, E2176 Winter time Schuman Ln., Oroville Concow Rd., Oroville 2367 Campbell St., Durham School St., Richvale E37, Sq37, WT 37 Volunteer E38, WT38 Volunteer E45, Sq45, WT45, U45 E71, E971 (reserve), Sq71, Rescue Sup.71 County Career & Volunteer County Career & Volunteer Hwy 99, Chico E41, E941 (reserve) County Career Frontier Circle, Chico Fair St., Chico Cal Fire Cal Fire La Porte Rd., Clipper Mills 1834 Lumpkin Rd., Feather Falls 10 Robinson Mill Rd., Oroville 2540 Oro-Bangor Hwy, Oroville Oro-Quincy Hwy, Berry Creek 297 Rockerfeller Rd., Berry Cr Oro-Quincy Hwy, Berry Creek E42, E942 (reserve), U42, WT42, BS42 E44, E294 (OES), R44 E6553 (Foothill Fire District) WT52, Sq52 E2154 E55, Sq55, WT55 E60 County Career & Volunteer County Career Volunteer Volunteer Winter time County Career & Volunteer Volunteer E61, Sq61, WT62 Volunteer E2168 Winter time Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 42

49 Station Number Address Equipment Type Staffing 63 Cal Fire 176 Nelson Ave., Oroville Walnut Ave., Oroville Foothill Blvd., Oroville Cherokee Rocky Top Rd., Oroville 2290 Palermo Rd., Palermo E63, Sq63, U2163 County Career E64, E964, WT64, R64, HM64 E66 County Career & Volunteer Volunteer E67, WT67 Volunteer E72, E272, WT72, S72 County Career & Volunteer B St., Biggs E73, E973 (reserve) County Career E. Gridley Rd., Gridley E74, T74, BS74, Boat 74 County Career & Volunteer Kentucky St., Gridley E76, WT74 Volunteer 77 DFG 3207 Rutherford Rd., Gridley E77, E277, Doz77, Doz277, Boat 77, Boat 277 Volunteer (DFG Brigade) As part of this fire services study, it is appropriate to understand what the existing and proposed stations do and do not cover, if there are any coverage gaps, and what, if anything, to do about them as the County continues to evolve. In brief, there are two geographic perspectives to fire station deployment: Distribution the spreading out or spacing of first-due fire units to stop routine emergencies. Concentration the clustering of fire stations close enough together so that building fires can receive enough resources from multiple fire stations quickly enough. This is known as the Effective Response Force or commonly the first alarm assignment the collection of a sufficient number of firefighters on-scene, delivered within the concentration time goal to stop the escalation of the problem. To analyze first-due and first alarm fire unit travel time coverage for this study, Citygate used a geographic mapping tool from ESRI Mapping Corporation program called Network Analyst that can measure travel distance over the street network. Citygate ran several deployment map studies and measured their impact on various parts of the community. The maps (found in Volume 2 of this study) display travel time using prior Butte County incident data to reduce the posted speed limits per type of street to those more reflective of real fire truck travel times. Absent an existing County adopted fire response policy, this study used travel times consistent with NFPA 1710 for career-staffed stations and NFPA 1720 travel times for the volunteer-staffed stations. Thus, the following maps are based on 4 minutes travel for the first-due unit and up to 8 minutes travel for the balance of the effective response force (first alarm) units from career-staffed stations for coverage in the more densely populated areas. When one minute is added for dispatch reflex time and two minutes for crew notification times, Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 43

50 the maps then effectively show the area covered by career stations within 7 minutes for first-due units and 11 minutes for a first alarm assignment from the time the 911 call is made. For volunteer companies, the travel times mapped are 10 minutes travel for the first-due unit and 14 minutes travel for follow-up units. For comparison to time over distance measures, the Insurance Service Office (ISO) recommendation is for first-due fire companies to cover a 1.5-mile distance. 1.5 miles driving distance for career companies equates to 3.5 to 4 minutes travel time over the road network. For the volunteer/rural areas to achieve the Class 8B ISO recommends a driving distance of 5 miles from the nearest station. This equates to 10 to12 minutes on rural roads where the average travel speeds are higher. NOTES: In order to show the most detail, the response maps will split the County into two views north and south (N and S). Additionally, in more densely populated areas, a closer view will be used to see more street detail. On many of the maps, a station 25 is shown at Butte College as a career-volunteer station. This is a future site under advance planning consideration. As such it was included in this mapping study for County staff to see effects of adding a company from this approximate location. Map #1 Career Fire Station 10 and 14-Minute Travel Time Coverage The first map shows the location of all County career and CAL FIRE stations. Population density is a good indicator of where fire stations are more necessary and one used by NFPA 1720 on volunteer fire service deployment to identify suburban from rural population densities and therefore the type of station/crew deployment needed. NFPA 1720 considers an area as beginning to have a suburban population density when there are more than 500 people per square mile. Displayed on this and other maps is the population density from the 2000 census information. Given the modest growth rates in the County up to now, these population densities are still indicative of the suburban densities in the region. This pair of maps also shows the 10 and 14-minute travel times from the fire station network. These travels times are consistent with NFPA 1720 s guidelines for combination departments (career and volunteer) serving large and mostly rural areas. It is apparent from reviewing these maps that the suburban population clusters are the established towns, which are covered by career-staffed stations. As for travel time coverage, most all of the County s developed roads are covered within 14 minutes or less travel time from a career-staffed fire station. Open space and agricultural areas are the exception. All the more developed areas even with less than 500 people per square mile are within the 14-minute reach of a career-staffed station. The message from this map view is that the career-staffed stations are appropriately located on the road network to give most of the County a rural level of first-due unit coverage. Map #2 Volunteer Fire Station 10 and 14-Minute Travel Time Coverage This map is similar to the previous map except that it shows the location of the entire County s volunteer fire companies. Most, if not all, of the volunteer company locations are in more Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 44

51 developed rural areas and as such they also extend 10 to 14-minute travel time coverage to much of the County road network. This pair of maps does show two critical areas of fire deployment in Butte County. First, the shear size of the area and how spread out even the population clusters are. This makes it very difficult to quickly gather multiple fire units for major emergencies, if non-suburban population density areas only have one fire station each. Second, it has to be noted how far apart the volunteer companies are from each other and career locations in the towns. Many of these volunteer covered areas must wait 14 to 30 minutes or more to receive second and third-due unit support. This means that these companies are really on their own during the first 15 minutes or so during a critical emergency. Map #3 First-Due Unit Coverage for Suburban Travel Times of 4 and 8 Minutes This map shows in light green colored street segments the distribution of first-due response time for each station per a career fire company response goal of 4 minutes travel time as recommended by NFPA 1710 for substantially career fire departments. Thus, the computer shows how far each company travels within 6 to 7 minutes fire department response time from the time of the fire communications center receiving the call. Therefore, the limit of color per station area is the time an engine could reach the 4-minute travel time limit, assuming they are in-station and encounter no unusual traffic delays. In addition, the computer uses speed limits per roadway type that are slowed by actual fire unit travel times. Thus, the projection is a very close modeling of the real world. Then in dark green is the area covered by a career company within 8 minutes travel time. This is an indication of areas where two or more career companies can provide multiple-unit support to serious fires. This map shows that where the career stations are located in the more densely populated areas the locations are appropriately sited, and that better travel times (and thus outcomes) can be expected from these stations. Fire stations are appropriately located in the centers of the County s population nodes. Real dispatch data is showing some response times to be longer in the County as will be reviewed in the next section of this report. This is due to not enough primary station coverage, traffic congestion, the non-grid street network, or the crew being on a prior call and another unit covering the incident. A long-term goal for the County should be to cover 90 percent of the geography with a first-due unit 4-minute travel time coverage plan for the areas above 500 people per square mile. This would only leave the very hard-to-serve large, open rural areas or dead-end pockets with coverage in a 10-minute plus travel time range. Even with this type of response system, there would be very little overlap between station areas so that arrival times for multiple units on serious fires will always be slower than in an area where the suburban populated densities are contiguous. The message to be taken from this map is that the County s response system is spread very thin and does not have the speed and weight of response in all the areas that already contain over 500 people per square mile. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 45

52 Map #4 All Incident Locations This is an overlay of the exact location for all fire department incident types for 3.5 years. It is apparent that there is a need for fire department services on almost every street segment of the unincorporated County. The open space, wilderness and agriculture areas as would be expected have far fewer calls for service, given the very low population densities. Map #5 First-Due Unit Coverage for Suburban Travel Times of 4 and 8 Minutes CHICO This map displays the desirable suburban population density 4 and 8-minute travel time coverage just in the greater Chico area. It is apparent that between city and County stations, there is good 4-minute coverage in and just outside the 500 people per square mile area. Map #6 First-Due Unit Coverage for Suburban Travel Times of 4 and 8 Minutes GRIDLEY As with Chico, the Gridley single station provides suburban 4-minute travel times to much of the higher population density area. However for serious fires, its closest support is Biggs in about 8 minutes and then other stations much farther away. Map #7 First-Due Unit Coverage for Suburban Travel Times of 4 and 8 Minutes OROVILLE Between city and County fire stations, much of the suburban population density area of Oroville is covered within 4 minutes travel time by one unit. The exception is the western Oroville area due to limited road crossing across the river and only one station north of the river. Map #8 First-Due Coverage for Suburban Travel Times of 4 and 8 Minutes UPPER RIDGE As with the other suburban population density areas, much of the Magalia area is covered by one County station with multiple-unit support coming from the Paradise Fire Department. Map #9 Multiple-Unit Coverage CHICO This map begins a shift to measure multiple-unit coverage. Displayed for the more suburban areas is the density of fire station coverage within 8 minutes travel time. Ideally in suburban population density areas, three to four fire crews are needed ALL within 8 minutes. This map shows by varying colors where the station 8-minute coverage or better occurs. In Chico s case, all of the area within 500 people per square mile receives at least four stations in 8- minutes and some of the outer area does also. Map #10 Multiple-Unit Coverage GRIDLEY Unlike the larger Chico area, Gridley and Biggs only have one fire station each. Therefore in 8 minutes travel time for good suburban outcomes, these areas only receive one fire station. This is also problematic in Biggs, where the single career crew is only staffed with two firefighters. Map #11 Multiple-Unit Coverage OROVILLE Given the city and County stations in and around Oroville, much of central Oroville receives 5 to 6 stations within 8 minutes travel. Much of the greater suburban area of Oroville receives at least three stations within 8 minutes travel time. This is good coverage given the population density and non-grid street network. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 46

53 Map #12 Multiple-Unit Coverage UPPER RIDGE Given that the Magalia area only has one fire station and back-up support from Paradise can only come from one direction, the Magalia suburban population density area only receives one or two stations within 8-minutes travel time. Map #13 Volunteer Coverage in 14 Minutes Travel CHICO NFPA 1720 for rural coverage would recommend in rural areas at least one fire company be onscene within 14 minutes travel time. The next series of maps uses a closer scale to show the parts of the County road network covered within 14 minutes travel by a volunteer company. However, this is only the travel time once the crew is able to get to the station after being notified. This could be sometime from the 911 phone call receipt. In the Chico area, a volunteer company covers the up canyon roads east of the city within 14 minutes travel time. As such, the spacing apart from the volunteer companies is good. Map #14 Volunteer Coverage in 14 Minutes Travel GRIDLEY The Gridley and Biggs areas also receive coverage from volunteer companies inside of 14 minutes travel time. Map #15 Volunteer Coverage in 14 Minutes Travel OROVILLE As this map displays, the coverage for 14-minute volunteer companies is quite good in the greater Oroville area, again indicating the physical locations of the volunteer companies is quite acceptable. Map #16 Volunteer Coverage in 14-Minutes Travel UPPER RIDGE As with the southern areas of the County, the 14-minute volunteer travel time coverage is good, and follows the limited road network. In this area, the volunteer stations are also well located. 2.6 PROPOSED STATION LOCATION CONFIGURATIONS County Fire staff asked Citygate Associates to look at alternate station locations in the area north of Chico as the County only has one station in the unincorporated area and is in need of replacement being over 50 years old. Map #17 County ONLY Career Multiple-Unit Coverage in 8 Minutes Travel CHICO This map measures the multiple-station coverage from only County stations. With County Stations #42 and #44 so far inside the city, there is only two-station coverage inside of 8 minutes travel time north of Chico and in a smaller area south of the city. Their effectiveness for covering County residents from these locations is minimal. Map #18 Relocate County Stations #41 and #44, add #43 on the perimeter of Chico Measured here is the effect of re-locating two stations and adding one near Chico even though Station #42 inside Chico has recently been repaired with a new modular building. These three tested locations slightly shift the two-unit coverage area northwest of Chico and the third unit south of Chico. While each station is located in a denser area of street and dwelling Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 47

54 development, this three-way location strategy does not really change multiple-unit coverage. It does improve single-unit coverage west and south of Chico and places Station #41 in the midst of the development occurring north and east of Chico. Map #19 Relocate County Station #41, Leave inside Chico Station #42 and ADD a Station #43 West of Chico This model tests the effect of leaving County Station #42 as is, while relocating the other stations as described on Map #18. A test parcel near Keefer and Garner Roads was used for this scenario. The effect of this is quite good as keeping station #42 as a volunteer station not only improves first-due unit coverage west of Chico, but when combined with the other County stations, there would be 3-station coverage in the areas north of Chico along both sides of the highway. Because these career station re-locations are either close to state highways or on arterials that connect to state highways, regional fire response would improve. Traffic on Cohasset road consistently hampers current Station #42 s regional response south of Chico. Leaving County Station #42 inside Chico has its benefits as it can both add to the response north and west of Chico and assist south and east of Chico. Staffing Station #42, under this proposal, would be the volunteer fire company. Most of the volunteers live near Station #42; keeping this station for the volunteers would ensure their continued essential participation. 2.7 MAPPING MEASURES EVALUATION Based on the above mapping evaluation, Citygate offers the following findings: Finding #3: With only 26 to 38 County dedicated line career firefighters on duty plus volunteers and fire season CAL FIRE firefighters and two chief officers as incident commanders, the County s response system is spread thin and does not have the weight of response in all the areas that already contain over 500 people per square mile. Yes, there are also the additional CAL FIRE specific wildfire units during fire season, and although they respond when available, they are not dedicated to County structure fires and medical calls. Finding #4: The mapping analysis overall for the 4-minute travel time area for career fire crew staffing and the 10/14-minute volunteer travel time maps demonstrate that the basic fire station locations themselves are good in that they cover most of the more built-up road network in the County. However, as the critical tasking section of this report points out, fire stations do not put out fires or handle medical emergencies -- firefighters do. Finding #5: Map set #1 shows that the vast majority of the County is covered by a fire station within 14 minutes of travel, if the station is staffed. This demonstrates again that the basic location of the fire stations on the road network is good. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 48

55 Finding #6: Finding #7: Finding #8: Coverage at the 10 to 14-minute travel time point is a rural level of service. As such, the outcomes will not be as good as with suburban levels of effort in the towns. The area north and west of Chico is too large for a single fire station. It would be better to re-locate old Station #41 and add a station west of Chico as Map #19 measured. Likewise, Station #44 could be further south of Chico, outside the city to serve County residents. Multiple-unit coverage is thin in Biggs, Gridley, and Upper Ridge due to the single-station coverage and the distances between stations. After the historical response statistics are analyzed in the next section of this report, then an integrated set of deployment recommendations will be made. 2.8 CURRENT WORKLOAD STATISTICS SUMMARY In this section of the Standards of Response Cover process, prior response statistics are used to determine what percent of compliance the existing system delivers. In other words, if the geographic map measures say the system will respond with a given travel time, does it actually deliver up to expectations? A detailed analysis of in-depth statistics is provided in Volume 3 of this report. What follows is a summary of those comprehensive measures and findings. The sections of this report that focused on distribution and concentration used geographic mapping tools to estimate travel time over the street network. Thus, the maps show what should occur from the station placements. However, in the real world, traffic, weather, and units being out of quarters on other business such as training or fire prevention duties affect response times. Further, if a station area has simultaneous calls for service, referred to as call-stacking, the cover engine must travel much further. Thus, a complete Standards of Response Coverage study looks at the actual response time performance of the system from incident records. Only when combined with map measures, can the system fully be understood and configured. As a review of actual performance occurs, there are two perspectives to keep in mind. First, NFPA 1710 for career departments only requires that a department-wide performance measure of 90 percent of the historical incidents (not geography) be maintained. This allows the possibility that a few stations with great response time performance can mask the performance of stations with poorer travel times. In the Standards of Response Coverage approach, it is recommended that the performance of each station area also be determined to ensure equity of coverage. However, even this approach is not perfect a station area may well have less than 90 percent performance, but serve lower risk open space areas with limited buildings thereby not having an economic justification for better performance. In addition, the study must discuss just what is measured within the underperforming statistic. For example, a station area with a first-due performance of 88 percent with only 50 calls in the 88 th to 90 th percentile is far different from an area with 500 calls for service in that 88 th to 90 th percentile. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 49

56 All measures then must be understood in the complete context of geography, risk, and actual numbers of calls for service that exceed the community s performance measure. The Department s response time performance must be compared to outcomes such as fire loss or medical cases and be contrasted to the community s outcome expectations. A community could be well deployed and have poor outcomes, or the reverse. A balanced system will avoid such extremes and strive for equity of service within each category of risk. Fire departments are required to report response statistics in a format published by the U.S. Fire Administration called the National Fire Incident Reporting System (NFIRS). The private sector develops software to do this reporting to state and federal specifications. Data sets for this section of the study were extracted from the CAL FIRE dispatch system (CAD) and the Department s fire incident records management system (RMS). Total response time in this study is measured from the time of receiving the call in fire dispatch from the County Sheriff s 911 Center in Oroville to the first unit being on-scene. Thus, a 4-minute travel time when 2 minutes is added for turnout time and 1 minute for dispatch processing is a 7-minute total reflex (customer) measure. For multiple-unit calls with career companies, the outer measurement is 8 travel minutes, plus two for turnout and one minute for dispatch, which is an 11-minute total reflex measure. Data sets were cleaned to eliminate records without enough time stamps or records with impossible times; such as a 23-hour response. The data sets were modeled in a new fire service analysis tool called NFIRS 5 Alive. For this review, we are modeling the Department s prior performance and comparing the data results to the ideal per NFPA 1710 for career fire service deployment and NFPA 1720 for volunteer fire service deployment since the County does not have an adopted response time goal. Later, this study will integrate all the SOC study elements to propose refined deployment measures that best meet the risk and expectations found in Butte County. Butte County Fire furnished NFIRS version 5 and supplemental CAD data. The NFIRS 5 data consisted of 48,934 incidents dated for the 4 calendar years of 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 as well as the first part of Submitted NFIRS 5 data also included a small number of apparatus response records as well as 10,473 patient records. Supplemental CAD data was submitted separately. The CAD data covered the dates from 2/10/2004 5/16/2007 and included 159,715 individual regional apparatus responses. Of the 25,853 apparatus responses submitted 11,836 (45.78 percent) actually reached the incident scene. Of those, 4,963 apparatus were first on the scene. This first apparatus on scene calculation was used to identify distinct incidents Incident Types Over the 48-month data period Butte County Fire responded to an average of incidents per day. There were EMS incidents per day as well as 3.06 fire incidents. Butte County averages 4.37 structure fires per week. For the 48-month time period 9.93 percent of incident responses were to fire, percent to EMS and percent were to other types of incidents. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 50

57 The three years of available data break down as follows: Total Incidents 11,384 11,509 11,279 10,837 45,009 Fires & EMS 8,596 9,042 8,857 8,698 35,193 Fires 1,264 1, ,468 Structure Fires EMS Only 7,332 7,806 7,863 7,724 30,725 Note: The sub-category numbers in this table do not add up to the incidents total row, due to the way the federal NFIRS data system counts some call types into overlapping summation categories. Butte incidents occur following a predictable pattern for most departments by hour of day: Notice a minimal number of incidents in the early morning. After 5:00am the number of incidents grows steadily through the early afternoon remaining fairly consistent until a gradual drop-off after at 6:00pm. This response graph is a fairly typical representation of fire department activity. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 51

58 The number of incidents tends to remain relatively constant by day of week with a very slight increase from Friday into Saturday. The following graph illustrates the number of incidents by month. The trend is increasing activity beginning in the late spring hitting a peak in July and tapering-off into the fall. Below is a list of the top CAD-defined incident types for the 24-month period: (continued on following page) NFIRS Code - Incident Type Count 321 EMS call, excluding vehicle accident with injury 19, Medical assist, assist EMS crew 5, False alarm or false call, other 3,094 Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 52

59 NFIRS Code - Incident Type Count 300 Rescue, emergency medical call (EMS) call, other 2, Vehicle accident with injuries 2, Grass fire Building fire Dispatched & canceled en route Service Call, other Passenger vehicle fire Public service assistance, other Person in distress, other Hazardous condition, other Good intent call, other Brush, or brush and grass mixture fire Authorized controlled burning Public service Outside rubbish, trash or waste fire Outside rubbish fire, other Special type of incident, other Natural vegetation fire, other Assist invalid Fire, other Extrication of victim(s) from vehicle Forest, woods or wildland fire Citizen complaint Assist police or other governmental agency Power line down Smoke or odor removal Motor vehicle/pedestrian accident (MV Ped) Motor vehicle accident no injuries Unauthorized burning Rescue or EMS standby Cover assignment, standby, moveup Mobile property (vehicle) fire, other 100 The following chart quantifies the top property types receiving service from Butte County Fire Rescue during the 48-month data period: (continued on following page) NFIRS Code - Property Type Count or 2 family dwelling 22, Residential, other 2, Highway or divided highway 2, Street, other 1, Open land or field 1,153 NNN None 1, Residential street, road or residential driveway 772 Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 53

60 NFIRS Code - Property Type Count 429 Multifamily dwellings Casino, gambling clubs 478 UUU Undetermined Outside or special property, other hour care Nursing homes, 4 or more persons Lake, river, stream Food and beverage sales, grocery store Crops or orchard Street or road in commercial area Vacant lot Vehicle parking area High school/junior high school/middle school Water area, other Elementary school, including kindergarten Manufacturing, processing Department Response Times This section will focus on the most recent year of response activity (calendar year 2006) that was available when this report was prepared. All data is from the dispatch computer system. While many fire departments track average response time, it is not highly regarded as a performance measurement. One of the most commonly used criteria to measure response effectiveness is fractile analysis of response time. A fractile analysis splits responses into time segments and provides a count and percentage for each progressive time segment. Butte County utilizes both career and volunteer resources percent of responding apparatus in 2006 were career; percent were volunteer. Of the 17,761 apparatus responses in 2006 there were 12,581 career company responses. Of those responding career companies, 8,616 (68.48 percent) reached the incident scene. Of the career companies reaching the scene, 7,002 (81.26 percent) arrived on the scene first. This next section looks at career response times, and then volunteer response times: Below is a fractile analysis of all incidents in Time begins with the receipt of the call in the fire dispatch center. Career Staffed Crews 1st Apparatus On Scene <= 07: % Desirable Goal Point 1st Apparatus On Scene <= 08: % 1st Apparatus On Scene <= 09: % 1st Apparatus On Scene <= 10: % 1st Apparatus On Scene <= 12: % 1st Apparatus On Scene <= 14: % Actual 90% Compliance Point Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 54

61 Here is a graph for total reflex time using the same measurement above. Given the above information on County career unit responses, the response time performance is what the geographic map models predicate in that there is not enough career staffed fire stations in the County to provide suburban type response times outside of the immediate station area. Also, given the uncertainty of when the volunteers can actually respond, career crews also are dispatched and thus have moderate to very long response times to rural, volunteer served areas Response Time Component Measurements The next step is to evaluate all response time components by breaking down Total Reflex Time into its three component parts of: 1. Call-handling time time of call until time of dispatch. Only dispatch records showing a call-handling time greater than 0 seconds and less than 3 minutes were used in this analysis. 2. Turnout time time of dispatch until time unit is responding. Only dispatch records showing a turnout time greater than 0 seconds and less than 4 minutes were used in this analysis. 3. Travel time time unit is responding until time the unit arrives on the scene. Only dispatch records showing a travel time greater than 0 seconds and less than 10 minutes were used in this analysis. Call Processing <= 01: % Desired Goal Point Call Processing <=01: % Actual Performance The above call processing time is from a very limited portion of all of the dispatch data. This is because in order to ease dispatcher workload and communications frequency airtime on emergencies with multiple responding units, the units do not give dispatch a received and inroute message. Thus, no time stamps exist to separate travel time from turnout and dispatch time. Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 55

62 The national recommendations are that 90 percent of the calls should be processed to dispatch within 1 minute, 90 percent of the time. Staff can determine why the current system is a little slower than this, and short of a technology fix, adjust procedures. In the future, technology can be added to the dispatch system in the form of mobile data terminals and GPS-based location units to better track apparatus movements without dispatcher impact. This technology is commonly available and greatly improves getting the closest available unit to the emergency. Staff can explore the exact costs for what would be needed for the dispatch system already in place. Crew Turnout Time the time from crew notification to donning protective clothing to getting underway. Turnout <= 01:00 8.1% Turnout <= 02: % Desired Goal Point Turnout <=04: % Actual Performance Older national recommendations were for turnout time to take 1 minute. Over the last five years of increasing protective clothing regulations by OSHA and the NFPA, complete data studies have shown this to be a near impossible goal to safely accomplish. Citygate finds a more realistic goal is to complete the crew notification and turnout process in 2 minutes or less, 90 percent of the time. Attention to training in this critical time element can help reduce the time. Fire staff needs to focus training and tracking performance in this area and bring this performance much closer to 2 minutes. Such improvement would enhance the performance of the Department and bring the actual response times much closer to the response times predicted by geographic modeling. Travel time For career companies the data set provides the following travel time measures: Travel <= 04: % Desired Goal Point in urban areas Travel <=11: % Actual Performance, County wide The above data measures support the map models that the career fire stations are very widely spaced and cannot provide urban/suburban outcomes once the travel time exceeds 4 to 5 minutes in the immediate area of the fire station Simultaneous Call Measurements Obviously incidents that occur at the same time tax fire department resources more than those occurring when there is no other fire department response activity. Examining incident data for the 48-month period shows percent of incidents occurred when the Fire Department was already engaged in other response activity. Here is the breakdown by number of incidents: At least 2 incidents occurring at the same time 52.60% At least 3 incidents occurring at the same time 21.15% At least 4 incidents occurring at the same time 07.11% At least 5 incidents occurring at the same time 02.29% Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 56

63 The graphs below illustrate the hourly distribution of 4 or more (7.11 percent) simultaneous incidents. The hour of day graph roughly follows the distribution frequency of this same graph of all incidents. Notice the largest share of simultaneous incidents occurs from 12:00 noon 6:00pm. The pattern of simultaneous incidents roughly resembles total incident activity during the 24-hour day. This indicates simultaneous incidents are generally correlated with incident activity when examined by hour of day. The likelihood of simultaneous incidents is highest on Saturday dropping-off to a low on Thursday: Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 57

64 Since outdoor fires generally have longer durations than other incident types we see simultaneous incidents rise sharply in the late summer and early fall. During this time of year longer average incident durations contribute to an increase in simultaneous incidents. For a department of Butte County s size that also includes fire season CAL FIRE units, a threeincidents-at-once call rate of 22 percent is not too worrisome, given that most simultaneous calls usually occur in vastly different areas of the County and that other County career or volunteer units, or other agency mutual aid units can back-up the County units when the County is stretched thin close to the cities Volunteer Company Response Time Analysis During the 2006 time period there were 5,180 volunteer company responses. Of those responding companies, 949 (18.32 percent) reached the incident scene. Of the volunteer companies reaching the scene, 273 (28.76 percent) arrived on the scene first. The most active volunteer companies were located and separated out for performance analysis. The following graph represents data for each company when it arrived first on the scene of an incident: Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 58

65 Notice the vast majority of volunteer responses arriving first on the scene are rescue responses. For comparison the following graph illustrates the number of volunteer apparatus responses in 2006 that arrived on the scene whether or not the apparatus reached the scene first. While there is significantly more tanker activity this category is still dominated by rescue responses: Total Response and Travel Time Here are the volunteer travel time measurements from data that had volunteer companies arriving first at an emergency: Travel <= 00:04: % Travel <= 00:08: % Travel <= 00:10: % Desired travel time goal for 500-1,000 people per square mile Travel <= 00:12: % Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 59

66 Travel <= 00:13: % Actual volunteer performance Travel <= 00:14: % Desired rural goal for less than 500 people per square mile When the volunteer company travel times are combined with dispatch and turnout steps, the following total reflex time performance is seen: 1st Apparatus On Scene <= 00:10: % 1st Apparatus On Scene <= 00:15: % 1st Apparatus On Scene <= 00:17: % 1st Apparatus On Scene <= 00:21: % Here is a graph for total reflex time using the same measurement above. The above volunteer response times are typical of single volunteer fire companies who are spread across wide areas and must travel to their fire station in order to respond with the fire apparatus. The volunteer company travel times are consistent with what the geographic map models predicted. The 90 percent performance at the desired rural time of 14 minutes travel for areas with less than 500 people per square mile again indicates the fire stations themselves are appropriately placed Response Time Statistics Discussion Given the above summary of Citygate s response statistics analysis, the detailed data in the comprehensive statistics analysis, and the findings based on the geographic mapping section, we offer the following findings: Section 2 Standards of Cover Analysis page 60