U.S. Nuclear Planning After the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review

Transcription

1 U.S. Nuclear Planning After the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review Presentation by Hans M. Kristensen Consultant, Natural Resources Defense Council Phone: (202) / Fax: (202) hkristensen@msn.com Website: To the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), University of Maryland, October 21, 2004

2 Overview Today s s U.S. nuclear posture The threats New planning capabilities Offensive-defense planning Conclusions

3 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture 2001 Nuclear Posture Review defined: Reduce operationally deployed strategic warheads to 1,700-2,200 by Maintain reserve of responsive force warheads Maintain Triad of offensive strategic nuclear forces Russia no longer an immediate enemy, but China and rogue states are enduring opponents Revitalize warhead production infrastructure Develop conventional strategic strike capabilities Increase role of missile defense (?)

4 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture SSBNs ICBMs Long-range bombers Fighter-bombers based in CONUS Tomahawk SLCMs

5 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Trident SSBN 14 Ohio class SSBNs split between Atlantic and Pacific: - 7 at Bangor, WA - 7 at King s Bay, GA Life extended to 42 years 4 oldest SSBNs converted to SSGN ( ) 2006) 4 SSBNs on Hard Alert

6 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture SSBN patrol rate remains at Cold War level US AND RUSSIAN SSBN PATROLS Poseidon SSBNs retired Annual number of patrols US SSBNs retired Russia US

7 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Trident SLBM force All D5 force C4 phase-out D5 conversion D5-Life Extension version Intermediate-range range ballistic missile with both nuclear and conventional warhead studied W88 deployed in Pacific from 2002

8 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture W88 in Pacific Most powerful ballistic missile warhead (455 kilotons) First hard-target kill warhead ever deployed in Pacific When SORT enters into effect in 2012, nearly 25% of U.S. SLBM warheads in Pacific will be hard- target kill US Hard-Target Warhead Deployment in Pacific W88 Trendline Kristensen, 2004

9 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Warhead Improvements Life-extension extension creates new Mod (W76-1) Ground-burst fuze: new mission Flight-tested tested October 2002 First W76-1/Mk 1/Mk-4A in Sep 2007 Three-axis flap control system: 3-year 3 program to develop GPS-accuracy for Trident II warhead Flight tested in April 2003 Maneuverable RV for high-priority targets such as HDBT

10 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Implications of Trident Modernization D5/W88 Pacific deployment: first-ever hard-target kill capability in region (23 % of Pacific warheads by 2012) W76-1/Mk 1/Mk-4A ground-burst fuze strike option will increase radioactive fallout compared with current W76/Mk-4 4 air-burst option; development at the same time Defense Science Board argues for lower-yield warheads to reduce fallout 100 kt W76-1/Mk4A with GPS-accuracy would increase kill probability against hard and deeply buried targets; pave way for conventional warhead option on SLBMs

11 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture ICBMs MX/Peacekeeper retired ( ); 16 left as of October 2004 W87 warheads moved to Minuteman III; mix with W78 New ICBM in Minuteman III at 3 bases MIRV retained; up to 800 warheads $6 billion modernization underway

12 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Strategic Bombers B-52H ( nuclear( workhorse ) Barksdale AFB / Minot AFB ALCM / ACM (B83 / B61-7) B-2 2 (stealth bomber) All at Whiteman AFB B83 / B61-7/11 Carrier of RNEP

13 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Fighter-bombers (DCA) Based in CONUS and Europe F-15Es of the 4 th Fighter Wing at Seymour Johnson AFB in North Carolina F-16C/Ds of the 27 th Fighter Wing at Cannon AFB in New Mexico Europe: Lakenheath, Aviano, Incirlik, Ramstein B61-3/4/10 gravity bombs; of 1,016 weapons 580 are active (480 in Europe)

14 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Korea Contingency: Weapons withdrawn from South Korea in December : 4 th FW F-15E F squadron simulated nuclear strike against North Korea In support of OPLAN 5027 Defense of South Korea against North Korean attack (including chemical weapons) Long-range mission with refueling and defense (KC-135, AWACS, F-16, F-15) F

15 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture European Contingency: 480 U.S. B61-3/4/10 bombs remain in Europe Eight bases in six countries 180 for use by non-nuclear nuclear host countries US Nuclear Weapons In Europe,

16 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Tomahawk TLAM/N All weapons stored on land (SWFPAC, Bangor, WA SWFLANT, King s s Bay, GA) Of 304 W warheads, 100 are active and 204 inactive Periodic certification of about a dozen SSNs, but followed by de- certification Redeployment would take some 30 days DOD decided in 2003 to retain TLAM/N

17 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Stockpile Outlook Reduction Strategic Non-strategic Total

18 Today s s U.S. Nuclear Posture Stockpile Outlook Source: Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, What s Behind Bush s Nuclear Cuts, Arms Control Today,, October 2004, p. 7.

19 The Threats Defined by 2001 Nuclear Posture Review: Russia will remain the largest nuclear power with a capability to destroy the U.S. China modernization of nuclear forces North Korea / Iran / Syria proliferators and rogue Issues: India-Pakistan / extended deterrence

20 The Threats Russia is not considered an immediate threat, but: "Russia s s nuclear forces and programs, nevertheless, remain a concern. Russia faces many strategic problems around its periphery and its future course cannot be charted with certainty. U.S. planning must take this into account. In the event that U.S. relations with Russia significantly worsen in the future, the U.S. may need to revise its nuclear force levels and posture." (NPR Report, p. 17)

21 The Threats China is considered an immediate or potential threat: "Due to the combination of China's still developing strategic objectives and its ongoing modernization of its nuclear and non nuclear forces, China is a country that could be involved in an immediate or potential contingency." (NPR Report, pp ) 17) Taiwan crisis potential immediate contingency Koran peninsula potential contingency

22 The Threats China scenarios identified in 1994 by STRATCOM: Korean peninsula Not full-scale attack against China; adaptive planning mission against North Korea Direct US-China Major attack response plan needed against China Taiwan scenario (?)

23 The Threats China Returned to SIOP 1994 NPR: STRATCOM and Joint Staff tried but failed to return China to SIOP 1997: Presidential Decision Directive 60 (PDD-60) broadened targeting against China 2000: STRATCOM returned China to SIOP; CHISOP (Chinese Integrated Strategic Operations Plan) created

24 The Threats Proliferators: North Korea, Iran, Syria North Korea: immediate contingency, attack on South Korea, missile strike against allies or U.S. May have some form of nuclear weapons Iran: potential contingency, missile attack against Israel. May pursue nuclear weapons Syria: potential contingency, chemical/biological attack against Israel (Iraq and Libya issues gone since 2001 NPR)

25 The Threats Proliferators: North Korea Crisis U.S. issued nuclear threat: Congress: What role have nuclear weapons played in preventing WMD from being used by Rogue states? In my view, sir, it plays a very large role. Not only was that message passed in 1990 by the President [to Iraq], that same message was passed to the North Koreans back in 1995,, when the North Koreans were not coming off their reactor approach they were taking [sic]. Gen Eugene Habiger, CINCSTRAT, 1997

26 The Threats Proliferators: North Korea The illusion of containing fall-out: B is 400 kt RNEP similar yield Source: Christopher Paine, et al., Countering Proliferation or Compounding it?, NRDC, May 2003.

27 The Threats Proliferators: North Korea Fallout from use of a single B against North Korea Assumes depth of 30 feet (10 meters) and yield of 300 kt (actual B yield is 400 kt) Source: Christopher Paine, et al., Countering Proliferation or Compounding it?, NRDC, May 2003.

28 The Threats Issues other than threats: India-Pakistan: nuclear crisis or war, Pakistani command and control, India-China Extended deterrence: Japan, South Korea, European countries

29 New Planning Capabilities NPR States New Capabilities Are Needed: The current nuclear planning system, including target identification, weapons systems assignment, and the nuclear command and control systems requirements, is optimized to support large, deliberately planned nuclear strikes. In the future, as the nation moves beyond the concept of a large, Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) and moves toward more flexibility, adaptive planning will play a much larger role. NPR Report 2001, p. 29.

30 New Planning Capabilities actually, nuclear planning and particularly adaptive planning has already undergone extensive modernization over the last decade: 1993 Strategic War Planning System (SWPS) study SWPS Modernization completed 2003 Created Living SIOP Reduced complete overhaul from 18 to 6 months Major plan production in 4 months Limited options in 24 hours

31 New Planning Capabilities Definitions: Deliberate Planned Missions executable war plans, prepared in advance, for anticipated contingencies. Provides foundation for adaptive planning by identifying individual weapon/target combinations that could be executed in crises Examples: SIOP/OPLAN 8044, large attack plans Adaptive Planned Missions war plans generated quickly in time-critical situations Examples: Theater Nuclear Options, WMD strikes, preemption

32 New Planning Capabilities Pre-Planned Planned Mission Planning: Note: Since this chart was made, DOD has formally stopped using the name SIOP. The strategic war plan is now called OPLAN The last plan to be called SIOP S (SIOP-03) entered into effect March 2003.

33 New Planning Capabilities Some Adaptive Planning capability already existed 10 years ago Within the context of a regional single or few warhead detonation, classical deterrence already allows for adaptively planned missions to counter any use of WMD. USSTRATCOM, answer to 1994 Nuclear Posture Review Working Group Five. but Adaptive Planning is underpinning everything today and will proliferate the number and character of strike options

34 New Planning Capabilities Adaptive Planning is capability as well as doctrine: Adaptive planning challenges the headquarters to formulate plans very quickly in response to spontaneous threats which are more likely to emerge in a new international environment unconstrained by the Super Power stand-off... We can accomplish this task by using generic targets, rather than identifying specific scenarios and specific enemies, and then crafting a variety of response options to address these threats. To ensure their completeness, these options consider the employment of both nuclear and conventional weapons. Thus, by its very nature, adaptive planning offers unique solutions, tailored to generic regional dangers involving weapons of mass destruction. General Lee Butler, May 1993 Adaptive Planning is basis for preemption doctrine

35 New Planning Capabilities the Pentagon will continue pre-planning planning for the largest missions: We will continue to do pre-planning planning for our immediate and potential contingencies, but one of the important things that came out of the QDR is it's necessary to develop new tools for adaptively -- in a timely way adaptively creating plans for situations that may arise very quickly in an unexpected way. J. D. Crouch, the assistant secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, January 9, 2002

36 New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: B-2 B 2 modernization October 1, 1997: B-2 B 2 replaces B-1 B in SIOP (SIOP-98) Planning and processing of a single SIOP sortie took well over 24 hours to complete November 1998: STRATCOM orders new timelines incorporated into B-2 B 2 planning documents Deliberate planned missions: no more than 24 hours Adaptive planned missions: no more than 8 hours

37 New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: SSBN modernization October 2003: Navy completes deployment of submarine-launched ballistic missile retargeting system (SRS) on strategic submarines: enables SSBNs to quickly, accurately, and reliably retarget missiles to targets and allow timely and reliable processing of an increased number of targets will reduce overall SIOP processing time and support adaptive planning

38 New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: targeting Support of Regional CINCs and NATO: Theater Nuclear Support mission SILVER Books ( ) 1995) NATO Nuclear Planning System (NNPS) ISPAN (2003-)

39 New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: STRATCOM Theater Nuclear Support System: Assist regional CINCs with designing and maintaining theater nuclear strike plans Mission assigned to STRATCOM in June 1994: Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan nuclear Annex C (JSCP CY 93-95) 95) JSCP CY included also guidance for CINCs requesting preplanned targeting outside their own AOR

40 New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: STRATCOM SILVER Books ( ): 1995): SILVER = Strategic Installation List of Vulnerability Effects and Results the planning associated with a series of silver bullet missions aimed at counterproliferation Targets: nuclear, chemical, biological and command, control and communications (C3) installations SILVER Book developed for EUCOM and PACOM

41 New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: NATO NATO Nuclear Planning System (NNPS): Is designed to automate NATO s s coordinated adaptive nuclear planning process Enables dispersed users to access the NNPS server at SHAPE Headquarters via remote fixed and mobile PC workstations Develop Major Contingency Options and Selective Contingency Option plans (target development, DGZ construction, force application, aircraft route planning, timing and deconfliction, and consequences of execution) Prepare planning products and messages for external commands and agencies

42 New Planning Capabilities Example of Adaptive Planning: STRATCOM ISPAN (Integrated Strategic Planning and Analysis Network) Contract awarded in 2003 to Lockheed Martin for 10-year modernization (continues SWPS modernization from ) Nuclear/conventional strike and missile defense planning the system will assess a given situation and present DOD decision- makers with potential courses of action. For each option, the war planning system will determine the probability of success, potential tial collateral damage, timing and other details. Military officials can then execute one of the options, or change the planning parameters to see a new set of options based on different requirements. Lockheed Martin, May 2003

43 Conclusions Significant numerical warhead reductions, but Cold War posture maintained (Triad) Improved weapons capability and accuracy Vastly more flexible and adaptive nuclear war planning system (responsiveness is core) Capability-based based (vs. threat-based) planning Option-hungry doctrine drives strike planning Arms control disconnected from vision