Milwaukee Police Department Collaborative Reform. Planning and Implementation Guide November 2015 Present

Transcription

1 Milwaukee Police Department Collaborative Reform Planning and Implementation Guide November 2015 Present Chief Edward A. Flynn [September 13, 2017] 1

2 Vision A Milwaukee where all can live safely and without fear, protected by a police department with the highest ethical and professional standards. Mission In partnership with the community, we will create and maintain neighborhoods capable of sustaining civic life. We commit to reducing the levels of crime, fear and disorder through community-based, problem-oriented, and data-driven policing. 2

3 Table of Contents 1. Background: History of Collaborative Reform Initiative.4 2. Why MPD requested Collaborative Reform Timeline Planning and Implementation Guide Findings and Recommendations Chapter 4- Community Oriented Policing Practices Chapter 5- Use of Force and Deadly Force Practices Chapter 6 Citizen Stop and Search Policies Chapter 7 Systems for Supervision, Accountability, Organizational Leadership, Remediation, and Discipline. 63 3

4 1. Background: History of Collaborative Reform Initiative : Community Oriented Policing Services- Critical Response/Collaborative Reform Initiative The Critical Response Technical Assistance (CRTA) program was established by the Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services office in 2011 to provide targeted technical assistance to law enforcement agencies experiencing a high profile event, a major incident, or a longer-term issue that the department needs technical assistance to resolve. Since 2011, agencies throughout the US have entered into agreements with DOJ for targeted in-depth review, analysis and strategic planning. For example, COPS provided an after-action analysis for Ferguson, MO after the August, 2014 demonstrations; technical assistance to Dearborn, MI as a result of an officer-involved shooting incident; and an evaluation of the public safety response after the December, 2015 terrorist incident in San Bernardino, CA. These assessments were narrowly focused on the specific area of technical assistance, including agencies policies relating to officer-involved shootings; agencies responses to mass demonstrations or shootings; building collaborative relationships with the community; and training for officers dealing with trauma. The COPS office sought to use findings to assist individual agencies and provide guidance to law enforcement agencies across the United States. Under the Critical Response Technical Assistance program, in 2012 the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) entered into an agreement with DOJ to provide an in-depth working analysis of five years of officer-involved shootings, with specific goals including reducing the number of officerinvolved shootings and changing the culture of LVMPD as it relates to deadly force. The agreement was the result of COPS former-director Melekian s offer to provide assistance after the 2011 publication titled, Deadly Force: When Las Vegas Police Shoot, and Kill (Las Vegas Review Journal). The scope was narrowly focused on use of force policy and procedures, training and tactics and investigation and documentation. While the assessment, conducted by CNA Corp., began under the Critical Response Technical Assistance program, the final assessment was published under the Collaborative Reform heading. In 2013, under the direction of COPS Director Davis, the Philadelphia and Spokane Police Departments entered into Collaborative Reform Agreements to address deadly force policies, practices and related processes. Similar to Las Vegas, the scope was narrowly focused within the context of use of force. These reports were the first published exclusively under the Collaborative Reform Initiative Technical Assistance heading. Subsequent to the Las Vegas, Philadelphia and Spokane assessments, agencies throughout the US entered into Collaborative Reform agreements with the DOJ, and most in response to high-profile events. These include St. Louis, MO (2014); Fayetteville, NC (2015); Calexico, CA (2015); Salinas, CA (2015); Milwaukee, WI (2015); San Francisco, CA (2015). Agencies selected for Collaborative Reform in 2016 include Chester, PA; North Charleston, NC; Commerce City, CO; Memphis, TN; Saint Anthony, MN; and Fort Pierce, FL. In May, 2015 the President s Task Force on 21st Century Policing was published, and in December, 2015 the Policing Practices and Accountability Initiative was created within the COPS office to oversee the Critical Response and Collaborative Reform technical assistance programs and to, assist law enforcement with implementing task force recommendations. The President s Task Force report included a broad series of recommendations that go beyond those originally articulated by the Critical 4

5 Response-TA program, wherein Critical Response assessments were more narrowly focused within the context of specific critical incidents and related objectives. During this time, the expectations for agencies receiving technical assistance under Collaborative Reform changed from the examination of critical incidents to requirements that the requesting agency sign an MOU that, for example, left to DOJ the determination of the goals and objectives necessary to implement Collaborative Reform effectively. These MOUs also required, acceptance that participating in CRI-TA will, at a minimum, include an assessment of departmental training, policies, procedures and incidents for community oriented policing practices and disparate treatment of historically and presentday marginalized populations, including racial and ethnic minorities. This includes traffic stops, pedestrian stops, use of force and officer-involved shootings. The technical assistance, according to the MOU, does not preclude any future investigations into the patterns and practices of the law enforcement agency by the DOJ Civil Rights Division. Of the eight Collaborative Reform reports published to date, DOJ has contracted with multiple technical assistance providers to perform assessments, including CNA Corp.; the Police Foundation; the Institute for Intergovernmental Research; and Hillard Heintze. On March 31, 2017 Attorney General Sessions issued a memorandum that directed DOJ officials to immediately review all Department activities including collaborative investigations and prosecutions, grant making, technical assistance and training, compliance reviews, existing or contemplated consent decrees, and task force participation in order to ensure that they fully and effectively promote the principles outlined above (Office of the Attorney General, Case 1:17-cv JKB; Document 23-1; filed 4/3/2017). 5

6 2. Why MPD Requested Collaborative Reform Law enforcement agencies throughout the United States entered into the Collaborative Reform process (CRI-TA) with the expectation that they would be true partners in the ongoing process of identifying areas for improvement while accurately describing the current state of local and national practice. While many agencies entered into the process as a result of critical incidents, they did so with the broader goal of utilizing it as an opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to progressive policing practices, to enhance the public s trust of the agency s motives and to derive the benefit of a thoughtful, external review of their policies and practices. In November, 2015 Milwaukee Police Department Chief Flynn requested that MPD participate in the Collaborative Reform Initiative Technical Assistance process. In his request he stated, It is my expectation that entering into this voluntary process with the COPS Office will provide an avenue to strengthen and build the mutual trust between the Milwaukee Police Department and the communities we serve. Chief Flynn also stated: I commit to you both [COPS Office and US Attorney] and recommit to the Milwaukee communities we serve the full transparency, openness, engagement and effort of the entire Milwaukee Police Department. I look forward to working with you and your offices to establish mutual goals for this initiative, including comprehensive assessments of key areas like use of force, training, discipline and accountability, community perspectives, recruitment and hiring, and the handling of mass demonstrations and protests, among others. More importantly, I look forward to the results of this collaboration between the COPS Office the Milwaukee Police Department, and members of our communities: objective, sustainable, strategies that affect positive changes in the promotion of public safety, the growth of community-police relations and the next steps toward the achievement of our vision of a Milwaukee where all can live safely and without fear, protected by a police department with the highest ethical and professional standards. Chief Flynn requested Collaborative Reform shortly after the Milwaukee Police Department achieved accreditation with WILEAG (Wisconsin Law Enforcement Accreditation Group). MPD sought accreditation in order to demonstrate to the broader community that the agency met professional standards in the development and application of first rate policies, procedures and practices. However, CRI-TA provided an opportunity to have a broader community conversation about those policies, procedures and practices and how they impact the communities the MPD serves. Further, in participating in the CRI-TA initiative, MPD sought to demonstrate its commitment to ongoing reform as well as external examination. It was the MPD s expectation that external review would make thoughtful recommendations to improve MPD s level of community engagement and trust, but would also recognize that MPD is a professional agency operating in good faith using evidence-based policing practices to protect vulnerable communities from high rates of violence. It was furthermore MPD s hope that this examination would bring to the fore the crucial issue that has so far been unaddressed in national discussion of policing 6

7 practices. That issue is that the conversation about police practice cannot take place separate and apart from the conversation about the violence the police are petitioned to reduce. The fact is that for social and historical reasons the same communities most victimized by violence frequently are populated by people who are distrustful of the police. Chief Flynn and the MPD recognized CRI-TA as an opportunity to set the table for a robust community conversation about the balance between effective crime control and the maintenance of community trust, and that it would also provide a framework for the development of a community of practice that would involve agencies that had embraced collaborative reform in a mutually reinforcing effort to address both the need for effectiveness in reducing crime as well as strategies for maintaining community support. It is important to note that the CRI-TA initiative was designed to provide 18-months of technical assistance to participating agencies in order to assist in implementing recommendations and evaluate progress. At this current state, the MPD is not aware if any technical assistance will be provided and MPD has been moving forward independent of the DOJ-COPS office and their contractors. 7

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10 3. Timeline May 2015: Final Report of The President s Task Force on 21 st Century Policing is published (Chief Flynn provides testimony in Listening Session on Training and Education; November 2015: Milwaukee Police Department Chief Flynn requested participation in the Collaborative Reform Initiative. December 2015: Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services granted Chief Flynn s request. December 2015: The Policing Practices and Accountability Initiative was created within the COPS office to oversee the Critical Response and Collaborative Reform technical assistance programs and to, assist law enforcement with implementing task force recommendations. January 2015-October 2016: COPS/consultant team performs assessment of Milwaukee Police Department and the Fire and Police Commission. February 2016: DOJ-COPS hosted a public listening session at the Milwaukee Public Library. October 2016: Initial draft assessment materials provided to Milwaukee Police Department and the Fire and Police Commission. November 2016: DOJ-COPS-consultant team met at the Milwaukee Police Department with members of the Milwaukee Police Department and the Fire and Police Commission for the Collaborative Conference, wherein discussions about the draft assessment s narrative, findings and recommendations occurred and the MPD and FPC provided to the consultant team clarifications, corrections and proofs relative to items contained in the draft report. November February 2017: COPS/consultant team and the Milwaukee Police Department continue conversation, documentation and amendments relative to items contained in the draft materials. March 31, 2017: Attorney General Sessions issues a memorandum directing DOJ officials to immediately review all Department activities including collaborative investigations and prosecutions, grant making, technical assistance and training, compliance reviews, existing or contemplated consent decrees and task force participation in order to ensure that they fully and effectively promote the principles outlined above (Office of the Attorney General, Case 1:17-cv JKB; Document 23-1; filed 4/3/2017). March present: Notwithstanding the Attorney General directive, the Milwaukee Police Department affirms to the Department of Justice its commitment to the Collaborative Reform initiative, stressing its importance to both the Milwaukee Police Department and its community of local stakeholders. March 2017: Common Council members submit open records request to Milwaukee Police Department for Collaborative Reform report. 10

11 March present: The Milwaukee Police Department evaluates the draft assessment s recommendations with the goal of identifying which the department can implement internally, which it advises against implementing and which may require technical assistance, funding or other resources in order to implement. July 2017: Department of Justice informs Milwaukee Police Department that draft documents are the property of the US Department of Justice and instructs they may not be released by the Milwaukee Police Department. May July 2017: Milwaukee Police Department provides briefing to Common Council members relative to current status of the Collaborative Reform initiative and its interest in briefing Common Council members at one of the Council s standing committees. Further, MPD begins discussions about how to move forward with implementing the Collaborative Reform initiative with local stakeholders, notwithstanding lack of progress with DOJ-COPS and the ability to receive technical assistance as articulated in the original reform agreement. July 2017: Milwaukee Police Department provides briefing to the Fire and Police Commission. 11

12 4. Planning and Implementation Guide The Milwaukee Police Department is confident that a robust community conversation can be achieved with its local elected and community stakeholders. This Planning and Implementation Guide seeks to provide the framework for each of its stakeholders for that conversation. The Planning and Implementation Guide is a dynamic, work in progress document that is organized in such a way that attempts to articulate current MPD practices relative to the draft assessment s recommendations. It is the MPD s goal that the Guide can contribute to or evolve into a robust plan, developed by MPD and the community, which identifies opportunities and challenges, agreements and disagreements, and articulation of a path as we move forward together toward collaborative reform. The Guide is not perfect. It is not intended to be a finished product. One critical missing piece is the voice of the community: how does the community voice fit into discussion about supervisory review? How can the voice of the community help inform innovations to the MPD s community policing strategy? How can the department learn more about how its policing practices are experienced and perceived throughout the community? These are a small sample of questions gleaned from the draft assessment report; those that occur organically, potentially disconnected from the report s area of focus, may be of even greater interest. At a recent town hall hosted by the Community Coalition for Quality Policing, the general topic of trauma was raised, both in questions posed to the panelists and in the questions provided to the MPD after the event ended. This is a priority area of focus for the Office of Violence Prevention in its Blueprint for Peace. This topic is not directly discussed in the draft assessment, but it is one that members of the community and members of the MPD make clear is a priority for discussion. This topic, along with others, can be put on the table. General Chapter Comments, are similarly works in process. They are included with the goal of assisting in providing MPD and local stakeholders with important context. The general comments, as with the entirety of the guide, are intended to be dynamic and hope to provide an accessible foundation and framework for a robust community conversation: a starting point, per se, that may help to elucidate the what and why of items that may be otherwise in the weeds. It is intended that each section of this guide, as well as other topics that may be generated along the way, will grow and evolve with time with input from MPD and its community of stakeholders. What this Guide does NOT seek to do is enumerate retail questions, concerns, or criticisms of the draft assessment report; rather it attempts to set the stage for action toward true collaborative reform. However, the areas of concern identified in this chapter, and the particular topics contained within the draft assessment they respond to, are important areas of focus for the Milwaukee Police Department to engage and discuss with its local stakeholders: If the MPD disagrees or refutes something, why? If MPD things it was inaccurately represented, why? To that end, if members of the community feel their voice has not been heard, or appropriately acknowledged, then these conversations can and should also occur. Similarly, the Guide does not attempt to include for each draft finding and recommendation the, what has the department accomplished since the draft came out, as due to the incomplete nature of the 12

13 findings and recommendations and the level of detail in each finding and recommendation, each would have a multitude of responses which may stand to confuse or obfuscate current discussions; rather, each includes a summary of department practices, and department subject-matter experts can discuss in detail how to qualify responses, measure progress, etc., as that may be of interest to local stakeholders. 13

14 Work in Progress with DOJ Between October, 2016 and February, 2017 the Milwaukee Police Department and consultant team continued its efforts toward completion of a final report. At the same time, parallel conversations were engaged with additional members of the COPS Office. Both MPD and COPS officials expressed concerns that many areas in the report did not match the reality of the Milwaukee Police Department s work, that there was not enough context provided to help the reader fully understand the rational basis or peer context of various findings, and that there were statistical or other errors. The concerns can be categorized in five main areas: 1) The draft report does not include discussion about crime trends in the City of Milwaukee; 2) The report does not attempt to nor does it adequately describe the current status quo relative to the Milwaukee Police Department in any area of assessment; 3) The draft report heavily relies on the use of anecdotes rather than more scientific methodology for agency assessment, leaving a lack of clarity relative to representativeness and applicability; 4) Lack of peer city review and context that adequately situates the assessment areas of focus into a national context of current practices or best practices; 5) Due to the lack of consistency in assessment areas, evaluation techniques and lack of identification of best practices, it is impossible to learn from, contribute or participate in a community of practice relative to policing policies and practices; 6) The report is generally inconsistent within the context of existing DOJ/COPS literature, recommendations and other federal programs. These areas of concern, not necessarily unique to the MPD s assessment, were in the process of being addressed as MPD worked with DOJ-COPS officials months subsequent to the Collaborative Conference. The MPD and DOJ-COPS office discussed that providing historical and peer agency context is important in creating a community of practice from which similarly-sized agencies confronting similar challenges with similar goals may learn from each other. To create a community of practice whereby law enforcement agencies across the United States can learn from each other s experiences, it is important there be uniformity and consistency in the Collaborative Reform process, from origination of the MOU between the DOJ and agency, development of goals and contracting with appropriate subject-matter experts. Further, it would benefit the initiative if standard qualifications were required of evaluators sent to an agency, containing a mix of equivalent practitioners and experienced researchers. Accurate representation of the status quo, especially in a peer-city context, would serve to educate and empower the MPD and local stakeholders to more clearly understand which areas of focus may be unique to MPD, areas for which the MPD may be more or less progressive than other agencies, and 14

15 accurately depict the evolution of MPD relative to these areas. It would further aid in understanding the practicality and operability of recommendations: what is considered a best practice; how does the MPD meet, not meet or exceed this best practice; how can it be implemented; does implementation have a cost? This would certainly require in-depth conversations with the accountable leaders of the agency to explain their strategies and tactics and would include a discussion about the national community of policing practice on which those strategies and tactics may be based. Further, reports with an over-reliance on anecdotes, whose inclusion does not exist to support factual findings based on documentation or data analysis, or recommendations based on best practices from other agencies, should be evaluated with caution: though there is merit to individual opinions, due diligence should be used to weigh those opinions to determine representativeness and appropriateness. This may especially be important when the goal is to facilitate conversations about wholesale strategic or operational reforms. Similarly, recommendations should not be opinions of technical assistance providers or their contracted subject-matter experts, as they may have no more validity than the status quo; recommendations should be based on industry expertise and best practices. Based on a comprehensive review of the MPD s draft assessment report and other agencies assessment reports, it was determined that many findings and recommendations are inconsistent with COPS own previous publications, which often have formed the basis of the very tactics under scrutiny. It would be helpful for MPD, and presumably other peer agencies, if those conversations about policing tactics and racial disparities derived from those tactics were discussed within the context of Department of Justice and COPS office programs and initiatives. This conversation could serve to educate and empower both the community and the MPD to hear, learn from and understand each other s experiences and perceptions. As an example, the efforts of the Department of Justice s Public Safety Partnership (formerly the Violence Reduction Network) will naturally generate racial disparities as tactics are acutely focused on areas with an over-representation of crime and poverty. It is essential that police departments voluntarily seeking collaborative assistance be supported in engaging a community conversation about policing tactics and the potential collateral impacts those tactics may have on community trust and police legitimacy. Broader conversations about how agencies and their communities respond to those disparities can occur within that context. Law enforcement agencies can have a place to explain its tactics, and community members experiences and perceptions can have a voice in that conversation. Policing requires maintenance of community support and effective crime reduction. Unfortunately, CRI- TA reports may indicate these approaches are incompatible rather than being able to occur in parallel conversations. This example is highlighted as it underscores an area of critical importance to MPD, its community of stakeholders and law enforcement agencies throughout the country. In the draft assessment it is of particular note in the chapters: Use of Force and Deadly Force Practices and Citizen Stop and Search Policies. 15

16 5. Draft Findings and Recommendations Chapter 4 Finding 10 Recommendation 10.1 Recommendation 10.2 Finding 11 Recommendation 11.1 Recommendation 11.2 Recommendation 11.3 Recommendation 11.4 Recommendation 11.5 Recommendation 11.6 Recommendation 11.7 Finding 12 Recommendation 12.1 Finding/Recommendation MPD does not have a formal, Department-wide strategy that guides officers, supervisors, and commanders in its community policing efforts MPD should develop a department-wide community policing strategy. MPD should engage with an independent community advisory board to regularly meet with and provide the chief with input on the operations of MPD MPD does not hold all members of the department accountable for engaging in community policing activities. MPD should require command officers to define, in writing, the specific steps to be taken to identify and engage local community stakeholders in collaborative community policing efforts within their areas of command. MPD should require every command officer responsible for any operational unit in the Department to complete a routine community policing status report. MPD should incorporate community policing performance measures in their routine CompStat process. MPD should provide training to supervisors and command staff on community policing for supervisors. MPD should update the performance appraisal process to ensure that it includes (as appropriate) measurements of an employee s contributions to the strategic community policing goals, including positive police-community interaction and problem resolution. MPD should publish and post online an annual review of progress towards community policing goals and objectives. MPD should update the promotional testing procedures for supervisors and command officers to include questions and activities testing a candidate s ability to lead and direct community policing efforts. MPD members generally do not understand their roles in community policing and rely on Community Liaison Officers (CLO) to engage in community policing activities. MPD should conduct in-service training for all personnel on community-oriented policing. 16

17 Recommendation 12.2 Finding 14 Recommendation 14.1 Recommendation 14.2 Recommendation 14.3 Recommendation 14.4 Recommendation 14.5 MPD should inform patrol officers on the roles and responsibilities of CLOs and provide officers guidance on how to collaborate with CLOs in their collective community poling efforts. Community surveys indicate a gap in trust between white and non-white residents in Milwaukee. MPD should conduct in-service training to all personnel on procedural justice. MPD should conduct in-service training to all personnel on fair and impartial policing. MPD should undertake an evaluation of its enforcement activities that specifically accounts for collateral damage on community trust and legitimacy. MPD should conduct bi-annual surveys of members of the public to measure their attitudes toward MPD and its officers. MPD should continue its commitment to releasing operational data to the public through the police data initiative and beyond. Chapter 5 Finding 15 Recommendation 15.1 Recommendation 15.2 Finding 16 Recommendation 16 Finding 17 Recommendation 17 Finding/Recommendation MPD has undertaken a commitment to provide all MPD officers Crisis Intervention Training (CIT). MPD should continue the CIT training sessions to meet its completion goal of all officers trained by the end of MPD should develop an in-service recertification CIT training. There is no formal training for Internal Affairs Division (IAD) supervisors and investigators on how to conduct use of force investigations. MPD should develop and enforce a formal use of force investigation training requirement for all IAD supervisors and investigators. MPD does not have specific guidelines for conducting use of force investigations, specifically how investigations are conducted, what evidence should be collected, and which supporting materials are gathered. MPD should develop a policy and checklist for use of force and deadly force investigations that outline best practices for the investigation and mandate all investigators attempt to gather a complete picture of available information in a consistent manner. 17

18 Finding 18 Recommendation 18.1 Recommendation 18.2 Finding 19 Recommendation 19 Finding 20 Recommendation 20 Finding 21 Recommendation 21 Finding 22 Recommendation 22 Finding 23 Recommendation 23 IAD investigations of critical incidents are too passive, as investigators mostly rely on criminal investigators to collect the appropriate information for an administrative review. IAD investigations should be more proactive and be conducted in parallel fashion to the criminal investigation of a critical incident. MPD should update its critical incidents standard operation procedures to reflect a proactive role for IAD. Documentation, collection, and marking of video evidence collected in use of force and deadly force investigations are inconsistent making it difficult to determine if those investigative steps occurred or were just not documented. MPD should update its policy on evidence collection and require supervisory review and approval of use of force reports. MPD does not provide specific direction for supervisors for obtaining videos for the Use of Force Report and investigation, whether from the vehicle, body camera, surrounding businesses, or other places. MPD should update its policy to require obtaining videos, including specific direction for all types of video if available. IAD investigative files do not adequately document involved officer interviews. MPD should transcribe and include the complete involved officers administrative interviews in the IAD file and reference them in the case summary. MPD IAD reports do not reference what steps are taken to provide critical incident support services to involved officers. MPD should document the critical incident support services offered and provided to officers involved in officer-involved shooting and use of force cases and require they be included in IAD reports. Investigative case files did not reflect whether supervisors and commanding officers conducted reviews of use of force investigations to determine the need for further documentation, review, or investigative steps. MPD should require commanding officers to address the investigative process taken by the supervisor, including whether it was appropriate, timely, and sufficient, in addition to whether the use of force was in compliance. 18

19 Finding 24 Recommendation 24.1 Recommendation 24.2 Finding 25 Recommendation 25 Finding 26 Recommendation 26 Finding 27 Recommendation 27 Finding 28 Recommendation 28 Finding 29 The use of force investigations being conducted by supervisors, and the review by commanding officers and IAD, are not completed within established timelines identified by policy. MPD should require internal controls to monitor the timeliness of these use of force investigations at all levels to ensure the policy is being adhered to. MPD should conduct periodic inspections to ensure IA personnel and supervisors maintain and conduct use of force investigations and administrative reviews with updated policy information. Although audio or video recordings of civilian witnesses are required, the audio or video recording of involved and witnessing officers is not. MPD should require audio and video recordings of involved and witnessing officers to improve the quality and transparency of the investigation. MPD policy states that members with body worn camera (BWC) shall make every effort to activate their BWC for all investigative or enforcement contacts, allowing for discretion when the capture of video is critical. MPD should update Department policy and use the more directed language for these BWCs, similar to what is used for the MDVRs which mandates officers shall record. MPD command does not routinely review the involved officer(s) use of force, complaint, and discipline history in use of force investigations. MPD should require review of the involved officer s history in use of force investigations for aggravating factors in patterns of behavior, including previous questionable use of force situations, anger issues, unsatisfactory performance, or related unsatisfactory behavior. The AIM system lacks sufficient data storage capacity causing use of force investigative reports, evidence reports, and supporting documentation to be located in multiple places. MPD should update its Administrative Investigation Management system to allow for more space to keep all documentation in one location or consider one physical file location for documents, photographs, audio, video, and other document evidence. MPD does not capture or report use of force data in a way that can be easily aggregated, analyzed, and reported. 19

20 Recommendation 29.1 Recommendation 29.2 Finding 31 Recommendation 31 Finding 32 Recommendation 32 MPD should capture additional standardized data fields that capture information, including level of resistance that an offender is using during an encounter, the type of weapon an offender used or displayed, mental illness history, and if contraband was seized. MPD should increase the quantity and quality of data collected around use of force reports, including contextual information such as deployment data, crime data, calls for service data, targeted enforcement priorities, and community perception information, which is imperative for fully understanding this issue. MPD has recently announced that it will no longer be outsourcing fatal officer-involved shooting incidents to the Wisconsin DOJ, instead opting for a regional approach with other local law enforcement agencies. MPD should require that non-fatal officer-involved shooting incidents are also investigated by an external agency. MPD does not have a policy for releasing critical incident information to the public in a timely fashion. MPD should work with community stakeholders to develop a policy on critical incident information sharing and public release. Chapter 6 Finding 33 Recommendation 33.1 Recommendation 33.2 Recommendation 33.3 Recommendation 33.4 Finding/Recommendation MPD s traffic stop practices have a disparate impact on the African-American community. MPD should engage an independent evaluator to measure the community impact of its traffic enforcement strategy as compared to the potential benefits of the strategy. MPD should continue voluntary collection of traffic stop data, a practice that is to be commended. MPD should, as part of its data driven practices, provide quarterly trends and analysis of traffic stop enforcement and searches to district supervisors, analyzing data across the city, districts, and peer groups. MPD should task supervisors with ensuring accuracy of data reported and reviewing and analyzing traffic stop data to identify trends and potential bias-based behaviors at an early stage. 20

21 Recommendation 33.5 Recommendation 33.6 Recommendation 33.7 Finding 34 Recommendation 34.1 Recommendation 34.2 Recommendation 34.3 Recommendation 34.4 Recommendation 34.5 Recommendation 34.6 Finding 35 Recommendation 35.1 Recommendation 35.2 MPD should, publicly and on a quarterly basis, report at the FPC the outcomes of its traffic enforcement strategy, including the demographic trends and crime trends, identified for the quarter. MPD should require the training currently provided on fair and impartial policing and procedural justice to be delivered to all officers in the department. MPD should communicate throughout the ranks that a traffic stop quota is prohibited. Pedestrian stops by MPD lack proper oversight and accountability. MPD should immediately modify its policy on field interviews to require that officers notify MPD dispatch that the officer has engaged in a field stop and notify dispatch when that stop was completed. MPD should develop a training bulletin for all MPD officers reinforcing the requirements for a field interview, including establishing reasonable suspicion for the stop, which should be reinforced through roll call training conducted by supervisors. MPD officers should be required to clearly define the reasonable suspicion of the stop within the Field Interview Card. MPD supervisory personnel should be held accountable for ensuring timely, accurate submission of Field Interview cards. Supervisors should be provided training on identifying trends and patterns that give rise to potentially biased practices regarding vehicle and pedestrian stops and vehicle searches. MPD should conduct an audit of its field interviews to review the timely and accurate completion of Field Interview cards, proper explanation for the reasonable suspicion giving rise to the stop, and as cross-referenced against the CAD data for the pedestrian stop. Community members are concerned that MPD engages in stop practices that are inflammatory to the community ethos, particularly the reported practice of curbing individuals. MPD should establish a policy that the curbing of individuals during routine traffic stops is prohibited. MPD should provide training for officers on how to safely conduct routine traffic stops and practices for ensuring appropriate containment of individuals. 21

22 Recommendation 35.3 Finding 36 Recommendation 36 MPD should begin collecting data on curbing as part of its traffic and pedestrian stop data collection. MPD s traffic stop information system is cumbersome and time-consuming, which results in traffic stops taking a significant amount of time. MPD should conduct a review of its technology and processes for traffic stops to identify and address the reasons for the amount of time it takes to conduct a traffic stop. Chapter 7 Finding 37 Recommendation 37 Finding 38 Recommendation 38.1 Recommendation 38.2 Finding 39 Recommendation 39 Finding 40 Recommendation 40 Finding 41 Finding/Recommendation MPD policy does not provide for appropriate oversight and require IAD to assess whether a complaint should be investigated by a district or by IAD. MPD should require that all complaints are sent to IAD for review and determination for appropriate assignment. MPD s policy regarding complaints from community members allows a supervisor to determine whether a complaint form shall be completed. MPD should immediately establish a policy that requires supervisors to accept all community member complaints, including anonymous and third-party complaints. MPD should ensure that supervisors are trained on their responsibilities under the new policy requiring acceptance of public complaints. MPD policy does not clearly define what constitutes a serious complaint. MPD should develop a written directive or additional language in MPD policy that specifically defines the categories and types of complaints that are serious in nature. MPD policy does not require members are notified when they are the subject of a complaint investigation. MPD should notify members when they are subject to a complaint allegation and investigation, unless it would jeopardize the Department s ability to investigate the misconduct successfully. MPD Standard Operating Procedure 450 regarding complaint investigations is inadequate, as it does not have required time frames for completion of external and internal investigations. 22

23 Recommendation 41.1 Recommendation 41.2 Finding 42 Recommendation 42.1 Recommendation 42.2 Recommendation 42.3 Finding 43 Recommendation 43.1 Finding 45 Recommendation 45.1 Recommendation 45.2 Recommendation 45.3 Recommendation 45.4 Recommendation 45.5 MPD should establish an appropriate time frame for community complaint investigations to be completed and hold investigators and supervisors accountable for that time frame. MPD should require supervisory review and approval for investigations open beyond 90 days and every 30 days thereafter. MPD does not analyze trends, patterns, or other issues associated with complaint data. MPD needs to evaluate and analyze complaint data to inform and develop appropriate interventions, training, and policy implications across the organization. MPD should ensure that complaint data are tabulated by citywide, district, unit, and peer groupings to help supervisors understand overall employee performance and the specific factors at issue within their district to allow for active and engaged supervision. MPD should ensure that complaint data are evaluated quarterly as part of the overall CompStat process to identify trends and patterns across the city. Complaint investigation files are poorly organized, lack consistency, and are often incomplete. MPD needs to develop specific guidelines and a checklist of requirements, including requirements for case file contents and the components of the investigative process. (refer to guidelines) MPD s progressive Disciplinary Matrix is ill-defined and not applied consistently. MPD should evaluate and update the Progressive Discipline Matrix to ensure that categories of conduct are appropriately defined. MPD should ensure that the Progressive Disciplinary Matrix address progressive discipline for subsequent and repeated misconduct. MPD should require that the Progressive Discipline Matrix be used to determine disciplinary action to ensure consistency, fairness, and transparency. MPD should re-train supervisory personnel in the disciplinary process and the proper application of the Progressive Disciplinary Matrix. MPD should inform all members of the Department of the role the Progressive Disciplinary Matrix plays in the disciplinary process. 23

24 Finding 46 Recommendation 46.1 Recommendation 46.2 Recommendation 46.3 Finding 47 Recommendation 47.1 Recommendation 47.2 Recommendation 47.3 Recommendation 47.4 Finding 48 MPD was proactive and developed its Early Intervention Program (EIP) in MPD subsequently engaged a focus group in 2012 to assess the program and the efficacy of the triggers. Input was not obtained from an EIP professional for either process. MPD should engage an EIP professional to assess the overall program and evaluate the indicators. MPD should evaluate EIP to determine recommendations for improvement and promising practices by including personnel experienced in early intervention from another policing agency or otherwise. MPD should establish a standing MPD committee on EIP to include MPD personnel, the chief s office, FPC, the Milwaukee Police Officers Association, and an EIP professional. MPD s policy does not sufficiently identify roles and responsibilities related to its EIP. MPD should update the EIP policy to include standards and protocols for intervention including roles and responsibilities of the supervisor, commander, the member, and the EIP Coordinator; creation of an intervention plan; reporting and documentation requirements with associated timelines; and outcomes of the process. MPD need to train supervisors on how to create an appropriate intervention plan, how to report and document actions taken in support of the intervention meetings and EIP process, how to comply with timelines for the progression of the EIP process, and requirements for reporting the outcomes of the process. Engaged supervisors are important because they are the individuals most likely to identify early on problematic behaviors by patrol officers. MPD should revise all of the benchmarks in EIP to have an alert notification trigger for any employee receiving three incidents in 90 days and over a rolling one-year period. MPD should consider additional performance indicators for inclusion in EIP, including past performance evaluations, pedestrian and traffic stops, arrest, weapons qualifications, training history, lawsuit or claim filed, and any management and supervisory action taken pursuant to a review of EIP notifications. MPD does not examine aggregated EIP data to identify potential patterns and trends across the organization. 24

25 Recommendation 48.1 Recommendation 48.2 Finding 49 Recommendation 49.1 Recommendation 49.2 Finding 50 Recommendation 50 Finding 51 Recommendation 51 Finding 52 Recommendation 52 Finding 53 Recommendation 53 MPD should use EIP to examine patterns of behavior such as employee average activity and to conduct comparisons across officers, units, areas, and other appropriate factors. MPD should maintain EIP alerts for several years to track the history of officers flagged by the system. MPD EIP policies and practices are not fully supported or known thorough out the department. MPD needs to provide ongoing training regarding the goal, practices, and outcomes associated with Department members on EIP. MPD should ensure through ongoing roll call training that the distinction between EAP and EIP messaging is conducted in roll call training and an accompanying memo or written directive explaining EIP. MPD does not have a written directive that states dishonesty in any matter of official police business is a terminable offense. MPD should add a written directive that states dishonesty in any matter of official police business is a terminable offense. The Milwaukee Police Department does not state that the ability to testify in court with credibility is an essential job function on the police officer job description. MPD should add the ability to testify in court with credibility as an essential job function. This is the prerequisite to establishing a written directive indicating that dishonest in any matter of official police business is a terminable offense. This is a best practice for a law enforcement agency. The Department provides limited and inconsistent rewards or acknowledgements for good behavior and job performance. MPD should improve communication and support accolades that champion positive employee behaviors. MPD personnel are not often reading or understanding new standard operating procedures or Code of Conduct standards when they are disseminated via . MPD should communicate with and train all department personnel in roll call sessions immediately after dissemination of new standard operating procedures or Code of Conduct standards beyond their acknowledgement of such policies as sent by the department via . 25

26 Finding 54 Recommendation 54.1 Recommendation 54.2 Finding 55 Recommendation 55 Finding 56 Recommendation 56.1 Recommendation 56.2 MPD does not encourage an open and consistent two-way communication between command staff or supervisors and employees. MPD should establish clear and consistent communication between leadership or supervisors and employees. This should include both two-way communication between supervisors and their direct subordinates and messaging from the top down to the rank-and-file. Such communication can be verbal, electronic, or in memo format to ensure consistency and comprehension. MPD should provide training to patrol and investigative unit sergeants on methodologies to conduct regular, ongoing team meetings with their subordinates, with a focus on helping them understand why such interactions with their subordinates supports their efforts to lead, control, and direct their work. Consideration should be given to providing such training in the Supervisors course. The training should also include a focus on using such meetings to organize and coordinate community policing activities. Many MPD officers have the perception that there is a lack of transparency in the Department when determining who is chosen to attend specialized training, leading to concern that there is favoritism among personnel. MPD should establish clear and consistent communication regarding procedures for who receives training and allow transparency for such selections. Personnel whose request to attend training was denied should receive the denial in writing, including the reason for denial. MPD personnel are unclear on why the Department is driven by numbers. MPD personnel are unaware of what takes place at CompStat. MPD should provide roll call or in-service training to all Department personnel regarding the Department s strategy on using data to determine operational strategies and allow personnel to attend CompStat meetings to increase their understanding. MPD should livestream CompStat meetings so that personnel can observe remotely, as needed. 26

27 6. Chapter 4- Community Oriented Policing Practices General Chapter Comments The topic of community oriented policing is one of substantial interest to both the MPD and the community of local stakeholders. MPD s community policing philosophy is both operationalized in its wholesale operational and strategic tactics and, in a retail sense, evident in how its officers engage with the community in their everyday delivery of services. The local community has expressed concerns relative to how officers regularly engage with the community they serve and if the department s community-oriented policing philosophy is effectively being communicated to its rank-and-file. Further, concerns have been raised relative to if all officers are effectively engaging in community oriented policing and, if so, how their efforts are being evaluated. This chapter, and this general topic, in a sense get at the heart of the challenges and opportunities of police-community interactions. The MPD, as agencies throughout the nation, upholds a commitment to police practices that are unbiased, constitutional and evidence-based. In agencies efforts to effectively reduce victimization, they confront the unfortunate social reality that those neighborhoods most afflicted with high rates of poverty and violence are inhabited by people who for legitimate historical reasons may be distrustful of the police. Additionally, critical incidents involving the police may further undermine the trust and legitimacy essential to maintaining positive police-community relationships. Community based approaches to policing result in better crime fighting, and creating that reality requires engaging with residents in ways in which the voice of the neighborhood is heard and informs daily work. When the police engage with neighborhoods to reduce their level of victimization and also to improve their capacity to act together, they are laying the ground work for sustainable public safety. The following narrative seeks to provide a helpful framework of historical perspective and current MPD practices with the goal of utilizing such in the conversation about current challenges and opportunities. The MPD appreciates that local stakeholders have a particular interest in this area of focus and believes that a robust conversation can occur relative to how the public experiences and perceives its community-policing activities and how those can be expanded or refined to more effectively meet the needs of the community it serves. Historical Perspective The stresses between communities and their police departments are historic. The 1960s were characterized by a series of violent civil disorders resulting in dozens of deaths and millions of dollars in property damage. Several presidential blue ribbon commissions were convened to examine the causes and prevention of urban violence. The general conclusion was that in virtually every instance the flash point had been generated by a police action but the underlying causes went beyond the issue of community-police relations, and were inextricably related to high rates of poverty and the attendant social challenges connected with it. Consequently, federal interventions at that time focused not only 27

28 on the police but on the larger social context that had so much to do with the state of community-police relations in disadvantaged neighborhoods throughout the United States. The Office of the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) was created in the Omnibus Crime Act of Although the COPS Office would become most known for the component known as the Universal Hiring Grant, which enabled police departments to increase their size with the use of federal money, the most important component in a practical sense was the development of training by the COPS Office for the purpose of expanding the use of community policing. Though there are many practical and technical ways of discussing both community oriented policing and problem oriented policing, the current body of literature and law enforcement experts and practitioners define community policing as a philosophy rather than a set of programs. It should also be noted that the community itself may have its own understanding and lexicon relative to what community policing is. It is not about how many bicycles or foot patrols an agency has, per se, but it is about the agency s relationship to physical space and how its activities effectively intervene and participate in the problems, challenges and opportunities within that physical space, and how the voice of the neighborhood is heard and informs daily work. In this regard, police as problem-solvers is interwoven in an agency s core mission and activities. The goal from the very beginning of COPS Office training all through the 1990s was ultimately to remove the hyphen, meaning that community-policing would just become policing, and that an orientation toward neighborhoods and problem solving would be intrinsic to the notion of what policing is all about, much as envisioned by Sir Robert Peel in 1829 when he founded the London Metropolitan Police. The early stages of the implementation of community oriented policing involved problem solving training, but it did not include an announcement that suddenly police were no longer doing regular policing but instead were doing something new. One reason for this was that in the early iterations of community policing there was internal resistance to the notion that police departments were deemphasizing crime fighting. There was a great deal of consternation for several years about how to measure whether or not community policing was more effective than traditional policing in the reduction of crime. What was gradually discovered was that many components of community policing, such as the thoughtful use of police walking beats or bicycle patrols coupled with the steady assignment of officers to the same neighborhoods, significantly reduced fear of crime. It is now understood that fear of crime has a significant impact on the use of public space, as perception of safety drives behavior. Therefore being visible and accepted in neighborhoods while employing problem solving techniques could reduce fear and build trust while at the same time deploying traditional measures to fight crime. Community policing as a philosophy developed specifically in response to what was known as the professional model of policing that emphasized preventive patrol, rapid response, and specifically discouraged close community relations as potential corruption hazards. Those professional departments maintained highly detailed rules and directives governing police conduct despite the fact that it was well known that much police work depended upon the intelligent use of police discretion. Implementing a philosophy was understood differently than implementing a tactical enforcement plan. 28

29 The community policing philosophy was seen as an attitude toward the work and toward the community. Therefore, the implementation of community policing strategies tended not to be overly specific about individual roles and responsibilities but very focused on organizational principles and where to locate responsibility for long-term problem solving projects. For example, in suburban jurisdictions every police officer might have full responsibility for problem solving efforts as well as first response. In busy urban jurisdictions burdened by high call volumes, the responsibility for problem solving is likely shared between first responders and officers operating out of the district stations specifically assigned to do long-term follow up. As the concept of community policing was developed and evolved, police more actively became part of the informal social control network, as it was the case that beat cops established personal relationships with residents and actively identified and participated in interventions. Community Policing in Milwaukee - Backdrop Short term improvements in crime rates can be achieved through police tactics alone but long term improvements require the development of neighborhoods with sufficient social capital to develop the social norms necessary for public peace. As Sir Robert Peel famously said, The people are the public and the public are the police; the police being only members of the public who are paid to give full attention to duties which are incumbent on every citizen in the interests of community welfare and existence. In 2010, MPD adopted the mission statement, In partnership with the community we will create and maintain neighborhoods capable of sustaining civic life. We commit to reducing the levels of crime, fear and disorder through community-based, problem-oriented and data-driven policing - directly derived from that principle. Operations The implementation of MPD s community policing strategy is directly connected to articulating the mission of the department and physically organizing the department in a way consistent with that vision and mission. Community based approaches to policing result in better crime fighting, and creating that reality requires geographic focus, steady beat assignments and organic interaction between regularly assigned officers working in the same neighborhoods, engaging with residents in ways in which the voice of the neighborhood is heard and informs their daily work. Toward that end, MPD s employs the following community policing pillars in support of MPD s mission. These programmatic building blocks, similar to those employed through peer urban agencies in the US, address the reality of extraordinary call loads on officers and the need to balance and prioritize community policing strategies. District boundaries reflect natural neighborhood boundaries instead of being based on equalizing calls for service; Each police district having its own radio channel; 29

30 Police officers are assigned to steady beats within districts, which allows officers to establish relationships with community members and business owners; The responsibility for civic engagement is conferred to the district captain level whose responsibility it is to provide the supervision for the deployment of police resources to create safe public spaces and engage in problem solving activities. District captains are expected to develop and support block watches and neighborhood associations and to meet with them regularly; Community liaison officers are assigned to each district; Foot beats and bicycle beats are prioritized: in 2007, the department deployed approximately 80 bicycles throughout neighborhoods and in 2016 there were 136 bicycles that are deployed; Specialty units are utilized; Grants are utilized to expand opportunities with residents and neighborhoods; Expansion and development of new community and faith-based partnerships; Community Prosecution Units are located at every district. Problem-Solving and Community-Building Programs, Activities, and Partners Officers are first responders to all matters of emergencies and crisis, but are most effective when they become familiar with areas and neighborhoods and have the ability to engage in positive interactions. From the individual level to the neighborhood or entire policing district, officers have regular opportunities to be problem-solvers and community partners, whether as part of standard protocol, a prescribed program or activity, or through organic interactions with the public they serve. The following table serves to provide examples of partnerships and specialty units within MPD operations. Community Liaison Officers (CLO) work directly with the community to facilitate block watches, crime/safety meetings, crime prevention education and neighborhood events. The Community Prosecution Unit (CPU) officers work collaboratively with the District Attorney s office, the City Attorney s office, Department of Neighborhood Services special enforcement inspectors, WE Energies inspectors and specialty units assigned to the District. Community Prosecution is based on four core principles: recognizing the community s role in public safety, engaging in problem solving, establishing and maintaining partnerships, and evaluating outcomes of activities. Crisis Intervention Training (CIT) covers topics including identifying mental illness, substance abuse, crisis de-escalation, active listening, psychiatric medications, emergency detentions, voluntary options and resources for consumers and families. All department members will be trained by the end of The Crisis Assessment Response Team (CART) is a collaborative effort between MPD and Milwaukee County Behavioral Health Division (BHD). The team responds as a resource to assist officers in the field to help determine an appropriate disposition for mental health related calls for service. 30

31 The Homeless Outreach Team (HOT) works to identify and engage in outreach to provide resources to homeless individuals. It takes a multi-layered, multi-disciplinary approach that brings needed resources in areas such as mental health and substance abuse treatment, affordable and sustainable house, jobs training, placement, transportation, etc. The Office of Community Outreach and Education (OCOE) is responsible for providing services that assist the community in preventing crime and building relationships through educational programs, partnerships and collaboration with community based organizations. Partnerships The Milwaukee Police Department s goal is to embed the notion of community-building into policing so that it is not just about responding to calls for service and following up with investigations, but rather partnering with communities, engaging in preventative activities and using problem solving. Through its partnerships, MPD is able to constantly refine its best practices, be more effective, and depend on partners as liaisons to the communities. Strong partnerships with the community can be operationalized in times of crisis as well as everyday interactions. The following table includes examples of the programs and partnerships that the MPD is honored to be part of, and which participate in the fulfillment of its vision and mission. However, some of the most critical relationships are developed at the resident, block and neighborhood level. The District commanders and their respective staffs attend and coordinate many meetings and events where the police and community can work together to problem solve neighborhood issues and develop strong and lasting relationships. These meetings and events help to increase the credibility and legitimacy of the police. Such events include National Night Out, Halloween parties, district open houses and resource fairs, Thanksgiving programs and meals, Christmas programs and meals, etc. Collaborations with faith based entities are designed to get the police and community working together beyond simply meeting, by taking on meaningful community based projects that leverage the capacity within individual neighborhoods. Federal grants such as the Byrne Criminal Justice Innovation awards for partnerships in Washington Park and the Amani neighborhoods, and the Building Neighborhood Capacity Program in Amani, provide invaluable opportunities for the MPD to further engage and participate with members of the community in their shared goals of community development. In 2017, the MPD is partnering with the Center for Self-Sufficiency as part of the Minority Youth Violence Prevention initiative. 31

32 The Sisters Diversion Program Collaboration with the Benedict Center engages a harm reduction model to divert women, who are frequently drug addicted and many with mental health issues, away from the criminal justice system and into a service provision model. MPD s Sensitive Crimes Division moved to the new Sojourner Family Peace Center. The center ensures the safety of victims of family violence and provides a pathway out by providing opportunities for lasting change. The MPD Ambassador Program creates a short-term work experience enriched with mentorship, community engagement, encouraging future leaders and building new bridges between MPD and the community. The Salvation Army Chaplaincy Program volunteers are called to critical incidents to provide emotional and spiritual support. The Citizen Academy is a 7-week program designed to provide citizens a working knowledge of the Milwaukee Police Department. Zeidler Center for Public Discussion Listening Circles provide a safe space or face to face discussion between law enforcement and the community to co-create resident-based solutions. Training and Preparation MPD trains officers to apply problem solving skills through scenario-based training and within their daily responsibilities they are provided opportunities to engage with the community. MPD focuses on both Problem Oriented Policing and Community Oriented Policing during Recruit Academy Training, Field Training and ongoing In-service Training. The MPD is currently working with the Milwaukee LGBT Community Center to apply for grant funding to create a training module related to the Transgender, Intersex, Gender-Nonconforming (TIGN) standard operating procedure. Recruit Training: 4 Hours Problem Oriented Policing Training 4 Hours Community Oriented Policing and Leadership 4 Hours Fair and Impartial Policing 4 Hours Cultural Competency 32 Hours Civil Rights/Constitutional Law 3 Hours Americans with Disabilities Act Overview In-service Training 32

33 4 Hours Procedural Justice (2015) 4 Hours Fair and Impartial Policing (2015) 3 Hours Americans with Disabilities Act Overview (2017) Implementing Recommendations The Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance program as initially designed was to include 18-months of technical assistance that would contribute to agencies fulfillment of the recommendations contained within the assessment report. Because, the draft Community Policing Practices assessment does not account for the Milwaukee Police Department s current practices in this area and is not helpful in providing peer agency context, benchmarks or best practices, the Milwaukee Police Department is attempting to identify additional opportunities to receive the assistance needed to fulfill draft recommendations, including: 1- Participating with the Vera Institute in development of the national model of CompStat 2.0 (information included below); 2- Engaging internal planning activities around creation of an agency-wide strategic plan; 3- Creation of a Request for Proposals that will provide the agency and local context, benchmarks and best practices to support the MPD s efforts in creating an agency-wide strategic plan (draft included below). Along with identifying and implementing strategies to engage the voice of the community, these items will help serve as a foundation for steps forward in the MPD s and the community s community policing goals. Peer agency experience and literature in this area, including COPS publications, do not speak to the majority of the recommendations contained in the draft assessment, so there is no repository or how to for how to accomplish these. The MPD spoke at length with COPS officials about this and the MPD s desire to receive technical assistance in this area. PARTICIPATION IN CREATION OF COMPSTAT 2.0 Beginning in September, 2017 the Milwaukee Police Department will participate in a CompStat 2.0 project through the Vera Institute of Justice, in collaboration with the Police Foundation and with support from the John T. and Catherine D. MacArthur Foundation and the US Department of Justice s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office). CompStat 2.0 seeks to develop an expanded approach to traditional CompStat models that will enable law enforcement and communities to work together to not only reduce crime and violence, but to address the contemporary conditions that lead to these problems, and to do so in a non-punitive way that is supportive of officers, commanders and the community. CompStat 2.0 expands metrics used in CompStat to include data central to the success of community policing, including data related to citizen 33

34 satisfaction, procedural justice, problem-oriented policing, complaints and use of force. These expanded metrics can assist in reducing and/or preventing crime and enhancing legitimacy. CompStat 2.0 s two-year initial phase includes national assessment of current CompStat approaches and the development of a prototype that can be customized to different sized departments to better institutionalize community policing. The prototype will include community policing measures, such as data on public satisfaction with police and residents fear of crime that will allow agencies to make policing decisions consistent with community policing practices (narrative retrieved from Vera Institute of Justice and the Police Foundation). The Vera Institute of Justice will be visiting Milwaukee in September, 2017 to conduct interviews of MPD officials and community members. The Vera Institute CompStat 2.0 model may be published by the close of DRAFT Request for Proposals For Common Council Consideration The police are the public and the public are the police. -Sir Robert Peel Introduction All members of the Milwaukee community depend upon the police to operate in such a way that they can safely use their public spaces, raise their children and pursue the American dream. Unquestionably, neighborhoods characterized by intergenerational poverty, severe levels of unemployment and other social challenges rely upon the police for safety and stability more than other neighborhoods. The challenge has historically been for the police that when they respond to demands for additional police attention to high crime neighborhoods from the residents of those neighborhoods, they apply evidencebased remedies that are often experienced as burdensome and on some level may alienate residents of the same neighborhoods who benefit from the results. One of the great challenges in American law enforcement is embedded in the fact that those communities that are most burdened by the highest rates of victimization from violent crime are frequently the same communities that, for understandable social and historical reasons, are somewhat distrustful of law enforcement s attempts to address the high level of violence. The Milwaukee Police Department seeks to create new and foster existing relationships and expand community conversations within the Milwaukee community within the context of these challenges. Building on existing efforts, the Milwaukee Police Department seeks to engage research, evaluation and recommendations for enhanced community engagement around what it seeks 34

35 to do in its efforts to reduce crime and create safe neighborhoods and how those efforts are communicated to and perceived by the Milwaukee community. Positive community-police relationships invariably contribute to greater public safety, and the MPD strives for each member of the community to experience the MPD as a positive force acting on their behalf. Community-based, Problem-oriented and Data-driven Law enforcement plays an essential role in the creation and maintenance of public safety, but the overarching requirement for public safety is the existence of stable neighborhoods capable of exerting informal social control. In response to this, MPD adopted the mission statement, In partnership with the community we will create and maintain neighborhoods capable of sustaining civic life. We commit to reducing the levels of crime, fear and disorder through community-based, problem-oriented and data-driven policing. The implementation of a community based approach is directly connected to articulating the mission of the Milwaukee Police Department, and to this end the Milwaukee Police department has not only committed to community-policing in its mission statement, but has sought to operationalize it through activities throughout department operations. MPD further attempts to operationalize its community policing strategy as it participates in various programs and activities throughout police districts, the Office of Community Outreach and Education and various specialty units, such as the Homeless Outreach Team, the Sensitive Crimes Division and the Crisis Assessment Response Team. The Milwaukee Police Department seeks to embed its community-based, problem-oriented and datadriven tactics within the context of a shared understanding with the community that what the department is doing represents the voice of the community, that that voice informs the department s daily work, and that the police and the community are working toward shared goals. Short term improvements in crime rates can be achieved through police tactics alone, but long term improvements require the development of neighborhoods with sufficient social capital to develop the social norms necessary for public peace. When the police engage with neighborhoods to reduce their level of victimization but also to improve their capacity to work together, they are laying the ground work for sustainable public safety. Community-based approaches are essential to effective crime fighting and sustainable outcomes; however, with high rates of criminal activity, especially concentrated in certain neighborhoods, it is incumbent on the police to engage community policing strategies. MPD s Challenge and Opportunity The Milwaukee Police Department seeks to expand on its commitment to data- and research-driven, problem-oriented, community-based policing by integrating and operationalizing the recommendations of the 21 st Century Task Force report, US DOJ-COPS, CRI-TA recommendations and best practices from peer law enforcement agencies. Further, the MPD seeks to use the recommendations contained therein to provide a basis for thoughtful community-police conversations. 35

36 At present there is not one outlet for technical assistance that studies recommendations from each of these outlets, and no standard metric by which the MPD can evaluate recommendations for their applicability and potential operability within the MPD and learn how to implement those recommendations: the City of Milwaukee is not included in the 21 st Century Policing Initiative technical assistance, nor is there a clear, determinate path for technical assistance as part of the CRI-TA process; further there is not a repository for peer-evaluated best-practices from agencies throughout the US that are engaged in specific community policing activities. In fact, the literature in this area is sparse, and is somewhat-limited to respective agencies programmatic examples. Notwithstanding, the MPD recognizes the opportunity afforded at this juncture to build upon its current practices and engage its stakeholders within the context of these initiatives, and further recognizes itself and the community as potential participants and contributors to the community of practice that can be created around how community policing is recognized, valued and embraced by law enforcement and its respective community stakeholders in the 21 st Century. The MPD strives to contribute to the body of literature that helps to inform the national dialogue on how law enforcement agencies and their stakeholders can collaborate to inform community policing policies and practices that contribute to mutual goals of public safety, public trust and legitimacy. US Department of Justice COPS, Collaborative Reform Initiative Technical Assistance (CRI-TA) According to COPS (US Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services), the Building Blocks of Community Policing are defined as: Building Trust: promoting trust and legitimacy through procedural justice, transparency, accountability, and honest recognition of past and present obstacles. Crime Reduction: encouraging the implementation of policies that support community-based partnerships in the reduction of crime. Policy: developing comprehensive and responsive policies on key topics while also implementing formal checks/balances and data collection/analysis. Training: emphasizing the importance of high quality and effective training and education with local and national training facilities. Technology: balancing the embrace of technology and digital communications with local needs, privacy, assessments and monitoring. Officer Wellness and Safety: endorsing practices that support officer wellness and safety through the re-evaluation of officer shift hours and data collection/analysis to help prevent officer injuries. Collaborative Reform Recommendation [A CRI-TA summary and list of recommendations will be included here] The President s Task Force on 21 st Century Policing In May 2015, the final report of the President s Task Force on 21 st Century Policing was published. Pillar 4. Community Policing & Crime Reduction begins with, Community policing is a philosophy that 36

37 promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem-solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder and fear of crime. While community policing principles are incorporated throughout the report s recommendations, it includes seven recommendations specifically targeted for community policing: Recommendation 4.1: Law enforcement agencies should develop and adopt policies and strategies that reinforce the importance of community engagement in managing public safety. Recommendation 4.2: Community policing should be infused throughout the culture and organizational structure of law enforcement agencies. Recommendation 4.3: Law enforcement agencies should engage in multi-disciplinary, community team approaches for planning, implementing, and responding to crisis situations with complex causal factors. Recommendation 4.4: Communities should support a culture and practice of policing that reflects the values of protection and promotion of the dignity of all, especially the most vulnerable. Recommendation 4.5: Community policing emphasizes working with neighborhood residents to coproduce public safety. Law enforcement agencies should work with community residents to identify problems and collaborate on implementing solutions that produce meaningful results for the community. Recommendation 4.6: Communities should adopt policies and programs that address the needs of children and youth most at risk for crime or violence and reduce aggressive law enforcement tactics that stigmatize youth and marginalize their participation in schools and communities. Recommendation 4.7: Communities need to affirm and recognize the voices of youth in community decision making, facilitate youth-led research and problem solving, and develop and fund youth leadership training and life skills through positive youth/police collaboration and interactions. 21 st Century Policing Initiative The COPS Office s Advancing 21 st Century Policing Initiative provides hands-on assessments and technical assistance to select agencies. The project intends to produce guiding materials for other agencies to use in their efforts to advance those policing strategies. Select agencies include: Tucson, Atlanta, Louisville, San Antonio, and Kewaunee County Sheriff s Office, WI. There are no CRI-TA agencies involved in this initiative. Deliverables Deliverable 1: Evaluation of current stakeholder input, especially resident input. Who or what agencies are recognized as comprising the MPD s constituency at present- what information has been collected from this constituency? Including public testimony; legislation 37

38 and formal opinion of elected stakeholders; input from community meetings; citizen complaints; surveys. Compile and collate input into a report that summarizes constituent feedback, identifying under-represented constituencies. Evaluate the nature of the input, articulating the survey instrument or research methodology and whether it was randomized or based on enthusiasm or convenience methodology, and determining representativeness. Evaluation of officers perceptions of how they are viewed by the community and their roles in community policing activities. Other evaluation determined by the research team. Deliverable 2: Evaluation of under-represented constituencies. Identification of who/what agencies may be un- or under-represented relative to engaging opinions about their relationship with the MPD and their role in contributing to the conversation about law enforcement and public safety. This should include youth and adult individuals not pre-disposed to be represented in enthusiasm or convenience surveys or are not regularly represented in public testimony. Deliverable 3: Peer review of policies and practices. What activities or strategies are agencies engaging relative to general or specific community policing activities; how are those activities memorialized in agencies formal policies and procedures, or other strategic plans, and communicated throughout the department? How do peer agencies incorporate community-oriented and problem-oriented policing into new recruit and in-service training? Identification of how these may be distinguished between agencies participating in 21 st Century technical assistance or Collaborative Reform technical assistance and those that are not, and whether there are best practices from 21 st Century TA or CRI-TA that can be evaluated for MPD. Deliverable 4: Alignment of 21 st Century report and CRI-TA. What recommendations overlap; which contradict; which are operational, and it what timeframe; which require expenditure; how can these be integrated into one strategic plan? Deliverable 5: Literature review. What does the national body of literature suggest, and what context does it provide; what is the history of the topic; how is Milwaukee situated within that context. 38

39 Federal agencies publications; International Association of Chiefs of Police (Institute for Community-Police relations, and publications);community Oriented Police Services (COPS Office); Police Executive Research Forum; Major City Chiefs Association (21 st Century Task Force convening report, and publications); the National Association of Black Law Enforcement Executives (various programs); US Conference of Mayors; Joyce Foundation; Urban Institute; Police Foundation, etc. Deliverable 6: Agency strategic planning. For recommendations determined operable for MPD, create a Gantt chart of activity with respective timelines, benchmarks, community and elected partners and critical activities. Deliverable 7: Reporting and evaluation techniques Based on peer agency review, make recommendations relative to integrating operable items into MPD s CompStat reporting. Deliverable 8: Identification of operable or related items that can include criminal justice system partners, and provide recommendations for points of integration and collaboration. Timeframe Final report should be submitted six months after award, with respective deliverables provided to the Milwaukee Police Department as completed prior to submission of the final report. Finding/Recommendation Finding 10 Recommendation 10.1 Recommendation 10.2 Finding 11 Finding/Recommendation MPD does not have a formal, Department-wide strategy that guides officers, supervisors, and commanders in its community policing efforts MPD should develop a department-wide community policing strategy. MPD should engage with an independent community advisory board to regularly meet with and provide the chief with input on the operations of MPD MPD does not hold all members of the department accountable for engaging in community policing activities. 39

40 Recommendation 11.1 Recommendation 11.2 Recommendation 11.3 Recommendation 11.4 Recommendation 11.5 Recommendation 11.6 Recommendation 11.7 Finding 12 Recommendation 12.1 Recommendation 12.2 Finding 14 Recommendation 14.1 Recommendation 14.2 Recommendation 14.3 Recommendation 14.4 MPD should require command officers to define, in writing, the specific steps to be taken to identify and engage local community stakeholders in collaborative community policing efforts within their areas of command. MPD should require every command officer responsible for any operational unit in the Department to complete a routine community policing status report. MPD should incorporate community policing performance measures in their routine CompStat process. MPD should provide training to supervisors and command staff on community policing for supervisors. MPD should update the performance appraisal process to ensure that it includes (as appropriate) measurements of an employee s contributions to the strategic community policing goals, including positive police-community interaction and problem resolution. MPD should publish and post online an annual review of progress towards community policing goals and objectives. MPD should update the promotional testing procedures for supervisors and command officers to include questions and activities testing a candidate s ability to lead and direct community policing efforts. MPD members generally do not understand their roles in community policing and rely on Community Liaison Officers (CLO) to engage in community policing activities. MPD should conduct in-service training for all personnel on community-oriented policing. MPD should inform patrol officers on the roles and responsibilities of CLOs and provide officers guidance on how to collaborate with CLOs in their collective community poling efforts. Community surveys indicate a gap in trust between white and non-white residents in Milwaukee. MPD should conduct in-service training to all personnel on procedural justice. MPD should conduct in-service training to all personnel on fair and impartial policing. MPD should undertake an evaluation of its enforcement activities that specifically accounts for collateral damage on community trust and legitimacy. MPD should conduct bi-annual surveys of members of the public to measure their attitudes toward MPD and its officers. 40

41 Recommendation 14.5 MPD should continue its commitment to releasing operational data to the public through the police data initiative and beyond. 7. Chapter 5- Use of Force and Deadly Force Practices General Chapter Comments MPD has demonstrated a commitment to a reduction in uses of force and, specifically, the use of deadly force. Restraint, as one of the Department s seven core values necessitates that police officers use the minimum force and authority necessary to accomplish a proper police purpose and that selfdiscipline is enacted, even when no one is listening or watching. It is further expected that officers act in proportion to the seriousness of the offense when confronted with a use of force situation, and a violation of this value may result in discipline up to and including termination. Improved technology within the Department provides that few instances of force are unseen or unheard and MPD s activity within the community also affords community members the opportunity to bear witness when restraint is properly or improperly practiced. Police officers are frequently in the public eye and the MPD has been very progressive in capturing video involving officer-citizen contacts with the use of body worn cameras, patrol in-squad video, and Axon interview room hardware, which records interrogations. The MPD has aggressively implemented its body worn camera program, and all sworn police officers have been trained and issued body worn cameras. In addition, the Department collects video evidence in regards to use of force investigations, but clarification is needed in our policies and procedures as to how these videos are collected, reviewed and inventoried. Each use of force incident is investigated and reviewed between multiple levels within the department and recommendations are made relative to the documented activities of involved officers. The MPD identifies outliers for uses of force and supervisors; commanding officers are expected to be familiar with and conduct debriefings with those identified officers who have met certain thresholds. Documented uses of force have declined nearly every year during Chief Flynn s tenure, as reported by Dr. Steven Brandl of the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee. External evaluations are also conducted for accountability purposes and Dr. Brandl authors bi-annual reports on MPD s use of force incidents to the Fire and Police Commission for its review. Overall, the report indicates that officer use of force investigations are of good quality, that the department provides extensive training to new supervisors, and that the department has held refresher in-service sessions for supervisors. It is important to note that technology limitations prevent us from gathering all of our use of force data (reports, video, recorded statements, etc.) in one system, but the 41

42 department is committed to researching ways to include all of this information in one system so it can be easily accessed and reviewed for continued analysis of patterns and trends. The MPD requires and has promoted professional training and officers are continually seeking and engaging in scenario-based training and de-escalation tactics. The department has committed to training all patrol officers and supervisors in Crisis Intervention Training (CIT) by the end of 2017 and will continue this pledge throughout 2018 to develop advanced CIT program. Technology, training and accountability has provided officers with the tools to make better decisions and supported a changing culture within the police department to be guardians of the trust from the community. There are some recommendations and findings beyond the scope of the department, as MPD does not have authority over the process and release of information related to fatal officer-involved shootings. Wis. Stat requires an outside agency to conduct fatal officer-involved shooting investigations. In addition, the draft report should note that the department does not have the authority to dictate policy to other agencies who investigate MPD s critical incidents; Memorandums of Understanding provide this authority. Finding 15 Recommendation 15.1 MPD has undertaken a commitment to provide all MPD officers Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) training. MPD should continue the CIT training sessions to meet its completion goal of all officers trained by the end of Recommendation 15.2 MPD should develop an in-service recertification CIT training. MPD received a $500,000 grant from the Greater Milwaukee Foundation and is currently in the process of training all patrol officers in Crisis Intervention Training (CIT). All police officers will attend a 40-hour training course that has been developed to provide police officers with the tools to handle incidents involving people in mental crisis. The primary purpose of CIT is to provide law enforcement with the skills necessary to safely de-escalate situations involving people with mental illness who are in crisis. Since recruit class #3-2014, all new recruits have received this 40 hour block of training during their police academy training, which helps ensure all new recruits become CIT certified. MPD is developing an advanced CIT for those members who have voluntarily requested to attend. This will serve as continuing education for department members. Finding 16 There is no formal training for Internal Affairs Division (IAD) supervisors and investigators on how to conduct use of force investigations. MPD should develop and enforce a formal use of force investigation Recommendation 16 training requirement for all IAD supervisors and investigators. All members who are promoted to a sworn supervisory position are required to attend supervisory development training. During this training, instruction is provided to new supervisors on use of force incidents (investigations and reporting) as well as instruction on the conduction of personnel investigations and citizen complaints. New supervisors receive extensive instruction in the Administration Investigations Management (AIM) system that is utilized to record all use of force 42

43 incidents and how to conduct a related investigation. It should be noted that an additional layer of oversight exists for the review of force reports, as each force report is shared with a certified master DAAT instructor assigned to the academy. This review is used to identify training issues that may exist systemically in the Department or in the individual officer, but also in developing scenario-based training events based on real-life occurrences Finding 17 MPD does not have specific guidelines for conducting use of force investigations, specifically how investigations are conducted, what evidence should be collected, and which supporting materials are gathered. MPD should develop a policy and checklist for use of force and deadly force investigations that outline best practices for the investigation and mandate all investigators attempt to gather a complete picture of available information in a consistent manner. Recommendation 17 All supervisors are given a Use of Force Documentation Checklist which contains specific guidelines for conducting use of force investigations, including background information, approach considerations, intervention options, follow-thru considerations and investigative findings. MPD agrees that SOP 460 Use of Force can be updated to reference this checklist. Finding 18 Recommendation 18.1 IAD investigations of critical incidents are too passive, as investigators mostly rely on criminal investigators to collect the appropriate information for an administrative review. IAD investigations should be more proactive and be conducted in parallel fashion to the criminal investigation of a critical incident. MPD should update its critical incidents standard operation procedures to Recommendation 18.2 reflect a proactive role for IAD. IAD supervisors respond to the scene of critical incidents. IAD supervisors do not conduct interviews at the scene so they do not interfere with or otherwise jeopardize the criminal investigation. While the IAD investigation does rely on interviews and evidence collected by criminal investigators as part of the administrative review, it is not solely based on the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation is to determine whether or not a crime has been committed. The administrative investigation is to determine whether or not a violation of the department Code of Conduct or standard operating procedures has occurred, which includes, but also goes beyond whether or not a crime has been committed. IAD sergeants conduct independent interviews of the primary officers involved in a critical incident and must make a determination, in consultation with their commanding officer(s) as to whether or not additional interviews of other officers or witnesses are required. Other information/evidence gathered as part of the administrative investigation may or may not be gathered by criminal investigators and includes, but is not limited to, CAD records, 911 and dispatch recordings, staffing and scheduling documents, video, use of force history, training records, etc. According to the commanding officer of the Internal Affairs Division and the direction given by the executive commanders of Risk Management, the direction of investigations into critical incidents are going to be conducted in a parallel manner with the criminal investigation, but not in conjunction. As indicated, the scope of their inquiry will be conducted based on possible violations of Code of Conduct, Standard Operating Procedures and/or the identification of training issues and needs. This parallel investigation is conducted based on information known to the Internal Affairs investigators and Department documents prepared and gathered (above) subsequent to the incident that may not 43

44 necessarily or immediately include the criminal investigatory reports completed by an outside agency. As indicated, the Department has no authority over the timely completion of reports complied by an outside investigating agency. PI-21 interviews (compelled administrative interviews) are issued when/if the involved officer refuses to make a statement to the criminal investigators and additional PI-21 interviews may be conducted after a thorough review of the criminal reports once received. Non-involved and witness officers are compelled to provide statements to the Internal Affairs investigators for their administrative inquiry. After the completion and submission of criminal investigatory reports are submitted to the Department, the commanding officer of IAD (or their designee) conducts a thorough and review of the entire file and determines the necessity of additional independent interviews and evidence gathering to support the nature of the internal investigation and direction. It should be noted SOP (E) does explicitly state, At the direction of the Chief of Police or designee, all critical incidents shall cause a separate internal investigation by the Internal Affairs Division to be conducted pursuant to SOP 450 Personnel Investigations immediately following the conclusion of, or concurrent with, the criminal investigation of the incident. In addition, a representative of IAD will respond to the scene of every critical incident. A walkthrough will be done for purposes of conducting an administrative review investigation. An administrative review of the incident is not complete and will not be closed until the Critical Incident Review Board (CIRB) conducts a review and presents the findings before members of the executive command staff and Chief of Police. Some evidence gathered during the IAD investigation often cannot be used in the criminal investigation. This necessary walling off of compelled information from the criminal investigators is required by law under Wis. Stat. 164 (Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights), and MPD makes every effort to comply with this requirement by having a clear separation between the criminal and administrative process. Also, Wis. Stat requires that an outside investigator conduct the criminal investigation into all police-related deaths. Consequently, MPD often does not have access to all of the necessary information for our internal administrative review until the criminal case is completed and reviewed by the Milwaukee County District Attorney s Office. We are in agreement with the concept of concurrent criminal and administrative investigations and we do initiate both investigations at the same time, but we find that legal as well as procedural barriers often slow down the internal case. It is important to note that while Wis. Stat (3)(c) does allow for an internal investigation to be conducted, it cannot interfere with the outside agencies investigation. A best practice review, taking into account Wisconsin s unique legal requirements, would be helpful in this area as the department would require technical assistance for this review. Finding 19 Recommendation 19 Finding 20 Recommendation 20 Documentation, collection, and marking of video evidence collected in use of force and deadly force investigations aren t consistent making it difficult to determine if those investigative steps occurred or were just not documented. MPD should update its policy on evidence collection and require supervisory review and approval of use of force reports. MPD does not provide specific direction for supervisors for obtaining videos for the Use of Force Report and investigation, whether from the vehicle, body camera, surrounding businesses, or other places. MPD should update its policy to require obtaining videos, including specific direction for all types of video if available. 44

45 In 2013, fields were added in the AIM System s Use of Force report, specifically addressing whether or not there was video evidence related to an incident, and if so, the name of the supervisor(s) who reviewed the video. In 2013, the collection and review of video evidence for use of force incidents was and continues to be addressed with all new supervisors at supervisory development training. It should be noted SOP (D)(1)(c) clearly states under the specific directions for completing the Use of Force report in the details field to Indicate if video or audio was available and the name of the supervisor who reviewed the video. An electronic (CD/DVD) copy of the video should be forwarded to IAD. In addition, SOP (A)(2)(Mobile Digital Audio / Recording (MVDR) Equipment) clearly states under MDVR evidence, Members are to notify their supervisor if a video recording documents an arrest, a pursuit, use of force, evidence collection or some other incident in which the video file may be required as evidence or would be appropriate for training purposes. In addition, the member shall also complete the Video File Request Report (form PV-10E) and fax the form to Open Records at extension Video files are only retained for 120 days from the date of creation unless the PV-10 is completed and forwarded to Open Records. SOP (G)(2) (Body Worn Cameras) also clearly states how members must categorize body worn camera video when it is downloaded, and two of the categories include use of force and critical incidents. Once the video is categorized, it ensures body worn camera video is maintained for seven years from the date of recording for use of force incidents and critical incident video is permanently maintained. Supervisory review and approval is required for Use of Force reports. SOP 460 directs that after the use of force report is filed by a supervisor, it must be tracked to the shift commander for review and then to the commanding officer for his/her recommendation. There is a tracking record with each report indicating when and to which supervisor the report was assigned, and the date the supervisor completed their level of review. SOP (B)(2-7) specifically states: 2. The supervisor responsible for filing a Use of Force Report shall obtain a number in the AIM system prior to securing from duty on the date in which the incident occurred. The member(s) and subject(s) names, date, time and location of the incident shall also be entered on the same date the number was generated. 3. In any situation which triggers the filing of a Use of Force Report photographs must be taken of the subject against whom force was used, to illustrate any injury or lack thereof. 4. The Use of Force Report is to be completed and tracked to the appropriate supervisor/shift commander within 3 days of the incident. A critical incident Use of Force Report shall be filed in accordance with section Each subsequent review by the shift commander/commanding officer shall be completed and tracked in an expeditious manner. 6. Reports shall be thoroughly completed and reviewed within seventeen (17) days following the date on which the incident occurred and then tracked to the Internal Affairs Division. 7. The Internal Affairs Division shall review reports within fourteen (14) days following receipt from the commanding officer of that location. 45

46 Finding 21 IAD investigative files do not adequately document involved officer interviews. MPD should transcribe and include the complete involved officers administrative interviews in the IAD file and reference them in the case Recommendation 21 summary. Implementation of this recommendation would be dependent on budgetary authority. MPD does not currently have the technical capabilities or personnel necessary to transcribe entire interviews. All officer interviews are recorded and a CD is created with the recording of each statement. IAD supervisors summarize officer involved interviews in their written reports. Finding 22 MPD IAD reports do not reference what steps are taken to provide critical incident support services to involved officers. MPD should document the critical incident support services offered and provided to officers involved in officer-involved shooting and use of force Recommendation 22 cases and require they be included in IAD reports. Currently, SOP (F)(2) (Officer-Involved Deaths and Other Critical Incidents) requires the primary and secondary member(s) involved in a critical incident to attend a confidential psychological debriefing with a mental health professional within 72 hours following the critical incident unless unusual circumstances arise. Arrangements for the debriefing and any subsequent counseling sessions are made through the Early Intervention Program (EIP). After mandatory debriefs are completed, a letter of completion is submitted by a mental health professional to the Early Intervention Program (EIP) administrator. A copy is also retained in the Office of the Chief and the EIP administrator provides the Internal Affairs Division with a copy of the completion letter for their files. It should be noted SOP 453 is currently in the process of being revised to ensure officers receive even more support services following a critical incident. The department has recently retained a department psychologist to assist members in successfully returning to active service following a critical incident. In addition to the above requirements, the revised policy will require the primary and secondary member(s) to attend a follow up confidential psychological debriefing with the department psychologist days following the critical incident and then again in six months following the critical incident. In addition, if a member is involved in more than one critical incident as a primary or secondary officer, the member will be required to attend a follow up confidential psychological debriefing with the department psychologist one year following the critical incident. Finding 23 Investigative case files did not reflect whether supervisors and commanding officers conducted reviews of use of force investigations to determine the need for further documentation, review, or investigative steps. MPD should require commanding officers to address the investigative process taken by the supervisor, including whether it was appropriate, timely, and sufficient, in addition to whether the use of force was in Recommendation 23 compliance. All use of force reports have a tracking record which reflects the various levels of review. In accordance with SOP (B), Use of Force reports: Must be completed by a supervisor within three days of the incident (the report must be 46

47 started the same day as well); Tracked to a shift commander for review and then tracked to a commanding officer (or designee) for review and recommendation (fourteen days is allotted for combined review by the shift commander and commanding officer), and The use of force report is tracked to the IAD for final review by a supervisor who is certified by the State of Wisconsin as an instructor of Defense and Arrest Tactics (DAAT). Use of force reports may be sent back to the authoring supervisor for corrections or additional investigation if there are omissions or deficiencies in the investigative process. This may be documented in the AIM report by requiring the supervisor to complete corrections, follow up needed, or further investigation needed. Examples include separately documenting statements of all officers using force; separate sworn and civilian witness statements and the subject on whom force was used; reviewing and documenting the review of video; and including information on injuries or medical treatment. In addition, SOP (G)(1 and 2) requires the member s commanding officer to review the AIM system Use of Force report and enter a recommendation under Incident Tracking. When the commanding officer determines the use of force is in compliance, these reports are forwarded through Incident Tracking and general information Status directly to the appropriate supervisor of the Internal Affairs Division. The Use of Force SOP further states if the review finds the member s use of force was not in compliance, training is needed, or if there are serious injuries requiring admission to a hospital or if death occurs, the commanding officer shall enter a recommendation under Incident Tracking. These reports shall be forwarded through Incident Tracking and general information Status directly to their respective bureau commander. Commanding officers may at any other time notify their bureau commander, and forward the Use of Force report to their bureau commander. Finding 24 Recommendation 24.1 The use of force investigations being conducted by supervisors, and the review by commanding officers and IAD, are not completed within established timelines identified by policy. MPD should require internal controls to monitor the timeliness of these use of force investigations at all levels to ensure the policy is being adhered to. MPD should conduct periodic inspections to ensure IA personnel and supervisors maintain and conduct use of force investigations and Recommendation 24.2 administrative reviews with updated policy information. The Internal Affairs Division strives to complete all investigations within 60 days of initiation. When investigations are forwarded to work location commanding officers for review, they are assigned due dates that allow for the completion and review of an investigation within that time frame. Work locations are given 45 days to complete an investigation as this allows an additional 15 days for review by the respective assistant chief and final forwarding to IAD. If at any level of the review deficiencies are discovered or additional investigation is required, it may be remanded to the work location, which may require the investigation to extend beyond 60 days. Auditing of outstanding investigations is conducted weekly by IAD and commanding officers are required to submit written documentation to account for any delays if the investigation cannot be completed with 45 days. Requests for extensions may be made by the IAD commanding officer and when an extended due date is granted, follow up is conducted to ensure completion by that date and additional documentation is required to explain the extended delay. Supervisory oversight by the commanding officer of IAD, the respective bureau inspectors and respective assistant chiefs helps to ensure accountability in completing investigations in a reasonable amount of time. MPD SOP 450 Personnel Investigations can be revised to include these 47

48 current timelines. It should be noted that complaints vary in complexity and a fixed completion period is impractical as these investigations are dependent upon factors such as the number and availability of complainants, witnesses, involved members; availability or unavailability of evidence; involvement of outside agencies (district attorney s office, city attorney s office, etc.); and state laws regarding officers rights in interviews and due process in discipline. Experience has shown taking a reasonable amount of time to conduct a complete, thorough, and impartial investigation better suits the interest of all parties involved than adherence to a strict timeline, which may result in inferior investigations. Finding 25 Although audio or video recordings of civilian witnesses are required, the audio or video recording of involved and witnessing officers is not. MPD should require audio and video recordings of involved and witnessing officers to improve the quality and transparency of the Recommendation 25 investigation. The practice of not video or audio recording officer statements is in part due to the recognition that officers have a legal right to decline any voluntary interview and will very often choose not to make a statement in the criminal case if it is recorded. The department has not made this a requirement because each officer has the right to consult with an attorney and many attorneys will advise against giving a recorded statement. The department s policy with citizen witnesses is to inform them that MPD would like to take a recorded statement, and if they decline, the department will conduct an unrecorded interview. It should be noted SOP 453 (Officer-Involved Deaths and Other Critical Incidents) is currently in the process of being revised and one of the revisions will remove the requirement that citizen interviews must be recorded. The policy will specifically remind sworn personnel that citizen interviews are consensual in nature and that citizens have the right to refuse to be recorded. The department also acknowledges that the state law requiring an outside agency to conduct an investigation into police-involved deaths takes this decision out of the department s hands as MPD, by law, cannot control the investigative process of any outside agency if they require the interviews to be recorded. Finding 26 MPD policy states that members with body worn camera (BWC) shall make every effort to activate their BWC for all investigative or enforcement contacts, allowing for discretion when the capture of video is critical. MPD should update Department policy and use the more directed language for these BWCs, similar to what is used for the MDVRs which Recommendation 26 mandates officers shall record. SOP (C) (Body Worn Cameras) currently requires members to activate their body worn cameras as soon as it safe and practical to do so as the policy specifically states, The department recognizes that officer safety is paramount. MPD agrees that this SOP can be updated to include the language shall record. Members with a BWC who arrive on a scene or engage in an enforcement contact must start recording as soon as it is safe and practical to do so. If multiple members are on scene with a BWC, all members with a BWC will record. In addition, this section requires members to make every effort to activate their body worn cameras 48

49 for all investigative or enforcement contacts, including, but not limited to: Vehicle stops Impaired driver investigations Field interviews and pedestrian stops Transporting citizens or prisoners Searches of persons or property Dispatched calls for service Crime scenes Crash scenes (may be turned off if member is waiting on a tow truck and no additional enforcement activity is likely) Advising a subject of Miranda warnings (in the field or without MediaSolv) Suspect/witness statements and interviews Vehicle and foot pursuits Emergency response to critical incidents. Finding 27 MPD command does not routinely review the involved officer(s) use of force, complaint, and discipline history in use of force investigations. MPD should require review of the involved officer s history in use of force investigations for aggravating factors in patterns of behavior, including previous questionable use of force situations, anger issues, unsatisfactory Recommendation 27 performance, or related unsatisfactory behavior. It is important to distinguish between a use of force incident, in which wrongdoing by the officer is not implicit, and a personnel investigation of inappropriate/excessive force in which non-compliance with the Code of Conduct, Standard Operating Procedure, or training is alleged. The above listed concerns are addressed in collaboration with the Use of Force Committee, the Critical Incident Review Board (which reviews all critical and sentinel incidents), the Early Intervention Program and the Internal Affairs Division. Use of force incidents may be investigated as personnel investigations or be addressed with policy review or remedial training. Commanding officers have AIM access to review all use of force incidents, closed personnel investigations and complaints involving members under their command. The Use of Force Committee conducts periodic comprehensive reviews of use of force issues affecting the department. It should be noted as part of this process the committee identifies outliers who statistically use force more than their peers. Commanding officers are required to take a proactive approach with those members identified as outliers. The committee meets quarterly and focuses on, but is not limited to, the following: Appropriateness of use of force by department members. Proper field supervision and supervisory review of use of force incidents. Application and effectiveness of department policies and procedures concerning the use of force. Proper use and effectiveness of equipment. Effectiveness of use of force training. Identification of training needs and opportunities for department members. The Critical Incident Review Board (CIB) responsibilities are enumerated in SOP 455 and during the CIRB review, the board deliberates for the purpose of preparing a written report for the Chief of Police, which contains a synopsis of the incident, identities of the members and citizens involved, and information including, but not limited to, the following: 49

50 The appropriateness of any actions or other factors leading up to the incident that resulted in the use of force. Proper administrative review of the use of force. Proper field supervision. Adherence to or deviation from department policy relevant to the incident under review. Effectiveness of department policy and suggestions for changes if necessary. Adherence to or deviation from department training and standards. Identification of training needs and opportunities. Proper use and functionality of department equipment. Any other factors that may pertain to improving our service to the community. In addition to the above reviews, SOP (F) (Personnel Investigations) requires, The commanding officer of the Internal Affairs Division shall cause a review of personnel investigations every six months to identify patterns of allegations concerning members of the department. If a pattern of allegations has been identified, the Internal Affairs Division shall notify the member s commanding officer. The member s commanding officer shall review the identified pattern of allegations with the member and determine if training or further action is required to address the pattern of allegations. The member s commanding officer shall document the course of action deemed appropriate to address the pattern of allegations in the After Action Report in the AIM System and track the report in AIM to the Internal Affairs Division. Finding 28 The AIM system lacks sufficient data storage capacity causing use of force investigative reports, evidence reports, and supporting documentation to be located in multiple places. MPD should update its Administrative Investigation Management system to allow for more space to keep all documentation in one location or consider one physical file location for documents, photographs, audio, Recommendation 28 video, and other document evidence. Implementation of these recommendations would be dependent on budgetary authority. At this time internal investigation/complaint files are not contained within the Administration Investigation Management (AIM) system as this system does not have the capability to contain all of the investigative files. However, there are paper files maintained at IAD. MPD has multiple stand-alone systems and this is currently being addressed with the purchase and implementation of the new TriTech RMS system. The Office of Police Information System Services will need to follow up with On Target Performance Systems to see if the AIM software can be integrated with the new TriTech RMS System, which will require funding and technical assistance. Finding 29 Recommendation 29.1 MPD does not capture or report use of force data in a way that can be easily aggregated, analyzed, and reported. MPD should capture additional standardized data fields that capture information, including level of resistance that an offender is using during an encounter, the type of weapon an offender used or displayed, mental illness history, and if contraband was seized. 50

51 MPD should increase the quantity and quality of data collected around use of force reports, including contextual information such as deployment data, crime data, calls for service data, targeted enforcement priorities, and community perception information, which is imperative for fully Recommendation 29.2 understanding this issue. Implementation of these recommendations would be dependent on budgetary authority. Steven Brandl, Ph.D., of the University of Wisconsin Milwaukee Helen Bader School of Social Welfare is provided MPD data to author a bi-annual report on officer use of force. Since 2009, this report has been published and is available on the Fire and Police Commission s public website. Analysis on Use of Force reports includes type of force, subject of force, actions that generated the incident, broken down by police and aldermanic districts. Dr. Brandl also provides a bi-annual presentation to the Fire and Police Commission. In the 2015 annual report Dr. Brandl states, The AIM system is not particularly well suited for the analysis of data. The process of converting the AIM system data to a format for statistical analysis is labor intensive and time consuming. MPD would require funding and technical assistance with this recommendation as it may result in the department having to utilize a different software to capture use of force data. Funding would be required to obtain new software and conduct user training for all members. Finding 31 MPD has recently announced that it will no longer be outsourcing fatal officer-involved shooting incidents to the Wisconsin DOJ, instead opting for a regional approach with other local law enforcement agencies. MPD should require that non-fatal officer-involved shooting incidents are Recommendation 31 also investigated by an external agency. The implementation of this recommendation would require Criminal Justice System participation and an intergovernmental agreement with surrounding agencies. MPD is part of the Milwaukee County Law Enforcement Executives Association Memorandum of Understanding (including Wisconsin DOJ) which dictates Investigation of Law Enforcement Involved Fatalities/Great Bodily Harm. However, suburban jurisdictions do not have the capacity to investigation all MPD officer involved non-fatal shooting incidents. MPD cannot require that outside agencies comply with this proposed recommendation. This MOU with surrounding municipal agencies will alleviate concerns about response times, as historically Wisconsin DOJ has taken hours to respond to critical incidents. This new regional approach will also address the concern and perception of using retired MPD personnel, who are employed by the Wisconsin DOJ to investigate fatal officer-involved shooting incidents. Wisconsin state law only mandates this type of procedure when the officer involved shooting results in a fatality Wisconsin Act 348, Wis. Stat investigation of a death involving a law enforcement officer specifically states: (2) Each law enforcement agency shall have a written policy regarding the investigation of officer-involved deaths that involve a law enforcement officer employed by the law enforcement agency. (3) (a) Each policy under sub. (2) must require an investigation conducted by at least two investigators, one of whom is the lead investigator and neither of whom is employed by a law enforcement agency that employs a law enforcement officer involved in the officerinvolved death. Finding 32 Recommendation 32 MPD does not have a policy for releasing critical incident information to the public in a timely fashion. MPD should work with community stakeholders to develop a policy on critical incident information sharing and public release. 51

52 The department currently does not release any detailed information, including any applicable video, until the Milwaukee County District Attorney s Office has reviewed the incident and presented its finding to the department and victim s family. Every incident is unique and requires weighing the facts to balance the public s expectation to know with the integrity of the investigation. MPD needs to consider best practice such as San Diego Police Department s policy regarding the release of video, which was crafted with input from attorneys, community members, elected officials and representatives from civil rights and media organizations. This policy allows for the video to be released as soon as it is appropriate to do so, but not until the district attorney has reviewed the critical incident and presented its findings to the agency involved. They also will not release video if the officer is criminally charged. 52

53 8. Chapter 6- Citizen Stop and Search Policies General Chapter Comments The vision, mission and core values of the Milwaukee Police Department are designed to improve levels of community trust and establish a professional agency which operates in good faith to protect vulnerable communities from high rates of violence. All members of the Milwaukee Police Department accept the challenge through the oath of office to create the best form of American policing through effective crime control and to develop strong community relations. The Milwaukee Police Department accepts the challenge of upholding these principles within the context of the violent crime issues affecting our community. All members of the Milwaukee community depend upon the police to safely use their public spaces, raise their children and pursue the American dream. While violent crime increased in nearly two-thirds of major cities across the United States, there was a 4% decline in violent crime in Milwaukee from 2015 to 2016 (Major Cities Chiefs Association). Furthermore, 63% of major cities reported an increase in homicide from 2015 to Residents of neighborhoods characterized by intergenerational poverty, severe levels of unemployment and other social service needs rely more upon the police for safety and stability. Unemployment, poverty, low educational attainment, vacant homes, foreclosed homes, hazardous properties, crime, police calls for service, fire department calls for service and ambulance dispatches are geographically concentrated in Milwaukee. Therefore, traditional police interventions including traffic stops, field interviews, and probation and parole checks combined with community oriented activities including bus checks, business checks, park and walks, tavern checks, vacant house checks and positive citizen contacts are concentrated in the same areas where criminals and victims are present. Like law enforcement agencies throughout the country, the MPD upholds a commitment to police practices that are unbiased, constitutional and evidence-based. In agencies efforts to effectively reduce victimization, agencies confront the unfortunate social reality that those neighborhoods most afflicted with high rates of poverty and violence are inhabited by people who for legitimate historical reasons are distrustful of the police. This distrust can be exacerbated by police tactics that, though effective, are perceived negatively. Police must be aware that the way authority is used is equally important as the result of its use. Action by police members must match written policy and training, including the implementation of fair and impartial policing. This draft chapter examines the impact of the data-driven component of the strategy on those neighborhoods most afflicted by high rates of crime, fear and disorder. The Milwaukee Police Department employs evidence-based tactics proven effective through academic research and programs instituted by the United States Department of Justice. Hotspot Policing, Koper-Curve Principles, Problem-Oriented Policing and Community-Oriented Policing are supported by academic research and 53

54 are implemented by the MPD through a variety of strategic initiatives to prevent and address crime in our community. For example, the traffic enforcement component of the MPD s traffic enforcement plan is based on the US Department of Transportation s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration s Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Safety (DDACTS) program, and supported by Bureau of Justice Assistance and the National Institute of Justice. It is shown to reduce both crime and accidents in areas where those problems are co-located. DDACTS integrates traffic crash, crime and other policing data to establish effective methods for deploying police resources. DDACTS employs highly visible and targeted traffic enforcement to reduce traffic crashes and crime. The theory behind traffic enforcement strategies is that a significant correlation exists between traffic stop enforcement and the reduction in auto theft, robbery and non-fatal shootings, which was found true in Milwaukee through analysis. Another component of MPD s traffic enforcement plan is directed traffic enforcement, which is largely based on complaints lodged by individuals regarding traffic safety concerns within their neighborhoods. MPD uses data analysis to identify "Hot Spots" to identify specific neighborhoods with high rates of violence and deploys resources to those areas. MPD was granted status by the US DOJ as part of the Public Safety Partnership (PSP). This program partners federal law enforcement agencies with MPD in specific high crime areas, for example the Center Street Corridor, and in 2016 recorded a 15% reduction in Part 1 Crime. These interventions are based on the significantly disparate impact of violent crime in one of the city s most challenged neighborhoods. The Center Street Corridor not only contains 10% of violent crime in the city, but also has a 39% poverty rate and 16% unemployment rate. The standard metric by which to judge disparity in the application of crime tactics has often stressed the general census data of a jurisdiction, as is included in the draft assessment. As crime victimization is not evenly distributed among all demographics, general census data is an inappropriate metric, as explained in literature published by the COPS Office. Furthermore, its inherent inaccuracy inhibits the essential community conversation that must address issues of police effectiveness and fairness at the same time. External examination of American police departments often identifies racial disparities in police activities. However, a crucial issue remains unaddressed within the national dialogue. Discussion of disparate police practice cannot take place independent from recognition of the violence that police are petitioned to reduce. Nonetheless, the Milwaukee Police Department recognizes the importance of police-community discussion about the disparities existing in Milwaukee resulting from lawenforcement tactics, as other major American cities similarly-situated in a context of high crime and other challenging socio-economic indicators. The report, unfortunately, does not effectively explain the difference between disparity and bias. While researchers can easily measure disparity through data collection, it can very difficult to identify the sources and causes of it even for social scientists. For example, disparity could be due to bias or due to 54

55 legitimate alternative factors such as differential criminal behavior. The COPS Office has identified Dr. Lorie Fridell as an expert in this field. Discussion on this topic should include a more expansive literature review, including research from Dr. Fridell. Dr. Fridell states, Only after controlling for driving quantity, driving quality, and driving location, can a researcher who finds that minorities are disproportionately represented among drivers stopped by police conclude with reasonable confidence that the disparity reflects police bias and decision making (Fridell, L.A By the Numbers: A Guide for Analyzing Race Data from Vehicle Stops. Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, D.C., pp. 1-24). The most important conclusion in this draft chapter was that resulting from a veil of darkness study conducted by the CRI-TA researchers, which was the primary methodology to evaluate whether the disparity identified in the draft report is indicative of bias. The draft report reads, The study presented in this chapter utilizes Grogger and Ridgeway s (2006) Veil of Darkness technique, and explains that this approach has been utilized in jurisdictions throughout the country. The draft assessment goes on to explain the Veil of Darkness: The VOD technique compares the racial composition of traffic stops conducted during daylight hours with stops conducted during nighttime hours. This approach is based on the premise that police officers have a hard time seeing the race and ethnicity of drivers at night; therefore, it is difficult for them to use driver race and ethnicity in their decision to conduct traffic stops. If racial and ethnic minority drivers are stopped more frequently during the daytime than during the evening, this could be an indication that some officers may be using driver race and ethnicity in their decision to conduct traffic stops. Perhaps the most relevant conclusion, derived from the researchers primary methodology in their evaluation, resulted in the following conclusion: First, we learned that most traffic stops involved African American drivers, regardless of district and time of day. A very large portion of traffic stops take place during the night time for all racial and ethnic groups included in this study. Further analysis using the Veil of Darkness technique revealed there was no statistical evidence that MPD officers are using racial profiling when they conduct traffic stops. Given the importance of this finding, is concerning that it seems to have been provided as an afterthought in the report and not cited in the executive summary or noted in press accounts. The DOJ report insisted on using general census data despite Dr. Fridell s recommendation that general census data should not be used in this type of research as she has indicated, If a researcher uses roadside observers to develop a demographic profile of drivers who violate traffic laws, the researcher has produced a benchmark that represents fairly well the group of people who should be at risk of being stopped by police if no bias exists. On the other hand, if that same researcher used instead U.S. 55

56 Decennial Census data to develop a demographic profile of people who live in the jurisdiction, the researcher has produced a benchmark that does not represent well the people at risk of being stopped by police if no bias exists. (Fridell, L.A By the Numbers: A Guide for Analyzing Race Data from Vehicle Stops. Police Executive Research Forum, Washington, D.C., p. 11). MPD s traffic stop practices have a disparate impact on the African- Finding 33 American community. The department s traffic enforcement policy (Memorandum ) specifically addresses this finding as our policy states, It is abundantly clear that crime disproportionately afflicts some of our neighborhoods. It is an unfortunate paradox that the vulnerable neighborhoods that most need the police are often inhabited by racial and ethnic minorities who sometimes feel unfairly targeted by police. Yet experience tells us that the intelligent, assertive use of police authority to stop people and vehicles can be an invaluable tool that reduces crime and enhances safety in these same neighborhoods. Our challenge is to balance these very real considerations. Our policy further addresses this challenge by stating, Our integrity demands of us that we reject expedient tactics. The Milwaukee Police Department will continue to focus its energies on smart policing strategies based on data, accurate and timely intelligence, reasonable suspicion, probable cause, the judicious use of police discretion and partnerships with the community, while rejecting any tactics even partly based on assumptions about race or ethnicity. In addition to the department s hot spot policing and directed patrol strategies, MPD s current priority traffic enforcement model is based on the nationally recognized Data-Driven Approaches to Crime and Traffic Safety (DDACTS) program. DDACTS is a law enforcement operational model supported by a partnership among the Department of Transportation s National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and two agencies of the Department of Justice: the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the National Institute of Justice. DDACTS integrates location-based traffic crash, crime and other enforcement data to establish effective and efficient methods for deploying law enforcement resources. DDACTS employs highly visible, targeted traffic enforcement to these affected areas. This model affords the department the dual benefit of reducing traffic crashes and crime, thus reducing overall social harm. In 2015, the department also conducted extensive research on traffic stop enforcement, measuring subject, victim and race. Please find these data indicated below: 56

57 57

58 The above tables include data from the date range of 1/1/ /31/15 and crimes include homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, and battery. MPD should engage an independent evaluator to measure the community impact of its traffic enforcement strategy as compared to the potential Recommendation 33.1 benefits of the strategy. MPD would require technical assistance and a funding source in order to have an independent evaluator measure the community impact of our traffic enforcement strategy. MPD should continue voluntary collection of traffic stop data, a practice Recommendation 33.2 that is to be commended. The state of Wisconsin required all law enforcement agencies to report traffic stop data to the state effective January 1, 2011, but in June 2011, the state legislature repealed this requirement. However, Chief Flynn decided MPD would continue to collect race and search data during every traffic stop despite the state law repeal. In October 2014, the Milwaukee Common Council passed Milwaukee City Ordinance (Collection of Traffic Stop Data), which requires the department to collect data on the races of all occupants of motor vehicles stopped by the department, analyze the data and use the results to inform department management. This ordinance was not passed until three years after the state law was repealed, which meant MPD continued to collect race and search data voluntarily until it was required by city ordinance. Recommendation 33.3 MPD should, as part of its data driven practices, provide quarterly trends and analysis of traffic stop enforcement and searches to district supervisors, analyzing data across the city, districts, and peer groups. MPD should task supervisors with ensuring accuracy of data reported and reviewing and analyzing traffic stop data to identify trends and potential Recommendation 33.4 bias-based behaviors at an early stage. MPD regularly analyzes traffic stop enforcement as part of the CompStat process and has analyzed both individual officer and work location specific traffic stop enforcement data during these presentations. MPD would require technical assistance and a funding source in order to train supervisors to identify potential trends in regards to traffic stop data. 58