PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE VERSION 2.0: AN EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE CONFLICTS OF THE 21ST CENTURY

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2 PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE IN PARTIAL FULLFILMENT OF THE CERTIFICATE-OF-TRAINING IN INTERNATIONAL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS VERSION 2.0: AN EFFECTIVE UNITED NATIONS FOR THE CONFLICTS OF THE 21ST CENTURY A THESIS BY IGOR GARCIA-TAPIA

3 CONTENTS INTRODUCTION...1 PART I: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE UN...3 CHAPTER 1: THE UN CHARTER...4 CHAPTER 2: THE PRIMACY OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY...7 CHAPTER 3: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS...10 PART II: THE NEEDS AND THE GAPS...14 CHAPTER 4: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS...15 CHAPTER 5: THE RESPONSIBILITIES COMPARED TO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS...18 CHAPTER 6: THE GAP IN UN PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES...22 PART III: A MODEL FOR ACHIEVING CAPABILITIES...26 CHAPTER 7: THE EXAMPLE OF THE USA...27 CHAPTER 8: THE STRUCTURE OF THE US DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT...30 CHAPTER 9: COMPATIBILITY...33 PART IV: THE RECOMMENDED MODEL...37 CHAPTER 10: UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED COMMANDS...38 CHAPTER 11: THE SECURITY STAFF COMMITTEES...43 CHAPTER 12: THE NEW PSO STRUCTURE...46 CONCLUSION...50

4 INTRODUCTION Since the end of the Cold War, the conflicts that the world has witnessed and experienced are largely of an intrastate nature. The 1990s shocked the international community with the brutality of the conflicts in the Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Somalia, Cambodia and DRC. There was also a realization of the inability of the mechanisms of the Cold War to address these conflicts effectively. The international community was, quite frankly, unprepared and unequipped to deal with this type of conflict. During this period entire countries, like Somalia, collapsed, others, like Rwanda, suffered devastating genocidal civil wars with massive human rights abuses, with Zaire (DRC) experiencing what can only be described as a holocaust. The international community failed, and this failure cost millions of lives. Since the late 1990s and beginning of the 21 st Century, lessons learned during these conflicts have been implemented, as have new mechanisms to deal with intrastate conflicts, but these solutions have only enjoyed partial success. With these issues still unresolved, the world now has new threats of a transnational nature to contend with. The systematic failure of the international system is compounded by the unilateral acts of certain countries, in particular the USA with regard to its 2003 invasion of Iraq. The United Nations has been at the forefront of these calamities. Designed as a forum for international relations, the UN had to quickly adapt to the circumstances of the Cold War. With the collapse of the USSR, however, the UN did not once again adapt to the prevailing circumstances. This caused the dramatic failures of operations such as UNPROFOR, UNOSOM and UNAMIR. These failures resulted in a sharp decline in the number of UN operations around the world, and gave the organization time to prepare for the challenges of the new millennium. Reforms have been carried out in order to address these issues. These have had some beneficial effects and since the end of the 1990s there has been a steady increase in UN field operations with the current figure at 113,708 deployed personnel on 28 Peace Support Operations. The Reforms however have only addressed immediate concerns, without addressing the longer term problems. The burden shouldered by the UN is constantly increasing as operations become larger, deployments longer and protracted conflicts require continued attention. The UN has increased its capacities in both conflict prevention and peace building, activities which have gained increasing importance in conflict resolution theory but which simultaneously increase the strain on the already stretched UN infrastructure. 1

5 The UN is currently stretched beyond its capabilities, with 28 operations and 113,708 personnel on operations all over the world all controlled and coordinated from a single headquarters in New York. This has begun to affect the ability of the organization to address issues in an effective manner, as was the case with the Russo-Georgian conflict of the summer of Reaction and deployment times have also been affected as is the case with the protracted deployment of UNAMID in Darfur. In human terms, these delays can mean hundreds of thousands of innocent lives being lost. Reforms and studies have taken place, in particular the 1997 reform proposals 'A Programme for Reform 1 and the 2000 'Brahimi' Report 2. This demonstrates the awareness of the organization of the need to transform itself into a more effective entity. Big steps are being made already, particularly with a system-wide adoption of the 'integrated' concept, including the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP), the setting up of Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTF) and the experimentation with Integrated Missions. These reforms, while beneficial do not address the deficiencies caused by a system that has outgrown its normal operating parameters. A larger overhaul of the system must take place in order to address the current deficiencies along with the possible future challenges. The issue at hand is not whether or not the United Nations should be reformed, the true issue is how, and along what lines should this reform take place. At the mission level, the organization is being proactive, but as a whole the system is stagnant. A general overhaul will be necessary sooner or later. The UN has an opportunity to adapt before the issues become too pronounced. Continued expansion is a very real probability and there is little possibility that the current structure will be able to sustain this growth. The UN should be attempting to be active as opposed to reactive with regards to future needs and challenges. 1 Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform - A/51/950 2 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping Operations - A/55/305 S/2000/809 2

6 PART I: THE LEGITIMACY OF THE UNITED NATIONS The United Nations is a unique organization. Purposely designed to regulate international relations and to prevent cataclysmic global wars, it boasts the largest membership in the world with every member represented in the General Assembly and entitled to an equal vote irrespective of size and wealth. The Charter of the UN is also a unique document, that brought together the aspirations and hopes of a generation, twice plunged into World War. The UN has succeeded in preventing any further Great Power wars, as well as regulating the relations between Cold War superpowers by acting as an open forum where direct contact and dialogue could be maintained. It was during this period that the UN began carrying out what we call today, peace support operations. For a time only the UN carried these operations out, however, following disasters in the early 1990s in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia and Rwanda, the UN began outsourcing these tasks to regional organizations, some of which were now free of their Cold War responsibilities and were attempting to redefine themselves. This trend still occurs today, but alongside a historic increase in UN run operations. Lessons have been learned and the UN is once again at the forefront of international conflict resolution, with an entire new toolbox that includes everything from Peacemaking and preventative diplomacy to peacekeeping and peace building. To carry out these tasks the UN maintains a level of legitimacy, both moral and legal that no other organization can boast. Coupled with the impartiality with which the UN carries out the tasks assigned to it, make this the ideal organization for conflict resolution. The UN is the most effective and experienced, and despite some well publicized failures, particularly in the 1990s, no regional organization or individual state could begin to compare. 3

7 CHAPTER 1: THE UN CHARTER Conflict resolution is the primary purpose and responsibility of the UN, it is enshrined in the UN charter and it is the most visible activity that the organization carries out. The conflict resolution structure of the United Nations was created to pursue these goals. The General Assembly as the primary venue where member states could resolve grievances, a Security Council where persistent conflicts could be resolved through negotiation, mediation, arbitration and, in the case of conflicts with the potential to threaten world peace, through enforcement action. Finally a secretariat was created to support the work carried out by member states. The Purposes and Principles of the United Nations: The Charter of the United Nations, along with the Statute of the International Court of Justice, created a global system to manage conflict and resolve international disputes. The preamble makes clear the purpose of the organization as...to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.... This was the very premise for the creation of a new world order that would replace the unregulated great power structure that had allowed two devastating world wars to occur within the space of only 30 years. The very first chapter of the charter deals with the purposes and principles of the organization. The very first paragraph of the first article once again reiterates the primary purpose:...maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace... Article 2 of this same chapter outlines the principles by which the organization will be run. The charter is not only a legally binding document, but also takes precedence over any other agreement to which members may be party to 3. Thus the signatories are obliged to act according to these principles, which require member states to fulfil the obligations assumed by the charter 4, to resolve international disputes by peaceful means 5 and refrain from the use of force when conducting their international relations 6, and lastly, to assist the UN in accordance with the charter and refrain 3 CH XVI, Art CH I, Art. 2, Para. 2 5 CH I, Art. 2, Para. 3 6 CH I, Art. 2, Para. 4 4

8 from assisting any country with which the UN is taking preventative or enforcement action 7. The UN General Assembly: The role of the GA is outlined in Chapter IV, articles of the UN charter. With regard to International security, articles 10, 11 and 14 are of particular interest. These state that the General assembly can debate any questions or matters outlined in the charter 8. This would include matters regarding international security 9. The GA itself may call to the attention of the SC any matters which it deems as a possible threat to international security 10. The GA may also make recommendations of measures to either individual member states or to the SC with the intent of resolving any conflict which may become a threat to international peace 11. The UN Security Council: The Functions of the SC are laid out in Chapter V, articles of the UN Charter, with articles 24 and 25 being of particular importance. The Security Council is the organ with the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and, when discharging it's duties, acts on behalf of all member states, always acting in accordance with UN Principles 12, and exercising the powers granted in Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII of the charter 13, which address, respectively, Pacific settlement of disputes, threats/breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, regional arrangements, and the trusteeship system. UN member states agree to accept SC decisions, making SC resolutions, unlike those of the GA, legally binding 14. The UN Secretariat: It is important to note that the UN secretariat has only a single article regarding international peace and security, this being that the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the SC any matter that may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security 15. The UN Charter establishes the primacy of the United Nations with regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. Thus the legitimacy for any action taken in this 7 CH I, Art. 2, Para. 5 8 CH IV, Art CH IV, Art. 11, Para CH IV, Art. 11, Para CH IV, Art CH V, Art. 24, para CH V, Art. 24, Para CH V, Art CH XV, Art. 99 5

9 respect by any member state stems exclusively from the articles of the charter. The United Nations, and in particular the Security Council, is the only body in the world that can legitimately sanction the use of both the pacific and coercive measures for the settlement of disputes that may endanger international peace and security. 6

10 CHAPTER 2: THE PRIMACY OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY The SC has two intended roles, one of which, the maintenance of international peace and security, is referred to in the UN Charter. The other is the elimination of Great Power war, the type of war that had left millions dead in both World Wars. This was the intended purpose of having veto-wielding permanent members. This is also, however, the source of many frustrations with regard to the SC carrying out it's designated role. The concept of permanent members on the security council in the post-second World War era made perfect sense. The five most powerful, victorious, countries would use their positions of power to avoid another catastrophic war. The inherent flaw of the SC: The purpose of the veto was to prevent these permanent Great Powers from legitimizing attacks against one another, and thus preventing so called Great Power War. This same system was also particularly effective in preventing direct Superpower war between the western allies and the communist bloc as the P-5 were almost equally divided between them 16. It also provided a permanent forum where potential clashes between superpowers could be addressed, such as the case of the Cuban missile crisis 17. The situation changed drastically after the collapse of the USSR and the end of the cold war. The composition of the P-5 no longer reflects reality. Third world countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria and Nepal provide more then 42% of the uniformed personnel, while simultaneously, the combined troop contributions of the P-5 represent less then 5% of UN peacekeepers 18. While the UK, France, Russia and China together only contribute 19% of the regular peacekeeping budget, and all contribute less then Japan and Germany which, when combined contribute the same as the USA, 26% 19. This situation gives countries which carry a very small portion of the burden a disproportionate amount of power, while countries making large contributions regularly find themselves under represented. The SC can thus find itself powerless to act because of the national interests of one of the P-5. More important is the loss of legitimacy because of this undemocratic black hole in an otherwise democratic organisation. 16 A/RES/2758(XXVI) of 25 October 1971 replaced the ROC with the PRC as legitimate representative of China. 17 October Numbers for December 2008, DPKO 19 DPI/2429/Rev.2 - February

11 The Primacy of the GA: The above mentioned problem has been, overcome to a certain extent. The Uniting for Peace resolution of 3 November , states that:...if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security." This resolution essentially redefines the responsibilities of the two organs. The SC maintains it's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, while the GA, which until this resolution was interpreted as having a 'secondary' responsibility, is now interpreted as having 'final' responsibility. This 'final' responsibility is exercised by the convening of an ESS 21, which may be convened through the SC via a procedural vote which is not subject to veto, or by request, within 24 hours by the majority of member states. Legitimacy & Support: The UN Charter places the GA as the principle organ of the UN in the same way the US constitution places the legislative branch, where the support of the people endows it with it's authority and legitimacy, before the executive and judiciary branches. Similarly, UN authority and legitimacy depends on the support of the member states. As the only organ with universal membership the GA is therefore the basis of the legitimacy of the UN. Because of the 'Uniting for Peace' resolution the decisions of the SC are subject to the tacit approval of the majority of the member states to avoid an ESS being convened by the GA. The SC must take this into consideration for any action, or lack of action to be considered as legitimate. In this way, the legitimacy of the SC stems from that of the GA. This state of affairs endows SC resolutions with a legitimacy, not only with respect to the UN Charter and international law, but also the moral legitimacy that is a result of a more democratic and representative system. 20 A/RES/377 A 21 Emergency Special Session 8

12 The legitimacy of the UN stems from the member states, through the GA to the SC. The importance of this hierarchy of legitimacy can not be overstated. As the only organisation with universal membership, the legitimacy of the UN and the authority with which it is endowed is virtually indisputable. With regard to preventing and resolving conflicts, both a broad spectrum of support and an unquestionable legitimacy are essential preconditions. 9

13 CHAPTER 3: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS A partnership between the UN and regional organisations has been presented as a possible solution to the inadequacies of the UN as demonstrated by key failures in the 1990's, particularly in Somalia, Bosnia and Rwanda. The UN Charter refers directly to these organizations in chapter VIII. The partial nature of these organizations during the cold war however made their use impossible, and it was not until the 1990's, in the former Yugoslavia, that the true usefulness of these organizations was realized. The pendulum, however, may have swung too far, as by the end of the 20 th century the number of UN missions had fallen and regional peacekeeping forces grew in number, and it soon became apparent that these missions suffered from an entirely new set of problems. Regional organizations in the UN Charter: The chapter VIII of the UN charter refers to the status of regional arrangements in the maintenance of local peace and security. The chapter contains two articles, 52 and 53, which refer respectively to the peaceful settlement of disputes and to enforcement action. There is a premise, regional organizations must act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN outlined in the first two articles of the UN Charter 22. Here once again the primacy of the UN Charter is established. Member states that enter such regional arrangements are encouraged to peacefully settle local disputes through these organizations before referring them to the SC 23. The SC itself is to encourage the use of these organizations as a first attempt at finding peaceful settlements to local problems 24. The implications are that by settling disputes peacefully at the local level, local problems can be addressed by local solutions, and, simultaneously, only the most serious intractable disputes are brought to the attention of the SC reducing the number of disputes that need to be solved at the highest level. With regards to the use of regional arrangements for enforcement actions under chapter VII of the UN Charter, the SC should, where appropriate, utilize these arrangements to carry out the actions necessary, while maintaining them under SC authority 25. Essentially transferring operational command to the regional organization while maintaining political authority at the SC. 22 CH VIII, Art. 52, Para CH VIII, Art. 52, Para CH VIII, Art. 52, Para CH VIII, Art. 53, Para. 1 10

14 Benefits of Chapter VIII enabled operations: VII actions. There are various benefits to the use of regional arrangements in both chapter VI and chapter First and foremost, the authority of the SC remains. The delegation of operational command does not diminish the overall UN authority at the highest level 26, thus maintaining legitimacy. The delegation of operational command can mean that the financial, personnel and administrative burdens of the operation are carried by the regional organization and not the UN secretariat. This in turn allows the UN to focus resources on the more intractable disputes. Also, as mentioned above, by encouraging member states to attempt to settle disputes peacefully through regional organizations, the number of disputes requiring SC attention are reduced. As member states of regional organizations are physically closer to the area in question, there is a significant reduction in both logistic and financial costs. Physical proximity also reduces deployment time, allowing more troops or peacekeepers or observers sooner, greatly increasing the possibility of preventing escalation. It has also been the case that regional organizations have launched operations and then have been retroactively mandated by the SC and thus legitimized Regional organizations might also be more inclined to support an operation to settle a dispute that threatens to destabilize their own region. Inherent problems with chapter VIII enabled operations: The benefits of using regional organizations for the purpose of maintaining regional peace and security are easily balance by the inherent problems. Regional organizations and defence alliances have a tendency of being principally built around the strength of a regional hegemony. ECOWAS, for example is under the sway of Nigeria, and, similarly, NATO depends on the capabilities of the USA 29. This creates a danger whereby the regional organization is seen as a vehicle for political interference on the part of the hegemony. The impartiality of the organization is then put into question, or, as was the example of the Nigerian-led ECOWAS force in Sierra Leone, the organization becomes partial and exasperates the conflict. This 26 CH VIII, Art. 53, Para NATO/KFOR in Kosovo in ECOWAS's Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia in 1992 and Sierra Leone in Practically all of NATO's strategic lift capabilities belong to the USA, which is the only country with any real force projection capability. 11

15 goes against the UN principles for the successful conduct of peacekeeping operations 30. This situation can also occur with traditional and ethnic alliances. Sending a contingent, from a ethnically Tutsi state to act impartially in a Hutu majority country is counter productive and can put the entire mission at risk. Some thing similar occurred in Kosovo in 1999, with some countries participating in KFOR were seen as partial to one side or the other, Russia and France were seen as pro-serb, while the USA was seen as pro-albanian. Lastly, no general policy can be applied to the use of regional arrangements in the place of a UN mission, as regional organizations are not necessarily well funded or equipped. Some regions do not have a capable organization with the capacity to carry out an operation. The EU is beginning to and NATO can does run operations, the AU is being aided in building a capacity to operate without support, but can still not maintain missions the size of MONUC or UNAMID. Regional organizations have been successful in the past, and will continue to be used in future. It would, however, be extremely dangerous to believe that they should be used as the only tools in the conflict resolution toolbox. The role of regional organizations must vary from case to case, as should the role of the UN. As the first level of the peaceful settlement of disputes they are essential to avoid overwhelming the UN. Similarly organizations such as the OSCE have been extremely successful in chapter VI type operations, and in particular, in peace building activities. When using a regional force for a chapter VII operation, the benefits of a rapid deployment and willing troop contributions must be balanced with the potential damage that may be caused. A balanced use to be considered is the use of these organizations as rapid reaction units that remain in place only until a UN, fully-impartial force can be deployed. The United Nations is the embodiment of the will of the international community. As the organization with the largest membership in the world the authority and legitimacy with which it is endowed is unrivalled. The UN Charter forms the basis of the legal legitimacy of the organization, and maintains a position of primacy before all other international accords as the signatories agree, as stated in the first chapter, to always adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN, and in the case of a clash of 30 UN Capstone Doctrine, Part 1, CH 3, Page 33 12

16 obligations between the UN charter and another treaty or agreement, the Charter shall prevail 31. The GA, on the other hand, forms the basis of the moral legitimacy of the organization. As the primary deliberative organ of the UN, and a international forum for the peaceful pursuance of international relations, where every member, great or small, rich or poor, has an equal vote, the GA carries the weight of the legitimacy of the organization. Empowered as it is to prevail over the SC on matters of the maintenance of international peace and security, the UN is the embodiment of the will of the GA, and the GA in turn I the embodiment of the will of the international community, from which it's true authority stems. No other organization carries so much legitimacy. The legitimacy of any attempt at resolving international disputes is rooted in the UN Charter, the GA and then the SC. Regional organizations depend on this legitimacy to act, as there are only three legal situations which allow for the use of force, direct UN run chapter VI and VII operations, chapter VIII-enabled operations and individual and collective self-defence. The first two depend directly on the SC and therefore on the GA for their legitimacy, while the the third depends on the UN Charter and international law CH XVI, Art CH VII, Art

17 PART II: THE NEEDS AND THE GAPS The unrivalled legitimacy of the United Nations can be considered a double edged sword. The legitimacy of the UN Charter places the UN in a position of authority as the guardian of this legitimacy. However, this authority goes hand in hand with a great responsibility. If the UN is the sole legitimate vehicle for the will of the international community, then it would be true that the UN must act in representation of this will, where ever and when ever it manifests itself. This is a necessity to maintain the authority of the UN and, more particularly the SC and GA. This Responsibility, however is not matched by capacity. The UN, and in particular the DPKO and DFS chronically find themselves understaffed and underfunded, as do many of the missions that they manage. The UN secretariat was never designed with the intention of commanding hundreds of thousands of personnel, and the unwillingness of member states to allow too much power and independence with the secretariat has only exasperated the situation. Today the UN deploys 113,708 personnel, meaning over 200,000 in real terms because of rotations, spread out over 28 missions all over the planet. No organization has ever come near this magnitude, and so the UN must be quick to learn lessons and best practices in order to be able to cover its responsibilities. There are particular gaps in the UN PSO structure that are holding the UN back from achieving its true potential. These gaps however require an overhaul of the PSO system, and not only of the secretariat. The gaps may appear daunting, but the international community must look ahead into the future and not have their actions dictated by some future crisis. The UN PSO system is already overburdened, a few key reforms will alleviate this and allow the UN to continue to expand and meet any future requirements. 14

18 CHAPTER 4: THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS The unique level of legitimacy of the United Nations places it in a situation whereby it is usually the only organization capable of intervening in the more complex and volatile conflicts. The UN Charter makes clear that those conflicts that cannot be solved peacefully at the local level will be solved at the SC. The nature of globalisation and of the transnational nature of many modern conflicts makes a unified and international response desirable, and the only sustainable solution. The UN is the only organization with the potential to expand and resolve this type of conflict, including international terrorism and modern piracy. Legitimate settlement of disputes & breaches of the peace: The signatories of the UN Charter are obligated to settle their disputes by peaceful means 33 and must refrain from the use of threats and force in their international relations 34. The SC has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security 35, and it can do this in two ways. By operating through the UN, or by invoking chapter VIII for the use of regional arrangements. In either case, the SC has two separate options, chapter VI or chapter VII actions. The UN Charter also maintains the inherent right of member states to defend themselves either individually or collectively from aggression 36. Excluding this inherent right, the SC, or as mentioned in chapter 2 the GA, The legitimacy provided by the UN Charter must be transmitted through the SC for any action of this kind to be considered legal and legitimate. As mentioned in chapter 3, the use of regional arrangements through the invocation of chapter VIII has many benefits but also many inherent problems that can, to a certain extent, dilute the the legitimacy of an operation. This limiting factor should encourage the strengthening of UN run operations in particular with regards to more sensitive modern conflicts, in particular those of an intrastate nature. UN DPKO UN CHART ER GA SC CH VIII CH VI CH VII CH VI CH VII SELF- DEFENCE Illustration 1: Legitimate use of force and actions for the maintenance of international peace and security. 33 CH I, Art. 2, Para CH I, Art. 2, Para CH V, Art. 24, Para CH VII, Art

19 The Authority of the UN: The UN Charter is not only a source of legitimacy for UN actions, but also the source of the authority of the SC, GA and UN in general. The act of signing the UN charter, and thus agreeing to abide by the obligations therein is what turns the UN Charter into the depository of legitimacy. The authority of the UN and it's individual organs stem from their designated roles as applicators of this legitimacy. The UN is the only organization that is universally accepted as having the authority to mandate operations to maintain international peace and security. The legitimacy of the UN Charter acts as the connector between said authority and the actual actions taken. Thus a UN sanctioned chapter VI or VII operation, whether UN run or chapter VIII enabled, is legitimate because it has been authorised by the designated applicator of the legitimacy deposited in the UN Charter which has, in turn, been sanctioned by the international community in the form of signatories. In this regard, while the role of the UN Charter as depository of legitimacy cannot be disputed, neither can the authority of the UN and it's organs in matters related to the maintenance of international peace and security. The Responsibility of the UN: As the only organization with the legitimacy and the authority to wield this legitimacy, the UN is both empowered and obligated to act in situations that threaten international peace and security. This obligation applies to the GA as well as the SC. The Uniting for Peace resolution 37 mentioned in chapter 2 makes clear that in cases where the SC fails to act, the final responsibility is transferred to the GA. In other words the UN must act because no other organization is authorized to act legitimately. In recent times, the responsibility of the UN has increased with the adoption by the international community 38 of the concept of R2P 39. With a dramatic increase, since the end of the Cold War, of intrastate conflict it has become clear that the interpretation of sovereignty should be redefined as a responsibility towards the population. A failure to protect populations by governments can now result in UN intervention 40. Similarly there is a potential for other responsibilities to fall to the UN, including 37 A/RES/377 A 38 September 2005 World Summit outcome document, Para ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, 12/ S/RES/

20 transnational terrorism, transnational conflicts and piracy. These in particular would require a dramatic change in the structure of the UN as they would overwhelm the existing structures of the organization. The responsibilities of the UN are expanding, with the adoption of the R2P principle it is clear that the needs of the 21 st century will be very different to the needs of the 20 th. It would be illogical to expect the same organization to carry out these new responsibilities without some form of reorganization. R2P is only the beginning and the challenges to come will require a 21 st century United Nations to deal with them. A failure to transform may result in a failure to address modern threats, this may in turn cause the international community to look elsewhere for solutions, thus eroding the authority of the UN and the stability of the international system at the centre of which it resides. 17

21 CHAPTER 5: RESPONSIBILITES COMPARED TO THE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS The United Nations is burdened with an immense responsibility that emanates from it's role as the exclusive applicator of the legitimacy of the UN Charter as mentioned in the previous chapter. The expansion of these responsibilities since the end of the Cold War have put a considerable and consistent strain on the organization's ability to carry out it's mandate. Currently the UN has more deployed personnel than at any point since it's creation, with 113,708 uniformed personnel 41 and civilians in Peacekeeping, Political and Peace building missions 42. This number is constantly expanding and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future as missions like UNAMID reach full strength and others like MONUC are reinforced. The number of Personnel on UN missions: There are currently 28 UN missions operating around the world. These are divided into two categories, peacekeeping operations (PKO) and political and peace building missions (PPBM). There are 16 PKOs and 12 PPBMs. These missions are run by two separate departments of the UN secretariat, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). They do not, however, necessarily divide the missions according to function as DPKO runs the 16 PKOs and an additional 2 PPBMs, while DPA run 10 PPBMs. Department PKO PPBM Total DPKO DPA Total Number of UN Missions by type & department in command 4344 There are 113,708 personnel deployed on UN missions, including uniformed personnel, international civilians, local civilians and UN volunteers (UNV). 96.9% of personnel work in PKOs, and 3.1% work in PPBMs. Of the personnel deployed on UN missions, 79% are classified as uniformed personnel, the remaining 21% are classified as civilian personnel and include international staff, local staff and UNVs. 41 Military Observers, Armed Troops and Police. 42 Figures for November DPI/2166/Rev.65 - December DPI/1634/Rev.90 January

22 These numbers are set to increase as UNAMID reaches it's mandated personnel strength. Personnel PKO PPBM Total % Uniformed 89, ,866 79% Civilian 20,760 3,082 23,842 21% Total 110,273 3, , % % 96.90% 3.1% 100% Type and distribution of personnel on UN missions 4546 The expansion of Peace Support Operations: Since the Cold War there has been a clear trend towards the increasing number of both UN missions and personnel deployed. Of the 75 past and present PKOs and PPBMs 57 have been set up since the end of the Cold War. Illustration 2: DPI/2444/Rev.3 October 2007 Prior to 1991 the numbers of missions and personnel were relatively low. In January 1991 there were about 10,000 deployed uniformed personnel on 8 PKOs. By July 1993 the number had increased dramatically to a record 78, uniformed personnel, primarily due to UNPROFOR in 45 DPI/2166/Rev.65 - December DPI/1634/Rev.90 January DPI/2444/Rev.3 October

23 the former Yugoslavia, UNOSOM II in Somalia and UNTAC in Cambodia. UNPROFOR alone had, by late 1994, almost 40,000 uniformed personnel deployed. With the closing of these massive missions there was a sharp decline in numbers. The failures of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, of UNOSOM II in Somalia and of UNAMIR in Rwanda made the UN lose a great deal of confidence in it's ability to resolve modern conflicts. It became blatantly obvious that the traditional peacekeeping that the UN practised was incompatible with the intrastate and ethnic conflicts of the early 1990s. From 1996 until the middle of 1999 the number of UN missions and deployed personnel decreased, almost reaching 1991 levels in June 1999 at 12,084 uniformed personnel. This trend was reversed in late 1999 with the deployment of large missions in Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone. By June 2000, only a year after almost reaching 1991 levels, the numbers of deployed personnel increased three fold and stood at around 36,605. Since this time the numbers of uniformed personnel deployed on UN missions has continued to rise. By August 2006 the numbers had surpassed the maximum of July 1993, and the trend shows a continued growth. The latest figures for December 2008 have the number of uniformed deployed personnel at 91,712 48, with UNAMID still only 60% deployed. The UN's capacity to carry out it's responsibilities: To command this massive number of personnel, the UN has an ad hoc headquarters within a secretariat that was never designed for this purpose. DPKO was created by Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 upon his becoming Secretary-General of the UN. Prior to this, peacekeeping had been run by the Office of Special Political Affairs. It was created as a department within the UN secretariat following a military headquarters structure, with an office of operations, an Office of mission support and a military and police division. Chronically understaffed and overwhelmed since the expansion of operations, DPKO was divided into two separate departments, DPKO and DFS at the level of Under-Secretary-General in March Thus, currently both DPKO and DPA run missions and DFS carries out support operations. Three departments involved in running UN Peace Support Operations Monthly summary of military and police contribution to united nations operations 49 A/RES/61/256 15/03/

24 The UN is in new territory. The numbers of personnel deployed on missions has expanded dramatically since the end of the cold war, and the current trend suggests that the demand for UN services will continue to grow. It is also clear that the current UN will be ill equipped to handle this trend and will not be able to efficiently grow it's current structures. Ad hoc reforms and tweaks have definitely improved the UN's ability to manage operations, but not to the level that it could potentially reach. The demands of UN Peace Support Operations will no doubt soon become too great to address. 21

25 CHAPTER 6: THE GAP IN UN PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES The current PSO structure of the UN is one born of forced expansion and not of thorough planning. Reforms have always attempted to make ad hoc improvements without truly reforming the PSO structure. There have been many reform attempts, and many reports on improving various elements of the PSO structure, but generally very little attempt has been made to completely reform the entire structure. For now, the current system of ad hoc reforms to individual components of the structure has sufficed, but as the trend of rising numbers of personnel and missions, longer mission lengths and new types of missions continues, there will be a moment in the near future where a restructuring will need to take place as the current structures have little room for growth. UN Headquarters: The UN was never intended to become a headquarters in the operational sense. A secretariat is not designed to command operations. An operational headquarters requires high levels of coordination, unity of command, unity of effort and the ability to adapt to the prevailing conditions. Two separate departments run operations with a third providing field support services. The operations themselves are not divided entirely along functional lines, in a word, there is chaos. In any given region there may be missions in neighbouring countries reporting to a different headquarters and receiving different guidance. In this way the UN in a single region does not speak with one voice. The UN cannot be considered a truly integrated HQ. The illustration on the right shows what a hypothetical transformed UN could possibly look like. DPKO and DFS would form the integrated operations staff, a Chief of Staff would be needed to coordinate operations and support divisions, and all missions would be managed through this system. Instead, DPA, DPKO and DFS The UN secretariat organized as a hypothetical integrated HQ 22

26 act as two and a half HQs within the secretariat. In this way, the efforts of the UN are divided, and unity of effort is lost. With the large numbers of missions and personnel it is doubtful even if a single integrated HQ would be able to work efficiently. The lack of member state participation: The UN is an organization with more personnel deployed on missions then virtually any state in the world, with the exception of the USA. 120 member states contribute personnel to the 28 missions around the world, and yet there is relatively little participation, on the part of contributing countries, in the planning and managing of PSOs. The SC and the GA oversee the operations but do not readily participate in the preparation precess. It seems illogical that countries, willing to put men and women in harms way on operations that may be of little strategic interest to them, should not be part of the planning, managing and assessing of the operations. This must contribute to the lack of confidence some countries have with regards to sending troops on UN operations. This is not to suggest that operations should be entirely run by member states, but rather that they should be more involved in some aspect of the process. According to the UN Charter this role would normally have fallen on the Military Staff Committee 50, as would the strategic direction of any forces placed under UN command 51. As the MSC was essentially stillborn, this role has been taken up by the UN Secretariat. Missions limited by borders: In traditional PKOs, a UN mission is placed between belligerents, usually on both sides of a disputed border. With the rise of intrastate conflicts in the post-cold War period and the beginning of UN interventions in these conflicts, missions tend to be launched in individual countries. Intrastate conflicts, however, are rarely exclusively intrastate. Mandates that are limited geographically are incompatible with conflicts of a non-interstate nature. The ethnic conflicts of the great lakes region of east Africa are a particularly good example of this. There are both ethnic Tutsi and Hutu populations in Rwanda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi and Uganda. Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s individual missions were sent 50 CH VII, Art. 47, Para CH VII, Art. 47, Para. 3 23

27 to virtually all these countries, each with a separate mandate, separate commander and separate initiatives, yet they were all essentially dealing with the same conflict. In the 1990s the conflict in Rwanda, in one way or another involved all the region. RPF supply lines crossed the Ugandan border where Tutsi refugees formed the support for the movement, the refugee crisis was exasperated when Tutsi soldiers in Burundi assassinated their Hutu president in an attempted coup 52. This resulted in the fleeing of thousands of refugees across the border to Rwanda. As the RPF captured Kigali and expelled the Government forces, these escaped across the border to Zaire (DRC) and other neighbouring states. Some of these refugees would then participate in the Congo wars 5354, as would almost all the governments in the region. The UN suffers limitations that have come to light in the last 20 years. A changing world and new types of conflict have forced the UN into over a decade of constant learning. Mistakes have been made, but the UN as an organization has demonstrated the ability to adapt to new challenges. What is required now is to predict where the limitations will be and create a structure that can learn, adapt itself and grow. The UN has a place in the 21 st century, but that place will require changes to the entire PSO system. These changes must provide the organization with the capabilities to sustain all the operations that will be necessary in the future. In this regard, it would be logical to carry out a transformation now before the pressure becomes too great. It is clear that the burden shouldered by the UN is constantly growing. The uniqueness of the UN and its unrivalled legitimacy and authority, however, also burdens the organization with unrivalled responsibility. The UN, as it stands, is overwhelmed by the dramatic increase in the demand for PSOs. The increasing number of personnel deployed on UN PKOs is at an historic high, and promises to continue escalating. The UN will soon have no choice but to undergo a massive reorganization as this may not simple be a temporary 'Surge' but a new permanent reality. The UN was never designed as an operational HQ, but the circumstances of the Cold War made and entirely impartial party desirable to command sensitive operations. It has been built up from scratch in an ad hoc manner. This may have sufficed in the few and relatively small deployments of the time, but it has been made clear by the events of the early 1990s that complex or multi-dimensional peacekeeping require a much more complex set of abilities including the ability to create a unity of effort between many actors, both civilian and military. 52 Melchior Ndadaye - 21/10/ /1996-5/ /1998-7/

28 Member states contribute to UN operations both financially and with manpower, The circumstances of the Cold War should no longer limit the entire responsibility to the UN secretariat. It is remarkable that the largest contributors of manpower are not appropriately represented in the decision making process, countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Nigeria and Nepal. Similarly, countries that provide a great deal of the funding for operations but do not sit on the SC, such as Japan and Germany, are not involved in the decision-making process, even though their continued contributions are essential. Finally, the events of the 1990s and more recent events in places like Sudan and Lebanon, demonstrate that operations should be carried with the objective of resolving conflicts in all their aspects. Limiting a mission geographically may slow a conflict down, but modern transnational conflicts tend to require a wider area of operation, even if the majority of a mission focuses on a single geographic territory. The cases of the conflicts in the Great lakes region and the intractable Arab-Israeli conflicts in the Middle East should serve as an example of why this is necessary. 25

29 PART III: A MODEL FOR ACHIEVING CAPABILITIES The exclusive legitimacy and the authority and responsibility derived from this legitimacy makes an efficient and capable UN desirable in order to guarantee the fulfilment of the ideals of the UN charter and the stability of the international system based on international law, the equality of states and the protection of human rights worldwide. The UN needs to expand its capabilities in order to successfully address the challenges of the 21 st century. The 1990's were a clear indicator of the necessity of this, and a great many reforms have taken place, including the concept of integrated missions and the division of labour between DPKO and DFS. These reforms, although enjoying some success, are too short term and are not enough to prepare the UN for these new challenges, especially the continued growth in number and size of mission. There are a few organizations around the world that could be used as examples of the UN to follow in terms of structure and organization. However, most of these do not have the same scope of activities as the UN system and thus may prove to be too impractical for an organization such as the UN. The lessons that need to be learned are not exclusively operational in nature, the UN can, in this sense, learn from its own experiences, but lessons of a more organizational character must also be learned from any source available. There are many situations that can be improved by purely making organizational improvements, and in this regard the UN has an obligation to look for tried and tested solutions to similar problems, irrespective of the context. The adoption of a few organizational aspects of another organization may greatly increase UN capabilities without having to experiment with new, un-tested concepts. 26

30 CHAPTER 7: THE EXAMPLE OF THE USA The UN does not only need to only learn lessons from its own experiences. But must also attempt to learn from similar entities. There is only one organization in the world that has a deployment and management capability in league with the UN, the United States Department of Defense. Comparable troop numbers, global deployments and an infrastructure forged in war. The experiences of the DoD can prove to be a great source of lessons for the UN in its PSO role. No other country, nor organization in the world can compete with the DoD and the UN. It is obvious that they are two very different organizations with very different mandates, but the structures used are transferable. The Compatibility between DoD and UN: The UN and the DoD, may at first glance appear complete incompatible. There are many characteristics, however, that both organizations share. These organizations have different mandates and to a certain extent this affects their structures, but the requirements on both, when seen from a certain perspective are very similar. Both organizations are required to maintain on-going operations around the world, and are required to constantly rotate personnel. Similarly, both organizations require civilian and military personnel to work in close cooperation. Also, both organizations have extensive experience in conflict zones and in various forms of PSOs, whether enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention or preventative deployments. The UN must keep a close surveillance for possible threats to international peace, while the DoD must keep a close surveillance for possible threats to the USA. Both organizations act as a centre of gravity for all the actors that participate in their area of expertise. There is a civilian head of each organization, and both organizations must work in difficult, if not hostile, territory. The DoD also includes the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) which in many aspects is similar to the UN Secretariat. Comparable Scope of operations: The organization with the most personnel deployed around the world is the DoD, The UN however is not far behind, and is the only comparable organization. The DoD has a global reach like no other Ministry of Defence in the world. It is also the only defence institution that can project and 27

31 sustain military power in any real sense 55, except, that is, for the UN which maintains 28 PSOs around the world predominantly using the private sector to sustain them. The DoD, through its subordinate units is present on every continent, and maintains operations in various countries and territories, including Iraq, Afghanistan, Kosovo and Bosnia & Herzegovina. The DoD also carries out a great deal of bi-lateral security assistance work all over the world, and maintains massive permanent bases in Europe and Asia. In terms of personnel, The DoD, in 2007, maintained about 240,600 56, double the UN current deployment, the difference is that DoD had deployed this number primarily to Iraq and Afghanistan, the rest deployed primarily to Europe in support of these operations. Thus the UN while deploying a smaller number of uniformed personnel, deployed them to more operations. So while the emphasis is different, with the DoD deploying more personnel and the UN managing more operations, the magnitude of these endeavours is on the same scale. The benefits: There are also a number of benefits to adopting a structure that would be familiar to the USA. There are certain factors that need to be taken into account, the USA is one of the permanent members of the security council, the USA is also the largest contributor to the UN regular budget and the Peacekeeping budget. The USA is undeniably the most powerful country in the world, and arguably the only country capable of acting independently of the security council in matters of international peace and security. The power of the USA is also essential as a deterrent to acts of aggression between states, as in the case of an enforcement action being mandated, it would most probably require the USA to act as an enabler, as was the case in operation Desert Strom in By creating a structure similar to the DoD, the UN may become a more viable option in the eyes of US policy makers. The US may also become more confident about the ability of the UN to carry out mandates and may avoid disregarding the institution and acting unilaterally as was the case with the Iraq war in Also, the adoption of a DoD-type structure for the UN may also encourage the USA to become more involved with UN PSOs, as the US contribution as of 31 st December 2008 is 91 uniformed personnel, 1/3 that of Fiji NATO depends on the DoD for the majority of its strategic lift capabilities. 56 DoD active duty military personnel strengths by regional area and by country (309A) - 31/12/ Peacekeeping Operations only 58 Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations

32 There is a possibility that some member states would disagree with the use of the US model for political reasons. There is, however, no similar structure in existence and an entirely new one would need to be created. The stakes are too high for a new, untested, model to be put into operation. The time alone required to create a new model would be great, as the planning process would be subject to political manoeuvring and stalling. The use of the US DoD model as a basis would not necessarily be presented as such. Once the model has been adapted to the unique circumstances of the UN it would already be quite different from the original. The idea is to adopt the parts of the system that work best and tailor the rest to UN needs, creating a unique UN model. The DoD and the UN are similar organizations that operate at the same magnitude around the world and the UN is the only comparable organization in terms of capabilities. The benefits of adapting a DoD-type structure for the UN are many. The UN can benefit from the experiences of the DoD, which has, over the years through countless deployments all over the world, adapted its structure to command forces in virtually every region of the world in a scale that is unparalleled by any nation. Also, the benefits of making UN PSOs more appealing to the US could provide the UN with support on a scale it has never received before, solely by building the confidence of the most powerful country in the world in the UN's ability to successfully resolve conflicts. 29

33 CHAPTER 8: THE STRUCTURE OF THE US DEFENCE ESTABLISHMENT The US defence establishment is a monolith in comparison to that of most other countries. The structure is one designed for a military that is permanently deployed around the world. The structure also concentrates strategic decision-making at the highest level, while simultaneously allowing operational decision making as much independence as possible. Each component has a task from arming and training, to planning and coordinating. There are departments for each branch of the armed forces, the Office of the Secretary of Defence (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and Unified Combatant Commanders (UCC). The current structure of the defence establishment was set up by the Goldwater-Nichols act of National Command Authority: The national command authority (NCA) is part of the chain of command from the Commander in Chief to the lowest ranks. The NCA in particular refers to the highest decisionmaking components of the chain of command. At the very top sit the president of the United States, referred to as the Commander In Chief (CINC), and the Secretary of Defense, who is the civilian head of the military. There are various components to the NCA, beginning with the National Security council which provides advice from all part of the government related to defence and security. The NCA, however, does not constitute a part of the DoD. Illustration 3: NCA The three primary components of the NCA all reside within the DoD, these are the Military departments, the Unified Combatant Commands and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The task of running the military is divided among them, the military departments train and equip forces, the Unified Commands manage the operations and the Joint Chiefs of staff carry out the planning and are charged with coordination between components. The NCA is a relatively simple structure, that concentrates power at the very top with the CINC and divides responsibilities in a manner that does not overwhelm any single component. 59 Pub.L

34 The Department of Defense: The DoD is the central component of the US defence establishment. It houses the civilian OSD, the civilian and military heads of the separate military departments, the Unified Combatant Commands (UCC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Each is an independent entity with different assigned roles reporting to the CINC via the Secretary of Defense. The DoD structure is designed to manage the different actors in order to conduct successful operations. Organization of the US Department of Defense The CINC, in consultation with the JCS and the Secretary of Defense makes command decisions. Orders from the CINC are relayed through the Secretary of Defense or through the JCS to one of the UCCs. A UCC is selected, according to competence or geographic area of responsibility, to carry out the orders. The JCS coordinates with the three military departments to provide the necessary manpower and material for the selected UCC. In the case that more then a single UCC will be required to carry out the orders, the JCS will also coordinate both commands. Each military department transfers the requested units to the command of the designated UCC. The UCC Commander plans and conducts the operations to successfully carry out the orders. The OSD, through the defense agencies provides support to the UCC, also through DoD field Activities. Headquarters: It should be noted that the US DoD does not posses a supreme military headquarters. Strategic decision-making is held exclusively in the hands of the civilian leadership, with the top 31

35 military leaders providing only an advisory and coordination role. Also it should be noted that there is a division between the active command and administrative command of forces. An Army infantry unit would be trained, armed, housed and administered by the Department of the Army. This same unit, however, would be operationally commanded by whichever UCC it is assigned to. This may lead to a situation where army units are commanded by a navy admiral or air force general. This structure allows complete civilian control overall, while placing Combatant Commanders in a position of supreme military authority within their geographic or functional area. Instead of managing the US military commitments around the world as a single operation, the DoD uses a Unified Command Plan (UCP) that divides the world into 6 geographic commands and 4 global functional commands. Thus the operational leadership of the Military is divide into 10 separate commands with the civilian leadership at the DoD providing strategic guidance and the military departments providing support. This provides a dedicated supreme command for each area, allowing for differences in focus and priority. The current structure of the DoD was forged by the Goldwater-Nichols act of 1986, reacting to failure of Operation Eagle Claw 60 and the deficiencies Operation Urgent Fury 61, particularly in communications, intelligence and coordination. The DoD, unlike other ministries of defence, is a global institution, and the structure of this organization reflects this reality. The global nature of this institution is also a point of similarity with the UN. There are many components of the DoD structure that could easily be adapted for UN use. These could greatly increase the ability of the UN to successfully carry out its mandates. 60 April 24 th 1980 Failed military operation to free 52 hostages at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, Iran. 61 October 25 th 1983 U.S. Invasion of Grenada 32

36 CHAPTER 9: COMPATIBILITY It would be counter-productive to attempt to turn the UN system into an exact replica of the DoD, the nature of each organization is different as are their responsibilities. There are, however, aspects of the DoD structure that are of particular relevance to UN PSOs. These structures and components may greatly improve, not only the ability of the UN to carry out its mandate, but also to increase member participation in the activities of the organization. The result would be a UN that is both more effective and more representative of the international community. Unified Combatant Commands: Unified Combatant Commands are the operational cornerstone of the US defence establishment. UCCs are joint commands with exclusive responsibilities in either a geographical area or a functional area. There are six geographic commands; EUCOM, AFRICOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, NORTHCOM AND SOUTHCOM, covering Europe, Africa, the middle East, the pacific, North America and South America respectively. There are also four functional commands; SOCOM, JFCOM, SRATCOM and TRANSCOM, respectively covering special operations, force transformation, Nuclear weapons and 33

37 transportation. Each UCC is assigned units from the military departments to carry out its missions, and directly commands missions within it's assigned area, so, for example, Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan are commanded by CENTCOM. UCCs give the U.S. Defence establishment a truly global character and reach. Tasks carried out by UCCs include not only combat operations but also humanitarian assistance, bi-lateral security cooperation and other soft uses of the military. UCCs are Joint commands, composed of units and staff from all the military services under a single commander. This situation creates a clearly defined chain of command and greatly increases unity-of-effort amongst different components. UCCs answer directly to the Secretary of Defence, thus bypassing any additional central bureaucracy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The second component that is of particular interest to the UN is the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS is composed of the Chairman (CJCS), a Deputy-Chairman (DCJCS), and the military chiefs of each armed service; the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps 62. The JCS is headed by the CJCS, the highest ranking officer in the military, who acts as the military advisor to the Secretary of Defence and the President on military matters 63. The main purpose of the JCS as a whole, other then its advisory role to the political leadership, is to coordinate between their respective military services in order to ensure the personnel readiness, policy, planning and training for the UCCs. The JCS acts as the communication conduit between the military establishment and the political leadership. The JCS also carries out contingency planning for the political leadership For this purpose of carrying out his assigned roles the CJCS is supported by a joint staff, which, because of the 1986 Goldwater- Nichols act, cannot be organized as an overall 62 U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 5: 151(a) 63 U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 5: 151(b)(1) 34

38 armed forces General Staff 64, and thus has no operational authority over UCCs and combat units. The Joint Staff is composed of equal numbers of personnel from each of the military services and is independent of any individual service. The Structure of NCA and DoD: For the JCS and UCC components to work in any UN context a similar division of responsibilities would have to be enshrined in a structure similar to the NCA. The NCA creates a system whereby all relevant actors participate and are represented in the structure; the individual military services, the military as a whole, the operational commanders and the civilian, political leadership. The division of responsibilities also ensures that no single component becomes overwhelmed. The Civilian component is entrusted with policy development, planning, resource management, fiscal, and program evaluation responsibilities. The individual military services are charge with the preparation of units and material, and the JCS carry out contingency planning and coordination activities. The success of any operation requires the participation of all actors. A command decision requires the Chiefs of the military services to provide their expertise to the JCS which, upon consultation with the UCCs involved, can then provide military advice to the president who, upon making a decision, tasks the Secretary of Defense with the responsibility of turning the decision into policy. The Secretary of Defense, in a role similar to that of the conductor of an orchestra, then manipulates the entire system into action, providing the UCC with the tools to carry out the new policy. The Structures identified represent the key components to the U.S. Defence establishment. 64 U.S. Code, Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 5: 155(e) 35

39 None of these components or structures could be implemented within the UN system as they are, there have to be a great deal of tailoring to adapt them to the UN context. However, the general principles behind these structures are applicable to the UN as an internationally present entity combining the efforts of both military and civilian actors for the accomplishment of political objectives. The fact the the UN is an international organization with no standing forces, makes these the need for a coordinated and participatory system all the more necessary. The U.S. Department of Defense is the only tried and tested organizational model that could be applied to the United Nations context. In terms of magnitude and scale of operations, no other organization in the world comes close to the UN and DoD. Modelling structures on those of the most powerful country in the world can also serve for confidence building in the capacities of the UN and encourage the abandonment of unilateral actions. The DoD model centralises political authority while decentralising operational authority. This means that in any situation there is a single commander with the ability to use all the tools at his disposal to achieving his goal. This could be extremely beneficial for the UN, which currently centralises both political and operational authority, leaving operational commanders little flexibility when reacting to constant changing situational environments. The DoD is inclusive of all the actors involved in the defense of the U.S. and her interests. Civilian control ensures the supremacy of political objectives over military objectives. The military still holds the important advisory and coordination role that allows it to act as one, while maintaining the individual identity of the military services. This means that the same departments that individually provide the man power and material for the successful completion of mission have a participation in the debate over how these assets will be used. This is of particular relevance to the UN where only the Security Council, and in particular the permanent members have a direct participation. The adoption of these components by the UN could nullify many of the deficiencies of the organization, including the claims of having an inflated, centralised bureaucracy at the centre of what can be described as a pull system where everything has to be requested and sent back to New York irrespective of urgency. The scope of responsibilities are too big for a centralised operational structure. 36

40 PART IV: THE RECOMMENDED MODEL It must be made clear the the United Nations is not the Department of Defense. Although similar in in some aspects, these two organizations are also very different. The UN is not a national institution and thus does not represent the national interests of any one country. The UN does not maintain its own reserves of manpower and material and so depends on the willingness of member states in order to carry out a mandate. The UN is primarily a civilian institution and as such places political and humanitarian objectives above military objectives. The UN is not a war-fighting institution and finally, the UN was never intended as a large and active institution, so the growth of the bureaucracy has been handled in an ad hoc manner, particularly since the end of the Cold War. Many reform proposals have been made over the years, some very dramatic, others more subtle, but the fact that these are made emphasises the awareness of the need to overhaul the organization. The reform proposal here is based on a tried and tested model designed to deal with the strains of maintaining large bodies of personnel deployed abroad. There are, however, changes already taking place within the UN PSO system, particularly from the bottom up. UN Missions have gone from traditional PKOs to multi-dimensional PKOs and are now experimenting with what are called 'integrated' missions. The integrated concept is ground breaking, with a single HQ commanding UN activities within a country, without the need for a separate administration, and sub HQ for every component of a mission, such as military, police, development etc. This trend has been included in the recommendations of this section in order to follow what could potentially one day become the standard for PKOs. 37

41 CHAPTER 10: UNITED NATIONS INTEGRATED COMMANDS The Unified Combatant Command component is essentially a Joint Headquarters at the theatre or operational level. The 'Joint' prefix implies that units from more then one military service are represented and commanded by this headquarters. While this may be true for a UN equivalent, it does not adequately describe the full spectrum of UN actors. UN missions have recently begun using the integrated mission model. This indicates that a single HQ commands all aspects of the mission, as opposed to the previous 'pillar' structure where each aspect of a mission is controlled by a separate organ. The 'Combatant' in the middle of the designation would also be inaccurate as the UN is not principally a war-fighting organization. It would therefore be accurate to describe the UN equivalent of UCCs as United Nations Integrated Commands, or UNICOMs. Structure of UNICOMs: In considering the structure of a UNICOM HQ, a number of requirements must be taken into consideration. The structure must be of an inter-agency nature including specialist staff from every area of UN activities within the functional or geographic area of responsibility. The structure must include military and civilian personnel working as a single integrated staff. There should be a single commander. The commander should be designated as a High Representative of the Secretary- General or HRSG or a similar title that denotes seniority over the title of SRSG. Finally, there should be a clear chain of command. For this purpose, civilian grades should be paired with military ranks to avoid confusion. As a general rule, both the HRSG and the DHRSG should be civilian, so as to subordinate military actions to political objectives. The rest of the staff should be fully integrated. Every attempt has been made to include all actors while maintaining the integrated character of the HQ. It should be noted that, following the current integrated mission philosophy, only what needs to be integrated 38

42 should be, integration for integration sake may prove to be counter-productive. As an example, tasks, such as humanitarian interventions, may be coordinated by a UNICOM but, to protect the humanitarian space, the structures should remain separate. The compositions of each UNICOM should reflect the function or area it is assigned. The above diagram reflects a standard structure, however, it is very likely that each UNICOM will look different. A UNICOM HQ would be composed of UN professional staff, local staff and seconded 39

43 national staff, just like any UN department. They would have a similar status as the UN offices in Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi. Regional and Functional UNICOMs: There should be created enough UNICOMs to divide missions in a way that no single HQ becomes overwhelmed. Also, the grouping of missions according to interdependence should be taken into account. There are currently 28 UN missions around the world divided as follows: 13 in the African continent, 7 in the middle east and 8 in the rest of the world, totalling 113,708 personnel. There are various means of dividing responsibilities, The following is a recommendation based on practicality: Three UNICOMs should be established in Africa to manage the 13 operations and 76,657 personnel that the UN has currently deployed in that continent. This is the equivalent of 67% of total deployed UN personnel and 46% of total operations. The three UNICOMs would each focus on a trouble spot on the continent. UNICOM AFRICA I (CENTRAL AFRICA) to oversee UNAMID, UNMIS, BONUCA and MINURCAT. UNICOM AFRICA II (GREAT LAKES & HORN OF AFRICA) to oversee MONUC, BINUB and UNPOS and also to coordinate UN Humanitarian and development activities in this region. Finally, UNICOM AFRICA III (WEST AFRICA), which would incorporate the functions of UNOWA, would oversee UNOCI, UNMIL, MINURSO, UNIPSIL and UNOGBIS. The first two UNICOMs could be co-located at the UN Office in Nairobi for convenience. The third UNICOM should be located at the current UNOWA office in Dakar, Senegal. UNICOM WEST ASIA should also be established to manage the four operations, two offices and 15,811 personnel that operate in this region. The importance of this command is the need to address the conflicts in the region as a whole and not as separate disputes. To highlight this point, UNICOM WEST ASIA should be headquartered in a symbolic location, such as co-locating with UNTSO at Government house in Jerusalem. UNICOM WEST ASIA, which would incorporate and expand the functions of UNSCO, would command the following missions: UNTSO, UNDOF, UNIFIL, UNAMI, and UNSCOL. UNICOM PSO should be a functional command that would manage all operations outside the area of responsibility of the geographic commands. It would command the remaining 8 operations and 21,887 personnel. UNICOM PSO would include the following missions: 40

44 MINUSTAH, UNMIK, UNOMIG, UNMIT, UNAMA, UNMIN, UNMOGIP, UNFICYP and the UNRCCA in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. UNICOM TRANSPORT is a second functional command that would control the global strategic transportation needs for the UN system similar in nature to USTRANSCOM. This UNICOM would be based at, and manage, the UN Logistics base in Brindisi (Italy) and also manage the UN Stand-by Arrangement System. The potential benefits of the UNICOM concept: The clearest benefit to the creation of a UNICOM system is the improvement in unity-ofeffort and unity-of-command. Using the example of UNICOM WEST ASIA, the direct efforts of 5 of the operations assigned to it could be directed at the solving of the larger Arab-Israeli conflict. Another benefit from using a UNICOM system would be the greater flexibility of action. As is the case with UCCs being the executors of executive orders, so to will UNICOMs be the executors of Security Council mandates. Thus UNICOM AFRICA I, for example, would have the flexibility of using assets from its entire AOR to carry out the different mandates assigned to it. So, in the hypothetical case of an escalation in fighting in Darfur a short term solution, if UNICOM AFRICA I already existed, would be to temporarily transfer troops from UNMIS and MINURCAT, thus allowing more time for new contingents to be found. This situation actually turns a UNICOM into a force multiplier. For this to happen, contingents need to be earmarked according to the caveats attached to them. Some TCCs already limit their units to Chapter VI activities and under no circumstances can they be used in a Chapter VII role. Similarly, some contingents can be incorporated with the explicit understanding that they may be used as a regional reserve, thus fasttracking the decision-making process for their activation. Finally, UNICOMs are modular, meaning more can be created when the need arises and similarly, when the global distribution of operations shift, UNICOMs can be deactivated. This allows for growth as well as downsizing with relative ease and without needing to reorganise the secretariat. UNICOMs can also remain despite there being no PKO in their AOR, shifting their mission from Peacekeeping to Peace building The UNICOM concept can change the nature of PSOs. The UN would, for the first time, act in a coordinated fashion within regions with a high density of conflicts, such as the Great Lakes 41

45 region in Africa. The proposed UNICOM structure will maximise participation of all involved actors, and creates a central point where liaison and coordination with regional entities such as the AU and ECOWAS in Africa, can greatly increase the effectiveness in addressing and resolving conflicts. In this regard, with SC mandates executed by UNICOMs the possibilities to rapidly intervene is greatly increased. With quicker intervention times disputes can be resolved before they turn into conflicts, thus eliminating the need for large, heavily armed and controversial peacekeeping operations. 42

46 CHAPTER 11: THE SECURITY STAFF COMMITTEES The Joint Chiefs of Staff component of the DoD structure acts as a forum for inter-service coordination and as the communication link between the military and their civilian leadership. The JCS does not act as military general staff and has no command authority over operational units. This however does not prevent it from being roughly organized as a joint staff, with the full complement of directorates. The JCS, composed of the chiefs of staff of the military services, acts as the source of military advice for the political leadership, and the Chairman of the JCS is the military advisor of the president and the Secretary of Defence. The UN already has a Military Staff Committee (MSC), upon which a JCS-type structure may be built. A second Police Staff Committee (PSC) would also need to be created, to reflect the growing role of police units in UN PSOs. The PSC would be established as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council 65. Together these two committees would be referred to as the Security Staff Committees (SSCs). Some adaptations would of course have to take place for the structures to be representative of the UN. The Structure of the reorganised MSC and PSC: The MSC is composed of representatives of the military chiefs of the Permanent members of the security council. This membership would need to be altered as, unlike the JCS which represents the organizations that provide the material and manpower, the P-5, with the exception of the USA, provide only a fraction of the total PKO budget, and a very small contribution of the deployed manpower. Noticeably missing are the second and third largest Financial Contributing Countries (FCCs), Japan and Germany. By including these two countries, the top 5 financial contributors would be represented on the committee. With regards to the contribution of manpower, not one of the top 10 contributors is represented, therefore, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Nigeria, the current largest contributors 66 should also be invited to join. This would raise the total number of representatives to 11 and would reflect the reality of UN PKOs. The PSC would have an almost identical structure to the MSC, including the addition of the second and third FCCs. The only difference in membership would be the the absence of India and the participation of Jordan as the second largest Police Contributing Country 67 (PCC). 65 CH V, Art. 29 of the UN Charter 66 Numbers as of 31 st December Monthly Summary of Contributions as of 31 st December

47 The chairmanship of the committees would continue to work using the current rotating system, possibly lengthening the duration to 6 months, as the chairman (CMSC and CPSC) will act as the principle military or police advisor to the SC and the Secretary-General. To support the role of the MSC and the chairman, a UN military staff (UNMS) should be established, composed of military officers from the military services of TCCs. A similar UN Police Service (UNPS) composed of police personnel of PCCs would also need to be established to support the work of the PSC and its Chairman. The Role of the SSCs: The new, representative, SSCs with their supporting UN staffs would serve a similar role to the JCS. CMSC would act as the chief military advisor to the SC and the Secretary-General and CPSC would act as the chief police advisor. The principle work of the SSCs in general would focus on the following: Readiness. The SSCs should identify units which meet the requirements for UN PSO service, they should be categorised by service, capabilities, whether they are rapidly-deployable and by caveat (whether they are available for chapter VI or VII operations and regional mobility). Policy. The SSCs should evaluate the performance of forces deployed on UN PSO duty. From these evaluations recommendations for policy changes and for the creation of new policy should be made to the Secretary-General, this should include reviews of Rules of Engagement and Standard Operating Procedures. 44

48 Planning. The SSCs should provide the military and police planning capabilities to support the work of the SC and SG, particularly with regards to the preparation of mission structures. This should be carried out upon consultation with operational and UNICOM commanders. The SSCs should also prepare contingency plans for possible future deployments and interventions. Training. The SSCs should promote the standardisation of PSO training for the military and police services of member states. In achieving this, the SSCs, working with the Secretary-General and UNICOMs should establish a standard curriculum for military and police PSO training. The Benefits of the new SSC system: The benefits of restructuring the SSCs into JCS-type organizations, are great. The UN Secretariat would no longer be burdened with direct military and police activities, while placing the management of military and police forces in the hands of the three key groups, the P-5, the top TCCs/PCCs and the top FCC. These countries can then directly participate in the establishment of standards, ROEs, SOPs and policy. They will also participate in the planning of missions for which they will, in one form or another, carry the burden. The SSCs can also provide a forum where concerns and technical issues can be addressed in-house. There is another benefit to the transfer of military and police responsibility from the UN Secretariat to the expanded SSCs. Unlike the secretariat, the SSCs would not be prohibited from maintaining an intelligence directorate that could liaise with the intelligence services of member states. In this way the SSCs can act as a focal point for the sharing of intelligence related to UN PSOs and planned operations. This intelligence capability should be limited to intelligence related to the ten key threats 68. This could dramatically improve the situational awareness of both operational commanders as well as provide support to the SC and SG in their decision-making. Security Staff Committees based on the Joint Chiefs of Staff concept could have an immense impact on the conduct of UN PSOs. A greater participation would give voice to the countries on which the UN PSO system most depends. These countries will have a wealth of knowledge and are key to the establishment of standards. The SSCs, by helping establish ROEs and SOPs, can greatly improve the effectiveness of troops as well as their safety in the field. Very few structural changes would be required to expand the MSC and to bring it into the PSO decision-making cycle, so the benefits can be many from only a relatively small investment. 68 Report of The High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change 45

49 CHAPTER 12: THE NEW UN PSO STRUCTURE: The recommendations made in the previous chapters suggest that a greater structural realignment would be required to for them to work effectively. This realignment would in turn have an effect on the structures of other components of the UN PSO system. Returning to the DoD structure, the UCC component and the JCS component have already been identified and adapted to UN use. This leaves the Secretariat, with its attached programmes funds and specialized agencies, and the Military departments for which the UN has no current equivalent. The structure as a whole, however, is more then suited for the needs of the UN as will be demonstrated. The adapted UN PSO structure: A UN structure must be modified in order to allow the changes recommended in the previous chapters. To begin with, a UN Command Authority must be established to identify the components that need to be managed. Based on the U.S. National Command Authority the UNCA would be structured as illustrated here on the right. 46