Report to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Vol. II, NRO Restructure Study, Final Report, July 1989

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1 Description of docuent: Requested date: Released date: Posted date: Source of docuent: Report to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office, Vol. II, NRO Restructure Study, Final Report, July February February April-2012 National Reconnaissance Office Attn: MS&O/Inforation Access and Release Tea Lee Road Chantilly, VA Fax: On-Line For The governentattic.org web site ( the site ) is noncoercial and free to the public. The site and aterials ade available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governentattic.org web site and its principals have ade every effort to ake this inforation as coplete and as accurate as possible, however, there ay be istakes and oissions, both typographical and in content. The governentattic.org web site and its principals shall have neither liability nor responsibility to any person or entity with respect to any loss or daage caused, or alleged to have been caused, directly or indirectly, by the inforation provided on the governentattic.org web site or in this file. The public records published on the site were obtained fro governent agencies using proper legal channels. Each docuent is identified as to the source. Any concerns about the contents of the site should be directed to the agency originating the docuent in question. GovernentAttic.org is not responsible for the contents of docuents published on the website.

2 NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE Lee Road Chantilly, VA February 2012 This is in response to your letter dated 17 February 2012, received in the Inforati on Manageent Services Center of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) on 23 February Pursuant to the Freedo of Inforation Act (FOIA), you are requesting "A copy of the final report for the 1989 NRO Restructure Study, Tasked by ADNRO, Conducted by Rear Adiral (Ret.) Robert Geiger and Barry Kelly.u Your request has been processed in accordance with the FOIA, 5 U.S. C. 552, as aended. The docuent you requested has previously been released in part to another requester. This docuent, consisting of 71 pages, is being released in part to you, as well. Material redacted is denied pursuant to FOIA exeptions : (b) ( 1) as properly classified inforation under Executive Order 13526, Sections 1. 4(c) and 1. 4(e); and (b) (3) which applies to inforation specifically exept by statutes : 50 U.S. C , which protects intelligence sources and ethods fro unauthorized disclosure ; and 10 U. S. C. 424 which states : " Except as required by the President or as provided in subsection (c), no provision of law shall be construed to require the disclosure of (1) The organization or any function... 2)... nuber of pers ons eployed by or assigned or detailed to any such organization or the nae, official title, occupational series, grade, or salary of any such person... (b) Covered Organizations... the National Reconnaissance Officeu.

3 The FOIA authorizes federal agencies to assess fees for record services. Based upon the inforation provided, you have been placed in the " otheru category of requesters, which eans you are responsible for the cost of search tie exceeding two hours ($44.00/hour) and reproduction fees (. 15 per page) exceeding 100 pages. Additional inforation about fees can be found on our website at www. nro. gov. In your request you expressed a willingness to pay fees up to $ No assessable fees were incurred in processing this request. You have the right to appeal this deterination by addressing your appeal to the NRO Appeal Authority, Lee Road, Chantilly, VA within 60 days of the date of this letter. Should you decide to do so, please explain the basis of your appeal. If you have any questions, please call the Requester Service Center at (703) and reference case nuber F Sincerely, ~~.L Stephen R. Glenn Chief, Inforation Access and Release Tea Enclosure : Report to the Director National Reconnaissance Office - Volue II - NRO Restructure Study Final Report

4 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN Report to the Director National Reconnaissance Office VOLUME II NRO Restructure Study Final Report July 1989 TOP SECRET / BVEMAN BYE 28039/89X Page 1of 71

5 TOP secret / BYEMAN Foreword The Restructure Planning Tea would like to thank all those who have contributed their tie to supporting us during the course of this study. Over the last five onths, we have et with a wide range of governent and contractor individuals who have shared candid and invaluable insights regarding their associations with the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). Although the priary objective of this report was to exaine probles within the NRO and to ake recoendations, we were all ipressed with the strengths of the organization. There are few other agencies that, in an effort to iprove theselves, would be as open in allowing their activities to be so thoroughly scrutinized. That in itself says soething about the confidence and strength of the NRO. The en and woen of the NRO should be justly proud of their accoplishents and their coitent to the service of their country. Finally, we would especially like to thank the Acting Director of the NRO, Mr. Jiie D. Hill, for all the support that he and his organization provided to the Planning Tea. We hope that this study has provided hi with constructive recoendations which will help to ake the NRO an even ore efficient and anageable agency. TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X Page 2of 71

6 1 OP SECRET / BYEMAN VOLUME I - Foreword BRIEFING 1.0 suary Bri~fing 2.0 Back-up Data VOLUME II FINAL REPORT TABLE OF CONTENTS Foreword Introduction Purpose Background.. 5 Study Need for the NRO Issue and Challenges. Issue Challenges.. Probles. Internal Probles. External Probles Restructure Recoendations Leadership Recoendations Near Full Tie DNRO Strengthen DNRO/DCI Relationship Strengthen DNRO/SECDEF Relationship. 16 Director, OD&E Should be Director, Progra B SECDEF and DCI Support to DNRO NRO Senior Manageent Forus Deputy Director for Military Support 17 Integrate DSPO Into NRO Strealine Staff Planning and Analysis. 21 NRO Advisory Board.. 28 Centralize BYEMAN Security 28 Collocate NRO NRO Mission and Charter overt Versus Covert National Reconnaissance Board. 35 Facility Acquisition. 36 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page 3of 71

7 TOP SECRET I BVEMAN Appendices Externals Introduction.. Goals and Method. Conditions and Perceptions Probles Recoendations. Ipleentation Ipleentation.... Planning Tea Mebers ADNRO Tasking Meorandu, BYE-27775/89 Persons and Organizations Interviewed. Overview of the NRO... Restructure Alternatives..... Ipleentation MOA, BYE-28040/89X "TOP SECREt: I BVEMAN BVE-28039I89X Page 4of 71

8 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN HRO RESTRUCTURE STUDY 1.0 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Purpose. This report suarizes the results of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Restructure study conducted fro February through July The study was conducted at the request of the Acting Director of the NRO (ADNRO) and the Directors of the three NRO Progra Offices to identify the organizational changes required to ensure that the NRO is prepared to respond to future intelligence challenges Background. During his last two years as Director of the NRO (DNRO), secretary Aldridge initiated siilar studies. His principal concerns were the growing inability of the NRO to work effectively, both internally and externally, for the developent and execution of the overhead progras, and the NRO's inability to achieve the necessary consensus, within the Intelligence Counity and the Departent of Defense (DoD), to get new initiatives prograed. These earlier studies highlighted any of the probles associated with the atrix nature of the NRO and the lack of DNRO line anageent authority. Just prior to his retireent in Deceber 1988, Secretary Aldridge provided his recoendations for restructuring the NRO to the Director, Central Intelligence (DC!). However, since his proposed changes were not well understood outside of the NRO and there had not been sufficient tie to exaine the ipleentation ipacts in detail, there was a general reluctance, both inside and outside the NRO, about proceeding without further analysis and Intelligence Counity review. In response to these concerns and specific questions fro the DCI, the ADNRO and the NRO Progra Directors initiated the current study to reexaine, in detail, the organizational probles, potential solutions, and ipleentation issues. 1.3 study. In January 1989, the ADNRO approached Rear Adiral (Retired) Robert Geiger and Mr. Barry Kelly and requested that they lead an independent study with participation fro the NRO, other Intelligence Counity agencies, and the DoD. The study. group, which was called the Restructure Planning Tea or Planning Tea, included ebers fro the NRO Staff, the three NRO Progra Offices, the Defense Support Project.Office (DSPO), the Joint Staff (JS), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), National security Agency (NSA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Intelligence Counity Staff (ICS). Appendix 1 lists the Planning Tea ebers. The tasking for the study was contained in a February 2, 1989 ADNRO eo, at Appendix 2, that expressed concern regarding a nuber of fundaental probles inhibiting the effectiveness and TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page 5of 71

9 TOP SECReT I BYEMAN efficiency of the NRO. The general objectives of the study were.to aintain the strengths of the NRO {strealined anageent, cradle-to-grave syste responsibility, and Service an~ Agency coposition), while recoending ways to "strengthen 1.nternal operations and the NRO decision-akin~ proc7sses (a~d~ :P:ovide increased support to our users, 1nclud1ng operat1ng 1l1tary forces ". The Planning Tea initiated its activities with a detailed survey of how the NRO is organized and how it does business, including how the Intelligence Counity and DoD users and custoers of NRO data view the perforance of the NRO. During a two-week period in March, exhaustive, in-depth briefings and discussions were conducted between the Planning Tea, the NRO staff, DSPO and the three Progra Offices to describe the organizational and operational baseline of the NRO. Seventeen ajor functional areas were covered ranging fro internal functions, such as personnel and contracting, to external interfaces, such as requireents and custoer interfaces. In addition, over the five onths of the study, discussions, interviews and eetings were held with a wide variety of current and forer Intelligence Counity and DoD individuals and senior anagers fro various contractors. A listing of the individuals involved is at Appendix 3. Based on this inforation, a set of issues was identified that represented a suation of real and perceived probles and syptos of probles. These issues were distilled into a proble set that fored the basis for the developent of potential solutions. In May, eetings were again held with the NRO Staff, DSPO and the Progra Offices to discuss the proble set and the corrective recoendations developed by the Planning Tea and to solicit their suggestions regarding other potential solutions. As the restructure activities continued, a concern was raised that there were obvious probles external to the NRO that would ipact upon the success of any NRO internal changes. Following a briefing on these probles to the ADNRO and the Progra Directors, the Planning Tea was instructed to provide a separate report directly to the Secretary of Defense {SECDEF) and DCI.regarding the external probles identified during the restru~ture effort. Subsequently, the Deputy Director, Central Intell1gence {DDCI) expressed his interest in receiving a report on these probles, including explicit recoendations for change. A suary of the "External" Report is provided in Section 5. During the Restructure Study, bi-weekly eetings were held between the Planning Tea Leaders and the ADNRO and the Directors of the three progras. During the first week in June the ADNRO requested that the Planning Tea ove its report date'up to TOP SECRET I BYEMAN BYE-28039I89X Page 6of 71

10 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN 7 July fro the original 31 July suspense. This report is the response to that request. 1.4 Need for the HRO. The NRO was created in an environent arked by bober and issile gaps,. Soviet advances in strategic weapons research and developent {R&D), the U-2 shoot down, and the inability of western intelligence services to penetrate the "iron curtain". The only eans available to collect the needed intelligence was the newly eerging technology of satellites. The founders of the NRO realized that a.routine approach to R&D and acquisition would not eet the technology challenges involved or produce the necessary spaceborne intelligence collection systes in the tie frae dictated by pressing national security concerns. The iportance of the ission called for special acquisition arrangeents to accelerate our response to the Soviet threat. To ensure the greatest probability of success in this new technology area, the best possible cobination-of national resources fro all agencies and departents working in the area of satellite reconnaissance was required. A atrixed organizational arrangeent was also selected to prevent the doination of the critical collection capability by a single agency or departent. Therefore, the NRO was established as a DoD agency with special acquisition authorities and atrixed resources fro the Air Force, Navy, and CIA. The results of the NRO's efforts have exceeded expectations. Fro the beginning, the NRO consistently deonstrated the ability to accoplish ipartial syste acquisition and operations in response to the needs of a diverse set of users and custoers. Multiple agency and departental participation in the NRO has resulted in the availability of a broad range of expertise and experience critical to the fulfillent of the ission. The NRO's cradle-to-grave responsibility ensures that both developental and operational considerations are reflected in systes acquisition, and the strealined acquisition approach allows a ore rapid response to requireents. A fundaental axio underlying the results of the study is that there is still a valid requireent for an NRO. Although charter and ission are addressed in ore detail in , in suary the Planning Tea believes that the nation has been well served by the NRO and that a single national organization is still the ost effective and efficient way to anage and execute space and airborne reconnaissance progras in support of-national intelligence and ilitary operational support requireents. An overview of the organization of the NRO is provided in Appendix 4. TOP SECRE'f I BYEMAN BYE-28039I89X Page 7of 71

11 I UP SECRET / BYE MAN 2.0 ISSUE AND CHALLENGES 2.1 Issue. The NRO has served the nation rearkably well over the past 25 years. The critical issue is whether the NRO can sustain that record. Certainly, when considering aking potentially ajor organizational changes in the NRO, the obvious question is "Why change soething that has worked so well for so long?". The Planning Tea believes that the NRO can sustain its superior perforance record but the environent has changed and the NRO ust cope with new challenges in order to achieve this goal. In the past, the intelligence questions were relatively siple and any new collection capability that supplied additional data on the USSR provided critically needed intelligence. The isolated developent of capabilities within single satellite systes and to support single intelligence disciplines (INTs) et these early requireents and was affordable. Today the intelligence and operational shortfalls are significantly ore coplex and require a ore integrated approach. Now there is a greater need for the erging of previously separate and distinct collection disciplines. Aerica's interests and intelligence needs have expanded far beyond the Soviet Union. Treaty onitoring has placed ore deands for dynaic coverage of larger areas. Targets are becoing ore obile and the eney has increased efforts to hide his activities. Increasingly, intelligence objectives require ore understanding of how things work, not just where and how any there are. The ability of our intelligence analysts to cope with the collected data is being stretched to the liits. And finally, users, especially the ilitary, require ore rapid access to intelligence and in soe cases the actual collected data. Additionally, prograatic flexibility is decreasing due to reduced funding growth and the costs associated with aintaining a significant baseline capability. This reduced flexibility has resulted in diinishing opportunities for new initiatives. More difficult requireents and reduced prograatic flexibility andate that National Foreign Intelligence Progra (NFIP) and DoD investent decisions ust be well reasoned and responsive to user and custoer needs. National Reconnaissance Progra (NRP) decisions are further coplicated by their coplexity, cost, and the tie required for an NRP syste to reach initial operating capability. 2.2 Challenges. The principal challenge facing the NRO is to aintain, through superior perforance, its leadership role in the developent of creative syste responses to requireents. To afford the axiu opportunity for new initiatives to be included in the NFIP or DoD progras, the need for baseline capabilities TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X Page Bof 71

12 lop SECRE't' / BYEMAN versus new initiatives ust be an area open to objective tradeoffs. The NRO shouid proote better syste end-to-end coherence, including analysis and disseination capabilities, and ore cross-syste and cross-int architectural integration including spacecraft, relays, ground stations, and tasking. The second challenge before the NRO is to iprove its understanding of, and responsiveness to, national and ilitary operational requireents. The NRO is, in siplest ters, a service organization. Understanding the custoers needs should be a fundaental precept for the NRO. The.third challenge is for the NRO to assue a fuller, ore proactive, role in the Intelligence and DoD counities in which it participates. The NRO should increase its understanding and participation in intelligence issues and probles and try to extend its influence beyond its traditional acquisition and collection role to work for ore effective and efficient systes developent in an end-to-end context. The NRO ust iprove its support to the National Foreign Intelligence Council (NFIC) and DoD decision processes to proote a better understanding of the coplex and often interrelated NRP, Defense Reconnaissance Support Progra (DRSP), and Airborne Reconnaissance Support Progra {ARSP) issues. Additionally, the NRO should develop a better consensus-building approach within the Intelligence Counity and DoD to support ipleentation of the NRP, DRSP, and ARSP. TOP &&CR&T / BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X Copy of.7 Page 9of 71

13 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN 3. 0 PROBLEMS 3.1 Internal Probles. In responding to the challenges above, the NRO ust deal with soe significant internal probles. The proble descriptions that follow were synthesized fro the briefings and discussions the Planning Tea held with t~e NRO Progra Eleents and the various eleents of the Intell1gence counity and DoD with which the NRO deals. The external inputs included NRO contractors, analytical and production intelligence activities, ilitary operators, Congressional staffers, and the senior anagers fro the ajor intelligence and defense organizations. The probles identified by the Planning Tea are. consistent with those highlighted by the previous restructure studies and earlier exainations of the NRO's perforance such as the 1986 McMahon study. The Planning Tea recognizes that selfexaination is not easy for individuals or organizations. The Planning Tea believes that it cannot be stated too often or too strongly that the willingness of the NRO to sponsor such a candid exaination of how it does business speaks well for the strength of the organization and its coitent to ake a positive change The critical anageent positions of DNRO and Director, Progra B lack the dedicated attention required to provide effective leadership of the NRO. The "white world" responsibilities of the Secretary of the Air Force and the broad ission of the CIA Deputy Director for Science and Technology do not perit a sufficient aount of tie to be spent on their NRO responsibilities The DNRO does not have the corporate resources necessary to develop, aintain, or evaluate responses to, top-down strategic, prograatic, or policy guidance. The DNRO also lacks the resources to provide integrated NRP/DRSP/ARSP responses to requireents. No organizational entity exists within the NRO, dedicated to supporting corporate NRO objectives, with the responsibility, and adequate and appropriate resources, to affect: - Architectural integration or efficiencies necessary to produce a unified reconnaissance constellation in which the systes copleent each other, work together effectively, and unnecessary duplication is eliinated. - Developent and aintenance of corporate planning docuentation such as a strategic plan technology road ap, or consolidated baseline ' "contracts" between the DNRO and the Syste Progra Offices (SPOs) to provide a docuented, top-level TOP SECfti!T I BYEMAN BYE 28039I89X Page 10of 71

14 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE. 15 DECEMBER 2010 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN baseline to support top-down guidance and decision aking functions. - Resolution of cross-progra or cross-int issues such as ultiple technical solutions fro different Progra Offices for the sae col~ection proble, the developent of a SIGINT/IMINT cuing capability, or the developent of a shared resource such as a coon relay capability. - Actions necessary to support an understanding of, and support for, NRO initiatives in Intelligence Counity or DoD forus. Existing corporate resources (the Staff) lack clear purpose or direction and are.not effectively organized, anaged, staffed, or supplied with the resources necessary to support the realization of NRO objectives The existing NRO Staff operations function cannot support the degree of DNRO attention to operations, necessary to support the objectives of aintaining the NRO's cradle-to-grave responsibility, including operations, and increasing the level of NRO support to ilitary operations The structure and procedures necessary to facilitate effective NRO decision processes are lacking. currently, it is very difficult to ake, and ipleent, non-consensus decisions. Additionally, there is no ability to include custoer and user considerations in internal NRO activities without liiting NRO flexibility. The Staff support to the process does not adequately prepare the participants, nor does it adequately disseinate and follow-up on decisions when they are ade The atrix nature of the organization is critical to the realization of effective service and agency participation in the NRO and the infrastructure support and custoer insight that results fro that participation. However, this organizational structure also results in the divided loyalty of the Progra Eleents between the NRO and their parent organizations which has tended to be heavily biased toward the parent organization. Additionally, the Progra Eleents often have overlapping responsibilities and interests that ay be at odds with the objectives of the NRO. These conflicts often result in a destructive level of copetition between the Progra Eleents. The DNRO has little ability to resolve or anage these conflicts because of his lack of line authority and the ability of the Progra Directors to use their dual reporting chains and the power TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page 11of 71

15 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN of their parent organizations to circuvent his decisions. The effects of this conflict of loyalties have been deonstrated in several acquisition-related decisions and reversals, in prior efforts to restr~c~ure the NRO, and in the current restructure planning act1v1ty No entity exists within the NRO with the responsibility and the resources to work with the Intelligence Counity and the DoD to ensure that proper requireents developent and feedback occurs. siilarly, there is no NRO organization responsible for the translation and disseination of requireents to the Progras in a anner that supports a unifor understanding of the national and ilitary support requireents The DSPO has provided a useful focus, and the necessary "black/white" function, for the ilitary/nrc interface, but has had liited effectiveness in influencing how the ilitary does business with the NRO in areas such as requireents or support to operations. Additionally, the understanding of the ilitary proble, developed in the DSPO, is not effectively influencing NRO activities due to the isolation of the DSPO fro the ainstrea structure of the NRO The NRO does not put enough ephasis on ensuring that systes are planned, acquired, and operated with end-to-end coherence The lack of an effective NRO siulation policy and a corresponding lack of NRO anageent direction for siulation activities has resulted in a lack of adequate, credible and coon siulation tools to support crossprogra, ulti-int, syste end-to-end, and top-level architectural analysis and planning The NRO does not have an effective, unified security syste to support the needs of the NRP and DRSP. The current "ultiple standards" approach across the three NRO Progra Eleents and the other governent organizations engaged in BYEMAN activities is resulting in a significant and unnecessary expenditure of NRO funds by contractors~ Intelligence Counity and DoD decisions regarding NRO progras are becoing ore coplex, especially with respect to cross~progra and cross-int issues and ~ostjben7fit tradeoffs. The NR? does a reasonable job of 1nterfac1ng at the SPO level, w1th external organizations to support acquisition and operations activities. Howeve~ the NRO is not organized to act as a single corporate entity TOI' SECRET f BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page 12of 71

16 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN with these external organizations in a anner that provides the with the tiely inforation the external organizations require to participate effectively in Intelligence Counity or DoD decision forus. 3.2 External Probles. In addition to the internal NRO. probles, there are a nuber of related external probles that also have to be addressed: The current foral national and ilitary requireents and guidance processes do not support requireents forwarding, validation, and feedback between custoers and users and the NRO; therefore, ther$ is a lack of sufficiently concise, effective, and prioritized requireents to support systes acquisition and tradeoff decisions and systes developent A significant portion of the ilitary has an inaccurate view of the NRO's role in the intelligence support process, including such areas as requireents developent, tasking of collection systes, and data disseination The NFIC process does not facilitate effective adinistration or execution of the NFIP progras by the NFIC senior anagers. NFIC principals often lack sufficient understanding of the issues, especially the ore coplex NRP issues. Contributing to the difficulty is the Intelligence Counity's lack of a syste or agreed ethodology for planning and analysis on the NFIP scale. The resultant lack of an effective long-range strategy causes decision aking to occur in the context of near ter prograatic and perforance considerations which tend to favor the baseline over new and/or long-ter initiatives. The process is particularly ineffective in addressing NRP issues. The higher cost, longer ter initiatives, that typically characterize ost of the NRP, do not fare well against the lower cost, near-ter initiatives of the other NFIP progras Insufficient syste end-to-end planning and prograing coherence across NFIP and related DoD progras wastes resources and liits capabilities The lack of a consistent, concise, and workable definition of what should be protected within the BYEMAN security syste, partially due to the lack of a good definition of the BYEMAN, TK, and other security systes' interfaces, has resulted in an inconsistent, outdated approach to security classification that does not support TOP SI!CfU!T / BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X Page 13of 71

17 TOP &I!CRET I BYEMAN the objective of protecting critical data while ensuring sufficient access to data for those who have a valid need to know. TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page 14of 71

18 . TOP SECRET / BYEMAN 4. 0 RESTRUCTURE RECOMMENDATIONS 4.1 Leadership. Before detailing the restructure recoendations it is iportant to address the question of "Why restructure to solve probles that are ostly resolvable with better anageent?" It is iportant to understand that the anageent position of the DNRO is inherently weak principally due to the atrix nature of the NRO over which the DNRO does not have coplete line authority. Restructuring will help by reoving organizational obstacles inhibiting anageent control and by providing the "tools" to proote ore effective anageent. The resultant iproveents could be even ore effective if cobined with effective leadership but the changes cannot substitute for good leadership. To be effective, the changes, especially those associated with strengthening the DNRO's decision authority, ust be supported by the DNRO, DCI, and SECDEF. 4.2 Recoendations. To structure the NRO to build upon its excellent record, we recoend that: The DNRO's DoD position should enable hi to be a near full tie anager of the..._..nrp, DRSP, and ARSP. The DNRO's "white world~has provided soe iportant advantages in support of the anageent and execution of the NRO ission. However, the anageent requireents of the NRO require that the DNRO devote at least 80 percent of his tie to NRO atters. Often the non NRO responsibilities of the DNRO, especially when the DNRO has also been the Secretary of the Air Force, have ade this aount of attention to NRO atters ipossible. The Planning Tea believes that if the DNRO has a second hat in the DoD, it ust allow for the focus of his attention to be on his responsibilities as DNRO while facilitating participation in those space issues that are iportant to the NRO and its ission The DCI should treat the DNRO as his principal advisor regarding the developent and execution of NRO progras and actively include the DNRO as a senior eber of his anageent tea. When the DCI and ODCI exclude the DNRO, and instead go to senior anagers of CIA or the Intelligence Counity Staff, or other NFIP Progra Managers with a question or a request explicitly within the DNRO's purview, they undercut the DNRO's anageent prerogatives and weaken his anageent position. The DCI and DDCI should have sufficient interaction with the DNRO to foster a close anageent relationship. Conversely, the DNRO should keep the DCI and DDCI fully infored on a tiely basis regard.ing NRO issues, probles and plans. 'fop SECRET / BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X Page 1Sof 71

19 TOP SECRET / BVEMAN The SECDEF relationship with the DNRO should be strengthened to iprove execution of the Defense progras anaged by the DNRO. This includes the DRSP and other progras for which the SECDEF has given anageent. responsibility to the DNRO. currently, the effect1veness of these progras suffers ~ecause the.large ~n~ ~iv7rse DoD constituency akes the 1pleentat1on of 1n1t1at1ves difficult. While all these diverse DoD interests should have an opportunity to actively participate in the progras, there ust be an effective and enforceable way to end debates and ake final decisions so that ipleentation can proceed. A closer anageent relationship between the SECDEF and the DNRO would bolster the DNRO's ability to resolve contentious issues, consistent with DoD policy and strategy, in a tiely and enforceable anner. As with the DCI, the DNRO should keep the SECDEF fully infored, on a tiely basis, regarding all NRO issues, probles, and plans The Director of the Office of Developent & Engineering should be the Director of Progra B. Currently, the CIA's Deputy Director for Science and Technology (DDS&T) is the Director of Progra B. Because the DDS&T reports directly to the DCI, there are real and perceptual probles regarding his willingness to support a DNRO decision that is unfavorable to the CIA, or to appeal it with the DNRO. Instead, the DDS&T can use his CIA coand chain and take the issue directly to the DNRO's boss, the DCI. The proxiity of the DDS&T to the DCI also tends to cause the DCI to look first to the DDS&T for support regarding NRO issues. In addition, a non-nro related proble resulting fro the DDS&T being the Director, Progra B is the real or perceived loss of objectivity for his DDS&T responsibilities because of his close ties to Progra B. Additionally, the DDS&T is liited by other responsibilities and can spend only about 20 percent of his tie on NRO and Progra B atters. The effective anageent of the NRO and Progra B requires that the Director of Progra B is soeone who spends the ajority of his tie working Progra B and NRO issues The SECDEF and DCI ust give the DNRO their active support for hi to fulfill his difficult anageent task. This is so iportant that we recoend that the SECDEF and DCI should specifically reaffir their support for the DNRO ~n an MOA, such as the one in Appendix 6. It is critically 1portant that both the SECDEF and DCI work closely together to support the DNRO and his decision authority. To effectively anage the NRO, the DNRO's decision authority ust have the force of line anageent control in spite of TOP SECRET / BVEMAN BVE-28039/89X Page 1Sof 71

20 NRO APPRqVED FOR RELEASE 15 DECEMBER 2010 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN the atrix nature of the organization. The SECDEF and DCI ust not allow eleents of the NRO to subvert the DNRO's authority. Additionally, they ust support the DNRO's "hire & fire" recoendations regarding the senior anagers of the NRO The frequency, regularity, and discipline of foral internal NRO senior anageent forus ust be iproved. The senior anagers of the NRO need to eet frequently and regularly for the purpose of supporting a ore effective decision pro cess that should include: - The ability to identify issues requiring anageent attention as early as possible and to frae the in a anner that clearly identifies the decisions that ust be ade and the tradeoffs involved. - The supporting data ust be readily available, well organized, coplete, and credible. - A supporting process to allow the counication and discussion of the issues and the relevant data by the appropriate anagers. This process should: -- Fit the structure and objectives of the organization -- Ensure all participants have adequate tie and data to participate effectively. - Clearly understood decision authorities. - The eans to ensure that issues are resolved at the lowest possible anageent level, but that issues not resolved can be raised quickly for top-level resolution when required. - An effective ethod of docuenting decisions and counicating the to all parts of the organization. - The ability to follow-up on decisions to ensure they are ipleented A new NRO position should be created: the Deputy Director for Military Support. The DSPO and the ilitary interface probles require ore senior and appropriate representation within the NRO anageent structure. The objectives for establishing this position include: TOP SECFli!T / BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X Page 17of 71

21 NROAPPROVED FOR RELEASE 15 DECEMBER 2010 TOP SECRET / BVEMAN - Enhancing senior advice to the DNRO regarding support to ilitary operations; - Facilitating counications with the principal organization, the Joint staff, responsible for the conduct of ilitary operations; - Iproving NRO interfaces with those orga~izations associated with support to ilitary operat~ons; and - Providing a eans to iprove the ilitary's understanding of how the NRO functions within the context of the Intelligence Counity and support to ilitary operations. The new position should be filled by a two-star flag officer, dual-hatted in an appropriate position on the Joint staff, who is failiar with support to ilitary operations issues. This officer should reside in NRO facilities and spend at least 70 percent of his tie on NRO atters. He should assist the DNRO and DDNRO with the anageent of the NRO with ephasis on issues related to ilitary support. The Deputy for Military Support should be the nuber three officer in the NRO coand chain The existing ilitary support functions (DSPO) should be integrated into the appropriate staff and line eleents to increase the understanding of, and responsiveness to, ilitary requireents. The ilitary deputy should have a special staff of six to ten ilitary officers to facilitate liaison activities with the ilitary. This sall staff organization should retain the title 11 DSP0 11 within the "white world" and should provide the organizational cover and the "black/white" interface function necessary to support the NRO/DoD interface. The reaining DSPO functions should be integrated into the appropriate, restructured, corporate eleents to eliinate the current isolation of the DSPO fro the NRO so that the effectiveness of the DSPO activities within the NRO is increased. Specifically, the TENCAP liaison function, the exercise support activities, and the planning and analysis activities now perfored by the DSPO should be transferred to the Planning & Analysis (P&A) organization (4.2.10). While a separate DRSP should be aintained, the budget adinistrative functions for DRSP should be integrated, with the NRP budget support functions, into the NRO budget office which will aintain independent tracking of the NRP, DRSP, and ARSP. In a siilar fashion the adinistration of, and guidance for, the DRSP R&D ' TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X Page 1Bof 71

22 TOP SECRET I BVEMAN activities should be cobined with the NRP R&D.guidance and adinistrative functions and placed in the P&A organization. A ore integrated NRO and DSPO anageent structure should also iprove the anageent oversight of DSPOsponsored activities by ensuring that there is a single set of anageent procedures, and adequate resources, for the internal anageent oversight of NRP, DRSP, and ARSP activities. The careful anageent of the DRSP is becoing ore iportant since the DRSP has atured and begun to consider initiatives that ay not be executed by NRO eleents. For exaple, an initiative ight be funded in the DRSP and anaged by the DSPO, both of which are under DNRO anageent control, but the actual developent ay be done by an activity not subject to the anageent of the DNRO. Additionally, the aount of funds provided by other organizations for execution of various initiatives, through the DRSP, have been increasing. Both of these areas require careful anageent attention to prevent abuses of the NRP or DRSP charters or the special authorities of the NRO. This anageent attention should be facilitated by a ore integrated NRO and DSPO anageent structure The DNRO's staff should be strealined along traditional staff lines. The existing NRO Staff is an organizational ixture of substantive functions, such as cross planning and analysis, operations onitoring and congressional liaison, and.adinistrative functions including traditional staff.functions such as personnel, policy, budget, etc. - This ixture does not allow effective or appropriate senior NRO anageent focus on the individual functions collected within the staff structure in a anner consistent with their relative iportance. The existing structure also results in span of control probles and poor lines of counication that are inconsistent with the staff requireents of an efficient NRO. The Staff should be restructured to separate the substantive functions fro the traditional adinistrative functions and to ensure that the substantive functions have the organizational structure necessary to ake the ore effective. The adinistrative functions of security, policy, registry, personnel, budget and coptroller, logistics and counications should be collected into a separate staff headed by a senior 0-6 or equivalent civilian. The security function is envisioned as a sall support eleent for the NRO headquarters. The policy function encopasses all those areas traditionally associated with classical adinistrative policy, including organization-wide policies and procedures, operating instructions, and regulations. The policy TOP SeCReT I BVEMAN BVE-28039I89X Page 19of 71

23 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE. 15 DECEMBER 2010 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN activity will be the central disseination and aintenance point for policies. The prograing and budgeting function provides for budget adinistration, includin~ bui~di~g the annual budget. A separate Coptroller's off1ce w1th1n the adinistrative staff is envisioned for ease of audit and separation of functions. This function should be responsible for the transferring, accounting, and auditing of funds. A separate operations staff should be created to strengthen the viability of the corporate NRO operations functions which are iportant. to both aintaining the NRO's strong cradle-to-grave approach to operations anageent and to iproving the support the NRO provides to ilitary operations. To support ilitary operations, the NRO ust have an operations anageent capability that is ore robust than the current ad hoc non-real-tie arrangeent. The DNRO should have the ability to anage operations rather than just be infored about the after the fact. The proposed operations organization should be responsible for the existing flight safety, contingency, operations status onitoring, weather, overhead Collection Manageent Center NRO personnel adinistration, and the current staff level launch support activities. The Inspector General (IG), General Counsel and Congressional Liaison functions should be organized as special staffs to the DNRO, uch the sae as they are in ajor corporations and ilitary coands. The NRO Congressional Liaison is a single person today and, recognizing the advantages of that approach, it should reain very sall (one or two people). The advantage of having that person report directly to the DNRO is based priarily on the iportance of that one person being able to convey to the Congress the Director's views. The IG currently does report directly to the DNRO, by charter, and t~ere should be no change to that special relationship. F1nally, the General Counsel is also a position that ust be able to provide advice, unfiltered by staff pressures to the Director. ' Additionally, care should be taken in structuring and staffing these staff eleents to ensure that there is no potential for conflict between the and the recoended planning and analysis organization (4.2.10). With the collocation of the headquarters eleents of t~e NRO, as described in , including the Progra D1rectors, the need for staff-level individual Progra Eleent Monitors to represent the progras will be TOP SECR~ I BYEMAN BYE-28039I89X Copy of 1 Page 20of 71

24 TOP SI!CRET / BYEMAN eliinated. Therefore, this function should be eliinated, as a staff function, and absorbed within each of the separate Progra Directors' offices within the collocated headquarters A substantial NRO Planning and Analysis (P&A) organization be created, with 80 to 140 personnel, as a separate line organization. To be responsive to the intelligence and operational needs of the future, the NRO ust anage its activities and develop its systes in an increasingly integrated anner. Iproved integration ust include a better understanding of user and custoer requireents, an enhanced involveent of users and custoers in NRO planning activities, the developent of crossprogra and cross-int solutions, and ore effective syste end-to-end planning coherence, including better coordination with the other NFIP and Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) progras. The anticipated intelligence and operational environent of the future requires the developent of a strong, centralized P&A capability within the NRO. The expected coplexity of the future.intelligence and operational requireents, diversity of the potential solutions available, criticality of the prograatic decisions, and liited resources that will be available require a substantial analytic capability to support and optiize the NRC's anageent and decision processes. The P&A organization should be established to eet the following objectives: Enhance the NRO's external interfaces including requireents onitoring, translation, and feedback to iprove the NRO's understanding of national and ilitary support requireents. - Provide a capability to develop and aintain an integrated architecture that will ore effectively and efficiently eet the intelligence requireents of the future. - Provide a capability to develop and aintain a strategic plan that details what ust be accoplished (technically, fiscally, and poli4ically) to realize the desired architecture. - Provide an independent support capability for the NRO decision processes, including an objective technical TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X Page 21of 71

25 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN assessent capability that can address cross-progra and cross-int issues fro a corporate NRO perspective. - Enhance the NRO's ability to effect better syste end-to-end and cross-progra planning and execution coherence between the DNRO-anaged progras and the other NFIP and TIARA progras. - Iprove the NRO's effectiveness in external decision processes including the ability to proote an understanding of, and_support for, NRO initiatives. The ission stateent or charter for the P&A organization should read as follows: "The Planning and Analysis organization of the National Reconnaissance Office is the central organizational entity responsible for top-1evel progra planning, coordination, and-analysis of the DNROanaged progras. The organization shall have the principal responsibility for interfacing with external organizations, with the exception of SPO-level developent and operational interfaces. They shall perfor requireents onitoring, analysis, translation, and feedback, and the coordination necessary to ensure syste end-to-end planning coherence between the DNROanaged progras and the other NFIP and TIARA progras. The P&A organization shall be responsible for the developent and aintenance of an architectural and strategic plan and the pianning and analysis, supporting guidance and baseline docuentation necessary td ipleent the plan. P&A shall also provide support, including, but not liited, to objective technical adjudication of cross-progra and cross-int issues for the NRO decision processes." The P&A organization should be organized in detail by its Director with the advice of the other senior NRO and Intelligence Counity anagers. Additionally, the final definitions of the functions perfored by P&A and its interfaces with the other Progra Eleents should be left to the P&A Director and the DNRO. However, the following are soe general principles of organization and operation that should be followed in establishing P&A: - Responsibility and Authority: The P&A Director and the P&A organization ust have a significant role with attendant supporting responsibilities and authorities in the anageent and execution of the DNRO-anaged ' progras. TOP SECRET'/ BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X Page 22ot 71

26 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN -- The roles, responsibilities, and authorities of P&A ust be clearly understood and, with the exception of essential checks and balances, all copeting functions within the NRO (staff and progra level) should be eliinated, or restructured, to avoid unnecessary conflict. -- The P&A organization, while focusing on the developent of the future NRO architecture, should also have significant responsibilities related to the anageent and execution of the current DNROanaged progras in order to avoid "ivory tower isolation". -- The Director of P&A should be a senior SIS/SES officer or a flag rank ilitary officer. The Director should be selected by, and report directly to, the DNRO, and have equivalent stature to the Progra Directors. -- The Director of P&A should be a eber of the Directors' Board and all other senior NRO anageent forus concerned with planning, prograing, and decision aking. -- The P&A organization should be a line organization equivalent to a Progra Office. -- The Director of P&A should have ready access to the DNRO and other Senior NRO anagers. To facilitate access to the DNRO and the ability of the P&A organization to support the DNRO, the Director of P&A, and the entire P&A organization, should be collocated in the sae facility as the DNRO. --The Director of P&A should be involved (e.g., developent of guidance for andjor assessent) in all critical NRO.decisions. - Independent capabilities and resources:. While the P&A organization should call upon the Progra Eleents, SPOs, and Intelligence Counity or DoD eleents for task-specific suppleentary expertise and support, P&A ust have sufficient independent.resources and capabilities to eet the routine ajority of its needs. -- P&A ust have a sufficient nuber of assigned full-tie personnel to perfor virtually all P&A TOP SECRET I BYEMAN BYE 28039I89X Page 23of 71

27 TOI' SECRET I BYEMAN responsibilities without having to re~y on teporary assignent of personnel.fro~ Progra Eleents, SPOs, or custoer organj.zat~ons. -- P&A ust be supported by an independent budget that includes sufficient funding for P&A contractor support, analytic tools developent, and travel requireents, as required. -- P&A ust have full and tiely access to any NRO data it needs, including access, through the SPOs, to all NRO contractors and any NRO data they have. -- P&A ust be able to use contractor support, as required, to fulfill its responsibilities. While P&A ay use the contracting capabilities of one of the Progra Eleents for this purpose, P&A should fully develop and control the stateent of work, and perfor its own COTR function. -- P&A ust have an independent capability to develop and operate analytic tools, including siulations, as deeed necessary to support NRO and external, NRC-related decision processes. -- P&A ust be able to establish policy for all NRO planning and analysis activities, including siulations, that are to be used for cross-progra coparisons or presented external to the NRO. The purpose of these policies is to ensure consistency and coparability of analysis and data. - Objectivity: P&A ust have a high degree of copetence regarding intelligence processes, NRO systes, and systes engineering, and ust perfor its ission with unquestionable objectivity; they ust aintain a national level perspective. -- P&A ust not be an advocate for any NRO progra eleent, SPO, or progra proposal (except as outlined beiow), or for any custoer agency or intelligence discipline. -- P&A should be an advocate for cross-progra; cross-int architectures, coherent end-to-end syste planning and integration, creative approaches to overhead reconnaissance to offset the tyranny of the baseline, an aggressive approach to R&D, and sufficient resources essential to all of these. TOP SECRET I BYEMAN BVE-28039I89X Page 24of 71

28 l'op SECRET / BYEMAN -Custoer involveent: The organization and. operations of the P&A organization ust be undertaken in such a anner as to provide for genuine and substantial custoer integration in P&A, and appropriate custoer influence on NRO planning and decisions without liiting the NRO's flexibility, particularly in the acquisition phases.. -- Professionals fro custoer organizations should be detailed on rotation, typically 2-3 year assignents, to P&A, and thoroughly integrated in all P&A eleents in both staff and anageent positions. Custoer detailees should account for at least 30 percent. of P&A personnel. -- Detailees should be noinated by their parent agency or service, approved by the Director of P&A, and operate under the authority and guidance of P&A anageent. They should retain no coand relationship to their parent organization and serve at the pleasure of the Director of P&A. -- Detailees should be encouraged to aintain a constructive, inforal dialogue with their parent organizations. Security procedures should be developed to facilitate this dialogue. The following are suggested functions that could be perfored by the P&A organization within the scope of the ission stateent, supportive of the objectives, and consistent with the guidelines above: - Planning The P&A function should be responsible for the developent and aintenance of a strategic plan that includes the architectural and capability objectives of the DNRO-anaged progras. The plan should identify necessary technologies, provide conceptual road aps (technical, fiscal, and political) for developents and ajor new initiatives, and serve as the basis for toplevel technical and prograatic guidance. The planning activities should be responsive to national and ilitary requireents, consider the funding and priorities of all DNRO-anaged progras, and include the interaction with other Intelligence Counity eleents necessary to assure attention to end-to-end TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page 25of 71

29 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN syste scope, including collection, processing, exploitation, disseination, and analysis. The P&A function should establish and aintain the decision docuentation necessary to record and disseinate decisions that affect the NRO strategic plan and related topics. This docuentation should include the baseline syste "contracts" between the NRO and the SPOs. _This should help iprove the decision process by facilitating the flow of inforation within the organization and by providing an accurate technical and fiscal baseline against which infored decisions can be ade. The P&A organization should provide an evaluation of, and guidance to, the R&D planning process (including Military Exploitation of Reconnaissance & Intelligence Technology), and the progra and budget build process in accordance with the Strategic Plan. The involveent of P&A in the R&D and progra and budget build processes should result in a stronger influence of requireents and architectura~ considerations in the NRO prograing, budgeting, and decision processes. - Syste and Mission Analysis The P&A function should perfor cross-progra analysis to support the NRO corporate decision processes, such as the budget build and ad hoc reductions. The analysis should include the assessent of the current progras and operations for the purpose of shortfalls identification and the evaluation of proposed new initiatives or reductions. The scope of analyses perfored by the P&A function ay include, for exaple, an evaluation of consistency with the NRO Strategic Plan, requireents satisfaction, and prograatic risk. The intent is to have an NRO P&A capability that will work closely with the SPOs to accoplish its tasks, but will also have an independent ability to carry out its responsibilities without direct SPO participation when appropriate. The P&A function should also be the focal point for NRO responses to, and participation (if any) in, external studies. - Interface and Liaison The P&A function should be responsible for TOP SECRET I BYEMAN BYE-28039I89X Page 2Sof 71

30 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN translating Intelligence Counity and DoD requireents, priorities, and guidance into coherent and prioritized guidance for use within the NRO. The P&A organization should onitor and provide feedback to the Intelligence Counity on requireents satisfaction and progra planning. Consistent with this responsibility, the organization should represent the NRO.in requireents and user forus, such as SIGINT overhead Reconnaissance Subcoittee (SORS) and Coittee on Intelligence Reconnaissance & Exploitation (COMIREX) (existing SPO and detachent operational and developental interfaces will not be affected). The organization should also support coordination aong the DNRO-anaged progras and other national progras (Consolidated Cryptologic Progra (CCP), General Defense Intelligence Progra (GDIP), etc.) for syste end-to-end planning coherence. The P&A function should also provide support to the DNRO for the advocacy, coordination, and explanation and arketing of the DNRO-anaged progras with the Intelligence Counity and the DoD. - Analytic Tools The P&A function should establish requireents for, develop, and operate top-level, cross-progra, analytic tools. It should develop appropriate policy for issues such as consistency, validation of odels, and easures of erit for all NRO siulations, including SPO-level siulations used for activities or studies external to the SPO. In addition, P&A should support the developent of analytic tools for Intelligence Counity use. The P&A function should also anage the NRO exercise support tools such as EXCAP (Progra A tactical support siulation). To support this function, the P&A organization will anage the NRO analytic tools (including siulation) budget. Based on the functions suggested above, there are a nuber of possible organizational structures that could be used for the P&A organization. However, the exact nature of the P&A organization should be left to the new P&A Director. Additionally, the nuber of personnel required for P&A will vary based on the final definition of the functions to be perfored, and the type and degree of any other NRO organizational restructuring that occurs. As an estiate, based on the caveats above, the nuber of personnel required for P&A ranges fro 80 to 140. TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X Page 27ot 71

31 TOP SECRET/ BYEMAN The DNRO should appoint a broad based Advisory Board of "experts" to address strategic, technical, and prograatic issues. A broad selection of senior experts, including currently eployed and retired individuals, fro governent and civilian organizations should be retained, on a reserve basis, to provide ad hoc advice to the DNRO. Their collective expertise and experience should include appropriate technical, anagerial, governental, and intelligence areas. The group should have a designated chairperson and vice chairperson and be supported by an executive support activity within an appropriate eleent of the NRO, designated for this purpose. The ebers should serve for two-year ters. The total group should eet three ties a year to aintain currency regarding NRO issues. Other eetings, or activities, of the group, in whole or in part, should be at the request of the DNRO A cent.ralized BYEMAN security ipleentation anageent function should be created within the NRO. This function should be responsible for anaging all BYEMAN security ipleentation across all governent and contractor organizations to ensure consistent ipleentation standards. This activity should be under the policy direction of the DCI through the CIA Director of Security. However, the dayto-day anageent of this activity should coe fro the DNRO. The BYEMAN security syste exists priarily for the purpose of supporting and protecting NRO activities. The existing approach to the anageent of the BYEMAN syste is based on a belief that the NRO is just an extra large "progra" and that security anageent for a progra cannot be intrusted to the DNRO as the progra anager. This assuption is not correct. The NRO is, by charter, a separate Defense agency. The DNRO should have line anageent responsibility for the critical support functions, such as security, that he needs to fulfill his duties as DNRO. The DNRO's anageent of the BYEMAN security syste should be consistent with the policy direction fro the CIA Director of Security. Conflicts should be raised to the DCI or DDCI for resolution. The Director of this function should be noinated by the CIA Director of Security, with recoendations fro others, and selected by the DNRO fro the noinees A, B, and C progra identities should be aintained and the process of collocating the NRO should be initiated iediately. As a first step, collocate the DNRO his deputies, their staffs, the P&A organization, centralized security, and the Directors of A, B, and c and their staff support. Initiate facility and planning activities to support the Headquarters collocation and the eventual TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page 2Bof 71

32 TOP SI!CRET I BYEMAN collocation of the A, B, and C SPOs with the headquarters eleents in a single facility. While the Planning Tea recoends the tiely and total collocation of the NRO, the Planning Tea does not recoend oving to national agency status. After the HRO has been collocated, consideration should be given to standardizing support functions. It is essential that the anageent eleents of the NRO and the P&A function are collocated as soon as possible. The SPOs should be oved as soon as facilities and detailed planning can be co~pleted. The exceptions are selected interfaceintensive'or shared functions, such as launch supper~ or the Naval Research Laboratory, which should reain in place. Once collocated, the NRO should ove naturally toward a ore efficient organizational.structure. There is substantial benefit to be gained by the NRO and its users and custoers fro the collocation of the NRO. It will provide the opportunity for daily interaction between the DNRO and the Progra Directors and proote their shared attention to the anageent of the NRO. The result should be an iproved decision process, enhanced counications, and better anageent integration. Additionally, collocation should foster a stronger sense of a "corporate" NRO and a shared ission. The Planning Tea believes that without the anageent advantages of full collocation, the DNRO will not be able to resolve the anageent probles which have propted the restructure activities in the NRO. A substantial P&A group and a headquarters-type collocation will not provide sufficient anageent support for the DNRO to cope effectively with copeting Progra Eleents and probles that cut across progra lines. Exaples of the potential probles include: - The future architecture for geosynchronous SIGINT collection has been a very contentious issue between Progras A and B, which appears to be resurfacing. The Intelligence Counity can ill afford a repeat of the wasteful and destructive copetition this issue has raised in the past. - Often, the copetitive pressures between Progra Offices are reflected in how they deal with industry. An exaple of.these inefficiencies is the case where a single contractor is responsible to one Progra Office for the developent of a syste, and responsible to another for technology efforts. The Progra Offices will, for priarily copetitive reasons, place restrictions on the contractor that will inhibit intra contractor efficiencies and creativity that would benefit the developent of the syste. Additionally, TOP SECRET I BYEMAN BYE-28039I89X Page 29of 71

33 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN the Progra Offices, again otivated by the divisive copetitive environent, develop a "ine" and "theirs" attitude about contractors. This attitude often inhibits effective procureent practices, such as inter-contractor cooperative efforts, and results in the Progra Offices copeting, along with their contractors, rather than assuing the objective viewpoint appropriate to the Governent role in systes acquisition. - An efficient architecture should provide for the axiu shared use of support capabilities such as counication relays irrespective of which NRO progra has developed the capability. However, the distrust that the Progras have for each other has ade the extreely reluctant to depend on resources controlled by another Progra Office. An exaple of this is the NRO anageent's inability to influence copeting progras to seriously consider using coon relays. unding and operating two b\(1\.(b\(3\ one developed and operated by Progra C an by Progra A. Both progras are growing increasingly expensive and duplicating ore of the other's priary collection ission. A strong P&A function should give the DNRO the capability of objectively developing.an integrated architecture in this area. However, without the anageent strength of a collocated NRO, the DNRO will probably have difficulty in ipleenting the architecture. As our coplex of overhead assets grows both quantitatively and qualitatively, it becoes increasingly iportant that we seek synergistic integration to enhance the value of each syste. Cuing between SIGINT and!mint satellites is a prie exaple of the cooperation between systes which is endent... ti be another area of close eros cooperat The technology is here, the need is present, and the dollars are shrinking; yet the bureaucracy of the three NRO Progra Offices stands in the way of real cooperation. The loser is the nation expressed in ters of national security and cost ' effectiveness. While a P&A eleent can provide the DNRO with support that should iprove his anageent ability it cannot provide hi with the anageent leverage r~quired to TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page 30of 71

34 TOP SEGRET / BVEMAN copletely handle these difficult probles. Moreover, ost of the people external to the NRO, including leading industrial anagers, have been overwhelingly in favor of full collocation for one reason, sound anageent. Soe of the arguents against collocation include: - Progra A clais full collocation will destroy their ability to anage their progras. They believe that their anageent style cannot be effective if reoved fro their present contiguous location with their prie contractors. The Planning Tea believes that, given a five-year lead tie, the necessary anageent and resource adjustents can be ade. Both Progras B and c have successfully anaged their progras fro the East Coast, while working with the sae ajor contractors used by Progra A. - Progras A and c believe that full collocation and integration will result in the eventual take-over of the NRO by the CIA. This belief stes fro the fact that the personnel grade structure of Progra B is higher than either A's or c s. In addition, they believe that the generally longer tenure of civilian versus ilitary assignents will result in the eventual "civilianizing" of all significant positions. Progra C is also concerned about their ability to support the restructure fro within existing Navy resources or their ability to get the Navy to provide additional resources. The Planning Tea believes that all these concerns are resolvable. The NRO could reiburse the Navy for the costs associated with any additional slots, or selected positions could be identified as Progra C positions and filled with retired Progra C individuals in a civil service or contract anner (siilar to the in-house arrangeents currently used by Progra c to provide suppleentary SPO anpower). The proble of rank differential between the Progra Eleents should be a workable proble within the confines of the NRO. The Planning Tea believes that the foreost qualifications for any position in the NRO should be the relevant expertise and experience of the candidate. This is an area in which the Progra Offices are very equal. The specified criteria for a position, such as SPO Director, should include the caveat that, given the qualifications cited above, the position can be filled by an appropriate ilitary or civilian (e.g. 0-6 or SIS/SES ) individual. The NRO already has soe TOP SECRET / BVEMAN BVE-28039/89X Page 31of 71

35 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN experience with functional organizational structures that have "senior" individuals working for "junior" persons. To su up, the opposition to collocation coes alost entirely fro Progras A and c. The essence of the counter arguents to full collocation avoids discussing the NRO anageent probles that forced Secretary Aldridge to begin the process of organizational evaluation, but instead focus on the perceived needs of the individual Progra Offices or their parent organizations. Restructuring without collocation and anageent integration is doing too little, too late to solve the fundaental probles of the NRO. The Planning Tea reviewed six basic alternatives for realigning the Progra Eleents, to include collocation options. A ore detailed discussion of these options is in Appendix 4. In each case it was assued that the. corporate headquarters would be realigned and that a P&A eleent would be created as described above. The first option was to keep the existing Progra Eleent structure, with the three Progras, A, B and c. The second option was to reorganize along functional lines, P&A, R&D, Acquisition, Operations and Logistics; and the third option was to reqrganize along business lines, SIGINT,!MINT, Other, P&A and Support. A fourth option, siilar to one used in another national progra, was a functional option with all three Progra Eleents aintaining separate acquisition responsibilities. The fifth and sixth options were also hybrids. The range of options allowed various strengths and weaknesses of the NRO to be identified and traded off. Several of the options were ore dependent, in ters of their effectiveness, upon collocation than the others, but in all cases collocation was considered a distinct advantage No changes to the ission stateent or charter of the NRO are required to support anticipated national or ilitary support activities of the NRO. There were four issues in the ission/charter area: - Viability of the NRO charter to support the objectives of the organization: - NR? ~u~port to ~litary ~p7rations including the acqu1s1t1on of ded1cated 1l1tary support satellites; - The extent of NRO involveent in areas outside its traditional collection acquisition role; and TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page 32of 71

36 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN - NRO involveent in the anageent and execution of the ARSP. The Planning Tea's preliinary findings are that the first issue is not a proble in that the current charter is still valid and that the last three issues are not due to probles with the charter but rather are due to ipleentation probles caused by a lack of specific NRO policy or strategies related to these areas. There are at least two docuents which can be called the NRO "Charter": DoD Directive , March 27, 1964, which establishes the NRO as an operating agency of the Departent of Defense (revised 3 October 1979), and the "Agreeent for Reorganization of the National Reconnaissance Progra" signed by the DCI and the SECDEF, 11 August There have been ultiple docuents which have affected the charter of the NRO, such as the addition of the DRSP in 1980, with the ost recent being Executive Order 12333, signed 4 Deceber The "Charter" of the NRO has withstood the test of tie. The sae can be said for the ission of the NRO. In spite of the changing operational and political environent, the basic authorities of the NRO have reained intact and both DoD Directive and the 1965 Restructure Agreeent, which describe the NRO ission in the broadest ters, are viable. The Planning Tea believes that the charter of the NRO, as written, perits and supports the objectives of the NRO with respect to its future. Making reasonably plausible changes to the charter will not solve any of the probles inhibiting the efficiency or effectiveness of the NRO. Unless specifically excluded by the charter, an organization's ability to odify its role in selected areas is predoinantly liited by historical precedent and the willingness of other organizations to accept the changes. Given that the charter is over 20 years old, there are odifications that could be ade to reflect the de facto changes that have occurred. However, unless a substantial gain can be realized fro updating or changing the charter, the risks entailed and tie consued by opening up the issue argue against aking any changes. It is unclear why support to ilitary operations continues to be a question--whether or not the NRO is "chartered" to support ilitary operations has been questioned periodically since the early 1960's. Each 'tie TOP SI!Cfti!T I BYEMAN BYE-28039I89X Page 33of 71

37 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN the question is raised, the answer coes back with a resounding "YES". The NRO has built, and continues to build systes whose priary ission is to support ilitary operations. The DRSP was fored in 1980 to facilitate the building of such systes, to augent other systes so they provide better support, and to ake sure that the ili~ary operator is trained and equipped to ake the best poss1ble use of overhead data. The proble is not one of ission or charter. Rather it appears to be an educational or awareness proble, both within the ilitary and the NRO, exacerbated by the lack of an NRO strategic plan to direct and guide ipleentation within the NRO. The recoended ilitary deputy and the staff, DSPO and P&A organizational changes identified earlier in the report should help increase NRO awareness and responsiveness to ilitary support probles and help with the education of the ilitary regarding the NRO's ission and capabilities. The Intelligence Counity is becoing increasingly aware of the dollar and perforance ipacts associated with the lack of conerency between the functional portions of systes (e.g., collection, processing, tasking, etc.) through all phases of prograing, developent, and operations. While the NRO has been traditionally considered as only a collection syste acquisition organization, it does, in fact, do work in all areas including syste anageent, processing, exploitation, and disseination. The principal probles in this area are the lack of a policy or a strategic plan detailing a reasonable set of ipleentation actions, that the NRO could initiate, and the lack of adequate Intelligence Counity or DoD procedures to facilitate effective syste end-to-end planning and prograing. The charter also is adequate with regard to the NRO's role in anaging and acquiring special airborne reconnaissance platfors. During its early years the NRO played a very active role in this area. With the developent of advanced airborne reconnaissance concepts with the potential to provide critical support to a wide range of national and ilitary users, the NRO should develop the appropriate policy and planning to facilitate the acquisition and operational anageent of appropriate airborne reconnaissance platfors, sensor payloads data links and ground stations. ' TOP SECRET I BYEMAN BYE-28039I89X Page 34of 71

38 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN The HRO should reain a covert organization until stronger iperatives for change are identified. The issue of whether or not selected inforation regarding the NRO should be overt and unclassified does not appear to inhibit the realization of any NRO organizational objectives. The otivation for considering the declassification of any inforation is principally due to the obvious inconsistency between the covert nature of the NRO and the widely known existence of satellite systes and their role in reconnaissance and the existence and ission of the NRO itself. Arguents against declassification include: (1) opening the door to Freedo of Inforation Act (FOIA} inquiries; (2} the danger to strealined NRO anageent techniques through increased adinistrative oversight; and (3) further erosion of NRO security (usually described as the "slippery. slope" syndroe). The Planning Tea has concluded that there is no significant cost for reaining covert and no ajor benefit for becoing overt. However, declassification of selected inforation regarding the "fact of" the NRO appears to be feasible without har to the NRO ission. The Planning Tea also believes that the eventual declassification of "fact of" inforation is very likely, perhaps as a by-product of the recoended restructure actions, and careful planning for such a transition should be initiated A National Reconnaissance Board should be created. This board should not be a decision-aking group. Instead it should provide the SECDEF, DCI, and DNRO with advice regarding requireents and progra issues concerning the NRP, DRSP, and ARSP and related aspects of other NFIP and DoD progras. The group should be chaired by the DDCI with ebers fro the NRO, CIA, DIA, NSA, IC Staff, the Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (either coand, Control, Counications & Intelligence (C3I) or Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Policy (ATSD/IP)), at the Deputy Director or equivalent level. Soe believe that the Director, IC Staff should chair the group. However, the Planning Tea's strong preference is for the DDCI to chair the group. The DDCI's chairanship is ore likely to aintain deputy director level participation in the group. The agenda of the Board should be driven by intelligence challenges and the DDCI's active participation in the upper levels of the national security process places hi in a better position to focus the Board on the appropriate issues. The DDCI's chairanship adds to the top-level status of the Board and provides an appropriate TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BVE-28039/89X Page 35of 71

39 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN senior authority for interaction with the DoD on NFIP/DoD issues. Since the DNRO reports to the DDCI, there are those who believe that the DDCI ay be an inappropriate chairan for a group whose principal responsibilities include providing advice to one of his subordinates. Additionally, because the DDCI also enjoys a siilar arrangeent with the other ebers of the group, his ability to enforce his position ay inhibit the give and take advisory nature of the group. The Planning Tea believes that these concerns can be answered. However, this decision correctly belongs to the DCI who should discuss this issue with the SECDEF. The intent is to keep the group sall, to enhance its effectiveness, and to focus the group on user and custoer needs and progra responses rather than financial or prograatic accoodations. The staff support, including executive secretary function, should be supplied by the NRO A three part facility acquisition progra should be initiated to rapidly and copletely support the restructure actions. A teporary facility is required to support the iediate collocation of the iniu essential NRO anageent eleents and the initial P&A organization. The ost iportant criterion for this facility is iediate availability. The only facility eeting this criterion is liited in size. Therefore a larger interi facility which can be available in a year to 18 onths is required to provide for the collocation of all NRO anageent eleents and the full P&A organization. Once the interi facility is ready, only essential liaison functions and eeting facilities should reain in the Pentagon. Finally, a peranent facility will be required to support the total collocation of the NRO. During the course of the study, a facilities tea fro CIA conducted a search of the Washington D.C. area to deterine if facilities were available to support potential restructure recoendations. Detailed facility options were developed that can support all the recoendations in this report. The facilities tea investigated existing governent facilities and new construction on governent property. Coercial options were also investigated to include lease purchase and new construction. The tea's evaluation ' criteria included cost, schedule, security, ability to satisfy size requireents and accessibility. Existing governent buildings were ruled out because of size and TOP SEGRET 1 BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Copy of7 Page 36of 71

40 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN security probles. Cost and schedule delays, driven by the need for an environental ipact stateent, site aster plan considerations, and funding cycle constraints ruled out new construction on governent land. The coercial option was far ore flexible and satisfied ore of the selection criteria. After surveying 160 interi facilities and 150 peranent facilities, both interi and peranent sites were identified in Fairfax County to support the collocation of the NRC. The NRO has a lease agreeent for a teporary facility in I h\13\ Virginia. Approxiately 130 people can be accoodated in this facility alost iediately. However size and security considerations ake this site viable for only a short period of tie (1-2 years). There are two principal candidates for the interi facility to support pe~ h\/':1\!lllllon Rt 28 near Dulles andlllllllllllin Westfields, south of Dulles. Depending on which one is chosen, iediate authorization will allow availability within 11 to 18 onths. The two alternatives for a peranent site to support the total collocation of the NRO are associated with the two interi locations. to Westfields and within two iles of there are building sites owned by the developers of the ial interi buildings that. will eet the requireents for a peranent NRC facility. In either case, iediate authorization will allow occupancy in approxiately 51 onths. TOP SI!CRET I BYEMAN BYE 28039I89X Page 37of 71

41 . TOP SEGR&T / BVEMAN 5. 0 EXTERNALS 5.1. Introduction. In addition to exaining the NRO, the Planning Tea was tasked to identify and analyze proble a:eas, and present specific recoendations for change, in Intell1gence counity and DoD anageent and interrelated processes external to the NRO. 5.2 Goals & Method. The Planning Tea defined its principal "external" goal as the identification of proble areas and the definition of corrective actions that, irrespective of internal NRO structure, would have the highest potential to: Iprove the effectiveness of internal NRO planning and decisions for the developent and acquisition of overhead systes; Iprove the NRO's responsiveness to users' intelligence and operational support needs; and, Enhance the ability of NFIP anagers to deve~op and sustain a consensus within the Adinistration and with the Congress for appropriately focused long-ter resource investent in overhead systes and related progras. A subset of the Planning Tea, representing key national and operational users of NRO products and an officer fro the IC Staff, participated fully in all aspects of the analysis. In addition, they focused on the so-called "external" issues. They reviewed docuents, held conferences, had eetings in their parent organizations, and conducted extensive interviews with a broad range of executive- and working-level representatives of the Intelligence Counity, DoD agencies, the Services, and the Unified & Specified (U&S) coands. In addition, any executivelevel visitors fro Intelligence Counity and DoD organizations spoke to the Restructure Planning Tea about their views of Intelligence Counity or DoD processes and their relationship to NRO planning and decision aking. 5.3 Conditions and Perceptions. The ost serious ipacts on NRO and Intelligence Counity interaction and organizational perforance ste fro a nuber of external conditions and perceptions: An increasingly constrained fiscal environent, and the dynaics of rising costs and continued expansion of requireents in a period of intense copetition for arginal funds; TOP S&CRET / BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page 3Sof 71

42 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN The difficulties of overcoing the rigidity of a strong baseline progra with a reasonable degree of innovation; Cross-progra and cross-discipline planning and adjudication weaknesses in the NRO and broader Intelligence Counity and DoD; Lack of discipline in the national intelligence and defense requireents processes; Perceptions by ilitary operators that NRO assets are not reliably available to the; and, A general perception of ipotence on the part of NRO custoers in such areas as requireents-to-progra tracking. These conditions give rise to a confusing NRO progra anageent environent and a tendency for no-holds-barred copetition using tactics that underine loyalties within the NRO and erode external confidence and support. The net result is a distrustful, occasionally hostile, user counity that feels unable to assure itself that either its syste requireents, and by extension, its ability to produce the required intelligence, will be acted on within priorities considered by the user to be rational and reasonable. 5.4 Probles. The ost iportant external factors contributing to this environent fall into five ajor proble categories reflecting faulty, or inadequate, user counity processes. These lead to specific internal NRO probles or actions that have a negative effect on the product qf the NRO and the Intelligence Counity and DoD~ An Intelligence Counity requireents syste that fails to convert disparate, ultiple entries of requireentsrelated data into a cohesive stateent of adequate structure and detail, binding on the NRO for strategic planning and syste acquisition. This leads to aggressive, uncoordinated NRO efforts to seek requireents fro any source and individual partisan user relationships based on support of a progra initiative. Results include virtually uncontrolled progra copetition and ad hoc progra and resource decisions without any consistent requireents yardstick against which to easure cost versus benefit coparisons across progras or intelligence disciplines. A resource adjudication and oversight process that is ad hoc and priarily driven by financial pressures. This leads to decisions unsupported by any strategic concept or plan, and often represents an invitation for Congressional TOP SECRET I BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page 39of 71

43 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN coittees, already frustrated by what they discern to be indecision and lack of coitent by the adinistration, to take extraordinary action through authorization and appropriation strictures. Disjointed and uncoordinated DoD requireents processes and operational intelligence support interfaces with the NRO. This leads to lack of focus, daaging isconceptions about unfulfilled requireents and systes availability, and inadequate NRO support to ilitary operations. Lack of an effective, integrated NRO and Intelligence Counity and DoD process for total syste end-to-end planning, prograing, and tracking of execution. This leads to inefficiencies and disconnects aong ajor progra eleents, lack of an appreciation for the total syste costs and, in soe cases, failure to realize all the eleents essential to achieve a progra's full substantive potential. Inadequate top-level Intelligence counity processes, including a lack of effective support to NFIC deliberations: guidance that often lacks adequate substance, direction, and granularity; and an inadequate budget-doinated cross-nfip planning and analysis capability to support either. This leads to poorly infored top-level decision aking, progras that are left free to pick aong the plethora of high priority tasks or to justify virtually any desired initiative in association with soe eleent of "guidance," and a reliance on cost/benefit and tradeoff analysis perfored by advocates of progra or departental interests. 5.5 Recoendations. To address these deficiencies, we propose that the Director of Central Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense take the following specific actions Establish an effective, integrated Intelligence Counity requireents syste with top-to-botto traceability fro intelligence proble to progra response, in order to perit the developent of Intelligence Counity and NRO strategies, suppress wasteful copetition, and to facilitate cross-int and cross-progra tradeoff analysis and custoer feedback. In the interi, the NRO should pursue its own top-level aggregation and organization of available requireents sources as a eans to support internal planning and analysis and as a basis of dialogue with custoers. ' Focus DoD-NRO interfaces to ensure proper service at all levels to the interests of warfighters. TOP SI!CFII!T / BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X. Page 40of 71

44 TOP SI!CRET I BYEMAN Reinforce DIA's responsibility for validation and integration for all DoD operational intelligence support requireents and as the authoritative spokesan for these needs in NRO planning and acquisition. Support.related NRO restructure options to establish a Deputy Director for Military Support and other internal easures to increase NRO service to operational support needs Provide anageent focus for Intelligence-Counity planning and prograing for a total syste end-to-end process and review procedure to ensure coherence in all aspects of developent a~d acquisition and axiu return on investent. Establish the DNRO's responsibility for leadership of a joint Intelligence counity process for planning and end-to-end syste architecture developent for all NRC-based systes. In ost cases other than SIGINT systes, all funds for developent and acquisition of the total syste would be prograed in the NRP or DRSP; funds would be transferred to progras ipleenting planned syste segents only in the progra year. This would preclude uncoordinated reallocation of syste funds in out years by other progra anagers who have no stake in total syste perforance. Ipleentation of selected syste coponents would continue to be executed by NFIP and DoD agencies, as appropriate, within the context of the total syste end-to-end plan Iprove Intelligence Counity processes for support to top-level decision aking, guidance, and planning and analysis. Establish a Intelligence counity Planning and Analysis unit that reports directly to the Director, ICS. It would be analogous to the proposed NRO P&A unit, but with broader responsibilities for cross-nfip analysis and assessent of progra initiatives. It would have the explicit responsibility to identify issues and drive the to decisions, supporting all NFIC principals with structured decision-support papers. It would prepare NFIP strategy and all progra guidance docuents. This unit should have analytic capabilities reallocated aong, or added to, existing IC staff TOP S!CPli!T I BYEMAN BYE 28039I89X Page 41of 71

45 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN eleents to provide for top-level all-source analysis, INT-specific analysis, and fiscal considerations, as well as augentees fro NFIP agencies in order to ensure that agencies participate and have good insights and confidence in the process (sae concept as Intelligence Counity detailees in NRO P&A) The recoendation to create a National Reconnaissance Board, as outlined in , is also vital to the success of broader Intelligence Counity and DoD changes. The Board has at least equal iportance in ters of its value to external proces_ses, including requireents discipline, DoD-NRO interfaces and attention to operational support, end-to-end planning and prograing, and the full range of Intelligence Counity and DoD deliberation processes. 5.6 Ipleentation. These actions will have full positive effect only if ipleented in conjunction with ajor anageent revisions within the NRO. Throughout. the study process, we were struck by the interrelationships between internal NRO proble areas and "external" factors. Although changes can proceed independently, unless there is real progress in resolving these probles together, no approach to restructuring the NRO or iproving its internal anageent and.decision aking processes will achieve its full potential. TOI' SI!CFU!T I BYEMAN BYE-28039I89X Page 42of 71

46 TOP SECFI!T I BYEMAN 6.0 IMPLEMENTATION Many of the recoendations above will require the approval and support of the SECDEF and DCI to be ipleented. We recoend that their approval and support should be docuented in a brief MOA such as the one in Appendix 7. This MOA should also be used to reaffir the charter and ission to the NRO and the SECDEF and DCI support for the anageent authority of the DNRO. To facilitate ipleentation of the recoendations contained in the report, a NRO restructure ipleentation tea should be fored iediately. This tea should report directly to the DNRO or his deputy and be responsible for anaging the restructure ipleentation activities. The ipleentation tea should include the facilities group that was a part of the Planning Tea and representatives fro the NRO Progra Eleents. The first action for the ipleentation tea should be to ensure that all NRO personnel have a coplete and factual understanding of what was recoended, what has been approved, and the general plan for ipleenting the approved recoendations. TOP secret 1 BYEMAN BYE-28039I89X Page 43of 71

47 TOI' SECRET / BYEMAN APPENDICES TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X Page 44of 71

48 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN APPENDIX 1 Study Tea Mebers K. Geiger, RADM (RET), USN Tea - Ronald D. Tabor, LtCol USAF The Joint Staff FACILITIES, COMMUNICATIONS AND SECURITY TEAM I TOP SECRET I BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page 45ot 71

49 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN APPENDIX 2 ADNRO Tasking Meorandu TOP SECRET I BYEMAN BYE-28039I89X Page 46ot 71

50 TOP SE RET HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM...$(NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE WASHINGTON, D.C. OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE (NRO) PLANNING TEAM SUBJECT: BACKGROUND... February Study Objectives and Guidance for the NRO Planning Tea During the past year and a half, tbe NRO has conducted a series of foral and inforal discussions and studies aong the NRO eleents--and with external organizations--concerning the effectiveness and efficiency of the NRC's organizational structure and its planning and decision-aking processes. During this period, the NRO has recognized soe fundaental probles which ay best be resolved by an internal restructuring, including: a. The NRO's decision-aking process needs to be reviewed and perhaps updated to ake it consistent with changes in the Counity which have taken place since the creation of the NRO. b. Intense copetition aong the progras ay have outlived its usefulness. Constraints or alternative ethods of fostering technical copetition need to be exained. c. The purpose of the D/NRO's staffs (NRO, DSPO, OSSPO) has changed over the years and needs updating. d. The ethod by which requireents are received, analyzed with participation of the Counity, and subsequently incorporated into syste designs and odifications differs aong the progras; it needs to be reviewed to deterine if changes are necessary. e. The responsibility for the developent of exploitation and distribution systes for NRO systes product is vague and inconsistent across the counity. The role of the NRO needs to be redefined in this critical area in view of technolo9ical advances, of expanding collection systes, and of constrained budgets of the last few years. HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM TOP S CRET C:L.ADtflllO,... ' 1.\ ss o'?" r. c ~~.~~BYE 27775/89 c\'t 't'i(l~o, :('\:~~ COPIES 0 ~AGE!"-OF-r PAGES ~~ --

51 TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM RESOLUTION The Director and the Board of Directors of the NRO are resolved to exaine and adopt proposals which can iprove its ability to service the overhead collection needs of the Counity and the ilitary services. The goal is to reshape it into an organization which can operate efficiently and effectively in a cliate of expanding ission requireents and increased budget copetition: which can develop an integrated architecture to 7et future reconnaissanqe requireents and the consensus to bring 1t to realization: and which provides increased support to our users, including operating ilitary forces. It is:also our intent to preserve the strengths of the NRO. The NRO has designed and deployed the world's ost effective space systes, providing this nation with unique advantages. Our strengths include the strealined acquisition procedures we have developed, the vertically-integrated progra organization which take cradle-to-grave responsibility for our reconnaissance systes, and the unique identities and talents of the Air Force, CIA, and Navy progra offices we have built. The Board of Directors is foring, and will provide guidance to, a Planning Tea which is to identify and develop the significant issues pertinent to the restructuring of the NRO, understand the factors, present options, and ake recoendations. PLANNING TEAM GUIDANCE Planning Tea Chair and Mebership. The Planning Tea Director will be RADM Robert Geiger, USN (Ret). His principal deputy will be Mr. B~rry Kelly. The Tea Director should ake his recoendation for Tea structure and coposition to.the Board of Directors 3 Feb 89. The Directors of the NRO staff and Progras A, B and c are each prepared to provide tea ebers upon agreeent with the Tea Director. Authority and Reporting. The Planning Tea Director will have full authority for the conduct of the study, subject to the g~idance provided herein and subsequently by the NRO Board of D1rectors as a group. The Tea Director will have authority to assign tasks within the Planning Tea, to schedule work to eet schedule ilestones agreed upon between hi and the Board of Directors, and to review and approve the work produced by the Tea before presentation or delivery to the Board. The Tea Director is authorized to request inforation, including HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM TOP SEGRET CLASSIFIED IV IYIEMAN 1 CONTROLNO BYE ZZZZS/89 COPY OF COPIES PAGE~ OF~ PAGES

52 TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONiROL SYSiEM docuents, data and interviews with key personnel throughout the NRO organization. He is also authorized and encouraged to request pertinent inforation fro Intelligence Counity and other user organizations. The Board of Directors will identify points of contact on the NRO Staff and within each Progra Office for coordinating access to such inforation. The Planning Tea Director will report to, and accept guidance or direction fro, only the NRO Director or Board of Directors. The Tea Director will eet with the Board on 3 February 1989 to review and discuss the study guidance, tea ebership and approach to initiating the tea's work. He will eet with the Board bi-weekly thereafter to review progress, address critical issues, and when appropriate, ake recoendations for early actions on proposed restructure transition plans. Objectives. The Planning Tea is tasked to identify and develop the significant issues pertinent to restructuring the NRO to eet the following objectives, understand the factors which relate to those issues, present options for addressing near ter probles and restructuring of the NRO, and to ake recoendations aong the options. The Planning Tea shall not be constrained by past approaches to restructuring or reorganizing the NRO, nor by prevalent opinions or feelings toward restructuring. The Tea is expected to bring a fresh perspective to all issues. The objectives are: a. General (1) Maintain the strengths of the NRO (a) (b) (c) Strealined anageent Cradle-to-grave syste responsibility Service/agency coposition of the NRO (2) Strengthen internal NRO operations and the NRO decision-aking processes, specifically to ensure that the NRO has the capability to develop an integrated overhead architecture appropriate to future reconnaissance requireents and to build the consensus which will be required to bring it to realization. {3) Provide increased support to our users, including operating ilitary forces, and strengthening our external interfaces. HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM TOP SEeRET CLA151FIID BY BYIMAN 1 CONTROLNO BYE 27775/89 COPV OF COPIES PAGE --:r- OF --r PAGES

53 TOP SECRET HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTAOL SYSTEM. i b. Specific (1) Review, revalidate or ake recoendations for clarifying the internal interpretation of the NRO ission stateent. (2) Define the external interfaces appropriate to the ission stateent and the external decision process (3~ Review expanding NRP/DRSP ilitary operational support iss1on. (Should the NRP and/or the DRSP operate and/or build space systes with a prie ission of ilitary support?) {4) Make recoendations for better identifying, validating, and prioritizing requireents; for providing objective technical evaluation of prograatic alternatives; for counity involveent in value assessent of technically valid options; for execution of cross-progra analysis and the developent and aintenance of NRO long-range plans. (5) Make recoendations for organizational adjustents both for the near ter and for the long ter. (6) Make recoendations for the developent of anageent and operation standards to include: progra anageent, financial planning, prograing, reporting, contracting, security, and other support functions (personnel, logistics, etc.). CLOSURE The planing tea shall prepare a final report and briefing by 31 July 1989 which should include: a. Restateent or validation of the proble(s). b. suary of proble analysis. c. Specific options for resolving probles, e.g. changes to internal processes, renegotiation with external agencies for iproved interfaces, proposals to the DC! and SECDEF for changes to counity anageent processes. d. Options for NRO functional realignents and/or collocated/integrated organizational adjustents will address, as applicable, ilitary/civilian per$onnel systes, support infrastructure, facilities, etc. Facility needs will be addressed in sufficient detail to include an assessent on the availability of governent facilities, lease versus purchase options, citing trades, and preliinary design efforts to enable HANDL.E VIA BY EM AN CONTAOL SVSTEM TOP SECRET CLAaiFIIO IY IYIMAN 1 CONTA~LNO ~~E 27775/89 COPY OF. COPIES PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

54 TOP SE6RET HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CONTROL SYSTEM realistic costing. All options should be coplete with resource, ission, and personnel ipact assessents, and ipleentation guidelines. e. Tea Director recoendations. f. Guidelines for follow-on actions: (1) Developent of detailed ipleentation plans for any resultant restructure. (2) Developent of internal anageent and operating standards... The Planning Tea shall be available to assist the DNRO in preparing his report to the DC! and SECDEF D. HILL Acting Director HANDLE VIA BY EM AN CONTROL SYSTEM TOP SEeRET CL.AIIIFIID 8Y 8YIMAN 1 CONTROLNO BY~ 27775/89 COPY OF COPIES PAGE-s-OF -r PAGES

55 NRO.APPROVED FOR RELEASE 15 DECEMBER 2010 TOP SECRI!T / BYEMAN APPENDIX 3 Organizations and Persons Interviewed This list is not inclusive. NRO personnel are not included. Alost every senior level (ilitary grade 06 and SIS/SES) NRO eber participated in soe phase of the report. Also not every listee below et with every eber of the Tea. CINC TENCAP Representatives NSA Senior Overhead Steering Council Operations Deputies, The Joint Staff and Service ACSI's President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) MDEC TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X Page 52of 71

56 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN TOP SECRET I BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page 53of 71

57 TOP SECRET I BYEMAN APPENDIX 4 Organization of the NRO This section provides a brief overview of the NRO's current structure. The NRO is organized as shown in Figure A4-l. The DNRO is appointed by the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence of the DCI, and the Deputy Director (DDNRO) is appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence. For several historical and functional reasons, the DNRO's overt position has traditionally been the Under Secretary of the Air Force. This position provides needed insight into the Air Force space activities that support the NRO, such as launch capability, technology progras, and operations. There is, however, no andate that the DNRO be the Under Secretary. There have been cases, ost recently with Mr. Aldridge, where the Under Secretary has advanced to the Secretary position, and has retained the directorship of the NRO. Likewise, there have also been cases in which the DNRO held an Assistant Secretary's billet. There is a relatively sall NRO Staff of approxiately 90 people, under the leadership of an Air Force brigadier general, to support the DNRO and the DDNRO. The staff is anned with personnel fro all three Services, CIA (Progra B), NSA, DMA, and soeties DIA. Additionally, in 1980, the DNRO was assigned responsibility for the newly-created Defense Reconnaissance Support Progra (DRSP), intended to leverage NRO designs for ilitary support with specifically appropriated DoD onies. A Defense Support Project Office (DSPO) was established to assist in the anageent and execution of the DRSP. The DSPO is a sall Staff of about 25 personnel, under the coand of a ilitary officer in the grade of 06, whose priary purpose is to provide and aintain an interface between the ilitary and the NRO. The execution of the National Reconnaissance Progra (NRP) (systes developent, acquisition, and operations) is accoplished by the three progra eleents, Progras A, B, and c. Progra A, the west coast eleent, is a covert, Air Forceanned activity of about 700 people overtly known as the Secretary of the Air Force Directorate of Special Projects (SAFSP). Led by an Air Force Major General and collocated with the Air Force Systes Coand's Space Systes Division (SSD) at Los Angeles Air Force Base, SAFSP receives the ajority of its adinistrative support fro SSD resources, although it is entirely functionally separate. Progra B, located in the Washington, D.C. area, is the CIA eleent of the NRO. Within the Agency, it is the Office of TOP SECRET I BYEMAN BYE-28039I89X Page 54of 71

58 NRO APPROVED FOR RELEASE, 15 DECEMBER 2010 u. 0 u. :E < 1- <C, tn a: CJ 0 0 a: a: a.. z al 0 0 ~ a: <C a: z.a: z CJ c c 0 a: a.. 0 <C ~ <C a. L...-- en a: c CJ 0 a: a. BYE 28039/89X Page SS' of 71

59 TOP SECRET / BYEMAN Developent and Engineering (OD&E), in the Science and Technology directorate. The Director of Progra B is currently also the DDS&T. Coposed of about!llllipeople, it receives all of its overhead support, personnel, contracting, logistics, etc., fro CIA. The third eleent of the NRO, Progra c, is a Navy activity located in the Washington, D.C. area at the Naval Research Labs. It is the sallest of the progra eleents, having responsibility for only one satellite syste and its world-wide distributed ground station network. There are about 200 personnel in this activity, coanded by a Rear Adiral. Progra c receives its adinistrative support through Navy channels. Each progra office has a unique relationship with its parent organization. These relationships vary in degree and type of non-adinistrative support and participation contributed. In all cases, however, the support relationships, both adinistrative and substantive, with the Navy, Air Force, and CIA, have been an integral supporting part of the NRO. TOP SECR&T / BYEMAN BYE-28039/89X Page SSOf 71

60 TOP SECRET/ BYEMAN APPENDIX 5 Restructure Alternatives The Tea exained in detail the existing NRO organizational structure (as in figure A4-1), and deterined that there were six distinct options for realigning the Progra Eleent portion of the NRO organization. These options included alternatives based upon functional or business lines, historical precedent, and hybrids of these. For each of the restructure options, it was assued that the corporate structure would be realigned as described in section (Figure AS-1), and that a P&A organization as described in section (Figure AS-2) would be included. The first option (figure AS-3) was to preserve the existing A, B, and c structure with the addition of the proposed P&A function. This organizational structure would not eliinate the unhealthy copetition of the progras. However, a ajor positive aspect of the existing organization is the strong parent organizational identity found in each of the eleents. This fosters soe degree of understanding of the user/custoer needs of the parent organizations and facilitates the infrastructural support that the NRO eleents receive fro the parent organizations. The second option considered (Figure AS-4) was a proposal for a functional Progra Eleent structure (P&A, R&D, Acquisition, Operations and Logistics). There were a nuber of ipleentation variables that could have been used to construct suboptions. This alternative was developed and evaluated with the assuption that it would involve the collocation of the existing Progra Eleents and the eliination of any distinct A, B, or C identities. This option included a separate organization to execute R&D, although guidance for those activities would coe fro P&A. Acquisition would build and acquire the space and ground segents, Operations would be responsible for day-to-day operations, and a separate Logistics organization would be responsible for providing the "O&M" and infrastructure support. This alternative solved the inter Progra Eleent copetition proble, but it also eliinated the positive aspects of the existing Progra Eleent relationships with their parent organizations. Additionally, it supports the developent of an integrated architecture and enhances integrated operations. The downside included the increased infrastructure cost to the NRP of replacing the. support which is now provided by the parent organizations of the Progra Eleents. This alternative was likely to be ore bureaucratic and since there would probably have been another level of anageent between the acquisition anager and the SPOs, the alternative would be less strealined than today s organization. TOP SECRET / BYEMAN BYE 28039/89X Page 57of 71