REBUILDING POST-GADDAFI LIBYA

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3 1 REBUILDING POST-GADDAFI LIBYA Editor s Note: This report synthesizes a 72-hour crowdsourced brainstorming simulation in which 50 analysts from around the world collaboratively explored the challenges posed by the reconstruction of Libya after Muammar Gaddafi s ouster. Since the end of the uprising in October 2011, Libya has been undergoing a challenging transition to democracy and economic revitalization. In spite of large monetary reserves, an abundance of oil and gas, an educated population and technocratic elites, Libya s reconstruction remains plagued by numerous challenges that jeopardize its prospects for sustainable development. These challenges include weak governmental institutions and civil society organizations (CSO), underdeveloped infrastructures, ethnic tensions and political rivalries. From February 11th to February 14th of this year, Wikistrat conducted a live speed simulation focused on the challenges of rebuilding Libya. Fifty analysts proposed multiple competing pathways and policy options available to Libya, to other governments and to the international community in pursuing the reconstruction of the country in the post-gaddafi era. This report summarizes their findings.

4 2 Economic Policy Options Wikistrat analysts postulate that Libya s vast resources should allow the country to embark on a promising development course, but warn that such positive scenarios might depend on a number of variables, including a politically stable and foreign investment friendly climate. On the downside, some analysts view Libya s resources as a potential drawback, as the government might seek to use them to buy temporary social peace instead of setting the stage for a permanently brighter future. Representative Options: Libyan gas boom provides new leverage in EU-Libyan Relations: Libya s oil and gas resources (existing and future) could give greater leverage to the Libyan government to build ties with key EU members that are currently dependent on Russian gas. Over the next decade, projects like the linking of the already-existing Greenstream gas pipeline with more gas fields, as well as the exploitation of shale gas resources, should allow Europe to diversify its energy sources. The powerful position and the revenues this would bring would allow Libya to develop quickly and take an influential position in the region. From the Green Revolution to the Green (r)evolution: The Libyan government could leverage its oil and natural gas revenues to increase economic and social stability by turning to renewable energy. It could expand its portfolio with the development of solar resources for export of electricity into the EU market as part of the DESERTEC project. Successfully implemented, this program would help reduce Libya s dependence on fossil fuel extraction, create broader employment options, provide additional fresh water supplies and foster greater integration in the Maghreb and with Europe. Libya s New Special Economic Zone: To foster growth, the Libyan Government, assisted by NATO and the European Union, could create a Special Economic Zone (SEZ) on Libya s coastal areas (between Tripoli and Benghazi), which would become new enclaves of growth and economic diversification with ties to European and Gulf trading partners. Benefits would include: Creating space to retrain the workforce to compete in global markets Promoting FDI in non-extractive activities Fostering greater integration Promoting proper governance and rule of law Lowering the foreign footprint These growth areas would be decoupled from the vagaries of traditional Libyan power centers.

5 3 Political Policy Options The political landscape presents a set of dual challenges to the Libyan government and its Western backers. First, the internal political structure is weak and highly decentralized with many stakeholders who may or may not be beholden to the national authorities. Second, the ouster of Gaddafi has led to a revival of radical Islamist militias and cells, which may pose a direct threat to the Libyan government and Western interests. Both sets of challenges require different approaches. Representative Options: Cultivate tribal stakes in the political system: Tribes are influential local political actors in Libya. They would need to be convinced that they have as great a stake in Libya as a whole as they do in protecting their local interests and resources and that, in fact, their best chance to protect those local interests would be by working together through a project of national restoration. This process would be based on a bottom-up approach, in which tribes would gradually co-opt into the constitutional drafting process and would progressively acquiesce to the authority of a national government through a resource-sharing agreement. This, of course, is easier said than done; success would be predicated upon an existing measure of political goodwill among tribal leaders and upon the Libyan government s ability to mediate effectively already existing tribal conflicts. Send in the Senussis!: Libya, like other Arab Spring countries, runs the risk of empowering Islamic-based tyranny that might refuse to ever again cede power through democratic elections. Libya is often posited as having only two alternatives for its political culture: Western-style secularism or some Islamist-lite accommodation with the Salafists. However, there is a third way forward: that of the Senussi Sufis, who are supremely legitimate in Libya as far as Islam is concerned, yet non-salafi. With help from the U.S., Turkey and maybe Italy, Libya could develop a comprehensive program to identify, woo, support and empower Senussi shaykhs to bring them to prominence once again, get them involved in the political process and perhaps even entered into an anti-salafi security arrangement. U.S.-led Western coalition tackles AQIM and the Muslim Brotherhood: The West now has to deal with the consequences of its support to the anti-gaddafi militias which tore the lid off of Gaddafi s successful strategy to suppress AQIM. To restore order, the U.S. and its European allies could design and implement a policy that encourages, nurtures and supports the proponents of a liberal, pluralist, representative and tolerant civil society in an effort to displace the gamut of jihadist forces from the Muslim Brotherhood to al-qaeda itself. This would not be an easy policy option for the West, as it would require a complete change of mindset in Washington and the European capitals.

6 4 Security Policy Options Wikistrat analysts see a major security challenge in the continued independent existence of the militias that overthrew Muammar Gaddafi in This challenge needs to be tackled if Libya is going to successfully reestablish the state s monopoly on the use of force. Representative Options: Establishing the Libyan Border Force: Recent developments in Mali illustrate once again the potentially devastating consequences of long, porous and barely-monitored frontiers. To prevent weapons and military materiel from leaving the country and to thwart the further growth of al-qaida and affiliates, criminal gangs and other armed groups in Libya, the national government (with NATO support) should establish the Libyan Border Force (LBF) to police and control its borders. Under the plan, the government should: 1. Identify and enlist members from the militias that helped liberate the country, providing them with a path to a viable future in service of the state 2. Organize them into a paramilitary force 3. Train and equip that force 4. Deploy it in the field After a period of service, LBF members will be able to move over to the national military. New Energy Security Force in response to regional fears: The In-Amenas siege showed glaring vulnerabilities in the protection of strategic and critical infrastructure. In reaction, the Libyan government, fearful that its main source of revenue is under threat, could establish a specialized government security force to protect oil and gas infrastructure. It could also take the uncompromising position with foreign companies that IT should be in the sole entity in charge of securing those sites. This specialized force would be trained in conjunction with international partners. Disarmament and demobilization of militias: The militias are still strongly distrustful of a strong central government, and many are unwilling to serve alongside former members of the Gaddafi-era military in the Libyan Armed Forces. A possible alternative to assuage these concerns would consist of amalgamating suitable militias into regional paramilitary-type forces, whose members and leadership would be from a mix of groups and ideologies. These forces would be responsible for both internal security and conventional combat operations. The creation of these forces would also allow the Libyan government to pursue disarmament and demobilization of Libya s other numerous militia forces. Rebuilding the Libyan Armed Forces: Security Sector Reform (SSR) is essential for Libya to move forward. The current array of forces, their ideologies and allegiance, their equipment and capacities do not amount to any kind of functioning security force on behalf of the state. The Libyan government, assisted by NATO, should build up a representative tribal and regional Armed Force to serve the security needs of the state and the local communities while conjointly running a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) effort focused primarily on ensuring the reintegration of militia members.

7 5 Conclusion During the forty years of Colonel Gaddafi s rule, Libya s potential was stymied by ineffective policies, corruption and nepotism, leaving many Libyans in a state of destitution. The revolution in 2011 unleashed new expectations for more inclusive policies. Although many challenges remain even two years later, opportunities to meet the initial expectations have arisen as well. In the economic domain, Libya s vast resources provide the country with the financial means to pursue a course of sustainable, inclusive development. In the political domain, Libya and the international community have the chance to work together to build the capacity of the national government and contain the Islamist threat. Coaxing the right tribes might be key to achieving both goals. In the security domain, international support for training and equipping Libyan security forces, while engaging and demobilizing the militias, will be key to ensuring a peaceful future.

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