HAZARD MANAGEMENT AND DISASTER PLANNING

Transcription

1 HAZARD MANAGEMENT AND DISASTER PLANNING Terrorism brings new dimensions for the principles of Hazard Management and Disaster Planning. Whilst the fundamental tenets of a Disaster Management system threat identification and analysis, monitoring, alert and warning, evacuation, shelter, relief and recovery are still essential to the management of the consequences of a terrorism event, is highly dependent upon effective organisation and communication (Demath, J and Platt, R 2002). Evaluations of recent disaster events and Disaster Management in the Caribbean highlighted the inherent weaknesses in organisation and communication (Collymore 1999; 1995, 1991, 1989). In seeking to develop effective consequence management systems building on current capacity it will be important to fully reflect on the implications of lessons learnt from recent natural impacting events. It is also important to note that despite the similarity in the consequences of a terrorism event and natural and technological hazard, the issue of causation is critical. Terrorism is the deliberate causing of harm (Platt 2002) and is often calculated, cold blooded and may even be criminal. 1

2 Additionally the manifestations of terrorism events are largely unpredictable as to form, location and magnitude and the effects may spread more rapidly than those generally associated with technological and natural hazard events (Blocm 2002). What this suggests is that the time and resource demands for managing the consequences of terrorism related events will amplify significantly the short-comings in our emergency management systems. In seeking to improve the organization for and communications for preparedness and response planning there is a need to reassess the process for determining the threats that can compromise our development, their probability and consequences that flow therefrom. DISASTER MANAGEMENT Disaster Management is one dimension of the environmental security portfolio that clearly highlights some of the critical policy and strategy issues that confront small island developing states in this age of terror. It allows for an easy definition of how traditional policies and approaches must be altered to deal with the challenges of this emerging environment security agenda. More importantly it provides a framework within which to consider the utility of the Fergusson model for security management. 2

3 The basic tenets of the Fergusson model are that I. Issues of environment and security are of transnational or global II. They involve several actors thus requiring III. The roles and functions must be managed within a comprehensive and holistic approach. Efforts to recognise and forge the links between environment, disasters, development and security initially raised in Agenda 2, (UN 1992) and the United Nations Convention on Diversity, have been constrained by the essential characteristics of smallness and fragility (World Bank; Collymore J et 1993). The issues associated with this age of terror, the consequences of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have reinforced the global dimension of the problem and its solution as well as the need for multi-level actions within a coordinated mechanism. These two (2) driving forces, national and international security considerations and the minimization of the need to protect the environment seek to ensure that potentially hazardous biological and chemical materials are not abused (Pearson, G. 1997). The tenets of the Fergusson Security Management model are underpinned by two cross-cutting themes, communication and organisation. The communication component 3

4 encompasses those issues associated with threat assessment, monitoring, alerting, responding and recovery as well as collection, collation and analysis of information and its dissemination for support of decision making are priming activities here. Organisation embraces the institutional arrangements and relationships that allow for the sharing and application of the information for preventative and countermeasures programmes and policies. It elaborates the roles and functions of the multi-level actors and the mechanism and processes for their coordination and cooperation. The major natural hazards which threaten the Caribbean include hurricanes, volcanoes, earthquakes and are transbounding in nature, even through an event may be experienced in a particular jurisdiction. The effective preparedness for and management of an event requires monitoring and information sharing activity from several activities and from a diversity of players (Scott, Berridge, Collymore 1994). This is so for the hurricane hazard and especially so for the seismic and volcanic hazards. Currently preparedness and response planning systems are marginally fact based. They are seldom informed by hazard identification and analysis, including probability of occurrence and related consequence scenarios. This shortcoming has been recognized and within the last decade there have been periodic interventions to address these (Molina 1998; CDMP). Building on these initial efforts the CHAMP and CADM are seeking to provide a more systematic approach to the development of regional capacity 4

5 for fact based in Disaster Management interventions. The CDB, through its DMFC is also committed to and partnering this process. Clearly the emergency management systems in the Caribbean in preparing themselves for this age of terror will need to focus on the new threats, and the changes to our monitoring and warning systems, roles and relationships of the actors, the nature of Damage Assessment and Needs Analysis (DANA), equipment and operational standards and the legal and authenity associated with them. Terrorism brings additional threats that result in widespread death and disease and the destruction of societal infrastructure, Jenkins BM, Understanding the link between Motives and Methods in Roberts B, ed. Terrorism with Chemical and Biological Weapons; Calibration Risks and Responses. Alexandria, Virginia: Chemical and Biological Arms Control Institute, pp THREAT ASSESSMENT National and regional emergency managements, in this era of terror, will need to assess the threats to the environment paying particular attention the probable nature of consequences and the implication for monitoring and management. The September 2001 and anthax experience in the United States has signalled the need to examine the potential for the use of biological and chemical agents for the spread of disease, 5

6 widespread death and the disability of critical societal infrastructure including transportation, food water and utility supply. The nature of the monitoring systems to be established will be informed by the character of the threat, in each jurisdiction and its cross-boundary implications, whatever the agent of transfer. Biological and Chemical agents require different kinds of preparedness and response systems (MsSwegan, 2000 JAMA 283 No1.15 Review of Chemical and Biological Terrorism; Research and Development to Improve Civilian Medical Response Threats associated with chemical agents are likely to be acute, localized and immediate whilst biological agents (other than toxins) may be more subtle, effects less immediate and less discernable with the potential for very widespread dissemination. An important dimension of this assessment process in the Caribbean has to be an examination of the current biological and chemical agents in society and the potential for causing significant disease and death by intent or through negligence. The second element of the threat assessment process must be the determination of the possible opportunities for the introduction of these agents into our jurisdiction with intent to create mass destruction. Indeed this process should be urgently initiated to allow for a 6

7 more informed consideration of the WMD risk in the Caribbean and targeted strategic policies and programmes to address these. In the context of the Fergusson Model, the issues of priority, the incorporation of new actors and levels of intervention are important. Firstly, when the results of the threat assessment are analysed there will be a need to determine how terror related WMO hazards rank when juxtaposed to our traditional hazards, especially natural hazards. Prioritisation will involve consideration of not only the consequences of threats irrespective of source but of the capacity to change the loss potential therefrom, the short and medium term investments required in countermeasures planning, the probability of occurrence and the existence of international, regional or bilateral arrangements that can support the process. New actors and new relationships between existing actors will also be required. The results of threat assessments for natural and technological hazards, except for those that are terrorism based, are usually public knowledge, even if not utilized. Threat assessments for terror hazards are usually restricted to the security forces and elements of the diplomatic community, even though the consequences will be required to be managed by a much wider set of players (Fergussion, 2001). 7

8 The nature of the new threats associated with terror calls for several layers of cooperation. At the national level this entails more organized and structured dialogues between the security and emergency management community. It will also require more regional and international cooperation among security forces (already emerging in the fight against drugs) and stronger civil military protocols for share threat information. MONITORING, ALERT AND WARNING In the Caribbean our infrastructure for monitoring the hazards that are more predictable in terms of form, location and seasonability have been subject to ongoing concern (See Scott, Collymore, Berridge 1994; Also RA1V Meeting Reports of the 1990s). Even for the most frequently anticipated and experienced hazard, the tropical cyclone, the monitoring equipment has been generally limited. Only now are the defective radars within the regional being replaced. The Seismic Research Unit is now beginning to acquire some important resource to enhance its monitoring capacity. The monitoring of new environmental and security related threats, such sea level rise and WMD, will impose a substantial additional demand on a already weak monitoring systems and stretched fiscal resources. Given the dependence of reliable response and preparedness systems on effective monitoring and surveillance this must be at the 8

9 frontier of our capacity development. It is also an important first step in improving the communications in our response operations (Demuth, J and Platt, H 2002). If biological or chemical agents are critical hazards to our community then some investment will be required in enhanced surveillance systems to include instrumentation for better detecting these agents. The more efficient use of existing metal detection systems and basic surveillance practices are immediate low-cost options for improving current practice. The use of the monitoring information to generate alert and warning decisions will require more integration of the threat information databases and networks, and ongoing analysis of the threat situations. Since much of this information may now fall in the realm of national intelligence or highly restricted careful and immediate consideration must be given to the timing of and the modes of its access by the alert and warning decision-makers and consequence managers, who are not now normally included in the intelligence/security group. Beyond that there must be concomitant investment in the training of the medical and scientific partners in rapid diagnostic approaches so that monitoring information can result in timely and appropriate alerts and or warnings. 9

10 Given the security elements associated with terrorist activities the integration of the databases of the actors in this widened monitoring work will require reflection on data validity and integrity issues, capacity constraints and privacy. The idea of a national electronic network to monitor reports of unusual medical events and medial databases from hospitals and other sources, including emergency agencies to provide real-time valid information, critical detection and early warning have been proposed (Waeckerle, J.F 2000). In the Caribbean, the CAREC and CANSEC mechanisms provide an embryonic infrastructure upon which the idea could be explored, to forge links between intelligence and disease monitoring. The CISN provides a potential technological framework for accommodating cooperation in this area within specific invited communities around a common goal whilst still maintaining secrecy. RESPONSE AND RELIEF OPERATIONS A recent CDERA audit of disaster preparedness within its sixteen (16) Participating States indicated that inspite of the number of hazards to which they are exposed and have experienced there is a low level of readiness with the exception for the hurricane. Even for this event the capacity is highly variable (CDERA 2001). 10

11 Many hazard preparedness plans are very detailed and generally effective up to the preimpact phase and inadequate in managing past impact situations. This is inspite of the many models and guidelines developed for such critical areas as shelter management, relief policies, emergency housing assistance, donations management and supplies management. Response planning which includes consideration of terrorist mass destruction events raises many issues centred around roles, responsibilities and authority. It necessitates intense consideration of the civil-military relationships in disaster events management. Already in the Caribbean, there is an ongoing effort to building the operational parameters for civil-military relations in disaster response (CDERA Regional Coordination Plan; Regional Operations Order). These plans and operational guidelines do not address the issue of security. Event with this infrastructure in place, which is frequently reviewed and exercised, there is still an inclination to see the military as the primary manager of disaster events resulting from natural and technological hazards. The inclusion of terrorism consequence management in the response planning of the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency has a high potential for straining the tenuous civil-military coordination arrangements. A terrorist originated disaster will require health emergency response and law enforcement. Authority and control in this very dynamic operating theatre needs to be proactively considered and addressed. 11

12 Saving lives of victims of the event whilst minimizing potential for loss of other lives requires the environment of both emergency health professionals and detection and law enforcement personnel. The safety from terror and safety from the consequences mandates the establishment and understanding of a common incident management and decision-making protocol. Early dialogue on the character of Incident Management Systems that accommodates the functional integration of personnel from different organizations is required. These operational integrative mechanisms are build on standard terminology, protocols for chain of command, communications and flow of information and an emphasis on logistics planning (Christen, H et al 2001). The Unified Management Systems approach may provide the framework for defining the actors and the nature of their engagement at the varying levels of operation national, regional and international. It also provides a mechanism where performance and equipment standards can be agreed and cooperative training and capacity development structured. The Regional Response Plan which CDERA manages this, with the exclusion of security issues. It established monitoring and alerting protocols, communications and information flow protocols, command and control principles and minimum commitment levels. Enhancing this system to accommodate management of terrorism consequences 12

13 could be a first point of departure in addressing the issues of communication and organization in the restructured efforts to protect the environment and improve security and safety. Whilst an enhanced Regional Response Plan Mechanism can provide the operational blueprint for addressing the issues of agency and jurisdictional coordination, these must be founded on basic national actions and decisions in relation to authority and legality. Psychological preparedness for catastrophic events with extensive loss of life, devastation of social and physical landscapes is a new element of preparedness and response planning for environmental security in this age of terror. Only recently have we in the Caribbean started the issue of trauma management amongst victims and emergency workers (CDERA 1996; PAHO *). Contingency plans for managing public hysteria and disruption health care delivery systems will be a essential addition to response planning (Simon, J.D; 1997 JAMA Vol 278, ). More attention will need to be paid to the adoption and application of Critical Incident Stress Management Systems as part of the disaster planning dispersation. Meeting the capacity and capability can be achieved through regional and multiinternational cooperation in plan development and training. 13

14 There will also be a need to determine if there is a legal authority to mandate mass vaccinations, quarantining or evacuation if consideration essential (Cole, T. 2000). These require national level actions and decisions that can be informed by lessons from regional and international states. Terrorism consequence management as a key element of our environment security challenge will necessitate a revisit of current relief and recovery policies. Presently these are very rudimentary in the CDERA Community, though guidelines exist. (CDERA Disaster Relief Policy; CDERA Guidelines for Recovery Planning). Moreso the issues of role of and the nature of support to and from the private sector will loom large. Contaminated environments will necessitate more prevent consideration to only the nature of the information to be collected but to preparation for undertaking it. Dress and equipment standards and debriefing protocols for join health and law enforcement officials will need to be established. 14

15 (Cole, T When a Bio-weapon Strikes, Who will be in Charge? JAMA Vol 284 No.8) (Waeckerle, J.F 2000 Domestic Preparedness for Events Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction, JAMA Vol 283, No 2 8pp) (Christen, H et al 2001 An overview of Incident Management System, Perspectives on Preparedness No 4, September 2001) Cole, T