Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) Homeland Security in Action Conference The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California August 27, 2008 CAPT Chip Strangfeld Deputy Assistant Director DNDO Mission Management Directorate
The radiological / nuclear threat could come from any number of sources 2
The Threat (cont.) An Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) is a device capable of producing nuclear yield. It may be a modified stockpile warhead, a state-designed nuclear explosive, or a device fabricated by a terrorist/criminal organization. An Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) is a device intended to disperse radioactivity for malicious reasons. It is not capable of producing nuclear yield. An Radiological Exposure Device (RED) is radioactive material as a sealed source or in a container that exposes people to radiation. 3
DNDO: An Interagency Office DNDO was founded on April 15, 2005 with the signing of NSPD 43 / HSPD 14. It is a jointly-staffed, national office established to improve the Nation s capability to detect and report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation, and to further enhance this capability over time. DNDO is an interagency office comprised of detailees and liaisons from: Department of Energy Department of Defense Department of Justice/Federal Bureau of Investigation Department of State Nuclear Regulatory Commission DNDO also works with and has detailees from other DHS components such as the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, Transportation Security Administration, and Federal Emergency Management Administration. 4
DNDO Objectives Develop the global nuclear detection and reporting architecture Develop, acquire, and support the domestic nuclear detection and reporting system Characterize detector system performance before deployment Establish situational awareness through information sharing and analysis Establish operation protocols to ensure detection leads to effective response Conduct a transformational research and development program Provide centralized planning and integration of USG nuclear forensics programs through the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center 5
MMD Maritime Goals & Objectives Strengthen Partnerships: Work with maritime stakeholders (Federal, state, local, tribal & private sector) to develop & deploy a robust multi-layered domestic defense within the GNDA. Enhance partnerships with strategic federal partners working within the maritime domain, including DOD, CG, TSA & CBP. Develop partnerships with foreign governments through SPP, GICNT and GMP to strengthen GNDA and enhance the layered defense. Promote Preventive Rad/Nuc Detection Technology for Maritime Use: Conduct test & evaluations of rad/nuc detection technologies to characterize & understand current capabilities. Promote research & development for next-generation systems with better applicability to unique maritime requirements. Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness: Perform risk analyses and architecture studies of maritime pathways. Improve information sharing among maritime stakeholders. Develop PRND programs & capabilities, working with strategic partners & stakeholders. 6
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture A multi layered, international system offers multiple opportunities for detection. Second Line of Defense Border Protection Materials Protection, Control, & Accountability Coast Guard Inspection Port-of-Departure Screening At-sea Interdiction Potential source of SNM Potential target 7
Domestic Nuclear Detection Architecture Securing the Cities 8
Key Mission Areas DNDO focuses on increasing detection capabilities in key mission areas as part of a comprehensive strategy to protect the Nation against radiological and nuclear threats. At Ports of Entry (POEs) Small Maritime Vessels General Aviation Domestic Interior Through its Mission Management Directorate, DNDO collects requirements and develops integrated plans with executing partners in each mission area that address: Technology acquisition and deployment Training and exercises Information sharing and alarm resolution 9
Ports of Entry A joint radiation portal monitor (RPM) deployment strategy was developed with Customs and Border Protection for all U.S. ports of entry (POEs) Prioritizes system deployment at the POEs based on risk, vulnerability (or consequence), industries, importance to the economy and supply chain, or military bases located nearby DNDO seeks integrated systems for the future that will detect a wide spectrum of rad/nuc threats (both shielded and unshielded materials) DHS and partner programs will deploy integrated technologies both domestically and overseas 10
Rail Test Center at the Port of Tacoma Legislative mandate to establish an Intermodal Rail Radiation Detection Test Center Completed activities: Stakeholder relationship development Mobile Command Center infrastructure Mobile RPM data collection Ongoing activities: Spreader bar testing On-dock rail requirements development Modified traffic pattern assessments Potential activities include evaluation of human portable, mobile spectroscopic, and non-intrusive inspection systems 11
Small Maritime Vessel Threat Direction from Deputies Committee (10 Nov 05) to explore options to reduce the risk from small maritime craft. Much of the current public discourse focuses on container security In fact, the greatest observed maritime threat remains smuggling. There are a wide variety of maritime threat scenarios beyond the confines of a single container. For example, a formal Coast Guard risk assessment revealed that small boats actually pose a higher risk. These small boats, traditionally used to smuggle drugs and migrants, can also be used to carry out Cole-type attacks on U.S. interests, bring in weapons of mass destruction (and other types of weapons) and/or to sneak terrorists into our communities. From VADM Thad Allen, Chief of Staff (now Commandant) Testimony on Role of the CG in Border Security Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on HLS, U.S. Senate, April 6, 2006 12
Focus on Small Maritime Vessel Risk The DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy approved in April 2008. Small vessels are, however, readily vulnerable to potential exploitation by terrorists, smugglers of weapons of mass destruction (WMD s), narcotics, aliens, and other contraband, and other criminals. Objective B.ii: Develop a robust layered defense by expanding and enhancing maritime radiological/nuclear detection capabilities to international, Federal, state, local, Tribal, and private stakeholders. Objective C.v: Expand research into and invest in advanced maritime radiation/nuclear detection technology for human portable radiation detection equipment, mobile standoff radiation detectors, and fixed detectors that could be deployed on or near the waters in the vicinity of small vessels. 13
Small Maritime Vessels Vessels less than 300 Gross Tons Includes all types: recreational boats, commercial fishing vessels, tugs, etc. Vessels with fewer security regulations & information required by law, such as Automatic Identification System (AIS) requirement 96 Hour Advance Notice of Arrival 24 Hour Crew List Significant Challenge: Relatively anonymous Free to navigate on the water 95,000 miles of U.S. coastline Sheer volume and density 13 million privately owned pleasure craft; 110,000 fishing vessels 14
West Coast Maritime PRND Pilot 3-year plan to design, field & evaluate layered preventive radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) capability for public safety forces to counter small vessel threats. Coordinated through respective Coast Guard Sector AMSC subcommittee. Commenced 4th Qtr FY07, in the Puget Sound region Four phases to Pilot: Architecture analysis & review of current capabilities Systems engineering design and development of concepts of operations Deliver capability & training for human portable, mobile standoff & fixed sensors Assess & document lessons learned; exercises Pilot expands education, communication, & coordination among local public safety officials. Build awareness about threat of small vessel smuggling WMD & vulnerability of these ports to direct attack. Pilot lessons learned will be applied to future ports 15
West Coast Maritime PRND Pilot Objectives: Exploit geographic choke points for efficiency Establish buffer zones to limit potential consequences Integrate intelligence, detection, interdiction, reach-back, incident response Capitalize on lessons learned from experience & improving technologies to strengthen the architecture over time Puget Sound Pilot participants include: USCG personnel from Seattle and Port Angeles Customs and Border Protection (OFO and Air and Marine personnel) 15 State and local public safety agencies Expect to start San Diego later this year 16
What Will Be Delivered? Standardized & characterized radiation detectors for state and local players. New technologies (boat-mounted systems) applied/evaluated in the maritime environment. Government-furnished equipment provides latitude, flexibility, standardization Human Portable Equipment Personal Radiation Detectors (PRD s) Handheld and backpack systems Boat-Mounted Detectors COTS Mobile Stand-Off Detectors Maritime Spectroscopic Variants Technology Demonstrations for Fixed Stand-Off Detectors 17
West Coast Maritime PRND Pilot - Initial Lessons Learned CG Area Maritime Security Committee is critical for interagency participation. Need to include all maritime stakeholders such as shore-side public safety due to alarm adjudication, response, surge, etc. Regional maritime PRND CONOPs is recommended due to complex overlapping jurisdictions/authority, as well as the limited resources available. Limited local RN threat awareness and understanding of various agencies (federal, state, local) responsibilities. The public/commercial boating communities need to be kept informed as capability is deployed. Standardize equipment simplifies training, SOPs, protocols, etc. 18
Securing the Cities Notional STC Deployment Sites Goal: To prevent a rad/nuc attack on New York City by enhancing regional capabilities to detect, identify, and interdict illicit radioactive materials DNDO is working with stakeholders in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut to create a maritime PRND program. This effort is a part of the overall Securing the Cities effort to detect and prevent the transport of rad/ nuc weapons and materials from all pathways into New York City while protecting the surrounding region Maritime is playing a significant role in the securing the cities program 19
Building Preventive Detection Capabilities Plans PRND Handbook (CVI / Maritime modules) Program Assistance Concepts of Operation (CONOPS) Protocols Organization Equipping Training Exercising Promising Practices (States/Urban Areas) Anole/Bobcat/Crawdad Reports Responder Knowledge Base PRD/DELE/ARD Courses State Spectroscopic Analysis Course DNDO Exercise Support Operations Support Joint Analysis Center P O E T E OPS 20
Program Support PRND Program Management Handbook Commercial Vehicle Inspection module Developing Maritime module Special Event module Currently conducting PRND PM Handbook facilitated delivery in Florida and California Facilitated deliveries assist States and Urban areas in developing PRND program implementation plans 21
Program Support Test campaigns Anole Handheld Backpacks Mobile Bobcat Pagers Crawdad (in progress) Maritime specific rad/nuc detection equipment 22
Operations Support The Operations Support Directorate is responsible for developing the information sharing and analytical tools necessary to create a fully integrated operating environment, as well as conducting training, exercises and engagements related to preventive radiological and nuclear detection. Programs include: Joint Analysis Center Nuclear Assessment Program Technical Reachback Training, Exercises and Engagements 23
Situational Awareness Joint Analysis Center (JAC) Provides near real-time situational awareness of the nuclear threat Shares information and databases with the Intelligence Community, counterterrorism resources, Fusion Centers, FBI JTTFs, DOE, CBP, DOS and other US inter-agencies, as well as State, county and municipal law enforcement communities Provides and coordinates adjudication support to federal, state, and municipal authorities to assist in the resolution of nuclear detection alarms/alerts 24/7 operation Operational support through FBI and DOE field components Technical support through access to National Laboratories DHS provided service at no cost to the agency 24
Training, Exercises and Engagements Training for Federal, State, and local law enforcement and emergency responders so they may enhance their radiological and nuclear (RN) detection capabilities through preventive RN training courses. National curriculum for the preventive RN detection mission includes: Personal Radiation Detector (PRD) course Detection Equipment for Law Enforcement (DELE) course Advanced Radiation Detection (ARD) Course (Pilot) Exercise support to validate that equipment is properly employed and the alarm adjudication process is in accordance with Federal, State, and local alarm protocols. Support for Securing the Cities and the South East Transportation Corridor Pilot Projects Program also coordinates and facilitates DNDO exercise involvement with interagency and national-level exercise programs Ongoing engagement strategy with State and local entities Total Trained Will provide Situational Awareness of DNDO in DHS UASI Prioritized Cities/Areas direct indirect FY06 415 -- FY07 2043 -- FY08 1169 1100 25
Port Security Grant Program Port Security Grant Program (PSGP) DNDO served on the evaluation panel for Port Security Grants evaluations (for the past two years) DNDO working to expand priorities and allowable costs to include PRND Port Security Roundtable June 24, 2008 with House Homeland Security Committee DNDO is working with Coast Guard Headquarters and Intelligence Coordination Center to revise MSRAM to include more relevant IND/RDD threats and pertinent preventive radiological/nuclear detection (PRND) scenarios 26
Summary DNDO is committed to collaborating with all relevant stakeholders in bolstering port security. Continue engagements with stakeholders to introduce new initiatives and gather user requirements Assist stakeholders in validating/modifying Concepts of Operations (CONOPs) to address emerging threats Where appropriate, develop tenable technologies to meet user needs Continue efforts to emphasize rad/nuc priorities in PSGP guidance 27