Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex

Transcription

1 Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex National Radiological Emergency Preparedness Conference April 28, 2015

2 History of the NRIA Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (1996) NRIA originally drafted in 2004 as an incident annex to the National Response Plan (NRP). NRIA updated in 2008 as an incident annex to the National Response Framework (NRF). The NRF was updated in Presidential Policy Directive 8 (PPD-8) directed the creation of national planning frameworks and integrated operational plans 2

3 NRIA Scope This iteration of the NRIA supersedes the 2008 version and will serve as an operational annex to the Response and Recovery FIOPs. Addresses both inadvertent/accidental incidents and deliberate attacks: - Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) - Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD) - Radiation Exposure Device (RED) - Fixed nuclear facility incidents (deliberate and inadvertent/accidental) - Lost/found/orphaned radioactive material sources - Transportation incidents - Domestic nuclear weapons accidents - Foreign incidents involving nuclear or radioactive material (deliberate and inadvertent/accidental) 3

4 Updates Since 2008 NRIA Expansion of scope to address the Recovery Mission Area. Inclusion of new authorities, capabilities, and assets: - Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act, Price-Anderson Act, Clean Water Act - Nuclear Regulatory Commission base and site teams and resident inspectors - Department of Defense Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Response Enterprise - Updated NUREG-0654/FEMA-REP-1 Clarification of roles and responsibilities of coordinating agencies and linkages between mission areas. Identification of policy/strategic issues that uniquely impact delivery of the Response and Recovery Core Capabilities. 4

5 NRIA - Composition Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex Base Annex Deliberate Attacks (Branch 1) Inadvertent Incidents (Branch 2) International Incidents (Branch 3)

6 Key Issues & Challenges CORE CAPABILITY ISSUE/CHALLENGE RESOLUTION METHOD ASSIGNED TO ACTION REQUIRED ISSUE RESOLVED Note: this listing of issues and challenges represents unresolved or unincorporated topics, and is exclusive of the planning assumptions, critical considerations, and critical information requirements identified during information analysis. 1. Need a central repository of vetted analysis, lessons learned, and best practices that can be utilized after a nuclear/radiological incident. FRPCC to examine options external to the NRIA planning effort. FRPCC Referred to FRPCC for action Resolved Planning 2. Affected communities will likely need resettlement planning support that is synchronized with technical information about contamination levels and protection action recommendations. Follow up with Community Planning and Capacity Building Core Capability Partners, such as EPA. EPA FEMA Addressed in Execution Checklist Resolved Public and Private Services and Resources 3. Need to identify the identification, credentialing, and indemnification requirements to ensure personnel can deliver services and resources near the impacted area. 4. Neighboring and host states may withhold emergency services resources to ensure that sufficient capability exists to secure their own jurisdictions. Need to coordinate with ESF #8 and #13. Need to crosscheck Response FIOP for duplicate task. Address through Public and Private Services and Resources Core Capability partners and include item in the NRIA as a critical consideration. HHS DOJ FEMA CRCPD Addressed in Execution Checklist Addressed in Base Annex and Branch Plans Resolved Resolved Mass Search and Rescue Operations 5. Blast and thermal effects, delayed building collapse, and hazardous material releases in the urban environment will present physical hazards for rescuers and evacuees. Identify any necessary modifications to the Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue Addendum. FEMA Referred to FEMA US&R Resolved 6. Restrictions on air movement may require alternative transportation modes/nodes for search and rescue Identify any necessary modifications to the Catastrophic Incident Search and Rescue FEMA Referred to FEMA US&R Resolved 6

7 KEY ISSUES How will various incident management roles be integrated/coordinated? How will interagency partners access the incident area/crime scene? What protocols, equipment, and expertise are needed to monitor responders accumulated radiation dose data? How can we improve pre-incident preparedness at the Federal level? How will large-scale radioactive waste be managed? What is the policy for reimbursing host states that provide sheltering and support services? How will resource requests be de-conflicted? 7

8 Federal Deployment Limitations Information analysis established the following within Phase 2a: There is limited Federal capability to operate within the damage zones. Multiple interagency missions (e.g., Counterterrorism, Defense, Continuity, Response, Recovery) will occur simultaneously. There is limited Federal capacity (e.g., military air support) to simultaneously support the deployment requirements of multiple missions. Prioritization of capability will be necessary to realize the greatest good for the greatest number of people. 8

9 Response Posture The Response Posture Workgroup prioritized Response Core Capability delivery based on those that have the greatest impact on life-saving operations, while also ensuring the safety of federal responders. This prioritization is for use adjudicating resource requests within Phase 2a and some Core Capabilities become pivotal as the incident progresses. Many core capabilities are not dependent on the same resources, therefore, could be supported simultaneously without affecting a higher priority core capability. 9

10 NRIA Resource List 10

11 Resource Prioritization IND Utilizing the NRIA Resource List, the Resource Prioritization Workgroup identified Federal resources that could conduct operations within the damage and/or fallout zone in Phase 2a: Severe Damage Zone FBI Hazardous Evidence Response Team EPA National Counterterrorism Evidence Response Team DOE Aerial Measuring System EPA Fixed-Wing Aircraft for Aerial Monitoring Moderate Damage Zone DOD CBRN Response Enterprise (e.g., Command and Control CBRN Response Elements A & B, Defense CBRN Response Force) DOE Radiological Assistance Program EPA Environmental Response Team EPA CBRN Consequence Management Advisory Team EPA On-Scene Coordinators Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center Light Damage Zone FEMA Urban Search and Rescue Task Forces and Incident Support Teams Fallout Zone All assets, resources, and teams capable of operating in the SDZ, MDZ, and LDZ. Outside of the Damage and Fallout Zones The majority of Federal assets, resources, and teams will deploy to and stage outside of the damage and fallout zones. 11

12 Zoned Approach The traditional approach of deploying the maximum number of resources and responders to the incident area as quickly as possible is not realistic or effective for some types of nuclear/radiological incidents notably INDs due to the scope and complexity of the scenario (e.g., degree of immediate destruction, high levels of residual radiation in near-term). The Zoned Approach Workgroup found that using the Severe, Moderate, and Light Damage Zones to plan response operations and prioritize actions ( Zoned Approach ) helps to maximize: - Life-saving operations - Safety of Federal responders - Effectiveness of responder activities 12

13 Zoned Approach IND Phase 2a Due to exceptionally high dose rates, Federal operations in the Severe Damage Zone expected to be limited to overflight operations such as aerial monitoring and to law enforcement investigative operations. Immediate local and state lifesaving operations in the Light and Moderate Damage Zones outside of the fallout zone. Requests for Federal assistance in the Moderate and Light Damage Zones are expected to focus on lifesaving operations specifically urban search and rescue operations. Majority of Federal operations and staging will occur well outside of damage and fallout zones* Severe Damage Zone (to.5 mile) Moderate Damage Zone (to 1 mile) Requests for Federal assistance are expected for the Light and Moderate Damage Fallout Zones. While the type of assistance required will mirror nonfallout zones, Federal capabilities must be able to operate in a contaminated environment. Capabilities will have a limited stay time to protect federal responders from unacceptable health effects/risks. FALLOUT ZONE (inclusive of the DFZ) Federal Public Information and Warning Actions/Operations immediately upon detonation directing everyone within 50 miles to "Get Inside, Stay Inside and Stay Tuned" via IPAWS and all other media means. Light Damage Zone (to 3 miles) Outside Damage Zone *Based on modeling, impacts to critical infrastructure (e.g. fuel, water, power) may Presenter s inhibit Name operations outside June of the 17, damage 2003 zones. 13

14 Resource Prioritization Fixed Nuclear Facility Utilizing the NRIA Resource List, the following Federal resources that could conduct operations within the Plume, Plume Exposure Pathway, and Ingestion Exposure Pathway in Phase 2a: Plume DOE Aerial Measuring System DOE Radiological Assistance Program EPA Fixed-Wing Aircraft for Aerial Monitoring Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center DOD CBRN Response Enterprise (e.g., Command and Control CBRN Response Elements A & B, Defense CBRN Response Force) Plume Exposure Pathway 10 miles EPA Environmental Response Team EPA CBRN Consequence Management Advisory Team EPA On-Scene Coordinators Ingestion Exposure Pathway outside of the Plume 50 miles The majority of Federal assets, resources, and teams will deploy and stage outside of the affected area. 14

15 Zoned Approach Fixed Nuclear Facility Zoned Approach Fixed Nuclear Facility Reactor Site Expanded Evacuation Zone within the Plume out to 5 miles Federal response within the Plume Exposure Pathway and the Plume itself limited to agency authorities and radiation monitoring Early Evacuation Zone 360 for 2 miles Immediate local and state evacuation operations in Plume Exposure Pathway Plume Exposure Pathway 360 for 10 miles Majority of Federal operations and staging will occur outside of the Plume Exposure Pathway and upwind of the plume Ingestion Exposure Pathway 360 for 50 miles 15

16 Executive Decision Points A series of time-phased decision points are outlined for executive leadership with guidance on decision criteria, responsible entities, and other information. Examples include: Public Information and Warning Crisis Standards Of Care Emergency and Permanent Work Involving Contaminated Structures Management and Removal of Debris Long Term Waste Management Decontamination Standards / Clearance Goals Funding and Applicability of the Price Anderson Act Relocation, Alternative Housing, and Reoccupancy Remediation and Cleanup

17 Nuclear/Radiological Incident Task Force (NRITF) Interagency group that convenes within the NRCC to provide nuclear/radiological incident specific subject matter expertise in support of national level incident planning and whole community core capability delivery. Addresses specific tasks, objectives or issues, related to a nuclear or radiological incident, and makes recommendations for executive decision points. The Task Force does not take the place of any Emergency Support Function (ESF), Recovery Support Function (RSF), program area, or agency. 17

18 Operational Coordination 18

19 Mission Area Integration - Prevention If the incident involves suspected federal crimes of terrorism, the FBI will lead and coordinate the law enforcement response and investigation. The Response and Prevention Mission Areas should enhance information-sharing pathways and coordinate interdependent decisions and operational activities. The FBI has mechanisms to share sensitive information and coordinate interdependencies of activities and decisions at both the national and local level with its partners, as appropriate. The FBI-led WMDSG at the FBI SIOC utilizes its FEMA-led Consequence Management Coordination Unit (CMCU) to ensure information sharing and coordination across the PPD 8 mission areas. 19

20 Continued Development and Issues Refining diagrams, illustrations, and tables Determining lead for imported contaminated consumer products that are distributed before detection Confirming where no operational changes are required compared to what is set forth in the FIOP Clarify coordination of domestic response to international incidents Refining and clarifying executive decision points Prevent messaging and preparedness 20

21 NRIA Planning Team Co Leads: Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Response Directorate Planning Division FEMA Recovery Directorate National Disaster Recovery Planning Division Collaborative Planning Team: Core Planning Team Members: Department of Defense (DOD) Department of Energy (DOE) Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Department of Transportation (DOT) Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 21

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