Cuban Missile Crisis: Significance of the 11th Day History Extended Essay

Cuban Missile Crisis: Significance of the 11th Day History Extended Essay Candidate number: Date: October 3, 2016 Word Count: 3710 Research Question : Discuss the significance of the 11th day of the Cuban Missile Crisis in relation to the resolution of the event.. 1

Abstract The research question in this essay is: Discuss the significance of the 11th day of the Cuban Missile Crisis in relation to the resolution of the event. To understand the significance of the 11th day (October 26, 1962), the entire 13 day event was reviewed for notable correspondence, and four particular letters of interest were identified. These letters among heads of state (President John F. Kennedy, Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and Prime Minister Fidel Castro) followed the creation of a military blockade by the United States around Cuba after it was known that the Soviet Union had been providing military aid to Cuba in the form of nuclear missiles. This correspondence highlighted areas of political and military tension between the two superpowers, the Soviet Union and the United States, both which possessed nuclear weapons. The grievances and ultimatums expressed in the letters created an increasingly tense diplomatic situation in which nuclear war became a possibility. The authors expressed different political and personal perspectives on the Cuban Missile Crisis: the perceived threat of invasion of Cuba, the heightened military tensions over the blockade, and the fact that the leaders of both the Soviet Union and the United States did not want to publicly appear to accept defeat. On the 11th day, a compromise was proposed in a letter from Khrushchev, and a resolution to the crisis was primed. Word Count 226 2

Table of Contents Page Abstract (2) Table of Contents (3) Introduction (4-5) The Letter from the 24th of October (5) The Letter from the 25th of October (5-7) The Castro Letter from the 11th Day (7-8) The Khrushchev Letter from the 11th Day (8-11) Conclusion (11) Bibliography (12-14) 3

Introduction The Cuban Missile Crisis refers to an international geopolitical incident occurring over the 13 days beginning on October 16th and ending on October 28th of 1962. The main three political powers involved were the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of Cuba. The executive powers were President John F. Kennedy, Premier Nikita Khrushchev, and Prime Minister Fidel Castro, respectively. The conflict arose when, on October 16th, the United States began to discuss the confirmed the building of missile sites capable of utilizing nuclear 1 warheads on the island of Cuba. To better understand the resolution of the conflict, the research question: Discuss the significance of the 11th day of the Cuban Missile Crisis in relation to the resolution of the event. will be investigated. 2 The nuclear missiles were purchased by Raul Castro from the Soviet Union on July 2nd. This was in accordance to an agreement made between Fidel Castro and Nikita Khrushchev that Cuba needed a means by which to protect itself. This transaction resulted in shipments of armaments and materials to build missile sites as well as the missiles themselves. The United States gained evidence of this situation on the 16th of October when a United States U-2 spy plane photographed construction of possible nuclear missile sites in Cuba. The United States 3 leaders considered two different strategies to deal with the situation. The first strategy proposed by United States leadership to deal with the Cuban nuclear threat was to mount an airstrike against the known missile sites in hopes of neutralizing the threat. Unfortunately, this plan had two large problems associated with it: principally, that the airstrike might not destroy all of the missile sites, possibly resulting in nuclear retaliation, and secondarily that this incursion would provoke the Soviet Union to join the conflict. Through various representatives, the Soviet Union had already pledged to provide economic and material 4 support to Cuba, so the possibility of a war with the Soviet Union was significantly increased if direct action was taken by the United States towards Cuba. The liabilities of the first strategy led the United States to pursue their second strategy, to create a military blockade around Cuba, cutting off further supplies from the Soviet Union. The blockade was implemented by the United States on October 22 after a public announcement by President Kennedy describing the 5 presence of nuclear missiles in Cuba. 1. MRBM Launch Site, Photograph. NSA archives: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962. 2. Sergeĭ Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev: Creation of a Superpower. (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 411. 3. "Minutes of the 505th Meeting of the National Security Council." Avalon Project: Cuban Missile Crisis. Accessed October 3, 2016. 4. Current Intelligence Weekly Review: Bloc Economic Relations with Cuba, Patterns and Perspectives, Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1960. 5. John F. Kennedy, "Radio and Television Report to the American People on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba," Cuban Missile Crisis. Accessed October 03, 2016. 4

Subsequent to the United States blockade of Cuba, and as the prospect of nuclear war loomed, efforts at diplomacy continued through written letters. The letters of correspondence among the executive powers of the Soviet Union, the United States, and Cuba illustrate the significance of the 11th day of the Cuban Missile Crisis. The first of four pivotal letters was a message sent to President Kennedy from Soviet Premier Khrushchev. The Letter from the 24th of October On the 24th of October, Soviet Premier Khrushchev responded to Kennedy s public declaration of a Cuban blockade in a letter of greater than 800 words. In his letter, Khrushchev described his discontent with the blockade that prevented the Soviet Union from supporting Cuba with material and economic means. Khrushchev asserted that he could not agree to a quarantine of Cuba because he found it to be an ultimatum and threatening that if we (the Soviet Union) do not give in to your (the United States) demands you will use force. Khrushchev's main grievance was that the United States was repressing and compelling the Soviet Union to renounce the rights that every sovereign state enjoys. In this letter, the Soviet Premier questioned the morality and laws that could compel the United States to justify the degenerate imperialism on Cuba. Another notable feature of this letter to Kennedy is the overt mention of the United States actions pushing mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Khrushchev closes the letter with a threat that the Soviet Union, will then be forced on our part to take those measures we deem necessary and sufficient to defend our rights. To this end we have all that is necessary. 6 This letter from Khrushchev provides valuable evidence of the importance of the decisions made on the 11th day of the Cuban Missile Crisis because, from Khrushchev s perspective, it provides the foundation upon which the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States officially began. Prior to this letter, Kennedy s public address to the American people had implicated the Soviet Union as the provider of the Cuban missiles, but the Soviet Union had no reason to reply with threats such as those raised in Khrushchev s letter on the 24th. Due to its formal nature, the letter does not allow the author, Khrushchev, to describe his thought process nor explain his intentions or goals from the formation of the letter. Being authored from Khrushchev gives it credibility, but because it was written by the Soviet Premier in his role as Head of State, it must have been revised and changed from his original personal perspective. The Letter from the 25th of October 6. Nikita Khrushchev, "Khrushchev Letter to President Kennedy, October 24, 1962" Library of Congress. Accessed October 03, 2016. 5

President Kennedy responded to Soviet Premier Khrushchev s grievances and threats in a letter on the 25th of October, 1962, the tenth day of the Cuban missile crisis. Kennedy s letter was comparatively brief, only 263 words, and delineated the diplomatic intentions of the United States with regards to the blockade. He addressed Khrushchev s statements that the blockade is no longer appealing to reason by emphasizing the threat to the security of the United States posed by Cuban nuclear missiles. Kennedy claims that the Soviet Union provided important shipments of military equipment to Cuba. He asserts that in September, when he had first discovered evidence of Cuban missile sites, the Soviet Union initially denied all allegations of offensive weapons being sent to Cuba. This allowed Kennedy to refute the claim that he was pushing mankind toward the abyss of a world nuclear-missile war. Directly, he stated that, it was not I (President Kennedy or the United States) who issued the first challenge in this case (the Cuban Missile Crisis). Kennedy finished the letter with a warning to the Soviet Union, I hope that your (Khrushchev's) government will take the necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation (peace prior to the Cuban missile crisis). 7 The letter sent by Kennedy on the 25th was the first time that Kennedy directly told the Soviet Union that, as of September, he already knew that there were missiles in Cuba. Three days prior to this, on the 22nd of October, there was a public announcement in the United States about the presence of the missiles in Cuba but it neglected to state how early the United States knew about the presence of the missiles. This omission might have been planned to minimize resentment from the American public who, already stricken with the Communist Red Scare (McCarthyism), may have blamed the United States government for waiting a month to act upon the knowledge of the missiles. This letter also signifies the direct buildup of tension of between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union, in the letter sent on the 24th, implied that the United States was to blame for the increase in tensions, while the letter sent on the 25th by the United States implicates the Soviet Union for the start of the tensions. This demonstrates that both parties, the Soviet Union and the United States, according to their respective letters at this point in the crisis, were justified in their actions toward Cuba. The purpose of the Kennedy letter was to convey to the Soviet Union that the United States understood that there was potential for a nuclear war and that this potential justified placing a blockade around the island of Cuba to prevent further assistance from the Soviet Union. This letter is valuable for describing and contrasting the hopes and wants of the Soviet Union and the United States. This letter in combination with the other letter written by Khrushchev on the 24th show that both the Soviet Union and the United States did not wish for war, but neither was agreeable about the present situation in Cuba. This letter has few limitations as it works to complete the two main perspectives in contention during this crisis. It also works to show that prior to this letter there was a large difference between the leaders understanding of each other's policies towards this situation in Cuba. 7. John F. Kennedy, "Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev, October 25, 1962." Cuban Missile Crisis. Accessed October 03, 2016. 6

The historical context is also critical to understanding the political impact of the Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence. In the United States at this time, McCarthyism was still in full effect. McCarthyism employed unsubstantiated allegations of treason, promoted American patriotism, condemned communism, and added a layer of mistrust and suspicion of United States citizens. McCarthyism provided a challenging environment within which Kennedy negotiated with Khruschev. If he did not appear to the American public to have defeated communism, Kennedy would lose the political support of the American people. In addition, if he promoted negotiations in a manner which was completely transparent to the United States public, then back-door diplomatic deals could not occur. A similar political situation confronted Khrushchev. Although he did not have McCarthyism to deal with, he came to power in the Soviet Union through a platform based upon the popularity of a secret speech he delivered shortly after the death of Stalin. In this speech entitled On the Cult of Personality and its Consequences Khrushchev criticized the actions of Stalin throughout his 8 reign and championed the people of the Soviet Union. In this treatise, he described what a Soviet leader should be. During the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, Premier Khrushchev was now the leader and had to meet the expectations and exceed the criticisms that he placed upon Stalin. To do this, he had to become a champion of the people, so losing to the natural enemy of communism, capitalism, was not an option for Khrushchev. The Castro Letter from the 11th Day As a result of the political pressures at home, many of interactions between Khrushchev and Kennedy were by letter or telegraph in private communication. This underlying situation lead to the first correspondence of the 26th of October (the 11th day) from Cuban Prime Minister, Fidel Castro to Khrushchev. In this letter, Castro described his fear of the United States taking military action towards Cuba. He described two potential scenarios: first, an air strike which would destroy the missile sites, and second, a total invasion of the island. Castro believed that the imperialists aggressiveness makes them extremely dangerous. If the United States did invade, Castro claimed that it would be a brutal act in violation of universal and moral law. He suggested that in most legitimate self-defence the Soviet Union should eliminate this danger forever. He furthered this artificial dilemma by stating, However harsh and terrible the solution, there would be no other (option). Castro then appealed to the reputation of the Soviet Union by 9 describing Khrushchev to be, a tireless defender of peace. Castro sent his letter while simultaneously arming some of the missile sites and gaining access to a Soviet bomber jet. The self-defense he mentioned that would eliminate the danger was 8. Nikita Khrushchev, "Secret Speech Delivered by First Party Secretary at the Twentieth Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, February 25, 1956." Montclair State University. Accessed October 3, 2016. 9. John F. Kennedy, "Cuban Missile Crisis" Cuban Missile Crisis - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum. Accessed October 03, 2016. 7

most definitely a nuclear war. What Castro requested was the mobilization of the Soviet armaments against the nation of the United States. Although Castro describes Khrushchev to be a defender of peace, he intended it to be understood that the peace which would be reached is the peace following the destruction of the United States. There is a statement in the letter by Castro that the Cuban people will confront the aggression heroically. The island of Cuba being far too small to defeat a full invasion of the United States military allows this quote to be seen in a different light. The other perspective that could be taken from this quote is that the purpose of this letter is to alert Khrushchev that Castro is willing to sacrifice the Cuban people for the destruction of the United States by a nuclear war with the Soviet Union. This letter provides insight into the desperation that Castro was feeling at this time. Castro was not included in any of the direct Soviet negotiations with the United States. As a result, he had very limited control of the big overarching decisions which might lead to the resolution of the crisis. It also hints towards Castro's resentment of the United States due to numerous failed assassination attempts on Castro s life known as Operation Mongoose by the Central 10 intelligence Agency of the United States. This letter also followed the historically infamous Bay of Pigs invasion, which used exiled Cubans as soldiers in an unsuccessful attempt to overthrow 11 Cuba, which was followed up by a Cuban trade embargo that the United States imposed. This embargo nearly destroyed the Cuban economy until the Soviet Union agreed to trade with 12 Cuba. Another value of this letter is demonstrated by the type of language used by both Castro and Khrushchev. Both reference the concept of the United States being a force of encroaching imperialism, which goes against the moral laws apparent to both Khrushchev and Castro. This coincidental language may be due to consultation of Castro on the letter to Kennedy on the 24th, but it also could be the result of the ongoing friendship that Castro and Khrushchev 13 maintained. Khrushchev and Castro shared similar opinions on policies as Castro officially stated that Cuba was a communist nation after the Bay of Pigs Invasion, which had prompted a 14 visit to Cuba from Khrushchev. The Khrushchev Letter from the 11th Day 10. Mary S. McAuliffe, " Cuban Missile Crisis." Accessed October 3, 2016, 111. 11. Rita J. Markel, Fidel Castro's Cuba. (Minneapolis, MN: Twenty-First Century Books, 2008), 96. 12. John F. Kennedy, "Proclamation 3447." Government Printing Office. Accessed October 3, 2016. 13. Sergeĭ Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev: Creation of a Superpower. (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 505. 14. "Khrushchev to Visit Cuba." Accessed October 3, 2016. 8

The fourth and most important letter of the entire Cuban Missile Crisis was sent from Moscow to the United States via telegram on the 26th of October, the 11th day of the Crisis. The correspondence, from Khrushchev to Kennedy, was disguised as a letter from the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Gromyko. It referenced the letter sent by Kennedy on the 25th concerning the state of the missiles on Cuban soil. It also noted that both Khrushchev and Kennedy had publicly exchanged our evaluations of the events around Cuba. Khrushchev then demonstrated why Castro described him as a tireless defender of peace. Khrushchev conceded that everyone needs peace and claimed that both capitalists (United States), and communists (Cuba, and the Soviet Union) see war is our enemy and the calamity for all the people. He also pointed out that communists value above all, the lives of the people. Khrushchev took the warning at the end of Kennedy s letter sent on the 25th to be a threat of war. He cautioned that, if a war should break out, then it would not be in our (neither the United States nor the Soviet Union s) power to stop it. Khrushchev also went on to relate the missiles in Cuba to a cannon, which can be defensive or offensive depending on orientation. The argument was that Kennedy was overreacting with an apparently mistaken assumption that the missiles were intended for offensive purposes. Khrushchev proceeded to state that Cuba posed no real threat to the United States as, even with missiles of a power of 100 megatons (double that of the largest bomb ever detonated, tsar bomba) because only people, troops, can attack. This was to say that Cuba was far outmatched by the sheer number of troops that the United States could provide in retaliation. Khruschev assured Kennedy that the next ships headed to Cuba would have no weapons at all as Cuba has already received the necessary means of defense. 15 Khrushchev then addressed Kennedy s last point about reverting back to pre-cuban Missile Crisis relations. Khrushchev referenced the Soviet Union s preliminary reason for providing support to Cuba, which Khrushchev had previously told Kennedy when they met at the Vienna summit on June 4th, 1961. Khrushchev referred to a mutual conversation about an attack on 16 Cuba, presumably the Bay of Pigs invasion, which resulted in Cuban military and economic aid. He also pointed out similarities between the Soviet Union and Cuba, specifically the parallels between how difficult it is to accomplish a revolution and how difficult it is to reconstruct a country on new foundations. He proposed that, if you would recall your fleet, this would immediately change everything. He refused to speak for Fidel Castro, but expressed that he (Castro) and the Government of Cuba, evidently, would declare demobilization. Of note, Khrushchev had met with both Kennedy and Castro prior to the Cuban Missile crisis. Khrushchev met Kennedy at the Vienna summit at which they talked at length about topics that impacted both the Soviet Union and the United States. Khrushchev had previously commented 15. John F. Kennedy, "Cuban Missile Crisis" Cuban Missile Crisis - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum. Accessed October 03, 2016. 16. Rita J. Markel, Fidel Castro's Cuba. (Minneapolis, MN: Twenty-First Century Books, 2008), 96. 9

17 that he was generally pleased with the meeting with Kennedy in Vienna. That meeting had allowed for diplomatic channels to be open and enabled future disputes, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis, to be solved with negotiations. The Khrushchev meeting with Kennedy could be contrasted with the meeting with Castro by 18 Khrushchev at the New York United Nations General Assembly in 1960. Castro, after dramatically refusing service from the hotel he was provided, moved to a different hotel and invited the Soviet Premier to his room to discuss Cuba and their ideologies. This public display at the hotel in the United States amassed a large crowd, many of which were anti-communist and therefore anti-khrushchev and anti-castro. This conflict worked to strengthen the sense of camaraderie that Khrushchev and Castro now shared. At that Assembly, Khrushchev mentioned that categorically we shall never start a war. Remember my words; not only shall we never start 19 a war, but we want to live in friendship with you. Khrushchev, in his letter on October 26th, referred back to a proposal to the United Nations for the disbandment of armies and for the destruction of all armaments. He argued that armaments bring only disaster. He proposed that the Soviet military specialists in Cuba would be removed if the United States declared that it would not invade Cuba. The perpetuation of the blockade in Cuba, Khrushchev warned, would be the first step towards the unleashing of war, well then, it is evident nothing else is left to us but to accept the challenge of yours. This was actually both a threat and a response to the claim made by Kennedy on the 25th, which implied that the Soviet Union created the conflict. To resolve the situation, Khrushchev stated that if there is no intention to tighten that knot (referring to the knot of war) and thereby to doom this world to the catastrophe of thermonuclear war, then let us not only relax the forces pulling on the ends of the rope, let us take measures to untie that knot. We are ready for this (the end of the missile crisis). The purpose of Khrushchev s last letter was to propose a solution to the Cuban Missile Crisis and to reciprocate to the United States the idea that a nuclear war would result if the situation in Cuba were not resolved. This was the most valuable correspondence during the entire Crisis because it proposed a means by which both Kennedy and Khrushchev could withdraw without seeming to have been defeated by the other nation and its ideology. This was valuable as it set 17. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, Strobe Talbot, and Edward Crankshaw. Khrushchev Remembers. (London: Deutsch, 1971.), 458. 18. "Catalog Record: Reimbursement of Extraordinary Expenses to the City of New York. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-seventh Congress, First Session, on H.R. 4441, and Other Bills Relating to Reimbursement to the City of New York for Extraordinary Expenses Incurred during the 15th General Assembly of the United Nations. May 17, 1961" Hathi Trust Digital Library. Accessed October 03, 2016. 19. Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, Nikita S. Khrushchev in New York: A Documentary Record of Nikita S. Khrushchev s Trip to New York, September 19th to October 13th, 1960: Including All His Proposals to the United Nations and Major Addresses and News Conferences. (New York: Crosscurrents Press, 1960.), 179. 10

up the formal arrangements to end the Crisis, which were finalized the next day. The only way that this letter is limited in value for demonstrating the importance of the 11th day is that it does not include the subsequent diplomatic response to the letter, which is the formal agreement to remove missiles from Cuba in return for the lifting of the blockade and guarantee that the United States would not invade Cuba. 20 Conclusion The 11th day (October 26, 1962) was the most important in the Cuban Missile Crisis, as it provided a diplomatic solution so that an agreement was reached before drastic military action (nuclear strikes) had occurred. The first source, correspondence between the Soviet Premier and the United States President, demonstrated how the Soviet Union had developed the situation into a possible nuclear conflict. It also expressed the sympathy that the Soviet Union had for the nation of Cuba by labeling the United States as the aggressor in the Cuban Missile Crisis. This source is helpful for understanding the international relations at the time, including the perspective held by the Soviet Union. The complementary source, a letter from President Kennedy responding to Premier Khrushchev which described the United States intentions to the Soviet Union, allowed for the ground work of an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States to be proposed on the 11th day. Prior to this letter from Kennedy, the Soviet Union did not know if the United States was planning to invade Cuba. The third source, correspondence from Castro to Khrushchev, shed light on the relationship that Khrushchev had with Castro and by extension, that the Soviet Union had with Cuba. It reflected the similarities in ideologies that they shared as well as Castro s willingness to sacrifice everything, including Cuba itself, to reach his goals. It brought in a third perspective that is critical to understanding the diplomatic success of the 11th day. Ironically, the third source demonstrated why, in the end, Castro was cut out of the negotiations as solutions were made between Khrushchev and Kennedy without his knowledge, even though the results of the proposed solutions impacted Cuba most directly. The final source, the last letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy, represented the only time in the entire conflict that a solution was proposed to the other leader in an effort to avoid nuclear war. Even more impressively, the proposition by Khrushchev did not force either party to leave defeated. It was a compromise between the wishes proposed by the first letter and the complementary response. It respected the rights of Cuba, while simultaneously removing the nuclear threat. This proposition, which was both implementable and desirable for all parties made the 11th day the most significant in resolving the primary issues behind the Cuban Missile Crisis. 20. John F. Kennedy, "Cuban Missile Crisis" Cuban Missile Crisis - John F. Kennedy Presidential Library & Museum. Accessed October 03, 2016. 11

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