(rev 23 Aug 13 eliminated the old 10 Study Questions) NWC 3004B THE TANKER WAR, 1980-88: LAW AND POLICY BY GEORGE K. WALKER U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES VOLUME 74 CHAPTER II THE TANKER WAR, 1980-88 EXCERPTED AND REVISED BY CDR DAN CROUCH, JAGC JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE WITH SPECIAL THANKS TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW DEPARTMENT U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Part A. Prologue The Persian Gulf, known as the Arabian Gulf to Arab coastal states, is a shallow coastal extension of the Indian Ocean between the Arabian Peninsula to the west and Iran to the east. It extends northeast 614 miles from the Gulf of Oman in the Indian Ocean, through the Strait of Hormuz to the Shatt-al-Arab. The Shatt al- Arab is a marshy delta formed by the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, which marks the border between Iran, Iraq and Kuwait. To the south, the Strait of Hormuz has been described as the international oil highway or lifeline of the West. At times, as many as 80 large oil tankers pass through this international strait daily. There have been many actors in the Persian Gulf. Great Britain, for instance, whose influence dates from the early nineteenth century, maintained strategic interests in the area that evolved around oil and air routes to India and for a 2
century and a half the Gulf was considered a British Lake. But in 1971, Britain militarily withdrew from the Persian Gulf area and the U.S. assumed the mantle of providing naval security. However, after Britain s naval withdrawal from the Gulf, the U.S. did not immediately rush into the power vacuum with forces. Reeling from Vietnam and other strategic concerns related to the Cold War, the Nixon administration developed the Twin Pillars policy of military assistance to Saudi Arabia and Iran to protect common regional security interests. Under this policy, the U.S. would no longer assume direct responsibility for preserving world-wide security but would strengthen regional actors to play a primary role in assuring stability. Benign inaction characterized U.S. policy between 1971 and 1979. In the northern Gulf, however, there was no benign inaction. Iran-Iraq relations were strained, but the 1975 treaties to confirm land and water boundaries seemed to patch up differences. Thus matters stood until Iran s Shah fell in 1979. These shifting political balances were accompanied by increasing worldwide dependence on Gulf oil and, for the United States at least, reliance on transport of oil in ships flying other nations flags. By 1985, as U.S. domestic production continued to decline, U.S. oil companies saw the United States in a dangerously vulnerable position vis-à-vis OPEC oil. Western Europe received about 33% of its total oil from the Gulf, although Greece and France received 50% and Japan and Turkey received fully 66% of their oil from this region. By 1986, US-flag foreign trade tankers were almost non-existent. Their role had been taken over by other nations vessels, particularly those flying flags of convenience, but often beneficially owned by U.S. business interests. Additionally, the Suez Canal closure during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war prompted building ever-larger tankers, which could be operated more cheaply over greater distances than smaller ones, but which might have greater economic consequences (not to mention environmental effects) if damaged or sunk in a grounding, collision, or during armed conflict. Part B: The Early War (1980-1983) Several events precipitated U.S. military involvement in the Persian Gulf. First, in 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and caused concern for the United States that there might also be increased danger of instability in the Gulf because of the power vacuum there. In his 1980 State of the Union Address, President Jimmy Carter said the United States would use force in the area if necessary: Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force. U.S. naval task forces were already in the region because of the hostage crisis. They remained there. In April 1980, activist Iraqi Shiites tried to assassinate Iraq s deputy premier, a Sunni. Iraq began rooting out the activists, including bombing an Iranian border 3
town and expelling Iranian residents and Iraqis of Iranian descent because the government believed Iran was behind the Shiite assassination attempt. Iran began training infiltrators and Iraq began openly supporting attempts to topple the Iranian government by exiled members of the Shah s government then living in Baghdad. Iraq sought and received backing from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, who feared Iranian revolutionary ambitions, and signed secret agreements with Iraq to boost oil production and provide revenue for an Iraqi military effort against Iran. After border clashes in the summer of 1980, Iran began shelling Iraqi towns in early September, and on September 22, 1980 Iraq invaded Iran. Within days, Iraq declared the 1975 border agreement that demarked the southern boundary between Iraq and Iran along the Shatt al-arab to be void and asserted full sovereignty over the Shatt. Iran immediately issued a Notice to Mariners (NOTMAR) declaring waterways near its coast a war zone, announcing new shipping lanes in the Gulf after ships passed through the Strait of Hormuz, disclaiming responsibility if vessels did not follow the lanes, refusing to allow ships access to Iraqi ports (thereby closing the Shatt al-arab), and warning of retaliation if Gulf states allowed Iraq use of their facilities. Refusal of access to Iraqi ports was later characterized as a blockade of the Iraqi coast. Iran s rationale for its war zone declaration was twofold. Its first rationale was defensive in nature: to protect its coastline against intrusion by ships likely to present a risk to national security and to regulate ships stopping at a port anywhere in the Gulf. It required such ships to contact Iran s naval headquarters 48 hours in advance to receive prior authorization to pass through the zone. Iran s second stated concern was to guarantee the safety of international shipping, since warlike activities were likely to take place in the zone. On October 7, Iraq responded to Iran s claim by declaring the entire Gulf north of 29 degrees 30 minutes north latitude a prohibited war zone, purportedly as reprisal for the Iranian blockade. Iran s successful closure of the Gulf to Iraqi oil exports was a severe blow to the Iraqi economy. Outside support was probably necessary for the survival of the Iraqi regime since by the end of 1980, Iraq s oil exports dwindled from over 3 million barrels per day to 1 million. Closing Iraq s coast and bombing Iraqi oil terminals made Iraq a landlocked country, forcing it to export oil through pipelines to neighboring countries including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria and Turkey--and to import war-sustaining goods through those neighbors ports. Thus, at the beginning of the war, nearly all Gulf littoral states supported or at least tilted toward Iraq, as did Turkey and Jordan. In response, Iranian warplanes attacked Kuwaiti border posts and bomb Kuwait s Um-Aish oil refineries as reprisal for Kuwaiti assistance to Iraq. Most nations, including the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union and the United States, remained officially neutral. U.S. overall policy, known as the Carter policy, derived from goals of peace and preventing a larger war and had these themes: 4
(1) United States neutrality. (2) American expectation of neutrality and non-interference by other nations, particularly the U.S.S.R. (3) Defense of United States vital interests, including: (a) Preservation of freedom of navigation to and from the Gulf, (b) Prevention of the War s expansion in ways that would threaten the region s security (4) A desire for the immediate cessation of hostilities and solution of the dispute by diplomatic means. In 1981, with advice from the French and Great Britain, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates established the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) under Saudi leadership, to effect coordination, integration and interconnection between member states and to achieve unity among them. GCC members moved toward economic integration and defense and security coordination throughout the remainder of the war. Although the Council tried to underline its neutrality, it consistently supported Iraq during the war and Iran may have seen its creation as a step against it and the Islamic revolution. As the war progressed, military cooperation among the GCC states increased and the end result was a stronger, more unified military structure. Also in 1981, at Saudi request, U.S. Air Force AWACS aircraft deployed to Saudi Arabia to enhance surveillance capabilities. In May 1981 Iran seized a Kuwaiti survey ship and a Danish vessel, the Elsa Cat, bound for the UAE and Kuwait and carrying military equipment to Iraq. [See question 2] Both vessels were eventually let go, but Iran had sent a signal it would no longer tolerate tacit support for Iraq s war efforts. Likewise, Iraq began attacking commercial vessels in the northern Gulf, usually tankers and cargo ships bound for the Iranian ports of Bandar Khomeni or Bushire after being convoyed through Iranian territorial waters. In February 1982 an Iranian tanker was lost in the channel leading to the sea from Iran s Bandar Khomeni port, and Iraq announced that it had mined the channel. Despite peace efforts from many sources the Arab League, the GCC and the UN all attempted to achieve peace no agreement was reached, and in July 1982 Iran launched its first offensive into Iraqi territory. As Iran began to claim the military initiative in most arenas, and refused peace proposals, many countries began actively supporting Iraq, including France, which sold Iraq 5 Super Entendard fighters, purchased with Saudi oil money, and the U.S., which authorized sale of 60 helicopters for agricultural purposes and provided $460 million in credits for American rice. As concern mounted, the U.S. established the Central Command to plan and coordinate U.S. military operations in the region more effectively and it was stood up officially on January 1, 1983. On August 12, 1982 Iraq announced it would attack any ship within its Gulf Military Exclusion Zone (GMEZ) and tankers docking at Iran s Kharg Island, 5
regardless of nationality, would be targets. Kharg was Iran s main export terminal. When announcing the GMEZ and blockade of Kharg, Iraq stressed its war zones were designed to cope with the difficulties in distinguishing between vessel nationalities in the Gulf. On August 29, Iran responded, declaring it would protect foreign shipping, and began an escort program using shuttle convoys of Iranianflagged and neutral-flagged merchantmen lifting oil from Iranian northern Gulf ports to those further down its shore for world export. Iraq attacked all ships in its GMEZ through 1984, resulting in a change in the U.S. freedom of navigation policy to keeping access to the Gulf open for non-belligerents. On March 2, 1983 Iraq bombed Iran s Norwuz offshore oilfield, causing an immense slick in some areas surface oil was reportedly two feet think. Efforts to arrange a ceasefire to cap the outflow of between 2000 and 5000 barrels of oil a day were unsuccessful and experts became concerned permanent damage to the Gulf s ecosystem could result. Saudi desalinization plants on the Gulf were closed and fish imports from Gulf fishing areas were banned. The slick threatened international shipping as well, since many vessels use sea water for cooling and distilling into fresh water. Iran characterized the attack as a clear violation of a regional convention strictly prohibiting attacks against oil installations. In October, the Security Council again called for a ceasefire and condemned all violations of international humanitarian law called for the immediate cessation of military operations against civilian targets, and affirmed the right of free navigation and commerce in international waters. Late in 1983, after Iraqi officials visited Washington and explained Iran s closure of the Gulf to Iraqi oil exports had hurt the Iraqi economy and they would have to increase the cost of the war to Iran in order to press Iran to end it, President Reagan reaffirmed the Carter Doctrine and expanded its articulation of U.S. interests to include threats to Saudi Arabia and the necessity of keeping the Strait of Hormuz open if Iran tried to stop shipping there. U.S. military build-up in the region continued, and the U.S. initiated Operation Staunch, a diplomatic effort by the State Department to curtail the arms flow to Iran. Part C: Continued Attacks on Tankers and Other Shipping (1984-1986) Perhaps presciently, the United States published this Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) in January 1984: U.S. naval forces operating in international waters within the Gulf, Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman are taking additional defensive precautions against terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less than 2000 feet AGL [above ground level] not cleared for approach/departure to or from a regional airport are requested to avoid approaching closer than 5 NM [nautical miles] to U.S. naval forces. It is also requested that aircraft approaching within 5 NM establish and maintain radio contact with U.S. naval forces on [designated frequencies]. Aircraft which approach within 5 6
NM at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL whose intentions are unclear to U.S. naval forces may be held at risk by U.S. defensive measures.this notice is published solely to advise that hazardous operations are being conducted on an unscheduled basis; it does not affect the freedom of navigation of any individual or state. Iran protested this and later cordon sanitaires 1 around U.S. warships and aircraft, and U.S. Navy ships transiting Iran s territorial sea during the war. The United States rejected the protests, asserting a right of self-defense. By now, 19 U.S. warships, including a carrier, were in the Gulf area. In February 1984 the Iraqis extended their GMEZ to 50 miles around Kharg Island and warned any ships approaching Bandar Khomeni or Bushire would be sunk, after re-mining the approaches to Bandar Khomeni the previous October. In March, Iraq attacked a British ship under convoy, The Charming, in the Bandar Khomeni approaches, and Indian and Turkish tankers were also attacked. The war was creeping down the Gulf. Tankers were hit in Iraqi air attacks on Kharg, and Iraq destroyed Saudi tankers outside its GMEZ. Iran attacked Kuwaiti and Saudi tankers, including a supertanker, Yanbu Pride, for the first time in April and May 1984. Iraqi attacks were airborne, since the Iranian blockade had effectively bottled up Iraq s relatively weaker naval forces. Iraq had shifted its anti-shipping campaign focus in an effort to attack the weak link in Iran s war economy and to arouse world interest in the conflict. Iraq had some success in disrupting Iranian oil exports and its attacks prompted third state measures to protect their commercial interests. In attacking mostly neutral-flag tankers sailing independently, Iraq appears to have devoted minimal effort to obtaining visual identification of the target before launching missiles. In response, Iran began attacking neutral shipping bound for neutral ports, since there was no shipping bound for Iraqi ports, in an effort to arm-twist Iraq s financial backers to force Iraq to stop its attacks against the Kharg Island tankers. Iran s retaliatory policy against Arab shipping caused the GCC states to complain to the Security Council about Iranian acts of aggression on the freedom of navigation to and from their ports, asserting such acts of aggression constitute a threat to the stability and security of the area and have serious implications for international peace and security. During Council meetings, many states expressed concern for freedom of navigation in the Gulf because they had vessels under their own registry, flags of convenience, or were major carriers in the Gulf oil trade. The resulting Security Council Resolution Called upon all states to respect, in accordance with international law, the right of freedom of navigation Reaffirmed the right of freedom of navigation in international waters and sea lanes for shipping en route to and from all ports and installations of the littoral states that are not parties 1 A cordon sanitaire is essentially a security zone established around a specified location or for a specified distance around a moving vessel. 7
to the hostilities [and] Condemned the recent attacks on commercial ships en route to and from the ports of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia [and] demanded that such attacks should cease forthwith. Almost simultaneously, Saudi aircraft with U.S. AWACS helped down an Iranian fighter over the Gulf after two warnings although there was a dispute whether the aircraft was in Saudi or international airspace. The Saudis established an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), the Fahd Line, beyond Saudi territorial sea limits. This allowed Saudi interceptors, guided by U.S. AWACS and refueled by U.S. air tankers, to engage other aircraft--primarily Iranian--that threatened shipping. Saudi Arabia also proclaimed a 12 NM safety corridor within its territorial seas for neutral shipping carrying oil out of Kuwaiti ports. During the summer of 1984, the area of conflict widened when mines detonated in the Gulf of Suez and the Strait of Bab El Mandeb, choke points for the Red Sea to the west of Saudi Arabia, damaging several merchant ships. It is thought that a Libyan cargo ship laid the mines Libya and Syria alone among Arab nations had expressed strong support for Iran in the conflict as a means of disrupting oil exports from Saudi Arabia s western, non-gulf ports. The UN Secretary General expressed deep concern over the serious escalation of attacks on innocent and neutral merchant ships and their crews. Part D: Escalating U.S. Involvement: Reflagging and Convoys (1987-1988) By the end of 1985, attacks on merchant shipping had become the key method of combat between the warring states. Attacks on tankers in the Gulf continued, and because of the belligerents actions, the United States published a NOTMAR Special Warning in September 1985. 1. U.S. mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution when transiting the Gulf, which is becoming increasingly dangerous due to continued attacks on vessels outside the military zones declared by Iran and Iraq. 2. In view of recent Iranian visit, search, and in some cases seizure of vessels of third countries within the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman, U.S. mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution and to be alert to possible hazardous conditions, including hostile actions, when transiting these waters. 3. Iran has issued guidelines for the navigational safety of merchant shipping in the Gulf, [including]: - All Iranian coastal waters are war zones - All transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports is prohibited. - Iran will bear no responsibility for merchant ships failing to comply with the above instructions. 4. Iraq has stated the area north of 29 30 N is a prohibited war zone. It has warned that it will attack all vessels appearing within [its war zone] and 8
has further warned that all tankers docking at Kharg Island regardless of nationality are targets for the Iraqi air force. The NOTMAR added that the U.S. did not recognize the validity in law of the rules as published. On January 12, 1986 Iran boarded and searched the President Taylor, a U.S. flagged merchant vessel. The United States acknowledged a belligerent s right to board and search but cautioned about overstepping rights and norms. The next month, amid continued attacks on shipping, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 582, which deplored among other things, the violations of neutral territorial waters, the attacks on neutral shipping and the bombing of purely civilian population centers. In May, after attacks on shipping continued, the United States reaffirmed its commitment to Saudi defense, freedom of navigation, the free flow of oil and open access through the Strait of Hormuz. Iran responded the same day by warning that its naval forces would attack U.S. warships escorting or convoying cargo ships carrying cargo to Iraq or that tried to interfere with Iran s interception procedures and indeed during 1985 and 1986 Iran inspected more than 1,000 vessels. 9
On May 14, 1986, the United States issued a NOTMAR to advise that selfdefense measures would be exercised by U.S. naval forces, but they would be implemented in a manner that did not impede the freedom of navigation of any vessel or State. 1. U.S. Naval Forces operating in international waters within the [Arabian] Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea north of 20 north are taking additional defensive precautions against terrorist threats. All surface and subsurface ships and craft are requested to avoid closing U.S. forces closer than 5 nautical miles without previously identifying themselves. U.S. Forces, especially when operating in confined waters, shall remain mindful of navigational considerations of ships and craft in their immediate vicinity. It is requested that radio contact with U.S. Naval Forces be maintained on [designated frequencies] when approaching within five nautical miles of U.S. Naval Forces. Surface and subsurface ships and craft that close U.S. Naval Forces within five nautical miles without making prior contact and or whose intentions are unclear to such forces may be held at risk by U.S. defense measures. 2. These defensive measures also apply when U.S. forces are engaged in transit passage through [the Strait of] Hormuz or when in innocent passage through foreign territorial waters and when operating in such waters with the approval of the coastal State. During this period, Iraqi air attacks on Iranian oil facilities in the Gulf stepped up considerably, resulting in the destruction of a number of neutral vessels in port. Iraq even attacked an off-shore oil installation of the United Arab Emirates. In November, the U.S. responded by issuing an international NOTAM that closed Iranian airspace to U.S. aircraft and extended U.S. self-defense measures to threats from the air. It stated: 1. U.S. Naval Forces in the [Arabian] Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman, and Arabian Sea north of 20 north are taking additional defensive precautions against terrorist threats. Aircraft at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL which are not cleared for approach/departure to or from a regional airport are requested to avoid approaching closer than 5 nm to U.S. Naval Forces. 2. It is requested that aircraft approaching within 5 nm of U.S. Naval Forces establish and maintain radio contact [on certain frequencies]. Aircraft which approach within 5 nm at altitudes less than 2000 ft AGL whose intentions are unclear to U.S. Naval Forces may be held at risk by U.S. defensive measures. Early in 1987, Iran began testing Chinese manufactured Silkworm anti-ship missiles in the Gulf, causing Kuwait to become increasingly concerned about 10
attacks on its tankers. Kuwait requested Soviet and U.S. protection for its ships and in May the Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Company transferred the flag of 11 tankers from Kuwait to the United States, three to the Soviet Union, and three to the United Kingdom. Iran tried to persuade Kuwait to stop the reflagging process and when this failed, declared that Kuwait had practically turned itself into an Iraqi province and it could not allow Iraq to receive oil income for its war machine through Kuwaiti tankers flying other flags. Iran began laying mines, damaging several Soviet vessels bound for or under charter to Kuwait. On May 17, two Iraqi fighter-launched Exocet missiles hit the frigate USS STARK, presumably unintentionally. There were deaths and injuries among its crew and severe damage to the ship. The United States added three ships to MIDEASTFOR, ordered its forces to a higher state of alert and revised its Rules of Engagement for possible interactions between U.S. and Iraqi forces and anyone else displaying hostile intent or committing hostile acts. In July, the U.S. issued the following as both a NOTAM and a NOTMAR: In response to the recent attack on Stark and the continuing terrorist threat in the region, U.S. naval vessels operating within the [Arabian] Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea north of 20 north, are taking additional defensive precautions. It is requested aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters) approaching U.S. naval forces establish and maintain radio contact with U.S. naval forces on [designated frequencies]. Unidentified aircraft whose intentions are unclear or who are approaching U.S. naval vessels may be requested to identify themselves and state their intentions as soon as they are detected [T]o avoid inadvertent confrontation, aircraft including military aircraft may be requested to remain well clear of U.S. vessels. Failure to respond to requests for identification and intentions or to warnings and operating in a threatening manner could place the aircraft at risk by U.S. defensive measures. Illumination of a U.S. naval vessel with a weapons fire control radar could result in immediate U.S. defensive action. [Note: this last sentence was revised in September to state: Illumination of a U.S. naval vessel with a weapons fire control radar will be viewed with suspicion and could result in immediate U.S. defensive reaction.] In July, the U.S. Navy began convoying reflagged tankers, an effort that would require more than 100 convoy operations before the end of war. Previously, the U.S. had found intermittent convoys an effective deterrent to Iranian action, and Iran even refrained from harassing ships flying other flags when they sailed in the vicinity of U.S. warships. Reflagged tankers carried no contraband to or oil from Iraq. Nonetheless, Iran stepped up its mining operations in the Gulf and on July 24 th, the reflagged Bridgton struck a mine, as did the Texaco Caribbean, under charter to a U.S. company, on August 10th. The Bridgton incident opened a chapter of direct naval confrontation in the Gulf between Iran and the United States. Whether as a result of a deliberate Iranian government policy or independent Iranian Revolutionary Guard fervor remains unknown, but mines 11
began appearing all over the Gulf, in the Strait of Hormuz, in the Gulf of Oman and in Kuwaiti and Omani territorial waters. Iran reportedly completed testing its Silkworm missiles and some merchantmen began carrying chaff canisters. Press reports said Iran s air force had established a suicide plane squadron to attack merchant shipping and Iran began a naval exercise in the Gulf, which it called Exercise Martyrdom, involving firing a shore-to-ship missile and ramming a speedboat loaded with explosives into a dummy naval target. Some Iranian naval maneuvers were in Saudi territorial waters, and besides traditional ship boardings, the Iranians began to use helicopters for visit and search. The Gulf was becoming a much more dangerous place. The U.S. Navy, claiming a right of self-defense, captured the Iranian landing ship Iran Ajr caught laying mines in September. Three Iranian crew members died, two were lost at sea, and the U.S. repatriated an additional 26 crewmen to Iran through the Omani Red Crescent five days later. Iran asserted self-defense could only be claimed in response to an armed attack and that this was an aggression, however the attack effectively halted Iranian mine laying efforts for six months. But by mid-1987, Iranian aircraft, helicopters, small boats and warships had attacked more than 100 ships of 30 nationalities. On October 8, Iranian speedboats fired on U.S. helicopters; in accordance with U.S. self-defense principles and ROE, the helicopters returned fire, sinking one boat and damaging others. Iran claimed the U.S. helicopters fired first and vowed a crushing response. After the attack, U.S. Navy personnel rescued six Iranian Revolutionary Guards boat crew members; two died aboard USS RALEIGH and the remaining survivors were returned to Iran, again through the Omani Red Crescent. Later that month the United States, claiming self-defense, responded to another Iranian Revolutionary Guards Silkworm attack in Kuwaiti territorial waters on a U.S. flag tanker, the Sea Isle City, by destroying the Iranian Rostum offshore oil platform in the southern Gulf. Rostum was an Iranian Revolutionary Guards gunboat communication base and was not directly involved in the Silkworm strike. Those manning it were given time to evacuate before the attack commenced. Iran again claimed the platform attacks were aggression and reiterated that self-defense could only be claimed in response to an armed attack. Another Iranian attack occurred near the same time as the attack on the Sea Isle City against the tanker Sungari. Although owned by U.S. interests, the Sungari was Liberian-flagged at the time of the attack. In executing the strike against Rostum, the U.S. took pains to make clear the attack was in response to the Sea Isle City incident, and not for Iran s attack on Sungari. At this point in the war, the U.S. did not consider non-us registered ships, even if owned by U.S. interests, to have enough connection to merit protection. This view changed as the war deepened, at least where U.S. nationals were among the crew members. After Rostum, there were no more Iranian confrontations with the U.S. for six months, although the situation in the Gulf remained tense as unprotected non-u.s. shipping remained subject to Iranian attacks. Part E: End Game (1988) 12
A January 2, 1988 U.S. NOTMAR reflected the intensity of the situation. It said: 1. U.S. mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution when transiting the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Gulf of Oman, due to hostilities between Iran and Iraq. Mariners are further advised to avoid Iranian or Iraqi ports and coastal waters and to remain outside the area delimited below until further notice. 2. Iran has stated: A. Iranian coastal waters are war zones. B. Transportation of cargo to Iraqi ports is prohibited. C. [Safe channels for merchant shipping were provided]. D. Iran disclaims any responsibility for merchant ships failing to comply with the above instructions. 3. Iraq has stated: A. The area north of 29 30 N is a prohibited war zone. B. It will attack all vessels appearing within a zone believed to be north and east of a line connecting the following points: 29 30 N. 48 30E., 29 25 N. 49 09E., 28 23N. 49 47E., 28 23N. 51 00E. C. All tankers docking at Kharg Island regardless of nationality are targets of the Iraqi air force. 4. Several vessels have suffered damage from moored or floating mines in the Gulf. U.S. mariners should exercise caution in navigable waters throughout the Gulf 5. Mariners should be aware that Iranian naval forces visit, search and in some cases seize or divert to Iranian ports vessels of nonbelligerents In the spring of 1988 clashes involving U.S. naval forces recurred, several with Iran and one with Iraq. On April 14, USS SAMUEL B. ROBERTS, a frigate like STARK, hit a mine in a field Iran laid in shipping lanes in international waters 70 miles east of Bahrain. In response, on April 18, the U.S. navy engaged Iranian warships and neutralized two Iranian oil platforms that conducted or supported attacks on neutral shipping. Occupants of the two platforms were first given the opportunity to evacuate. During the U.S. attack, Iranian military aircraft took off from the nearby Bandar Abbas airport, also used by civil aviation. Although no attack ultimately occurred, these aircraft appeared close to commencing attacks on U.S. aircraft, in coordination with other Iranian aircraft in the area which appeared to be providing vector and targeting data. Iran saw the U.S. military attack (which represented an escalation of U.S. military action) as siding with Iraq, perhaps because Iraq retook al-faw near Basrah the day of the attack. Several Iranian naval units, including two frigates, were destroyed or damaged during that operation. This engagement, dubbed Operation Praying Mantis, was the largest combined surface and air engagement in war-at-sea for the U.S. Navy since World War II. Iran protested the platform attacks as aggression and responded a few days later with speedboat attacks on 13
a UAE oil rig, operated by U.S. interests, and a tanker and freighter that were nearby. While thus engaged, the boats were attacked by U.S. aircraft. In April, after Iranian gunboats attacked a Saudi-owned tanker off Dubai, the United States announced it would begin assisting friendly, innocent neutral vessels flying a non-belligerent flag outside declared war exclusion zones that are not carrying contraband or resisting legitimate visit and search by a Gulf belligerent. Following a request from the vessel under attack, assistance would be rendered by a U.S. warship or aircraft in the vicinity, if its mission permitted. This incremental escalation was partly in response to requests from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and U.S. oil interests operating under foreign flags. On July 2 and 3, Iranian speedboats positioned themselves at the western approach to the Strait of Hormuz to challenge merchant ships, a tactic that had in the past been a prelude to an attack. During the evening of July 2, USS ELMER MONTGOMERY responded to a distress call from a Danish tanker under Iranian speedboat attacks. That same day, two Iranian F-14 s had come within seven miles of USS HALSEY, and other F-14s were known to be at Bandar Abbas. On July 3, MONTGOMERY heard Iranian challenges to merchant shipping over the radios and many speedboats were seen approaching a Pakistani merchantman. USS VINCENNES, a guided missile cruiser with the Aegis system, was sent to the area to investigate the MONTGOMERY s report. VINCENNES helicopter was airborne at the time, and was fired upon by Iranian small boats. VINCENNES opened fire on the small boats in return and two minutes later, observed a flight take off from Bandar Abbas. Seven minutes later, and after repeated radio warnings, VINCENNES fired surface to air missiles that destroyed the flight which turned out to be a civil airliner bound for Dubai. The United States claimed a right of self-defense for the mistaken attack, which at the time the Commanding Officer believed to be a coordinated sea and air attack involving the speedboats and an F-14 from Bandar Abbas. Two weeks later, Iran announced its acceptance of the United Nations Security Council Resolution, which called for a ceasefire and on August 20 the costly war between Iran and Iraq came to an end after more than a million casualties, mostly from the land campaigns. The war at sea was a significant and destructive part of the conflict. There were deaths and injuries among merchant crews as, for the first time since World War II, deliberate and sustained operations were carried out against merchant ships. 14