THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT Theater Security Decision Making Course HARD CHOICES IN THE EAST CHINA SEA by Lt Col Brad Bridges, USAF and Professor Ron Ratcliff May 2014 NOTE: While the caselet background information (indicated by the text box) is based on factual information, the decision making scenario presented is fictional and does not represent the policy or intent of the United States Government. TSDM Leadership 14-3

Introduction The call came in from the Situation Room just as the National Security Advisor (NSA) was sitting down at her desk after a long day of meetings. The Senior Watch Officer informed her that a Chinese unmanned aircraft had been shot down by Japanese Self-Defense Forces in the vicinity of the Diaoyu/Senkakus Islands. 1 Within moments of the incident, the Chinese Minister of National Defense responded in a public statement of outrage at this act of war. Given the long history of tensions over this disputed territory, and the administration s strategic prioritization of Asia, it was clear the President would expect to be notified without delay. Background The islands in dispute, known as Diaoyu in China and Senkaku in Japan, are located in the East China Sea approximately equidistant (~250 miles) from mainland China and Okinawa. While China claims the islands on historical grounds dating back to the Ming Dynasty in 1403, Japan argues that the islands were uninhabited when it annexed them in 1895. Though the United States has not taken a position on the sovereignty of the islands, it has acknowledged Japan s administrative control of the territory and repeatedly affirmed its policy that Article V of the US-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the Senkakus. 2 The East China Sea has long been an area of strategic interest for the United States. Freedom of navigation in the East China Sea is of particular importance not only to the United States, but to the entire international community. Key raw material and oil shipments bound for many countries (including China and Japan) transit the East China Sea, so assuring unrestricted access to this important international shipping lane is vital to the world economy. Furthermore, the natural resource potential of the East China Sea has amplified the increasingly contentious standoffs between China and Japan over the Senkakus. Tensions in the East China Sea had been rising for some time. In November 2013, China drew international criticism when it established an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea (see Figure 1) and announced a requirement that Chinese authorities be notified in advance of international flights entering the zone. While no formal international agreements or laws govern ADIZs, the widely accepted purpose of these zones is to provide a security buffer that requires self-identification and pre-coordination by aircraft intending to enter another nation s airspace. The Chinese ADIZ was inflammatory for two key reasons. First, the ADIZ overlapped the disputed Senkakus as well as a Korean ocean research station on Ieodo reef. Second, China required that all flights, including those not intending to enter Chinese sovereign airspace, provide their flight plans to Chinese authorities prior to entering the ADIZ. China s ADIZ declaration drew immediate denunciations from Japan, South Korea, and the United States. Within days of the announcement, Japanese, Korean and American military aircraft (including two US B-52s) flew unannounced through the newly declared ADIZ, 1 For the sake of brevity, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands will be referred to as the Senkakus throughout the caselet. 2 According to Article V, Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. LEADERSHIP 13-2 1

disregarding Beijing s requirement of advance notice and approval. Additionally, the government of South Korea redrew its ADIZ boundaries to include the airspace above Ieodo reef. Furthermore, the Japanese and Korean governments specifically instructed their national airlines to ignore Chinese ADIZ reporting procedures. In contrast, US officials advised commercial carriers to continue the existing practice of observing international Notices to Airmen when flying through international airspace. While this was not a specific statement of US policy for commercial carriers operating in the Chinese ADIZ, the inference was that, in the interest of safety, they should comply with Chinese requests for advance notice and communication. Figure 1: East China Sea ADIZ Scenario Following its ADIZ declaration, China began a gradual increase in its airborne patrols and intercepts of aircraft operating in the area. Despite the intercepts, China continued to permit civil and military aircraft to transit the area without interference. Nevertheless, Japanese and Korean senior officials publicly voiced deep concern over China s provocative actions. Just days before the shoot-down, China commenced daily drone flights to within as close as 15 miles of the Senkakus, which met with immediate protests from the Japanese government. Despite urging from the international community for both China and Japan to exercise restraint, Japan issued warnings that it would defend its territory with force if necessary. Acting on these warnings, a surface-to-air missile fired from a Japanese Aegis destroyer downed the first Chinese drone to overfly the Senkakus. The drone shoot-down was a significant escalation in an already combustible situation, and the potential for broader conflict was higher than ever. LEADERSHIP 13-2 2

The President s response to the NSA s call explaining the situation was characteristically evenkeeled. He listened calmly to the NSA s recommendations before providing guidance. The NSA recommended that the Secretary of State (SECSTATE) and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) issue public statements for immediate release to the press. Furthermore, she indicated that the National Security Staff (NSS) would immediately work to formulate a range of US response options. She also recommended that the SECDEF and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) be directed to develop military courses of action for immediate review. The overall objective, she stated, should be to prevent broader conflict in the region. Any US response, military or otherwise, should be aimed at deterring China from escalating military conflict with Japan in response to the drone shoot-down, as well as reassuring Japan of US support. The President agreed with the NSA s recommendations, and added that an official US diplomatic response should be made public in order to send a clear message of US commitment to maintaining stability in Asia, and to establish diplomacy as the preferred mode of resolving differences. He added that the public response must be swift, as any significant delay could result in Chinese action that could quickly spiral into armed conflict. Additionally, he said that the response must be scalable according to Chinese reactions. While he wanted to avoid escalation, the President was pragmatic in his desire to preserve the option of gradually increasing pressure on China if the initial US actions failed to deter a Chinese military response. With this guidance, the NSA began interagency coordination with key members of the NSS. She asked her special advisor to schedule and coordinate a Principals Committee meeting on very short notice for the afternoon of the following day. Meanwhile, recognizing the urgency of the situation, the NSA decided to invite the SECDEF and SECSTATE to attend the Deputy Director of National Intelligence s presentation of the President s Daily Brief (PDB) the next morning and immediately thereafter to discuss immediate response options with the President. With the SECSTATE having just departed on a five-day trip to Europe, the Deputy Secretary would attend the PDB in his absence. Within hours of her initial notification of the shoot-down, the NSA approved press releases from both State and Defense. The SECSTATE s affirmed the US steadfast commitment to its treaty Allies in the region, expressed deep concern over escalating tensions, and urged restraint by all parties so the situation could be settled diplomatically. The SECDEF issued a similar statement, adding that the US military stood ready to support its Allies in the region. That evening, NSS directors from the Asia and Defense Directorates reviewed the situation and considered available short-term response options, presenting them in the required Discussion Paper for the next day s Principals Committee meeting. Initial discussions of a possible military response met with resistance from the State Department, which favored restraint and recommended immediately sending a senior delegation to the region to open diplomatic talks to defuse the situation. From State s perspective, an immediate and strong diplomatic response would demonstrate US commitment to regional stability while avoiding unnecessary escalation. LEADERSHIP 13-2 3

Meanwhile, the SECDEF called an emergency meeting in the Tank to discuss initial options with the CJCS and US Pacific Command (PACOM) Commander. The Chinese had not yet taken any overt steps to respond militarily, but the strong rhetoric coming from the Minister of National Defense raised significant concerns that they might do so. The SECDEF relayed the President s guidance, adding that any military response must be persistent and sustainable, and robust enough to enable a credible defensive posture if challenged. The SECDEF directed the PACOM Commander to explore the details for possible air and naval responses, and to provide an update early the next morning in preparation for his meeting with the President. Over the course of that evening, PACOM planners formulated and refined three courses of action. First, F-15s stationed at Kadena Air Base in Okinawa could be launched to patrol the Japanese ADIZ in the vicinity of the Senkakus starting almost immediately. Second, F-22s from Hickam or B-52s from Guam could forward deploy to Kadena, but that would likely take up to a week to coordinate and execute. Finally, Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) could task a naval force to arrive in the East China Sea within 3-7 days. The consensus among the planners favored a naval response due to its persistence, inherently flexible capabilities, and scalability to meet national objectives. The PACOM Commander received the options brief early the following morning. He concurred with his staff s assessment and, as he departed for the White House, directed them to prepare a more detailed assessment of available naval options. The President s Daily Brief began with an intelligence update that indicated increased Chinese air and naval patrols in the East China Sea as well as increased activity by Japanese Self- Defense Forces. Rhetoric in the Chinese state-run media was becoming increasingly bellicose, with widespread calls for Chinese retaliation. Official statements from the Ministry of National Defense condemned Japanese aggression and vowed to defend Chinese territory. As yet, there were no indications of an impending Chinese attack, but Japanese and Chinese forces were operating in close proximity, so the potential for miscalculation was high. Additionally, US Embassy Beijing was reporting anti-japanese protests in China s major cities. In Shanghai, groups of Chinese had begun targeting Japanese businesses and factories, and an angry mob had threatened to attack a Japanese primary school that was in session with 175 Japanese-national children in attendance. Chinese police were able to de-escalate the situation without injuries, but officials announced the school would be closed until further notice. Furthermore, US Embassy Tokyo reported two back channel requests from Japan s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to assist in repatriating Japanese nationals from China. The intelligence briefing concluded with a cautionary assessment: a toxic mix of Chinese nationalism, anti- Japan animus, and long-simmering social frustration within the Chinese population could constrain China's ability to respond to the drone shoot-down in a reasonable and proportional way. Following the intelligence brief, the NSA provided an update on the status of NSS actions. An Interagency Policy Committee was working to coordinate integrated national policy recommendations. It would likely be at least 7 days before medium and long-term policy options would be vetted through the Deputies and Principals Committees and made ready for National Security Council discussion and decision should the situation escalate. In the meantime, however, the SECSTATE and SECDEF were prepared with their initial LEADERSHIP 13-2 4

recommendations for the President and the NSA would hold a short-notice Principals Committee meeting to refine shorter-term policy options. The Deputy SECSTATE presented his boss s case for an immediate and strong diplomatic response. Given the tensions, he feared any overt flexing of US military muscle might aggravate the situation. He indicated the SECSTATE had already sent cables to the US ambassadors in Tokyo and Beijing directing them to urge both governments to exercise restraint. The SECSTATE had also personally contacted his counterparts with a similar message, and was laying the groundwork to conduct shuttle diplomacy between the capitals if the situation worsened. Additionally, the Deputy SECSTATE indicated that any diplomatic effort would ultimately need to address the root issue of sovereignty of the islands. He further added that a broader solution would be to encourage mediation under the auspices of the United Nations or perhaps even during the upcoming East Asia Summit. However, in the short-term, avoiding conflict was of paramount importance, and State s position was that diplomacy could best achieve this end. The SECDEF, on the other hand, recommended a stronger demonstration of resolve by deploying US military forces to the region. In his view, the trend of increasingly assertive Chinese military operations in the region required a strong US response to deter further escalation. He briefly provided an overview of the Air Force options before recommending the deployment of a naval force. He emphasized that the naval force would provide a highly credible deterrent, but could more easily calibrate its actions and thus avoid conducting operations that might be construed as offensive by the Chinese. The President thanked both men for their thoughtful recommendations, asked them to continue their planning, and told them to expect his decision soon. Remaining behind for a follow-up discussion alone with the President, the NSA supported the SECDEF s recommendation. In her view, the President needed to demonstrate US resolve unequivocally and immediately. A concerted diplomatic effort would certainly be part of a longer term solution, but defusing the immediate situation would require a strong but highly controlled military response. After a lengthy discussion, the President agreed that a military response was appropriate, but that care must be taken to strike the right balance between deterrence and provocation. Any mistakes in execution could have unintended consequences, so the operation would need to be planned and implemented with great care. With that, the President directed the NSA to have the SECDEF prepare a more detailed recommendation for a naval course of action. The SECDEF was already reviewing the PACOM commander s proposed naval response options when the NSA called to arrange an evening update for the President. PACFLT reported that options included deploying a Carrier Strike Group (CSG), an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), or a single Navy cruiser to the East China Sea to conduct routine training and flight operations. Each of the three naval assets could be en route within 24 hours and operating on station in less than 7 days. LEADERSHIP 13-2 5

In discussions with PACFLT and the Joint Staff, PACOM quickly identified issues with competing demands for scarce carrier resources. Recent long-range missile tests from a launch facility on the west coast of North Korea had prompted the deployment of the Japan-based GEORGE WASHINGTON Strike Group (GWSG) to the Yellow Sea to monitor events and deter North Korean aggression. Additionally, ongoing unrest in the Middle East demanded persistent carrier presence in CENTCOM s area of responsibility. Furthermore, deep defense budget cuts had resulted in numerous cancellations and delays for badly needed carrier maintenance. Adding another open-ended carrier deployment for an already strained force was going to require some tradeoffs. Despite these concerns, the PACFLT Commander s (COMPACFLT) recommendation to PACOM was to deploy a carrier strike group. Given the uncertainty of the situation and presence of China s newly mission-capable carrier LIAONING, anything less might not produce the required level of deterrence. COMPACFLT s recommendation made its way up the chain to the SECDEF, who agreed with the logic of PACOM s assessment. That evening, 24 hours after the Chinese drone had been shot down, the SECDEF received approval from the President for the immediate deployment of a carrier strike group to the region. Upon direction from SECDEF, PACOM directed COMPACFLT to identify and task a carrier strike group for immediate deployment to the East China Sea. Options included: 1. Re-task the GWSG currently conducting operations in the Yellow Sea within 36 hours transit of the East China Sea. 2. Request that the ABRAHAM LINCOLN CSG, currently transiting the South China Sea en route to CENTCOM, be diverted to the East China Sea to conduct operations. 3. Request approval to deploy the BONHOMME RICHARD ARG with its recently embarked F-35s as a substitution until another carrier strike group became available for tasking. As COMPACFLT reviewed the available options, the 7 th Fleet Commander (C7F) expressed concern over cutting short the GWSG s mission in the Yellow Sea when other options might be available. The move would most certainly discomfit the South Koreans, who were now being pinched by volatile situations on both their northern and southern flanks. On the other hand, requesting the LINCOLN was sure to create a food fight between PACOM and CENTCOM. With its deployment already extended 3 months, the JOHN C. STENNIS CSG Commander on station in CENTCOM would not bow easily to yet another delay in the arrival of his strike group s much anticipated relief. The third option, to deploy the BONHOMME RICHARD ARG, had several strong advocates on the 7 th Fleet staff. In addition to relieving some of the stress on the carrier fleet, they contended that deploying an ARG with the capability of deploying Marines ashore would be a strong deterrent against any Chinese actions to occupy the Senkakus by force. However, many inside the beltway viewed this option as highly inflammatory, and any implication that US ground forces might be involved in a US response was politically unpalatable. After weighing the options, COMPACFLT directed C7F to re-direct the GWSG to the East China Sea. Rhetoric from North Korea had cooled and Yellow Sea operations were winding down, so the risks of curtailing that high-visibility mission had become acceptable. Moreover, LEADERSHIP 13-2 6

time was of the essence and tasking the GWSG could be done immediately and would avoid a debate over mission priorities across combatant commands. The GWSG Commander had been closely following events in the East China Sea, and had already responded to several PACFLT inquiries about the strike group s ability to transition operations to the south rapidly. Accordingly, he was not surprised when he received the call from C7F with orders to proceed immediately to the East China Sea. Though he had halfexpected the orders, he was concerned nonetheless. His air wing, ships, and personnel were already stretched to their limits. With their current Yellow Sea tasking coming just as they were returning to homeport from their annual patrol of the region, he knew yet another sliding return date would be a significant disappointment for sailors eager to be reunited with their families and vice-versa. Furthermore, GEORGE WASHINGTON s flight deck non-skid surface was long overdue for repair, and safety of aircraft operations was becoming an issue. When he voiced his concerns to C7F, his commander assured him that all other options had been explored before calling the GWSG into action. The condition of the flight deck would need to be closely monitored, but for now it was an acceptable risk. Recognizing the magnitude and urgency of the mission facing him, the GWSG Commander hung up the phone and quickly turned his attention to preparing for his strike group s new tasking. The high potential for mishap or miscalculation between US and Chinese forces required him to review the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and communicate a clear operational plan for his forces. Given the visibility and potentially disastrous consequences if they failed to stabilize the situation in the region, he was certain these ROE would require close coordination with the Joint Staff and National Command Authority. With no time to lose, he gathered his warfare commanders together for a quick huddle to review the situation and their new mission. Within hours, GEORGE WASHINGTON was heading south as its leadership team gathered to discuss the details of the upcoming operation. The most pressing decision was where to position the strike group to best achieve national objectives. Sensitive to the potential of further provoking the Chinese by appearing overly aggressive, the strike group set course toward a position between Okinawa and the Senkakus. From this position the GWSG could demonstrate US resolve to defend its Japanese ally without approaching close enough to mainland China to risk inciting an unintended military reaction by the Chinese. As the leadership team turned its attention to the details of the upcoming operation, the Public Affairs Officer (PAO) asked the admiral for guidance on releasing information to the media. Erring on the side of caution, the admiral directed his PAO to coordinate all media inquiries with PACFLT, PACOM, and OSD to ensure any information being released was in step with the administration s strategic narrative. After briefing C7F of his intended destination and public affairs stance, the GWSG continued toward the East China Sea. Meanwhile, rising Chinese rhetoric was accompanied by frequent ADIZ intercepts as well as the dispatch of the aircraft carrier LIAONING to the East China Sea. The GWSG Commander consulted with his leadership team at his daily morning brief to review options for upcoming operations. The options considered included: 1. Conduct robust daily F/A-18 air defense patrols as well as armed F/A-18 reconnaissance flights over the Senkakus. LEADERSHIP 13-2 7

2. Conduct live fire training exercises within the East China Sea, but well away from the Chinese mainland and Senkakus. 3. Conduct routine E-2C reconnaissance flights within the Chinese ADIZ as well as limited F/A-18 air defense patrols. In reviewing the options with his staff and commanders, the GWSG Commander made it clear the intent of the operation was to reassure Japan and deter China without unnecessarily provoking a hostile Chinese response. Any option that might be construed as offensive in nature could be risky and ultimately counterproductive. Conducting fighter operations over the Senkakus or live fire exercises could very easily incite a Chinese overreaction. Moreover, the admiral added, the Chinese would be well aware of the capabilities the GWSG brought to the region without having to witness an overly heavy-handed display. Its mere presence would send a powerful deterrent signal. The E-2C reconnaissance flights provided a means to gather useful intelligence and challenge the Chinese ADIZ in a non-aggressive way, while limited F/A-18 patrols afforded the strike group a prudent defensive posture. Starting slowly would enable flight crews to gauge Chinese reactions and scale the US response appropriately. Having decided to conduct the E-2C reconnaissance flights and limited F/A-18 patrols, the GWSG Commander passed his intentions up the chain of command and received the green light to begin operations as soon as the Supplemental Rules of Engagement (ROE) were finalized. The ROE would define exactly where his aircraft could fly, and more importantly, where they could not. Furthermore, they would provide clear guidance on how and when forces should react to any engagement with the Chinese. A flurry of coordination with PACFLT, PACOM, and the Joint Staff resulted in a detailed Supplemental ROE which included several key elements, including restrictions on flights to a specified minimum distance from the Senkakus and mainland China as well as specific guidance on responding to Chinese aircraft intercepts. The intent of each of these ROEs was to minimize the potential of armed confrontation with Chinese forces. The National Command Authority was emphatic that the GWSG s primary objective was to deter China and de-escalate the situation. Carrier Air Wing planners had carefully combed through the Supplemental ROE and adjusted flight routes to ensure compliance. Just 36 hours after turning south from the Yellow Sea, the GWSG entered the East China Sea and prepared to begin flight operations. With his staff, the Carrier Air Wing Commander, commonly referred to as the CAG, systematically went over the plan for operations and key elements of the ROE. He emphasized the importance of avoiding confrontation with Chinese aircraft and urged his crews to be professional. Confident his team was ready, the CAG visited the ready rooms before the first launches. Spotting the LCDR who would be leading the first F/A-18 patrol, the CAG asked him if he was ready to go. Without hesitation, the young aviator replied tersely, Always sir. After a brief pause, the LCDR asked, Sir, this new mission is getting a lot of attention throughout the ship. Aren t these just uninhabited islands? Can you explain why we re doing this? The CAG smiled calmly as he began to describe why they were there LEADERSHIP 13-2 8