Process and impact of market liberalisation: Worldwide trends Dr Tim Kelly, ITU Tuesday Session 1 CTO Senior management seminar: Telecoms restructuring and business change Malta, 17-21 May, 1999 The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the ITU or its membership. Dr Kelly can be contacted at Tim.Kelly@itu.int. Agenda Market liberalisation: Trends Why? Where? When? How fast? WTO market liberalisation process Alternatives to competition/privatisation Build/Transfer arrangements Impact on tariff rebalancing Universal service concerns Does competition bring the expected benefits? 1
Degree of competition in basic services, 1998, by region 100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Africa Americas Arab States Source: ITU Telecommunication Regulatory Database. Asia- Pacific Monopoly Competition Europe Status of competition by market segment, worldwide, 1998 Local Long distance International Monopoly 47% Monopoly 56% Monopoly 54% Competition 53% Competition 44% Competition 46% Source: ITU Telecommunication Regulatory Database. 2
Degree of competition in mobile services, by region, 1998 Competition 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Africa Americas Arab States Asia-Pacific Europe Source: ITU Telecommunication Regulatory Database. Monopoly Why introduce competition into the Sector? To introduce fresh investment and/or foreign investment into the Sector Existing network may be ageing or poorly maintained Existing operator may be debt-ridden or financially constrained To introduce innovation, price competition and new management techniques To create new business opportunities for local entrepreneurs and other suppliers To create more choice for consumers To improve level of teledensity and pace of network roll-out 3
Competitive markets tend to grow faster than monopolistic ones Cellular subscribers per 100 inhabitants, developing countries 1.00 0.80 0.60 Competitive markets Source: ITU World Telecom Development Report 1998: Universal Access 0.40 0.20-1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Noncompetitive markets Growth in international traffic per line, in emerging markets (1990=100) 200 175 Competitive markets 150 125 100 Non-competitive markets 75 50 25 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Source: ITU World Telecommunication Development Report, 1996/97. 4
Different approaches to market liberalisation Introduce competition first in mobile and value-added, and only later in basic services e.g., South Africa has had mobile competition since 1994 (Vodacom and MTN) but Telkom SA has an exclusivity until 2003/4 over basic service. Introduce a duopoly for a period followed by more open competition e.g., UK introduced duopoly (BT/Mercury) in 1982 but went for full competition in domestic services in 1991 and in international service in 1996. Go for big bang approach to market liberalisation e.g., SwissCom had full monopoly in Switzerland until 1998; now open competition. From duopoly to competition... Mobile cellular subscribers in the UK In thousands 8'000 6'000 4'000 Licensing of two additional digital service providers Source: ITU World Telecom Developm ent Report 1998: Universal Access 2'000 0 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 5
Trade in telecoms: : The WTO process Dual role of telecommunications As a facilitator of trade in other sectors (GATS) As a directly traded product and service (BTA) How can telecom services be traded? Modes of delivery Cross-border (e.g., international calls) Commercial presence (e.g., Foreign Direct Investment) Consumption abroad (e.g., calling cards) Movement of staff (e.g., consultancy services) Total value of telecoms trade around US$120 bn in 1998 (principally equipment) WTO timetable 1986-1993: Uruguay Round 15 April 1994: Marrakech Treaty (GATS) 1994-1997: Group on Basic Telecommunications (GBT) April 30 1996: Standstill Feb 15 1997: Basic Telecommunications Agreement (BTA) April 1997: Information Technology Agreement (ITA) 5 February 1998: Implementation of BTA November 1999: New round launched in Seattle? 6
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) principles Most-favoured nation (MFN), Article II Transparency, Article III Domestic regulation, Article VI: qualification requirements and procedures technical standards licensing requirements Monopolies and exclusive service supply (Article VIII) Market access (Article XVI) National Treatment (Article XVII) Countries permitting competition in basic telecoms: 1990 1995 1998 Japan United Kingdom United States Australia Canada Chile Finland Japan Korea (Rep.) New Zealand Philippines Sweden United Kingdom United States Australia Austria Belgium Canada Chile China Denmark El Salvador Finland France Germany Ghana Hongkong SAR Israel Italy Ireland (Dec 98) Japan Korea (Rep.) Mexico New Zealand Netherlands Norway Philippines Russia Spain (Dec 98) Sweden Switzerland Uganda UK USA plus others... 7
Percentage of outgoing international traffic open to competition 35% 46% 74% 85% 4 14 29 48 1990 1995 1998 2005 Monopoly Competition Number of countries permitting more than one operator for international telephony Note: Analysis is based on WTO Basic Telecommunications Commitments and thus presents a minimum level of traffic likely to be open to competitive service provision. Source: ITU, WTO. Level of competition in international services in WTO basic telecoms agreement Monopoly Competition Source: ITU Telecommunication Regulatory Database. 8
African countries making GATS commitments to liberalisation Côte d Ivoire Full competition by 2005 Ghana Duopoly for five years, then review Mauritius Competition by 2004 Senegal Competition some time between 2003-2006 South Africa Competition by 2003 Uganda Duopoly, 1998-2003; thereafter review Alternatives to introduction of competition Liberalisation of sectors other than basic telecoms mobile communications public payphones Internet Service Providers Award of franchises for different regions comparative or peer competition, but not in same geographic area (e.g., Indonesia) Award of build/transfer arrangements Build Operate Transfer (BOT), Build Transfer Operate (BTO), Build Own Operate Transfer (BOOT) etc (e.g., Thailand) 9
Country Examples of strategic foreign investors in mobile, SADC Mobile Operator Foreign investor Stake Botswana Vista France Telecom 51% Botswana Mascom Portugal Telecom / 49% EcoNet (Zimbabwe) Lesotho VCL Vodacom (RSA) 51% Malawi TNM Telekom Malaysia 60% Mauritius Emtel Millicom 50% (Luxembourg) Mozambique TMM Deutsche Telekom 26% Namibia MTC Telia (Sweden) 26% South Africa Vodacom Vodafone (UK) 32% Swaziland Swazi MTN MTN (South Africa) 31% Tanzania MIC Millicom 57% Tanzania TriTel TRI (Malaysia) 60% Zambia Telecel Telecel (USA) 70% Zimbabwe Telecel Telecel (USA) 40% Private sector participation through Build/Transfer 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 - Pre- Build / Transfer Teledensity Post- Build / Transfer Contractors TOT 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 Thailand Two build/transfer agreements were signed between TOT (Incumbent) and: Telecom Asia (92) for 2.6 million lines TT&T (93) for 1.5 million lines to be completed by end-1996 Source: ITU World Telecommunication Development Report 1998: Universal Access 10
Regional franchises (KSOs( KSOs): Indonesia Impact of competition on tariff reform Historically, tariff structures have used crosssubsidy to fund low-priced connection, line rental and local call services from high-priced long-distance and international calls Competitors will target those market segments where potential returns are greatest Technology is tending to reduce the distance and duration element of tariff structures Competition will hasten trends towards costoriented tariffs Interconnection becomes critical to market evolution Should regulator mandate terms for interconnection or leave it to the market? 11
12 Tariff rebalancing trends, in US$ Average of 39 major economies 10 8 6 4 300 minutes, local calls 2 3 mins Int'l call to US Monthly line rental 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Source: ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database. Monthly residential subscription, in US$: Selected countries plus World average Thailand $3.19 Russia $3.43 Turkey $4.12 Venezuela India Malaysia Indonesia Philippines Hongkong Brazil $4.16 $5.15 $7.11 $7.22 $8.53 $8.91 $8.94 Source: ITU World Telecommunication Indicators Database. Average Mexico S. Africa Argentina $9.39 $9.75 $12.05 $12.83 12
Monthly residential subscription charges, US$ $10 $8 $6 Hungary Uruguay Malaysia Higher monthly subscription charges... $4 Morocco $2 $- 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 lead to faster growth rates Source: ITU World Telecommunication Development Report, 1998: Universal Access. Percentage of households with telephone 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Malaysia Hungary Uruguay Morocco Long distance market share % share of long distance calls 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0% NCCs (Japan) Clear (NZ) Optus (Aust.) 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 Long distance prices come down... Long distance prices Index, 1993=100 100 As competitors gain market share... 95 90 85 80 Japan New Zealand Australia 75 1993 1994 1995 1996 Source: ITU Asia-Pacific Telecommunication Indicators, 1997. 13
Universal service: Fears and responses Competitors will only invest in most profitable areas ( cherrypicking ) and will avoid rural areas Use license obligations to ensure that a prescribed minimum of investment reaches target Competitors will put incumbent operator out of business Incumbents have generally done better once competition is introduced Competition will mean super-serving existing users not reaching new users Teledensity grows faster under competition Competition means foreign ownership Liberalisation can create local entrepreneurs (e.g., EcoNet in Zimbabwe, private telecentres in Senegal) Teledensity in Philippines (competitive) and Pakistan (monopoly) 3 2.5 2 1.5 1 0.5 Philippines Introduction of competition in Philippines Pakistan 0 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 14
The benefits of liberalising the market for privately-operated payphones Payphones can be used to extend access to under-served regions Privately-operated payphones can form basis for teleshops, telecentres In Senegal, operators of private telecentres receive discount on price of calls Telecentres in Senegal employ more people than SONATEL 9% 8% 7% 6% 5% 4% 3% 2% 1% 0% Payphones in Senegal As % of main lines Per 1'000 inhabitants 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Source: ITU World Telecom Indicators Database. Positive impact of competition on Telstra (Australia) Revenue (US$bn) 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 Revenue Profit 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 Profits (US$ bn) - 1990 1992 1994 1996-15
Conclusions: Getting the recipe right Identify objectives of introducing competition What are the measures of success? What are the concerns of incumbent, unions, consumers? Define a long-term market strategy Sequencing of competition in different market sectors Timing of competition vis-a-vis privatisation Establish licensing procedure and regulator Address interconnection issues Interconnection will make or break competition Set out strategy for achieving Universal Access / Universal Service 16