Establishing Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme D. Jinchuk Office of Nuclear Security Department of Nuclear Safety and Security International Atomic Energy Agency
Outline Nuclear Security General Overview Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme Conclusion 11/16/2011 2
Outline Nuclear Security General Overview Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme Nuclear Security Plan 2010 2013 Nuclear Security Guidance Conclusion 11/16/2011 3
Safety is not Security Regulatory infrastructure Emergency response plans Radioactive waste and spent fuel Management Safety engineering and design Nuclear Safety Programme Nuclear Security Programme
Nuclear Security Prevention Detection Response to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances or their associated facilities. 11/16/2011 5
Nuclear Security Spectrum Responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with each State Deter- Protect- Dissuade Secure Assess Threat Detect Assess Alarm/Alert Manage Crime Scene Analyze Evidence Neutralize Attack or Recover item Prosecute Prevention Detection Response
After 9/11/2001 range of Credible Threats has broadened dramatically 11/16/2011 7
new Global Scenario The threat scenarios are not new, but the probability of occurrence has increased 11/16/2011 8
Potential Nuclear Security Threats Nuclear explosive device Theft of nuclear weapon Theft of material to make a nuclear explosive device Radiological dispersal device RDD Theft of radioactive material/source Use of radioactive material out of regulatory control Sabotage of a facility or transport to cause dispersal of radioactivity 11/16/2011 9
External & Internal Threats External threat Terrorists Protestors Demonstrators Activists Extremists Criminals Internal threat Insider is anyone with authorized, unescorted access who could: act alone or in collusion with external threat May be passive or active May be violent or nonviolent NPPs special care of subcontractors during outages 10
What are the materials? Nuclear materials (uranium, plutonium and thorium in different forms) Radioactive sources Radioactively contaminated materials 11
Two Ways Sabotage may lead to undesired consequences Directly Adversary applies energy directly to nuclear/radioactive material to cause dispersal Adversary must gain access to where material is located Example: explosive or incendiary device used to disperse material Indirectly Adversary uses energy present in material or system to cause dispersal Requires initiating process upset and disabling mitigation systems Example: disabling primary cooling system and backup cooling capability allowing material to overheat (LOCA) 12
Examples of Undesired consequences Loss of Life/Severe Injury Nuclear detonation Radiation exposure Radioactive material inhalation/ingestion Environmental Damage / Relocation Radioactive contamination Political Upheaval Loss of public confidence Economic Loss Costs from damage to persons, property, infrastructure and/or environment 13
Attacks on nuclear facilities: some examples from open sources 1966-1977: Europe--10 terrorist incidents against European nuclear installations 1974-1986: USA--32 acts of intentional damage or suspected sabotage at NF 1978: Spain--Bomb exploded in steam generator of Lemoniz NPS 1982: France--Five rockets fired into Creys-Malville NF (Super Phenix, RR) 1982: South Africa-- Several bombings at the Koeberg NPP during construction. 1983: West Germany--Four West Germans gain forced entry to a Pershing missile site 1987: California--Bomb exploded in parking lot of Sandia National Laboratories 1992 Russia, reportedly 3 threats against NPPs 2002 and 2007 US: Al Qaeda member claims that attacks on NPP s were considered at time of 9/11 planning 2004: Australia--Alleged plot to attack Lucas Heights research reactor 2005: Lashkar-e-Toiba operatives reveal that Kaiga NPP in India was a target 2007: South Africa--Break-in at Pelindaba research reactor site. Gunmen stormed the facility's emergency response control room and shot and seriously wounded on duty manager. 14
The International Response Solid platform of international legal instruments, binding and non-binding Safeguards agreements, additional protocols Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and Amendment Nuclear Terrorism Convention and other counter terrorism conventions UNSC Resolutions, in particular, 1373 and 1540 Safety related conventions including CNS, Joint Convention & Conventions on Notification and Assistance Codes of Conduct (non-binding) All instruments support taking leading role for implementation through its programmes : Development of internationally accepted guidance Development of common principles Delivery of strategies and assistance 11/16/2011 15
Nuclear Power Programme NUCLEAR SECURITY INFRASTRUCTURE 11/16/2011 16
General o Responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely with each State o A State intending to embark on a nuclear power programme should actively consider the establishment or improvement of its nuclear security infrastructure. o A State s nuclear power programme must be based on nuclear security infrastructure that ensures protection of people, society and the environment from any adverse consequence that may arise from a nuclear security event. 11/16/2011 17
National Nuclear Security Infrastructure POLICY LEGISLATION ORGANIZATION National Policy and Strategy for Nuclear Security National Legislation and Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Security National Coordination Mechanism for Nuclear Security Competent Authorities for Nuclear Security Operational Aspects for National Nuclear Security Nuclear Security Systems and Measures Prevention First Line of Defence Detection Second Line of Defence Response 18
Nuclear Security Coordination within a State Governmental Policy Authorities Judiciary Military Forces Medical and Emergency Services Customs Coordinating Mechanism Civil Defence Intelligence Services Regulatory Bodies Legislative Authorities Border Protection Police 11/16/2011 19
Threat Assessment o National Threat Assessment o Design Basis Threat (DBT) or alternate threat based approach for facilities. o Nuclear security measures to be designed and implemented based on the assessed threat. 11/16/2011 20
Infrastructure development programme 21
Evaluation of the Status of Development of PP Regime Self-evaluation Recommended first step Performed by State personnel involved in the State nuclear power program development Consider augmenting evaluation team with consultants not directly involved in the program Evaluation team should have a level of independence to allow objective findings Independent review Missions: INIR, INSServ, IPPAS 22
Evaluation Steps 1. Identify terms of reference for evaluation of the NS infrastructure, organizations and individuals involved 2. Evaluate the status of development for each element of PP regime 3. Identify areas needing further attention 4. Prepare action plan to address these areas 23
Basis for PP Regime Evaluation Elements (Issues) of a State PP Regime (NSS-13) State Responsibility International Transport Assignment of PP Responsibilities Legislative and Regulatory Framework International Cooperation and Assistance Identification and Assessment of Threats Risk Based PP System and Measures Sustaining the PP Regime Planning and Preparedness for and Response to Nuclear Security Events 24
PP regime: Issues and Milestones Issues Milestone 1 Milestone 2 Milestone 3 State Responsibility International Transport Assignment of Physical Protection Responsibilities Legislative and Regulatory Framework International Cooperation and Assistance Identification and Assessment of Threat Conditions Conditions Conditions Risk Based Physical Protection System and Measures Sustaining the Physical Protection Regime Planning and Preparednessfor Response to Nuclear Security Events 25
Status Evaluation There should be evidence that each issue has been addressed or a plan for how it will be addressed Evidence includes: reports, presentations, organization descriptions, etc. Plans include: Objectives of the work Detailed activities Organization (person) responsible for the activity Funding and resources required How resources will be provided Timescale for completion 26
PP regime: Issues and Milestones State Responsibility Milestone 1 Conditions State is considering becoming a party to international legal instruments Interagency committee on nuclear security established Awareness of international guidelines on nuclear security Milestone 2 Conditions State has become a party to international legal instruments Clear national policy and strategy for establishing physical protection regime in place 27
PP regime: Issues and Milestones International Transport Milestone 1 Conditions State is considering becoming a party to the CPPNM Plan to develop physical protection requirements for transport of nuclear material Milestone 2 Conditions State has become a party to CPPNM Regulations for physical protection during transport established 28
PP regime: Issues and Milestones Assignment of PP Responsibilities Milestone 1 Conditions Plan to implement a division/office responsible for management of security and physical protection arrangements Milestone 2 Conditions Clearly defined and assigned physical protection responsibilities within all levels of involved governmental entities, operators, and transport organizations Arrangements and draft of agreements for local and national law enforcement assistance 29
PP regime: Issues and Milestones Legislative and Regulatory Framework Milestone 1 Conditions Plan to develop national legislation for regulation of physical protection arrangements Plan to develop physical protection regulations Plan for production of regulatory documents Milestone 2 Conditions Essential elements of legal framework enacted Independent regulatory body established Regulations for licensing and inspection issued Physical protection requirements to be specified in bidding process defined 30
PP regime: Issues and Milestones International Cooperation and Assistance Milestone 1 Conditions Indication of current international obligations for cooperation and assistance Milestone 2 Conditions Identification of points of contact for cooperation and assistance Commitment to provide information on nuclear security incidents to other concerned States, the and other relevant international organizations 31
PP regime: Issues and Milestones Identification and Assessment of Threats Milestone 1 Conditions Identification of the organization that will manage development of DBT Plan to collect information on illegal, malicious, criminal and other acts External and other threats have been considered for the selected nuclear power plant sites Milestone 2 Conditions DBT defined and transmitted to the regulatory body and the operator organization Regulations require the use of DBT as a basis for design of the physical protection system for nuclear power plants 32
PP regime: Issues and Milestones Risk Based PP System and Measures Milestone 1 Conditions Milestone 2 Conditions Government awareness of the risk of malicious acts Plan to hire/contract with experts to assist with vulnerability analysis and risk assessment Nuclear material categories and related PP measures established Process for design of PP measures against sabotage established Demonstrated knowledge of best practices for PP design 33
PP regime: Issues and Milestones Sustaining the PP Regime Milestone 1 Conditions Identification of competencies required and approximate number of experts needed National and other State institutions available for training in nuclear security Strategy for attracting, training, and retaining competent personnel Programme to develop strong security culture Milestone 2 Conditions Adequately staffed regulatory body and operating organization Training programs in place Construction security requirements defined Personnel screening programs in place Security culture evident Procedures for protection of sensitive information developed 34
PP regime: Issues and Milestones Planning and Preparedness for Response to NS Incidents Milestone 1 Conditions Entities responsible for response to nuclear security incidents identified Commitment to develop a contingency plan for response to nuclear security incidents Milestone 2 Conditions Roles and responsibilities for all relevant entities defined Contingency plan developed and approved Requirements in place for exercises to test contingency plan 35
Status Evaluation Results For each physical protection issue: 1.Identify the evidence provided 2.Summarize evaluation of current status Significant actions needed Minor actions needed No actions needed 36
Action Plan State should prepare an action plan to address evaluation findings For each item needing action provide Condition being addressed Statement of the action to be performed with a discussion of how it will address the finding Completion schedule for each action Party responsible for completing the action 37
CONCLUSIONS 11/16/2011 38
Establishing Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme o Responsibility for nuclear security rests entirely within each State o The requirements for development of a national physical protection regime are contained in INFCIRC/225/Rev. 5 (NSS #13) o Nuclear security is based on global undertakings and all States share this collective interest in nuclear security whether or not they are implementing a national nuclear power programme. o Nuclear security infrastructure needs to be established in a State as early as possible to ensure that the legislative & regulatory framework & the role & responsibilities of competent authorities are appropriately defined, at the very latest should be established before inviting bids for a NPP. o It is expected that the implementation of the physical protection measures for the NPP will proceed in a similar manner to the sequencing for safety requirements. 11/16/2011 39
Thank you! D.Jinchuk@iaea.org 11/16/2011 40
NUCLEAR SECURITY PLAN 11/16/2011 41
Nuclear Security Plan 2010 2013 Objective: To contribute to global efforts to achieve worldwide, effective security wherever nuclear or other radioactive material is in use, storage and/or transport, and of associated facilities, by supporting States, upon request, in their efforts to establish and maintain effective nuclear security through assistance in capacity building, guidance, human resource development, sustainability and risk reduction. 11/16/2011 42
Implementation of Nuclear Security Plan Nuclear Security Guidance Nuclear Security Peer Reviews and Advisory Services Sustainability Support Research and Development Integrated Nuclear Security Plans Information Management and Collection Cooperation and Networking Risk Reduction and Security Improvements 11/16/2011 43
Nuclear Security Guidance NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES 11/16/2011 44
NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES Fundamentals (PRINCIPLES) Objectives and principles Essential elements from international instruments Recommendations (WHAT) General approaches, actions, concepts and strategies Applications of Fundamentals Implementing Guides (HOW) Ways & means on how Recommendations to be applied and implemented at systems level Technical Guidance 11/16/2011 45 Reference Manuals, Training Guides, Service Guides
Structure of Nuclear Security Series Security Fundamentals Recommendations Implementing Guides Technical Guidance 11/16/2011 46
NUCLEAR SECURITY FUNDAMENTALS Purposes To set out the overall objective of Nuclear Security Regime, and To establish the set of Essential Elements for an appropriate and effective national nuclear security infrastructure. In final stage of preparation 11/16/2011 47
NUCLEAR SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS 11/16/2011 48
Implementing Guides 11/16/2011 49
Technical Guidance 11/16/2011 50
Nuclear Security Infrastructure Technical Guidance o Technical Guidance on Establishing Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a National Nuclear Power Programme is under preparation o This guide outlines actions to be taken by States to establish or improve their nuclear security infrastructure for a nuclear power programme. 11/16/2011 51
Nuclear Security Infrastructure for a Nuclear Power Programme - Technical Guide overview Scope of the Technical Guide It covers all aspects of nuclear security and is based on a holistic approach for nuclear security for a nuclear power programme. National nuclear security infrastructure is part of the global framework. Each State is responsible for establishing, implementing and sustaining its national nuclear security infrastructure. 52
National Strategy and Policy Technical Guide overview (Cont.) The national security policy and strategy for a national nuclear power programme should: be based on the State s overarching national security policy take into account international legal obligations in relation to nuclear security identify all competent authorities that have a role in nuclear security infrastructure establish coordinating mechanism among competent authorities take into account international best practice in nuclear security Implement, maintain and sustain a comprehensive nuclear security infrastructure establish policy for bilateral, regional and international cooperation and assistance. 53
Legislative Framework Technical Guide overview (Cont.) States should become parties to all relevant international legal instruments and be aware of obligations imposed by binding UNSC Resolutions (13 counter terrorism instruments) Legislative framework should establish the functions and powers of all competent authorities Legislative framework must establish both the civil and administrative framework for nuclear security as well as the appropriate criminal or penal provisions related to prosecution and adjudication of offences related to nuclear security (offences, extradition, jurisdiction) 54
Regulatory Framework Technical Guide overview (Cont.) Authorisation and approvals in relation to nuclear security may reside in one or more regulatory authorities. Exercise of regulatory power should be undertaken by a body that is independent include power to promulgate guidance in relation to nuclear security requirements include powers of inspection and enforcement take into account the need to protect sensitive information empower regulatory body to share information with other competent authorities including prosecutorial bodies include civil and administrative penalties 55
International Cooperation Technical Guide overview (Cont.) The global implications of a nuclear security event underlines the importance of international cooperation and assistance Cooperation and assistance is encouraged in the areas of: Notification of nuclear security events and participation in international and regional databases Exchange of information on nuclear security techniques and practices Technical cooperation and assistance Sharing of information in relation to unauthorised removal or other unauthorised or criminal acts Recovery and return of seized items Cooperation in relation to the alleged criminal offences including nuclear forensics cooperation Exchange of lessons learned following nuclear security events 56
Common Nuclear Security Measures National Threat Assessment Threat Assessment or DBT for the design of Nuclear Security Measures Protection of Sensitive Information Management Systems for Nuclear Security Human Resources for Nuclear Security Promotion of Nuclear Security Culture Sustaining the National Nuclear Security Infrastructure 57
Summary The requirements for development of a national physical protection regime are contained in INFCIRC/225/Rev.5 ( NSS#13) Specific conditions must be met to complete milestones in the development process of nuclear security infrastructure including PP regime Evaluations by the State and by outside experts should be performed to verify status 58