Joint Cabinet Crisis. Cuban Missile Crisis. Study Guide

Joint Cabinet Crisis Cuban Missile Crisis Study Guide 5th-7th February 2016

Contents 1.Chairs and Staff...2 2. Historical background...4 2.1. US-Soviet confrontation...4 2.2. The Cuban Revolution and its consequences...4 2.3. Recent events of 1962...5 3. Cabinets and character profiles...7 3.1. John F. Kennedy s Cabinet...7 3.2. Nikita Khrushchev s Cabinet...10 4. Links for further preparation...13 ANNEX: CRISIS RULES OF PROCEDURE...14 1

1.Chairs and Staff Daniel Kastan Crisis Director Hi, my name is Daniel Kastan and I am going to be your Crisis Manager. I am a 22 year old law student from Passau University. I was born in London but mostly raised in Munich and Washington D.C. While going to school in D.C., I went to my first MUN conference organized by Georgetown University. There I partook in two JCCs. I loved it and hope you will too after an unforgettable weekend in Nancy. This will be my tenth conference and I know I will enjoy it as much as I enjoy every other MUN I went to. Hope to see you all there! Philipp Sander Assistant Crisis Director Hello everyone, I am Philipp, a 23 years old masters student of international politics and international law at the University of Kiel, Germany. First introduced to the exciting world of Model United Nations during my undergraduate studies in Mannheim, I have attended a variety of MUNs throughout Germany and the UK, gathering experience as a delegate in both regular committees and crisis simulations as well as behind the scenes as part of the crisis simulation staff. I am eagerly looking forward to meeting all of you and having a great time processing your directives. Alexander Eriksrød USSR Chair I am Alexander, an Austro-Norwegian European studying European Social and Political Studies at Sciences Po Paris and University College London. I bring relevant experience as delegate, chair, organizer and journalist from many and one MUN, the Global Young Leaders Conference (GYLC), Model NATO Youth Summit (MoNYS) and European Youth Parliament (EYP). I very much look forward to chairing at MUNancy 2016 and to meeting you all! 2

Georg Haustein USSR Co-Chair My name is Georg, I am 20 years old and I am currently studying Political and Social Sciences at Sciences Po Paris in Nancy. I have been attending several MUN conferences in the past few years, but MUNancy will be the first time chairing a committee for me. The JCC cabinet will be completely different from normal MUN committees and I am sure that it will be difficult but also a great experience for you and for us as chairs. Hopefully we will have a great time and I am, of course, looking forward to vivid debates. See you in Nancy! Max Moosburger USA Chair Originally from Salzburg, Austria, I am now an 19-yearold second year student at Sciences Po Paris, Campus de Nancy. A thorough interest in international relations and especially global security issues has motivated me to participate in various policy simulations in Europe and the United States, where I garnered some invaluable experiences, which I am now eager to apply and pass on as Head of Cabinet at MUNancy. Markus Specht USA Co-Chair My name is Markus, I am 20 years old and an International Baccalaureate alumnus who started participating at MUN conferences after returning from a year in the United States in 2012. I am a now a firstyear student at the Nancy campus of SciencesPo Paris and an active member of UNAN. MUNancy 2016 will be my first time organizing a conference and I look very much forward to chairing the US cabinet of the JCC. 3

2. Historical background 2.1. US-Soviet confrontation In the early 1960s, the cold war between the United States and the USSR was at its height. Both world powers continued their space race. After the Soviet Union had launched Sputnik, the first man-made satellite, into orbit on October 4 th, 1957, the United States and Soviet Union competed against each other to be the first state to reach certain space milestones (e.g. first person in space and, first person on the moon). On the planet s surface, the competition took the form of an arms race, and on June 1 st, 1961, the US officially started to deploy Jupiter type nuclear intermediate-range ballistic missiles targeting the Soviet Union in Turkey. During a meeting in Vienna on June 3 rd, 1961, Kennedy and Khrushchev discuss international relations. Apparently, Khrushchev developed a low opinion of Kennedy on this occasion which may have contributed to his aggression during the Cuban Missile Crisis. From June 4 th, 1961 to November 9 th, 1961, US and Soviet forces engaged in a stand-off as the Soviets began construction of the Berlin Wall. Ultimately the tanks were withdrawn and President Kennedy accepted the Berlin Wall lest war break out. 2.2. The Cuban Revolution and its consequences On January 1 st, 1959, President Batista of Cuba fled from Cuba to the Dominican Republic. His departure allowed Fidel Castro s revolutionary forces to seize power; Castro became Prime Minister. Initially, Castro claimed that his revolution was not a Communist revolution. Nonetheless, the USSR officially provided diplomatic recognition of the new Cuban government the following year. When the revolutionary government nationalized American property, the United States ended all exports to Cuba on October 19 th 1960. Exactly two month later, Cuba openly aligned itself with the Soviet Union after the Soviet government had established trade relations and provided an economic credit to its new ally. Consequently, the US rescinded its diplomatic recognition of the Castro government and closed its embassy in Havana on January 3 rd, 1961. Still under the Eisenhower administration, the US initiated a plan to train and support a cadre of 1,500 anti-castro Cuban exiles. In the midst of deteriorating US-Cuban relations, John F. Kennedy defeated Richard Nixon in the 1960 election and was sworn-in as President on January 20 th, 1961. On April 17 th, 1961, the rebels landed at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba in order to topple the Castro government. The Kennedy administration decided to withdraw military support for the invasion, dooming the rebel force. After three days, the exiles were defeated, a major blow for the United States and John F. Kennedy. The President later authorised the CIA to conduct Operation Mongoose, a covert operation in Cuba in order to kill Castro and remove the Communist government from power on November 30 th, 1961. 4

2.3. Recent events of 1962 January 21-31, 1962 Cuba expelled from OAS At the Organization of American States s eighth meeting of ministers of foreign affairs in, the United States leads the other Western Hemispheric countries in a vote to eject Cuba from the Organisation. February 3, 1962 May 13-20, 1962 May 29, 1962 US embargo on all trade with Cuba The United States announces Proclamation 3447, a near-complete economic embargo of Cuba. Khrushchev decides to place missiles in Cuba Khrushchev decides to place nuclear missiles in Cuba at some point during a May trip to Bulgaria. After the trip, he informes members of the Politburo of his plans. Talks between USSR and Cuba on nuclear missile deployment After deliberations within the Soviet government, Khrushchev dispatches a delegation to discuss the placement of nuclear missiles in the country. Castro accepts the missile deployment the day after meeting the delegation. September 15, 1962 First missiles arrive in Cuba Poltava, the first Soviet ship carrying medium-range ballistic missiles (or MRBMs) arrived in Cuba. Construction begins. October 14, 1962 October 15, 1962 October 16, 1962 U2 overflight takes first pictures of MRBM sites A U2 aircraft flying over western Cuba takes pictures of the Soviet missile sites for the first time. Analysis of U2 pictures indicate MRBMs being assembled Analysis from the National Photographic Interpretation Center confirms the existence of Soviet missile sites in Cuba. The photographic analysis also reveals that the Soviets are placing intermediate-range IL-28 bombers in Cuba, capable of carrying nuclear bombs to the U.S. Ex-Comm has its first meeting. Ex-Comm, a group of American political leaders, meets for the first time to discuss the Soviet missiles. Ex-Comm would meet several times throughout the crisis and the members rarely agreed on what to do. 5

October 17, 1962 October 18, 1962 October 19, 1962 October 20, 1962 October 21, 1962 October 22, 1962 Photos show evidence of long-range missiles. More photos of the missile sites are analysed and show that Cuba also has long-range Soviet missiles. These missiles are capable of traveling 2,200 miles. Robert Kennedy meets with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko. Attorney General Robert Kennedy keeps a previously scheduled meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, but does not mention the missiles. Gromyko tells Kennedy that the only help the Soviet Union is giving to Cuba is assistance growing crops and missiles that are only for defense. Ex-Comm suggests quarantining Cuba. Ex-Comm meets and discusses sending U.S. ships to Cuba to prevent Soviet ships from reaching the island. They are careful to call it a quarantine because a blockade is an act of war. Robert Kennedy gives Ex-Comm's recommendation to the president. After meeting all day the previous day, Robert Kennedy tells the president that Ex-Comm recommends a quarantine. President Kennedy was in Chicago, but lies about having a cold so that he can return to Washington to deal with the crisis. Ted Sorenson writes one of the most important speeches President Kennedy will ever give. Attorney and advisor to the president, Ted Sorenson, writes the speech that Kennedy will give to the nation. Informing Americans that the Soviets have missiles in Cuba that are pointed at the U.S. will be an important moment in American history and one of the most frightening speech as president ever gives. President Kennedy gives a televised speech to the nation. President Kennedy gives a speech that is carried live on television stations across the country to inform Americans that missiles have been discovered in Cuba. He tells Americans that he has ordered a Navy quarantine around Cuba and orders the Soviets to remove the missiles. 6

3. Cabinets and character profiles 3.1. John F. Kennedy s Cabinet Have you ever wondered, how it must have felt to hold the fate of the world in your hands during those infamous thirteen days in October 1962 when the America and Russia stood at the precipice of an all out nuclear war? As a member of the Executive Committee (ExComm) of the U.S. National Security Council advising the President and Vice- President of the United States of America, you, being at the levers of power, will decide how to respond to Russia stationing ballistic nuclear missiles on the communist Island of Cuba, just over a thousand miles away from Washington and New York. Never have the stakes been higher: not just are the United States about to loose whatever strategic advantage they might have had over the USSR, but millions of its citizens are in immediate danger of succumbing in a nuclear holocaust. You are the only ones in the position to prevent all this from happening, but only with a smart strategy and through savvy diplomacy. Are you up for the challenge? McGeorge Bundy Position: National Security Advisor Having been chosen as the youngest ever dean of Harvard s Faculty of Arts and Sciences, McGeorge Bundy already looked back on an accomplished career as foreign policy expert when he was appointed National Security Advisor (NSA) by President Kennedy in 1961. One of Kennedy's "wise men," Bundy played a crucial role in all of the major foreign policy and defense decisions of the Kennedy administration. During the crises, Bundy encouraged the members of the Executive Committee to consider different options and various approaches towards resolving the conflict and even played devil s advocate to make change his President s mind. He himself, however, was also perfectly willing to change his mind if another position seemed more sensible. At the beginning of the crises (October 18) he advocated inaction, so as to avoid open hostilities, the next day, however, he changed his mind and favoured a decisive military strike, regarding a blockade as insufficient. Robert Kennedy Position: Attorney General of the United States Nominally head of the Justice Department and America s highest prosecutor, attorney and legal council, Robert Kennedy was more than just that to his brother, John F. Kennedy: he was one of his most trusted advisors on all policy issues, including foreign and security policy. Inaction, to him, was unthinkable, but so was a military first strike. He was therefore a strong proponent of a blockade policy so as to demonstrate to the Soviets America s seriousness about the threat it was facing whilst at the same time leaving enough room for the Russians for a manoeuvre to pull back. He demonstrated his political skills and intellect during an enormously tense meeting with the Soviet ambassador, which would turn out to be turning point in the crisis. 7

Dean Rusk Position: Secretary of State An experienced and cautious diplomat, Rusk was a major proponent of multilateral approaches and international backing. Even though he never outrightly opposed it, he remained cautious about a military strike and much rather advocated for diplomatic solutions, so as to undermine Soviet-Cuban relationships and thus breaking the deadly axis between Moscow and Havana. Advocating for a blockade, he was nonetheless against an ultimatum and in favour of UN monitoring. Even though the relationship between Rusk and the President was fraught from the beginning, his insight proved to be crucial for the resolution of the crisis. Robert McNamara Position: Secretary of Defense A shrewd former business man, McNamara was known for his deconstructing analysis of policy issues. He regarded the soviet deployment as a political crisis, not an issue affecting overall nuclear balance between the superpowers. It was McNamara who most forcibly supported the idea of a blockade early on in the ExComm meetings. Rather than issuing a military ultimatum, he favoured a more nuanced option which would allow for negations, since he feared immediate soviet nuclear retaliation in response to any American military action against Cuba. John McCone Position: Director of Central Intelligence A powerful former industrialist and government advisor, John McCone took to the helm of the worlds most powerful spy agency in late 1961 after the disastrous Bay of the Pigs invasion. In September 1962, McCone foresaw the possibility of Soviet nuclear deployment on the island of Cuba and ordered the surveillance flights which ultimately discovered them. During the ExComm meeting, John McCone took a hard line stance, arguing for an airstrike after a 24 hour ultimatum. His opposition to the blockade was based on his conviction that it was irresponsible to allow the stationing of ballistic missiles close to America for an extended period of time. General Maxwell D. Taylor Position: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Taylor, an accomplished World War II commander, severed as highest general in the armed forces and Kennedy s top military advisor. The President and his brother held Taylor in highest regard and had an exceptionally good relationship with him. Joining with other hardliners, he advocated a surprise military air strike. However, he had his doubts about getting our feet in that deep mud of Cuba and believed a costly invasion should be a last resort. 8

C. Douglas Dillon Position: Secretary of Treasury Although he served as Secretary of Treasury, Dillon had vast foreign policy expertise due to his experiences as ambassador to France and Undersecretary of State. During the crisis he favoured a hard line, initially advocating a military strike but later, Dillon proposed to begin with the blockade, refuse negotiations, demand removal of the missiles, and threaten further military action. He was convinced that America had to demonstrate firm intention and was the first to come up with the idea of the blockade to present the Soviets with an ultimatum to remove the missiles or face military action. Llewellyn Thompson Position: Ambassador at Large for Soviet Affairs Having served as a senior staffer in the America s Moscow embassy and as ambassador to Austria, Thompson was US Ambassador to the Soviet Union until just a few weeks before the crisis erupted and as a result was named Ambassador at Large for Soviet Affairs, so as to legitimise his advisory function in the ExComm. His unparalleled knowledge of Russian and Soviet politics, culture and language made him a vital part of the team. He supported the blockade and urged the President to accompany it with a demand that Khrushchev dismantle the weapons in Cuba. Adlai Stevenson Position: U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations A former Governor and presidential candidate, Stevenson was a prominent Democratic party politician how was named UN ambassador by JFK in 1961. In the ExComm he boldly proposed to make an exchange with the Soviets: if they would remove their missiles from Cuba, the United States would agree to remove its obsolete Jupiter missiles from Turkey. However, he faced strong opposition from some other EXCOMM members, who regarded such an exchange as a sign of weakness. In the end it turned out that this very exchange would be the Soviets demand for their retreat from Cuba. During a UN Security Council session, Stevenson famously demonstrated to the world the extent of the Soviet aggression and monumentally won the debate against his Soviet counterpart. 9

3.2. Nikita Khrushchev s Cabinet In 1962, the world was dominated by the United States of America and the only country capable of holding up to its power was the Soviet Union. Thus, the Cuban Missile Crisis perfectly epitomizes the aims of the US and NATO to oppress the Soviet Union and its allied countries. Russia was aiming to execute its legitimate right of self-defence by taking effective measures to achieve power balance in the world between the Soviet Union and the United States. In the Soviet Cabinet you can help the Soviet Union and all communist States at that time to finally regain control and put an end to the US strive for world hegemony. We hope that you will enjoy participating in our cabinet and we are looking forward to your input. Will the Cold War find a peaceful end or will the imperialist US be erased from the landscape? The world is in your hands. It should be noted that the Cuban missile crisis (referred to as Caribbean crisis in the Soviet Union) was perceived very differently in the Soviet Union than in the United States. Other than the US, the Soviet Union was long accustomed to (dangers of) war, while the US had, much due to its insulated geographical position, never experienced this fear on its homeland. (Khrushchev had, as a child, personally experienced the invasion of his hometown by Austrian forces during World War I). Nikita Khrushchev Position: First Secretary of the Communist Party and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev (1894-1971) was First Secretary of the Communist Party before becoming Chairman in 1958. He moved from supporting Stalin s repressive methods to rather liberal domestic reforms aimed at improving the lives of the ordinary citizen (the effectiveness of which was, often, questionable). In foreign policy, his role was crucial: he took the final decisions in all matters of the crisis. He had a high opinion of Kennedy and even, rather far from reality, thought this to be mutual (especially after the Vienna meetings in 1962). The rivalry of the Cold War, together with the surrounding ideological, political and military competition, led Khrushchev to place ICBMs on Cuban soil. He aimed to (1) restore the nuclear balance which he perceived as unfavorable and (2) to protect the allied Cuban government from a feared US invasion. After the imperialist invasion of the Bay of Pigs failed utterly and left the United States humiliated, the Soviet Union had reason to believe a US-invasion (overt, this time) was imminent. Hence Khrushchev was determined not to lose the only important ally so close to American soil whose leader Castro, in addition, represented a very appealing revolutionary spirit. Leonid Brezhnev Position: Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Soviet Union Brezhnev was the head of the Soviet state, although this position is seen as largely symbolic. He was, however, close to Khrushchev and greatly influenced him. Brezhnev, who followed Khrushchev in 1964, was one of the Hardline-Communists during all of 10

the Crisis. Later on, the meetings between Brezhnev and Nixon played an important role in breaking the ice and reducing tensions between the two superpowers. Brezhnev had long advocated these meetings internally as, as he knew, the Soviet Union could not sustain the enormous costs of the Cold War much longer. Andrey Gromyko Position: Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union Gromyko was never particularly fond of president Kennedy, and even disliked him personally because of his arrogance. Western pundits liked to refer to him as Mr. No because of his frequent use of the Russian veto in the UN Security Council. He nevertheless supported general détente between the Soviet Union and the United States and, in 1963, he helped negotiate the first Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In his memoirs he stated that Disarmament is the ideal of socialism. Matvei Zakharov Position: Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Union Zakharov gave his local commanders the authority to make their own decisions concerning the use of the nuclear means of the Luna, Il-28, or FKR-2 as instruments of local warfare for the destruction of the invaders of the Cuban territory and to defend the Republic of Cuba. Zakharov thus raised the game considerably in what might have been one of the most dangerous moves of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Walerian Sorin Position: Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United Nations Walerian Zorin was confronted on October 25, 1962, by the US ambassador to the United Nations (Adlai Stevenson) with the photographs taken by American U-2 reconnaissance planes over Cuba. Why did you deliberately, cynically deceive us about the nuclear build-up in Cuba? Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny, that the USSR has placed and is placing medium-range ballistic missiles and missile sites in Cuba? Yes or No? Don t wait for the translation! Yes or No, I ask [ ] I m prepared to wait for my answer until hell freezes over. Famously, Zorin refused to provide an answer in the United Nations General Assembly. It is known today that he had not been informed about the stationing of nuclear weapons in Cuba. Anatoli Fjorodowitsch Dobrynin Position: Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States Dobrynin was the Ambassador of the Soviet Union to the United States throughout the majority of the Cold War. He helped to solve the Cuban Missile Crisis peacefully, but also negotiated several arms treaties with the US including the Ballistic Arms Treaty in 1972 which prevented a nuclear war. Even though he was very much committed to communist ideals, the English-speaking Dobrynin was considered to be one of a few Soviet diplomats who understood the United States, which becomes evident in his diplomatic friendship with Henry Kissinger. Throughout the Cold War era he was known 11

for his back-channel diplomacy and in the end he sustained a network of diplomats and journalists even reaching the Oval office. Wassili Alexandrowitsch Archipow Position: Submarine Commander, Soviet Union Arkhipov can be considered to be the real hero of the Cuban Missile Crisis as he refused to launch a Nuclear Missile from a submarine, which he commanded as Senior Officer. When the Soviet submarine was attacked by United States Navy destroyers on 27 October 1962 the crew, including the three officers in charge, did not know whether the Soviet Union and the United States were at war. Contrary to the other two officers in charge Arkhipov thought it would be wiser to wait for further instruction from Moscow and denied the launch of a nuclear missile, which prevented the outbreak of a nuclear war. Fidel Castro Position: Prime Minister of Cuba The president of the Republic of Cuba from 1959 to 1976 survived many attempts of removal (partly through economic blockades) and even assassinations by the American government before 1962. Following the Bay of Pigs invasion he reached a secret agreement with Nikita Khrushchev which aimed to protect the Republic of Cuba with Soviet nuclear missiles. Due to the fact that Castro was left out of any negotiations concerning the aftermath of this agreement, he felt betrayed by Khrushchev, but the relations between the two countries were good throughout the 1960s. Even though he did not play an important role in the development of this particular crisis, at MUNancy his position and demeanor may lead to a completely different outcome than in 1962. Raúl Roa García Position: Foreign Minister of Cuba Roa's role as the Foreign minister at the time can be considered as essential for the actual execution of diplomatic agreements between the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union within the borders of Cuba. Anything concerning the integrity of the country needed to be discussed with the Foreign Minister. Therefore, everything pertaining to solutions in Cuba and the maritime territory of Cuba needs to be approved by Roa throughout the conference. Andrej Grechko Position: Supreme Commander of the United Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization Grechko is the man to turn to when it comes to any unfriendly tasks. As the Commander in Chief of the Forces of the Warsaw Pact, he was responsible for the defense of all Member States of the Soviet Union and on October 26 1962 he wrote to Hungarian Minister of Defense Lajos Czinege demanding combat readiness as a response to Kennedy s provocative announcement on 23 October 1962 and the increased danger of the outbreak of war caused by the Western aggressors. 12

Therefore, when it comes to ultimately defending communism, Grechko is the man who has the power to command military actions from the Warsaw Pact Member States and increase the military capabilities of the Soviet Union. 4. Links for further preparation http://www.cubanmissilecrisis.org/ http://microsites.jfklibrary.org/cmc/oct16/ You might also want to check out the 2000 movie Thirteen Days starring Kevin Costner which provides an accurate account of the Cuban missile crisis. 13

ANNEX: CRISIS RULES OF PROCEDURE I. GENERAL Joint Cabinet Crisis simulations (hereafter JCC) are not subject to the same rules of procedure governing other MUN bodies. Therefore, the present document regulates every dynamic of the work within the JCC. II. CRISIS STAFF a. The Crisis Director and, in his place, all members of the crisis staff are the maximum authority within the JCC. They decide upon the development of the Crisis and their decisions are not subject to appeal. In the case of a specific conflict between two participants, the Crisis Director, or a representative from the Crisis Staff, will rule on the issue. b. Only the Crisis Staff has the authority to issue decisions on the development of the crisis. Any communications between Cabinets, not approved by the Crisis Staff will be considered null, and the participants will be sanctioned within the crisis. c. The Crisis Staff is only subject to the Secretary General on disciplinary matters. III. COMMITTEE DIRECTORS a. Committee Directors are the main authority within each cabinet, and are only subject to decisions made by the Crisis Staff, on crisis-relevant matters, and by the Secretary General, on disciplinary issues. b. Within each committee, chairs represent the Head of State of the country in question. For this reason, they are the main decision making authority on official actions. c. Committee Directors also regulate debate within the Cabinet by giving the floor to delegates at their discretion. It is up to the Committee Director to set particular debating procedures within the Cabinet, if he or she so wishes, and these decisions are not subject to appeal by the delegates. IV. PARTICIPANTS a. Participants, also referred to as delegates, are the backbone of the JCC simulation. They are subject to executive actions and debating procedures 14

introduced by the Chair, decisions on the development of the Crisis Staff and to the Secretary General on disciplinary matters. b. They play the role of a minister, a military general or any other sort of political or religious authority within the cabinet. Participants must therefore fulfil this role to the best of their abilities, and avoid privileging other personal circumstances when making crisis-related decisions and actions. V. DISCIPLINE Participants, Committee Directors and Crisis Staff members are all bound to the MUNany 2016 general rules of conduct, and any breach thereof will be immediately reported to the Secretary General for consideration. VI. LANGUAGE Delegates are not bound to utilize parliamentary language at any time, in contrast with other MUN bodies. Participants may also refer to themselves and their peers in first and second person, respectively, both during speeches and informal negotiations. However, participants must, at all times, refer to the assigned characters of their fellow participants and keep a respectful attitude towards the committee director and the Crisis Staff. VII. WORK WITHIN THE JCC a. The JCC is composed of three cabinets, each of them representing a specific State. The crisis develops through the interactions both between and within individual cabinets. The Crisis Staff will manage additional international actors. b. Each cabinet is composed of one Committee Director and ten delegates, each of them representing a particular minister or authority of the respective country. VIII. DIRECTIVES a. Directives are the only method to develop the Crisis. They consist of a text, submitted by participants to the Crisis Staff, through a platform that will be made available at the beginning of the simulation. Directives elaborate on a decision or command by the respective authority, which is to be implemented by the Crisis Staff. b. Directives must be specific. If they are not, they may not produce the expected results, or the Crisis Staff may even consider them inadmissible. 15

c. Participants are encouraged to be creative during the submission of directives. Participants should, however, also consider economic, institutional and military restrictions. Said restrictions may end up weakening a directive or even declaring it completely inadmissible. d. There are two main types of directives: individual and collective action directives. IX. COLLECTIVE ACTION DIRECTIVES a. Collective Action Directives are decisions made by the Cabinet as a whole. Collective action directives may be automatically submitted if no Cabinet member introduces an objection. If an objection is introduced, the directive will be voted upon through a show of placards. In order for it to pass, it requires a simple majority of all participants and the approval and signature of the ommittee Director. b. Due to their consensual nature, collective actions are more effective than individual actions, and are not restricted to any specific field of competence. However, the Crisis Staff will process them slower. c. There are four kinds of Collective Action Directives i. Press Release: Used to convey a public message in the name of the respective government. This message will reach all cabinets and all actors managed by the Crisis Staff. ii. Official Executive Action: Used to make coordinated military campaigns or establish particular nationwide policies. iii. Legislative Action: Used to present the draft of a law to the competent legislative authority for consideration and approval. This is still subject to consideration by parliamentarians, i.e. the Crisis Staff, and it may not pass even if the directive is correct. iv. Diplomatic Action: Used to communicate with other cabinets or with Crisis Staff run actors, or to arrange private meetings with their representatives. X. INDIVIDUALACTION DIRECTIVES a. Individual Action Directives elaborate on decisions made by one single participant. They do not require any voting procedure, and may be submitted 16

directly without consulting the whole. However, the content of said directives needs to be in line with the competences and authority of the submitting participant s character. b. Individual Actions may prove less effective than Collective Actions, but the Crisis Staff will process them faster. c. There are four kinds of Individual Action Directives: i. Press Statement: Used to convey a public message in the name of the respective character. This message will reach all cabinets and all actors managed by the Crisis Staff. ii. Individual Official Action: Used to carry out specific campaigns or actions within the competence scope of the submitting character. Individual Official Actions will be announced to the whole cabinet and, if relevant, to any other Cabinets involved. iii. Individual Undercover Communication: Used to communicate or to request a secret private meeting with members of opposing Cabinets or with representatives of Crisis Staff- run actors. iv. Individual UndercoverAction: Used to carry out a secret operation of any kind. This is subject to further specification by the Crisis Staff during the first day of the simulation. XI. RESOURCES Countries possess a limited yearly amount of resources at the beginning of the crisis. This amount may shrink or grow during the crisis, depending on the actions undertaken by each cabinet. Participants should take aid resources into consideration, since they may lead to unwanted effects, if not taken seriously. A specific list of available resources will be made available to the cabinet at the beginning and at several stages of the crisis. 17