L CaseMap Facts Report Filter: Linked To Source(s): " " - 43 of 7911(0.5%) Filtered ALL FS/ INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 02-19-2010 BY 65179 OMD/xis OIG-INTV-000062 Case: FBI in Military Zones Created: 2/23/2009 3:38:45 PM Vot.:.4 Time :F;iet.Tixt was ASAC of Critical Incident Response Group when 9/11 happened. He was responsible for the operational support branch of Critical Incident Response Group, which included crisis management. There wereotwo other ASAC in Critical Incident Response Group. One was Michael Bernacki, who was responsible. for National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime at that time. Stephen R. Wiley was the SAC in charge of the whole Critical Incident Response Group. In approximately Spring 2002, Michael Bernacki got promoted to another area, and became responsible for both the operational support branch and the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. Then Brenton L. Mosher was assigned to be ASAC of operational support branch and remained as ASAC for National Center for.the Analysis of Violent Crime. SOuTtO(s)' at 2:18, 4:52-8:00. re: 10/1/02 entail (bates number FBIOI8224CBT) fromi I tot Fran kie Battle with cc: to d and, I said. he could not recall the email and reviewing it did not refresh his recollection. With regard to observations of detainee treatment, said land 1 jhad concerns and briefed and Stephen R. Wiley when they got back from U.S. Naval Base Gitantanamo Bay, Cuba. also recalled that they did an EC which he approved. at 8:30-11:51. 1 'was the Unit Chief at the time and [was a program manager. When Stephen R. Wiley met with those coming back, tried to sit in. at. 11:51-13:58. said that in his mind, the ernails from U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba did not present. an issue that needed to be run up the chain immediately. 13:58-14:47
In July 2003 transferred to Counter Terrorism Division - FBI as a section chief (SES position) of Operational Response Section (Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI), Where he remains as of the date of the interview. Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI includes the Fly Team (investigators who respond to CT investigationsimissions around the world). L lit in charge of Fly Team right now. MLDU- Federal Bureau of Investigation is part of Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI. Military Liaison and Detainee Unit is the liaison to the military, readies people to deploy, and coordinates ' people who are assigned to the military commands, they coordinate activities at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. When got to Counterterrorism 0 erational Response Section - FBI the head of Military Liaison and Detainee Unit was He has since been replaced by t Counterterrorism Operationa espousesection - FBI also includesnationai joint terrorism ( ask Force. The military is continually seeking support froth Federal Bureau of Investigation. said they defined the mission to include anything that would safeguard the homeland this includes Sensitive Site Exploitations and. interviews. said he was very cautious Of Sensitive Site Exploitations because the agents were not trained for war. Since has been at Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI the mission has grown from4 agents to 15 in Afghanistan alone. In Afghanistan the Federal Bureau of Investigation is housed in Central Intelligence Agency space. re: 018131CBT email from on---1 in which 1 says he ran into FranIcieBat it 1-7MMNFaT en and.. a conversation withr 1 about his 'U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba ex?erience. does not recall the conversation specifically, though he recall's talking to, _ Jgenerally. re: 018203CBT does not recall ' I ema'. Frai1kte Battle does not involvement of Marion E. "S ike" Bowman o bn this issue. Frankie Battle said he worked with n Hostage Rescue Team, and he would trust him to _auto ball in an a rri mate manner to w omever should know. 14:47-20:00 Rankle Battle 24:37-25:53. 25:53-28:34 28:34-30:00 30:00-34:05. said he view J as a behavioral expert, more them, and he would rely on him for those issues. 34:05-35:46. 1 tasked whether thought there is a problem or something that OIG-INTV-000063 be Per FBI
requires guidance, in terms of the Federal Bureau of Investigation working with military who are entitled to use different methods. said there is no issue. Federal Bureau of Investigation agents know what our boundaries are, and we know how to conduct ourselves. We make that clear to anybody who deploys.. It is no different.over there than it is here in terms of how we conduct interviews said. If you observe other things, you report it -- that has always been the case, said. There is no frizziness there. re: email to 018206CBT. does not recall receiving the email. Reading it does not refresh his recollection. re: 00009 1CBT EC 11/221021 1 said the document is vaguely familiar to him, but he does not recall it as much at the other EC. It is possible for the SAC to review and sign something on behalf of those below him/her in the chain. said he recalls the 5/30/03 EC with the attachments. The agents did the correct thing to report these things they were seeing -- and' we should not be a part of that. It is of concern because we are placed in ah awkward position. We are not griing to be a part of that. 35:46-37:49. 37:49-39:47. 42:38-44:55; 48:00. 46:00. 46:00-51:03. does not recall talking with for John S. Pis-tole about detainee issues at any point.in tune. 51:03-52:00. said the line of participation versus non-participate was clear to all of us. We Frankie.Battie expect them report things to us if they have concerns. 52:00-54:45; 57:30. ' Whet is the basis for the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents to report these things? They are instructed clearly not to do things that they would not be allowed to do anywhere. If something else is going on, they should report it and remove themselves from that situation. With respect to the 5/30/03 EC, it took forever to get it out, but it was being worked on. Interview l 57:30-59:30. 59:30-1:00:31. recalls being there wberj Ell zu OIG-INTV-000064
Wiley that there was a detainee duct taped and on his knees, and theytold the military they didn't want any.part,of it and he excused himself. Interview l. 1:00:31-1:03:20. does not recall had concerns about the legality of specific Frankie Rattle techniques. does recall that!... Jhad concerns about legality generally: does not know what response ot beyond Stephen 1:03:20-1:04:58 R. Wiley's genera( instructions that, while we.can't tell he military what to do, we won't be involved in that. does not recall discussion of the 20th.Hijacker, specifically. He does not recall!specific concern about violation of the torture statute. 1:04:58-1:08:22 said hn be very emphatic. He had great concern. He brought it to our attention. We supported that. said he hopes executive management responded appropriately. 1:08:22-1:10:55. said International Terrorism Operations Section 2 has responsibility for substantive issues re: Iraq. was responsible for staffing. does recall an EC dated 9/11/03 from the Fly Team within Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - 1:10:55.- 1: 13:53, FBI re: interviewing HVDs. said that EC was establishing the reasons why the Federal Bureau of Investigation was in Iraq and the protocols they would follow. said the term High Value Detainee was not used in the EC to define those persons who would be subjected to extraordinary techniques. High Value Detainee meant those detainees who were notable persons who could bring forth information to assist us in protecting the homeland. said they didn't get nto specifics about interviews, and we did not think it was necessary at the time. It went without saying, what the code of conduct should be. Legal advisors talked to them about deadly force and how that applies over there. There was more concern about that. There was More concern about the health and welfare of our people, as Interview I 1:13:53-1:17:25. OIG-INTV-000065 1 opposed' to concerns about interviews. said the pre-deployment briefings are 5 days it includes people who have been there, medical issues, EAP, legal issues, etc. They started when got to Counterterrorism Operational Response Section - FBI. doesn't think the issues of interrogation techniques are covered in the 5 day training. 1:19:26-1:24:50.
. insisted that act ed Ilid not need-anyone to tell them what they could and cou no o. were experienced agents. The fact that they brought it forward shows they knew what they could not do. While we didn't write a specific policy about what they could and could not do, said he thought those issues were covered. believes Stephen R. Wiley-would have sent the concerns up. o chain right away, without waiting for a written document. does not recall exposed to all the techniques liste d claiming to have been in the legal analysis memo Category 1, II, III, and IV. 1:26:50-1:27:30 Franicie Battle Interview- I 1:27:30., 1:32:36 1:33:30. vaguely recalls the 11/25/03 EC EC about the impersonation / helicopter. He does not recall how it was followed up on. He doesn't recall-any communications with' jorl labout the drafting of the EC. 1:33:30-1:36:25 said Steve Gentry is now an ASAC in Houston. He served in Afghanistan. He sent and EC to, Joseph M. Demarest, Jr. and others re: Federal Bureau of Investigation presence in Afghanistan. asked hit to evaluate what the Federal 1:36:25-1:39:50 Bureau of Investigation was doing over there. does not recall what follow up there was on Steve Gentry's recommendations. does not know of a special interrogation plan or requested use of aggressive interrogation techniques in Iraq and Afghanistan. does not get involved in who is being interviewed and substantive issues like that. International Terrorism Operations Sectidn I presides over issues in Afghanistan. They would be more involved in that. looks at training, equipment, staffing and issues-like that. 1:39:50-1:40:48 1:40:48-1:41:55- said( wrote and email to DAD T.I. Harrington on an issue. He was working a special mission with Joint Special Operations Command that was not read i nto. I }went to Fort Bragg with three other Fly Teampeople. They were 11:41:55-1:48:22 OIG-INTV-000066
0. given a briefing about the targets and. the sensitive thingsthey were using for the mission (i.e. satellites). The email has bates number 01004880GC. said he was out of town when it was Sent. He recalls reading it, but doesn't recall the context. knows that returned shortly after the email was sent. doesn't know what T.J. Harrington said to him does not recall all the context. thinksr-1 1 Jwas concerned about the types of things they would be doing. said the Federal Bureau of Investigation should not be involved in any coercive interrogations. said he has no knowledge about what the military is allowed to do in terms of battlefield interrogations or other detainee interrogations. Interview If 1:49:25 1:49.25-1:50:10 know and T.J. Harrington talked to. 1:50:10-1:51:10 does not recall that all interrogations in Afghanistan were suspended at some point. has been to Iraq once and Afghanistan once. He has been to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba three times (oncewhile at Critical Incident Response Group nd twice since he has been at Counterterrorisdi Operational Response Section - FBI). The first trip to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was to see was Critical Incident Response Group was doing. He went for a "look see" with land 1 (Second trip to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba was with T.I. Harrington, the last time at U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba he was observing the operations, assessing the personnel I land his crew). All three trips to U.S. Naval Base Guantanamo Bay, Cuba were a "look see." The trips to Iraq and Afghanistan were also "look sees" because he felt he wa sending people 'down range" and he wanted to see what it was like. 1 went to Iraq and Afghanistan with on that trip to see if Behavioral Analysis Unit could help there as well. L (vent t see some of the interviews being conducted in Iraq. 1:51:10-1:51:59 1:51:59-1:54:30 1:54:30-1:56:25. z 1C:21 O L
filled in some questions on the questionnaire that he had inadvertently left blank. He said he never saw or heard about those techniques. vaguely recalls the May 2004 guidance. 1:56:25-1:58:00: 2:09:21 OIG-INTV-000068