Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation

Transcription

1 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Page 433

2 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Page 434

3 Table of Contents Page Appropriation Language Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Construction Projects Nonproliferation and International Security International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention HEU Transparency Implementation Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production Fissile Materials Disposition Construction Projects Global Threat Reduction Initiative Department of Energy/ Defenses Nuclear Nonproliferation Page 435

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5 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Proposed Appropriation Language For Department of Energy expenses, including the purchase, construction, and acquisition of plant and capital equipment and other incidental expenses necessary for atomic energy defense, defense nuclear nonproliferation activities, in carrying out the purposes of the Department of Energy Organization Act (42 U.S.C et seq.), including the acquisition or condemnation of any real property or any facility or for plant or facility acquisition, construction, or expansion, [$1,423,914,000] $1,637,239,000, to remain available until expended. Explanation of Change The only change from the language proposed in FY 2005 is the proposed funding amount. Overview Page 437

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7 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Threat and Response: The convergence of heightened terrorist activities and the associated revelations regarding the ease of moving materials, technology and information across borders has made the potential of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD) the most serious threat facing the Nation. Preventing WMD from falling into the hands of terrorists is the top national security priority of this Administration. The FY 2006 budget request for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation represents an unprecedented effort to protect the homeland and U.S. allies from this threat. Funding Schedule by Subprogram Appropriation a Appropriation b Adjustments b Request FY 2005 FY 2006 Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development , ,750-1, , ,218 Nonproliferation and International Security... 86, ,000-62,682 91,318 80,173 International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation , ,000-27, , ,435 Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention... 39,764 41, ,675 37,890 HEU Transparency Implementation... 17,894 20, ,784 20,483 International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation... 19, Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production... 81,835 40,097 3,872 43, ,000 Fissile Materials Disposition , ,000-10, , ,065 Offsite Source Recovery Project ,600-7, Global Threat Reduction Initiative... 69, ,803 93,803 97,975 Subtotal, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation... 1,416,650 1,435,397-13,174 1,422,223 1,637,239 Use of Prior Year Balances ,941-15,000 14, Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation... 1,367,709 1,420,397 1,706 1,422,103 1,637,239 FY 2004 Comparable FY 2005 Original (dollars in thousands) FY 2005 Comparable Appropriation a FY 2004 reflects distribution of the rescission of $7,832,911 from the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for FY 2004, approved reprogrammings, and comparability adjustments. Reference the FY 2004 Execution table for additional details on these adjustments. b The FY 2005 adjustments column reflects distribution of the rescission of $11,363,176 from the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L ), transfer of funds pursuant to a letter dated December 9, 2004, from the Chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriation Committees to the Secretary of Energy, and comparability adjustments. Reference the FY 2005 Execution table for additional details on these adjustments. Overview Page 439

8 Public Law Authorization: P.L , National Defense Authorization Act, FY 2005 P.L , The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 FYNSP Schedule (dollars in thousands) FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FYNSP Total Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Nonproliferation & Verification Research and Development , , , , ,084 1,453,120 Nonproliferation and International Security... 80,173 81,857 83,493 85,165 86, ,555 International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation , , , , ,205 1,790,827 Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention... 37,890 38,686 39,460 40,249 41, ,339 HEU Transparency Implementation... 20,483 20,913 21,331 21,758 22, ,678 Elimination Weapons Grade Plutonium Production , , , , , ,933 Fissile Material Disposition , , , , ,592 3,400,668 Global Threat Reduction... Initiative... 97,975 97, , , , ,719 Subtotal FYNSP, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation... 1,637,239 1,673,441 1,710,494 1,748,421 1,787,244 8,556,839 Overview Page 440

9 FY 2004 Enacted Approp FY 2004 Execution General Reduction Rescission Supplemental (dollars in thousands) Reprogram -ming/ Transfers a Comp FY 2004 Adjustment b Comparable Nonproliferation & Verification R&D , , , ,197 Nonproliferation and International Security , ,888 86,219 International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation , , , ,734 Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention... 40, ,764 HEU Transparency Implementation... 18, ,894 International Nuclear Safety & Cooperation... 4, ,831-3,958 19,850 Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production... 50, , ,835 Fissile Materials Disposition , , ,125-6, ,693 Global Threat Reduction Initiative ,464 69,464 Subtotal, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation... 1,372, , ,006 5,865 1,416,650 Use of Prior Year Balances , , ,941 Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation... 1,372,612-45,000-7, ,065 5,865 1,367,709 a Reflects $32,100,000 reappropriated to Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production in FY 2004 from unobligated balances expiring in FY 2003 transferred from DoD in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2004; $19,850,000 transferred from Department of State Agency for International Development for International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation, and approved reprogrammings. b Reflects a net comparability adjustment of +$5,865,000 (+$5,750,000 from Environmental Management for Off Site Source Recovery and $6,115,000 for U.S. Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Return, and -$6,000,000 to Defense Programs for the storage of surplus HEU). Overview Page 441

10 FY 2005 Execution (dollars in thousands) FY 2005 Enacted Approp Rescission Adjustments Comp Adjustments FY 2005 Comp Nonproliferation & Verification R&D ,750-1, ,963 Nonproliferation and International Security ,000-1, ,463 91,318 International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation ,000-2, , ,651 Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention... 41, ,675 HEU Transparency Implementation... 20, ,784 Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production... 40, , ,969 Fissile Materials Disposition ,000-4, , ,060 Offsite Source Recovery Project... 7, ,540 0 Global Threat Reduction Initiative ,803 93,803 Subtotal, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.. 1,435,397-11,363 +4,189-6,000 1,422,223 Use of Prior Year Balances -15, , Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 1,420,397-11, ,069-6,000 1,422,103 Mission The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation mission is to provide technical leadership to limit or prevent the spread of materials, technology, and expertise relating to weapons of mass destruction; advance the technologies to detect the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction worldwide; and eliminate or secure inventories of surplus materials and infrastructure usable for nuclear weapons. Benefits The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program supports the NNSA and DOE mission to protect our national security by preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials to terrorist organizations and rogue states. These efforts are implemented in part through the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, formed at the G8 Kananaskis Summitt in June Strategic, General, and Program Goals The Department s Strategic Plan identifies four strategic goals (one each for defense, energy, science, and environment aspects of the mission) plus seven general goals that tie to the strategic goals. The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation appropriation supports the following goals: Defense Strategic Goal: To protect our national security by applying advanced science and nuclear technology to the Nation s defense. General Goal 2, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Provide technical leadership to limit or prevent the spread of materials, technology, and expertise relating to weapons of mass destruction; advance the technologies to detect the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction worldwide; and eliminate or secure inventories of surplus materials and infrastructure usable for nuclear weapons. Overview Page 442

11 Contribution to General Goal 2 Within the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation appropriation, there are eight programs each of which makes unique contributions to General Goal 2 as follows: The Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development program (Program Goal ) contributes to General Goal 2 by developing new technologies to improve U.S. capabilities to detect and monitor nuclear weapons production, proliferation, and testing worldwide. The HEU Transparency program (Program Goal ) contributes to General Goal 2 by developing and implementing transparency measures which increase confidence that low enriched uranium (LEU) purchased under the 1993 U.S./Russian HEU Purchase Agreement is derived from HEU extracted from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons and eliminated from Russian stockpiles. The Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production program (Program Goal ) contributes to General Goal 2 by shutting down the three remaining weapons-grade plutonium production reactors in the Russian Federation through: (1) construction of a new fossil-fuel (coal) plant at Zheleznogorsk; (2) refurbishment of an existing fossil-fuel (coal) power plant at Seversk. The Nonproliferation and International Security program (Program Goal ) contributes to General Goal 2 by strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime by (1) limiting sensitive exports; (2) supporting international safeguards; and (3) providing policy recommendations and technical and policy advice to develop and implement U.S. policy (treaties, agreements, and mutual inspections). The Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP) (formerly Russian Transition Initiatives) program (Program Goal ) contributes to General Goal 2 by preventing adverse migration of weapons of mass destruction expertise by engaging weapons experts in commercially oriented, nonmilitary efforts and by helping to downsize the nuclear weapons infrastructure. The GIPP will engage WMD experts in cooperative projects involving the ten major Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) National Laboratories and U.S. industry. The International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program (Program Goal ) contributes to General Goal 2 by working in Russia and other regions of concern to (1) secure and eliminate vulnerable nuclear weapons and weapons-usable material; and (2) install detection equipment at border crossings and Megaports to prevent and detect the illicit transfer of nuclear material. The Fissile Materials Disposition program (Program Goal ) contributes to General Goal 2 by eliminating surplus Russian plutonium and surplus U.S. Russian and HEU. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) (Program Goal ) contributes to General Goal 2 by identifying, securing, removing and/or facilitating the disposition of high-risk, vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials and equipment around the world that pose a potential threat to the United States and the international community. Means and Strategies The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program will use various means and strategies to achieve its program goals, including numerous collaborative activities with a variety of partners. However, various external factors may impact our ability to achieve these goals. Overview Page 443

12 The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program goal is to detect, prevent, and reverse the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) while mitigating nuclear risk worldwide. Our programs address the danger that hostile nations or terrorist groups may acquire weapons of mass destruction or weapons-usable material, dual-use production or technology, or WMD capabilities, by securing or eliminating vulnerable stockpiles of weapon-usable materials, technology, and expertise in Russia and other countries of concern. The events of September 11, 2001, make it clear that our threat detection programs are urgently required, and must proceed on an accelerated basis. We will fully exploit the world-class expertise of our National Laboratories to increase our design, testing, and fielding capabilities for detection technologies. The pace and nature of treaties and agreements, extremely poor economic conditions in many host countries, political and economic uncertainties in the former Soviet Union, and the unwillingness of threshold states to engage in negotiations can all have dramatic effects on our performance and effectiveness. Customs issues, Nuclear Regulatory Commission actions, and other Department of Energy elements can also cause significant impacts to our ability to achieve program objectives. We work with many U.S. agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations to further our nonproliferation goals. All major policy issues are coordinated with the National Security Council, and we also work closely with the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce. We continually leverage our considerable nuclear nonproliferation research and development base within the National Laboratory complex. In addition, NNSA coordinates with the Department of Commerce on export control policy and international agreements, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on fissile materials disposition programs as well as working with the International Atomic Energy Agency to further international safeguards. The United States Enrichment Corporation and the Tennessee Valley Authority are involved in the HEU purchase agreement and fissile materials disposition programs, and the U.S. Industry Coalition is NNSA s partner in the Global Initiative for Proliferation Prevention. The U.S. Agency for International Development, the Nuclear Energy Agency, the intelligence community, and other agencies are also involved in some programs. Finally, we anticipate continued frequent collaborations with the Department of Homeland Security as that department fulfills its role in the national security arena. Validation and Verification To validate and verify program performance, NNSA will conduct various internal and external reviews and audits. NNSA s programmatic activities are subject to continuing review by the Congress, the General Accounting Office, the Department s Inspector General, the National Security Council, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Department s Office of Engineering and Construction Management, and the Department s Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance. Each year numerous external independent reviews are conducted of selected projects. Additionally, NNSA Headquarters senior management and Field managers conduct frequent, in-depth reviews of cost, schedule, and scope to ensure projects are on-track and within budget. NNSA has established a comprehensive validation and verification process as part of its Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Evaluation (PPBE) system. Long-term performance goals are established/validated during the Planning Phase and linked in a performance cascade to annual targets and detailed technical milestones. During the Programming Phase, budget and resources trade-offs and decisions are evaluated based on the impact to annual and long-term performance measures. These NNSA decisions are documented and used to develop the budget requests during the Budgeting Phase. Overview Page 444

13 Program and financial performance for each measure is monitored and progress is verified during the Execution and Evaluation Phase. NNSA validation and verification activities during the PPBE Execution and Evaluation phase include a set of tiered performance reviews to examine everything from detailed technical progress to program management controls to corporate performance against long-term goals. This set of reviews includes: (1) the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART); (2) NNSA Administrator Program Reviews; (3) Program Managers Detailed Technical Reviews; (4) quarterly reporting of progress through the Department's JOULE performance tracking system; and (5) the NNSA Administrator's Annual Performance Report. NNSA is using the OMB PART process to perform annual internal self-assessments of the management strengths and weaknesses of each NNSA program. Among other things, the PART process helps NNSA ensure that quality, clarity, and completeness of its performance data and results are in accordance with standards set in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 and reinforced by the President's Management Agenda. Independent PART assessments conducted by OMB provide additional recommendations to strengthen NNSA programs. Each NNSA program is reviewed at least annually by the NNSA Administrator during the NNSA Administrator Reviews. These reviews involve all members of the NNSA Management Council to ensure progress and that recommendations are fully integrated for corporate improvement. The focus of these reviews is to verify and validate that NNSA programs are on track to meet their long-term goals and annual targets. A second more detailed review of each program is conducted by the program managers. These Program Manager Detailed Technical Reviews are normally held at least quarterly during the year. The focus of these reviews is to verify and validate that NNSA contractors are achieving detailed technical milestones that result in progress towards annual targets and long-term goals. These two reviews work together to ensure that advanced warnings are given to NNSA managers in order for corrective actions to be implemented. NNSA sites are responsible and accountable for accomplishing the verification and validation of their and their sub-contractors performance data and results prior to submission to NNSA Headquarters. The results of all of these reviews are reported quarterly in the Department's JOULE performance tracking system and annually in the NNSA Administrator's Annual Performance Report and the DOE Performance and Accountability Report (PAR). Both documents help to measures the progress NNSA programs are making toward achieving annual targets and long-term goals. These documents are at a summary level to help senior managers verify and validate progress towards NNSA and Departmental commitments listed in the budget. Additionally, NNSA performs a validation of approximately 20 percent of its budget on an annual basis. A new two-step process was developed for use during FY This consisted of Phase 1: Validation of the Need for the Program s Proposed Activities (Program Review) and Phase 2: Pricing Validation of Selected Programs (Pricing Review). Budget validation efforts focused on determining consistency with NNSA strategic planning and program guidance, integration of planned activities/milestones with budget estimates, and reasonableness of budget estimates. During the FY 2006 process, Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program (EWGPP) and International Nuclear Material Protection and Cooperation participated in Phase I. NNSA leveraged the work done by the U.S. Army Corps of Overview Page 445

14 Engineers for EWGPP for Phase II. These reviews found the overall process for developing the budgets for FY 2006 satisfactory and the cost estimates were found valid and reasonable. In addition, the General Accounting Office, Inspector General, National Security Council, Foster Panel, Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board, and Secretary of Energy Advisory Board provide independent reviews of NNSA programs. Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) The Department implemented the PART tool to evaluate selected programs. PART was developed by Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to provide a standardized way to assess the effectiveness of the Federal Government s portfolio of programs. The structured framework of PART provides a means through which programs can assess their activities differently than through traditional reviews. The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs have incorporated feedback from OMB into the FY 2006 Budget Request and have taken or will take the necessary steps to continue to improve performance. For FY 2004, OMB evaluated the MPC&A program using the PART tool. The MPC&A program achieved a perfect score on purpose and design because it has a clear purpose that addresses a specific need. It also achieved a perfect score in strategic planning because the Department has established specific, measurable goals and time frames. OMB has therefore assigned to this program 85 percent, its highest rating of Effective. In addition, MPC&A provided OMB an FY 2005 update to its FY 2004 PART. For FY 2005, OMB evaluated EWGPP, using the PART tool. OMB recognized the program for having very good, solid, and tangible performance measures to effectively guide and monitor program progress. However, because the EWGPP program was recently transferred to DOE/NNSA from DoD, it is relatively new for DOE/NNSA and has not had a chance to develop a track record of results. Therefore, OMB assigned a rating of Results not demonstrated. For FY 2006, OMB evaluated the Nonproliferation and International Security (NIS) program using the PART. The NIS program achieved a perfect score on purpose and design because it has a clear purpose that addresses a specific need. It also achieved a perfect score in strategic planning and program management sections because NNSA has established specific, measurable goals and time frames with appropriate federal oversight and controls. OMB rated this program 87 percent, its highest rating of Effective. Overview Page 446

15 Funding by General and Program Goal FY 2004 Comp Approp (dollars in thousands) FY 2005 Comp Approp FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 General Goal 2, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation Program Goal 2.40, Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development , , , , , , ,084 Program Goal 2.44, Nonproliferation and International Security... 86,219 91,318 80,173 81,857 83,493 85,165 86,867 Program Goal 2.46, International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation , , , , , , ,205 Program Goal 2.45, Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention... 39,764 40,675 37,890 38,686 39,460 40,249 41,054 Program Goal 2.41, HEU Transparency Implementation... 17,894 20,784 20,483 20,913 21,331 21,758 22,193 Program Goal 2.43, International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation... 19, Program Goal 2.42, Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production... 81,835 43, , , , , ,881 Program Goal 2.47, Fissile Materials Disposition , , , , , , ,592 Program Goal 2.64, Global Threat Reduction Initiative... 69,464 93,803 97,975 97, , , ,368 Subtotal, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation... 1,416,650 1,422,223 1,637,239 1,673,441 1,710,494 1,748,421 1,787,244 Use of Prior Year Balances. -48, Total, Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation... 1,367,709 1,422,103 1,637,239 1,673,441 1,710,494 1,748,421 1,787,244 Overview Page 447

16 Funding for a proportional share of NNSA s annual assessment required to pay for Defense Contract Audit Agency activities is included in this appropriation. The amount estimated for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation is $368,611 for FY 2005 and $512,217 for FY 2006, to be paid from program funding. Significant Program Shifts Securing Nuclear Weapons and Material For over a decade, the United States has been working cooperatively with the Russian Federation to enhance the security of facilities containing fissile material and nuclear weapons. The scope of these efforts has been expanded to protect weapons-usable material in countries outside the former Soviet Union as well. These programs fund critical activities such as installation of intrusion detection and alarm systems, and construction of fences around nuclear sites. Efforts to complete this work and to secure facilities against the possibility of theft or diversion have been accelerated. A number of major milestones for this cooperative program are on the near horizon and the FY 2006 budget ensures that sufficient funding will be available to meet these milestones. Security upgrades will be completed for Russian Navy nuclear fuel and weapons storage by the end of FY 2006 and for Rosatom facilities by the end of FY 2008 both two years ahead of the original schedule. Russian Strategic Rocket Forces sites will be complete in 2007, one year ahead of schedule. Additionally, cooperation will begin with the nuclear warhead storage sites of the Russian Ministry of Defense s 12 th Main Directorate. Pre-Screening Cargo Containers for Nuclear and Radiological Materials The world s shipping network, with millions of cargo containers in various stages of transit, could conceal nuclear and radiological materials. However, the busiest seaports, also provide the opportunity for law enforcement officials to pre-screen the bulk of the cargo in the world trade system. Under the Megaports Initiative, DOE cooperates with international partners to deploy and equip key ports with the technical means to detect and deter illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials. This effort supports the U.S. Department of Homeland Security s Container Security Initiative. The FY 2006 budget supports the completion of five ports, which will increase to ten the number of ports participating in and equipped through the Megaports Initiative. Expanding NNSA Radiation Detection Research and Development This budget will provide a critical boost to important basic and applied research in radiation detection, significantly reducing detector size and increasing sensitivity. In addition, the funding provides for fundamental research for Homeland Security and Intelligence missions, providing significant synergy across multiple agencies and missions. Eliminating Russian Plutonium Production The Elimination of Weapons Grade Plutonium Production Program will result in the permanent shutdown of three Russian nuclear reactors, which currently produce weapons-grade plutonium. These reactors, which are the last three reactors in Russia that produce plutonium for military purposes, also provide necessary heat and electricity to two Russian closed cities in the Russian nuclear weapons complex. This budget provides the funding needed to shutdown the three reactors through 1) refurbishment of an existing fossil-fuel (coal) power plant in Seversk by 2008; and 2) construction of a new fossil-fuel plant at Zheleznogorsk by This will eliminate the production of 1.2MT annually of weapons-grade plutonium. The program is of critical importance because plutonium that is never Overview Page 448

17 created does not have to be accounted for, does not need to be secured, and will not be available to be targeted by terrorists. Disposing of Weapons-grade U.S. and Russian Fissile Material The Fissile Materials Disposition program disposes of inventories of surplus U.S. weapons-grade plutonium and highly-enriched uranium (HEU) as well as supporting efforts to dispose of Russian surplus weapons-grade plutonium. The construction of the Pit Disassembly and Conversion Facility and the MOX Fuel Fabrication facility have been delayed due to a liability issue with Russia and levelfunding of the budget in the outyears. The FY 2006 net increase is primarily for the Off-specification HEU Blend-Down Project with TVA and increased oversight to support major construction of the MOX Fuel Fabrication facility in FY Global Threat Reduction Initiative On February 11, 2004, the President stated in a speech at the National Defense University that the greatest risk to the United States or anywhere else in the world is the possibility of a terrorist attack using nuclear or radiological materials. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) has several ongoing efforts to combat this threat. In the latest step to increase effectiveness in preventing nuclear and radiological materials from falling into the hands of terrorists or other rogue actors, the Secretary of Energy announced the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) in March The mission of the GTRI is to identify, secure, remove and/or facilitate the disposition of high-risk, vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials and equipment around the world that pose a threat to the United States and to the international community. This initiative will comprehensively address all vulnerable nuclear and radiological materials throughout the world and secure and/or remove these materials and equipment of concern as expeditiously as possible. A transfer of responsibility has also been made for the U.S. Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Return program from the Office of Environmental Management. This program eliminates the stockpiles of U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors through repatriation to the U.S. This program is part of the GTRI decision unit and is funded at $14.3 million. NNSA has established a GTRI office under the Deputy Administrator for Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation, to consolidate, accelerate, and expand under centralized management the Department s current programs related to nuclear materials removal and radioactive source security and recovery: Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR) Program Targets research reactors and medical isotope production processes worldwide for conversion to suitable LEU fuels and targets. Russian Research Reactor Fuel Return (RRRFR) Program Eliminates stockpiles of Russian-origin HEU by repatriating such material to Russia. U.S. Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel Return (FRRSNF) Acceptance Program Eliminates stockpiles of U.S.-origin spent nuclear fuel in foreign research reactors through repatriation to the U.S. Overview Page 449

18 Kazakhstan Spent Fuel Prevents proliferation of nuclear weapons by securing nearly three tons of weapons-grade plutonium in the BN-350 breeder reactor at Aktau, Kazakhstan. HEU Research Reactor Fuel Purchase Purchase Russian HEU fuel for use in US research reactors Radiological Threat Reduction (RTR) Program Identifies, recovers, and stores, on an interim-basis, certain domestic radioactive sealed sources, as well as other radiological materials that pose a security risk to the United States and/or world community. Reduces the international threat posed by radiological materials that could be used in a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or dirty bomb. Emerging Threats Recover or disposition in place nuclear materials located throughout the world that are at risk of theft, illicit diversion, or other illegal use, and not addressed by other programs. Budget Structure Change NNSA has consolidated the Department's current programs related to nuclear materials removal and radioactive source security and recovery into one GPRA unit to support the new Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI). This new GPRA unit, GTRI, includes the entire Off-site Source Recovery Program as requested in the FY 2005 Congressional Request, and includes activities transferred from the Office of Environmental Management and from the Nonproliferation and International Security and International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation programs. In FY 2006, NNSA requests changing the name of the Russian Transition Initiatives to the Global Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (GIPP). GIPP will remain focused on the FSU, which poses the greatest potential threat of WMD expertise migration. However, new WMD scientist redirection and complex transition requirements in Libya, Iraq, and possibly elsewhere require that the program expand its activities to additional regions. The proposed name change reflects this expanded mission. Global Partnership The Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, formed at the G-8 Kananaskis Summit in June 2002 has recommitted the G-8 nations (the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, and the United Kingdom) to address nonproliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety issues. The G-8 leaders have pledged to devote up to $20 billion over ten years to support cooperative efforts, initially in Russia, and have invited other similarly motivated countries to participate in this partnership. The President has committed the U.S. to provide $10 billion over ten years to be matched by $10 billion from the other members, attesting to the belief that nonproliferation concerns are of the highest government priority; and therefore that this program s work is of paramount importance for the security of the nation and the world. The following table reflects the Department of Energy activities, by country and program. Overview Page 450

19 U.S. Nonproliferation and Threat Reduction Assistance to Former Soviet States (dollars in millions) Summary by Country FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 Russia Kazakhstan Ukraine Uzbekistan 1.0 Georgia Total, Russia & FSU Risk Based Analysis The Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation programs have established a management risk-based approach to allocating program funding. All Assistant Deputy Administrators evaluate nonproliferation program activities under their purview against a series of eight standardized risk factors. Nonproliferation program activities are assigned a rating of high, medium, low or not applicable, as appropriate, together with a brief explanatory statement describing the basis for the rating. An assessment summarizing the overall program risk is also included. Nonproliferation risk factors include the following: (1) budgetary risk; (2) funding urgency; (3) policy priority; (4) likelihood of crisis; (5) legal or moral obligation; (6) opportunity to save money and/or time; (7) unique political or technological opportunity, and; (8) other party involvement. The FY budget request was developed taking into account these eight risk-based factors. These same factors are used by the Deputy Administrator in evaluating the allocation of funds across programs. Overview Page 451

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21 Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development Funding Schedule by Activity (dollars in thousands) FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 $ Change % Change Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Operations and Maintenance (O&M) Proliferation Detection , , , , % Nuclear Explosion Monitoring... 95, , , , % Supporting Activities... 5,362 15,488 6,105-9, % Subtotal, O&M , , , , % Construction , , % Total, Nonproliferation and Verification R&D , , , , % FYNSP Schedule (dollars in thousands) FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FYNSP Total Nonproliferation and Verification R&D , , , , ,084 1,453,120 Description This program develops new technologies to improve U.S. capabilities to detect and monitor nuclear weapons production, proliferation, and prohibited nuclear explosions worldwide. Using the unique facilities and scientific skills of NNSA and DOE national laboratories and plants, in partnership with industry and academia, the program conducts research and development that supports the nonproliferation mission requirements as necessary to close the technology gaps identified through close interaction with other U.S government agencies and programs. This program satisfies an important and distinctive role by stimulating and integrating discoveries in basic science to classified nonproliferation and national security applications. Benefits to Program Goal Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development The Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development program has two main subprograms that make unique contributions to Program Goal The Proliferation Detection subprogram advances basic and applied technologies for the nonproliferation community. Specifically, the subprogram develops the tools, technologies, techniques, and expertise for the identification, location and characterization of the facilities, materials, and Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Page 453

22 processes of undeclared and proliferant Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs; and to prevent the diversion of special nuclear materials. The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring subprogram builds the nation s operational sensors that monitor the entire planet from space to detect and report surface, atmospheric, or space nuclear detonations; and produces and updates the regional geological datasets enabling operation of the nation s ground based seismic monitoring networks to detect and report underground detonations. The Supporting Activities elements include crosscutting support such as strategic initiatives and participation in DOE s Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs. Major FY 2004 Achievements In the Proliferation Detection subprogram, a number of advanced radiation and remote sensing technologies were successfully field-tested against simulated, real-world proliferation targets. During flight tests, an airborne hyperspectral imaging system demonstrated real-time capability for detection and identification of gas plumes; and an ultraviolet lidar detector underwent extensive testing at the Dugway Proving Ground; Radiation detection, synthetic aperture radar, and persistent wide-area search technologies were positively evaluated against key proliferation signatures. The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring Subprogram improved the accuracy and sensitivity of U.S. capabilities to detect nuclear explosions. The program delivered first unit of the next-generation nuclear detonation sensor package addressing revalidated and more-demanding national security requirements to monitor the entire Earth from space with greater sensitivity. Support was provided for launch and initial checkout of three previously delivered operational nuclear detonation sensor packages, including one that contained a demonstration/validation experiment for a next generation optical sensor. The program also delivered regional seismic monitoring station calibration data sets and improved analysis tools for operational users to address emerging proliferation threats, keeping pace with the installation of monitoring stations. Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Page 454

23 Annual Performance Results and Targets FY 2001 Results FY 2002 Results FY 2003 Results Demonstrate systems to protect key infrastructure and special events from chemical and biological attacks. (MET GOAL) Conduct Critical Design Reviews for three new-generation nuclear explosion-monitoring sensors that are proposed for future satellite deployment. (MET GOAL) Field a demonstrated, deployable prototype biological threat system at the Winter Olympics. (MET GOAL) Demonstrate a chemical agent detection system in a subway system. (MET GOAL) Start satellite sensor-payload assembly of operational nuclear explosion detection payloads for the next generation of Global Positioning System satellites scheduled for first launch in (MET GOAL) Perform experiments of prototype, unmanned-aerial-vehicle-based Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR) systems to detect proliferation. (MIXED RESULTS) Demonstrate prototype commercial cargo inspection system to detect fissile materials and high explosives. (MET GOAL) Provide two assays for biological threat agents to the Center for Disease Control Laboratory Response Network. (MET GOAL) Demonstrate a fixed system to protect complex, key infrastructure facilities, components, and capabilities. (MET GOAL) Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Page 455

24 Annual Performance Results and Targets (R= Results; T = Targets) Performance Indicators Development of Advanced U.S. Capabilities to Detect Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: FY 2003 Results FY 2004 Results FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 Endpoint Target Annual number of advanced radiation and remote sensing technologies developed and evaluated through customized tests that challenge and characterize their operating parameters. These advanced technologies are intended to improve U.S. capability to detect the early stages of nuclear weapon programs. Development of Advanced U.S. Capabilities to Detect Nuclear Explosions: Annual number of advanced technologies and operational systems (e.g. satellite payloads and seismic stations calibration data sets) delivered to U.S. national security users which improves the accuracy and sensitivity of nuclear weapons test monitoring. Percentage of research projects for which an independent R&D merit assessment was completed during the second year of effort and again within each subsequent three year period to assess scientific quality and mission relevance. (EFFICIENCY MEASURE) Advancement of Knowledge within the Nonproliferation R&D Community: Annual number of professional papers/exchanges presented-each representing Science and Technology knowledge and U.S. leadership in program areas. R: 4 R: 9 T: 7 R: 4 R: 7 T: 6 R: 20% R: 37% T: 40% R: 250 R: 202 T: 200 T: 8 T: 6 T: 7 T: 7 T: 9 T: 8 Annual targets advance the state of the art in advanced technology to provide future capabilities for U.S. monitoring agencies. T: 8 T: 6 T: 9 T: 9 T: 8 T: 9 Annual targets advance state of the art in concert with deployment schedule of user agencies. T: 70% T: 100% T: 100% T: 100% T: 100% T: 100% Subject all projects and proposals to merit review process. T: 200 T: 225 T: 225 T: 225 T: 225 T: 225 Maintain scientific underpinnings of advanced R&D program. Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Page 456

25 Nonproliferation and Verification R&D O&M Detailed Justification (dollars in thousands) FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 Proliferation Detection , , ,471 The Proliferation Detection program applies the unique skills and capabilities of the NNSA and DOE national laboratories and plants to meet the non proliferation research and development requirements necessary to close the technology gaps identified through close interaction with other U.S. government agencies program. The program develops the tools, technologies, techniques, and expertise to address the most challenging problems related to detection, location, and analysis of the global proliferation of weapon of mass destruction with special emphasis on nuclear weapon technology and the diversion of special nuclear materials. The program facilitates long-term scientific innovation through sustained commitment to mission focused technical areas that build best-in-the-world competence. The increase in FY 2006 will provide a crucial boost to critical basic and applied research in radiation detection. This increase will also set new research in motion to significantly reduce detector size, while increasing sensitivity. This work supports not only the nonproliferation mission, but also supports fundamental research necessary for Homeland Security and Intelligence missions. As such, the program will provide significant synergy across multiple agencies and missions. The Proliferation Detection program also plays a key role in filling the critical middle ground between fundamental research and near-term acquisition by using the unique skills of the national laboratories and plants as applied research integrators. Through the extensive relationships that the laboratories maintain with universities, basic science from academia and federal research programs are brought together to develop real-world system solutions based on classified insights into national security problems. Additionally, the Proliferation Detection program hands off technical know-how that has been developed and validated to the U.S. industrial base and U.S. Government acquisition programs to support national security missions. Technical advances, new proven methodologies, and improvements to capabilities are transferred to operational programs through technical partnerships including the development of special prototypes to assist major acquisition efforts. Partnerships with the industrial suppliers are often coordinated with user programs to facilitate successful outcomes. Congressionally Directed Activity: The Conference Report, , accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L ), included an increase of $6. 5 million for proliferation detection for high priority research requirements. Nuclear Explosion Monitoring... 95, , ,642 The Nuclear Explosion Monitoring program builds the Nation s operational treaty monitoring space sensors, and produces and updates the regional geological datasets and analytical understanding to enable operation of the Nation s ground-based treaty monitoring networks. The satellite-based segment of the program builds three distinct sensors and two support packages for each Global Positioning System (GPS) satellite. These packages constitute the Global Burst Detector Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Page 457

26 (dollars in thousands) FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 payloads for monitoring atmospheric detonations. In addition to building the payloads, the program supports the integration, initialization, and operation of these payloads. The satellite segment also supports the maintenance, integration and testing of the previously built high altitude detection system payloads on the Defense Support Program (DSP) satellites. The program conducts a limited amount of engineering and development to prepare the next generation sensors. In FY 2006, the program will balance the multiyear production of GPS Block IIF satellite payloads, support for the remaining GPS Block IIR satellite payloads, and early design and development of GPS Block III satellite payloads to best meet delivery timelines and requirements as launch schedules and onorbit satellite health dictate. Due to required design work and the stringent production schedules, efforts to develop new techniques or improved sensor technology will be constrained in FY The Space and Atmospheric Burst Reporting System production efforts continue to ramp up in FY This provides a significant new effort to develop and produce the follow-on high altitude-monitoring payload that replaces the current aging DSP system due to retire in FY This payload effort will satisfy recently revalidated requirements for monitoring upper atmosphere and space detonations. The ground-based segment of the nuclear explosion monitoring research program provides classified, focused, applied research and engineering products integrated into a knowledge base, with appropriate testing, demonstration, and technical support for use in the U.S. National Data Center and U.S. Atomic Energy Detection System. Through a Memorandum of Understanding with U.S. monitoring agencies, NNSA provides the integrated geophysical models and nuclear event source models that enable global, regional and specific site threat detection, reporting and interpretation of nuclear events. This classified knowledge base is developed in coordination with the installation of seismic stations by monitoring agencies. The program also conducts a limited amount of applied research and system support to monitoring agencies in non-seismic ground-based detection technologies. The classified knowledge base systems integration function is performed at the national laboratories and is supplemented in part by research from open competition. In FY 2006, the ground-based program baseline has been increased by $5 million specifically to accommodate funding of multiyear open competitive research through Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) contracts. Congressionally Directed Activity: The Conference Report ( ) accompanying the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2005 (P.L ) included $20 million for ground-based systems for monitoring. Supporting Activities... 5,362 15,488 6,105 Supporting activities includes crosscutting support for the two subprograms. These activities include strategic initiatives such as technology roadmapping and assessment, nonproliferation analysis and studies, Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR), Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs open competition. In addition, the conceptual design and regulatory and environmental activities for the replacement research facilities in Area 300 at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) are included in FY Publication activities enhance communications between the technologists in the DOE community, policymakers, and the general public. Total, Nonproliferation and Verification Research and Development O&M , , ,218 Nonproliferation and Verification R&D Page 458