BRIEFING: Age of uncertainty

Transcription

1 BRIEFING: Age of uncertainty [Content preview Subscribe to IHS Jane s Defence Weekly for full article] As Western forces disengage from Afghanistan, the five nearby ex-soviet nations in Central Asia are employing diverse strategies to ensure their security in a tough neighbourhood, reports Joshua Kucera As the withdrawal of Western troops from Afghanistan looms, the countries to the north in ex-soviet Central Asia face an uncertain future. While many countries in the region have expressed concern that instability from Afghanistan will spill over into their territories, they mostly lack the means to develop modern militaries themselves. They are generally looking to Russia, which has boosted its military aid and co-operation programmes in Central Asia for several years. The United States - always a distant second in military influence in the region - has meanwhile begun to reduce its footprint in Central Asia: a trend that seems destined to continue as Washington disengages from Afghanistan. However, more than two decades after gaining their independence from the Soviet Union, the five countries in the region remain set on different trajectories, with varying defence and military policies as well as attempts to exploit the regional interests of Russia and the US. Kazakhstan, the region's richest country, has been the only one able to begin creating a modern military. With partners from around the world, the country is also making energetic attempts to build its own defence industry. Kyrgyzstan had hosted the region's only US military base, but refused to renew its lease and increasingly co-operates with Russia in its counter-insurgency efforts. Tajikistan, which is also preoccupied by the threat of insurgent groups coming across its porous borders, hosts Russia's largest foreign military base. Like Kyrgyzstan, it has been promised massive Russian military aid over the next several years. Uzbekistan is the only country in the region to clearly prefer a military relationship with the US to one with Russia. Turkmenistan, meanwhile, remains one of the world's most isolated countries. All of the countries, to varying degrees, exaggerate the threat of Islamist terrorism spilling over from Afghanistan to justify crackdowns on internal opposition and to attract international aid. Page 1 of 8

2 The US Air Force ended its operations Manas Air Base, Kyrgyzstan, on 3 June. (PA) The turning point in regional geopolitics was perhaps the US' departure from its air base in Kyrgyzstan. Manas Air Base (formally called the Transit Center at Manas) was established in 2001 as the US started its war in Afghanistan. It served as the processing point for nearly every US service member going in and out of Afghanistan, as well as for troops from many other coalition members. However, the base was dogged by controversy, most significantly over a series of murky fuel contracts negotiated with family members of two successive Kyrgyzstani governments. The other major recent US military presence in Central Asia has been the Northern Distribution Network (NDN): a series of logistics routes set up with local commercial shipping companies to transport cargo into (and now out of) Afghanistan. The NDN was conceived as a strategic hedge against Pakistan, which provides the most direct land route between Afghanistan and the sea but has often had difficult relations with Washington. The NDN proved its worth in 2011 when Pakistan closed its border with Afghanistan to US and NATO traffic for months in retaliation for NATO aircraft operating from Afghanistan having killed Pakistani soldiers. Now, with the restoration of logistics routes through Pakistan, only a small fraction of US military cargo uses the NDN, which costs more due to its greater distances and Central Asia's onerous bureaucracies. In addition, as the emphasis shifts to moving equipment out of Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, the main NDN entry point into Afghanistan, has thrown up obstacles. US military officials and diplomats are reluctant to criticise Uzbekistan publicly, but commercial shippers involved in the NDN have said the country has imposed Page 2 of 8

3 intolerable customs and border procedures in its determination to prevent drugs or weapons being smuggled in trains and trucks from Afghanistan. In June 2013 US Transportation Command officials said only 4% of military cargo leaving Afghanistan went via the NDN. As the US steps out, a resurgent Moscow is again asserting itself militarily in its former Central Asian republics. Its primary vehicle for doing so is the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO): a politicalmilitary bloc led by Russia that also includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Formed soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the CSTO has for most of its existence been little more than a talking shop. Recently, however, it has expanded its ambitions. The organisation is in the early stages of setting up a Rapid Reaction Force and joint air forces on top of the Rapid Deployment Forces it has already created. In 2009 the CSTO announced the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force, which then-russian president Dmitry Medvedev said "will not be inferior to NATO forces in terms of combat potential". Russia has provided two units: the 98th Guards Airborne Division and the 31st Guards Air Assault Brigade. Kazakhstan has contributed the 37th air assault brigade. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have each contributed an infantry battalion. The force carries out annual joint exercises that usually simulate a 'terrorist' incursion into Central Asia. In the most recent exercise, 'Rubezh-2014' (Frontier 2014), held in Russia's Chekyabinsk region in July, the scenario entailed a "reconnaissance unit [that] detected international extremist organisations attempting to intimidate and enlist locals, and store ammunition, arms, and drugs in warehouses". The CSTO forces "blocked and destroyed the extremists by using artillery and air force", according to Russian military spokesman Colonel Yaroslav Roshupkin. Meanwhile, in April 2013 CSTO Secretary General Nikolay Bordyuzha announced the formation of joint air forces. "We expect that all governments that are today able will share the appropriate air assets for the formation of the collective air forces," he said. It is still unclear what assets have been contributed and by whom, but the only countries likely to provide anything are Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. The Central Asian component of the joint air forces will likely be based at Russia's Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan, where Russia has recently reconstructed runways for larger aircraft. In 2012 Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoigu suggested that long-range strategic bombers could be stationed there. In February 2014 Shoigu announced that Russia would expand its presence at Kant, deploying four Su-25 ground-attack aircraft in addition to the eight Su-25s and two Mi-8s it currently has based there. Page 3 of 8

4 These Russian Su-27s operating from Kant Air Base in Kyrgyzstan may soon be joined by strategic bombers. (PA) The CSTO has never been used in combat and it is unclear what might trigger its deployment. The organisation was widely criticised for not intervening in the ethnic violence in southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010 that killed several hundred people. At the time the CSTO's charter only called for its activation against external threats; since then, however, the body has expanded the parameters of when it may intervene. Bordyuzha has said the CSTO may also act against 'extremists' and that consensus among member states is no longer required (although the consent of the host nation is). More recently, CSTO officials have had to publicly reassure members that the organisation would not deploy in Ukraine. Russia has also firmed up the status of its military base in Tajikistan - the base of the 201st Motorised Rifle Division, with an estimated 7,000 soldiers - as Russia's largest foreign military base. In 2012 the two countries agreed to extend the base's presence in Tajikistan through to As part of the base agreement Russia has promised Tajikistan a military aid package reportedly worth about USD200 million. In September 2013 the CSTO announced an aid package designed to help Tajikistan protect its long border with Afghanistan. Tajikistani President Emomali Rahmon said at the time that the assistance would include "constructing new buildings of frontier posts, restoring warning and signalling systems, and providing border troops with a means of air patrol and surveillance as well as radar". Russia also has tried to create a joint air-defence system among CSTO members: a key vector of Moscow's military efforts in Central Asia. Integration with Kazakhstan is the furthest advanced, but Russia has also Page 4 of 8

5 expressed its intention to eventually include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the system. During a visit to Kazakhstan in January, Shoigu said Moscow would this year deliver five divisions of S-300PS air-defence systems (with each division to contain 12 units). Russia's advances in Central Asia have been opposed by Uzbekistan, which remains the region's geopolitical wild card. While a founder member of the CSTO, Uzbekistan's participation in joint military exercises and other activities dropped off until 2012, when it formally left the organisation. Uzbekistan's break with Russia has been exacerbated by Moscow's increasing ties with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, with which Uzbekistan has tense relations. To counterbalance Russia's heavy hand, Uzbekistan has tried to leverage US interests - in particular in Uzbekistan's transit connections to Afghanistan. Most US military aid to Uzbekistan was suspended in 2004 by congressionally imposed human rights restrictions. The relationship soured further when Uzbekistan ejected the US from the Karshi-Khanabad airbase near the border of Afghanistan. However, Uzbekistan became a key node in the NDN and its wider military ties to the Pentagon have improved in line with its co-operation with the US on military transit. India, meanwhile, has made modest security co-operation efforts in the region. Delhi seems to have abandoned its plans for an air base in Tajikistan, despite spending millions to renovate the Ayni air base there. However, it has set up a military hospital in the south of the country and in 2013 donated two Mi-17 transport helicopters to Tajikistan. Much of the region's military procurement remains opaque. Of the five Central Asian states, only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan publicly announce their defence budgets. According to figures from IHS Jane's Defence Budgets, Kazakhstan's defence spending in nominal terms is forecast to reach USD3.1 billion in 2018, up from USD1.7 billion in 2011, and USD670 million in According to World Bank data, Kyrgyzstan's nominal spend has risen from USD89 million in 2006 to USD231 million in It is likely that the other three countries' defence budgets have risen at a similar pace and will continue to do so throughout the current decade. Nevertheless, with the exception of Kazakhstan and, to a lesser degree, Turkmenistan, Central Asian countries still largely rely on Russian handouts and discounts for new procurement. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan are not known to have made any substantial recent acquisitions other than through Russian aid. Turkmenistan has made some efforts toward military modernisation, although many analysts have seen its acquisitions as more for show than as part of a serious defence strategy. The country has focused on its new navy, for which it has begun constructing a new naval base and a naval academy. Turkmenistan has acquired two new Project missile corvettes from Russia and has contracted to buy 10 fast patrol boats from Turkey's Dearsan, including eight with anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missile launchers, and a six-barrelled anti-submarine mortar. Page 5 of 8

6 Turkmenistan became Dearsan's first export customer in 2011 when it ordered two P 1200-class patrol craft similar to those being built for the Turkish Naval Forces Command. It has since ordered eight more. (Dearsan) Kazakhstan has by far the region's most dynamic military. The country has been trying to re-arm and so become less reliant on Russia for military technology. It has prioritised developing an indigenous defence industry through joint ventures between the state-run defence company Kazakhstan Engineering and defence manufacturers from around the world. When unable to set up joint production in Kazakhstan, it has increasingly bought equipment from partners outside the ex-soviet world. Kazakhstani officials acknowledge that their procurement decisions are often made in the interests of geopolitical balancing as much as on the characteristics of the equipment itself. Page 6 of 8

7 An Airbus Helicopters EC145 in service with the Kazakhstani MoD and on display at ICADEX. EC145s are produced in Astana under the joint venture Eurocopter Kazakhstan. (J Kucera) The most prominent joint venture is with Airbus Helicopters (formerly Eurocopter) and Kazakhstan Engineering: Eurocopter Kazakhstan. Formed in 2010, this produces in Astana EC145 light utility helicopters, some of which are already in service with the Kazakhstani Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Emergency Situations. Officials from Kazakhstan and Airbus have also discussed the possibility of manufacturing the EC645 T2 multirole helicopter and the EC725 Caracal military transport helicopter. Kazakhstan has also purchased from Airbus four C295 military transport aircraft under a 2012 memorandum of understanding that envisages buying eight of the aircraft overall. Joshua Kucera is a JDW Correspondent, based in Boston Page 7 of 8

8 Copyright IHS Global Limited, 2014 For the full version and more content: IHS Jane's Defence Industry and Markets Intelligence Centre This analysis is taken from IHS Jane s Defence Industry & Markets Intelligence Centre, which provides world-leading analysis of commercial, industrial and technological defence developments, budget and programme forecasts, and insight into new and emerging defence markets around the world. IHS defence industry and markets news and analysis is also available within IHS Jane s Defence Weekly. To learn more and to subscribe to IHS Jane s Defence Weekly online, offline or print visit advertising solutions contact the IHS Jane s Advertising team For Page 8 of 8