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2 COMMANDER S NOTES Marines, Our feature article is a spotlight on China's Airborne Corps. China is modernizing at a rapid rate, and it appears determined to develop its airborne capability to rival both Russia and the United States. They are expanding their airlift capacity, honing methods and equipment for delivery of heavy materials, modernizing equipment, and reorganizing their force. They also make a concerted effort at training. They have matured their airborne capability to be a force that is viable for employment in any contingency operation. We next focus on two capabilities for the GCE. The Marine Corps and US Army are experimenting with the Trophy active protection system. Both will field a small number of systems over the next few years to provide an initial capability. We also spotlight counter-battery radar systems employment. This article is intended to raise awareness on planning considerations and doctrine relative to counterbattery radars. It also covers the various capabilities we currently possess and are in the process of fielding. We want to challenge paradigms with an article on UAS organization considerations. Most major ground forces have organic UAS capabilities residing inside their land force. As we field more and more UAS capabilities, it is clear that many of these should reside as organic to the GCE. This article surveys various ground forces and presents some considerations relative to force organization. As always, we welcome your feedback. Semper Fidelis, Col Tim Barrick Commanding Officer Marine Corps Tactics & Operations Group

3 TABLE OF CONTENTS China s Airborne Corps... 2 Trophy Active Protection System... 7 Counter-Battery Radar UAS Organization Considerations RPG-30 Kryuk Hook Antitank Disposable Launcher Doctrine Update l Cover Photos Chinese Airborne Corps: Trophy APS: Counter-Battery Radar (AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR): Pictures of the G/ATOR were provided by Marine Corps Systems Commander Project Executive Office Land Systems PM G/ATOR 1

4 China s Airborne Corps By Col Timothy E. Barrick, Commanding Officer Figure 1. PLAAF Airborne Corps. Foreign Military Organization & Capabilities C hina s Airborne Corps is one of the country s premier combat capabilities for crisis response and contingency operations. The Airborne Corps is a strategic asset, separate from the People s Liberation Army (PLA), and is instead a People s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) asset. It is intended as a strategic capability for rapid response and decisive operations. In recent years, China has devoted significant effort to modernize and reorganize the Airborne Corps to enhance its capabilities. As evidence of this focus, in the 2017 International Army Games, the Chinese airborne platoon finished first place, winning 11 of 12 events, even beating out Russian competition. 1 China endeavors to make its Airborne Corps on par with Russian and US airborne units, and has developed a respectable capability. As an example of this ongoing focus, just last year in May 2017, China reorganized its 35,000- strong 15 th Airborne Corps. 2 China eliminated the 43 rd, 44 th, and 45 th Airborne Divisions headquarters and transformed the force into a brigade-based structure. The new corps organization, no longer the 15 th Airborne but simply Airborne Corps, now comprises six maneuver brigades (with 18 airborne battalions), 2 a special forces brigade, a support brigade, and an aviation brigade (see Figure 2). The Airborne Corps has improved its heavy drop methods to enable effective delivery of its ZBD-03 airborne infantry fighting vehicles that are in its 133 rd and 134 th Abn Mechanized Brigades. Additionally, the corps is improving its ability to operate in high altitude environments (i.e., Tibet). Another aspect of this modernization effort is the transition to a combined arms organization, similar to what the Russians adopted with their battalion tactical group construct. This Synthetic or Composite Infantry Battalion concept, as the Chinese refer to it, incorporates enhanced fire support, mobility, armor, air defense, engineering, NBC defense, information warfare, and command and control capabilities into a combined arms construct. 3 The standard airborne battalion is approximately soldiers. As this modernization evolves, this will likely grow. In recent years they have trained their airborne battalions in both airborne and air assault operations. The Airborne Corps aviation brigade consists of both fixed-wing transports (Y- 20, IL-76, Yu-8/Yu-9, and Yu-12) and helicopters

5 Figure 2. PLAAF Airborne Corps Organization. (AS332 Super Puma, SA 321 Super Frelon [Z-8], Z- 9, and Mi-17). The Y-20 transport is a new acquisition made in 2016 (they now have four) which provides a capability nearly on par to the C- 17. These transports give the Airborne Corps a lift capacity for up to two light airborne brigades, or about two mechanized airborne battalions RAND Study Airborne missions can include seizing enemy strategic points; seizing airfields, bases, and ports to facilitate landing operations; conducting sabotage, undermining the enemy s wartime potential or cutting off its forces; and undermining the enemy s command system and transportation hubs. Figure 3. ZBD-03 air-droppable Infantry Fighting Vehicle with 30mm gun. 3 The PLA probably would use airborne operations in a cross-strait conflict, either against the main island of Taiwan or against some of the smaller Taiwan-held islands in the Taiwan Strait area. 1

6 Figure 4. Type 96 towed 122mm howitzer. 4 Figure 7. Paratroopers in CS/VP4 8x8 allterrain vehicles (ATVs). 7 Figure 5. New PCP-001 motorized 82mm selfpropelled rapid mortar. 5 Figure 8. ATV with 107mm Rockets. 8 Figure 6. New self-propelled 120mm mortar based on the ZBD-03 air droppable chassis (a similar light tank variant has a 105mm gun). 6 Figure 9. LYT2021 fast attack vehicle. 9 The mechanized airborne brigades employ the ZBD-03 airborne infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) with a 30mm gun, coaxial 7.62 machine gun, antitank guided missile, and a capacity for four to five troops. While available information is limited, the mechanized brigades are likely configured into three battalions with three companies each and ZBD-03s per company, for a total of IFVs in a mechanized airborne brigade. The air assault brigades also utilize 4x4 and 8x8 all-terrain wheeled vehicles, with various configurations, to give the force mobility. Each airborne battalion possesses the full array of infantry weapons anti-tank guided missiles, mortars, and machine guns. Each airborne brigade s artillery battalion leverages the venerable Type 96 (a Chineseproduced D-30) 122mm towed howitzer and towed Type 63 multiple rocket launcher (MRL) (107mm). As part of the modernization effort, China is exploring motorized 82mm self-propelled mortar and MRL variants, as well as modern lightweight 122mm and 155mm towed and selfpropelled howitzers. A self-propelled 120mm mortar based on the 4

7 Figure 10. Offloading an ATV from an Mi Figure 12. Type-87 25mm AA Gun. 12 Figure 11. IL-76 dropping a ZBD Figure 13. Airborne Soldier with AT Rocket. 13 ZBD-03 chassis was recently produced by Norinco. Additionally, the company has developed a 105mm mobile assault gun or light tank variant to the ZBD-03. The Chinese continue to examine new equipment acquisitions for the Airborne Corps, aiming to modernize and enhance its overall warfighting capability. With its modernization effort, a focus on exercises and training, and enhanced transportation capabilities, the PLAAF Airborne Corps represents a very capable (though untried) rapid response force for China. 5

8 Figure 14. Airborne Brigade on Parade. Sources: Synthetic Infantry Battalion in China's Current Military Transformation - Building China's Basic Combat Unit for the Future Image Source: Image Source: Military Change-9 ; 16 May 2017: Image Source: Image Source: Image Source: Ibid Ibid. 6

9 Trophy Active Protection System By GySgt Christopher R. Boyette, Tank Advisor, Maneuver Division Problem: (The Marine Corps ) Current and future ground combat vehicles lack the capability to detect incoming antiarmor threats and defeat the threats before impact. There is a need to engage incoming projectile threats both vertically and horizontally. Passive and active protection systems will improve the survivability by detecting and defeating antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), high-angle incoming air-to-surface missiles, mortars, low-angle trench-fired/other close-in munitions, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)... (D-UNS for VPS 15218DB, 6 Aug 2015) In this issue, we examine Marine Corps initiatives that are in the works relative to active protection systems (APSs), specifically Trophy. On the modern battlefield, the enemy s ability to employ advanced antitank guided missiles (ATGMs), rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and recoilless rifles poses a significant threat to US ground combat vehicles, up to and including the main battle tank. This advancement in threat capability highlights the need to add an APS capability to existing passive protective measures to defend against these threats. The Marine Corps participation in the Army s Expedited APS program is the most rapid and effective means to field an APS capability. The Marine Corps is currently testing the Trophy APS to fill this capability gap in the protection of ground combat vehicles. Trophy Background Russia was the first nation on record to employ APSs in combat, fielding the Drozd system in Afghanistan in the 1980s following over a decade of development and testing. During the same period of time, Israel accelerated the development of their own APS in response to tank and armored vehicle losses during the Yom Kippur War, and later in the second Lebanese War of Israel began the development of the Trophy APS in the early 1990s, finally fielding it in 2009 on their Merkava MK-IV tanks. Figure 1. Soviet T-54/55 with Drozd. After two years of active employment, the first recorded use of the Trophy APS in combat demonstrated the first successful interception of a RPG by this new system. Later in 2014, during Operation Protective Edge, Israeli Merkava MK-IV tanks located near the central Gaza Strip were fired upon by Hamas antitank teams on multiple occasions using various antiarmor weapon systems. Over the course of these engagements, Israeli forces reported zero casualties. After decades of independent testing and development, the US Department of Defense determined that the Israeli Trophy system met US military requirements as a commercial off-the-shelf hard-kill system. For the Marine Corps, the Trophy APS provides added protection through a layered vehicle protection system approach, in conjunction with the Marine Corps M1A1 main battle tank s passive armor. 7

10 How Trophy Works The technology an APS utilizes to defeat threats is not new. While new to ground platforms, it is already in use by aircraft and naval warships. When Trophy detects and identifies an incoming antiarmor threat, it is able to automatically intercept and neutralize the threat by launching an effective countermeasure without any required input from the vehicle crewmembers. Each Trophy launcher is loaded with multiple countermeasures, with additional countermeasures in the auto-loader. This capability allows the Trophy APS to neutralize multiple threats simultaneously. Trophy also alerts the crew to the hostile fire point of origin. Although it does not provide a grid to the point of origin, it does provide the direction of attack in relation to the vehicle s position. Figure 2. Major Components of the Trophy APS. Employment Considerations Understanding the success and durability of the Trophy system has led to its implementation, along with other upgrades to the Marine Corps M1A1 main battle tank. It should be noted that this system may require a future update to tank employment doctrine, since there may be a risk to dismounted infantry operating within close proximity to tanks employing any APS. Current doctrine outlines the interdependence of infantry and tanks when operating within an urban environment for mutual security and support. To mitigate the risk of fratricide to infantry operating alongside tanks outfitted with the Trophy system, certain tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) employed by our ground combat element (GCE) may have to be adjusted. It should be noted that in the Israelis' combat experience, whose infantry and tank TTPs are similar to the Marine Corps, they did not have to adjust those TTPs when Trophy was employed alongside their infantry. During Operation Euphrates Shield, the recent conflict in Syria between ISIS and the Turkish Armed Forces, Turkey lost approximately 10 German-built Leopard 2A4 tanks, with 60% damaged or destroyed by 8

11 Figure 3. How Trophy Works. antiarmor threats. These tanks were not equipped with APSs, highlighting the risk to modern armored vehicles in a threat environment laden with advanced antiarmor capabilities. Although Trophy has the ability to address many of the current advanced antiarmor threats being employed, the current battlefield still poses additional risks to armored ground vehicles. Planners must take into consideration all of the possible adversary tactics and weapons, to include the employment of antitank mines and improvised explosive devices, while the Marine Corps continues to close our capability shortfalls. Figure 4. Turkish Leopard 2A4, destroyed by ISIS ATGM fire. 9

12 Potential Transportation Challenges Any APS employed by Marine Corps ground combat vehicles must be expeditionary, especially via ship-to-shore connectors. As currently configured, when the Trophy APS is installed on the Marine Corps M1A1, the overall turret width is increased. This width increase prevents the use of the M1A1 deep water fording kit, as well as the use of the current landing craft, utility (LCU) for ship-to-shore movement. Another potential constraint is that the increased weight of the M1A1 may not allow for movement via the landing craft, air cushioned (LCAC) when both Trophy and a front-end attachment (such as the track-width mine plow) are installed. Currently, transportation aboard US Navy amphibious ships requires a weapon system explosive safety review board approval for the Trophy s countermeasures, and further testing of the amphibious ready group s capacity to transport the system will be needed. Due to its size, weight, and power constraints, the Trophy APS can only be installed on the M1A1, and will not be used with other ground combat vehicles. Fielding and Implementation In FY17, the Marine Corps began testing the Trophy APS on the Marine Corps M1A1, setting the conditions for a future program of record. In FY18-19, the Marine Corps will procure up to nine systems for developmental testing, TTP experimentation, system optimization, and integration into the GCE. The Marine Corps currently plans to procure a total of 56 systems as special mission kits, capable of outfitting four tank companies in a specific theater of operations, depending on operational requirements. The M1A1 Trophy APS is the first increment in this nascent technology. As this technology progresses, the Marine Corps plans to take advantage of future system advancements to apply to other ground combat vehicles. 10

13 Counter-Battery Radar By CWO2 Alex Molina, GCE Effects Targeting Officer GCE Capabilities Field artillery target acquisition radio detection and ranging (RADAR) systems are located in the radar section in the target acquisition platoon of the field artillery regiment, organic to the Marine division. These assets are critical to the division commander s reactive counterfire (i.e. counterbattery) fight and are typically employed in general support of the division. Incorporating these assets into the division s collection plan enhances coverage of the force and increases force protection. Placement of the target processing center (TPC) and RADAR teams. RADAR zone placement/enemy indirect Figure 1. LCMR Counter-Battery RADAR. fire (IDF) assets to be monitored. Counterfire processing. Target acquisition RADARs are not Security for the teams. intended to work independently, but as a system of systems, providing a tactical Logistics. capability to the force. Careful consideration is Tactical employment. required to ensure the proper sensor-to- Capabilities. 11 shooter links and approval processes are established. The RADAR plan is developed by the radar officer, concurrent with the operation order and its fire support plan. Subordinate units should coordinate all requests for radar support with the artillery regimental operations section and/or the division fire support coordination center (FSCC). When required, the RADAR section has the ability to task-organize to provide a detachment in support of a regiment or battalion. The current fielded USMC target acquisition RADARs are the AN/TPQ-54 Light Weight Counter Mortar RADAR (LCMR) and the AN/TPQ-46 FireFinder RADAR. Additionally, the AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR RADAR will be fielded to the artillery regiments over the next 10 years, with a one-for-one exchange with the AN/TPQ-46 FireFinder RADAR. Figure 2. Setting up the LCMR. If a RADAR detachment is provided to a subordinate unit, it is important to include the RADAR detachment leader early in the planning process. The RADAR detachment leader should work with the supported unit s S-2, S-3, FSCC, and S-4 to plan for the following considerations:

14 Figure 3. AN/TPQ-46 FireFinder. Target Processing Center The RADAR detachment may come with a TPC and any variation of RADARs. The TPC is the command and control node for all RADAR assets that process counterfire targets; it provides liaison between the supported unit and RADARs. The TPC can be located at one of two locations with the senior artillery headquarters to expedite cannon response to counterfire missions, or with the FSCC to take advantage of available intelligence and facilitate clearance of counterfire with ground and air units. The RADAR detachment leader will advise the staff on the best location for the TPC. RADARs can operate dispersed, but the distance is restricted to the limitations of the organic communications assets. RADAR Zones RADAR zones are prioritized areas for locating hostile weapon systems. The RADAR detachment leader makes recommendations for zones size and placement in coordination with the supported unit s S-2 and S-3. There are three types of priority zones. In order of precedence, they are: Critical friendly zone (CFZ) Call for fire zone (CFFZ) Artillery Target Intelligence Zone (ATIZ) 12 Figure 4. AN/TPQ-46 FireFinder. A CFZ is an area established around a friendly unit or location that is critical to the success of the combined arms commander s plan. When the computer predicts an enemy round will impact in a CFZ, the RADAR generates a fire mission on the location from which the round was fired and sends it to the controlling field artillery headquarters. The CFZ does not have to be within the RADARs search zone. A CFFZ designates a search area in which the commander wants to attack hostile firing systems. A CFFZ would be placed around an enemy fire support position identified by the intelligence preparation of the battlespace as a high-payoff target. When the system identifies a target inside a CFFZ, it generates a fire mission. A CFFZ must be in the RADAR s sector of search. An ATIZ is an area in enemy territory that the commander wishes to monitor closely. Any weapon detected in an ATIZ will be reported ahead of all acquisitions, other than those from CFZs or CFFZs. Counterfire Processing The target information from RADAR assets will include a point of origin (POO) and point of impact (POI), and will be collected and processed by the TPC. If no coordination is required for enemy IDF to be prosecuted at the POO, the TPC will transmit a fire mission to the supporting artillery unit for prosecution. If

15 coordination is required, the TPC will transmit the fire mission to the supported unit s FSCC for deconfliction. supported staff. The RADAR detachment leader must be able to perform cueing based on the enemy assessment from the S-2 and reports of incoming enemy IDF from the S-3 or FSCC. Based on the enemy electronic warfare and IDF capabilities, the RADAR team may have to conduct survivability moves. Figure 5. AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR Because of its small size, a RADAR team cannot provide its own security in every tactical situation. Therefore, the supported unit is required to provide security when needed. The RADARs are also susceptible to identification by enemy electronic attack and radio direction finding. This requires close coordination between the RADAR detachment leader and the Figure 6. AN/TPS-80 G/ATOR The supported unit supplies Class I, III, and V for the RADAR detachment. The TPC is responsible for tracking the consumption rates of the individual teams and providing that information to the supporting unit s S-4. Radar Capabilities RADAR Minimum Range Maximum Range at 360 /6400 Mils Maximum Range at 90 /1600Mils IDF Type LCMR 500 meters 10 kilometers Can be adjusted to less than 6400mils Mortars, Artillery, Rockets FireFinder 750 meters N/A 24 kilometers Mortars, Artillery, Rockets G/ATOR 750 meters 32.5 kilometers 60 kilometers Mortars, Artillery, Rockets 13

16 RADAR Emplacement Displacement Personnel Equipment/Transport Requirements Comms assets LCMR 20 Mins 10 Mins 2 Marines (2-0842) FireFinder 10 Mins 6 Mins 8 Marines ( & ) G/ATOR 10 Mins 7 Mins 8 Marines ( & ) 3 large cases with D00337K; able to be air lifted in to battlespace via all aslt sprt assets except H-1 3 D00337K, 1 D00307K, 2 MEP 813 Generator w/ trailers, 1 Antenna Trailer Group (size of D00337K); able to be air lifted via MV- 22/CH-53/fixed wing 1 D00037K w/ MEP 1070, 1 Communication Equipment Group D00337K, 1 D00337K, 1 D00307K, 1 RADAR Employment Group (size of D00037K); able to be air lifted via MV-22/CH-53/fixed wing VRC 110/OE254 PRC-119/OE254/ OE201B, VRC- 117G /RF291 VRC-110/OE254/ OE201B, VRC- 112/ RF291 14

17 UAS Organization Considerations By Maj Christopher Perry, UAS Officer Problem: VMU supporting relationships may not facilitate optimal support to the MAGTF. Background: UASs are operated by joint, coalition, and adversary forces. Each force, even the adversary, potentially have sound doctrinal processes/procedures that could be considered by the Marine Corps for implementation. Solution Description: Consider VMU supporting relationships and whether or not the supporting relationship optimizes support to the MAGTF commander. Organization of the Force O ver the past decade, the use of unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) worldwide has significantly expanded, and is expected to exponentially increase over the next several years. There are many different ways to employ UASs. The purpose of this article is to examine organic, joint, coalition, and adversary methods of employing UASs, and provide considerations for alternate employment methods or command relationships that could improve support to the MAGTF. Given the brief scope of this article, a summary will only be provided on one joint, coalition, and adversary UAS service or nation. Marine Corps In the early 1980s, Marine Corps UASs, then known as remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), were organic to artillery regiments. During this period, RQ-2B Pioneer RPV detachments were attached to the 10th Marine Regiment s Target Acquisition Battery, serving as spotters for artillery. In the mid- 1990s, RPV companies were placed in the Marine aircraft wing (MAW) and given the title, Marine Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Squadron (VMU). There are two types of employment configurations. The centralized configuration involves launch, recovery, and control from a single location. The distributed configuration involves operations from a forward split site or ground control station which provides improved coordination with the supported unit, improved line-of-sight to the unmanned aircraft, and/or 15 improved communications to the supported unit that are not affected by terrain. The primary VMU platform is now the RQ- 21A, which is either employed in support of MEUs as part of the aviation combat element (ACE), or in support of a regiment. Typically, the supporting VMU squadron or detachment determines the best employment method to be utilized when supporting the MAGTF scheme of maneuver centralized or distributed. US Army In the US Army, the primary combined arms, close combat force is the brigade combat team (BCT). The primary brigade-level aviation maneuver organization is the combat aviation brigade (CAB) [similar to the MAW], which provides scalable support to BCTs based on METT-T analysis. The primary Group 3-5 platforms in the Army UAS inventory are the RQ-7B Shadow (typically employed at the company level) and the MQ-1C Gray Eagle (typically employed at the division level), which are organized into companies and placed beneath the CAB alongside various rotary-wing and fixed-wing platforms. Each BCT has a brigade aviation element staffed by a UAS subject matter expert, whose responsibility is to incorporate UASs into the ground commander s scheme of maneuver. Based on METT-T analysis during planning, UAS companies or platoons are generally attached to the supported unit, with the size of the UAS company or

18 (Source: ATP , Counter-Unmanned Aircraft System Techniques) platoon scaled in accordance with the ground scheme of maneuver. Australia Australian Group 3-5 UASs include the RQ- 7B, MQ-9, MQ-4C, and Heron, which are organized into UAS batteries, an organization similar to a VMU. The UAS battery is scalable and supports Army combat brigades by providing attachments to each supported unit. Detachments that are collocated with maneuver elements are provided communications, force protection, and logistics support. UASs that cannot be launched and controlled from a forward location are launched and recovered at the UAS battery main headquarters echelon, the centralized location for launch and recovery operations, and headquarters for UAS operations. To facilitate simplified planning and integration with the ground scheme of maneuver, the UAS battery S-3 section/detachment is located within the joint fires effects coordination cell, an organization similar to the fire support coordination center. Russia Russian UASs are comprised of Group 1-3 UASs (Group 4 and 5 UASs are in development, and projected to be available in 2020), are organized into companies, and are organic to brigades and battalion tactical groups. Russian UASs are placed beneath a battalion/squadron and attached to ground combat units as required for each mission. Each motorized rifle brigade has its own UAS company. Multiple rocket launcher (MRL) units also have their own dedicated UAS, with each UAS matching the capability/range of the MRL. As an example, Group 2 UASs are placed with BM-21 Grad units, and Group 3 UASs are placed with BM-30 SMERCH units. Of note, this arrangement resulted in artillery inflicting 80-90% of Ukrainian casualties. Artillery adjustments were massed on a target 2-10 minutes after observation, a tempo comparable to (and sometimes better than) Marine Corps kill-chain tempo. Conclusion It is noteworthy that the UAS organizations of joint, coalition, and adversary UASs are slightly different from the current Marine Corps UAS organization. These services and countries currently use a structure similar to that utilized by the Marine Corps in the early 1980s, when RPVs were attached to GCE units. While data showing the efficiency of Army and Australian kinetic effects is not available, the observed efficiency of Russian UAS operations during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict may be evidence that further consideration of Marine Corps UAS organizations and supporting relationships should be taken into account when planning for future MAGTF operations. 16

19 Sources: US Army: ATP , Aviation Tactical Employment FM 3-04, Army Aviation USMC: MCRP , Unmanned Aircraft System Operations Australia: LWP-CA (STA) [Australian UAS Operations) Russia: Lessons Learned from the Russo-Ukrainian War; MCIA Tactics Update: Russia Volume 1; OE Watch Volume 5 Issue 2, February

20 RPG-30 Kryuk Hook Antitank By MSgt Peter Clark, Intelligence Tactics Instructor Course Chief Weapon Spotlight Figure 1. RPG-30 Hook (Source: Jane s Defense). The RPG-30 is a Russian 105mm non-reloadable antitank disposable launcher (ATDL). The RPG-30 is also an antitank grenade launcher (ATGL). Commonly known as a rocket propelled grenade, an ATGL is a shoulder-fired antiarmor weapon. The term rocket propelled grenade stems from the Russian term "ruchnoy protivotankovy granatomyot," meaning hand-held antitank grenade launcher. Note: Not all ATDLs are considered ATGLs. For example, the AT4 (84mm) is an ATDL that is also a recoilless weapon. The primary difference between an ATGL and recoilless weapons is that an ATGL round is a propelled rocket; it continues to propel itself once it leaves the launcher. A recoilless weapon fires an un-propelled round; it receives all of its kinetic energy from the initial launch. The AT4 recoilless weapon should also not be confused with the Russian AT-4 Spigot, which is an antitank guided missile. The RPG-30 is a unique ATGL because it is designed to defeat both explosive reactive armor (ERA) and active protection systems (APSs). When the RPG-30 is fired, a 40mm decoy rocket is launched from a side tube, in addition to the 105mm rocket fired from the main tube. This decoy rocket acts as a false target, tricking a target's hard-kill active protection system into engaging it, allowing the main rocket a clear path to the target. 18

21 Figure 2. RPG-30 operating concept (Source: Military Analysis). Performance: The RPG-30 has a maximum effective firing range of 300 meters. The peep sight only goes out to 200 meters. Rate of Fire: Single-shot disposable. Warhead: The 105mm rocket is equipped with a tandem high explosive antitank (HEAT) warhead. A tandem warhead is designed to defeat ERA. 1 ERA is a passive defense system that defends against shaped charge warheads. ERA consists of an explosive layer sandwiched between steel plates. When a shaped charge, such as a HEAT round, detonates against an ERA plate, the ERA plate explodes, forcing the opposing plates to rapidly separate in opposite directions. This has the effect of disrupting the flow of the molten jet created by the detonating shaped charge, significantly decreasing its penetration. ERA typically generates ~ mm equivalent of rolled homogenous armor (RHA) protection. Since ERA will not completely stop a HEAT round from penetrating, a backing layer of armor is still required. Figure 3. Function of ERA (Source: Recreated from CIAR.org). A tandem warhead is two shaped charges arrayed in tandem that are specifically designed to defeat ERA. When a tandem HEAT warhead strikes ERA, the lead charge detonates and its molten jet is disrupted by the exploding ERA. Now that a path is cleared to the vehicle s hull, the second round detonates against it with the full penetrative capabilities of its shaped charge. When detonated against a target without ERA, the penetrative effects of the warhead are enhanced compared to a single warhead. Most tandem warheads have a smaller lead warhead in order to decrease total weight, because its only purpose is to detonate ERA. Performance 1 : Armor (RHA) 900+ mm (35in) (ERA-equipped vehicle), 950+ (37in) (non-era equipped vehicle). Brick 3,000mm (10ft). Reinforced Concrete 1,500+mm (5ft). Log and dirt 3,700mm (12ft). 19

22 Sights: Raised iron peep site (sighting range in meters 50, 100, 150, 200), is compatible with Russian night vision devices for nighttime use. Operating Crew: 1. Length: 3.7ft. Weight: 12kg (26lbs). Active Users: The RPG-30 entered service with the Russian Federation Army in In April 2015, the RPG-30 was marketed for export for the first time at the LAAD 2015 exhibition in Brazil. 2 Sources: 1 TRISA Worldwide Equipment Guide (WEG), Volume 1: Ground Systems, U.S. Army TRADOC, Aug RPG-30 anti-tank rocket launcher, Anti-Tank Weapons, Jane s Infantry Weapons, Sep 2017 Image Sources: Figure 1 Jane s Defense Figure 2 Military Analysis

23 Doctrine Update New Urban Operations Doctrine The Army and Marine Corps recently published Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 3-06/Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 12-10B, Urban Operations as the first part of an urban doctrine update ranging from the joint to battalion and below levels. The Joint Publication (JP) 3-06, Urban Operations is due to be published later this year, and the classic Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 12-10B.1, Military Operations On Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) (formerly MCWP ) is awaiting final editing (readers may access its proposed contents in Doctrine Circular , MOUT at the following link: ftc/mctog/gcecoi/mctog_products/forms/allit ems.aspx). Recognizing that force-to-space ratio issues will confront and stress military forces operating in ever more expansive urban environments, ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B addresses the reality that acting in cities and urban areas will be less of a choice than it was in the past. This is in line with the Marine Corps Operating Concept, which recognizes that with well over half of the world s population living in urban environments, urban terrain is the most likely terrain on which Marine forces will operate. A brand new publication to the Marine Corps, ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, Urban Operations targets battalion and regimental staffs, and captures changes to urban operations beginning with the results of Project Metropolis in the late 1990s, and including the lessons learned in recent US operations, those of other nations, and the near-term impacts of continued, accelerated urbanization. ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, Urban Operations still views the environment through the classic urban triad of complex man-made physical terrain, a population of significant size and density, and dynamic supporting infrastructure. While it greatly improves discussion of information and a dense and hyper-connected population, readers will need to await the publication of JP 3-06 to see the new urban quad. The urban quad will formally add a connected population to the traditional triad. 21 Accordingly, ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B provides readers with additional insight into mitigating risk to smaller forces in larger cities,

24 such as controlling essential routes and infrastructure, conducting aggressive information operations, and avoiding attritional battles. Published before the recent addition of information as a seventh joint function (akin to the warfighting functions), this publication addresses information management within command and control, as well as information operations as part of a multi-domain approach to urban activities. It also provides a very indepth look at the impact of urban terrain on each of the other Marine Corps warfighting functions. As part of its update, ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B recommends methods and approaches for battalion and regimental staffs. From suggesting purpose-based battlespace frameworks (shaping, decisive, and sustaining actions) over spatial-based frameworks (deep, close, and rear) to creating defensive depth in the urban space, to employing different kinds of sensors in combination with manned reconnaissance to create more comprehensive intelligence gathering, the publication provides significant updates to offense, defense, and stability activities in the urban environment. ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B, Urban Operations provides its readers new insights into the urban problem set and more effective ways to create solutions. Given the rapid urbanization and technological advancements occurring in the world, Marine forces are likely to see frequent updates to urban doctrine from the squad to the joint level. ATP 3-06/MCTP 12-10B is just such an update, and needs to be an immediate part of each unit s training and professional military education program. Feedback We welcome your comments on what you ve read in this issue of The Sand Table. Contact the Senior Editor: MCTOG XO, LtCol David O Brien, SMBPLMSMCTOGSANDTABLE@usmc.mil 22

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