TRANSFORMATIONS AND ISSUES REGARDING THE ARTILLERY AND ROCKET SYSTEMS

Transcription

1 238 Military Art and Science TRANSFORMATIONS AND ISSUES REGARDING THE ARTILLERY AND ROCKET SYSTEMS Laurean Georgel OPREAN Ioan Vodă Field and Air Defence Artillery Training Center, Sibiu, Romania ABSTRACT If the war hasn t change radically, its circumstances are by far variable, evolutional and in a permanent change. This is why the weapon systems, military equipments and especially people become the sole tools capable to solve the crises and the conflicts. And the rapid reaction to solve them is the main form of response of the modern armed for ces. Thus, within a complex environment where the forces are engaged, they have to have permanently at their disposition highly accurate weapons, the latest technologies and militaries highly trained for the missions assigned. This is without doubt a factor of operational superiority, a multiplier of the combat power. KEYWORDS: weapon systems, transformation, mortars, multiple rocket systems, tube artillery 1. Mile Stones in the Artillery Evolution In order to correctly understand the artillery evolution starting from the ordinary guns until the current complex artillery and rocket system with which the nowadays armed forces are equipped, I shall present a short history of the artillery, in order to highlight the key moments of the artillery transformation. At the global level, the artillery has had a spectacular evolution over the time. If it were to present briefly the essential transformation that the artillery knew in time, we could identify 6 main moments: a. In the Middle Age, the first revolutionary change in artillery aimed the use of artillery in order to support the cavalry and the infantry, to standardize the instruction with pieces, to organize an artillery search, terrain movements and fires. The range of the first guns was small, 1-2 km, the effects of the personnel stone bombs were limited. But, nevertheless, the munitions have become very different and the gun calibers have increased notably. In order to achieve remarkable result in the combat, the great European powers had also used a great number of guns, the artillery had been organized on entities and had been applied the firing rules and new combat tactics. b. during the modern age, the second revolutionary change of the artillery

2 Military Art and Science 239 materialized into the perfection of the indirect firing methods, the equipment of the artillery subunits with modern pieces, as a result of the technological discoveries and the organization of the artillery groups to ensure a great density of the fire in combat, in order to allow the execution of grouped or masked fires on certain targets. The efficiency of the artillery fires increased due to the development of the guns and cannons, the introduction of recoil mechanism and the aiming mechanism with an independent line of sight, the size of the caliber, range and rounds, as well as by developing the destructive force of the shots and projectile, according to the targets. c. The third important moment worth mentioning was marked by the evolution of the artillery after 1900 and during the First World War. Due to the destructive power of munitions, the mobility and weight of the guns, the artillery has become a main fire support asset for the infantry, as well as a destruction mean against the armored vehicles and the enemy s defensive campaigns. The position war emphasized the role of artillery fires, thus becoming a determining point in the duels of the belligerents. In order to kill the personnel taking cover into the trenches, there were created special projectiles, shrapnel and shells, their fusing burst projected bullets or shrapnel in the trenches occupied by the enemies. The employment of this new type of projectiles imposed the adaptation of new methods and procedures of executing the adjustment and effect fires. For the first time there were used the anti-aircraft and antivehicle artillery, due to the entry of the planes, surveillance balloons and armored tanks. d. The next important moment was noted down by the artillery evolution during the interwar period and the Second World War. In order to strengthen to essential role of the artillery in the firing system of the army, I would like to remind the marshal Montgomery s words: The heavier the combat and the longer the war, the numerous is the infantry to be supported by the artillery. The transformation display the weapon innovations: the self-propelled artillery invented by the British, the reactive projectile launchers invented by the Russians, the V1, V2, V4 tactical rockets invented by the Germans, and the nuclear howitzers with a command and control system produced by the Americans. The destructive capability of the artillery fires during the Second World War reached unbelievable size in terms of concentrating and timely moving the artillery units, artillery fires mass, use of large caliber artillery. I would like to mention two important examples, the first referring to the German gun DORA on train chassis KRUPP, 800 mm, that was transported by 60 trains, eased the total destruction of Odessa and Sevastopol. It was firing projectiles of 7 tones, to a range of 38 km. Over Sevastopol 200,000 tones of projectiles and bombs were fired, the town being effectively demolished. This led to the notable increase of destructive effects of the artillery projectiles that produced important material damages and shook the Russians moral. Actually, during the Second World War, the artillery was also known as the The God of War. This euphemism given by the Soviets, has a justification and a real basis, the artillery fires was the most powerful combat mean in the commanders hands, especially in terms of direct and close support of the infantry and armored vehicles, and the pieces used in the military operations were numerous. For a clear understanding, I shall mention two important examples: during Iaşi-Chişinău (20-23 august 1944) operation, the Soviets managed to concentrate 200 pieces/km in the breaking sector, and the Romanian-German front fought against with 40 pieces/km at most, the force ratio being thus crushing in the favor of Russians (5 to 1). During the Berlin battle, the Soviets grouped 22,000 guns (cannons, howitzers,

3 240 Military Art and Science mortars) 3,200 tanks and autoguns, thus registering a density of 270 guns/km on the direction of striking Bielorus (commanded by Marshal Jukov). The artillery was ready in 30 minutes, the fires reaching a depth of 8-12 km in the German defense. e. Another important moment in the evolution of the artillery is the post-war period when there were brought into the light deep mutations in the military theory and practice regarding the method of using the armed forces and especially the field artillery in the military operations (the French system of the artillery firing bases in Indochina and the American system used in the local wars from Korea and Vietnam). I also want to talk about the strategic, operational and tactic changes in terms of artillery and ballistic missiles use, considering starting from 1956 that the age of tube artillery and smooth bore barrel came to an end, and the rockets are the main action vector for the artillery, especially when it comes to the force, size, destructive effect on target and the range. But this isn t more than a utopia, because after several decades of abandoning the classical artillery, there was a return to its technological development and to the elaboration of new employment procedures in the joint operations. Later, starting with the 80, these mutations were influenced decisively by the artillery missions centralization, the arise and diversification of self-propelled weapons, multiple launch rockets systems, fire control systems, radars, sound and radio search stations, laser telemeters, modern communication and computer systems, munitions with submunitions, armor-piercing rockets, and the application of new doctrines, according to which the battle space won t accept the linear combat. In conclusion, according to the historical scenarios here above, I can state for certain that the basic artillery missions cannot be replaced by other weaponry equipping the aviation, combat helicopters, the armored forces, naval artillery. In order to accomplish the basic artillery missions: general support, direct support, reinforcing support, general and reinforcing support, common support, field artillery and rocket systems coordinate the achievement of lethal and non-lethal effects of joint group forces, fact depicted during the conflicts in Iraq, Western Balkans and Afghanistan. 2. A Comparative Study of the Current Alternatives in Terms of Equipping the Artillery and Their Evolution Trends It is obviously that the artillery history is interesting, but nowadays two aspects are important and those are the current technological level of the artillery and their perspectives in terms of evolution. In order to achieve the assigned tactical missions [1], the field artillery and rockets execute the specific support tasks according to the operation scenario, adopting a dynamic organization, equipment, tactics, techniques and procedures/ttps. Thus the artillery executes 6 basic activities [2]: artillery command and control, multiple data and information acquisition, combat deployment, fire support execution, timely execution of fire maneuver and means, ensuring the service support for the artillery. Hereunder I shall undertake a comparative study of the three current methods of equipping the artillery with fire assets, meaning the tube artillery, smooth bore barrel (the mortars) and the multiple launch rocket systems, from the point of view of the expeditionary forces in the joint operations. Tube artillery and mortars First of all, the Western military experts analyzed the integration of the tube artillery on armored chassis in the expeditionary groups. They reached the conclusion that the general tube artillery and especially its selfpropelled variant, lost terrain before the mortars and MLRS.

4 Military Art and Science 241 Their arguments refer to the fact that the bomb launcher is more efficient due to its organic integration to the smallest tactical levels (battalion and company). It has a short time of reaction, a high rate of fires, and the reduced weight allows to be easily transported on great distances (strategic mobility) in the area hard to enter. According to them, the self-propelled systems ensure a great speed n any type of terrain, a relevant ballistic protection for the personnel, but they are great consumers of resources, especially CL and need an expensive maintenance and difficult to execute in the TO. They are also considered to be heavy to deal with the current scenarios where an operational speed and increasing mobility, reduced resource consumption are needed. On the other hand, the mortars are lighter artillery systems than the selfpropelled artillery; they weight only few hundreds of kilos and can be successfully used within the urban areas, mountains, and cross road, as support for the infantry, rangers, Special Forces, airborne, or aircrafts. It is also suggested the fact that in the scenarios supposing counter battery fires, the mortars are mounted on combat cars or armored amphibious transporters in order to ensure a high ballistic protection. Secondly, some experts consider that a flexible combination of the fire support of different armed forces, like the naval artillery, field artillery or combat helicopters, UAVs equipped with rockets, ballistic missiles and artillery assets shall make the tube artillery unavailable. Thus, the mortars present plenty disadvantages. With a caliber that does not exceed 122 mm and a limited range (between 5-13 km), the mortar can cover only a limited area, a close zone, cannot act over armored cars, munitions with submunitions cannot be used, the target effect is reduced due to the projectile caliber, most of them do not have a centralized fire center and are used only for a limited range of targets. Comparing to the smooth bore barrels, the tube artillery has a large caliber (între ) and fires the different range of munitions that meet the requirements to achieve the effect on targets, thus producing great advantages for the tube artillery before the mortars. More than that, the howitzers have a great range (42 km with base-bleed projectiles), meaning fire covering for a surface 16 th times greater than mortars can cover. It worth mentioned that most of the mortars do not have the precision nor the capability of the tube artillery to execute, in any conditions direct fires, a very important role in executing the close security and defense of the battlefield of the artillery and to ensure force protection. In exchange, the integration of mortars to the infantry battalion or company level or similar, is an advantage from the tactical point of view. We have to bear in our minds that the employment of the tube artillery units can be benefic for the assured fire support and for the information delivered through its STA systems. This is a traditional advantage of the tube artillery against the mortars. The modern management systems of the artillery also integrate and process the data from a large spectrum of sources: acoustic sensors, observation radars, surveillance, counter-battery, photometric images, or UAV images, aerial and satellite images. Together with the operational orders, messages, data and images delivered, all this information creates in real time the data base of the command and control systems of the modern artillery. On the other hand, there are contestations that suggest the fact that the artillery should lose the privilege to access everything that means intelligence within the battlespace and not to be able to coordinate all the lethal and non/lethal assets of the joint forces, in order to achieve the effects on the battlefield. Those experts propose that all the relevant data should be delivered to all

5 242 Military Art and Science the firing assets of the force groups or only to those responsible for the fire conduct. This underlines the decentralization of the fire mission or for the decision-maker to take certain technical measures without priory consulting an Effect coordinator within the battlespace which is the higher rank artillerist of the joint force group. The artillery and armored forces The expeditionary forces must have the capacity to rapidly deploy in the theater of operations, because otherwise the strategic mobility is impossible. Because the mobility is so important, the multinational forces equipped with light armored technique have become the main assets for a rapid reaction in crisis and conflict situations. Thus, in the current scenarios, the combatant forces have permanently benefited from a close support and the armored forces or the artillery has a privileged role. As for the particular features of the armored forces, the tanks can be transported on platforms in order to provide the immediate support. Nevertheless, the armored forces must to be employed in a manner that allows them to fully exploit their capabilities especially the combined action with the other forces assigned to the operation. Thus they should be used for deep operations, marching offensive, in order to execute the counterattacks, aircraft or airborne destruction, own flanks defense or in other situations that could change the course of military actions. Nevertheless, their late intervention leads to the increase of violence, lost of the tempo, and the appearance of great difficulties in controlling the battlespace. As for the artillery, it still remains a branch capable to support efficiently the dynamic operations of the armored forces. It has a determining role in achieving the effects in the enemy disposition and can execute barrage fire to protect their flanks, the gaps or to block, neutralize the airborne or to interdict the movements. Thus, the artillery can cover with fire large surfaces without using the special transport platforms or other elements of service support. It disposes of reduced resources consumption and an easy maintenance. The artillery munitions also became highly accurate (employment of intelligent ammo), the fire concentration is flexible, and the possibility to assess and measure the effects on targets is increased. Even if the targets are not stationary anymore, the artillery has the means to identify, select and precisely strike even the moving targets. Plus, the artillery actions to accomplish the missions can be seen less challenging than using the armored forces, especially for the stability missions. The psychological effects among the civilians or the enemy are easier to be obtained by the artillery through precise strikes, from great distance reducing the damages and the casualties comparatively when using the armored forces. The artillery capability to act as a member of the combined tactical groups, it gives a plus of utility at a tactical level. Usually, the stability and peacekeeping/ peace enforcement operations tend to become more complex and the artillery actions are omnipresent even close to the alignment. The self-propelled systems deploy more rapidly than the armored forces, they can react to a larger spectrum of scenarios of the insurgents and can be kept in the close areas and engaged for a rapid reaction and for great range. The tube artillery and the rocket launchers The adepts of the multiple launcher rockets systems (MLRS, LARS) rushed into recommending them, giving as arguments the followings: the modern launcher systems are not heavier than the tube artillery, making them easier to be transported by air;

6 Military Art and Science 243 their relatively lighter weight and the lack of recoil when releasing the projectile made possible the installation of wheels, thus gaining operational mobility; the rockets currently used by the M LRS have a greater range than a selfpropelled of 155 mm but the range up to 70km led to the separation of the rocket trajectory: ballistic and aerodynamic, meaning that if a counter-battery radar detects the rocket in the second part of the trajectory, it is impossible to determine the coordinates of the subunit that executed the fire. During the Cold War, la rocket launchers were used in the combat against the armored forces that attacked a position, but nowadays the systems are configured to gain effects to great distances and on objectives of tactical, operational and strategic importance. This facilitated the equipment of all launchers with GPS and their connection to a complex data base system. I underline the fact that de experts using the tube artillery are not impressed by these arguments referring to the mobility, range and precision. The development of new category of self-propelled guns/ howitzers armed and partially armed determines to reconsider the tactical advantage of employing the launchers for great distances, between km, because sometimes their effects can be efficiently exploited. Plus, the rounds for the tube artillery are equipped with intelligent fuses and GPS. From their point of view, there are 4 critical observations regarding the tactical deficiencies of the launchers: a. The rocket launchers cannot execute fire within the entire area between the piece and target, generally remaining a clear zone of km due to the construction problems of the launchers. This limit cannot be found on tube artillery that can engage directly and indirectly any target beyond the safety zone, and exceptionally within this area. b. The launchers were designed to execute a large fire concentration, as for the tube artillery can be obtained only by using simultaneously a large number of pieces/ subunits. But, recharging the artillery pieces is very quick and a great organization of the fire tempo provides a permanent fire on a target or a group of targets, while recharging a launcher takes up to minute in optimal conditions. c. While the tube artillery can fire different types of projectiles (explosive, illuminating. Cargo, fuming, printed materiel, incendiary), equipped with different types of fuses, the rocket launchers cannot fire but a limited types of rockets, and their equipment with modern warheads or the change of the rocket characteristics to obtain effects on target, can considerably affect their quality, leading thus to a lack of precision, besides the rapid worn-up of launchers. d. the launcher rocket systems need a certain storage, handling, and transport procedure, this creating greater logistic problems than for the tube artillery. 3. Conclusions Every argument the specialists brought in favor or against a certain field artillery system are trus, but they shouldn t be separately analyzed but complementary. Also, by implementing the ISTAR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance) concept in NATO, they wanted to monitor the battlespace in order to provide the commanders and the staff with the relevant information for the decision making process and to fulfill the assigned mission, the field artillery being both an information provider and a beneficiary. As I mentioned before, neither the Romanian Artillery was left aside when it came to all these analyses and dilemmas. Currently, it is needed a new vision on the artillerist s training, on the organization of the artillery and the activities executed by

7 244 Military Art and Science the artillery staff, fire support planning and execution. This thing leads to a new challenge especially when it comes to the equipment with the new technology and artillery assets compatible with those from the NATO member countries that can afford to complete and accomplish the planned effects, the development of new methods that can allow the improvement of the quality and precision of the artillery fires. I consider that the field artillery and rockets should keep maintaining the same high standards, no matter the conditions of the deciders. I also specify that the general major William J. Snow s words can still be taken into consideration: There is no other arm of the service whose efficiency is so directly dependent upon its officers as is the Field Artillery. The trends of the artillery systems at the beginning of this decade can mainly be circumscribed to the development of their traditional development: lethal, mobility, rapidness, precision, efficiency of ammo, fire center automation, proper armed protection against the ballistic impact of the bullets and shells, operational autonomy over 600 km and reaction speed under 2 minutes. We should not forget the safety when exploiting it, automatic load and aim, increase of range and fire precision, different intelligent munitions, and general training on simulators in terms of artillery piece to brigade level. In conclusion, I consider that the development of this arm resides mainly in the adaptability to the new requirements of the conflicts, in reactivating the striking means and data acquisition assets, in a proper training for the artillery structures, in optimizing the artillery staff activities and especially in creating those structural, administrative, active and technological capabilities required to execute the traditional operational functions. REFERENCES 1. Manualul pentru luptă al batalionului de artilerie, (Bucharest, Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, 2007), Ibidem, 12. BIBLIOGRAPHY Bucher, A. United States Marine Corps. The Third Revolution of Artillery. Oprean, Laurean-Georgel, Lt.col. Manualul pentru luptă al batalionului de artilerie. Bucharest: Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, 2007, 12. Stroea, A. Compatibilitatea artileriei cu cerinţele câmpului de luptă modern. Bucharest: Editura Centrului Tehnic-Editorial al Armatei, 2006 S