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2 Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 07 FEB REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED to TITLE AND SUBTITLE Operation Anaconda An Air Power Perspective 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Headquarters United States Air Force,AF/XOL,Washington,DC 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR S ACRONYM(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR S REPORT NUMBER(S) 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT a. REPORT unclassified b. ABSTRACT unclassified c. THIS PAGE unclassified Same as Report (SAR) 18. NUMBER OF PAGES a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18

3 From the Chief of Staff Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and a coalition of like-minded nations embarked on a worldwide campaign against terrorism. In support of this fight, the United States Air Force has played a vital role in Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, and most recently, IRAQI FREEDOM. In memory of the victims of terrorism and in consideration of the Airmen who will see this fight through to victory, we must learn and apply the lessons of air and space operations in these joint campaigns. Few causes will ever have greater importance. One of the most crucial joint combat operations in Afghanistan was Operation ANACONDA, designed and executed to remove the last remaining organized Taliban resistance. Operation ANACONDA generated lessons involving many aspects of the art of joint warfare. These are explored in detail in this report, Operation ANACONDA, An Airpower Perspective. This report reminds all Airmen of the complexities inherent in a successful joint operation. It highlights the necessity of clear lines of command, and it reminds us that organizational capabilities and proper coordination of joint activities cannot be taken for granted. It is also vital to realize that lessons learned from this operation were used to improve our joint combat planning and capabilities in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. As a Service, we will continue to refine the employment of our expeditionary air and space forces in joint operations to ensure their effectiveness over any adversary. We will all benefit from embracing and applying the thorough and thoughtful reporting and analysis in these and other lessons learned reports. We cannot afford to do less. I thank Dr. Rebecca Grant and the teams of professionals at Task Force Enduring Look and the Office of Air Force Lessons Learned (AF/XOL) who researched and assembled this report. The Secretary of the Air Force and I salute the dedication and sacrifice of all Airmen contributing to our successes in Operations NOBLE EAGLE, ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI FREEDOM, and ongoing operations around the world.

4 Table Of Contents Executive Summary 3 Chapter 1: Introduction 11 The Roots of Operation ANACONDA 15 Chapter 2: Planning for Operations in the Khowst-Gardez Region 19 Early Planning for Khowst-Gardez Area Operations 20 The Plan Comes Together 24 Enemy Situation 27 Estimating Enemy Courses of Action 31 Hammer and Anvil 32 Chapter 3: Widening the Plan 35 Planning for Close Air Support 38 Theater Air Control Prior to Operation ANACONDA 41 Moving to Bagram and Creating an ASOC Cell 50 USCENTCOM Approval 55 Targets for Preliminary Airstrikes 56 Airlift Requirements 57 Chapter 4: The First 72 Hours: 2-4 March Pre-AssaultActivity 60 Air Assault by TF Rakkasan 62 Perceptions of Operation ANACONDA after 2 March March Battle at Takur Gar (Roberts Ridge) 72 Improving Close Air Support 78 Assessing the First 72 Hours 80 Chapter 5: Renewing the Attack: 5-15 March Building Up to Renew the Attack 83 Valley of Death 85 Changes in Air Support 88 Seizing Objective Ginger 92 Afghan Forces Clear the Whale 95 1

5 Chapter 6: Persistent Close Air Support 99 Hour-by-Hour Airstrike Analysis 104 Chapter 7: Observations 110 Some Implications 112 Training 112 Planning and Preparation 113 Execution 116 Command 118 Conclusion 119 Enduring Impact 120 2

6 Executive Summary Operation ANACONDA is a unique case study in the application of force. From 2-16 March 2002, a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF), built around 1,411 U.S. Army soldiers, and Special Operations Forces (SOF) from the United States and six other nations took on the task of clearing the Shahi Kot valley in eastern Afghanistan of al- Qaeda and Taliban forces who had survived earlier battles. It was a complex, non-linear battle that demanded full integration of Joint forces and, to the frustration of all, revealed some Joint warfighting stress points. For the first time in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, American forces were locked in a prolonged ground battle in difficult terrain. Eight Americans (5 U.S. Army, 2 USAF and 1 U.S. Navy SEAL) died during Operation ANACONDA and 80 were wounded. Seven of those deaths came on 4 March 2002 at the ridgeline at Takur Gar during a helicopter insertion of a Special Forces team and an attempt to rescue them. Operation ANACONDA also turned out to be an acid test of land and air component cooperation in a pitched fight. The al-qaeda and Taliban forces holed up in prepared defensive positions in the 10,000-foot mountains and rained mortars and small arms fire down on the Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen holding blocking positions below. Over the next two weeks, bombers, fighters, helicopters and AC-130 gunships delivered close air support (CAS) into the postage-stamp size battle area measuring about 8 nautical miles (nm) x 8 nm. Deconfliction and coordination of this fire support proved challenging with friendly troops and controllers in a small area. In the air, funneling the strikes in was just as intense, and strike aircraft reported several near misses as one pulled up from an attack run while another rolled onto the target. After initial contact sparked 3

7 heavy fighting, air controllers attached to ground forces or airborne in OA-10 Thunderbolts called in airpower to provide immediate close air support. Ultimately, Operation ANACONDA was a success. Operation ANACONDA sought to clear the enemy in that valley area and in those hills, said General Tommy R. Franks, U.S. Army, Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and succeeded in doing so where many operations in history had not been able to get that done. 1 However, it was also an object lesson in the complexities of planning and executing rapid air support for ground operations in a hostile, rugged environment. The report that follows seeks to document air and ground operations during the battle in a case-study format. It offers new statistical analysis from a joint database of the immediate close air support delivered during the battle. Conclusions are left to the reader. This Executive Summary outlines the principal phases of the battle and the overarching observations from this case study. Operation ANACONDA developed out of a plan to clear the Khowst-Gardez region of al-qaeda and Taliban remnants before they could organize a spring offensive and destabilize the interim Afghan government. The fall of Kabul and other cities in November and December 2001 had pushed surviving al-qaeda and Taliban east toward the high, rugged mountains bordering Pakistan. In early December 2001, a strike at Tora Bora tried to round them up, but many escaped. From 6-14 January 2002, smaller attacks hit Zhawar Kili, site of a well-established al-qaeda terrorist training camp. Attention centered on the Khowst-Gardez region because it had a known concentration of al-qaeda forces and might also harbor top al-qaeda leaders. Planning 4

8 for operations in Khowst-Gardez dates back to early January 2002, but the plan didn t come together until early February Special Operations planners initially met on 6 February 2002, later a small group of the Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) planners joined them for another meeting on 9 February On 17 February 2002, the team briefed their plan to the CFLCC, Lieutenant General Paul T. Mikolashek, U.S. Army, and Major General Franklin L. Buster Hagenbeck, U.S. Army, Commander, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) and also CFLCC-Forward (Fwd), who would also command Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain in this operation. The Operations Order (OPORD) published 20 February 2002 spelled out CJTF Mountain s concept of operations (CONOPS). Working with Afghan forces, the plan was to fight with air assault teams along the eastern ridges. Combat operations would take several hours. CJTF Mountain s CONOPS called for nonlinear simultaneous operations in noncontiguous areas of operations oriented on the following priority objectives: (1) Capture/kill al-qaeda key leaders (2) Destroy al-qaeda foreign fighters (3) Prevent the escape of al-qaeda foreign fighters (4) Defeat Taliban forces that continue to resist The main effort and supporting efforts would effectively box in the area with Afghan forces deployed both west and east of the steep mountain ranges. 2 But two flaws marred the plan for a swift operation. First, the enemy troop estimates of al-qaeda and Taliban forces was in dispute with ranges between 168 to over 5

9 one thousand. Although there were higher estimates by USCENTCOM, the number that made it into CONOPS were much smaller in the Shahi Kot valley itself. After the battle was underway, the CFLCC-Fwd staff calculated the higher end of the spectrum and more than was originally estimated. The gap went unresolved. The second flaw was that the air component had not been involved in the early development of the plan. Planners all along counted on a certain number of CAS sorties per day based on the estimates of enemy forces in the area. But Lieutenant General T. Michael Moseley, the Combined Forces Air Component Commander (CFACC) did not learn of Operation ANACONDA until 23 February 2002, a mere 5 days before the original start date of 28 February Neither the land nor the air component had done all they needed to do to put a theater air control system in place to handle close air support requests. Coordination of pre-strike targets, logistics and communications was inadequate. The final plan for Operation ANACONDA was briefed during a video teleconference with General Franks on 26 February The CFLCC asked for General Franks to hear comments from General Moseley, who estimated the air component could run two simultaneous CAS events, given the size of that [area.] 3 However, this assumed deconfliction and orchestration of fires plus knowing the sustainment requirement, approving pre-planned targets, understanding the rules of engagement inside and outside engagement zones, defining activities for special operations teams, checking the status and equipment of enlisted terminal attack controllers (ETAC) and ground forward air controllers (GFAC) and more. 4 Later that day, 26 February 2002, forecasts of low visibility led to a two-day weather delay. 6

10 Operation ANACONDA began on 2 March 2002 as Afghan forces began advancing toward the Shahi Kot valley. Unexpected fire--thought to be from al-qaeda mortars, but later determined to be accidental fire from an AC-130 gunship--turned back the Afghan force. Still, the air assault went ahead after preliminary sweeps of the landing zones by AH-64 Apache helicopters. But soldiers and special operations forces being delivered by helicopters came under attack almost immediately as they found themselves pinned by fires from hard-core al-qaeda forces on the mountain slopes above them. Calls for close air support came fast and furious. The Coalition air component delivered 177 precision bombs (Joint Direct Attack Munition [JDAM] GBU-31s and laser-guided 500-pound GBU-12s) and strafing attacks in the first 24 hours. On the ground, CJTF Mountain extracted portions of Task Force (TF) Rakkasan from the southern positions Blocking Points (BP) Heather and Ginger and reinforced the northern BPs. Ground forces held on while close air support continued. One SITREP that evening concluded: Enemy continues to control the high ground in vic [in vicinity of] whaleback [the western ridge of the Shahi Kot Valley] and small fortified pockets throughout the area of operations. The theater reserve was committed to the battle on 3 March Numerous bombing strikes were made against dug-in enemy forces vic Babulkeyl resulting in moderate to heavy enemy casualties, the CJTF Mountain report noted on 3 March Quick reactions by combatants on the ground, persistent close air support, the extraction of forces from BPs Eve, Heather, and Ginger, and the commitment of the TF Summit reserve force contained damage and kept Operation ANACONDA underway. In the first 72 hours, 751 bombs fell into the Operation ANACONDA battle area (495 7

11 precision strikes and 256 MK-82s.) For example, bombers delivered strings of 27 MK- 82s five times in 15 hours on 3 March CJTF Mountain also noted that the enemy fighters were staggering from three nights of air strikes. 6 The tragedy at Takur Gar (later known as Roberts Ridge) began in the early morning hours of 4 March Three rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) hit an U.S. Army MH-47 Chinook helicopter attempting to re-insert a U.S. Navy SEAL team. 7 Under intense fire, the MH-47 lifted off rapidly, causing Petty Officer First Class Neil C. Roberts to fall from the aircraft. Then at 0540L, the lead CH-47 from a rescue force was also hit by RPG fire and crashed. Embattled forces fought on the ground all day as F- 15Es and other aircraft strafed and bombed al-qaeda positions only a few hundred feet away. 8 The task of securing the area and wiping out the concentration of al-qaeda and Taliban was far from over. CJTF Mountain anticipated that elements already in the Objective Ginger AO [area of operation] will continue their movement into preestablished fighting positions to the south and east. 9 A series of airstrikes on al- Qaeda reinforcements helped turn the tide on 5 March Late in the afternoon, an MQ-1 Predator spotted vehicles and al-qaeda fighters in a ravine to the south of Objective Ginger. Over the next several hours, A-10s, F/A-18s, and an AC-130 gunship attacked al-qaeda forces. Target neutralized personnel in the open, the ground controller reported. 10 The air support had a direct impact on the battle. Due to increased bombing and CAS the enemy was unable to sustain any effective fires upon our forces, stated CJTF Mountain s evening report on 7 March

12 The final phase of Operation ANACONDA consisted of two tasks: taking Objective Ginger and clearing a major promontory west of the valley (known as the Whale), so that Afghan military forces could move safely into the Shahi Kot valley. Extensive air support enabled the 9 March 2002 operation to seize Objective Ginger. More bombs were dropped from fixed-wing aircraft on 9 March 2002 (327 total) and 10 March 2002 (340 total) than on any other days of Operation ANACONDA. Attack helicopters, fighters, bombers and AC-130 gunships delivered a persistent, lethal barrage for 75 minutes from 1745 local time until The objective was secured on 10 March To clear the Whale and enter the Shahi Kot valley, an additional several hundred Afghan forces moved over the Whale on 12 March 2002, while their tanks and additional forces attacked from the north toward Serkhankhel. Activity in Operation ANACONDA tapered off after 14 March Two days later, CJTF Mountain was able to report to the CFLCC that there were very few enemy personnel in the entire ANACONDA area. 12 Thank goodness for the bravery of those soldiers that we were able to take the fight to the enemy and be successful here, said General Richard B. Myers, U.S. Air Force, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 13 Two major lessons emerged. First was the critical importance of unity of command. Throughout this intense operation, no single commander had authority to integrate all the disparate force elements. With the late start in planning, ground and air commanders alike scrambled to correct shortcomings throughout the battle. The second lesson was that views on the most efficient use and application of airpower differed significantly. There were gaps in the understanding of tactical procedures for theater air 9

13 control, and air and ground planners and operators alike were following different doctrinal concepts on the use of airpower in relation to the ground battle. Operation ANACONDA led both the U.S. Army and the USAF to study shortfalls immediately and correct them. Two sessions of high-level talks on Operation ANACONDA paved the way for better operational linkage between the components. As General Franks said later, We ll never have the precise picture of any particular place where we re conducting an operation. 14 The challenge is to open the aperture on this so that there are more people involved in a process like this, so that the right sets of questions can be asked earlier, and the pre-positioning and the prep tasks can be done prior to execution, noted General Moseley. 15 And with Operation ANACONDA s sobering lesson in mind, that was exactly what the components did to ensure success in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM a year later. 10

14 Chapter One Introduction Operation ANACONDA was planned as a brigade-sized operation under the command of 3 rd Brigade, 101 st Airborne Division (Air Assault), named Task Force Rakkasan and became the biggest ground battle of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. 16 Operation ANACONDA began early on 2 March and concluded on 16 March The CONOPS for Operation ANACONDA was for Coalition forces to attack in the Shahi Kot valley and close off escape routes and trap any fleeing al-qaeda and Taliban fighters. Instead, both the Afghan and U.S. forces encountered unexpected resistance. The initial Hammer and Anvil plan collapsed. All ground forces came under heavy fire from al-qaeda positions in the surrounding hills and villages. Air controllers, most crammed into a 3 nm x 5.6 nm area, called for close air support (CAS) as the intense battle continued. In the days that followed, the plan was reformulated, troops were reinforced, and air support mechanisms were beefed up. Coalition aircraft delivered an average of more than 250 bombs per day into an 8 nm x 8 nm area about one-sixteenth the size of an Operation DESERT STORM-era killbox. TF Rakkasan took their final objectives on 10 March 2002 and Afghan military forces with their embedded SOF teams entered and cleared the Shahi Kot valley a few days later. By 16 March 2002, Operation ANACONDA was over. For the first time in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, American forces were locked in a prolonged, bloody ground battle in difficult terrain. Eight Americans died in Operation ANACONDA and 80 were wounded. 17 Operation ANACONDA sought to 11

15 clear the enemy in that valley area and in those hills, said General Tommy R. Franks, U.S. Army, Commander, U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), and succeeded in doing so where many operations in history had not been able to get that done. 18 But questions abounded: why was the intelligence estimate off the mark? How had al-qaeda remnants managed to put up such stiff resistance? Was the ground plan sound? Did close air support provide all it could? Did the mix of SOF forces and conventional forces complicate matters? Had the air and land components cooperated to the best of Memorial Service for the Eight Servicemen Killed in Operation ANACONDA their ability or had they failed to serve the combatant commander well? Operation ANACONDA raised important questions about land and air component operations under intense combat conditions. It was a shock to the system that a force with plenty of air available, and well-trained troops on the ground, could encounter such fierce resistance late in the Afghanistan war and struggle so hard with the coordination of 12

16 air support. Publicity about the operation fueled debate both in the press and in military circles. While all praised the tactical performance of Soldiers, Sailors, and Airmen alike, there was a pervasive sense that something had gone wrong, and especially that the command and control organizations had all faltered in small ways that added up to significant collective mistakes. Senior military leaders wanted to learn all they could about the successes and failures of Operation ANACONDA. USCENTCOM produced an after-action report in June 2002, but it was not released. The Air Force began immediate improvements in equipping air controllers and other measures designed to improve close air support. The Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff led high-level meetings in the fall of 2002 to discuss close air support and other air and land component coordination issues for future operations. Still, the frustrations and emotions surrounding Operation ANACONDA left a strong impression. As General Franks said of the operation in May 2002: The view that we will inevitably get from two or three different people involved in an operation like this will be absolutely factual and valid in the view of the people who are absolutely and honestly on the ground seeing what they saw. And so I would not debate the reports or comments that people have made. 19 Missing from the debate is an account of what happened on the ground and in the air. This report relies on full sources reports filed during the operation, immediate afteraction reports, statistical analyses, and interviews with participants to try to fill in a more complete picture of the planning and execution of ground and air operations during Operation ANACONDA. 13

17 The remainder of this introductory chapter reviews the roots of the operation. Chapter Two examines the early intelligence assessments of the Khowst-Gardez region, initial planning for the operation and CJTF Mountain s concept of operations as published in February Chapter Three discusses the air component s effort to put together its plan for airlift and support on a few days notice and reviews the theater air control system that became so heavily tasked during the battle. The battle itself is divided into two chapters. Chapter Four discusses the first 72 hours, including the deaths of task force personnel at the battle of Takur Gar (afterwards referred to as Roberts Ridge.) Figure 1: Lines of Communication from Kabul to Gardez 20 Chapter Five covers task force efforts to renew the attack, the close air support on attempted al-qaeda reinforcements, and the final seizure of Objective Ginger and a terrain feature known as the Whale. A separate chapter examines statistics of the 14

18 persistent close air support and its impact on the battle. The last chapter discusses implications and Operation ANACONDA s enduring impact. The Roots of Operation ANACONDA Operation ANACONDA appeared to be a unique episode in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM but its roots went back to the battles of November and December The fall of major cities once controlled by the Taliban forced al-qaeda and Taliban remnants to retreat to old strongholds. Many al-qaeda and Taliban managed to flee the battle area in front of Northern Alliance forces. After Kabul fell on 13 November 2001, one Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) officer noted that we sat there with report after report after report of thousands of vehicles leaving Kabul on the southwestern road leading to the Khowst-Gardez region (see Figure 1). Airstrikes were restricted because of concerns that civilians might be mixed in. 21 At Konduz, Northern Alliance forces arrived at the outskirts of the town on 20 November They then permitted a negotiating period to arrange surrenders before they took the town for good on 26 November As the Northern Alliance gained control of the center of the country, only a limited number of al-qaeda could make an escape west through Iran. Hard-core al-qaeda who managed to escape were left with few places to go. Yet many of them as well as Osama bin Laden and other key leaders remained at large. Most of the main hideouts and escape routes lay to the east and south on the semicircular border with Pakistan. Below the Khyber Pass a switchback indented the 15

19 border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Rimming this indentation of the border were some of the region s tallest mountains (see these geographic features in Figure 2). Figure 2: Rugged Terrain of Afghanistan and Pakistan 22 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), General Richard B. Myers, described it by noting: that whole area of Eastern Afghanistan up against Pakistan is very, very rugged territory. The line on the map is just a line on a map And so you can ebb and flow through that territory as you wish, and you find people that want to support you, and my guess is that bin Laden is moving fairly frequently. 23 The area General Myers described was home turf for the al-qaeda. Bin Laden had operated there since the late 1990s and as Taliban control of Afghanistan collapsed the mountains became a refuge again. 16

20 USCENTCOM was well aware of the situation. On 9 December 2001, Coalition forces attacked the Tora Bora cave complex. But many Taliban and al-qaeda escaped again. There are multiple routes of ingress and egress, noted Vice CJCS, General Peter Pace, U.S. Marine Corps, so it is certainly conceivable that groups of 2, 3, 15, 20 could [be] walking out of there. 24 After Tora Bora there was a sense that because there were not enough boots on the ground, that some bad guys got away. The way to rectify that was to increase the number of conventional forces and turn this into a boots on the ground operation, commented one officer later involved in air support for Operation ANACONDA. 25 Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Donald H. Rumsfeld confirmed on 19 December 2001 that the hunt was still on. I would think that it would be a mistake to say that the al-qaeda is finished in Afghanistan at this stage, he said. Some Taliban had just gone home, dropped their weapons these are Afghans and they ve gone back to their villages and said, To heck with it. I m not going to do anything. On the other hand, the al-qaeda do not drift into the villages, particularly, the SECDEF explained. They re still in pockets. They re still fighting, in some cases. 26 Coalition forces were also shifting to a different phase of the war. The Combined Forces Land Component Commander (CFLCC) stood up in mid-november 2001 and received tactical control (TACON) of all ground forces operating in theater, including SOF. By the beginning of 2002, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM was trying to move from Phase III Decisive Operations to Phase IV, where the emphasis would be on security assistance to the new interim Afghan government. 17

21 Before that transition, USCENTCOM still needed to eliminate remaining al- Qaeda and Taliban forces and continue with site exploitation, raiding caves and other caches that might provide information on the Al Qaeda terrorist organization and its future plans. The missions were also trying to confirm or deny the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Afghanistan. Typical exploitation operations lasted several hours only and rarely encountered enemy forces. This set a pattern of assumptions that would color the planning for Operation ANACONDA. 18

22 Chapter Two Planning for Operations in the Khowst-Gardez Region Afghanistan in February 2002 was not entirely free of Taliban influence, which posed problems for the Afghan Interim Authority Chairman Hamid Karzai. After Tora Bora and Zhawar Kili, the Khowst-Gardez region appeared to be the center of remaining al-qaeda and Taliban strength in Afghanistan (see Figure 3). A glance at the map showed why the Khowst-Gardez region was a natural collection point for the Taliban and al-qaeda forces. The province of Khowst jutted 50 miles eastward into Pakistan like a peninsula. The Khowst-Pakistan border was rural territory labeled by Pakistan simply as the federally administered tribal areas. From the city of Khowst, the relatively flat terrain offered easy access to Pakistan. Three major roads led from Khowst to towns inside Pakistan, while river watersheds provided other routes of travel. Refugee camps full of Afghan nationals clustered inside the Pakistan border. 19

23 Figure 3: Gardez and Shahi Kot valley 27 As for Gardez, it was the capital city of Paktia province, with Khowst to the southeast and near the Pakistani border (see Figure 3). All major routes south from Kabul intersected about 75 miles south at Gardez. About 15 miles south of the city, foothills sheltered the Shahi Kot valley, which would be the major focus of Operation ANACONDA. Early Planning for Khowst-Gardez Area Operations Preliminary plans for future coalition operations in the Khowst-Gardez region dated back at least to January On 1 January 2002, a summary titled CJFLCC Operations reviewed threats from remaining concentrations of al-qaeda and Taliban forces in Afghanistan. The threat assessment stated there could significant enemy forces 20

24 in the region attempting to reconstitute a viable force to counter U.S./Coalition forces entering the area. The objective in the Khowst area was to clear Khowst-Gardez region of AQ/Taliban elements and pockets of resistance [and] exploit enemy sites. 28 Reports indicated the local populace was sympathetic to the Taliban. The same January document that mentioned a strong Taliban and al-qaeda presence in Khowst-Gardez also outlined future military action. It identified the Afghan Commander the ATF [Afghan Task Force] commander for operations in Khowst and noted that planning was underway for the objectives in the area for mid January 2002 operations and included raids for high value targets. The CFLCC published an initial threat assessment and concept of operations for destroying al-qaeda in Khowst-Gardez and blocking escape routes to Pakistan. 29 The Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) sketched out operations to identify al-qaeda leaders, foreign fighters, and Taliban members still continuing to resist. The plan called for identifying the al-qaeda concentrations and working with local Afghan forces. Objectives not suitable for special operations would be singled out for attack by conventional forces. While the original idea was for Afghan forces to carry the brunt of the action, this FRAGO specifically noted that CFLCC would act in support of Afghan forces when possible. Critical to success will be synchronizing unconventional and conventional operations to find, positively identify, and destroy enemy forces without collateral damage, the FRAGO stated. 30 In late January 2002, Combined Forces Commander guidance was issued through the Coalition Target Coordination Board (CTCB). The objectives were: Eliminate al-qaeda pockets of resistance and key Taliban leaders Expedite operations IVO [in vicinity of] Khowst-Gardez 21

25 Combine the use of Afghan, coalition conventional, and SF [Special Forces] forces IOT [in order to] systematically sweep and clear Khowst-Gardez Focus ISR and solidify IPB [intelligence preparation of the battlefield] IOT facilitate operations Operations should be swift (<72 hours) and decisive 31 The SOF TF was paying close attention to the Khowst-Gardez region as their next potential target area according to the Commander of the 20th Air Support Operations Squadron (20ASOS) and the assigned 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) ALO, who was at this time working with special operations forces. They beefed up our numbers of TACPs [tactical air control parties] with these ODAs (operational detachment-alpha) teams operating in areas like Khowst and Gardez, the Commander stated. By mid-february 2002 there were about six ODA teams operating in the area. 32 Operation ANACONDA started off as a SOF plan. Initial planning took place during the week of 6-13 February According to this commander, each one of the task forces had been looking at this area, 70 square miles, for six weeks. The tasker came down for each of the task forces to come up with a plan, how we would handle this concentration, this puddle of al-qaeda. Next, The SOF TF came up with a plan, which was not much different than what we had been doing for the previous few months, essentially building engagement zones, special engagement zones in this case, around that area. Cut off various escape routes, run an air campaign against it. Like Tora Bora, bomb the living heck out of it for four or five days, as long as it took, and then slowly tighten the noose on it. We had the advantage here as opposed to Tora Bora We could put a fishnet around all four sides. 33 On 6 February 2002, various representatives of special operations forces met in Kabul to establish that they needed a coordinated battle front. They knew that the Khowst-Gardez area had entrenched al-qaeda, including Chechen al-qaeda who would fight to the death. To make it even more tempting, there was very strong suspicion that 22

26 this [was] where UBL [Usama (sic) bin Laden] was, because this is where the palace guard was, one SOF participant noted. 34 On 9 February 2002, the land and special operations component elements met in Kabul. They determined that large concentrations of forces were in the Shahi Kot valley. Reports indicated that enemy forces numbered as high as 1,000 foreign fighters at this point in early February However, planners had to make a judgment call about the accuracy of the estimates. Previous experience in Afghanistan showed that sources sometimes overestimated the numbers of enemy forces. In relation to previous engagements, the 20ASOC Commander cautioned: We used to call it Taliban math because the numbers were not worth anything that you could plan around. As a hypothetical example, he explained that a given estimate might be enemy and when the operation was under way, it would turn out to be under On the other hand, relying on these ground assets was often the only way to gain intelligence. As a later Army report observed: The enemy waged primarily a guerilla war in the contemporary operating environment. They did not typically have well-defined organization (order of battle) nor did they employ forces in open terrain. The intelligence required to support this kind of war placed a premium on human intelligence (HUMINT) 37 Beginning in early February 2002, the SOF TF began to submit requests for more improved surveillance of the Shahi Kot area. But final planning for new operations had to go ahead without waiting for the final analysis to be resolved. 23

27 The Plan Comes Together The plan for Operation ANACONDA was finalized February 2002 at the CFLCC-Fwd s new location at Bagram Airfield, approximately 25 nm north of Kabul. Planners from CFLCC/C3, and differing teams worked on operational and collection requirements. Before mid-february 2002, the planning elements that evolved into Operation ANACONDA were all very conceptual according to the 20ASOS Commander. It was unclear who would command the operation 10th Mountain, the 101st Airborne, or a SOF commander. 38 While some Airmen, such as the 20ASOS Commander, were involved in preliminary planning since they were embedded with SOF operations, the air component had no role in the planning for Operation ANACONDA at this time. Our tasker was to go to Bagram with the SOF TF s operational inputs to the conceptual plans, recalled the commander. 39 Bagram was a combat zone base with limited support and communications available at this time. In fact, the CFLCC-Fwd planning staff was in the midst of moving from support locations to Bagram from February The initial planners decided that the complex integration of U.S., Coalition, and Afghan forces demanded a CFLCC-Fwd to assume command of the operation. The plan now had a name. An individual from the U.S. Army, 5th Special Forces named the concept Operation ANACONDA. 40 But for those not immediately involved in the small-group planning effort, Operation ANACONDA was barely at the rumor stage. As the plan morphed from a special operations mission to a larger, more complex conventional and special forces operation, the transition time was so brief that the 24

28 components did not have the chance to initiate, much less complete, a deliberate planning process. USCENTCOM was becoming strongly committed to mounting operations in this target-rich area for many reasons. CJCS General Myers was briefed on planning for the upcoming operation during his visit to the theater in mid-february He later said: And of course, one of the reasons we want to go in there is not just to eradicate the Taliban and the al Qaeda [sic], but also to gain information, and information that might have impact upon future operations somewhere around this world, and so we d like some of them to surrender so we can get our hands on them and interrogate them. 41 Given all these considerations, the ideal operation would be a short-duration seizure of the area with the chance to take prisoners and search the caves and redoubts thoroughly. Planners also assumed that the al-qaeda might launch a spring offensive around the time of the Islamic New Year on 21 March 2002, and they wanted to wipe out the Khowst-Gardez concentration before then. 42 The small team led by CFLCC-Fwd representatives had a plan ready to brief by video teleconference (VTC) on 14 February They then decided to delay the briefing until the CFLCC, Lieutenant General Paul T. Mikolashek, U.S. Army, arrived at Bagram three days later. General Mikolashek, Major General Franklin L. Buster Hagenbeck, U.S. Army, Commander of 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) and CFLCC-Fwd, and also Commander, CJTF Mountain, and all other subordinate task force commanders took the concept brief on 17 February It appears that the CFLCC was briefed on a concept for a swift operation that would not face heavy enemy resistance. Evidence for this conclusion comes from the CFLCC s reported questions for the briefer. He asked first what level of understanding does CFACC have regarding this operation at 25

29 this time? He then directed coordination with the CFACC for the estimated number of sorties required for the operation and dedicated airlift support to build the logistics base for the operation. 43 He also asked whether there were not actually too many conventional US forces in the objective area, given the enemy situation estimate. CJTF Mountain indicated that civil affairs/humanitarian operations would follow rapidly once areas were secured. The overall tone of this meeting as recorded a few weeks later indicated that there were few major concerns with the concept or with the enemy situation estimate. On 17 February 2002 at 2100 local time, the CFLCC designated the Afghan military forces as the main effort, took overall command, and ordered the execution date to be no earlier than 25 February 2002, with a target date of 28 February This gave CJTF Mountain barely more than a week to take over an operation that had started out in SOF hands. I think that s where the ball was dropped first, General Moseley commented later. I don t think the CFLCC knew what this thing was growing into, and I don t believe the CINC staff knew what this was growing into, he said. 44 indicated: The Operations Order (OPORD) was published on 23 February 2002 and I will use a combination of conventional and special operation forces working in conjunction with Afghan forces (AF) to complete the destruction of identified al Qaeda [sic] leadership, organization, and infrastructure and prevent their escape to Pakistan. 45 Two main elements were crucial: the assessment of how strong the al-qaeda and Taliban forces in the area were and what they would do when the attack came. 26

30 Enemy Situation With just days to go before the execution of Operation ANACONDA, a crucial change occurred in the enemy situation estimate. By the time the OPORD was published, CJTF Mountain s official estimate of enemy forces had been telescoped down from a number that took in Khowst-Gardez as a whole to a much lower number pegged only to Objective Remington the three villages in the immediate Shahi Kot valley. The 126- slide CONOPS briefing put the threat at less than two hundred. A U.S. Air Force major, who served as the Assistant Division ALO at the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), understood the lower number came from the CFLCC-Fwd G-2 (or another Army source.) 46 Apparently, CJTF Mountain had for some reason narrowed its focus to counting enemy fighters in a smaller geographic area. Instead of tabulating the estimate of enemy forces in the entire vicinity, CJTF Mountain s estimate defined the number as those within Objective Remington. Already there were indications that the al-qaeda might put up resistance. For example, Khowst was already a hotspot. The Afghan commander, near the city of Khowst, called for help from airpower during a skirmish on 16 February In a taste of what was to come in March 2002, a GFAC directed F-15Es, F/A- 18Cs and B-1s to targets, dropping a total of 16 JDAMs. The next day, F-16s dropped JDAMs southeast of Khowst. Even still, forward observers also spotted Taliban and al-qaeda gathering in another location nearby. 47 Doubts about the numbers generated by various sources now came back to haunt the final planning stages. The late change in the estimate of al-qaeda and Taliban remnants present in the Shahi Kot Valley area was, in one sense, typical of operations in 27

31 Afghanistan, where estimates of enemy strength routinely varied. It was very similar to the unknown quantities in every other operation, said the 20ASOS Commander. The difference was that this time, the spread in the estimates might have dictated different tactics or, at the least, larger ground force commitments to achieve better force ratios. Air assault and hammer-and-anvil tactics could sweep up a smaller force of enemy troops. But a larger force of enemy fighters in defensive positions would put up much more resistance, especially when concealed in favorable terrain. At any rate, the lower number of the OPORD estimate contrasted with other estimates. At the end of February 2002, USCENTCOM produced a different evaluation of the enemy situation that counted Taliban and al-qaeda independently. USCENTCOM estimated there were several hundred Taliban fighters in the area. Many of the Taliban had families in the Shahi Kot valley. USCENTCOM further believed there were an additional several hundred foreign al-qaeda fighters present. The al-qaeda fighters did not mix with the villagers but local Afghans fed them. USCENTCOM described the al- Qaeda in Shahi Kot as dedicated to [the] cause of Jihad; eager to fight to the death if confronted. 48 Added together, this made for a total of as many as 1000 Taliban and al- Qaeda in the area. Strategic reconnaissance pinpointed some known enemy locations near Objective Remington around 25 February However, these reports were skeptically received in the established vetting process because they did not meet the requirements for the established deliberate, pre-planned targeting process, a land component report stated later. 49 Further, reports indicated that al-qaeda and Taliban had paid most of the population of the Shahi Kot valley to leave. 28

32 Had a full effort been made to focus ISR assets on the Shahi Kot Valley, the enemy situation estimate might not have been so murky. We could have set the stage for this much better, General Moseley said. The initial planners did not formulate tailored requirements or contact the air component to do that. Compartmentalization of the planning played a role, too. However, the end result, according to General Moseley, was that there was not a full air and space ISR collection effort tailored to the specific Operation ANACONDA mission prior to the start of the operation. 50 It was a missed opportunity. The air component had on hand conventional and non-conventional collection assets capable of pinpointing enemy firing positions, routes of travel and personnel in wide area or spot searches. Had General Hagenback s task force requested it, we could have gone up and just parked over the top of this place and the bad guys would have never known you re there and then just surveyed the whole thing, General Moseley said. If I had known the plan, he continued, I could have come back and said to the CFLCC, give me time to go out and survey this for you and let me go map this for you and I will get all available assets. I mean I ll go out and get you the geologic structure of the OP. In fact, General Moseley said he did call General Mikolashek to request guidance on ISR coverage. However, the CFLCC told General Moseley he was waiting for an answer back from General Hagenback at CJTF Mountain on requirements. For example, the air component already had a track record of providing detailed analysis of sites in Afghanistan. Earlier in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Global Hawk was used with an InfraRed sensor to locate men, animals and campfires of al- Qaeda forces around Mazar-e-Sharif and Tora Bora. Although Global Hawk was 29

33 grounded during the Operation ANACONDA timeframe pending an accident review board, General Moseley commented that if Global Hawk had been available it would have been sweet. You could have found one person sitting on one rock and with the support of Global Hawk called in airstrikes and you could have air-bursted them into the next life. 51 The enemy forces estimate discrepancy was of particular concern to the CFACC, in part because it might affect air operations. If there were a larger number present, as USCENTCOM claimed, then it stood to reason that the al-qaeda and Taliban forces might also have crew-served and MANPAD weapons that could threaten aircraft conducting CAS. Hence, the CAOC dealt directly with the USCENTCOM and with the CFLCC to try to resolve it prior to Operation ANACONDA. General Moseley later said that from his perspective, We didn t really survey this right, nor did we put the collection assets on this right, nor did we prioritize the collection deck right to find out where these people were, so we would know about where they were and how many there were before we put in our ground teams. 52 A year later General Hagenback said: We only probably had about 50% of the intelligence right locations and more importantly, the enemy s intent, which was to stand and fight. 53 With no final troop analysis assessment, the larger range of enemy strength estimates dropped off the map. Commanders went forward believing less than 200 al- Qaeda and Taliban fighters would be in the objective area. 30

34 Estimating Enemy Courses of Action Aside from the question of how many al-qaeda were in the area, the major issue was what they would do when the attack started. As the 20ASOS Commander described the early planning, Operation ANACONDA was different from Tora Bora. At Tora Bora, we picked out every single cave and came up with several hundred DMPI s (designated mean point of impact) and then decided to hit every single cave entrance that we can find, as often as required. For Operation ANACONDA: We knew choke points, so the intent was to get our forces around this piece of land and then gradually work up the LOCs [lines of communications] until we made contact. At any rate, now we had the 101st in town and the 10th Mountain there to lock those LOCs. The commander thought in mid-february 2002 that once the objective area was encircled, we were going to kick the hornet s nest with airplanes and then walk up the road carefully. 54 CJTF Mountain s CONOPS was different. The estimate of the enemy s most probable course of action began with the assumption that al-qaeda forces and local villagers would receive several hours notice of the beginning of the attack. 55 Once the operation began, the expectation was that much of the al-qaeda would flee by any means possible. The OPORD CONOPS briefing expected the immediate objective would be supporting senior leader security and infiltration. After that, some of the main body would establish defensive positions designed to inflict U.S. casualties or try to take U.S./Coalition prisoners of war. Then, at some point, they would exfiltrate and regroup as conditions permitted

35 Ground forces would block off the mountains to the east, pushing the al-qaeda into the northern or southern escape routes. It was believed that al-qaeda in the area would defend from caves and mountain BPs [blocking positions] and the primary purpose would be to divert attention and allow senior leadership to escape. One of the biggest problems would be sympathetic local leaders offering bribes to let al-qaeda forces slip away when the Afghan forces arrived at the villages. 57 Although analysis indicated that the worst-case scenario would be an organized defense in depth of the villages and prepared mountain positions and caves. General Hagenbeck s opinion was that the enemy s objective would still be to let senior leaders escape while inflicting American casualties. As in Tora Bora, fighters will attempt to exfil [exfiltrate] through severe terrain into ratlines [visible escape routes in the lower Shahi Kot valley] toward Pakistan, the estimate continued. The assessment also assumed that the al-qaeda would operate in such a way as to avoid drawing air attacks and inviting use of CAS. Likewise, local Taliban remnants might try to move in to attack, but in General Hagenbeck s opinion that would permit massing of troops, making a more lucrative target. 58 Hammer and Anvil Having made the case for the al-qaeda escape behind a light defensive screen, the CTFJ Mountain s CONOP called for nonlinear simultaneous operations in noncontiguous areas of operations oriented on the following priority objectives: (1) Capture/kill al-qaeda key leaders (2) Destroy al-qaeda foreign fighters 32

36 (3) Prevent the escape of al-qaeda foreign fighters into Pakistan, and (4) Defeat Taliban forces that continue to resist. 59 According to the plan, the operation was to begin with Special Forces working with the three Afghan military forces. The main tasks were to prepare and position the Afghan forces, and to put special operations teams on the ground to establish a virtual cordon around the Shahi Kot area. Also, a collection of Special Forces began intricate preparations for Operation ANACONDA. Planners demarcated several Areas of Operation (AO) covering the roads and trails east of Khowst on the border with Pakistan. Then, reconnaissance teams would be inserted and positioned. Next, SOF TF forces would maneuver Afghan forces against enemy concentrations and integrate CAS as required. Afghan forces moving in from Gardez would be the main effort. To the south, Afghan forces blocked road intersections. On the east side of the mountains, Afghan forces were to set up their blocking positions at the base of the mountains west of Khowst. The main effort and supporting efforts would effectively box in the area with Afghan forces deployed both west and east of the steep mountain ranges. At the same time, TF Rakkasan would conduct the air assault to key positions on the eastern ridges to block escape routes. This would either pin down the al-qaeda or force them into the hammer and anvil of the Afghan forces. Blocking positions established by regular U.S. and Coalition SOF would stop fighters from crossing the mountains. All this was to unfold in a very small area. The Shahi Kot valley from the western side of the whale to the eastern ridgeline was about 8 nm x 8 nm. The actual objectives were in an even smaller area. The focus was on three villages, Babulkyel, 33

37 Serhkhankel, and Marzak, dotted along the valley floor and thought to contain a significant number of enemy troops. The combat operations phase would terminate when these villages were clear and secure. The combat operations phase was envisioned to last less than one week. 60 Figure 4: Area of Operations Looking Northwest The OPORD and related briefings spent very little time on air support and when they did, the main concern was with AC-130 overwatch of key areas and with the role of Apache helicopters and the CH-47s that would be delivering troops. The OPORD published in February 2002 began as concept that started with SOF operators and was turned into a larger plan by a team that included CFLCC-Fwd and SOF planners. General Mikolashek and I knew less of ANACONDA than I desired to know at that time, General Moseley commented later. 61 Not much time was left to widen the plan. 34