Russia and Network-Centric Warfare?

Transcription

1 RS 58 Russia and Network-Centric Warfare? By Adam Dempsey Western strategists regard Network Centric Warfare (NCW) as a product of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) utilising breakthrough technologies on a scale akin to the levee en masse. The conceptualisation of the RMA, however, was first considered by Russia in the 1920s and 1930s with the envisioning of joint operations. Yet whilst study of RMA is now dominated by the West, Russia nevertheless identifies with Western strategic thinking concerning contemporary security threats. Russia primarily sees security as shifting from clear-cut questions of war and peace. Global stability is generally challenged by an array of vague and complicated political, economic, ethno-religious and demographic problems. i In response, modern militaries seek to develop a capability mix reflective of the fragmentary nature of threats. NCW is integral to such changes as it potentiates modified tactics and procedures that enable information advantages over competitors. Yet despite focussing on operational elements of warfare, NCW also impacts upon all levels of military activity, from the tactical to the strategic. Strengthening the power of information has been the technological shift from platform-centric to network-centric computing in modern times. The development of the internet has facilitated the exploitation of information across heterogeneous networked computational nodes. This has often led to the development of symbiotic relationships amongst business competitors. Sharing information of the highest quantity and quality leads to the development of architectures that generate high levels of competitive awareness and therefore advantage. Accordingly, any attempts made by Russia to develop NCW capabilities need to draw inspiration from a dynamic national economy. In this respect, prospects have improved since As Russia has continued to modernise economic growth has been strong in recent years, increasing by 7% in Such robust recovery has prompted firms to invest in information technology (IT) to restructure enterprises and compete internationally. By 2005 demands for IT products by businesses grew at 25- Page 1 of 6

2 30% annually. Of some significance is the use of internet sites such as Sotovik to advertise lower prices and enhanced services in a competitive consumer sector. A likely source of encouragement to the military is the formation of Rosoboronexport in This company consolidated private sector defence firms into a governmentsupervised agency. In 2007 Rosoboronexport gained the exclusive right to sell weapons to foreign countries. Key to success in sales has been an increase in revenue per transaction. This has been achieved by yielding the lower-end weapons market to cheaper suppliers like India. In return, Russia s state-of-the-art military technologies continue to impress the world. The BMP-3 armoured fighting vehicle in particular was chosen over Western offerings for the United Arab Emirates and Oman, countries traditionally in Washington s sphere of influence. As the success of Rosoboronexport demonstrates that infostructures are vital for economic success, NCW also emphasises robustly networked forces improve information sharing. Successful development of NCW therefore requires the military to make a cultural shift from individualism to collectivism. Russian military attempts to make this shift show some promise. Regarded as an official white paper, The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation emphasises that structural changes have occurred. In the drive to improve command-and-control structures Russia s military has evolved into a three-service system. ii A decentralised command-and-control structure was initially proposed for Under such reforms administrative functions of military districts such as the Caucuses are to be restructured into inter-service or joint regional operational groupings. Even preceding these proposals, however, was evidence of Russian network-centric activities during In response to events at Beslan components of the army formed task-forces, without waiting for orders from the federal centre, to react to future terrorist attacks. By making cultural and systemic changes, the architecture of NCW promises a shift to more effective war-fighting. Amongst concepts characteristic of NCW are opportunities for self-synchronisation of forces. Self-synchronisation is the ability of Page 2 of 6

3 well-informed forces to organise warfare activities from the bottom up. In doing so, NCW challenges the notion that individuals are required to govern collectives and instead argues the merits of transferring power to the edge. This involves empowering individuals throughout an organisation by expanding access to information. It is anticipated that increased access will eliminate procedures needed to oversee forces in the absence of quality information. As Russia continues to reduce the high levels of troops from the Soviet era prospects for self-synchronisation appear to increase. Alongside the decentralisation of command-and-control structures, the Russian military is downsizing to create a smaller professional force. Key to reform has been the development of new manpower structures reliant more upon professional volunteer contracted soldiers than conscription. Such downsizing also reflects thinking that network-centric forces operate effectively with combat elements of 3,000-5,000 men than divisions numbering 15,000-20,000. Yet Russian military reform is complicated by an array of demographic concerns. Estimates suggest that Russia s population is declining by 700,000 a year. Combined with changing economic fortunes, a declining population has resulted in a decline in military recruitment. Officers are increasingly under pressure to recruit contract soldiers from the least-privileged and least-healthiest backgrounds. According to Nikolai Pankov, Deputy Minister of Defence, the Officer Corps itself is also perceived to be suffering from an erosion of standards. As their salaries are now well below national averages, 83% of lieutenants indicated that they did not wish to continue with military service. The lack of investment in the military under Yeltsin has also raised concerns that many officers remain culturally suited to control of large troop numbers reminiscent of the Cold War. This prompts suggestions that Russian manpower may be unable to operate technologies associated with NCW with any real confidence. The utilisation of such technology is fundamental to NCW s emphasis upon speed of command. As a result of networking NCW facilitates shared situational awareness that enhances understanding of battle-space-and-time. Superior information positions provide forces with a richer picture of the battle-space and yields competitive advantages. Information superiority therefore requires excellent sensors, powerful networks and technological capabilities. These allow forces to act with intensifying speed, precision and reach. As such technologies potentially facilitate a massing of Page 3 of 6

4 effects over force, the shock and awe of events results in rapid foreclosure of adversarial actions. It is with speed of command that Russian thinking appears to pay closest attention to NCW. Russia s diverse security concerns have prompted calls for improved systems of reconnaissance, electronic warfare and information weapons capable of disrupting enemy networks. Whilst the military s research and development policies remain closely guarded, it is suggested that enhancing command and information systems is to be prioritised. This potentially allows Russia to extend upon electronic warfare experiences gained during counterterrorist operations in Chechnya. Here Altayets- BM stations were utilised for jamming cellular communications and Okhotnik-2 detectors deployed for electronic reconnaissance. iii Whilst Russia is currently redeveloping electronic warfare capabilities, reports suggest this will form a separate arm of service. iv Russian enthusiasm for NCW is further questioned by recent military spending suggesting that platform-centric operations remain prioritised. With Russian GDP growing commensurate with oil prices, Russia was able this year to set its defence budget at $40 billion. This budget contributes to a re-equipping programme running until 2015 aimed at modernising all areas of the armed services. The programme plans to introduce 50 Topol missiles, 50 bombers, 100,000 vehicles and 31 naval vessels. This is further supported by plans to replace 45% of aircraft equipment and the concomitant implementation of dual-use technologies. Ballistic missile tests are also set to increase in the years ahead. A likely consequence of such testing are Russian Navy plans to commission the first of a new class of ballistic missile submarines this year. Underpinning the entire spending programme is the intent to produce and deploy in the next few years weapons matching Western equivalents. To demonstrate rejuvenation in military prowess, Russia has resumed strategic bomber patrols into Atlantic and Pacific air-space (albeit it with Cold War platform). Early in 2008 Russian naval exercises culminated in the stationing of its sole air-craft carrier, guided missile cruisers, strategic bombers and early warning aircraft in the Bay of Biscay. Recently Russia has also increased troop numbers in the breakaway Georgian state of Abkhazia. Page 4 of 6

5 Such deployments reflect recent changes in military doctrine that might suggest NCW is of secondary importance to Russia. In 2007 Russia s Security Council posted on its website a statement indicating that global terrorism was no longer Russia s chief threat. Instead, threats now come from the increasing strength of rival alliance structures. Of particular concern are NATO s perceived plans in historical areas of interest such as former Soviet and Warsaw Pact states. Accordingly, Russia s response to NATO enlargement and the stationing of missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic is again filtered through zero-sum lenses. To assure absolute sovereignty and geopolitical status Russia is prioritising military power to deal with strong state adversaries. Conclusion Technological advances have facilitated a networking of information that allows enhanced situational awareness and increasing returns with minimised actions. As Russia continues to integrate into the global economy its military has an indigenous sector from which it can evaluate NCW. Evaluation initially appeared vital as Russia identified with Western thinking regarding an array of effectively networked security threats. In doing so Russia s military made changes that seemingly gave due consideration to NCW s emphasis upon selfsynchronisation and speed of command. Russia also acknowledges that its security stands to benefit from the incorporation of technologies characteristic of NCW. However social, economic and cultural obstacles bring into question the effective implementation of such instruments into the military. Yet whilst the military recognise the usefulness of elements of NCW its current strategic doctrine suggests that Russia is not ready to engage it in its entirety. As Russia feels the need to signal to NATO that its power is on the rise NCW will remained eclipsed by displays of military might. Therefore the sight of tanks and troops marching through Red Square with SU-27s and MIG-29s flying overhead is likely to continue. Page 5 of 6

6 ENDNOTES i The Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation. The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. 2 nd October, 2003, p. 19. Available from (Accessed 2nd June 2008) ii The Defence Ministry of the Russian Federation. The Priority Tasks of the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation p. 24 iii Interfax-AVN. Russia to set up Separate Arm of Service for Electronic Warfare. 14 th April Available from (Accessed 5 th June 2008) iv Interfax-AVN. Russia to set up Separate Arm of Service for Electronic Warfare About the author Adam Dempsey holds a BA in International Relations and Strategic studies from Lancaster University and an MA in Intelligence and Security Studies from the University of Salford. His research interests focus upon how an increasingly networked global society impacts upon security and defence issues. He is particularly interested in the security policies of Russia, China, the Indian Sub-Continent and Latin America. Disclaimer The views of authors are their own. The UK Defence Forum holds no corporate view on the opinions expressed in papers or at meetings. The Forum exists to enable politicians, industrialists, members of the armed forces, academics and others with an interest in defence and security issues to exchange information and views on the future needs of Britain s defence. It is operated by a non-partisan, not for profit company. UK Defence Forum papers are archived at - the last three years being accessible only to members and subscribers. Prior to that they are in the public domain subject to usual conventions. Members wishing to comment on papers can access a noticeboard via the members area of the website July 2008 Page 6 of 6