Punching up: Russia's smaller surface fleet builds bigger impact

Transcription

1 Punching up: Russia's smaller surface fleet builds bigger impact [Content preview Subscribe to Jane s International Defence Review for full article] Russia is renewing its major surface combatant force structure with a number of new classes. While such procurement programmes face enduring challenges, Dr Lee Willett discusses how key equipment is adding greater effect When President Vladimir Putin unveiled Russia's new maritime doctrine in July 2015 during the Navy Day fleet review at Baltiysk in the Baltic Sea, he did so from the deck of the Russian Federation Navy s lead Project frigate, Admiral Gorshkov. Russia s new surface fleet construct reflects developments in the wider regeneration of its navy, with fewer but more capable platforms making up the order of battle (ORBAT). The Russian Federation Navy s lead Project 11356M frigate Admiral Grigorovich fires a Kalibr 3M- 14T cruise missile during combat operations over Syria in November The Admiral Grigorovich frigates are one of several surface ship classes carrying Kalibr. (Russian Ministry of Defence) In recent times, Russian submarine operations (including the firing of Novator Kalibr 3M-14 sealaunched cruise missiles [SLCMs] into Syria) and transits to the Mediterranean Sea by its sole aircraft carrier, the Project /6 ship Admiral Kuznetsov, have grabbed most of the media headlines. However, as Russia has sought to rebuild its strategic presence around the world from the Arctic to the Atlantic, and to the Pacific, but also across important European waters such as the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean seas its surface fleet has been central in regenerating the naval element of this presence. During the Georgia war in 2008, the navy s surface ships actively shaped events both at sea and ashore, conducting fleet-on-fleet engagement and trade blockades as well as launching attacks on shore targets and supporting amphibious landings. In 2008 Russia sent its first ships to contribute to the international counter-piracy campaign off Somalia. In 2009, surface ships were deployed to three different oceans simultaneously. In 2014, during the Crimea crisis, Russian surface ships were very active in the Black Sea region, and whilst that year is often regarded as a watershed moment in terms of the frequency and Page 1 of 11

2 intensity of Russian naval activity, surface ships have continued to play a prominent role since then. Major surface units have been deployed to escort Kuznetsov on its high-profile deployments to the Mediterranean, and have also conducted surface action-group deployments in the European and Pacific theatres. In November 2016, lead Project 11356M frigate Admiral Grigorovich fired a number of Novator 3M-14T Kalibr SLCMs during combat operations in Syria, and that theatre has proved to be a testing ground for new Russian technology. Previously, a number of Project Buyan-M corvettes/patrol vessels had fired Kalibr missiles against targets in Syria, in Russia s first demonstration of a long-range SLCM capability. As noted in a 2015 US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) report, titled The Russian Navy: a Historic Transition, looking at the development of the Russian navy, Kalibr provides even modest platforms, such as corvettes, with significant offensive capability. In a still drawn from footage released by Russia s defence ministry, a Buyan-M corvette is shown launching a 3M-14 Kalibr cruise missile from the Caspian Sea against targets in Syria in October The Caspian Sea strikes demonstrated Russia s possession of a long-range land-attack cruise missile capability for its surface fleet. (Russian Ministry of Defence) Russian surface ships have also been used to generate presence in areas of prominent national interest. For example, frigates have shadowed NATO ships operating in the Baltic and Black Seas in particular, as was seen during NATO s BALTOPS 2017 exercise in June. Surface ship strategy According to Russia s maritime doctrine, the purpose of its navy is to establish and maintain conditions for the safe conduct of Russian maritime activities; to provide naval presence such as [showing] the flag and [demonstrating] military capabilities, alongside conducting port visits; to conduct operations including combating piracy; and to support international military, peacekeeping, and humanitarian operations. A surface ship is a core force element for any navy in meeting such tasks. Analysing Russian military developments is always challenging, due to availability of open source information on key capabilities. Nonetheless, the ONI report points to a number of core technologies that are underpinning the evolution of Russia s wider force structure and are boosting the navy s operational output. According to the report, The new technologically advanced Russian Page 2 of 11

3 Navy, increasingly armed with the Kalibr family of weapons, will be able to more capably defend the maritime approaches to the Russian Federation and exert significant influence in adjacent seas. The ONI report noted that major Russian surface units play a number of important roles in Russian military doctrine. For example, larger platforms can be forward-deployed at distance, to offset stand-off threats such as cruise missiles. Smaller surface combatants would tackle threats closer in. The navy is fitting ships, both large and small, with systems that bring greater punch, for example SLCMs and anti-ship missiles. The navy is also going through a major transition from the legacy Soviet Navy to a Russian Navy that should reflect the latest achievements of Russian advances in science and technology, the ONI said. Set in the context of budget realities with emphasis on a smaller number of more capable and more multipurpose platforms, Russia s ships and submarines will be armed with the latest capabilities in weapons; sensors; and command, control, communications, computer[s], intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance [C4ISR] systems, the report added. Force structure The key developments in Russia s emerging naval force structure arguably are centred on five primary ship programmes: the Project 20380/20381/20385 Steregushchiy I/II-class frigate; the Derzkiy-class frigate; the Project 11356M Admiral Grigorovich-class frigate; the Project Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate; and the Project Buyan-M corvette/patrol vessel. Page 3 of 11

4 The Russian lead Project frigate Admiral Gorshkov. Encapsulating the challenge the navy is facing, the Gorshkov frigates are very capable but the programme has suffered significant delays. (Oleg Kuleshov) A future destroyer programme is understood to be under way. However, some analysts suggest that the size and complexity of the ship make it a challenging acquisition proposition at a time of limited budgets. Within Russia s surface ship force structure development, there seems to be a focus on frigate, corvette, and patrol platforms: this focus may be driven in large part by financial factors. Plans for the future Project Lider-class heavy destroyer, with a 12-ship programme probably intended to replace the Udaloy- and Sovremenny-class destroyers and the Slava-class cruisers, have been reported. However, it is not known when construction might commence. It has been reported that design work began in 2015 at the Northern (Severnoye) Design Bureau, and that the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) has approved a draft design. Construction of the 15,000-18,000-tonne destroyer is scheduled to commence in 2019, with entry into service expected around Armament on board the 200 m-long platform is expected to include anti-ship and/or land-attack cruise missiles, surface-to-air and anti-submarine missiles, and a 130 mm (5 inch) gun. The ONI report suggested that the lead unit is unlikely to be built earlier than the mid-2020s. Reports differ on whether the ship will be nuclear or conventionally powered: however, nuclear build will be significantly more expensive. The first of the new ship classes to enter service was the Steregushchiy I/II frigate. The lead ship was commissioned in 2007, and five are in service; currently, 12 are planned in total. Notable equipment fits include, from the second-in-class (Project 20381), the (URAV index code) 3K-96 Redut surface-to-air missile (SAM) system (US Department of Defense [DoD] designation SA-NX- 28). The 3K-96 system comprises the 3S-97 vertical-launching system (VLS), the navy versions of the army s 9M96, 9M96M, and 9M100 air-defence missiles, and the 5P-20K-A Monument-A multipurpose radar system. For the Project (batch II) Steregushchiys onwards, perhaps the primary improvements are in the ships surface-to-surface cruise missile capabilities, with the 3M-14T Kalibr land-attack SLCM and the 3M-54T (SS-N-27B Sizzler ) anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) fired from the ships 3S-14 VLS. These ships are likely to have been built to a modified design, with the aft mast above the helicopter hangar removed and the mainmast possibly using an integrated design that houses all major radars, sensors, and antennas. Page 4 of 11

5 The Project frigate Gremyashchy is pictured receiving Russian-made 1DDA diesel turbines during build work in The ship is the first of two batch II Steregushchiy frigates. (United Shipbuilding Corporation) Currently, there are two ships in batch II. However, with the original design built around imported engines that Russia can no longer access (following export bans imposed in the wake of the Crimea crisis) and with other concerns about size, role, and cost, it seems this batch will be limited to two platforms. Lead ship Gremyashchy was launched on 30 June, but it is not confirmed yet when both ships are expected to be commissioned. What may initially have looked like a third batch of Steregushchiy platforms has also emerged, with the Project designation 20386/Derzkiy. The keel for lead ship Derzkiy was laid in October 2016: it has been reported that the ship is scheduled for launch in 2019 and commissioning in Up to 10 are planned, with initial deliveries intended for annual intervals from While the final design is unknown, it does however appear that these new ships are significantly different from the Steregushchiys. At 3,400 tonnes, they will be much larger than the 2,200/2,500- tonne Steregushchiy ships. The differences may include a more stealthy design, the possible use of composite construction, an integrated mast, and a modular mission bay (which may house the SLCM fit). It is understood that the hangar will be sited below the flight deck: it has been reported that the ship will operate helicopters and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). According to Jane s Fighting Ships, there appear to be four phased-array antennas: it is possible, but not confirmed, that some of these may be new systems. At the keel-laying ceremony, Vice Admiral Viktor Bursuk, the navy s deputy commander-in-chief for armaments, stated that the ships were a logical extension of the [Project] series and a breakthrough into the future. Alongside anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-air warfare tasks, the ships will be intended to provide presence at home and at distance, securing the sea lines of communication in between, and interestingly, according to reports to provide fire support for amphibious operations. Russia s current operational focus on amphibious activity and its potential absence of an aircraft carrier capability going forward underlines the importance of amphibious warfare in Russian navy power projection strategies. A platform intended to be a primary frontline warship for the Russian Navy, conducting multiple roles including anti-air, anti-surface, and subsurface operations, is the Project Admiral Gorshkov-class frigate. According to the ONI, these frigates are intended for combat operations in distant and close-in maritime zones, as well as for participating in the execution of missions in the oceanic zone. In April Russian defence minister Sergei Shoigu told the MoD that the arrival of the Gorshkov class would increase the combat capabilities of Russia s surface fleet by 30%. A total of 15 Gorshkov platforms are planned. Lead ship Admiral Gorshkov, having completed sea trials in both the Baltic and White seas, was commissioned on 22 November Development and build progress has been slow, however, with the first-in-class contracted in Second ship Admiral Kasatonov was launched in December 2014 and was expected to be commissioned in The programme has been impacted by the post-crimea ban on engine exports to Russia. The original delays to the Project programme prompted Russia to make interim plans to fill the gap, by building six Project 11356M Admiral Grigorovich frigates. Lead ship Admiral Grigorovich was commissioned on 11 March Ship two Admiral Essen entered service in June that year, having undertaken sea trials in the Arctic: just over a year later, in May 2017, Admiral Essen was reported to have launched Kalibr missiles against Islamic State targets in Page 5 of 11

6 Syria. The programme also brings another batch of SLCM-capable platforms, with the ships able to embark both the 3M-54T ASCM and 3M-14T land-attack missile. The ships are intended to be based in the Black Sea. However, with the programme similarly affected by the availability of engines, it may be that only the first three ships will enter service with the Russian Navy, with the last three perhaps being sold to India. Reports in January suggested that two the partially built Admiral Butakov and Admiral Istomin would be sold, with two more built indigenously in India (although the sixth Russian ship, Admiral Kornilov, could fill one of these last two berths). It is understood, however, that Russia is seeking to order two more for its own navy, to maintain a force level of six. A still image from a Russian defence ministry video released in August 2016 showing a Kalibr missile being launched from one of two Buyan-M corvettes that fired missiles against targets in Syria. The Buyan/Kalibr fit offers a good firepower-to-price ratio. (Russian Ministry of Defence) One of the most significant surface ship developments has been the fitting of the Kalibr capability to the Project Buyan-M corvettes/patrol ships. The ships eight-cell 3S-14 VLS launcher has been used to fire missiles on a number of occasions during combat operations in Syria. What is most striking in this development is the proven ability to fit long-range land-attack punch to even relatively small surface platforms, and for these platforms to have a demonstrable impact in shaping events ashore. Strike operations The arrival of the Kalibr missile system in Russia s ORBAT has had a significant impact on the naval strategic balance, giving Russia a capability that was previously the preserve of the US Navy (along with the UK Royal Navy). The proven combat capability of the Kalibr land-attack missile variant, along with the strategic implications of what appears to be a credible submarine- and surface-ship ASCM capability, has asymmetrically altered the naval equilibrium, especially in Europe. A Russian fleet that is smaller in number now packs greater punch in strike operations. Kalibr-NK is the domestic system codename for the 3K-14 (S-14) system that uses the 3M-14T surface-launched land-attack cruise missile. The US DoD code for the 3M-14T missile is SS-N- 30A (although the NATO reporting name is unknown). The 3M-14T is commonly stored within a Page 6 of 11

7 transport launch container (TLC) that is loaded in and fired from either a vertical or inclined launcher. The system burst into political and public consciousness in October 2015 when, according to unconfirmed Russian media reports, about 26 3M-14T missiles were launched from Buyan-M platforms and Project 11661K Gepard-class frigates in the Caspian Sea against targets in Syria. Alongside the Buyan corvettes and Gepard frigates, the first two Project 11356M frigates have also fired Kalibr missiles in combat. According to the ONI, Russia plans to deploy Kalibr capability on all new design construction nuclear and non-nuclear submarines, corvettes, frigates, and larger surface ships. As reported recently by Jane s, 15 Kalibr-capable surface combatants have entered service during the past five years. The Project 11356M Grigorovich frigate Admiral Essen, alongside the Yantar shipyard in the Baltic Sea, prior to sea trials. Highlighting Russia s range of interests, the ship conducted trials in the Arctic before participating in combat operations over Syria. (United Shipbuilding Corporation) The solid-propellant booster-launched, turbofan-powered 3M-14 missile is believed to travel at a speed of m/s at a cruising height of approximately ft ( m), although the missile can fly as low as 66 ft above the sea. Based on the strikes conducted from the Caspian Sea, the missile is believed to have a range in excess of 900 n miles. The Russian MoD has previously stated a maximum range of approximately 1,080 n miles. For guidance and targeting, the missile uses preprogrammed data, inertial navigation, the GLONASS global navigation satellite system, a radar altimeter, terrain profiling, and the ARGS-14 radar seeker (for terminal guidance). The guidance package gives the missile a claimed accuracy of less than 5 m. The standard missile is reported to be armed with an approximately 500 kg blast/fragmentation high-explosive warhead: it is thought that a nuclear warhead is also available. No further details are available on the warheads or their fuzing systems. The Russian Navy s anti-ship missile (ASM) punch comes from the 3M-54T missile (SS-N-27B Sizzler ), which is part of the 3K-54N Biryuza-NK surface ship system. According to the ONI, Russia will continue to develop its ASM capability, with a design focus on increasing speed, range, and employment flexibility, in addition to improving the ability to penetrate ship defensive systems. It noted too that Russian ASM research is expected to focus on achieving hypersonic speeds and improving seeker capabilities, including the possible use of advanced radar seekers that allow improved countermeasure discrimination. Russia s deployment of ASMs across multiple platforms, said the ONI, provides multiple maritime strike options. Page 7 of 11

8 The three-stage 3M-54R ASM is made up of two missile components the cruise stage and the combat stage (along with a solid-propellant booster). In its turbofan-powered cruise phase, it has a speed of approximately m/s and a cruising altitude of 492 ft. What is referred to as the combat stage is a supersonic short-range missile, powered by a solid-propellant rocket motor, for engagement of the moving target in the terminal phase, guided by the ARGS-54 active radar seeker. Maximum seeker-detection range is understood to be 65 km, although this can be restricted to reduce warning time: the seeker is also reported to be able to operate at up to Sea State 6. The missile carries a 200 kg blast/fragmentation warhead, probably with semi-armour piercing capability. Detecting sensors A display of Russia s Ship General Purpose Firing System 3S-14 series multimissile vertical launching system (VLS), with a scale model of the launcher fitted in a 20 ft standard ISO shipping container. The 3S-14 system is enabling the deployment of a wider range of more capable systems across Russia s surface fleet. (Jim O Halloran) While precise details on emerging Russian sensor technologies are difficult to confirm, it appears that Russia s new surface platforms are coming with an improved set of sensors. The ONI report noted an improved radar capability on the Steregushchiys compared with the original design. Russian industry is also producing some new radar systems for the surface fleet. Electronic warfare company JSC Zaslon told Jane s at the 2017 International Maritime Defence Show in St Petersburg in July that it has developed a new multipurpose radar. According to the company, the modular Zaslon Multi-Purpose Navy Radar System (MF RLK ZASLON) has completed development and is ready for deployment across ship types ranging from corvettes to destroyers. It was developed originally for the Project frigates. Page 8 of 11

9 The system, which can perform search-and-detection tasks for airborne, low-altitude, and surface threats, operates in active mode (in the IEEE S- or X-bands) or in passive mode (in the IEEE C-, L-, S-, X-, and Ku-bands). According to the manufacturer, in active mode, it can track up to 200 targets over a maximum range of 200 km; in passive mode, it can detect up to 50 surface targets simultaneously, covering a maximum range of 300 km. It can also detect and jam more than 100 airborne targets in the IEEE K- and Ku-bands. The radar will be installed in the Project s integrated mast. While the multipurpose nature of Russia s new frigate fleet reflects the global trend of both boosting and broadening capabilities, the navy s emerging frigate classes do retain a central antisubmarine warfare (ASW) role. The Grigorovich frigates carry a hull-mounted sonar. Both Steregushchiy batches and the Gorshkovs carry a Zarya hull-mounted sonar and a Vinyetka active/passive low-frequency towed array system. For the Derzkiy frigates, it is understood that hull-mounted and towed array systems are planned. According to Rosoboronexport, the export variant of the Zarya-M sonar family has a directed emission mode (i.e., active) detection range of up to 35 km. Russia's existing frigate and corvette fleet Class Type In service Average Age Project 1135 Krivak Frigate Project 1154 Neustrashimiy Frigate Project Gepard Project 20380/20381 Steregushchiy Light frigate Frigate Project Grigorovich Frigate Project Gorshkov Frigate Project 1241 Tarantul Corvette Project 1234 Nanuchka Corvette Project 1124 Grisha Project 1331 Parchim Source: IHS Markit Light frigate Light frigate Class Final Retirement Page 9 of 11

10 Enabling ubiquity the 3S-14 VLS The Russian navy s ability to spread deployment of its combat-proven Kalibr missile system across most of its surface fleet is enabled by the ubiquitous presence of the 3R-14UKSK-Kh fire-control system and the 3S-14 series multimissile VLS fitted to the Steregushchiy, Grigorovich, Gorshkov, Derzkiy, Buyan-M, Bykov, and Karakurt classes, as well as the Project 11661K Gepard-class frigates.eight-cell versions of the 3S-14 VLS are fitted to (or are being fitted to) all of the above ships, with the exception of the Gorshkov frigates where 16 cells are being installed.the system is often seen as Russia s answer to the widely available Lockheed Martin Mk 41 and Naval Group (ex-dcns) Sylver VLS systems. The manufacturer of the 3R-14, Concern Morinformsystem-Agat, refers to the system as a Ship General Purpose Firing System (SGPFS). In addition to the 3R-14 fire-control system and the 3S-14 universal below-deck launcher, there is a universal missile loading set.the key to the flexibility of a VLS system is the number of systems it is certified to carry. For the 3S-14 VLS, it can accommodate containerised and containerless missiles, with its inventory including weapons such as the 3M-54T, 3M-54T-1, and P-800 ASMs/ASCMs; the 91RT2 anti-submarine, rocket-dispensed torpedo system; and the 3M-14.An inclined, fixed, or elevatable above-deck (45 slant) launcher, designated 3S-14P, is also available: it can carry groups of two, four, six, or eight missiles. This containerised capability can be fitted in 20 ft standard ISO shipping containers. In terms of new ship builds for the Russian navy, an operational 3S-14 VLS system first appeared on Dagestan (ex- Burevestnik ), the second Gepard ship, which was commissioned in November Next to receive the 3S-14 system were the Buyan-M corvettes/patrol ships, with lead ship Grad Sviyazhsk commissioned in July Re- Kalibrating the navy While Russia stepped back into the political spotlight a decade ago, there remains a vibrant debate about how effectively the naval modernisation programme is progressing, in the context of Russia s strategic aims.according to a report published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in March 2016, Despite substantial efforts to make good on its naval modernisation plans what has been delivered thus far to the Russian Navy has fallen well short of expectations. As noted in the CSIS report, budgets, industrial capacity, and integrating new technologies have proved to be significant challenges in a number of new programmes, including the Gorshkov frigate.the CSIS report pointed to a lack of access to foreign technology, in the wake of the Crimea crisis, noting the implications of the loss of use of Ukrainian and German diesel engines for Russia s surface ship programme. This, however, is driving a Russian focus on rebuilding indigenous capabilities, although this process will certainly take time.the CSIS report continued that the Gorshkov frigate programme is the most ambitious naval shipbuilding project undertaken by the Russian Federation since the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the ships adding critical capability while reinvigorating Russian shipbuilding industry with crucial experience of building large, modern warships. The Gorshkov class, it noted, would add advanced combat capability, much of which [the fleet] currently lacks. A report in The National Interest in August 2017, written by two senior scientific staff from the Center for Naval Analyses, suggested that Russian naval developments are still proving to be effective in meeting national strategic aims. The modern Russian Navy is not designed to compete with the US Navy, but instead to counter it, the report noted. In this context, while Russian naval power projection ambitions are reduced, its surface forces can still play an important role in securing Russia s maritime approaches and key waters of interest, especially in the High North, East Atlantic, and European regions, through presence and the provision of capabilities such as long-range precision strike. For the full version and more content: Page 10 of 11

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