Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV

Transcription

1 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV Figure 12: Macdonough s Victory on Lake Champlain, 1814, by Edward Tufnell, with the U.S. Saratoga on the left and Eagle on the right and the British Confiance in the center 96

2 Compensating for Incompetency: Hartman Compensating for Incompetency The American Victory at the Battle of Plattsburgh, September 11, 1814 Benjamin Hartman Benjamin Hartman is a graduating senior history/pre-law major and Honors Fellow from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. He served as the Vice President of the Tau Sigma Chapter from and He will attend the University of Texas School of Law in Austin, Texas, in the fall. The Almighty has been pleased to Grant us a signal victory on Lake Champlain, wrote Commodore, soon-to-be Captain, Thomas Macdonough on September 11, Indeed, Macdonough and his army counterpart, Brigadier General Alexander Macomb, had won a great victory. In Plattsburgh Bay on Lake Champlain, the ships of the British naval squadron under the late Captain George Downie lay devastated, with their colors struck and their holds full of wounded and dead men. To the north of the town of Plattsburgh, the invading British army, consisting in part of Wellington s veterans from the Peninsular War under the command of Governor-General of Canada Sir George Prevost, engaged in the disheartening process of retreating back to Canada. One naval historian, David Curtis Skaggs, characterized this victory as the most important tactical and strategic naval victory for the United States in the War of Besides a stunning defeat of British arms, the Battle of Plattsburgh was also highly significant in regard to the ongoing peace negotiations. The Duke of Wellington, who would later defeat Napoleon at Waterloo, wrote to the Earl of Liverpool in light of the Battle of Plattsburgh, [i]n regard to your present negotiations, I confess that you have no right from the state of the war to demand any concession of territory from 1. Captain Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Off Plattsburgh, September 11, 1814, in : Chesapeake Bay, Northern Lakes, and Pacific Ocean, ed. Michael J. Crawford, Vol. 3 of The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 2002), David Curtis Skaggs, Thomas Macdonough: Master of Command in the Early U.S. Navy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003), xiii. 97

3 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV America. 3 Although some might consider the War of 1812 negligible because the situation returned to status quo antebellum, one of the reasons that the United States did not have to make concessions was due to the outcome of the Battle of Plattsburgh. 4 One historian simply put, as it turned out, the fate of the West was dependent upon the outcome of the war in the East. Wisconsin and the Mississippi Valley were saved, not at St. Louis, but on Lake Erie, the Niagara frontier, and Lake Champlain. 5 Even with such far-reaching consequences, in some ways this battle was a fairly simple affair. On the lake, Macdonough s American squadron managed to outgun the Royal Navy in open combat, and then Prevost, lacking naval support to continue to attack the forts held by Macomb s mix of United States regulars and militia, opted to retreat back to Canada. Yet, despite its apparent simplicity, the Battle of Plattsburgh on September 11 turned out to be the culmination of a successive series of mishaps and incompetent bungling on both sides. For instance, both armies suffered from a lack of cooperation between their respective army and navy branches, as well as several critical tactical mistakes prior to and during the Battle of Plattsburgh. The crucial difference between the British army and their American counterparts proved to be a combination of luck and the quality of the commanders. While both the British and American commanders had to deal with incompetency, miscommunication, and other damaging factors in the preparation for the Battle of Plattsburgh, the defenders, General Alexander Macomb and especially Commodore Thomas Macdonough, proved better able to compensate for their drawbacks than their British opponents, ultimately leading to the American victory. The preparation for the Battle of Plattsburgh actually began in 1812, as both sides struggled to gain control of Lake Champlain through an arms race in making ships. One of the many problems that would plague both armies was the friction and uncooperativeness between the army and navy. For the Americans, this began early. In 3. The Duke of Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool, Paris, November 9, 1814, in The War of 1812: Writings from America s Second War of Independence, ed. Donald R. Hickey (New York: The Library of America, 2013), Skaggs, Julius W. Pratt, Fur Trade Strategy and the American Left Flank in the War of 1812, The American Historical Review 40, no. 2 (Jan., 1935), JSTOR (accessed September 18, 2015),

4 99 Hartman Compensating for Incompetency 1812, the first Secretary of the Navy during the War of 1812, Paul Hamilton, ordered Thomas Macdonough to take command of the naval forces on Lake Champlain, saying, [o]n Your arrival, You will communicate with Genl Dearborn, or the Commanding Genl who will afford You, every requisite assistance: & with whom You are to co-operate with the force under Your Command. 6 However, when Macdonough arrived at Lake Champlain, he found General Dearborn less than compliant. In fact, he discovered that Dearborn had placed a civilian named Mr. Billings in charge of one of the sloops that Macdonough was supposed to command. 7 After requesting from Dearborn the transfer of the sloop to his command, Macdonough wrote to Hamilton, [i]t is the intention of Genl Dearborn to continue this Mr Billings, from some unaccountable cause, in the command of this vessel, I consider it an assumption of my command, I am strangely deprived of more than half the force in having this vessel in the hands of those, that know not, what to do with her. 8 Eventually, by December at the latest, General Dearborn felt obliged to surrender the sloop President to Macdonough s hands as his flagship, but still the interservice rivalry did not bode well for future coordinated operations. On top of dealing with uncooperative army generals, Macdonough also had to begin creating a squadron of ships large enough to enable him to keep the British completely out of Lake Champlain. In one of the seemingly few bureaucratic successes of the war, the Secretary of the Navy placed Macdonough, then just a lieutenant but later promoted to the rank of commodore, directly under his command. 9 This had the beneficial effect of cutting out unnecessary levels of command or internal wrangling as Macdonough reported directly to the Secretary, who reported directly to President Madison. But this command also placed the entire responsibility of the fleet s building and actions on Macdonough s young shoulders. He was only twenty-eight years old 6. Secretary of the Navy Hamilton to Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, Portland, Maine, September 28, 1812, in Vol. 1 of The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, ed., William S. Dudley (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1985), Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Hamilton, White Hall, Lake Champlain, October 14, 1812, Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Hamilton, White Hall, Lake Champlain, October 26, 1812, Skaggs, 65.

5 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV when he took command. 10 When he first arrived on Lake Champlain and wrested control of the President from General Dearborn, the fledgling U.S. fleet consisted of two gunboats and three sloops, the whole totally unprepared. 11 Macdonough was expected to use this small flotilla as a basis for creating a fleet large enough to command the lake, support army incursions into Canada, and suppress the rampant smuggling on the borders of New York and Vermont with Canada. 12 With such a small fleet, Macdonough began 1813 by writing to the new Secretary of the Navy, William Jones, that [i]t is generally understood that the British intend to have superior Naval force on this Lake next summer, which will be the case unless, the alteration takes place in our sloops which I have mentioned. 13 Macdonough wanted to alter the sloops to make room for more guns, and he also desperately needed more sailors to man his fleet, a problem that would hound the British as well. 14 However, by May, Macdonough felt sufficiently secure to sail out from the shelter of the shipyards of Vermont to head to Plattsburgh on the New York side of the lake. He happily reported to Jones, I have the honor to inform you of the arrival at this place of the vessels under my command on Lake Champlain, and of their being ready for service. 15 Theodore Roosevelt, in his seminal work on the War of 1812 s naval history, states that at this time the United States had two sloops and six gunboats. 16 However, Roosevelt omitted the President, which was not fully ready for battle, so the American fleet actually had its original three sloops in addition to the six 10. Skaggs, Thomas Macdonough, Commodore Macdonough s Autobiography, in Rodney Macdonough Life of Commodore Thomas Macdonough, U.S. Navy (Boston, Mass: The Fort Hill Press, S. Usher, 1909), Skaggs, Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Shelburn, January 22, 1813, in Vol. 2 of The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, ed., William S. Dudley (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1992), Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Shelburn, January 22, 1813, Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Plattsburgh, May 1, 1813, Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812 (New York: Modern Library, 1999), 100

6 Hartman Compensating for Incompetency gunboats. Thus, Macdonough s little fleet was growing. At the beginning of summer in 1813, the United States, despite the bungling of General Dearborn, had managed to win the shipbuilding race, and Macdonough was poised to take control of the Lake. The fact that he had been able to do so by summer indicates that, at least at this time, the British did not focus their efforts seriously on building a fleet strong enough to challenge Macdonough, an oversight that would continue and would haunt them later. Yet it was still early in the game in 1813, still sufficient time for American incompetence to upset the balance of power on the lake. On June 3, 1813, Macdonough sent two of his sloops, the Growler and the Eagle, under the command of Lieutenant Sidney Smith north to the lines in order to prevent smuggling and the British gunboats from intruding on American waters. 17 However, Lieutenant Smith overreached himself and passed the lines to the point of entering the narrow Richelieu River in pursuit of a trio of British gunboats. The river s narrowness both impeded the maneuverability of the American sloops and put them in range of musket fire from the shore. The nearby British garrison was happy to oblige in this respect. Major George Taylor, commanding the British soldiers, reported to his superior, observing the Vessels to be near enough the shore for Musquetry, I ordered the Crews of two Batteaux & row boat, which I took with me from the Garrison to act according to the circumstances, to land briefly on each side of the Rover and to take a position to rake the Vessels. 18 Sailing Master Loomis, who was in command of the Eagle and under the orders of Lieutenant Smith, who commanded the Growler, later reported to Macdonough, I received a twentyfour pound shot in my larboard quarter between wind and water and went thro and knocked three planks off from the starboard side under water and she sunk to the bottom and the enemy took possession of her. 19 The exact reason that Lieutenant Smith pursued such a reckless course remains unknown. Skaggs postulates that Smith 17. Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Plattsburgh, June 4, 1813, 490. Note: the lines is a term used for the border with Canada. See Skaggs, Major George Taylor, British Army, to Major General Richard Stovin, British Army, Isle aux Noix, June 3, 1813, Sailing Master Loomis to Macdonough, in Rodney Macdonough, Life of Commodore Thomas Macdonough, U.S. Navy (Boston, Mass: The Fort Hill Press, S. Usher, 1909),

7 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV was both angry at having been replaced in command by Macdonough and desirous of gaining more credit. 20 For whatever reason Smith made such a reckless decision, the effects were disastrous. As Skaggs so aptly notes, [s]everal months of work were lost in one afternoon. 21 Because of American incompetence, the British gained military superiority on Lake Champlain in one stroke, without having to build a single vessel. Yet the disaster did not bear the bitter fruit of complete despondency in part because Thomas Macdonough overcame Smith s failure in two ways. First, Macdonough simply resumed his fleet-building program with more vigor, aided by the lack of bureaucratic entanglement under the Secretary of the Navy. In fact, the Secretary of the Navy wrote to Macdonough following the loss of the Growler and the Eagle, [y]ou are to understand that upon no account are you to suffer the enemy to gain the ascendancy on Lake Champlain; and you have now unlimited authority to procure the necessary resources of men, materials, and munitions for that purpose, I rely upon your efficient and prudent use of the authority vested in you. 22 Through the loss of the Growler and the Eagle, Macdonough actually gained the top priority and a vast increase in authority directly from the Secretary of the Navy, who allowed him to resume building a fleet in earnest to match the newly-superior British forces. But the second, and possibly more important, way that Macdonough overcame the setbacks from the Lieutenant s incompetency was through his shrewd judgment during the infamous Murray s Raid. Having suddenly attained naval superiority, the British moved to exploit their newfound power on Lake Champlain. The British organized a hasty raiding party, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel John Murray, that included the Growler and Eagle, now renamed the Broke and the Shannon. 23 The British troops landed at Plattsburgh and raided up and down the New York shore, with the 20. Skaggs, Ibid., Secretary of the Navy Jones to Lieutenant Thomas Macdonough, Navy Department, June 17, 1813, Skaggs, Note, Roosevelt thinks that at this time the ships had been renamed the Chubb and the Finch, which were names of two sloops during the Battle of Plattsburgh. It is possible that the Broke and the Shannon were renamed later, or that Roosevelt just got them confused. See Roosevelt,

8 103 Hartman Compensating for Incompetency result that the object for which the corps under the command of Lt. Cl. Murray had been detached having been fully accomplished by the destructing of the enemy s Blockhouse, Arsenal, Barracks and public Storehouses at Plattsburgh. 24 Unable to face the British navy during this raid, Macdonough moved his remaining ships to a secure harbor at Burlington, Vermont. Elements of the British fleet appeared off of Burlington, tempting him to fight. Macdonough wrote, [t]hey came off Burlington, where I was preparing another force, when a sharp cannonade commenced and continued about half an hour between our gunboats, the battery of the army and their vessels. 25 Macdonough did not have enough personnel to sufficiently man his flagship, the President, and so Skaggs wrote, Macdonough wisely refused to leave the protection of the shore batteries. 26 Thus, Macdonough refused to allow himself to recklessly seek glory at his fleet s risk, like Lt. Smith did, and his ships survived Murray s Raid in consequence. This judgment showed Macdonough s ability to compensate for some of the setbacks caused by the incompetency of others. If Murray s Raid evidences Macdonough s ability to compensate for the circumstances, then in an ironic twist it also shows, according to Skaggs, some of the British failures that would prove fatal to their future operations. First, Skaggs notes that after Murray s Raid the British left their small fleet on Lake Champlain under the command of a junior officer named Daniel Pring, and secondly that they failed to fully exploit their naval superiority, ensuring that it would be temporary. Skaggs wrote, [t]hat such a junior officer as Pring was left in command of such a critical position constitutes one of the most incomprehensible aspects of the War of 1812 on this lake Moreover, the British failed to exploit their naval superiority. No serious effort was made to build a ship that would ensure British naval dominance of the lake. 27 In effect, because of the British command s incompetence and neglect, the Royal Navy effectively threw away its naval superiority and allowed Macdonough to match and 24. Commander Thomas Everard, R.N., to Governor-General Sir George Prevost, Lake Champlain, August 3, 1813, Macdonough, Commodore Macdonough s Autobiography, in, Rodney Macdonough Life of Commodore Thomas Macdonough, U.S. Navy (Boston, Mass: The Fort Hill Press, S. Usher, 1909), Skaggs, Ibid., 73.

9 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV surpass them in the shipbuilding race. So the combination of the loss of two sloops and the depredations of Murray s Raid had the effect of raising the importance of Lake Champlain in the eyes of the American leaders in Washington, while simultaneously highlighting a noticeable apathy and neglect on the part of the British commanders. The British naval superiority barely lasted three months. By September 6, Macdonough, having filled his personnel complement with men borrowed from the army and having embarked on a frantic building program that purchased and refurbished several merchant ships into vessels of war, returned to the waters of Lake Champlain with five sloops and four gunboats. 28 But Macdonough was far from finished in his efforts to build more ships. In anticipation of continued building on the part of the British, Macdonough wanted to construct an overwhelming number of gunboats, somewhere between twenty and twenty-five. 29 Because of the poor sailing of some of the purchased merchant vessels, Macdonough had only four sloops and four gunboats by the end of 1813, but he was determined to retain control of the Lake. The British began to realize that they needed to build a fleet themselves if they wanted to regain Lake Champlain. 30 In 1814, the shipbuilding race began in earnest as the British scrambled to catch up to Macdonough and Macdonough strove to keep his lead. Jones wrote to Macdonough in January, ordering him to employ all possible means to expedite the building and equipping of those Vessels that will prove decisively superior to any that the enemy can oppose to you. 31 Fortuitously, as Macdonough tried to decide whether to build several gunboats or one ship, Jones recommended the services of Mr. Brown of New York, which consisted of a pair of shipbuilding brothers who 28. Rodney Macdonough, Life of Commodore Thomas Macdonough, U.S. Navy (Boston, Mass: The Fort Hill Press, S. Usher, 1909), Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Plattsburgh Bay, November 23, 1813, Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Vergennes, December 28, 1813, Secretary of the Navy Jones to Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough, Navy Department, January 28, 1814, in : Chesapeake Bay, Northern Lakes, and Pacific Ocean, ed. Michael J. Crawford, Vol. 3 of The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 2002),

10 105 Hartman Compensating for Incompetency excelled at their craft. 32 Mr. Brown agreed to the navy s pay, and in a mere forty days built a 26-gun ship that would become Macdonough s flagship, the Saratoga. 33 Jones wanted Macdonough to also make use of a steamboat that was currently being built by merchants, but Macdonough objected to using such new technology since the machinery was incomplete and also lacked spare parts. Macdonough wrote to Jones that these weaknesses on the part of the steamboat have induced me, to abandon the idea of fitting this vessel to be propelled by steam, but to have her directly fitted for Twenty Guns in the rig of a Schooner. 34 This schooner would eventually become the sloop Ticonderoga, commanded by Lieutenant Cassin. 35 The British, Macdonough reported, were building a larger ship, which they had rigged but had not yet armed or manned, and Macdonough desperately wanted to enter the lake and claim it before the British arrived. 36 Macdonough s hope did not come to fruition. As Macdonough built ships and, more importantly, desperately tried to enlist enough sailors to man his fleet, the British regained military superiority on the lake. On May 9, Pring led the British squadron onto the lake in an attempt to crush Macdonough s incomplete fleet. 37 On May 13, Macdonough reported to Jones that the British had entered Lake Champlain with an intention of blocking us in at Otter Creek, where Macdonough s fleet was under construction. 38 Rodney Macdonough, Thomas Macdonough s grandson, wrote that the British flagship was Pring s recently built 16-gun brig called the Linnet, and a further five sloops and thirteen galleys used as gunboats completed the British fleet. 39 Hitherto, 32. Secretary of the Navy Jones to Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough, Navy Department, January 28, 1814, Skaggs, Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Vergennes, April 30, 1814, Skaggs, Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Vergennes, April 30, 1814, Rodney Macdonough, Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Vergennes, May 13, 1814, Rodney Macdonough, 141.

11 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV much of the tension on the lake centered on the two fleets movements without regard to the American army, but the skirmish at Otter Creek was significant because it allowed Macdonough and his future counterpart, Alexander Macomb, to begin developing a history of teamwork that the British forces would lack. When Pring s fleet began to move, Macomb sent fifty light artillerymen under Captain Arthur Thornton to man a battery at the mouth of Otter Creek. 40 Macdonough sent Lieutenant Stephen Cassin and a group of sailors to join Thornton at the battery. 41 The result was a fierce but nondamaging artillery duel between the batteries in the American fort and Pring s flotilla, in which the worst hurt consisted of a few wounds and a single gun dismounted. 42 However, far from being ineffectual, this engagement carried a twofold result for the Americans. First of all, it prevented the premature destruction of Macdonough s fleet by forcing Pring to withdraw, but it also allowed an instance of cooperation between the American army and navy, beyond merely squabbling over the use of soldiers for sailors due to a lack of naval enlistment. 43 In stark contrast, seeds of discord were sown between their British counterparts, as one historian records that Governor-General Prevost was furious that Pring had failed to destroy Macdonough s fleet, and he blamed the navy for not sending a large enough force, despite the fact that at this time the responsibility for supply lay on Prevost. 44 Despite the incompetency and occasional squabbling over men, Macdonough and Macomb learned to compensate for their defects through teamwork, while the British leadership practiced blame and fell under its own blindness to the actual tactical situations. Yet the British still had the ability to race Macdonough at shipbuilding on Lake Champlain. One historian, John R. Grodzinski, noted that the main problem of 40. Allan Seymour Everest, The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1981), Allan S. Everest, Alexander Macomb At Plattsburgh, 1814, New York History 44, no. 4 (1963), America: History and Life with Full Text, EBSCOhost (accessed September 5, 2015), Rodney Macdonough, Everest, The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley, 150. Also, the point about joint army-navy cooperation comes from Skaggs, Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr., The Battle of Plattsburgh, 1814 The Losers, American Neptune 21, no. 1 (1961), Historical Abstracts, EBSCOhost (accessed September 5, 2015),

12 Hartman Compensating for Incompetency shipbuilding afflicting the British at their base of Isle aux Noix was not shortages of building materials, ordnance, or stores; it was a lack of seamen. 45 In addition to the abundance of materials already in Canada, the British received aid from an unlikely source: smugglers from the United States. Vermont in particular lacked a strong support for the war, which helped foster in many areas a [w]idespread toleration of smuggling. 46 Prevost evidently reported that American contractors supplied cattle to feed two-thirds of the British Army in Canada. 47 While supplying the British army with food was illegal and possibly treasonous, even worse were Americans supplying building materials for the British fleet on Lake Champlain. To Macdonough s consternation, he learned that the British were building a ship and that Americans were helping to supply the parts. On June 29th, he wrote to Jones, I had information yesterday that two spars intended for the masts of a ship building at the Isle Aux Noix were on their way to canada in charge & under the management of four citizens of the United States, I sent Sailing Master Vallette to destroy them. 48 Less than two weeks later, Macdonough again reported, on the night of the 7 th. Midn. Abbot distroyed four Spars supposed to be for the enemy s ships Main-Mast and her three Top-Masts four Miles within the enemy s country. 49 Macdonough was officially supposed to curtail smuggling, and he and his counterparts in the army certainly tried with some success, as noted above. However, stopping the smuggling completely was impossible because the border Vermont and New York share with Canada was too long for effective anti-smuggling operations. Furthermore, one historian stated, stopping the commerce along the Champlain-Richelieu path flirted with the possibility of open rebellion in Vermont. 45. John R. Grodzinski, Defender of Canada: Sir George Prevost and the War of 1812 (Oklahoma City: University of Oklahoma Press, 2013), Edward Brynn, Patterns of Dissent: Vermont s Opposition to the War of 1812, Vermont History 40, no.1 (Winter 1972), Harvey Strum, New York Federalists and Opposition to the War of 1812, World Affairs 142, no. 3 (Winter 1980),,JSTOR (accessed September 13, 2015), Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, at the lines, June 29, 1814, Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, near the lines, Lake Champlain, July 9, 1814,

13 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV Thus the trade was permitted to continue. 50 So despite a shortage of manpower, the British capitalized on the American inability to completely shut down smuggling across the lines and built the largest warship to enter Lake Champlain, the HMS Confiance, which launched on August 25, Unfortunately for the British, Brown s company was still in business. As reports of the Confiance s construction made their way to Macdonough s notice, he began to get worried. He wrote in early July, [t]he enemy are progressing rapidly with their Ship which they say will be ready by the first of August. 52 Possibly because of the financial strains facing the nation and also because of a poor idea of the complications of defending the Lake Champlain and Plattsburgh frontier, a plan that Skaggs labeled unrealistic, Jones would not authorize the funds for Macdonough to supplement his fleet with a new ship. 53 But President Madison overruled Jones, and Brown s shipbuilders were sent to Lake Champlain. 54 Brown s men outdid themselves, and the brig that became the second Eagle was launched three and one-half weeks after its timbers were growing in the forest. 55 Aside from rounding out the final American fleet, the speed of Brown s shipbuilding program, particularly in regards to the Saratoga, Ticonderoga, and the Eagle, also enabled Macdonough to have sufficient time to train the ships crews. 56 Furthermore, over the summer Macdonough was able to cooperate with elements of the army during a series of raids into Canada, which again aided the cooperation of the two service branches. 57 So despite the early failures in interservice cooperation, the incompetent loss of the Eagle and the Growler, and even Jones s reluctance to build 50. H. N. Muller, A Traitorous and Diabolical Traffic: The Commerce of the Champlain-Richelieu Corridor During the War of 1812, Vermont History 44, no. 2 (Spring 1976), Grodzinski, 167. Note: Confiance means Confidence. 52. Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, near the lines, Lake Champlain, July 9, 1814, Skaggs, Irving Brant, Madison and the War of 1812, The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography 74, no. 1 (January 1966), JSTOR (accessed September 18, 2015), Ibid., Skaggs, Ibid.,

14 109 Hartman Compensating for Incompetency him another ship, Macdonough was able to compensate through a little luck and good judgment in order to create a well-trained and well-equipped fleet able to challenge British incursions into Lake Champlain. However, Macdonough and Macomb would not face mere incursions into New York or Lake Champlain, but rather a full-scale invasion of the British Army of Canada led by Governor-General Sir George Prevost, and the entire British squadron headed by the flagship Confiance under Captain George Downie. London ordered Prevost to invade New York and sent him a substantial reinforcement from the European continent, including sizeable contingents of Wellington s veterans from the Peninsular Campaign. Numbers have been a continual point of contention amongst historians of the Battle of Plattsburgh because initial American reports exaggerated the size of the British army. Based on numbers probably inflated by Alexander Macomb, Rodney Macdonough wrote that there were not less than 15,000 troops, chiefly from the Peninsular, all of whom were retained for the invasion of New York except one brigade which was sent farther west. 58 Theodore Roosevelt counted 11,000 British soldiers. 59 Another historian from the 1960s says about Prevost only repeated proddings, explicit instructions, and the actual arrival of some fourteen thousand Peninsular veterans in July and August convinced him that the time for attack had come. 60 One historian of Plattsburgh, Allan S. Everest, wrote in the 1980s that Prevost had [s]ome sixteen thousand hardened veterans of Wellington s campaigns in Spain. 61 However, Everest then noted that because he had to guard his supply line to Canada, Prevost actually took only about 7,000 men to Plattsburgh. 62 More recently, Skaggs noted, [w] hile some estimates of Prevost s strength are as high as fourteen thousand, the reality is probably about half that figure The number actually arriving at Plattsburgh was probably closer to seven thousand. 63 Most recently, Grodzinski did a detailed analysis of the troops who arrived for service in Canada. Grodzinski contends that Prevost had 58. Rodney Macdonough, Roosevelt, Heinrichs, Everest, War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley, Everest, Alexander Macomb at Plattsburgh, Skaggs, 114.

15 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV at his disposal more than 10,000 troops, but that less than half of these new forces were from Wellington s Invincibles, with the remainder drawn from garrisons throughout the British Empire. 64 Furthermore, of these 10,000, he argues that only about 7,500 of these men actually constituted Prevost s army at Plattsburgh. 65 Given the more likely estimates from Grodzinski and Skaggs, Grodzinski s conclusion that Prevost did not command a red-coated juggernaut of elite troops seems most probable. 66 Prevost began the buildup to his campaign by souring his relations with his men. He tightened dress regulations for the soldiers that conformed to spit-and-polish garrison duty but seemed inappropriate to men who had been so long in the field. 67 Grodzinski, an able defender of Sir George Prevost, points out that Prevost acted well within his rights as the commander-in-chief. However, this incident, insignificant on its own merit, nonetheless illustrates the minor lapses of judgment and incompetencies within the British command that would balloon into major failures. 68 Prevost s objective was to take Plattsburgh. Allan Everest notes that earlier historians sometimes assumed that Prevost intended to invade all of New York, perhaps trying to reproduce Burgoyne s plan from the Revolutionary War and take Albany. 69 This served to make the American victory seem that much more dramatic, but it is extremely unlikely. Rodney Macdonough thought that Prevost probably intended to capture either Crown Point or Ticonderoga, while Everest and Grodzinski agree that Prevost simply wanted to take Plattsburgh. 70 Either way, taking American territory would work in favor of the British position during the ongoing peace negotiations. 71 Allan Everest also points out that [t]here is no evidence that Prevost was enthusiastic over his new orders because Prevost knew that if the British invaded New York in the 64. Grodzinski, Ibid., Ibid., Skaggs, Grodzinski, Everest, The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley, Rodney Macdonough, 158; Everest, The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley, 166; Grodzinski, Rodney Macdonough,

16 Hartman Compensating for Incompetency same way the Americans invaded Canada it would bring forth maximum war effort from the Americans, and Prevost also strongly believed that control of the lake was absolutely necessary for any sustainable victories on land. 72 Yet, despite this belief in the necessity of control over Lake Champlain, Prevost began his invasion before the British fleet was ready to sail. Ironically, he had a good shot at taking Plattsburgh, partly due to the incompetency of the American War Department. Prior to Prevost s invasion, the American Army under General Izard and his second-in-command Alexander Macomb had around 5,500 trained and fit regulars to defend Plattsburgh. But just before the British army crossed the border, General Izard was ordered to move to Sackett s Harbor by the Secretary of War. 73 Earlier that summer, Izard had wanted to be transferred, but then he realized that Prevost had gathered a large army on the Canadian border. By then the Secretary of War refused to listen to his remonstrance and transferred him anyway. 74 Izard, ordered to take his group of 4,000 men with him, left Brigadier General Alexander Macomb with a ragtag force of around 3,400 soldiers, of whom only about 1,500 were effective, since the rest were convalescent or otherwise impaired. 75 Actually, historians also differ in their accounts of the size of the American army, but they tend to agree that the number of effective American regulars was 2,000 or less. 76 Thus, the American force was substantially smaller than the British army due to bureaucratic incompetence within the War Department, but since the battle turned out to hinge on the outcome of the naval conflict, the numbers of men on land primarily highlights that both the British and the American high commands were saddled with certain ineptitudes. In addition to his trained regulars, Macomb had access to some militia units from New York. These he sent to engage and hopefully slow the advancing British columns. Prevost began his march on September 3, and the militia fought with the 72. Everest, The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley, Rodney Macdonough, Everest, Alexander Macomb at Plattsburgh, Everest, The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley, Roosevelt, 309; Everest, Alexander Macomb at Plattsburgh, 313; Rodney Macdonough, 158; Skaggs,

17 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV British three times on the roads to Plattsburgh, all on September At Beekmantown Road, the militia was driven back, and at Culver Hill the British column never broke ranks at it scattered the American skirmishers and snipers. 78 Finally, at Halsey s Corners, the Americans managed to use a cannon to engage a British column but were forced to retreat in the face of a bayonet charge. 79 The Americans lost about 45 men, and the British lost several hundred but managed to force their way to Plattsburgh and establish positions facing the American fortifications, which Macomb had constructed on the south side of the Saranac Creek. 80 At the same time that Prevost began his invasion, Macdonough moved his fleet to Plattsburgh Bay, writing to Jones, [a]s an attack on this place is threatened by a land movement of the enemy and their fleet evincing no immediate signs of coming out, Brigr. Genl. Macomb and myself considered this movement of our vessels proper and necessary. 81 Beyond merely cooperating by conferring with Macomb, Macdonough also endeavored to provide shore support by sending his gunboats to impede the British as they attempted to cross the aptly named Dead Creek. Although Macdonough optimistically wrote, their progress was considerably checked by the fire of the Gallies, untill their Artillery could be brought up, Dead Creek saw the death of at least two sailors and the gunboats had to withdraw after the swift British reaction. 82 However, the gunboat action had the very important effect of reinforcing Prevost s already accepted belief that control of the lake was absolutely necessary prior to assaulting the American fortifications on the south side of the Saranac Creek past Plattsburgh. Prevost decided to await the arrival of the British fleet. Thus, Macdonough and Macomb cooperated to overcome some of the effects of the Secretary of War s incompetent removal of 77. Everest, Alexander Macomb at Plattsburgh, Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Plattsburgh, September 3, 1814, Master Commandant Thomas Macdonough to Secretary of the Navy Jones, Off Plattsburgh, September 7, 1814,

18 113 Hartman Compensating for Incompetency General Izard and put forth enough resistance to convince Prevost to halt his army at Plattsburgh and await naval superiority. However, the British began to feel the incompetent effects of their own bureaucracies and mismanagement. Several scholars contend that, at this critical juncture, Prevost should have gone ahead and attacked the American fortifications. One historian noted that there were few militia present, the moment was opportune for an assault on the works. 83 In fact, militias from New York and even Vermont had begun to arrive, significantly bolstering Macomb s strength up to around 3,400 while Prevost waited. 84 However, Prevost was a cautious commander, and the same historian wrote, but Prevost had no intention of risking his force until the naval engagement was settled. 85 Furthermore, if Prevost did not have the overwhelming military superiority of 10,000 to 14,000 soldiers, then he would be understandably cautious. Attacking a strong fortification with a superiority of 7 to 2 is probably feasible for a daring general, but not for a cautious one who did not have control of the lake. Prevost s fears of Macdonough s fleet s ability to hound a frontal assault on Macomb s defenses, as well as the fear of isolation when his supply lines were guarded by 2,000 men, were probably unfounded, but they were understandable for a man of his risk-aversive temperament. Far more ominous for British prospects was the situation developing at Isle aux Noix, where Captain George Downie was desperately trying to put the finishing touches on his flagship, the 37-gun Confiance. Downie was desperate for several reasons. If the American Secretary of War s removal of Izard on the eve of Prevost s invasion constituted an incompetent act, then Downie s appointment as Captain of the British squadron on Lake Champlain constituted a disaster. However, this failure was not because Downie was a poor officer. In fact, he was quite capable. The problem was he had been appointed to command the squadron, replacing Captain Fisher, on September Prevost began his invasion on September 3, and the Battle of Plattsburgh occurred on September 11. Downie had a ridiculously small time to prepare his fleet, and a change in command on the eve of a major offensive violated all norms of military 83. Hienrichs, Grodzinski, Heinrichs, Skaggs, 109.

19 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV command. 87 One of the reasons this rapid change happened was that Commodore Sir James Yeo, the commander of the Royal Navy on the Great Lakes, had succeeded in removing the Royal Navy from Prevost s authority prior to the beginning of the campaign. 88 While potentially streamlining the British Navy, all it really did was cause a violation of the military principle of unity of command, which resulted in serious mismanagement of the British invasion effort. 89 The only apparent explanation of Yeo s incomprehensible replacement of Fisher is that Fisher s demands for more men verged on impertinence. 90 On top of his arrival just as the British invasion got underway, Downie also had to deal with the fact that the Confiance was not ready for combat. He lacked the requisite number of sailors to effectively man this powerful vessel and, more disturbingly, lacked gun locks to fire his cannons efficiently. 91 In fact, the carpenters did not even complete Confiance s fittings until after it was sailing into battle in Plattsburgh Bay. 92 While the British army awaited the navy to enter the lake, Prevost began to send a series of increasingly cold letters, pressuring Downie to hurry up and support his invasion. On September 9, Prevost wrote, I have postponed moving on the Enemy s position on the South bank of the Saranac, until your Squadron is in a state of preparation to cooperate with this Division of the Army. I need not dwell with you on the evils resulting to both Services from delay. 93 In the time just after the War of 1812, some historians and also the Royal Navy argued on the basis of these letters that Prevost forced or goaded Downie to attack when he was not ready. Everest wrote, [a]s both Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief, he could bring pressure to 87. Skaggs, Ibid., Ibid., Grodzinski, Ibid., Heinrichs, Governor-General Sir George Prevost to Captain George Downie, R.N., Plattsburgh, September 9, 1814, in : Chesapeake Bay, Northern Lakes, and Pacific Ocean, ed. Michael J. Crawford, Vol. 3 of The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 2002),

20 115 Hartman Compensating for Incompetency bear upon any officer commanding the fleet. 94 On the other hand, Prevost s defender Grodzinski pointed out that Prevost technically never gave Downie a direct order and that Downie was smart enough to decide on his own when best to sail. 95 From the evidence, it seems abundantly clear that Prevost did pressure Downie considerably. However, since Downie was under Yeo s command because of the division of the services, Prevost was certainly not responsible for the pathetic lack of preparation that Downie confronted. Thus, Prevost did commit some mismanagement, but Sir James Yeo s incompetence certainly dwarfs Prevost s responsibility for the ensuing naval engagement. Neither Prevost nor Downie were in positions to compensate for the incompetent preparation they faced. Interestingly, on paper Macdonough s and Downie s fleets were nearly equal in ships, men, and firepower. Macdonough had the Saratoga as his flagship, along with the sloops Ticonderoga, Preble, Eagle, Montgomery, and ten gunboats, and Downie sailed in his flagship, the Confiance, along with the Linnet, Chubb, Finch, and around eleven gunboats. 96 As with all numbers at the Battle of Plattsburgh, historians disagree over the number of guns, weight of the broadsides, and number of men in each fleet. Grodzinski records that Downie had a total of 90 guns, whereas Macdonough had about 88 guns. 97 Skaggs puts the weights of the broadsides in terms of long and short guns, with the British having 1128 lbs., long and 736 lbs., short; versus an American broadside of 759 lbs., long and 1274 lbs., short. 98 Grodzinski gives Macdonough 862 sailors and marines to 799 for Downie. 99 However, the numbers vary by only a little, and historians generally accept that the fleets were nearly equal. Yet, despite the equality on paper, Macdonough gained several key advantages early in the Battle of Plattsburgh Bay primarily through his foresight and excellent planning. Macdonough anchored his fleet in Plattsburgh Bay in such a way that if the British chose to enter the bay they would be against the wind, which would impede 94. Everest, Alexander Macomb at Plattsburgh, Grodzinski, Ibid., Ibid., Skaggs, Grodzinski, 183.

21 Tau Sigma Journal of Historical Studies: Vol. XXIV their sailing, and he also prepared the Saratoga by having a kedge planted broad off on each of her bows, with a hawser and preventer hawser (hanging in bights under water) leading from each quarter to the kedge on that side. 100 This setup would allow him to turn his ship around while still at anchor should he need to change his broadsides. Macdonough s preparations paid off when Downie decided to sail his ships straight into the Bay toward him. Everest describes this move by writing, [u]naccountably, Downie rose to Macdonough s bait. 101 This move was the last mistake Downie made and the culmination in a long line of incompetent mistakes and poor decisions that brought the British fleet to Plattsburgh Bay on September 11. The Eagle fired at the British first, but its shot fell short. The Linnet gave the Saratoga a broadside, and then Macdonough personally sighted and fired one of his long guns, which killed several sailors on the Confiance. 102 As the Saratoga continued to fire on the Confiance and Downie tried to get his flagship into position, the Confiance lost several of its anchors and chains. 103 The Confiance, Linnet, and Chub then engaged the Saratoga and the Eagle, while the Finch and four British gunboats moved to engage the Ticonderoga and the Preble. The remainder of the British gunboats remained aloof from the fray. Seven American gunboats fought the Linnet, and three supported the Ticonderoga and the Preble. 104 Early in the battle, as both sides exchanged broadsides and the gunboats peppered the ships with shot, the British Lieutenant McGhee of the Chub having his Cables, Bowsprit and Main Boom shot away drifted within the Enemy s line and was obliged to surrender. 105 Also early in the battle, Captain George Downie was crushed to death by a dismounted cannon. 106 Macdonough himself was twice knocked unconscious, once by a spanker 100. Roosevelt, 319. Parentheses original. Note: A kedge is a type of anchor, and a hawser is a heavy rope Everest, The War of 1812 in the Champlain Valley, Roosevelt, Rodney Macdonough, Ibid., Commander Daniel Pring, R.N., to Commodore Sir James Yeo, R.N., Plattsburgh Bay, September 12, 1814, in : Chesapeake Bay, Northern Lakes, and Pacific Ocean, ed. Michael J. Crawford, Vol. 3 of The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 2002), Roosevelt,

22 117 Hartman Compensating for Incompetency boom, and a second time by the severed head of a gun captain, but he managed to both survive and continue to direct his ship. 107 The Ticonderoga managed to cripple the Finch, and it drifted aground on Crab Island. There the convalescent American residents of the island hospital manned a 6-pounder cannon and fired until the Finch struck its colors after its commander could not lighten it to the point of escaping the shoal and after the battle was lost everywhere else. 108 The British gunboats managed to force the Preble out of the fight, but they could not dislodge the Ticonderoga from the American line. 109 The Eagle too dropped out of the American line, much to Macdonough s ire. 110 The cannonading between the Saratoga and the Confiance got so fierce that one British sailor reported afterwards, [n]ever was a shower of hail so thick as the shot whistling about our ears There is one of our marines who was in the Trafalgar action with Lord Nelson, who says it was a mere flea-bite in comparison with this. 111 When the Saratoga lost her last gun on the broadside, Pring reported that the ship cut her Cable, and winded her Larboard Broadside to bear on the Confiance who, in vain endeavoured to effect the same Operation, at I was much distressed to observe the Confiance had struck her Colours. 112 Macdonough s careful positioning of his anchors had paid off, as well as the Saratoga s shooting away the Confiance s anchors. Facing a fresh broadside and unable to reply in kind, the Confiance had no choice but to strike its colors. Macdonough then turned his fresh broadside on Pring s Linnet, which was also forced to strike, with the Finch striking in its turn. The British gunboats fled, leaving the broken British fleet in American hands Skaggs, Roosevelt, Ibid., Thomas Macdonough, Commodore Macdonough s Autobiography, in Rodney Macdonough, Life of Commodore Thomas Macdonough, U.S. Navy (Boston, Mass: The Fort Hill Press, S. Usher, 1909), Midshipman Lea to His Brother, Isle Aux Noix, September 21, 1814, in Rodney Macdonough, Life of Commodore Thomas Macdonough, U.S. Navy (Boston, Mass: The Fort Hill Press, S. Usher, 1909), Commander Daniel Pring, R.N., to Commodore Sir James Yeo, R.N., Plattsburgh Bay, September 12, 1814, in : Chesapeake Bay, Northern Lakes, and Pacific Ocean, ed. Michael J. Crawford, Vol. 3 of The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 2002), 610.