FORT ANNE: HISTORICAL RESEARCH AND ARCHEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF BATTLE HILL BATTLEFIELD GA FORT ANN, NEW YORK

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1 FORT ANNE: HISTORICAL RESEARCH AND ARCHEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS OF BATTLE HILL BATTLEFIELD GA FORT ANN, NEW YORK ARPA COMPLIANT COPY Research Based on a Grant from The American Battlefield Protection Program To Raymond W. Harvey Post 703, American Legion Report Prepared By: Michael Jacobson, PhD, RPA For the Raymond W. Harvey Post 703, American Legion and Kristen L. McMasters Archeologist and Grants Manager National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program 1201 Eye Street NW (2287) Washington, DC April 8, 2015 This material is based upon work assisted by a grant from the Department of the Interior, National Park Service American Battlefield Protection Program. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Interior.

2 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. i Acknowledgements The Public Archaeology Facility and authors of this report would like to acknowledge those who aided in the research and analysis for this project. We would like to thank the Raymond W. Harvey Post 703, American Legion for allowing us to take part in this study and for helping to arrange for the presentation of our results at the public presentation in April We would also like to thank members of the Fort Ann community that aided our research into the Battle of Fort Anne. We would also like to acknowledge George Sherwood. He was kind enough to provide us with a tour of Battle Hill and some of his interpretations of the battle that aided our own interpretations of the battlefield s landscape. We would also like to acknowledge Saratoga National Historic Park Historian Eric Schnitzer and the rest of the Sarartoga National Historic Park staff for discussing the Battle of Fort Anne s relation with the larger Burgyone campaign and allowing us access to their collections. The staffs of the New York State Archives, New York Public Library, and the Massachuettes Historical Society were also more than accomidating in providing acces to their archives.

3 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. ii TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION Overview of the Battle of Fort Anne Project Overview... 4 II. RESEARCH GOALS Identification of Archives and Collections Defining Features of the Battle of Fort Anne Identifying the Boundaries of the Fort Anne Battlefield Developing an Archeological Research Design for Fort Anne Battlefield III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Documentary Research Initial GIS Mapping and Analysis Field Survey Methods Final GIS Analysis IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND Burgoyne s Campaign Fall of Fort Ticonderoga Fort Anne Battle of Fort Anne - Day 1 (July 7, 1777) Battle of Fort Anne - Day 2 (July 8, 1777) Battle Results Aftermath V. DEFINING FEATURES AND KOCOA ANALYSIS KOCOA Analysis Historic Perspectives of Defining Features Withdrawal from Skenesborough First Day of Battle: July Second Day of Battle- July Withdraw from Fort Anne Geographic Analysis of Defining Features VI. DEFINING FEATURE INTEGRITY Environmental Setting Post Battle Land Use and Alterations General Threats to Defining Feature Integrity Condition of Battlefield Defining Features VII. ARCHEOLOGICAL RESEARCH DESIGN Research Goals...Error! Bookmark not defined. 7.2 Research Questions...Error! Bookmark not defined. 7.3 Data Needs and Field Methodology...Error! Bookmark not defined. 7.4 Laboratory Analysis...Error! Bookmark not defined. 7.5 Curation...Error! Bookmark not defined. 7.6 Report...Error! Bookmark not defined. 7.7 Conclusions...Error! Bookmark not defined. VIII. SUMMARY APPENDIX I: BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDIX II: BATTLE OF FORT ANNE REPOSITORY COLLECTION DATAError! Bookmark not defined. APPENDIX III: FORT ANNE BATTLEFIELD DEFINING FEATURES DATABASE... Error! Bookmark not defined.

4 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. iii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1.1. Location of Fort Anne Battlefield in New York State Figure 1.2. Location of Fort Anne Battlefield in Washington County Figure 1.3. Boundaries of Fort Anne Battlefield established by National Park Service Study Figure 1.4. Potential National Register Boundary for Fort Anne Battlefield Figure 4.1. Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne s 1777 campaign strategy Figure 4.2. Map of 18 th century fort system in Champlain-Hudson region Figure 4.3. Map of Battle of Fort Anne, July 7, Figure 4.4. Map of Battle of Fort Anne, July 8, Figure Lithograph of Fort Anne - probably depicts sawmill and blockhouse at Kane s Falls Figure Faden map of Burgoyne Campaign with approximate routes of Continenal and British Armies Figure 5.1. Overview of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features Figure 5.2. Detailed view of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features Figure 5.3. Continental Army s viewshed from Fort Anne Figure 5.4. British viewshed from summit of Battle Hill Figure 5.5. Viewshed of Continental positions during Battle of Fort Anne Figure 5.6. British Range of Musket Fire from the Summit of Battle Hill Figure 5.7. Continental Range of Musket Fire from Base and Side of Battle Hill Figure 5.8. Continental Range of Fire for Rifles from Base and Side of Battle Hill Figure 5.9. Degree of Slope for Fort Anne Battlefield Figure Three dimensional rendering of Battle of Fort Anne Figure 6.1. Terrain and watershed map showing Fort Anne Battlefield defining features Figure 6.2. USDA Soil Series associated with Battle of Fort Anne defining features Figure 6.3. Undated map of "Skenesborough" and Artillery Patent, now Whitehall Township Figure 6.4. Site of Fort Anne c (Lossing 1860:139) Figure 6.5. Site of Battle Hill c (Lossing 1860:141) Figure 6.6. Overlay of defining features on 1762 Brassier map Figure 6.7. Overlay of defining features on 1777 Faden map of Burgoyne Campaign Figure 6.8. Overlay of defining features on 1780 map (Burgoyne 1780) Figure 6.9. Overlay of defining features on 1825 Geddes map Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1853 Levey map Figure Overlay of defining features on 1866 Stone and Stewart map Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1893 Fort Anne, NY-VT 15 USGS Quadrangle Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1904 Fort Anne, NY-VT 15 USGS Quadrangle Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1944 Fort Anne, NY 7.5 USGS Quadrangle Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 1 of 4) Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 2 of 4) Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 3 of 4) Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 4 of 4) Figure Impacts to Battle Hill section of Fort Anne Battlefield Figure 7.1. Proposed areas for archeological testing highlighted in red.... Error! Bookmark not defined. Figure 8.1. Revised study and core areas for Fort Anne Battlefield

5 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. iv Figure 8.2. Revised area of Potential National Register nomination (PotNR) for the Fort Anne Battlefield.... Error! Bookmark not defined. LIST OF PHOTOGRAPHS Photo 4.1. Capt. William Montgomery s headstone at Trinity Church, New York City Photo 5.1. Facing north across Skenesborough (Whitehall) Harbor Photo 5.2. Facing west at reconstruction of Fort Anne well Photo 5.3. Facing west at New York State historical marker for Fort Anne well Photo 5.4. Facing south from summit of Battle Hill towards Fort Anne and Wood Creek Photo 5.5. Facing north across Continental Army s avenue of approach on morning of July 7, with Battle Hill in the background Photo 5.6. Facing east at Battle Hill from area of Kane s Falls Photo 5.7. Facing northeast across woods on Battle Hill Photo 5.8. Facing north across summit of Battle Hill Photo 5.9. Facing north across ravine west of Battle Hill s summit Photo Facing northwest across eastern slope of Battle Hill from Continental Army s position Photo Facing north across Great Meadows, possible area of post-battle British camp Photo 6.1. Facing southwest at Daniel Weller burial Photo 6.2. Facing west across stone wall on Battle Hill Photo 6.3. Facing west at cut into Battle Hill and Battle Hill plaque Photo 6.4. Facing north across Champlain Canal Photo 6.5. Facing south across rail line near base of Battle Hill Photo 6.6. Facing south at southern portion of defile Photo 6.7. Facing south across southeastern face of Battle Hill Photo 6.8. Facing north across access road Photo 6.9. Facing north at granite mine area Photo Facing north across Battle Hill summit Photo Facing west across 20 th century landfill at base of Battle Hill Photo Facing south across British camp post-battle Photo Facing east at area of Fort Anne Photo Facing northwest at area of Fort Anne and surrounding Continental camp Photo Facing south across start of Skenesborough Road in Whitehall (Skenesborough) Photo Facing west at cut along US Route 4, Skenesborough Road and Battle Hill defining features Photo Facing south across Skenesborough Road, Old Route Photo Facing south along Champlain Canal and Wood Creek near Comstock, Wood Creek along left side of channel Photo Facing west at Champlain Canal, area of Wood Creek near Battle Hill, showing impacts from construction of the canal LIST OF TABLES Table 4.1. Battle of Fort Anne Order of Battle Table 5.1. Battle of Fort Anne Defining Features Table 6.1. USDA Soil Series for Fort Anne Battlefield (USDA 1975)

6 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 1 I. INTRODUCTION During June and July of 1777, British forces under the command of Lieutenant General John Burgoyne advanced across the Lake Champlain region attacking the Continental Army s Northern Department. This was part of Burgoyne s ultimate plan to divide the northern colonies from the other rebellious colonies and end the American Revolution using a multi-pronged attack (Alden 1969: ; Cubbison 2012: ; Graymont 1972:114; Ketchum 1997:84; Luzader 2010:1-32; Scott 1927:62; Watt 2002:49-51; Williams 2005:50). Burgoyne s forces attained early victories by easily capturing Continental posts at Crown Point, Fort Ticonderoga, and Skenesborough as well as defeating Continenal forces at the Battle of Hubbardton. In these early stages of his campaign, Burgoyne s seemed unstoppable. On July 7 and 8, 1777, remnants of the Continental Army s evacuees from Fort Tichonderoga took a stand at the small outpost of Fort Anne 1 against Burgoyne s 9 th Regiment of Foot in what became known as the Battle of Fort Anne (Ketchum 1997: ; Luzader 2010:69-71). A small contingent of Continental troops who fled Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesborough with women and injured soldiers arrived at Fort Anne on the night of July 6. The 6 th Regiment of the Albany Militia would soon arrive to help reinforce those at Fort Anne. During July 7 and 8, the soldiers at Fort Anne put up a steady and strong attack on the advancing British. Only when their position became untenable did they withdraw to Fort Edward. The Fort Anne battlefield is in an area of rock quarrying and granite mining. The community of Fort Ann, New York and the American Legion Raymond W. Harvey Post 703 in Fort Ann are concerned with the threat of impacts presented by such mining activities. Members of the community are also interested in long term strategies for preserving the battlefield. To help with such preservation efforts, a better understanding of the historic events and landscape features associated with the battle was needed. To aid in its preservation efforts, the American Legion Post 703 received a grant from the National Park Service s American Battlefield Protection Program (ABPP). Researchers at the Public Archaeology Facility (PAF) of Binghamton University conducted the historical research and battlefield delineation to better determine the locations of battle related landscape features and their integrity and research potential. The information gained from the project will enhance the interpretation of the battle and help to inform preservation and development in the area. The ABPP documented the Battle of Fort Anne (ABPP Number NY215) in 2001 and reported on their survey of the battlefield in the program s 2007 Revolutionary War and War of 1812 study (NPS 2007). The 2007 study lists the Battle of Fort Anne as being a Priority II/Class C battlefield. Under the ABPP s criteria, Class C battlefields are [S]ites with high or medium short- or long-term threats Priority II, Class C sites need immediate preservation or may be lost by 2017 (NPS 2007:10). The determination of threat for the Fort Anne Battlefield states that preservation initiatives are needed directly. 1 Historic accounts and histories have varied in spelling Fort Ann as Fort Ann or as Fort Anne. The name of the Village of Fort Ann was officially named without the e in 1808 (Fort Ann 2007:8, 12). For the purposes of this report, when referring to the battle and 18 th century associations of the fort, the Fort Anne spelling will be used and when referring to post 18 th century associations of the area, the Fort Ann spelling will be used.

7 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 2 As a first step to delineate the Battle of Fort Anne, this project included detailed documentary research to identify the defining features related to the battle. This report presents historical research and spatial analyses related to the Battle of Fort Anne. The project, as presented here, consisted of historical research to identify landscape features related to the battle, field verification of the features, and an initial assessment of their integrity. Project researchers conducted military terrain analysis of the landscape. Researchers applied KOCOA (Key Terrain, Observation, Cover/Concealment, Obstruction, and Avenue of Approach/Retreat) criteria for conducting the military terrain analysis. The results of the historical research and field survey presented in this report suggest that there is a wide range of integrity among the individual defining features with generally good integrity for the battlefield as a whole. Most of the battlefield has remained relatively undeveloped since the 18 th century. The impacts are limited to residential development in the Village of Fort Ann as well as the development of transportation routes along Wood Creek. Taken as a whole, the defining features provide a high research and interpretive potential for the Fort Anne Battlefield. It is important to note that this study focused on historic and archival research as well as field mapping. No archeological survey or excavation occurred as part of this research. Section 7 (p. 107) provides a research design for future archeological testing. 1.1 Overview of the Battle of Fort Anne In 1777, British General John Burgoyne attempted to divide New England from the other colonies in rebellion and thus end the American Revolution. His plan involved a multi-pronged attack into present day New York State (Alden 1969: ; Cubbison 2012: ; Graymont 1972:114; Ketchum 1997:84; Luzader 2010:1-32; Scott 1927:62; Watt 2002:49-51; Williams 2005:50). Burgoyne led his main force through the Champlain and Hudson Valleys towards Albany, while Brigadier General Barry St. Leger led a force across the Mohawk Valley towards Albany. Burgoyne hoped General William Howe would aid him from New York City and the southern Hudson River Valley. The result of such a campaign would cut off New England, specifically Boston, from the rest of the colonies and force their submission. At the beginning of his campaign, Burgoyne was successful in routing the Continental Army. On June 30, 1777, he captured Crown Point (Ketchum 1997: ; Luzader 2010:45). The next week, the Continental Major General Arthur St. Clair abandoned Fort Ticonderoga to Burgoyne (Ketchum 1997: ; Luzader 2010:56). St. Clair presented no effective defense against the British; instead withdrawing from the fort during the night. On July 7, Burgoyne s army defeated the main Continental Army withdrawing from Fort Ticonderoga at the Battle of Hubbardton (Ketchum 1997: ; Luzader 2010:60-67). By mid-july 1777, Burgoyne controlled the Champlain Valley and was on the verge of entering the Hudson River Valley. Up to this point, the Continentals presented minimal resistance to Burgoyne s army. Following the evacuation of Fort Ticonderoga, a small contingent of withdrawing Continentals resisted the British advance at the Battle of Fort Anne. A mixed group of soldiers from various regiments and companies came together under the command of New Hampshire s Colonel Pierse Long to form a unified stand against Burgoyne s army (Ketchum 1997: ; Luzader 2010:69-71). The stand was a temporary one, and made only after a long and difficult withdrawal. The stand at Fort Anne allowed time for the rest of the Continental Army s Northern Department under the command of Major General Philip Schuyler to concentrate its resources and troops to mount a more effective defense at Fort Edward and later

8 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 3 Stillwater, New York (Hogeboom Pension 1818; Miller Pension 1832; Van Alstyne Pension 1818; Van Rensselaer Pension 1818; Wittbeck Pension 1818). During the withdrawal from Fort Ticonderoga, St. Clair divided his Continental troops. He led the main army overland towards present day Vermont, while a second group composed of women, sick and injured soldiers, and guards under the command of New Hampshire s Colonel Pierse Long withdrew to Skenesborough (Ketchum 1997: ). At Skenesborough, Long s forces joined with a company of the Continental Army s 3 rd NH under the command of Captain James Gray (Gray 1777). The trip from Fort Ticonderoga to Skenesborough brought the Continentals across the southern portion of Lake Champlain; it also provided Burgoyne s naval fleet a quick means for attacking the Continentals (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVII). Shortly after the Long s forces reached Skenesborough, Burgoyne s ships arrived and commenced bombardment of the port of Skenesborough (Thacher 1823:100). Facing cannon fire from Burgoyne s ships and approaching land forces, Colonel Long ordered the destruction of the Continental Army s baggage, supplies, and artillery before withdrawing the Continental Army to Fort Anne (Gray 1777). The withdrawal to Fort Anne was not easy - the withdrawing Continentals made slow progress along bad roads and a shallow creek throughout the night of July 6 into the morning of July 7. Long s withdrawal to Fort Anne followed the military road from Skenesborough to Fort Anne while the women, sick, and injured soldiers took boats on Wood Creek. The military road running parallel to Wood Creek was in disrepair having received little maintenance, and its bridges were destroyed (Burgoyne 1780: Appendix XVIII). Burgoyne dispatched 190 soldiers of the 9 th Regiment of Foot to pursue the Continentals (Hagist 2004:39). Most of the Continentals arrived at Fort Anne in the early hours of July 7. The Battle of Fort Anne was composed of two skirmishes fought over two days and centered on Battle Hill. The hill was located approximately ¾ mile north of Fort Anne (Hagist 2004:39). On July 7, the 9 th Regiment of Foot under Colonel John Hill established a camp to observe Fort Anne. That same day, Capt. Gray led a force to engage the British (Gray 1777). He started by attacking the British camp ½ mile north of Fort Anne. The fighting occurred in an area of heavy woods. The British soldiers were unable to see the Continentals attacking them (Hagist 2004:39). Unable to withstand the Continental attack and obstructed by the woods, the British withdrew up the slope of Battle Hill. The Continentals returned to Fort Anne ending the first day of the battle. On July 8, the Continentals returned to the base of Battle Hill in another attack against the British. The Albany Militia s 6 th Regiment arrived at Fort Anne to reinforce the Continentals (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818). The fighting was fierce as the Continentals attacked the British on Battle Hill (Gray 1777). On the summit of Battle Hill, the British established a fighting line. The line was long consisting of a single row of scattered British Regulars to prevent the Continentals from surrounding them (Hagist 2004:40). The steep slope and heavy fire prevented the Continentals from overwhelming the British position. That afternoon both sides were running low on ammunition. A war whoop from a British scout put an end to the battle. Captain John Money advanced towards Battle Hill with a contingent of Native American warriors. Seeing the fighting, the warriors abandonded Captain Money rather than join the battle. Alone, Captain Money let out a war whoop and created the impression that British reinforcements had arrived (Hagist 2004:40). With their ammunition running low

9 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 4 and believing that Burgoyne came to reinforce the 9 th Regiment, the Continentals withrew from Battle Hill, and burned Fort Anne before withdrawing to Fort Edward (Gray 1777). The Battle of Fort Anne allowed Gen. Schuyler time to prepare a sustained strategy against Burgoyne. While the British were occupied at Fort Anne, he removed supplies from Fort George and Fort Anne (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818). He concentrated his forces at Fort Edward and made his way to Stillwater in preparation for Burgoyne s advance. As Burgoyne advanced, he became more committed to following his campaign to the end. His supply line grew longer and his advance slowed as he invested more time in moving his supplies and artillery across the terrain of the Hudson Valley. Along the way, Schuyler s forces destroyed and obstructed roads causing more delays (Ketchum 1997; Luzader 2010). Fort Anne became a turning point in Burgoyne s campaign, slowing his momentum and leading to his defeat and surrender at Saratoga in October of Project Overview The Battle of Fort Anne occurred along the southern edge of the Champlain Valley in present day Washington County, New York (Figures 1.1 and 1.2, p. 6). The extent of the battlefield stretched from Skenesborough (present day Whitehall) to Fort Edward, New York. However, the majority of the battle was located in the area immediately north of the Village of Fort Ann at the base and summit of Battle Hill (Figures 5.1 and 5.2, pp. 40 and 41). The name, Battle Hill, is from the 19 th century and derives from the events of the Battle of Fort Anne. During the 19 th century, the construction and trade related to the Champlain Canal led to increased settlement and development in the area of Fort Anne, leading to the development of the Village of Fort Ann (Fort Ann 2007). The 18 th century fortification Fort Anne is no longer visible on the landscape, but the overall terrain and landscape related to the Fort Anne Battlefield is still present. An initial survey of the Fort Anne Battlefield conducted for the ABPP (NPS 2007) described the battlefield area as having a study area consisting of 2,395 acres (969 ha) and a core area of 858 acres (347 ha) (Figure 1.3, p. 7). The core area is that portion of the battlefield that included direct combat or fighting. The study area includes the entire extent of the battlefield. Historic accounts and the presence of related material culture define the battlefield s extent. The study area includes not only the core, but also secondary areas, such as avenues of advance/retreat, supply lines, and observation posts. These areas were essential for the greater conflict, but were not directly involved with the actual combat actions. The Fort Anne Battlefield is in a rural area consisting of small farms, forests, and hills. The research presented here consists of historical research and mapping of the Fort Anne Battlefield. In reviewing the accounts of British and Continental troops in terms of how they viewed the battlefield s landscape, a new and integrated interpretation of the battle can be made. As mentioned previously, the analysis presented here relies on military terrain analysis (KOCOA). Military historians and the ABPP have used such a system to help in the interpretation of how battles unfolded (McMasters 2009). The analysis recognizes the concept of landscape as a military resource used by officers and soldiers in their attempt to gain an advantage in battle, and influence the outcome of an engagement. Maximizing observable areas for oneself and limiting or obstructing the views and advance of the other side is the foundation of such a battle strategy. The application of this approach to the Battle of Fort Anne produced a more inclusive interpretation of the battle s history.

10 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 5 Researchers based their identification and interpretation of the battlefield s defining features on a review of journals, letters, pension applications, maps, and other historic documents created by or originating from participants in the Battle of Fort Anne. Due to the relatively small number of identifiable accounts of the battle, it was important to ensure that each perspective from both sides of the conflict, British and Continental, was used in the analysis to develop a comprehensive and integrated view of the battle. Researchers made use of accounts from British, Continental, and militia participants and associated individuals. Battles are not monolithic; they are a conflictive process between multiple sides, each with their own ideologies and views of warfare. Interpreting the battle accurately requires that the researcher addresses these multiple perspectives. The inclusion of multiple historical views combined with mapping using a geographic information system (GIS) approach, provides a more integrative and visual approach to understanding the battlefield and its features. A defining feature in this study was defined as either a natural (i.e., creek or hill) or cultural (i.e., structure or road) feature that was integral to the progress of the battle. Contextual information related to the defining features aided the determination of their role in the battle. Contextual information included aspects of the feature, such as their size, composition, function, and distance from other features. Field verification in the form of a pedestrian walkover followed the identification of defining features from historic documents. The walkover allowed an interpretation of the features role in the battle and relation to the battlefield s landscape as a whole. The walkover also provided an initial determination of their integrity by identifying any surface evidence of disturbance. The comparison of the soldiers views of space to the current use of space provides an initial assessment for the defining features. Using this baseline information, further analysis of the landscape using visual assessment and spatial analyses helps to determine the integrity of the features. Integrity is defined here as the level in which a defining feature represents its location, setting, feeling, contains material deposits related to its use during the battle, and the ability of the information related to the feature to answer possible research questions concerning the overall battle (See Section 6.4, p. 94, for a full definition used in assessing defining feature integrity). The spatial inventory of features and their integrity helps to determine priorities for preservation. The following sections will elaborate on the historical background from these several perspectives, summarize the battlefield s defining features using KOCOA analysis, and present a research design that will assist with assessing integrity and development of a preservation plan for the Battle of Fort Anne Battlefield.

11 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 6 Figure 1.1. Location of Fort Anne Battlefield in New York State. Figure 1.2. Location of Fort Anne Battlefield in Washington County.

12 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 7 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 1.3. Boundaries of Fort Anne Battlefield established by National Park Service Study.

13 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 8 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 1.4. Potential National Register Boundary for Fort Anne Battlefield.

14 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 9 II. RESEARCH GOALS The primary goal of this project is to identify the boundaries for the Battle of Fort Anne and the locations of any associated features. It is a first step on a path of preservation by identifying the cultural resources associated with the battle. The American Legion Post 703 and the community of Fort Anne wish to better understand the importance of this battle and establish a path of preservation of the battlefield s landscape and its interpretation to a larger public. To locate the battlefield s boundaries, researchers formulated a set of research goals for this project. Those research goals include the identification of historical archives and documents related to the Battle of Fort Anne; the identification of defining features; and an initial assessment of the integrity and context of the battlefield s defining features and general landscape. 2.1 Identification of Archives and Collections Due to the significance of the Battles of Saratoga and Burgoyne s campaign, the overall campaign has received attention from numerous historians (Alden 1969: ; Corbett 2012; Cubbison 2012; Graymont 1972:114; Ketchum 1997; Luzader 2010; Scott 1927:62; Watt 2002:49-51; Williams 2005:50). However, most of these secondary histories have focused on the larger battles of the campaign, such as the Battle of Hubbardton, which occurred on the same day as the Battle of Fort Anne (July 7, 1777). The secondary histories provide narrow descriptions of the Battle of Fort Anne. This presented a limited foundation for project researchers in developing a base of primary documents to help with the identification of the battlefield s landscape features. To expand this foundation for research, the project s first task was to identify archives and collections holding materials related to the Battle of Fort Anne. The documents, images, and letters related to the battle are distributed among various institutions and archives. The identification of archives with relevant materials established a broader foundation for research, allowing researchers to prioritize and quickly access relevant records. This aided our research by providing a means to access efficiently the materials most helpful to our study; it also establishes a central reference for researchers to use in future studies of this battle (See Appendix II, p. Error! Bookmark not defined. for list of archives with relevant materials). Section 3.1 (p. 11) details the methods used to conduct the historic documentation of the battlefield s defining features. Sections 5.1 and 5.2 (pp. 37 and 42) present the results of the documentary research and the military terrain analysis. 2.2 Defining Features of the Battle of Fort Anne Following the identification of historic resources and archives, researchers proceeded to the second research goal of identifying the defining features of the Battle of Fort Anne using military terrain analysis and KOCOA standards. As mentioned previously, KOCOA is an application of military terrain analysis and an acronym categorized as Key Terrain, Observation and fields of fire, Cover and concealment, Obstacles, and Avenues of Approach and Retreat. The categorization of a battle s defining features provides standardization in the interpretation of a battle s flow and its landscape.

15 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 10 Researchers determined the general locations of defining features by reviewing historical texts, oral histories, and maps. Analysts mapped the defining features into a geographic information system (GIS) to allow for additional analysis. Project researchers followed the initial mapping with a field survey, during which teams walked portions of the battlefield, mapping those landmarks and defining features visible in the current landscape. Field survey and GIS analysis helped to refine the perception of how the troops used these features, most specifically by interpreting firing ranges of weaponry probably used during the battle. Analysis of historic maps and imagery that postdate the battle help to support interpretations of changes in the landscape noted by disturbance of the ground surface. This comparison and analysis allowed an initial assessment of the features integrity. The characterization of these features using a KOCOA analysis helped researchers determine the function of each feature in the battle and how each feature influenced the course of the battle. Section 3.2 (p. 12) details the methods used to analyze the battlefield s defining features. Section 5 (p. 37) presents the results of these landscape analyses. Appendix III (p. Error! Bookmark not defined.) provides a list of identified defining features and associated information. 2.3 Identifying the Boundaries of the Fort Anne Battlefield The resulting information on defining features helped to fulfill the third research goal, that of identifying the Battle of Fort Anne s boundaries. Secondary histories and the knowledge of the local community at Fort Anne acknowledged the presence of the Fort Anne battlefield. The presence of markers placed throughout the 20 th century provides an understanding of the battlefield s presence in the landscape. However, the precise boundaries or those limits used for the listing of the site on National Register of Historic Places have not been delineated. The data compiled from the historic research and spatial and military terrain analysis provide the information needed to identify and map the boundaries and features associated with the Fort Anne Battlefield. Contextual information on the defining features allows an evaluation of defining feature boundaries, as well as the boundaries for the study area, core area, and potential National Register area. All of this information requires field confirmation or archeological field survey to more accurately determine the integrity of the major defining features and answer questions related to the history of the battle. 2.4 Developing an Archeological Research Design for Fort Anne Battlefield This report identifies the Battle of Fort Anne s boundaries, details the battle s defining features, and prioritizes them according to their influence on the battle and initial integrity assessment. The next step in a path to preservation is to use this priority classification to determine further research questions. The primary one is the determination of integrity of battlefield deposits associated with defining features as identified by the presence of subfeatures and concentrations of battle related artifacts in a spatial pattern reflective of troop positions or movements during the battle. More specific research questions for future research are presented in Section 7.2 (p. Error! Bookmark not defined.).

16 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 11 III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY This section outlines the strategies used to accomplish the goals of this project. 3.1 Documentary Research The first task in researching the Battle of Fort Anne was the identification of primary historic records and secondary histories related to the Battle of Fort Anne and/or the Burgoyne Campaign of This task consisted of compiling a list of archives that contained materials associated with the Battle of Fort Anne. Project researchers searched archives using archives on-line catalogs, contact with archivists, and information gathered from other historians or secondary sources. Appendix II (p. Error! Bookmark not defined.) contains a list of archival sources reviewed for this study. From this list, researchers prioritized which archives to access to aquire information related to the battle. Project researchers put a high priority on the archives that had materials that were associated with direct participants of the battle (e.g., Captain James Gray s accounts at the Massachusetts Historical Society). Project researchers did not travel to archives whose collections or materials were available using interlibrary loan or on-line access; instead, researchers reviewed these documents at the PAF facilities. Researchers followed the listing of archival materials with a review of the historic records of the battle. Project researchers examined documents, including pension applications, correspondence, journals, military reports, and maps to identify landmarks, positions, and topographic features related to the Fort Anne Battlefield. The review of documents also focused on information that would help researchers understand the combatants motives and tactics, both of which are closely related to how the battle unfolded and its aftermath. Research teams recorded any references or remarks relating to landscape features on a common form. This form recorded the name of the feature, the location of the feature, the relevance to the battle, the bibliographic source of the statement, the perspective of the source, any additional comments, and if the reference contained a map or illustration of the feature. Researchers entered the records into an Access database for use in cataloging and GIS mapping (See Appendix III, p. Error! Bookmark not defined.). Project researchers often established the names of features from the source s reference to the feature, such as hill, ridge, or ambuscade. Researchers standardized these names for use in the defining features database and the GIS. If descriptions of features contained different names, such as hill versus mountain, but the locations and overall descriptions were similar, we concluded that the sources were referring to the same feature and they were given the most widely used name. Researchers also recorded the contextual information of the source or witness, including bibliographic referencing. This contextual information included the source perspective, rank, and military unit. Perspective was defined as the source s side British or Continental. Rank and military unit represents a further breakdown of the perspective information. The contextual information allowed for comparisons of various sources. Analysts could compare different views of the same feature, or visualize how the same participant saw different features on the battlefield. The contextual information also helped to track individuals across the battlefield for the duration of the battle, providing there was enough information from the witness. The identification of military unit helped to place the individual in the

17 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 12 battlefield based on general troop movements. The placement of individuals allowed researchers to determine the reliability of the source s perspective of certain features and movements. For example, a Continental troop who engaged the enemy on Battle Hill was given more credence than those accounts that provided secondary descriptions of the battle, such as the military chaplain, Enos Hitchcock. Those troops who were describing a feature or movement with which they were not directly associated were probably relaying secondary information, and although it may be correct, a direct participant s observations of an action took precedence. Although researchers prioritized some sources given the context, researchers included other more indirect sources. Relevance to the battle was an attempt to categorize the function of the feature or the role it held in the battle. It was also an initial step towards performing a KOCOA analysis. This relevance can be further categorized using KOCOA analysis. The recording of each observation of the different features also allowed for a comparison of views. The back and forth comparison of various sources observations on features permitted a commonality between sources and general view of the landscape to develop. This comparative interpretation was illustrated on a series of GIS maps to present the relationship to known features. The alignment of historically identified features with the present landscape with added information, such as historic images, maps, and soil maps, helped to show the changes in the battlefield s landscape and determine associations between present day features and the battlefield s features. 3.2 Initial GIS Mapping and Analysis Analysts constructed a GIS map for the project using the software program ArcGIS Basemaps for GIS were made using USGS 7.5 minute quadrangles for Fort Ann, NY (1944) and modern aerial imagery. Analysts examined and imported available aerial photographs of the project area from the 1940s to the present into GIS to serve as basemaps and to provide a visual tool for seeing changes to the project area s landscape through time. Project analysts used and analyzed digital elevation models (DEMs) for the Fort Ann, NY quadrangle in ArcMap 10.1 to conduct slope and viewshed analysis. Shapefiles with hydrography and USDA soil survey data helped inform the environmental contextual information related to the project area. Historic maps from c to the mid-20 th century were georeferenced in GIS to visualize the landscapes from different times and to identify the locations of defining features and post battle disturbances to the landscape. Project analysts used historic illustrations and historic photographs to aid in the identification of defining features as to their locations and any post battle impacts. Integrated with this GIS basemap was an initial mapping of the defining features identified in the documentary research. Analysts based their initial interpretation of locations and boundaries of the features on the descriptions of distances and sizes related to other defining features and other topographic features, and historic maps of the battlefields. Boundaries were also initially compared to the topographic and aerial photographs to relate the general locations of the defining features to the present landscape. The initial mapping allowed a basis for field survey and further analysis and interpretation of the documentary accounts. The accounts provided an initial insight that field mapping and further GIS analysis would later help to either confirm or contradict.

18 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p Field Survey Methods Following the historic research and initial GIS analysis, project teams conducted a field walkover of the battlefield and the areas associated with the battlefield s defining features. During the walkover, crews mapped the location of the defining feature with a point; if an area was involved, then a general outline of the feature was recorded using a GPS receiver. The crews also photographed the defining feature and took note of its condition. Since this project did not include subsurface testing, features were identified based on measurements provided in historic sources, relation to larger features (hills), and presence above the surface or as part of the terrain. The survey team logged each battlefield feature using a Trimble GeoXH series global positioning system (GPS) running Windows Mobile and ArcPad 10. The data dictionary used was based on the one developed by the National Park Service for the Revolutionary War/War of 1812 documentation project (NPS 2001). Not all items in the data dictionary were relevant to this study. The team used this dictionary in order to be consistent with the previously collected NPS data. The GPS system parameters were set to those used in previous studies: PDOP Mask: 6.0; SNR Mask: 6.0; Elevation Mask: 15: Minimum satellites: 4. Project researchers took photographs of the battlefield s overall landscapes and the areas of defining features. Whenever possible, the survey team took multiple shots in a 360-degree pan from a central point. Together, these photographs presented an overall perspective of the landscape surrounding a defining feature. 3.4 Final GIS Analysis Using the results of the field mapping, project analysts conducted a final, more in-depth spatial analysis using GIS. The information from the walkover allowed for refinement of the defining feature locations and boundaries, which were further refined with more spatial analysis. The data recorded by the GPS and the project photographs were integrated into the GIS base map. The data aided in the comparison of the different accounts and data sets reviewed in this study. The comparative analysis of historic sources, present location and condition of landscape features, and known changes to the battlefield s landscape permitted a refinement of the locations and boundaries for the battle s defining features. Specialized GIS analysis was conducted to refine further these boundaries and locations. Analysts used Digital Elevation Models (DEMs) to identify elevation changes across the battlefield aiding in the analysis of terrain. Terrain features, such as rises and depressions, can inform analysis of avenues of approach and retreat, areas of concealment, and firing or observer positions. Project analysts attempted to identify a source for LiDAR data or close interval DEM data. However, no such information sources could be located. A DEM of 10 m resolution was used for this project s analyses. The 10 m resolution offers a more generalized view of elevation than close interval DEM, such as 2 m or 1 m. Although not as detailed as the close interval elevation data, the 10 m DEM data still provided information useful in conducting viewshed and slope analysis.

19 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 14 The general mapping of the defining features was further refined using the military terrain analysis extension for ArcGIS When analysts linked distance or range of fire to the viewshed analysis, the spatial analysis established a predicative model for ascertaining areas of gunfire for the battle. The extension allows for the interpolation of viewsheds using DEM data based on various conditions, such as observer height, target height, azimuth, distance between observer and target, and elevation angle of observation. By integrating the range of fire with a viewshed analysis, factors related to terrain and attributes of the shooter can be changed and accounted for in the analysis. Within the attributes of the viewshed, observer height can be changed for those troops standing or hidden at a lower height behind an obstacle, such as brush or fallen timber. Distance can be changed to account for the different firing ranges of various weapons, such as musket and rifle. Changing these attributes for the interpolation of viewsheds allowed for experimentation in the positioning of observers and seeing the effects of the landscape, such as accounting for trees or obstacles. For this study, project researchers based the range of fire on muskets. Both the main Continental Line and British 9 th Regiment of Foot present at the Battle of Fort Anne were using mainly muskets (Spring 2008:204). The members of the 6 th Albany Militia may have been using rifles since the state government expected the militia members to provide their own supplies (Militia 1775) 2. No records of artillery units were identified in relation to this battle. For the range of fire analysis, muskets had an assumed range of 100 yards. Muskets were accurate to within 50 to 80 yards of a target whereas rifles had a range within 200 to 500 yards (Babits 1998:12-15). When analysts conducted the range of fire analyses of possible firing positions, analysts used an average range of 300 yards for the rifle and an average range of 100 yards for the musket to determine the area firing ranges from specific positions within the battlefield. Due to increased accuracy and firing range of rifles, troops and warriors were more likely to aim and fire rifles for accuracy, whereas soldiers fired muskets with little regard to aim or accuracy (Babits 1998:12-15). Those musket balls at the maximum extent of the range of fire would most likely not be accurate on their target. In this analysis, positions of the observer were akin to the positions of shooters and artillery positions. The range of fire analysis helped to clarify where firing positions were located and reinforced whether defining features were associated with fields of fire or outside of these areas. Range of fire analysis helped to estimate general firing positions and determine areas for future archeological testing. Most of the accounts provided only general locations and troop positions in relation to the battlefield s landscape rather than stating exact positions. Based on this information, analysts were not able to determine the firing ranges from exact locations. However, they conducted range of fire analyses from more generalized areas or defining features, such as the summit of Battle Hill. Project analysts also used the information provided by metal detector hobbyists or relic hunters on general areas where they found battle related material culture on the battlefield. Since their information was more about general areas rather than specific locations, range of fire analysis was based again on a general position. GIS allowed a common venue to compare the different data sets used in this study. Historical viewpoints gained from the documentary evidence varied among individuals. With GIS, researchers could place these views within the same database and compare them to provide an integrated historical perception 2 According to Section VI of the Rules and Orders for Regulating the Militia of the Colony of New York (Militia 1775) every man do with all convenient speed furnish himself with a good musket, or firelock, and bayonet, sword, or tomahawk, a steel ram-rod, worm, priminin-wire, and brush fitted thereto, a cartouch box containing twenty three rounds of cartriddges, twelve flints, and a knap-sack, agreeable to the directions of the Continental Congress.

20 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 15 of the battle. The addition of other data sets and analysis to the historical perspective provided a deeper understanding of the battle. Primary documents and the documentary record often do not directly address spatial analyses, such as viewsheds and firing ranges. However, with the aid of spatial data (DEMs), analysts could use the results of such analyses in comparison with documentary accounts to develop an improved image of combat not available strictly from the historical records. The data sets served to inform each other, providing new interpretation of, and insights into, the battle.

21 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 16 IV. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND This section provides a summary of the history associated with the Battle of Fort Anne. It is not meant to be an exhaustive study of the Burgoyne campaign and associated events, such as the fall of Fort Ticonderoga, Battle of Hubbardton, and the Battles of Saratoga. The section provides a general background to the events that led to and include the Battle of Fort Anne, and the results of the battle on the campaign. It also introduces the battlefield s landscape and defining features that are covered in depth in Section 5 (p. 37). 4.1 Burgoyne s Campaign During the winter of 1777, British Lieutenant General John Burgoyne developed an extensive plan to divide the northern rebel colonies. In October of 1776, Burgoyne returned to Britain to deal with his wife s estate following her death (Cubbison 2012:28). During the trip to Britain, Burgoyne shaped his plan to end the rebellion. Burgoyne laid out his plan in a treatise Thoughts for Conducting the War from the Side of Canada (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012: ). Burgoyne s plan was an answer to what he saw as Governor-General Sir Guy Carlton s failure to end the revolution (Cubbison 2012:28; Watt 2002:36-37). In 1776, Burgoyne served under Carlton in Upper Canada (Cubbison 2012:27-28). During that campaign season, Carlton led the British army to push the Americans out of Quebec and followed them into Lake Champlain. The campaign culminated in the Battle of Valcour Island in which the British navy defeated Major General Benedict Arnold s navy on October 11, 1776 (Ketchum 1997:41). The timing of this battle so late in the campaign season pushed Carleton to end his movement down Lake Champlain without attempting a siege of Fort Ticonderoga (Ketchum 1997:42) Burgoyne and other British officers saw an opportunity for Carlton to push further and defeat the Continentals and ultimately end the rebellion (Ketchum 1997:42). However, Carlton cautiously ended the campaign and returned to Canada for winter quarters ending the campaign season. With his plan, Burgoyne sought to advance further than Carleton and put and end to the conflict. Burgoyne s design for conducting the campaign primarily consisted of a three-prong attack on the New York colony, specifically the Champlain, Mohawk, and Hudson Valleys. His goal was to divide the New England colonies from the rest of the colonies. Burgoyne assumed that the rebellion was centered in New England and that by isolating New England the rebellion would end. 3 Burgoyne s army was the main force of the campaign and would leave Upper Canada and move south along Lake Champlain and into the Hudson Valley towards Albany. Lieutenant Colonel (holding the rank of Brigadier General during the campaign) Barry St. Leger would lead an army along the Mohawk Valley and meet with Burgoyne s forces in Albany (Alden 1969: ; Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012: ) (Figure 4.1, p. 17). Burgoyne s forces included over 8,000 British regulars and Hessians, 150 French Canadians, 100 Loyalists, and 400 Native American warriors, while Brigadier General Barry St. Leger led a group of approximately 1,900 British regulars, Hesse-Hanau Jagers, French Canadians, Loyalists, and Canadian and 3 American support for the Revolutionary War went beyond New England s regional boundaires and extended throughout the colonies leading to the continuation of the conflict outside of New England (Alden 1969).

22 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 17 Haudenosaunee 4 (Mohawk, Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga) Native American warriors (Alden 1969:311). Burgoyne expected Sir William Howe to provide additional reinforcement by moving north from New York City into the Hudson Highlands (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:183). He also asked that a diversion be made within New England (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:184). Burgoyne calculated that the British Army, Loyalists, and British allied Native Americans attacking American settlements on multiple fronts would create alarm through the region helping to overpower the Continental Army (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012: ). Lord George Germain and King George III put their support behind Burgoyne. Figure 4.1. Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne s 1777 campaign strategy. General William Howe s role in Burgoyne s campaign was unclear and tenuous. Burgoyne s plan discussed cooperating with Howe s army, but Burgoyne did not provide details on how this cooperation was to happen (Luzader 2010:19). General Howe s goal for the 1777 campaign season was the capture of Philadelphia (Ketchum 1997:56; Luzader 2010:5-8). Germain intended Howe to reinforce Burgoyne by moving troops up the Hudson River, but due to Germain s mistake, the orders for Howe did not arrive until 4 Haudenosaunee is the name preferred by Native Americans who are part of the six Nations of the Iroquois Confederacy. The Haudenosaunee originally consisted of five nations: Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Cayuga, and Seneca. In the early 18 th century, the Tuscarora were adopted into the Haudenosaunee, which became known as the Six Nations (Glatthaar and Martin 2007:23; Graymont 1972:6).

23 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 18 August 1777 (Luzader 2010:24-25). Philadelphia by sea. By that time, Howe had already begun his advance towards Burgoyne based his plan on the experience he gained in the 1776 campaign and by consulting with Loyalists from the region. His meetings with members of the exiled Johnson family in Canada shaped his design for action in the Mohawk Valley. They told him that a strong contingent of Loyalists remained in the Mohawk Valley and the Johnson family s ties with the Haudenosaunee, specifically the Mohawk, would ensure their loyalty with Britain (Watt 2002:21, 33). Sir John Johnson s formation of a Loyalist force in the Mohawk Valley and their trek across the Adirondacks to Canada supported the idea of loyalist determination in the area (Watt 2002:30-32). Loyalists and Native Americans would rise up to reinforce a small British contingent marching along the Mohawk Valley leaving the main body of British troops to move south along Lake Champlain and the Hudson Valley. Based on his experience fighting across Upper Canada and the Champlain region under Carlton in 1776, Burgoyne predicted the type of terrain he would face during his 1777 campaign. He recognized the importance of Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga for maintaining a supply chain (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012: ). He also knew how Continental Major General Philip Schuyler would react to such an invasion. [I]t is natural likewise to expect that he (Schuyler) will take measures to block up the road from Ticonderoga to Albany by the way of Skenesborough, by fortifying the strong ground at different places, and thereby oblige the King s Army to carry a weight of artillery with it, and by falling trees, breaking bridges, and other obvious impediments to delay (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:179). These would become major issues for Burgoyne during the campaign, but during the winter of 1777, he used his experience to shape his initial strategy for the campaign. In his plan, Burgoyne noted the choice of route he would need to make to move from Lake Champlain to the Hudson River Valley. His first target was Crown Point. From there he could base his operations and stores for attacking Fort Ticonderoga, which would then serve as a base for his army as they continued along Lake Champlain (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:183). Following his army s taking control of Lake Champlain, he would make the cross over from Lake Champlain to the Hudson River towards Albany. Burgoyne proposed that the simplest route would be by way of Lake George, but thought that the Continental Navy may have too large of a force to pass that way. If his allied Native American warriors and light infantry were unable to take Lake George, he would have to follow a secondary route. This second route was along Lake Champlain s South Bay to Skenesborough (present day Whitehall). His army would follow the waterways (Wood Creek) towards the Hudson River Valley (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:183). Burgoyne realized this was a riskier route as considerable difficulties may be expected, as the narrow parts of the river may be easily chocked up and rendered impassable, and at best there will be necessity for a great deal of land carriage for the artillery, provisions, etc. which can only be supplied from Canada (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:183). Burgoyne knew the possible risks to his campaign. The Continental Army s reaction to his attack, the terrain, and his increasing distance from Canada would all be factors that could limit his success.

24 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p Fall of Fort Ticonderoga Following a winter of preparations in Britain, Burgoyne arrived in Quebec in early May of During that month, Carleton and Burgoyne made final preparations in Montreal for the campaign. On May 27, 1777, Burgoyne initiated his campaign leading his main force from Montreal towards the Champlain Valley (Cubbison 2012:46). Burgoyne s army included about 8,671 infantry and 516 artillerymen composed of British, German, and Canadian troops (Luzader 2010:33). Loyalist and Native Americans would join his campaign as he progressed south from Canada. Burgoyne s forces travelled with a fleet of boats consisting of five ships and about 200 bateau and other craft (Luzader 2010:56) that made use of the rivers and lakes that stretched from Montreal to the Hudson Valley. By June 15, Burgoyne s army arrived at Fort St. John followed by Crown Point on June 30 (Cubbison 2012:46). The Continentals previously abandoned Crown Point. This provided Burgoyne with a simple path to prepare his attack on his first target, Fort Ticonderoga. Occupation of the Lake Champlain-Hudson River region was essential to control the New York and New England colonies. Trade and transportation were concentrated in this conduit and as a result whoever controlled the route controlled political, military, and economic access to Upper Canada and the Northern Colonies. Throughout the 18 th century, the French and British fought to control this region. To aid occupation of the region, both nations established a system of forts across the Lake Champlain Hudson River area (Figure 4.2, p. 20). The British and French militaries generally positioned these forts about 10 miles apart or the approximate distance of a day s march (Ketchum 1997:26-27). Fort Miller, Fort Edward, and Fort Anne were part of this fortification system. Due to its location on Lake Champlain, Fort Ticonderoga became one of the central forts in the system. Fort Ticonderoga served as a supply post for ships traveling along Lake Champlain. It was an observation post witnessing traffic on the lake. It also served as a defensive position by creating an obstacle to advancing enemy forces. To be able to control movement across Lake Champlain, a military force had to hold Fort Ticonderoga. The French originally built the fortification in the 1750s and named it Fort Carillon (Ketchum 1997:29; Luzader 2010:47). During the French and Indian War, British General Jeffery Amherst captured both Fort Carillon (renamed Fort Ticonderoga) and Crown Point (Ketchum 1997:18, 29; Luzader 2010:47). Although Fort Ticonderoga was vital to controlling travel between the Hudson River and Upper Canada, the British let the fortification decay after the French and Indian War due to the lack of threat. The lack of British investment and security in the fort aided the Continental Army's capture of Fort Ticonderoga in 1775 as one of the first actions of the war (Ketchum 1997:29; Luzader 2010:48). The Continentals made use of the fort as a staging point in their 1775 invasion of Canada. To defend the fortification, the Continental Army conducted massive repairs to the fort during The Continental Army s occupation of Fort Ticonderoga was tenuous. Its condition and design made it difficult to defend. The French designed the fort to prevent a British attack from the south; however, the Continentals needed the fort to defend against a British invasion from the north (Ketchum 1997:116). The fort s location on the fringes of New York s wilderness also required a large effort to supply the fort (Luzader 2010:48-49; Wayne to Council of Safety December 4, 1776). The lack of threat from Canada meant the British did not need to maintain the fort and so the British left the fort in disrepair. Fort

25 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 20 Ticonderoga s orientation, difficulty in supplying, and disrepair required a large investment on the part of the Continentals 5. Figure 4.2. Map of 18 th century fort system in Champlain-Hudson region. 5 Major General Anthony Wayne (Wayne to Council of Safety December 4, 1776) placed the blame on the lack of supplying and preparing Fort Ticonderoga on the Continental Congress. Most of the soliders did not receive pay or supplies. The wretched condition they are in for want of almost every necessary and convenience of life except flour & bad [meat] is shocking to humanity & beggars all description.

26 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 21 In 1776, the Continental Army attempted to strengthen their position on Lake Champlain and prevent a British attack from Canada by repairing Fort Ticonderoga. A major part of the reconstruction of Fort Ticonderoga was the buildup of artillery placements on the hills around the fort (Luzader 2010:48). An artillery battery was placed atop Rattlesnake Hill (renamed Mount Independence) south of Fort Ticonderoga (Ketchum 1997: ). The guns on Mount Independence served to defend Fort Ticonderoga by firing on ships approaching the fort on Lake Champlain. The Continentals added to their defense against an advancing British navy by constructing a boom and bridge between Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence separating Lake Champlain from South Bay (Ketchum 1997:122). The Continentals, under the supervision of Colonel Jeduthan Baldwin, made basic repairs to the fort s infrastructure. These included improved drinking water, gardens, as well as the great bridge and defensive works on Mount Independence (Ketchum 1997:122). However, by 1777 most of Fort Ticonderoga was still unrepaired. The fort s defenses centered on stopping an attack from Lake Champlain. There was little investment in stopping an attack from land. The Continentals did not construct defenses on Sugar Loaf Hill (renamed Mount Defiance) southwest of Fort Ticonderoga. It is debated whether Major General Horatio Gates rejected suggestions to put artillery on the hill (Ketchum 1997; Luzader 2010:48-49). It appears that the Continental Army s lack of resources made it prioritize its reconstruction of the fort to defend against attacks from Lake Champlain. Mount Defiance s position required an attacking force to access it by land and climb up a steep slope. The Continentals saw these factors as meaning there was less of a threat from Mount Defiance than from Lake Champlain. Burgoyne saw the capture of Fort Ticonderoga as vital to keeping his army supplied during the campaign (Cubbison 2012:48 based on Burgoyne 1777: ). His plan included a large force to take the fortification. As of July 1, Burgoyne s army consisted of 3,576 British soldiers, 2,919 German soldiers, 511 artillery, and additional allied Native American warriors (Cubbison 2012:48 based on Burgoyne 1777:96-97). The size of Burgoyne s army allowed him to attack Fort Ticonderoga from both Lake Champlain and the land west and south of Fort Ticonderoga. With over 7,000 troops, Burgoyne was able to split his forces and overcome whatever defenses the Continentals were able to establish at Fort Ticonderoga. Beginning June 30, he started his advance from Crown Point. He divided his forces into three groups. He sent Brigadier General Simon Fraser with an advance corps consisting of British light infantry and grenadiers, the 24 th regiment, Canadians, allied Native American warriors, and ten light artillery pieces along the west shore of Lake Champlain. He ordered the German soldiers under Major General Friedrich Adolph Baron von Riedesel and consisting of Brunswick chaffeurs, light infantry, and grenadiers along the eastern shore of Lake Champlain (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIV). Burgoyne and his flotilla advanced along the lake preventing an attack from the Continentals along the lake (Ketchum 1997:164). Burgoyne anchored his vessels just out of reach of Fort Ticonderoga s cannons (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIV) and waited for his land forces to engage the Continentals. Major General Arthur St. Clair led the Continental forces at Fort Ticonderoga in the face of the approaching British army. St. Clair arrived at Fort Ticonderoga to take command of the fort on June 12, 1777 (Ketchum 1997:114). He was joined by a force of troops from New England, specifically New Hampshire and Massachusetts, to garrison the outpost (Furnham 1777; Gray 1777; Ketchum 1997:147-

27 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p ). St. Clair s soldiers numbered about 2,000 (Ketchum 1997: 163). Baldwin and the Continental s fatigue units were still making repairs to the fort during June of Burgoyne noted the additional defensive works and blockhouses at Fort Ticonderoga as being in good condition (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIV-XV). Throughout the month of June, St. Clair s scouts reported on the British advances along Lake Champlain. Ambushes of scouting and fatigue parties outside of the fort also told of the approaching British army. Limited resources and soldiers as well as incomplete defenses forced St. Clair to prioritize his defenses. He did not have enough troops to defend both Fort Tichonderoga and Mount Independence simoultanesously. Instead, he concentrated his troops at Fort Ticonderoga hoping to hold the fort. If he could no longer hold his position at Fort Ticonderoga, he planned on withdrawing to Mount Independence (Ketchum 1997:158). Fraser s advance was the first to engage the Continentals on July 2. The British attacked a group of Continentals at a small outpost and sawmill northwest of Fort Ticonderoga at Mount Hope (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XV; Ketchum 1997:165). James Thacher, the 16 th Massachusetts s surgeon stated that the Continentals abandoned their positions outside of the fort due to the approaching British and their Native American allies (Thacher 1823:98). Over the next few days, Burgoyne s forces closed in on Fort Ticonderoga while St. Clair s soldiers maintained what defenses they could within the fort (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XV; Thacher 1823:98). On July 5, the Continental Army's position became untenable. That day, Fraser noticed the open position on Mount Defiance and began setting up a gun placement atop the hill aimed at Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XV-XVI). Thacher (1823:98-99) described the situation in a distressing tone, It is with astonishment that we find the enemy have taken possession of an eminence called Sugar Loaf Hill, or Mount Defiance, which, from its height and proximity, completely overlooks and commands all our works at Ticonderoga and Mount Independence The situation of our garrison is viewed as critical and alarming. Fraser s artillery on Mount Defiance had an open range of fire onto both Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, the two areas St. Clair was concentrating his troops for a final defense. The Continentals held no recourse against the artillery on Mount Defiance. The officers at the Council of War held by St. Clair agreed that the British position on Mount Defiance and the lack of troops and supplies in the fort made a successful defense of Fort Ticonderoga unfeasible (Ketchum 1997: ). The only choice was to abandon the fort and withdraw to Mount Independence. The night of July 5, St. Clair began the withdrawal from Fort Ticonderoga. St. Clair s original plan was to move supplies and personnel secretly from the fort without signaling the British of their withdrawal. Thacher (1823:99) described the withdrawal as confused as the occupants of the fort were forced to gather their belongings for an immediate exit. He was responsible for securing the sick and wounded as well as medical supplies. St. Clair divided the occupants of Fort Ticonderoga into two groups. The main army of about 2,000 soldiers was to leave the fort and march towards Hubbardton. The rest of the fort s contingent consisting of women, and injured and sick (mostly measles) soldiers were to travel by bateau to Skenesborough (present day Whitehall) with Colonel Pierse Long s New Hampshire Regiment serving as protection (Ketchum 1997:174). At about 3 o clock am July 6, the boats were ready to leave Fort Ticonderoga for Skenesborough. Long s flotilla consisted of five armed gallies and about 200 bateau full of artillery, supplies, and people (Ketchum 1997:180; Thacher 1823:99). St. Clair and the rest of the withdrawing

28 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 23 Continentals would make their way east on land and regroup with Col. Long on the way to Fort Edward. The morning of July 6, the British entered Fort Ticonderoga and saw it abandoned. After securing the fort, Burgoyne s army began its pursuit of the withdrawing Continentals. Fraser reported to Burgoyne that he observed the Continentals withdraw and decided to pursue them. Burgoyne felt confident in Fraser s ability and allowed him to continue his pursuit of the fleeing Continentals over land while he followed the Continentals across the water. When the Germans reached Mount Independence, Burgoyne ordered Reidesel to take his troops and reinforce Fraser (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVI-XVII). St. Clair s main army arrived at Hubbardton July 6 and established a camp unaware of the close proximity of the British and German troops (Luzader 2010:61). On the morning of July 7, Fraser surprised the St. Clair s rear guard under the command of Colonel Seth Warner. Fraser divided his troops along with the Germans to flank the Continentals (Ketchum 1997: ). The battle fell into disorder as the Continentals panicked under heavy fire (Ketchum 1997:200). Warner was able to reform his troops and counter the attack. However, the Continental right flank was hard-pressed. Unable to stand against the fight and loss of leadership, the Continentals withdrew (Ketchum 1997:205). While the Continentals continued to lose ground at Hubbardton, Colonel Pierse Long s flotilla arrived at Skenesborough 6 around 3 o clock on the afternoon of July 6. Long s troops joined with members of the 3 rd NH, Scammell s company under the command of Captain James Gray who were stationed at Skenesborough. It took Burgoyne s navy only two hours to catch up with Long s flotilla (Thacher 1823:100). Fort Ticonderoga s boom and bridge were unable to delay Burgoyne s attack (Thacher 1823:100). Commodore Lutwidge took about a half hour to cut a passage through the boom and bridge (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVII). Burgoyne s vessels commenced cannon fire on Long s boats, while British troops and allied warriors made landfall attempting to surround the Continentals (Thacher 1823:100). Burgoyne dispatched the 9 th, 20 th, and 21 st regiments to flank and surround the Continentals at Skenesborough (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVII). In the face of the British attack, the Continentals fell into disorder. The officers of our guard now attempted to rally the men and form them in battle array; but this was found impossible, every effort proved unavailing, and in the utmost panic, they were seen to fly in every direction for personal safety (Thacher 1823:100). Continental Captain John Calfe stated the British arrived at Skenesborough just as he arrived and began firing on them, which occasioned a great confusion (Calfe in Noyes 1899:290). With Skenesborough lost, Col. Long ordered the destruction of the flotilla and the sinking of the baggage into the Skenesborough port rather than lose it to the British. Private Roger Lamb of the British 9 th Regiment of Foot put the Americans loss at 200 boats, 130 pieces of cannon, and all provisions and baggage (Hagist 2004:35). Included in this loss were three destroyed gallies and two captured gallies. Lord Francis Napier (Bradford 1962:305) listed the gallies taken or burned as: Trubull Galley taken with two 18 pound, two 6 pound, six 4 pound, and four 2 pound cannons and 12 swivels; Liberty Schooner taken with powder; Revenge Sloop destroyed; Gates Galley with two 12 pound, two 6 pound, three 4 pound, and four 2 pound cannons and 8 swivels destroyed; and Enterprize Schooner destroyed with provisions. Corporal George Fox of the British 7 th Regiment of Foot stated that the British used iron hooks to collect the provisions abandoned by the Continentals; we got our grappling irons to hook up the barrels of pork 6 Major General Benedict Arnold constructed his navy at Skenesborough for use in the Battle of Valcour Island (Alden 1969:278).

29 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 24 and flour, but we had such quantities of pork that we were sick at the site of it (Houlding and Yates 1990:18). Burgoyne noted that 30 prisoners were taken at Skenesborough (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVII). The Continentals evacuating Fort Ticonderoga lost personal belongings, artillery, and basic provisions. They had minimal supplies to continue a fight against the British. With the British closing in and Skenesborough a loss, Long order a withdrawal towards Fort Anne located approximately 14 miles south of Skenesborough. The women, sick, and injured from Fort Ticonderoga floated south along Wood Creek, while soldiers continued along the military road and adjacent woods attempting to stop or slow any advance from the pursuing British. Close behind the evacuees was a small contingent of the British Army. Burgoyne dispatched 190 men of the 9 th Regiment of Foot under the command of Colonel John Hill to take post near Fort Anne, to observe their [Continental Army] motions. (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVIII) and to intercept the fleeing rebels (Hagist 2004:39). The Continentals under Col. Long spent their second consecutive night on the march from Fort Ticonderoga under harsh circumstances. The road was in bad condition as the path was in disrepair and bridges were out (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVIII). Continental Chaplain Enos Hitchcock claimed that Wood Creek was filled with logs and along with its shallowness made the withdrawal difficult and slow (Hitchcock in Weeden 1899:117). The British private, Roger Lamb of the 9 th Regiment of Foot, stated that they captured some of the withdrawing Americans boats (Hagist 2004:39). The British secured the boats capturing 30 prisoners, including women, sick, wounded and two officers before continuing the pursuit of the Continentals (Hagist 2004:39; Schnitzer 2012). The Continentals were aware of the capture, but unable to stop it (Calfe in Noyes 1899:290; Hitchcock in Weeden 1899:117). Capt. Gray and his troops were in the Continentals rear attempting to defend the withdrawing army. Retreated from Skensboro [sic]; & lost all my money, Baggage &- lodged in the woods at Night (Gray 1777). 4.3 Fort Anne On July 8, 1777, Colonel Jonathan Trumball wrote to his father of the evacuation of Fort Ticonderoga. He also mentioned the dire situation developing at Fort Anne, Genll Schuyler with the little Handfull of Fugitives From Ty. and the Small Body of Militia already Collected, is forming his Stand at Fort Ann where they are in Want of Every thing that Can be Conceived Necessary for the Subsistance of an Army (Johnathan Trumbull Sr. to Washington July 14, 1777). From the end of June through July 8, 1777 Burgoyne s forces crossed the Champlain Valley against minimal resistance. They took over Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga without firing a shot. Burgoyne s navy decimated Skenesborough. The British faced a challenge at the Battle of Hubbardton when they met with the main body of Continentals withdrawing from Fort Ticonderoga, but General Fraser was still able to defeat the Continentals. At Fort Anne, the Continentals decided to make a stand. The army under Colonel Pierse Long s command at Fort Anne consisted of a mixed group of soldiers from various units (See Table 4.1, p. 35 for a detail on numbers of soldiers). Long s 2 nd New Hampshire composed the core of the force. Sick and injured soldiers, women, military surgeons, and chaplains fled Fort Ticonderoga with the 2 nd NH. Members of the 3 rd New Hampshire s Scammell s Company under Captain James Gray s command joined the withdrawing 2 nd NH at Skenesborough. The 15 th Massachusetts under Captain Benjamin Farnum was already at Fort Anne when the Fort Ticonderoga evacuees arrived. The 6 th Regiment of the Albany Militia

30 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 25 would arrive on July 8 to reinforce the Continentals. Together this mixed group prepared to fight the oncoming British. Fort Anne was a small outpost defending the crossing from the Champlain Valley to the Hudson Valley. The area of Fort Anne was associated with fortifications since In that year, Fitz John Winthrop built a simple fortification called Stone Fort near the confluence of Halfway Creek and Wood Creek (Fort Ann 2007:9). British forces built a second fort to the south of the original fort in Following an epidemic, the fort was abandoned and destroyed. In 1711, the British built Queen s Fort (renamed Fort Anne) in the location of the original Stone Fort (Fort Ann 2007:10). In 1757, to defend against French incursions during the French and Indian War, the British rebuilt Fort Anne again at the confluence of Halfway Creek and Wood Creek. During the period between the French and Indian War and the American Revolution, the fort fell into disrepair. The Continentals took control and rebuilt the fort to aid their invasion of Canada in 1775 (Fort Ann 2007:11). By 1777, British reconnaissance defined Fort Anne as a small fortification supporting 30 troops (CO42-36:129). Fort Anne became part of a larger fortification system present in the Lake Champlain and Hudson Valley region. On the night of July 6, the first of the Continentals fleeing Skenesborough arrived at Fort Anne. Captain Benjamin Farnum of the 15 th MA noted in his journal Nuse [sic] of Tyconderogea [sic] & Mount independence being Veaqueated [sic] this Evening the retreating [people?] begun to Come into this Gearison [sic] (Farnum 1777). Evacuees from Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesboro continued to arrive at Fort Anne into the morning of July 7 (Calfe in Noyes 1899:290). Capt. Gray arrived at Fort Anne around 6 am noting that the fort was in confusion (Gray 1777). 4.4 Battle of Fort Anne - Day 1 (July 7, 1777) As the Continentals arrived at Fort Anne during the night of July 6 and into the morning of July 7, the British 9 th Regiment of Foot came to within a quarter mile of the fort (Hagist 2004:39). Although he just arrived at Fort Anne at 6 am that morning and had no time to eat, Capt. Gray was sent out around 11 am with 150 men and 17 Rangers from Fort Anne to scout for the enemy. More than a half a mile march from Fort Anne, Gray s troops entered some woods. He ordered his troops into formation, front, rear, and flanking guards, in preparation for an engagement. The Continentals met a group of British Regulars, the 9 th Regiment of Foot. Gray s troops exchanged fire with the British. The British withdrew with Gray s troops advancing close behind them. The members of the 9 th Regiment of Foot withdrew up a hill in their rear (Battle Hill). Gray waited with his troops at the base of this hill and they continued their fire against the British until 6 pm. Sometime during the day, Gray was reinforced by an additional 150 men. With the approach of night, the Continentals withdrew from the base of the hill for Fort Anne (Gray 1777). Gray (Gray 1777) noted his casualties included 1 killed and 3 wounded and 3 British killed. This number was supported by Capt. Calfe (Calfe in Noyes 1899:290). Roger Lamb stated that the British halted and laid upon their arms all night (Hagist 2004:39). The first action of the two-day battle near Fort Anne was a skirmish. The troops from both sides were still in a transitory state as evacuees and reinforcements were still arriving at Fort Anne and the British 9 th Regiment of Foot was establishing itself in relation to Fort Anne. The skirmish between Capt. Gray s troops and the 9 th Regiment established the battle s terrain. By moving out of the fort and confronting the British, Gray determined that the battle would not be a siege of Fort Anne, but an attack against the British

31 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 26 position. The British withdrawal up Battle Hill established their position for the duration of the battle. Rather than a fight around Fort Anne s fortification, the Battle of Fort Anne became a conflict over Battle Hill. 4.5 Battle of Fort Anne - Day 2 (July 8, 1777) Figure 4.3. Map of Battle of Fort Anne, July 7, The second day of the Battle of Fort Anne was more intense than the first. The morning began with a Continental deserter entering the British camp. The deserter informed the British that the Continental force included 1,000 soldiers (Hagist 2004:39). Colonel Hill s 190 men could not match the 1,000 Continental soldiers. Hill sent for reinforcements from Skenesborough. Burgoyne s forces at Skenesborough were occupied hauling artillery and baggage over the falls at Skenesborough for the overland trip towards Fort Anne (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVIII-XIX). Burgoyne ordered the 21 st and 20 th Regiments of Foot to quicken their march to Fort Anne, but they were delayed by a rain storm. Shortly after Hill sent for reinforcements, the deserter disappeared and was discovered to be a Continental spy (Hagist 2004:39). The spy was able to determine the strength of the British army outside of Fort Anne. With this new information, the Continentals returned to attack the British position.

32 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 27 Besides the added information supplied by their spy in the British camp, the Continentals at Fort Anne were also aided by additional reenforcements. The Albany Militia s 6 th Regiment arrived under the command of Colonel Henry K. Van Rensselaer. Major General Philip Schuyler sent the Albany Militia s 6 th Regiment to reinforce the Continentals at Fort Anne, but also to delay Burgoyne s Army (Hogeboom Pension 1818; Miller Pension 1832; Van Alstyne Pension 1818; Van Rensselaer Pension 1818; Wittbeck Pension 1818). This strategy of delaying the British rather than holding position at Fort Anne differed from the strategy held July 7. The Continental evacuees from Fort Ticonderoga were still reeling from Burgoyne s attack on Fort Ticonderoga and their continuous withdrawal from Burgoyne s advancing army. They were in a state of confusion attempting to maintain a stand and end the withdrawal. With the arrival of the militia reenforcements, Schuyler was asserting a new strategy to temporarily delay Burgoyne s forces rather than steadfastly hold Fort Anne. By delaying Burgoyne s advance, Schuyler gained time to remove supplies and personnel from Fort George and Fort Anne and centralized his forces at Fort Edward and later Stillwater (Hogeboom Pension 1818; Miller Pension 1832; Van Alstyne Pension 1818; Van Rensselaer Pension 1818; Wittbeck Pension 1818). He understood the garrison would be lost. This new directive of delaying the British rather than holding Fort Anne guided the Continentals attack on the British postion on Battle Hill during the fighting of July 8. The Continentals returned to the ground they fought on the previous day. Captains Gray and Hutchins left Fort Anne with the same troops as the first day of battle, approximately 300 men. They marched to the base of the hill and began their attack on the British. After two hours of fighting, Long ordered the Albany Militia from Fort Anne to reinforce Captains Gray and Hutchins (Gray 1777). Roger Lamb stated that the British sentries were able to repel the initial Continental attack, but the Continentals reformed and attacked again (Hagist 2004:39). The woods were so thick that the British view was obstructed; they could hear the Continentals, but not see them (Hagist 2004:39). The Albany Militia began to out flank and surround the British. Not being able to see, but hear that they were about to be surrounded, the British were obliged to change their ground, and retiere [sic] up a high hill, which was in their rear (Hagist 2004:39). Burgoyne referred to the withdrawal as Colonel Hill found it necessary to change his position in the height of battle (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIX). Several British troops were killed during this repositioning (Hagist 2004:39-40). Roger Lamb was one of the last of the British to withdraw to the top of the hill. I had not been there five minutes when lieutenant Westrop, who was by my side was shot through the heart; a few minutes after a man, a short distance upon my left, received a ball in his forehead, which took off the roof of his scull [sic]; he reeled round, turned up his eyes, muttered some words, and fell dead at my feet! (Hagist 2004:40) The Continentals followed the British up the hillside with a heavy fire. The Continentals overcame a British surgeon helping Captain William Montgomery who was injured near the base of the hill (Gray 1777; Hagist 2004:40). Montgomery s wounds proved to be mortal as he was paroled in New York City where he died of his wounds the following year (Photo 4.1, p. 28). The advancing Continentals also found the women, injured, and sick evacuees who the British took as prisoners on Wood Creek. At some point during the afternoon, Colonel Van Rensselaer was shot in his upper thigh (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818). Although his men thought it was a mortal wound, he stayed on the battlefield while the Continentals sent

33 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 28 Capt. Montgomery, the British Surgeon, and the rescued evacuees back to Fort Anne as they continued to fight the British on Battle Hill. Photo 4.1. Capt. William Montgomery s headstone at Trinity Church, New York City. The British atop Battle Hill were facing a Continental force larger than their own. To defend their position on the top of the hill, the British formed a single file across the hill s summit (Hagist 2004:40). This was a unique formation. Due to North America s wooded terrain the British Army adopted a two rank formation replacing the three rank formation used in Europe (Spring 2008: ). Burgoyne ordered the use of the two rank formation during his campaign (Spring 2008:142). A German officer described the formation used by Burgoyne s Army as two soldiers deep separated by 18 inches to allow space to move through wooded areas (Spring 2008:144). The formation allowed for quicker and more orderly maneuvers in woods and hilly terrain. With Col. Hill s 9 th Regiment on Battle Hill, the expanse of the hill along with limited troop size forced him to space his troops further than the two rank formation to prevent the Continentals from surrounding his position (Spring 2008:152). The spacing of the 9 th Regiment of Foot

34 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 29 helped to determine how much of Battle Hill the British position occupied during the battle. If the British were using what Major General William Howe termed an extended order spacing of 10 feet (Spring 2008:139), the 190 troops would have made a line formation of approximately 2,000 feet in length. In comparison, the Loyalist and Native American defensive line at the Battle of Newtown reached a mile and a half and included about 800 rangers and warriors (PAF 2010). This distance also averages to a spacing of approximately 10 feet. The British and Continentals continued their firefight throughout the afternoon. Captain Money claimed that he saw the heaviest fire during the campaign at the Battle of Fort Anne. It was only equaled by the Battle of Freeman s Farm (Burgoyne 1780:42). The effect of British fire against the Continentals may have been limited. Lamb stated that the British soldiers adopted a quicker method of reloading their muskets. It was our custom after loading and priming, instead of ramming down cartridge, to strike the breech of the firelock to the ground, and bring it to the present and fire (Hagist 2004:37). Such a method was not a standard practice or officially sanctioned, but British soldiers used this method elsewhere in the Burgoyne campaign, such as at the Battle of Hubbarton (Spring 2008:209). The method may have allowed for quicker loading, but was related to more misfires. During heavy fire engagements, such as Fort Anne, the sound of constant fire could hide a misfire. A soldier could think his musket fired, but not realize his musket misfired leading him to reload an already loaded weapon that continued to misfire (Spring 2008: ). Lamb acknowledged that it was possible for the cartridge to misfire and possibly lead to the explosion of the musket injuring the solider and those around him (Hagist 2004:37). Lamb stated the British used this loading technique because of the thick woods in America. It allowed for a quicker fire in the face of Continentals hiding in the woods (Hagist 2004:37). British use of such musket loading methods at Fort Anne may have influenced the battle as the battle ended with both sides running low on ammunition (Hagist 2004:40). 7 The Continentals realized the lack of return fire from the British and attempted to finally surround the British on the hill. As the Continentals advanced around the British on Battle Hill, both sides heard a war whoop (Hagist 2004:40). The Continentals interpreted the war whoop as coming from British allied Native Americans arriving to reinforce the 9 th Regiment of Foot. The Continentals were also running low on ammunition and decided to withdraw to Fort Anne rather than face the Native Americans. However, the war whoop was not from British allied Native Americans. Rather, the call came from Captain Money, Burgoyne s quartermaster. He arrived with a contingent of Native American warriors to reinforce the British on Battle Hill. As Capt. Money and the warriors approached within four miles of the battle, they heard the heavy fighting. The warriors refused to join the engagement despite Capt. Money s orders. Wanting to help, Money approached the base of Battle Hill and called out with his war whoop (Hagist 2004:40). The Continentals withdrew from Battle Hill to Fort Anne ending the Battle of Fort Anne (Figure 4.5, p. 31). At Fort Anne, Colonel Long considered his options to either continue to delay the British or withdraw to Fort Edward. One of the prisoners rescued during the battle, informed the Continentals that Col. Hill requested reinforcements and Burgoyne was dispatching two brigades, which amounted to 2000 soldiers (Farnum 1777; Gray 1777). With low ammunition and few soldiers fit to fight the oncoming 7 A July 7, 1777 receipt for John H. Beekman and Henry K. Van Rensselaer stated that Col. Van Rensselaer acquired from Fort Edward 100 weight of ball and seven pounds of powder for his regiment (Beekman and Rensselaer Receipt 1777).

35 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 30 reinforcements, Long s Council of War decided to withdraw to Fort Edward after burning Fort Anne (Gray 1777). The Continentals achieved their ordered mission. Maj. Gen. Schuyler ordered Van Rensselaer to delay the British at Fort Anne for 24 hours to allow him to move provisions from Fort Anne and Fort George to Fort Edward (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818). During their withdrawal from Fort Anne, the Continentals attempted to deny Burgoyne s army the use of the fort or the associated infrastructure by burning the fort and sawmills. Yet, Burgoyne stated that although the Continentals burned Fort Anne, they left a blockhouse and sawmill intact (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIX). Figure 4.4. Map of Battle of Fort Anne, July 8, The withdrawal from Fort Anne was not easy for the Continentals. During the withdrawal they marched 14 miles to Fort Edward in a steady rain (Gray 1777). Capt. Gray s company was in the rear defending against any pursuing British or allied Native American warriors. His account of the withdrawal expresses the drudgery felt by the Continentals on their march to Fort Edward. The wounded and sick in Col. Long s army grew in numbers from those originally brought from Fort Ticonderoga to include those injured during the fighting at Skenesborough and at Fort Anne (Calfe in Noyes 1899: ; Gray 1777) 8. 8 One of the members of Capt. Gray s company was thought to be mortally wounded. The surgeon suggested that the soldier stay at Fort Anne to either perish from his injures or have the British care for him. This I knew not of till we were ordered to march, at which time I turn d back alone (my Company being gone) to the rear of the Army, where I

36 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 31 The army left Fort Anne at 3 pm and arrived at Fort Edward at 10 pm (Gray 1777). There were no barracks or food waiting for the withdrawing Continentals at Fort Edward. Since they lost their baggage on the withdrawal from Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesborough the troops did not have blankets. This resulted in many of the soldiers spending the night sleeping on the ground in the rain (Gray 1777). As Capt. Gray wrote, The fatigue of this day I believe I shall always remember (Gray 1777). Figure Lithograph of Fort Anne - probably depicts sawmill and blockhouse at Kane s Falls (Emmet Collection- New York Public Library) found him, I then pick d up a tent, & fastn d it between two poles laid him in it, and ordered four soldiers to carry him- I took their 4 guns with my own and carried them to Fort Edward (Gray 1777).

37 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p Battle Results The Battle of Fort Anne was a technical win for the British as the Continentals were the first to withdraw from the battlefield. However, the Continentals were close to surrounding Col. Hill and the 9 th Regiment. The steep terrain on Battle Hill and lack of ammunition prevented the Continentals from overcoming the British control of the hill s summit. The Continentals suffered 15 soldiers (men) killed and wounded. Capt. Gray stated, Our loss in the two skirmishes about 15- The Enemy s unknown (Gray 1777). Gouverneur Morris in a letter to the Provincial Congress stated that the Continentals suffered 12 killed and many wounded including Colonel Van Rensselaer. The Continentals also captured 3 or 4 prisoners including a captain and a doctor (Morris to Provincial Congress July 14, 1777). Burgoyne stated that the British captured 30 prisoners, provisions, and the 2 nd NH Regimental colors (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIX). These prisoners may have been the sick or wounded who were unable to continue the withdrawal to Fort Anne. Gray s (Gray 1777) account of the surgeon telling him to leave an injured soldier at Fort Anne for the British to care for him supports this. The official British record of loss listed 13 killed, 22 wounded, and 2 captured at the Battle of Fort Anne (CO42-36:709). These included one lieutenant (Lt. Westrop), one sergeant, and eleven rank and file killed; one captain (Captain Montgomery also taken prisoner), 2 lieutenants (Lt. Stavely and Lt. Murray), 19 rank and file wounded; Adjunct Fielding was also listed as wounded; the surgeon was also captured. A Brunswick officer agreed with the official accounting when he listed the British losses as one officer (Lt. Westrop), one non-commissioned officer, and 11 privates killed and four officers wounded (Capt. Montgomery, Lt. Stavely, Adj. Fielding, Lt. Murray) (Brunswick Journal 1777). The Brunswick officer overestimated the Continental Army s losses at Fort Anne as 200 dead and 50 captured. Burgoyne s listing of capturing 30 Continentals also seems high, as the Continentals make no mention of such a loss of troops. Roger Lamb stated that the British suffered three officers and 19 men killed in the battle (Hagist 2004:40). His account of losses is almost double the official list of losses and may reflect a poor recollection of the losses during the battle. 4.7 Aftermath On July 11, Burgoyne wrote to Lord George Germain concerning the success of his campaign. I have the honor to inform your lordship, that the enemy, dislodged from Ticonderoga and Mount Independent [sic], on the 6 th instant, and were driven, on the same day, beyond Skenesborough on the right, and to Humerton [sic] on the left, with the loss of 128 pieces of cannon, all their armed vessels and bateaux, the gratest [sic] part of their baggage and ammunition, provision, and military stores, to a very large amount. The success has been followed by events equally fortunate and rapid (Burgoyne to Germain July 11, 1777 in Burgoyne 1780: Appendix XIV). Burgoyne s army occupied Crown Point, Fort Ticonderoga, Skenesborough, and Fort Anne as well as thwarted the main Continental Army withdrawing from Fort Ticonderoga at the Battle of Hubbardton. His army managed to accomplish this with little retaliation from the Continentals. The Continentals at Fort Anne took the fight to the British and delayed their advance for a time. However, the British Army s quick advance through the Champlain Valley put the Continental Army and government into panic.

38 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 33 While Burgoyne chased the withdrawing Continentals throughout the Champlain region, General Schuyler was concentrating his resources and creating obstacles to delay Burgoyne s campaign. Schuyler ordered Col. Van Rensselaer to serve as a diversion or to delay the British advance at Fort Anne providing Schuyler time to move supplies and troops to Fort Edward, then Fort Miller, and then at Stillwater as Burgoyne advanced (Hogeboom Pension 1818; Miller Pension 1832; Schuyler to Washington July 10, 1777; Van Alstyne Pension 1818; Van Rensselaer Pension 1818; Wittbeck Pension 1818). Our force at Fort Edward is at present 10,000 men, who are determined to maintain their ground at all events- Our Army augments very fast (James Gray to Theodore Parsons July 14, 1777) 9. Governor Morris reported on his visit to Fort Edward that Schuyler moved the provisions, stores, bateaux, &c. from Fort George prior to destroying it (Morris July 17, 1777). The destruction of Fort George also points to another of Schuyler s strategies, the destruction of the infrastructure. Morris suggested to Schuyler to prevent them [British] from procuring forage (Morris July 17, 1777). This included the destruction of farms, settlements, forage, livestock, and infrastructure like sawmills. Morris suggested the Continentals should leave nothing but a wilderness to the enemy (Morris July 17, 1777). Without the ability to procure resources for his troops or establish posts, Burgoyne s army would become weaker and easier to defeat. Schuyler also worked to delay Burgoyne s advance by constructing obstacles. He ordered troops to cut trees into waterways to prevent the British advance by boat and to break up roads to slow the advance of artillery, baggage, and troops. Accounts of Albany Militia state that they were active in the destruction of roads and creating of obstacles throughout the summer of 1777 (Adams Pension 1832; Anthony Pension 1832) Following the Battle of Fort Anne, Schuyler concentrated on the destruction of the road between Fort Anne and Fort Edward. General Fellows with a small Body of the Militia, but all I could get, is breaking up the Road between this and Fort Ann and felling Trees into it. I will throw every Obstacle in their Rout I possibly can and retard their progress as much as possible for this purpose I shall disengage myself of every Thing cumbersome, the Artillery especially as I can make no Use of it (Schuyler to Washington July 10, 1777). The destruction of the roads affected the British as one of the Brunswick troops stated that the British began constructing a new road between Skenesborough and Fort Anne on July 11, due to the previous one s damage rendering it impassible (Brunswick Journal 1777). The destruction of the roads and obstruction of waterways was Schuyler s gamble that Burgoyne would follow the withdrawing Continentals towards him at Fort Edward. Schuyler s movement of resources and troops would help to draw Burgoyne into a location the Continentals could better defend and control. After the Battle of Fort Anne, Burgoyne took the rest of his army to Fort Anne. In his journal (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIX) he stated that a large army of Continentals were amassed at Fort Edward and that defeating this army became his goal. The British Army s opening of roads and clearing of creeks allowed for the movement of baggage, artillery, and provisions. As he moved along the land route to the 9 Schuyler s amassing of troops did not include the majority of the 2 nd NH, Long s Brigade. The one-year enlistments of the soldiers in Long s Brigade expired following the Battle of Fort Anne (Ketchum 1997:280). Most of these soliders decided to end their service in the war and return to New Hampshire. Col. Long as well as two other officers decided to reenlist and continued the fight against Burgoyne to Saratoga.

39 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 34 Hudson and continued his advance, the opening of these routes became increasingly important to ensure the continuation of supplying his army. He also ordered his troops to move his gun boats and supplies from Fort Ticonderoga towards Lake George (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIX). His plan was to have his forces march from Fort Anne and from Lake George converging on Fort Edward. If successful, he could decimate the Continental Army s Northern Department. It would also dedicate him to a path made more difficult with the requirement of investing in repairing or building roads, and moving provisions and artillery across a wilderness terrain. He did, however, acknowledge the difficulties inherent in his plan of action, especially in light of the expected Continental delaying tactics Should those efforts fail the route by South Bay and Skenesborough may be attempted, but considerable difficulties may be expected, as the narrow parts of the river may be easily chocked up and rendered impassible, and at best there will be necessity for a great deal of land carriage for the artillery, provisions, etc. which can only be supplied from Canada (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012:183) Burgoyne realized what could be the downfall of his campaign and still followed that path. Even with the withdrawal of the Continental Army at Fort Anne on July 8, Burgoyne s forces did not take full control of the fortification until late July. Burgoyne established his campaign headquarters at Fort Anne around July 22 (Burgoyne 1780: Appendix 42; Digby in Baxter 1887:233; Hadden 1884:96). By July 28, the main army began to march from Fort Anne leaving soldiers to help with supplies (Digby in Baxter 1887:239; Hadden 1884:98). In September of 1777, Burgoyne ordered the abandonment of Fort Anne as he was unable to defend the post in the face of an approaching Continental Army (Hadden 1884:lxxxiii-lxxxiv; Ketchum 1997:340). Continental soldiers quickly reestablished control of Fort Anne and used it to undermine Burgoyne s supply chain. By September of 1777, Burgoyne s campaign began to falter. He lost troops during the campaign and he was unable to replenish his ranks. The Loyalist forces he thought would join him never emerged (Ketchum 1997; Luzader 2010). Burgoyne s Native American allies began to leave due to the lack of combat and his criticism of their treatment of civilians (Ketchum 1997: , 282). The result was that his force was decreasing. Although he spent July and August trying to ensure his supply lines, the long distance between Canada and his army led to gaps and opportunities for the Continental Army to attack it (Ketchum 1997; Luzader 2010). The Continentals increasingly surrounded his forces. With his losses of soldiers at Freeman s Farm and Bennington, and the defeat at Bemis Heights and the death of his leading officer, General Simon Fraser, Burgoyne found few options for victory. General Henry Clinton attempted to aid Burgoyne by moving north from New York City to the Hudson Highlands and attacking Fort Clinton and Fort Montgomery on October 6, 1777 (Fisher 2004). However, he was too late to have an effect; Burgoyne surrendered to Continental Major General Horatio Gates at Saratoga on October 16, 1777 (Ketchum 1997:425).

40 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 35 British 9 th Regiment of Foot- Colonel Hill- 190 soldiers (Hagist 2004:39) 9 th Regiment of Foot- Colonel Hill- 190 soldiers (Hagist 2004:39) 9 th Regiment of Foot- Colonel Hill- 190 soldiers (Hagist 2004:39) Table 4.1. Battle of Fort Anne Order of Battle. Overall Order of Battle Continentals 2 nd NH - Colonel Pierse Long- 600 (Ketchum 1997:222; Thacher 1823:99) 150 (Cubbison 2012:72; Luzader 2010:70) plus injured soldiers. Unclear on exact number, made up of soldiers from various regiments and companies at Fort Ticonderoga. 3 rd NH - Cpt. James Gray Company*- 50 (Gray Muster 1777) 15 th MA - Cpt. Benjamin Farnum Company-44 (Bailey 1880:362) 6 th Albany Militia - Col. Henry Van Rensselaer- 400 soldiers (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818) July 7 Order of Battle Capt. James Gray- 150 soldiers plus 17 rangers (Gray 1777) Reinforcement of 150 soldiers (Gray 1777) July 8 Order of Battle Capt. James Gray- ~150 (Gray 1777) Capt. Nathaniel Hutchins (1 st NH)-~150 (Gray 1777) 6 th Albany Militia - Col. Henry Van Rensselaer- 400 soldiers (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818) *Gray stated that he commanded over 220 men on march from Skenesborough to Fort Anne (Gray to Parsons July 14, 1777).

41 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 36 Figure Faden map of Burgoyne Campaign with approximate routes of Continenal and British Armies.

42 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p KOCOA Analysis V. DEFINING FEATURES AND KOCOA ANALYSIS The main unit of study for this project is the defining feature. A defining feature, as either a natural or a cultural feature, is the basic unit in the KOCOA system of military terrain analysis. Developed by military experts and historians, the KOCOA system is a specialized technique for landscape analysis in which natural and cultural terrain features or landmarks are studied for their relation to a battle (McMasters 2009). KOCOA is an acronym that stands for: Key terrain Obstacles Cover and concealment Observation points Avenues of approach and retreat. How combatants used a defining feature during a battle defines its categorization in the KOCOA system. Although a feature may have served multiple functions during the battle by the different sides in the conflict, to be termed a defining feature, the feature must meet at least one of these uses. The importance of a defining feature is based upon its role in determining the success or failure of a military unit in the battle. Table 5.1 (p. 38) lists the defining features related to the Battle of Fort Anne. These defining features are limited to those features or landmarks discussed in the historical records reviewed for this study. The list includes the major and influential features related to the battles. Records for each feature also include descriptions of its location; relevance to the battle; comment; its KOCOA description; and an integrity assessment. Appendix III (p. Error! Bookmark not defined.) lists a full record of all accounts recorded for the KOCOA analysis. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 (pp. 40 and 41) show the location of the major defining features.

43 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 38 Table 5.1. Battle of Fort Anne Defining Features. This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

44 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 39 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

45 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 40 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 5.1. Overview of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features.

46 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 41 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 5.2. Detailed view of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features.

47 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p Historic Perspectives of Defining Features The Battle of Fort Anne consisted of two skirmishes fought July 7-8, In both skirmishes, the British and Continental armies made use of the natural terrain of hills, creeks, and woods for their advantage. These natural features also posed difficulties by acting as obstacles or concealing enemy movements. Due to the confusion of the withdrawal from Burgoyne s advance and the small number of troops, specifically officers, there are few direct accounts of the battle. Second hand accounts made by individuals and official reports provide some insight, but can be problematic when attempting to identify landscape features related to the battle. Project researchers made every attempt to review accounts from combatants directly involved in the battle. Often these accounts referred to troop movements without discussion of distances. This section presents a review of the historical accounts of the Battle of Fort Anne s defining features and their roles in the battle. The following descriptions of the defining features include physical details of the features from the historical documents, the relation of the defining features to the overall battlefield, and the KOCOA classification of the defining feature. Given the fluid nature of combat, defining features can be classified into multiple KOCOA groups and the multiple roles defining features held are considered. Section 5.3 (p. 54) presents a discussion of spatial analyses that helped to refine the locations and boundaries of defining features by filling in any gaps from the historical record. Section 6.4 (p. 94) provides an initial assessment of the integrity of these defining features and any post-battle impacts on the features. Withdrawal from Skenesborough For the purposes of this project, the Battle of Fort Anne begins with the Continental army s withdrawal from Skenesborough. Under the ABPP s definition (McMasters 2009), a battle begins when an army decides to engage an enemy in combat. The Continental soldiers under Col. Long were in a running withdraw from Burgoyne s Army starting with the abandonment of Fort Ticonderoga (Ketchum 1997:222). The events at Skenesborough were a violent engagement between British and Continentals ships as well as land-based troops (Luzader 2010:69-73; Thacher 1823:100). Colonel Pierse Long decided that the Continental Army s position at Skenesborough was lost and a new position at Fort Anne would be more beneficial. The British Army s 9 th Regiment of Foot followed the withdrawing Continentals towards Fort Anne. They even engaged and captured one of the Continental s bateau (Hagist 2004:39). The withdrawal towards Fort Anne was an active engagement. The influence of the larger Continental Army led to a difference between the fighting at Skenesborough and Fort Anne. Major General Philip Schuyler s involvement of the Albany militia at Fort Anne added a new factor that differentiated the engagement of Fort Anne from Skenesborough. Whereas the fighting at Skenesborough served the goal of survival in withdrawing from the British, Schuyler directed Col. Van Rensselaer to make a stand and delay Burgoyne s army to allow time for Schuyler to implement larger logistical and strategic initiatives (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818). The result was a different goal and means of engagement between the fighting at Fort Anne and Skenesborough. The dissimilar experience of engagement allows this project to distiguish the fighting at Skenesborough from Fort Anne while recognizing its influence on the Battle of Fort Anne.

48 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 43 Photo 5.1. Facing north across Skenesborough (Whitehall) Harbor. The Continentals withdrawing from Skenesborough (Photo 5.1, above) followed one of two paths on an avenue of retreat towards Fort Anne 14 miles south of Skenesborough, either the Skenesborough Road or Wood Creek. The routes both took a generally parallel path between Skenesborough and Fort Anne. Long s Continental troops and women and injured conducted the withdrawal during the night of July 6 into the morning hours of July 7 (Farnum 1777; Gray 1777). The condition of the road was bad as it fell into disrepair and the Continentals razed the bridges (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVIII). Due to the bad conditions, the march was slow for both sides. Wood Creek s channel was shallow and obstructed by fallen trees leading to slow progress (Hitchcock in Weeden 1899:117). The creek s meandering nature also hindered a direct route allowing those taking the road to overtake those on the creek. British troops overcame and captured some of the Continental s boats and their occupants, and took them towards Fort Anne as prisoners (Hagist 2004:39). In the early morning of July 7, the Continentals began to arrive at Fort Anne. Capt. Gray arrived at the fort with the Continental Army s rear guard around 6 am (Gray 1777). Fort Anne was a small fortification made to resupply passing troops and observe movement between Lake Champlain and the Hudson Valley. The British, and later the Continentals, located a fortification in the area of Fort Anne since the end of the 17 th century through the 18 th century (Fort Ann 2007:9-11). 10 Its position on the rise above the confluence of Wood Creek and the Halfway Brook presented a good observation point for movement between the two valleys (Napier in Bradford 1962:306). The fort was associated with a blockhouse and sawmill. A sawmill located approximately 1.6 km (1 mile) northwest of Fort Anne along Halfway Creek 10 Continental soldier Issac Glynne stated that in the Spring of 1777, British allied Native Americans held Fort Anne. He also stated that the ground around Fort Anne was clear of woods, but was surrounded by tall fire weed (Glynne 1777).

49 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 44 at Kane s Falls further supported the need for timber resources in the region (Farnum 1777). A well, identified now with a historical marker and reconstruction (Photos 5.2 and 5.3, below, p. 45), was a water source for Fort Anne. The well was located directly east of Fort Anne s location. The outpost was not large and not meant to be a major defensive position. A British 1777 reconnaissance report made by Captain McMackay (CO42-36:129) described Fort Anne as About 30 men at this place; have a [barracks] picketed round. The size of the fort allowed the housing of about 30 troops, but during the Battle of Fort Anne, the number of Continentals exceeded this number. Long s group of about 600 troops, plus women and sick and injured troops brought from Fort Ticonderoga, plus those of Schammell s Company (Capt. Gray s troops) who joined in the withdrawal from Skenesborough would have exceeded Fort Anne s space. Captain Benjamin Farnham's company of the 15 th MA was posted at Fort Anne since June 14 (Farnum 1777). The additional troops and people withdrawing to Fort Anne most likely were too numerous to fit within the fort. It is likely that the Continental troops established a camp outside the walls of Fort Anne allowing space for the troops. Photo 5.2. Facing west at reconstruction of Fort Anne well.

50 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 45 Photo 5.3. Facing west at New York State historical marker for Fort Anne well. First Day of Battle: July 7 As the withdrawing Continentals established themselves at Fort Anne, the British 9 th Regiment of Foot set up a camp outside of Fort Anne. Based on Private Roger Lamb s description, the British Camp for July 7 seems to have been expedient. He stated that the British marched to within ¼ mile of Fort Anne then halted and lay upon their arms all night (Hagist 2004:39). The camp served the main purpose of the British 9 th s advance, to observe Fort Anne (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XVIII) (Photo 5.4, p. 46). The distance from Fort Anne provided by Pvt. Lamb and the purpose of observing Fort Anne would suggest that the British camp s location for the night of July 6-7 was located at the southern base of Battle Hill, more precisely between the base of Battle Hill and a stream flowing into Wood Creek. The British may have seen the stream as a resource for water as well as providing an obstacle to any Continental Advance. The Continental Advance against the British position began about 11 o clock. Capt. Gray quickly prepared after arriving at Fort Anne at 6 o clock that same morning (Gray 1777). Gray marched from Fort Anne towards the British position with 150 troops and 17 rangers (Gray 1777). His forces first engaged the British within a ½ mile of Fort Anne. Prior to the engagement, he detached his troops into front, rear, and flanking gaurds [sic] (Gray 1777). He implemented such a maneuver to help identify the British position without being surprised by a British attack. He described the landscape as wooded, which would have limited his area of observation. The avenue of approach in this area consists of wetlands (Photo 5.5, p. 47). It is unclear if these wetlands were present during the time of the battle or if they are a result of the redirection and rechanneling of the creeks related to the Champlain Canal. Participants in the battle discuss woods, but not specifically wetlands (Gray 1777; Hagist 2004:39). Wood Creek and a small feeder stream were present during the battle and may have presented obstacles for the Continentals in their advance.

51 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 46 The Continentals advance quickly overpowered the British, forcing the 9 th to withdraw up to the summit of Battle Hill (Photo 5.6, p. 47). Capt. Gray described it as we met with a party of Regualrs [sic] and gave them fire, which was Return d [sic] (by the Enemy) who then gave back- I then pursued them with close fire till they betook themselves to the top of a mountain (Gray 1777). The Continental troops positioned themselves at the base of the hill and continued to fire upon the British s position at the top of the hill. Around 6 pm, 150 Continentals arrived from Fort Anne to reinforce Capt. Gray s force. At that time, the Continentals had a little over 300 soldiers along the base of Battle Hill. Capt. Gray did not provide details on the spacing of his troops. In estimating of the area covered by the Continentals, with 300 troops spaced in a single line about 10 ft (3 m) apart, which would be a wide spacing for troops, the line would stretch 3,000 ft (914 m) in length. This would allow coverage for most of the south and eastern base of Battle Hill. This may be an overestimate of length if the Continental troops maintained a closer spacing and multiple lines. This spacing allows for an initial view that can be investigated with archeological testing. With darkness approaching, Cpt. Gray (Gray 1777) called off the attack and withdrew to Fort Anne. It is of note that neither of the two main British sources of the Battle of Fort Anne, Pvt. Lamb and Maj. Forbes, mention the fighting on July 7. Their accounts focus on the engagement of July 8. Pvt. Lamb misidentifies the date as July 9 (Hagist 2004:39). It may be that the British saw the July 7 skirmish as minor, especially in comparison to the main battle of July 8. This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Photo 5.4. Facing south from summit of Battle Hill towards Fort Anne and Wood Creek.

52 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 47 This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Photo 5.5. Facing north across Continental Army s avenue of approach on morning of July 7, with Battle Hill in the background. Photo 5.6. Facing east at Battle Hill from area of Kane s Falls.

53 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 48 Second Day of Battle- July 8 The focus of the Battle of Fort Anne was a defile or pass made by the gap of Wood Creek crossing between Battle Hill to the north and a series of hills to the south. The narrow pass restricted movement between the Champlain and Hudson Valleys throughout the 18 th century and became a focal point in engaging the British. The 9 th Regiment positioned themselves in the pass to observe and attack the Continental army at Fort Anne. The Continental Army used the defile s restrictive landscape to halt the British from crossing into the Hudson Valley. Major General Philip Schuyler ordered Col. Henry Van Rensselaer to march with 400 volunteers to the defile and halt the British advance (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818). take post at a defile or pass past Fort Ann formed by a ledge of rocks on his (Van Rensselaer) left and Wood Creek with a thick swamp on his right (Van Rensselaer Pension 1818). Van Rensselaer was able to reach the defile the morning of July 8. Schuyler wanted Van Rensselaer to delay the British at the defile until 4 o clock in the afternoon to allow time for Schuyler to remove stores and personnel to Fort Edward from Fort George and Fort Anne. Van Rensselaer and his force of Albany Militia held their ground until dusk surpassing Schuyler s orders. Van Rensselaer and the 6 th Regiment of the Albany Militia were a major part of the Continental Army s July 8 advance against the British. The start of the Continental Army s advance paralleled the advance of the preceding day. Capt. Gray, joined by Captain Hutchins, marched with their troops (estimated 300) back to the base of Battle Hill (Gray 1777). British Major Gordon Forbes stated that the attack commenced at half past ten (Forbes in Burgoyne 1780:61). After about 2 hours, Van Rensselaer s militia reinforced the Continentals. The army fired up Battle Hill at the British position. During the advance, the Continental Army attacked the British following the withdrawing British up the summit of Battle Hill. In pursuing the British, the Continental troops overcame the injured Capt. Montgomery and surgeon caring for him as well as the prisoners taken by the British on Wood Creek during the withdrawal from Skenesborough. The Continental troops recovery of the prisoners suggests that the Continentals crossed the British camp. The location of the British Camp for July 7-8 is not clear from the historical documents. Pvt. Lamb provided no details on the location of the camp after the first night s camp. He mentions that the Continental advance on the morning of July 8 was first met by British sentries, who were able to attack the Continental troops initially. Ultimately, the British sentries fell back after the Continental soldiers regrouped (Hagist 2004:39). Maj. Forbes offered some information on the British camp or main position on the morning of July 8. He described the Continental troops beginning their attack against the British front (Forbes in Burgoyne 1780:61). He also stated that the Continentals oriented their attack on Wood Creek. A large body of them passed the creek on the left, fired from a thick wood across the creek on the left flank of the regiment; they began to re-cross the creek, and attack us in the rear (Forbes in Burgoyne 1780:61). The British were grouped together between Battle Hill and Wood Creek. The Continentals were able to conduct a flanking maneuver while occupying the British front. After the Continental Army s flankers crossed back over Wood Creek, they were in a position to surround the British. Forbes stated that with the possibility of being surrounded, we then found it necessary to change our ground we took post on top of a high hill to our right (Forbes in Burgoyne 1780:61). Forbes description of landmarks suggest that the British camp was located along the eastern base of Battle Hill between the hill and Wood Creek; the description of the summit of Battle Hill being on their right, suggests that they were along the eastern side of Battle Hill rather than the southern side.

54 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 49 Accounts from Continentals also describe the British camp as located on the eastern base of Battle Hill. Capt. John Calfe stated that the Continental Army encountered the British within a mile march of Fort Anne (Calfe in Noyes 1899:291). The Continentals would engage the British along the eastern base of Battle Hill given this distance by following Skenesborough Road and Wood Creek north from Fort Anne. The account of the Continental officer, Major Beach, offered by Mr. Weller in 1848 confirms the location of the British along the eastern side of Battle Hill on July 8. Beach claimed that the British were in a heavily wooded area at the base of Battle Hill (Fort Anne 2007:19). The British did not cross into the southern portion of the hill to avoid being exposed to fire. According to Maj. Beach, the Continentals crossed Wood Creek to outflank the British at a location described as where the canal enters the old bed of Wood Creek, at the southwest end of the precipice which here rises perpendicular from the brink of the creek (Fort Anne 2007:19). The crossing was north of the British position requiring the Continentals to move south along Wood Creek as they attempted to surround the British. In the fighting of July 8, Wood Creek served as a slight obstacle for the Continentals troops, but they were able to overcome it. The Woods (Photo 5.7, p. 50) on Battle Hill and the surrounding area limited visibility. Roger Lamb (Hagist 2004:39) stated that the British could hear Continental soldiers attempting to outflank and surround their position, but could not see them due to the large number of trees. Capt. Money (Money in Burgoyne 1780:39) while on a scouting mission before Burgoyne s campaign described the woods as so thick that a party was required to pass through them for protection. The descriptions of thick woods suggest that the woods on Battle Hill were secondary growth rather than old-growth woods. An old-growth forest would have limited undergrowth and vegetation and would allow some visibility rather than the thick vegetation depicted in the historic accounts. 11 Such a situation provided an advantage to rangers who were experienced in woods fighting, concealing themselves behind trees and firing on the enemy often using rifles rather than muskets. The British Regulars of the 9 th would have been more acquainted with fighting in more open areas (Spring 2008:139). The British withdrawal up Battle Hill was a violent one. Pvt. Lamb stated that the British suffered several casualties as they withdrew up the hill (Hagist 2004:39-41). He was one of the last to withdraw up the hill and witnessed the soldiers around him shot as they attempted to reach the summit. Forbes does not detail the heavy firing associated with the move up the hill (Cubbison 2012:73). Capt. Money stated that the Battle of Fort Anne included some of the heaviest firing he witnessed during the Burgoyne campaign (Money in Burgoyne 1780:41). Pvt. Lamb stated that the British established a single firing line ( Indian file ) at the summit of Battle Hill (Hagist 2004:40). This formation was out of the ordinary two rank formation adopted by the British during the Burgoyne campaign (Spring 2008:152). The formation reflects the desperation of the British to establish a long line of defense across the summit of Battle Hill to thwart the Continental army s attempts at surrounding them. 11 Although settlement around Battle Hill was sparse during the 18 th century, there is evidence of logging in the vicinity that would account for the secondary growth on Battle Hill. In 1709, as a part of Queen Anne s War, British Colonel Peter Schuyler built an outpost (Fort Schuyler) in the area of Fort Anne as well as approxiamtly 200 bark canoes and battaeux for use on Wood Creek (Johnson 1878:16). In 1711, a second fort (Queen s Fort or Fort Anne) was built to replace Fort Schuyler. Subsequent reconstructions of Fort Anne during the French and Indian War (Stone 1901) as well as the presence of a sawmill operated by Philip Skene southeast of Battle Hill at Kane s Falls (Johnson 1878:302) show the presence of logging in the area of Battle Hill and the probability of secondary forest on the hill during the battle.

55 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 50 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Photo 5.7. Facing northeast across woods on Battle Hill. The terrain at the summit of Battle Hill is fairly flat and provided a good staging location to stop the advancing Continental Army. Photo 5.8 (p. 51) shows the flat terrain on the summit. To the west of the summit is a ravine with a steep to vertical incline that would serve as a good backdrop dissuading a Continental attack on the British 9 th s rear (Photo 5.9, p. 51). On the eastern side of the summit, the slope proved to be an obstacle to the Continentals. They were unable to make a simple and direct advance against the British (Photo 5.10, p. 52). Chaplain Enos Hitchcock claimed that the British built breastworks (Hitchcock in Weeden 1899:118). There is no other mention of breastworks related to Battle Hill. Hitchcock was not in the engagement and his information was second hand. It is likely that the British were using the natural terrain of boulders and rock outcrops as expedient firing positions. Pvt. Lamb stated that the firing between the British and Continentals continued until the British ran out of ammunition. The Continentals realized this and moved forward attempting to surround the British position (Hagist 2004: 40). The fighting on Battle Hill lasted for a couple of hours (Forbes in Burgoyne 1780:61) as neither side was able to advance or withdraw due to the steep terrain.

56 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 51 This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Photo 5.8. Facing north across summit of Battle Hill. This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Photo 5.9. Facing north across ravine west of Battle Hill s summit.

57 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 52 This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Photo Facing northwest across eastern slope of Battle Hill from Continental Army s position. Withdraw from Fort Anne The fighting on Battle Hill came to an end as both the British and Continentals ran out of ammunition. The Continentals were close to making a final attack on the British on the summit of Battle Hill when Captain Money s war whoop led the Continentals to withdraw from Battle Hill (Forbes in Burgoyne 1780:61; Hagist 2004:40). Money advanced to within 4 miles of the battle with a group of Native American warriors (Hagist 2004:40). Money ordered the warriors to accompany him into the battle, but the warriors abandoned him, refusing to fight. He advanced to the bottom of the hill and made his war call influencing the Continentals withdrawal (Hagist 2004:40). Capt. Gray and other Continental accounts did not detail the Continental troops avenue of retreat to Fort Anne. They probably withdrew down Battle Hill to Skenesborough Road and towards Fort Anne. Informed of Burgoyne s approaching reinforcements, Colonel Pierse Long in a council of war decided to withdraw to Fort Edward. Again, the Continental accounts do not detail the path taken to Fort Edward. Captain Gray listed the distance between Fort Anne and Fort Edward as 14 miles (Gray 1777; Hadden Journal 1884:89). The avenue of retreat was probably along the Fort Anne-Fort Edward Road, which corresponds with the present day NY 4. The Continentals burned Fort Anne (Gray 1777) when they left. The Continentals arrived at Fort Edward the night of July 8 (Calfe in Noyes 1899:292; Gray 1777). Burgoyne (Burgoyne 1780:Appendix XIX) noted that the Continentals destroyed Fort Anne, but left the sawmill and blockhouse (at Kane s Falls) intact, suggesting there was little Continental presence at this position during the battle. British Lt. Digby noted the presence of unburied British and Continental dead around Fort Anne. (Digby in Baxter 1887: ). His account suggests that the British attempted a quick burial of the remains, which were already beginning to decompose. The Continental withdrawal from Fort Anne was quick.

58 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 53 The British avenue of retreat from Battle Hill appears to have followed a path to the north meeting with Skenesborough Road. As with the Continental accounts, there is little detail on the path the British took during the withdrawal from Battle Hill. Pvt. Lamb stated that the British reformed on the hill following the Continentals withdrawal (Hagist 2004:40). The number of injured British soldiers made leaving Battle Hill difficult. Lamb, along with a soldier s wife, dressed the wounded and moved them on blankets to a hut two miles behind the 9 th s position (Hagist 2004:41). The hut was probably located in an area called the Great Meadows northeast of Battle Hill along both the Skenesborough Road and Wood Creek (Photo 5.11, below). He remained at the hut while the rest of the 9 th rejoined Burgoyne s army at Skenesborough after following the Skenesborough Road. Following the Battle of Fort Anne, Maj. Gen. Schuyler commenced an expansive project to create obstacles to Burgoyne s forces. He ordered the blocking of roads between Fort Anne and Fort Edward as well as Wood Creek. The Continentals created the obstructions primarily by cutting trees across the roads and creek (Adams Pension 1832; Anthony Pension 1832; Digby in Baxter 1887:233; Hadden 1884:94-95 Morris July 17, 1777). This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Photo Facing north across Great Meadows, possible area of post-battle British camp.

59 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p Geographic Analysis of Defining Features Project analysts applied various spatial analyses to the landscape of the Battle of Fort Anne to better identify the boundaries, locations and functions of the defining features identified in the documentary record. Analysts conducted the analyses using ArcGIS 10.1 software, a geographic information system (GIS) that provides a digital arena for the storage, analysis, and comparison of various types of spatial data. The analyses presented here include georeferencing of historic maps, viewshed analysis, interpolation of slope, and firing ranges for the core areas. Each of these analyses help to refine the locations of the defining features and provides a foundation for future research and preservation initiatives. The georeferencing of historic maps was an initial analysis conducted within GIS. Georeferencing involves the matching of shared points on historic and modern maps. The process fits historic maps into a similar scale and projection as the modern map overlaying the historic map on the modern map. The result is a historic image that is comparable to other data sets. By comparing historic maps with a shared scale, projection, and spatial reference, changes to the landscape and post battle disturbances to defining features become evident. Historic maps from the 18 th, 19 th, and 20 th centuries were georeferenced (Figures , pp ). Analysts used common points that they assumed were static over the 200 plus years between the original drafting of a map and the present for georeferencing. Analysts avoided points that are subject to change, such as riverbanks and road widths whenever possible. Although georeferencing can provide a reasonable match between projections of past and current landscapes, error based on inaccurate cartography practices in the past and uncertain changes to assumed common points can lead to a relative level of inaccuracy in the overlay. Section 6.2 (p. 70) details the results of this georeferencing. Viewshed analysis aided the determination of areas of observation and cover/concealment. The analysis relies on elevation data in the form of a digital elevation model (DEM) to determine line of site over a set range or distance. Elevation data related to the observers position in the surrounding landscape determines any obstacles that would limit or obstruct observations. For the Battle of Fort Anne, hills and slope were the major terrain obstacles, while historic accounts state that woods were another factor that limited observation on the battlefield. The viewshed analysis for the Battle of Fort Anne was conducted from the main positions for both Continentals and British. For the Continentals, observer positions were made at Fort Anne and potential firing positions along the base and slope of Battle Hill. For the British, observer positions were located at the base and summit of Battle Hill. The presence of trees on Battle Hill would have greatly restricted the sight distance for observers and increased the ability for combatants to conceal themselves. Fort Anne s purpose was to serve as an observation point and defensive post for the crossing between the Champlain and Hudson Valleys. Lake Champlain and the Hudson Rivers were the main travel corridors between Canada and New York. Both routes were defended with a system of fortifications, such as Crown Point and Fort Ticonderoga for Lake Champlain and Fort Edward and Fort Miller for the north Hudson River. Wood Creek and the associated carry served as the crossing between Lake Champlain and the Hudson River Valley. Fort Anne s postion on the carry provided observations of the movements between the two corridors. Throughout the 18 th century, Fort Anne was not a large fortification. It did not need to be as other paths, such as South Bay and Lake George, offered alternative crossings between the Champlain and Hudson Valleys (Burgoyne 1777 transcribed in Cubbison 2012: ). Fort Anne was

60 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 55 able to serve as an observation post and provide initial defenses while preparing larger defenses at larger fortifications, such as Fort Edward, as was the case with Schuyler. Viewshed analysis conducted on the location of Fort Anne, supports Fort Anne s role as an observation post since it was in a prime location to view movement through the defile or pass along the Skenesborough Road and Wood Creek between Battle Hill to the north and other hills to the south (Figure 5.3, p. 56). The fort s viewshed quickly stops after the defile, but the valley west of the defile or pass is open to the fort s observation. The British positions on Battle Hill during the Battle of Fort Anne provide some open areas of observation, while also facing limits in observation distance. The British moved across Battle Hill throughout the battle, moving from the base of the hill to the summit on both days of battle. The viewshed analysis of Battle Hill s summit shows the northern portion of the summit provided a better observation post than the southern ridge (Figure 5.4, p. 57). The summit provides an extensive view of the surrounding area including the valley to the west (area of Kane s Falls) and the Great Meadow to the east. However, observation of the lower elevations of Battle Hill was limited. The southern ridge s distance of observation is halted by the presence of steep slope. The presence of slope and trees meant those soldiers positioned along the southern ridge were in effect blind to movements immediately below them. The middle and northern sections of the summit held some improvement in sight over the southern ridge, but were still limited. Observers could see the flat terrace below the summit s northern section. With this observational context, the difficulty for the Continental soldiers was to move along either the southern ridge or the northern ridge. The southern ridge offered greater concealment, but the terrain was steeper and more difficult to cross. The northern portion was easier to traverse, but offered less concealment. The Continental soldiers avenues of approach covered much of the defile or pass along Wood Creek and resulted in a wide area of observation. The Continentals did not make a choice between attacking the British by way of the southern or northern ridge; they attacked by both sides. Their advance along the base of Battle Hill on both sides of Wood Creek allowed them a clear view of defile and Battle Hill s slope (Figure 5.5, p. 58). The one area that was out of their sight was the summit of Battle Hill. The limits of observation for both sides contributed to the standoff at the Battle of Fort Anne. Neither side held a clear view of their enemy s position. They could advance, but not confidently know their enemy s position or numbers. This may have led to both sides remaining cautious and not aggressively advancing into an unknown situation.

61 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 56 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 5.3. Continental Army s viewshed from Fort Anne.

62 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 57 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 5.4. British viewshed from summit of Battle Hill.

63 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 58 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 5.5. Viewshed of Continental positions during Battle of Fort Anne.

64 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 59 Range of fire analysis adds some more information on the development of the standoff at Battle Hill. Captain Money (Money in Burgoyne 1780:41) testified that the gunfire at the Battle of Fort Anne was intense. Although neither side had a clear view of the other and they may not have aggressively attacked the other, both sides attempted to use gunfire to hold their enemy in position or break their enemy s resolve. Analysts based the range of fire analysis on musket fire with a range of fire of 100 yards (91 m). Muskets had an accurate range of 50 yards (46 m), but the 100 yards (91 m) distance allowed for the identification of areas that may have musket balls even if not accurately aimed at a target. Analysts used a distance of 300 yards (274 m) for the range of rifle fire due to the presence of rangers (Gray 1777) and Albany Militia who may have used rifles due to tactics or supplying of their own arms, respectively. As with viewshed, the terrain was the determining factor for the range of fire. The slope limited the range of fire from the British position on Battle Hill s summit (Figure 5.6, p. 60). They had effective coverage across the ridges and some limited coverage below the northern ridge, but they did not hold a clear field of fire below that ridge. The British soldiers may have been able to achieve an increased firing range by positioning themselves at the edge of the summit and firing below them. The British may have positioned themselves a little lower than the summit for portions of the battle. Pvt. Lamb stated that he stayed on the lower slopes of Battle Hill as long as possible before withdrawing to the summit (Hagist 2004:40). He may have known from the July 7 engagement that his range of fire on the summit was limited and tried to maintain direct fire on the Continentals as long as possible. The field of fire from the base and slope of Battle Hill provided increased coverage relative to the summit of Battle Hill (Figure 5.7, p. 61). The field of fire from the middle elevation on Battle Hill firing down was open. The distance of the weapon seemed to be the limiting factor in the range of fire. As with the viewshed, there was little to no coverage of the top of Battle Hill. The range of fire for rifle shows a similar pattern (Figure 5.8, p. 62). The lower slopes and base of Battle Hill were exposed to gunfire, but the terrain blocked gunfire from lower elevations on the hill. This may have resulted in the British not suffering many casualties while on the summit. Pvt. Lamb s description of British soldiers being shot suggests that they were shot either at the base (Cpt. Montgomery) or on the slope while withdrawing to the summit (Lt. Westrop) (Hagist 2004:40). The British soldiers inability to effectively observe or fire on the Continentals below them may explain why the British suffered more casualties than the Continentals. The standoff created by the terrain s imposed limits on viewshed and range of fire probably also led to the Continentals waiting until they thought the British were running low on ammunition before finally advancing on the summit. They were only stopped by Cpt. Money s war whoop. Based on historic accounts, along with the viewshed and range of fire analyses, slope was a major factor in the fighting on Battle Hill. To better understand the role of slope and determine possible avenues of advance and retreat on the hill, analysts conducted a slope analysis. As with the viewshed analysis, DEMs were used to identify the percent rise and degree of slope on Battle Hill. Battle Hill consists primarily of areas of steep slope, especially along its southern and western sections (Figure 5.9, p. 63). The northern section of Battle Hill contains some flat areas dispersed between areas of steep slope. The summit also provides a thin but flat top. These flat areas may have provided staging areas for fighting or troop positions. This was the case with the summit. Figure 5.10 (p. 64) shows the general location of troop positions on Battle Hill in a 3D context.

65 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 60 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 5.6. British Range of Musket Fire from the Summit of Battle Hill.

66 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 61 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 5.7. Continental Range of Musket Fire from Base and Side of Battle Hill.

67 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 62 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 5.8. Continental Range of Fire for Rifles from Base and Side of Battle Hill.

68 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 63 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 5.9. Degree of Slope for Fort Anne Battlefield.

69 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 64 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure Three dimensional rendering of Battle of Fort Anne.

70 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 65 VI. DEFINING FEATURE INTEGRITY The steep hills and ridges along with the creeks and rivers of the Champlain and Hudson Valleys influenced the tactics and movements of those engaged in the Battle of Fort Anne and the larger Burgoyne Campaign. The valleys carved by the waterways, such as Wood Creek, allowed paths for movement across the landscape, while ridges and hills, such as Battle Hill, posed obstacles for movement. The defile or pass formed by Wood Creek running south of Battle Hill established a gateway between the Champlain Valley and the Hudson Valley. The narrowness of the pass allowed armies to defend or block access to the other valleys. Throughout the 18 th century, colonists recognized the importance of this crossover and established Fort Anne to observe and restrict movement through the pass. On a smaller scale, the forests and rocky terrain of landmarks, such as Battle Hill, provided defensible positions. During the Battle of Fort Anne, both the British and Continentals made use of the natural landscape as avenues of approach and retreat as well as for their own observations and defense. This section presents the natural and cultural setting for the Fort Anne Battlefield. The discussion presented here details the natural geological and climatic environment experienced by the battle s combatants. This is followed by a history of the changes to the battlefield s landscape following the battle and the American Revolution. A listing of the effects of development and changes to the economy and transportation in the region considers the direct and indirect effects on the battlefield s integrity. The section closes with an assessment of each defining feature s integrity based on surficial observation. 6.1 Environmental Setting The Fort Anne Battlefield extends for approximately 30 miles from Whitehall (Skenesborough) in the north to Fort Edward to the south. The focal point for the battlefield is centered on the Village of Fort Anne and Battle Hill. To help inform the archeological research design (Section 7, p. 107) the discussion of soils in this section focuses on the areas of Fort Anne and Battle Hill since that is the most likely area for future archeological testing. The discussion also provides a baseline of expected soils associated with the battle s defining features. Due to the ephemeral nature of battles, combat related activity did not occur long enough to allow extensive deposition or widespread alteration of the natural soils. Instead, limited material deposits made a slight impact on the natural soils. Therefore, this discussion informs more about the potential post-battle impacts to soils. There is an expectation that urban development will affect soils with construction and cut-fill activities. Agricultural practices may also affect soil deposits. However, pasture and plowing activities have a different impact than urban development. By reviewing soils, primary soil impacts become evident and can inform future testing and feature evaluation. The Fort Anne Battlefield is located within the Hudson-Champlain Lowlands physiographic area located between the Adirondack Mountains to the west and the Taconic Uplands to the south and east (USDA 1975:141). The entire region s topography is the result of glaciation during the Pleistocene epoch (USDA 1975:141). The ice sheets carved the bedrock while depositing unconsolidated debris consisting of boulders and gravel. The Hudson-Champlain Lowland was shaped by the erosion of soft bedrock by glacial lakes and streams resulting from the melting glaciers at the end of the Pleistocene epoch (USDA 1975:142). The glacial Champlain Sea transitioned to Lake Champlain while the associated rivers transitioned to the Hudson River and feeder streams and creeks. The result of the glaciation and erosion

71 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 66 was a series of steep hills and ridges sided by waterways. Battle Hill and Wood Creek are examples of this resulting terrain. The ridges and hills created by glaciation also divided the main waterways in the area of Lake Champlain and the Hudson River into separate watersheds. The smaller feeder streams and creeks, such as Wood Creek, helped to erode through the ridges establishing passes and connections between the watersheds (Figure 6.1, p. 67). Glacial activity established a steep terrain on Battle Hill devoid of much soil and exposed bedrock covering most of the hill. The glacial meltwater forming into streams like Wood Creek further added to the steepness and shape of the hills and valleys by cutting and eroding the hills and ridges. The glaciation also led to the development of the soils associated with the battlefield (Table 6.1, p. 68; Figure 6.2, p. 69). For the purposes of this project, the soils reviewed focused on the core area of the battlefield, including Fort Anne, Battle Hill, and the area of Skenesborough Road and Wood Creek defining features. There are two main types of soils within the central area of the battlefield and these are related to the terrain. Flood plain and lacustrian soils are associated with the lower elevations along Wood Creek and Skenesborough Road defining features. The Battle Hill defining features are associated with soils consistent with rock outcrops, glacial till, and terraces. There is one soil type that provides evidence of disturbance- Orthents and Psamments (OP). This soil series is associated with dredging of the Hudson River and Champlain Canal. This soil is very limited in the battlefield and localized to a section of the Skenesborough Road defining feature. Overall, the soils suggest a landscape of high integrity with limited soil development at higher elevations (Battle Hill) and deeper soil deposition in the lower elevations (Skenesborough Road and Wood Creek).

72 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 67 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 6.1. Terrain and watershed map showing Fort Anne Battlefield defining features.

73 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 68 Table 6.1. USDA Soil Series for Fort Anne Battlefield (USDA 1975). This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984).

74 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 69 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 6.2. USDA Soil Series associated with Battle of Fort Anne defining features. (See Table 6.1, p. 68, for soil descriptions)

75 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p Post Battle Land Use and Alterations Due to its location as a travel route between the Champlain Valley and the Hudson Valley, troops traveled near the Fort Anne Battlefield for the duration of the American Revolution. Burgoyne established his campaign headquarters at Fort Anne in late July of 1777 (Burgoyne 1780: Appendix 42; Digby in Baxter 1887:233; Hadden 1884:96). By July 28, the main army began to march from Fort Anne leaving soldiers to help with supplies (Digby in Baxter 1887:239; Hadden 1884:98). By September of 1777, Burgoyne was unable to defend against an approaching Continental Army and ordered Fort Anne evacuated (Hadden 1884:lxxxiii-lxxxiv; Ketchum 1997:340). The Continental Army continued to hold Fort Anne until October 10, 1780 when British Major Christopher Carleton burned the fort (Hadden 1884:21n). At this time the fort consisted of about 75 troops, a blockhouse, and stockade. The events associated with the area of Fort Anne after the battle were focused on fortification rather than the overall battlefield. Post War Settlement Although the British established settlement in the area of Fort Anne during the 18 th century, it was not until after the American Revolution that settlement reached sizable numbers. Fort Anne was located within the Artillery Patent consisting of 2,400 acres, which the British government granted to British Army officers on October 24, 1764 (Johnson 1878:301) (Figure 6.3, p. 72). Even with this patent, settlement to the area was slow. One of the early settlers in the region, Philip Skene, established Skenesborough and a sawmill at Kane s Falls (Johnson 1878:302). Skene was a Loyalist and lost his lands as a result of the war. Immediately following the war, settlement increased. George Wray established the Hamlet of Westfield, surveying the streets and naming them after his family (Fort Ann 2007:11). Wray also owned the falls along Halfway Brook, which he sold to Charles Kane who changed the name to Kane s Falls (Fort Ann 2007:11). The Hamlet of Westfield was renamed Fort Ann in The Village of Fort Ann was incorporated in 1820 (Fort Ann 2007:12). The early settlement around Fort Ann followed a pattern common throughout New York with the establishment of sawmills and gristmills. Villages grew around these mills (Johnson1878:302; Stradling 2010:39). Logging was the primary economy during the early 19 th century as settlers made use of the resources from the woods and opened up the area for farming (Stradling 2010:32-35). Following the opening of land, farming took a more prominent role in the economy. The Village of Fort Ann became the commercial center for the surrounding rural area. Battle Hill was subject to logging throughout the 19 th century. Logging in the area was conducted by Skene during the 18 th century and Major General Benedict Arnold may have used timber from the Battle Hill area for building his Lake Champlain fleet. During the early 19 th century, the Weller family owned most of Battle Hill. Daniel Weller was a Revolutionary War veteran who settled in Fort Ann and possibly fought in the battle of Fort Anne. He drowned in Wood Creek in He was buried on a portion of his property that he said was part of the Fort Anne Battlefield (Photo 6.1, p. 74). His burial along US Route 4 coincides with the Continental Advance. The steep slope and lack of soil on Battle Hill made it difficult to farm. A c lithograph of the defile area (Figure 6.5, p. 73) shows Battle Hill covered with trees. The description of the image states that the forest on the left is thick wood of the Revolution while the area west of Battle Hill is covered with agricultural fields (Lossing 1860:141). A 1942 USDA aerial photograph of Battle Hill shows it covered

76 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 71 with forest, suggesting there was little farming attempted on the hill even into the 20 th century (Figure 6.15, p. 87). During a walkover of the hill, project archaeologists saw no evidence of historic farming activities, but identified a stonewall property marker with a depression possibly associated with a structure in the southern portion of Battle Hill (Photo 6.2, p. 74). The area of Battle Hill appears to have had few impacts and limited utilization from the 19 th through the 20 th centuries. Recognition of the Battle of Fort Anne began with the settlement of the region. The Village of Fort Ann was given its name in 1808 due to the presence of the fortification and battle (Fort Ann 2007:12). An 1844 description of the Fort Ann area details the Fort Anne Battlefield. On leaving the street of Fort Ann Village, there is a bridge over Wood Creek, leading to its left bank. Immediately beyond the bridge there is a narrow pass, only wide enough for a carriage, and cut, in great measure, out of a rocky ledge, which terminates here exactly at the creek. The ledge is the southern end of a rocky hill, which converges towards Wood Creek, and between the two is a narrow tract of level ground, which terminates at the pass already mentioned. On this ground the battle took place, and the wood on the right bank of the creek, from which the Americans fired upon the left flank of the British, is still there, and it is up this rocky hill that they retreated and took their stand (Nielson 1844:30-31). Nineteenth century lithographs with accompanying descriptions of the battlefield (Figures 6.4-5, p. 73) also define the battlefield as centered on Battle Hill (Lossing 1860: ). Beginning with an 1853 map (Figure 6.10, p. 82), the hill north of the Village of Fort Anne is labeled as Battle Hill. It is of note that the historic USGS maps from 1893 and 1904 list Battle Hill on the hill south of Wood Creek (Figures , pp ). This is a mislabeling as the other maps have Battle Hill labeled on the current Battle Hill. In 1927, the Town of Fort Ann and the State of New York erected a plaque on Battle Hill to commemorate the 150 year anniversary of the battle (Photo 6.3, p. 75). The plaque was moved with changes to US Route 4. Throughout the 19 th and 20 th centuries, Battle Hill served as a commemorative landscape for the memorialization of the Battle of Fort Anne.

77 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 72 Figure 6.3. Undated map of "Skenesborough" and Artillery Patent, now Whitehall Township (NY State Library).

78 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 73 Figure 6.4. Site of Fort Anne c (Lossing 1860:139). Figure 6.5. Site of Battle Hill c (Lossing 1860:141).

79 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 74 Photo 6.1. Facing southwest at Daniel Weller burial. This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Photo 6.2. Facing west across stone wall on Battle Hill.

80 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 75 Transportation Photo 6.3. Facing west at cut into Battle Hill and Battle Hill plaque. Transportation developments presented the most definitive impacts to the Fort Anne Battlefield. The area of Fort Ann continued to be an active transportation route between the Champlain and Hudson Valleys throughout the 19 th and 20 th centuries. With rising industrial and commercial trade in the 19 th century, the connection between these two valleys increased in importance connecting Canadian ports with New York City and Albany. The first transportation development was the construction of the Champlain Canal. The canal began in 1817 with the charter of the Delaware Hudson Canal Company (Fort Ann 2007:173). The canal opened in 1823 and connected Lake Champlain and the Hudson River by connecting Whitehall to Fort Edward (Whitford 1906). The route generally followed Wood Creek leading to dramatic rechanneling and eradication of Wood Creek (Photo 6.4, p. 76). The initial depth was three feet deep with a 30 foot width (Whitford 1906:79). In the 1860s, the canal was deepened to five and later seven feet deep (Whitford 1906:13-14). In the early 20 th century, the canal was redesigned. Portions of the original canal were abandoned and new channels cut (Fort Ann 2007:176). Those working on the canal constructed small huts or structures along the canal for housing. Some of these structures were in proximity to the base of Battle Hill.

81 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 76 In 1848, transportation was improved in the area with the construction of the Saratoga Washington Railroad (Fort Ann 2007:173). The railroad paralleled the Champlain Canal connecting Saratoga Springs to Whitehall. The railroad passed along the base of Battle Hill and west of the Village of Fort Ann. The train transported iron ore from the surrounding area and tourists to Lake Champlain (Fort Ann 2007:175). The rail line is still in use as a line for commercial and passenger service (Photo 6.5, p. 77). The Skenesborough Road continued to be used into the 19 th century. The historic maps suggest there was little alteration of the road throughout the 19 th century (Figures , pp ). The major changes to the roadway began during the 20 th century. A portion of what became US Route 4 moved west of the Skenesborough Road following the base of the hills rather than the creek. The southern base of Battle Hill was also cut into to make room for US Route 4, moving it to the west. Portions of the road abandoned with the construction of US Route 4 became used as local roads, such as Flat Rock Road and Old Route 4. The newer portions of US Route 4 moved the road away from the Fort Anne Battlefield limiting impacts related to its construction. Photo 6.4. Facing north across Champlain Canal.

82 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 77 Photo 6.5. Facing south across rail line near base of Battle Hill.

83 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 78 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 6.6. Overlay of defining features on 1762 Brassier map.

84 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 79 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 6.7. Overlay of defining features on 1777 Faden map of Burgoyne Campaign.

85 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 80 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 6.8. Overlay of defining features on 1780 map (Burgoyne 1780).

86 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 81 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure 6.9. Overlay of defining features on 1825 Geddes map.

87 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 82 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1853 Levey map.

88 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 83 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure Overlay of defining features on 1866 Stone and Stewart map.

89 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 84 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1893 Fort Anne, NY-VT 15 USGS Quadrangle.

90 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 85 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1904 Fort Anne, NY-VT 15 USGS Quadrangle.

91 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 86 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1944 Fort Anne, NY 7.5 USGS Quadrangle.

92 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 87 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 1 of 4).

93 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 88 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 2 of 4).

94 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 89 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 3 of 4).

95 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 90 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure Overlay of Fort Anne Battlefield defining features on 1942 USDA aerial photograph (map 4 of 4).

96 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p General Threats to Defining Feature Integrity The Fort Anne Battlefield is located on private property with multiple landowners. The site is not listed on the National Register of Historic Places. The lack of listing is not due to ineligibility. Instead, the battlefield has not been listed since no one has attempted to list the property prior to this project. The result is that the battlefield is not protected from threats to its integrity. The main threats to the battlefield s defining features include the mining of the granite bedrock on Battle Hill and relic hunting. The impacts to the Fort Anne Battlefield have been localized and limited. The largest impacts resulted from the development of canal, railroad, and roadway transportation routes. The construction of these transportation routes resulted in the reshaping of the valley containing the Skenesborough Road and Wood Creek. Such reshaping distorted the setting and feeling associated with the paths taken by Continental and British forces from Skenesborough to Fort Anne. Other impacts were small, including a small refuse dump in the vicinity of the British July 7 camp, Daniel Weller s burial, and logging roads on Battle Hill. Figure 6.19 (p. 93) shows the location of impacts visible during the walkover survey. The most pressing threat to the remains of the Fort Anne Battlefield in the vicinity of Battle Hill is a proposed granite mine. A construction company is proposing a topsoil and granite mine on Battle Hill. The project plans include the construction of a haulage road connecting the mine area to US Route 4, clearing of trees and brush, stockpiling of topsoil, quarrying of granite, and construction of a berm to block visibility of the operations from the east (Oberon 2010). The proposed mine encompasses 50 acres (20.2 ha) (Oberon 2010, 2011). Figure 6.19 (p. 93) shows the proposed boundary for the project (Oberon 2011). In 2010 and 2011, Stephen Oberon conducted archeological reconnaissance in the area of the proposed topsoil and granite mine (Oberon 2010, 2011). Oberon briefly mentioned the Battle of Fort Anne and determined that the battle was localized at the base of Battle Hill. He based this determination on two 19 th century secondary sources (Oberon 2010:6, 2011:4-5). Oberon s recommendation suggested testing for Precontact materials and a low sensitivity for Euroamerican cultural material remains (Oberon 2010:7). Oberon did not test areas with a greater than 12 percent rise (Oberon 2010:11). This meant that approximately 50% of the parcel was not tested (Oberon 2010:20; 2011:9). The testing consisted of a grid of shovel test pits placed at an interval of 15 m (49 ft). No artifacts were recovered from the shovel test pits. In 2011, at the request of New York s Office of Parks Recreation and Historic Preservation, Oberon conducted an intensive metal detector survey of the proposed access road and flatter areas in the eastern portion of the proposed mine site (Oberon 2011:3). Jeff Slade conducted the metal detecting survey. The sampling strategy consisted of overlapping systematic transects 12 feet (3.6 m) in width (Oberon 2011:3). The metal detector survey identified three items: an iron ox shoe, a brass bullet, and an iron horse shoe. The testing methodology presents some issues in identification of battle related materials. The majority of the parcel was either not tested due to slope or tested with shovel test pits. Shovel test pits are an ineffective method for identification of battlefield remains due to their ephemeral nature (Reeves 2011:88). The metal detector survey was limited to the eastern portion of the proposed project area. This left the portion most likely associated with the Fort Anne Battlefield and most likely to have battlefield remains not covered by the metal detector survey area. Portions of the British position on the summit of Battle Hill are within the boundaries of the proposed mine, but this area was not tested with a metal detector survey, and survey in this area consisted of limited testing with shovel test pits.

97 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 92 The metal detector survey also limited the identification of battle remains. The size of the sweep is larger than recommended. Transect widths should be about 1 m (3.3 ft) rather than the 12 feet (3.6 m) to ensure there is close contact between the detector and the ground as well as tight coverage. Oberon stated they used a White s 5500D metal detector with a Blue Max coil (Oberon 2011:3). White s produced this detector in the 1980s as part of the Coinmaster line, White s entry-level line for metal detectors. Metal Detector survey involves the use of a technical instrument and so the age and design of the detector need to be considered when evaluating the survey. Members of the Register of Professional Archaeologists Advanced Metal Detecting for the Archaeologist training staff suggest that archaeologists should not use detectors older than 5-10 years in archeological survey (Powis 2012:10). For military sites, especially those that have been subjected to relic hunting (Fort Anne) a mid-to high level machine should be used (Powis 2012:10). Neither of these standards was met with the metal detecting survey conducted by Oberon (2011:3). The archeological testing on Battle Hill did not provide an effective means to evaluate the impacts of the proposed granite mine or identify cultural remains within or adjacent to the proposed granite mine. The archaeologist s methodology was not appropriate for identification of battle related materials. The methodology also did not fit current professional standards. The historical research conducted for the 2010 and 2011 survey was limited and did not take into account primary accounts that provided descriptions of the landscape used during the battle. The research presented for this battlefield preservation project identified the location of the Battle of Fort Anne s defining features and determined that the proposed granite mine will directly impact portions of the battlefield. The proposed topsoil and granite mine will impact the British position on the summit of Battle Hill, portions of the Continental advance, and the British retreat. The impact will be both direct and indirect. The removal of topsoils and granite bedrock will remove battle related cultural material, such as lead balls, buttons, and personal items of combatants. The impacts will also have long-term indirect effects as quarrying may undermine the rest of the summit of Battle Hill leading to future erosion. The quarrying will also impact the viewshed of the defining features influencing the feeling and setting of the features. It will also distort any research that relies on landscape or spatial analysis by altering the terrain of the area in and around the battlefield. The impacts on the terrain will distort the setting and feeling of the battlefield, which will adversely influence the experience and use of the battlefield as a commemorative landscape.

98 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) _p._93 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Figure Impacts to Battle Hill section of Fort Anne Battlefield.

99 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p Condition of Battlefield Defining Features The National Register of Historic Place s evaluation of integrity (National Park Service 1997) forms the definition of integrity used in this project s assessment of defining feature integrity. The individual assessments for the defining features presented here are not a determination of the eligibility of the Fort Anne Battlefield for the National Register of Historic Places. Taken together, the individual assessments inform an initial determination of integrity and the boundary for potential listing on the National Register of Historic Places. Further archeological investigations may be needed to better determine eligibility for listing on the National Register. This project uses the criteria established by the National Register of Historic Places as a guideline rather than an actual determination of eligibility. The National Register of Historic Places lists seven criteria for evaluation of integrity. These seven include location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association (Hardesty and Little 2009:63). Given that the defining features were associated with a battlefield and contained little to no structural remains, the common way to approach the defining features is to view them as archeological sites following under Criterion D of the National Register Criteria for evaluation, That have yielded or may be likely to yield, information important in history or prehistory (NPS 1997). As archeological features, to have a high level of integrity, not all seven need to be present. The defining features are associated with a battlefield and some of the criteria will not be applicable, such as design and workmanship. The criterion of setting is an evaluation of how similar the current landscape is to the time of its significance. The period of significance for this study is 1777 during Burgoyne s campaign. Feeling is defined such that the feature along with its setting provides a historic sense of the property during its period of significance (Hardesty and Little 2009:64). The location criterion relates to whether the defining feature s location is identifiable. For this project, material relates to the presence of archeological or cultural deposits associated with the defining feature. Association is defined as the ability of the feature and/or cultural deposits to answer potential research questions (Hardesty and Little 2009:64). Understanding that none of the features will meet all seven of these criteria and that some, such as design and workmanship will not be applicable, researchers established a scale to guide the integrity assessment. If a defining feature meets none or one of these criteria, it will be assessed as having low integrity. If it has two to three, it will be assessed as having moderate integrity, and if it has four or more, it will be assessed as having high integrity. The following is a list of the defining features associated with the 1777 Battle of Fort Anne with a description of their current conditions (See Table 5.1, p. 38). Evaluation of the defining features, based strictly on above surface indications, is limited and can be wrong when buried cultural deposits are considered. As such, these assessments should be considered preliminary. Further archeological field testing for buried cultural deposits should be conducted to better define the integrity assessment. Limited resources in terms of time and access prevented an extensive review of all of the defining features. Battle Hill

100 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 95 Battle Hill consists of a complex of defining features associated with the Battle of Fort Anne. It was the core area of the battlefield and as such was the focal point for the engagements that occurred between July 7 and 8, The defining features associated with Battle Hill included: Defile/Pass, Battle Hill Breastworks, British Retreat, Continental Hill Retreat, and Battle Hill Woods. Defile/Pass The defile/pass was a location formed by the passing of Wood Creek between Battle Hill to the north and a set of hills to the south (Photo 6.6, below). The defile/pass was the focus of the Battle of Fort Anne and part of the core area of the battlefield. The Champlain Canal, construction of a railroad, and the straightening of US Route 4 have impacted the shape of the defile. However, material from the battle may still be present in the area and can still be interpreted to public audiences to establish a feeling of the Battle of Fort Anne. Therefore, the feature has moderate to high integrity. This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Battle Hill Breastworks Photo 6.6. Facing south at southern portion of defile.

101 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 96 There is only one historical account of breastworks associated with the British position in the Battle of Fort Anne. Chaplain Enos Hitchcock mentions them in a secondary account (Hitchcock in Weeden 1899:118). The British do not mention the construction of breastworks. It is possible they used the natural terrain of boulders and rock outcrops as expedient forms of breastworks. Further archeological testing may help with this identification. However, with no clear identification for the location or identity of this feature, the feature has a low integrity. Battle Hill The British withdrawals and Continental advances and withdrawals on Battle Hill cover much of the same area. These avenues of approach and retreat covered the southern, eastern, and northern faces of Battle Hill as the British withdrew to the summit and the Continentals advanced towards them. At some point along the hill s slope the Continentals were unable to overcome the summit facing fire from the British on the top of the hill (Photo 6.7, below). The area between the two lines was a field of fire that covered much of Battle Hill (Photo 6.8, p. 97). Logging roads that cut into Battle Hill s slope present the biggest impact. These were probably constructed during the 19 th and 20 th centuries, with the most evident related to the 20 th century. Initial attempts at granite mining have also made an impact (Photo 6.9, p. 97). These impacts are localized. Reforestation has also covered much of these impacts meaning the feeling and setting for the defining feature is not adversely affected. This feature has high integrity. This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Photo 6.7. Facing south across southeastern face of Battle Hill.

102 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 97 This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Photo 6.8. Facing north across access road. This page/map was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Photo 6.9. Facing north at granite mine area. Summit of Battle Hill

103 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 98 The British 9 th Regiment positioned itself along the summit of Battle Hill after withdrawing from the base of the hill. The soldiers formed a single line that stretched across the full length of the summit to prevent the Continental troops from surrounding them. There are no identifiable impacts to the summit (Photo 6.10, below). Agriculture and other ventures were probably too difficult to attempt and so people left the area alone. Relic hunting may have occurred, but battle related materials are still likely to be present. The trees, low lying ridges, and boulders provide both a setting and feeling that help to inform visitors to the summit of the events that occurred there during the Battle of Fort Anne. The feature has high integrity. This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Woods Photo Facing north across Battle Hill summit. The woods on Battle Hill presented an obstacle and cover for those fighting in the Battle of Fort Anne. The British seemed to be the most concerned by the presence of the woods blocking their view of the advancing Continental Army. It is unclear how much of the original hill was deforested and for what purpose. The 1942 aerial photographs of the hill show intact woods. As the woods are associated with Battle Hill, they have a definite location. Although the trees on Battle Hill presently do not date to the Battle of Fort Anne, their presence provides a setting and feeling reflecting the landscape of Battle Hill during the American Revolution. The feature has high integrity. Base of Western Side of Battle Hill (British Camp July 7)

104 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 99 The British established their first camp within ½ mile of Fort Anne at the southern base of Battle Hill to observe the Continental Army at Fort Anne. On July 7, the Continentals attacked and overran the British camp and forced the British to withdraw up the slopes of Battle Hill. There is surface evidence of an early to mid-20 th century dumping site in the location of the feature (Photo 6.11, below). The presence of the metal and more recent refuse would make it difficult to identify the material remains of the British camp. The presence of the refuse takes away from the feeling of the feature as a Revolutionary war camp. The presence of the trees is suggestive of the wooded landscape present during the battle. Together, the feature has low to moderate integrity. This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Photo Facing west across 20 th century landfill at base of Battle Hill. Eastern Base of Battle Hill (British Camp July 8) Following the attack on their position on July 7, the British established a new camp. The location of the British Camp from July 7-8 is not clear. Based on historical descriptions it is located on the eastern base of Battle Hill. Wood Creek and Battle Hill bounded the camp. On July 8, the Continentals attacked and overran the camp forcing the British to withdraw up Battle Hill. Further archeological testing could help to identify the camp s location. There has been little impact to the probable location of the camp. The setting and feeling are also present as woods still cover the area, and Wood Creek and Battle Hill in that area have experienced little change. As such the feature has moderate to high integrity. Identification with archeological testing could show the feature has high integrity. Flat Area Northeast of Battle Hill (British Camp Post-Battle)

105 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 100 Following the Continental Army s withdrawal from Battle Hill, the British also withdrew from Battle Hill. Most of the 9 th Regiment returned to Skenesborough to rejoin Burgoyne s main army. However, Pvt. Lamb and the wounded British soldiers remained in a camp (Photo 6.12, below). Pvt. Lamb stated he established a refuge to stay with the wounded in a hut two miles from the summit of Battle Hill. The precise location is unknown, but the camp probably was located in an area called the Great Meadow. There is no evidence of the hut, but material remains of the camp may still be present. The setting and feeling associated with the Great Meadow at the northern base of Battle Hill is suggestive of a camp area, which could help with interpretation. Therefore, the feature has moderate integrity. This photo was intentionally deleted per the requirements of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 470hh) and its implementing regulations (49 FR 1027, Jan. 6, 1984). Wood Creek/ Skenesborough Road Photo Facing south across British camp post-battle. The Continental Army s advance from Fort Anne to the British positions at Battle Hill crossed both the Skenesborough Road and Wood Creek. The terrain covered by the feature consists of wetlands and woods. The construction of US Route 4, the railroad, and the Champlain Canal impacted the feature. However, the impacts are localized to portions of the advance. For those sections of the advance not associated with these impacts, there are no other noted impacts. As such the feature has moderate integrity based on its location, setting, and feeling.

106 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 101 Fort Anne Fort Edward Road The Fort Anne-Fort Edward road was the Continental Army s avenue of retreat from Fort Anne. Following the battle, Maj. Gen. Schuyler obstructed the road with fallen trees. The path generally follows that of US Route 4. There are no visible remains of the road from 1777 and straightening and redesigning of the road has occurred since Since the exact location of the feature is unidentified, there is little ability for the feature to meet the feeling, or association criteria. Setting is also difficult to meet with the development of rural farm fields and the urban development in the area of Fort Edward. There may be possible materials dropped by advancing troops. Therefore, the feature has low to moderate integrity. Fort Anne The area of the Fort Anne defining feature includes the location of Fort Anne and the Continental camp in the vicinity of the fort. Fort Anne was a fortification repeatedly built and razed throughout the 18 th century. During the Battle of Fort Anne, it was the central position of the Continental Army. The areas of the fort and camp have been impacted by the 19 th and 20 th century development of the Village of Fort Ann. The construction of a bank directly impacted the location of Fort Anne. Part of this development included the construction of a building in the style of the Fort Anne blockhouse (Photo 6.13, p. 102). A 19 th century residential structure impacted the area surrounding the Fort Anne location and possible site of the Continental Army s camp (Photo 6.14, p. 102). There is no surface integrity to the Fort Anne defining feature meaning the feature does not meet the setting and feeling criteria. With no definitive material remains, the association criterion is not met. The defining feature meets the location criteria. Therefore, the feature has low integrity. Fort Edward Fort Edward was a British fortification during the French and Indian War and a Continental fortification during the American Revolution. Maj. Gen. Schuyler used Fort Edward as a staging area to consolidate resources, supplies, and personnel to defend against British Gen. Burgoyne s advance. The Continentals withdrew to Fort Edward following the Battle of Fort Anne. David Starbuck (2010) has been conducting archeological excavations of Fort Edward since Although the Village of Fort Edward developed around the site of the 18 th century fortification, much of the feeling and setting are still present. Due to the location, feeling, and setting criteria being met, along with the presence of material artifacts the Fort Edward defining feature has high integrity.

107 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 102 Photo Facing east at area of Fort Anne. Photo Facing northwest at area of Fort Anne and surrounding Continental camp.

108 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 103 Skenesborough Road The Skenesborough Road was a military road connecting Skenesborough (Whitehall) to Fort Anne. The road paralleled Wood Creek. Members of the Continental Army withdrawing from Skenesborough followed the road to Fort Anne. The British 9 th Regiment of Foot used the road to pursue the Continentals and to return to Burgoyne s main army in Skenesborough following the Battle of Fort Anne. The present US Route 4 roadway generally follows the path of Skenesborough Road. Nineteenth and 20 th century development in the area of Whitehall impacted portions of the road (Photo 6.15, below). Redesign of US Route 4 led to straightening and leveling of the path. This cut into the hills and ridges, most notably in portions of Battle Hill (Photo 6.16, p. 104). Overall, the road is paved, but still representative of the location of the Skenesborough Road (Photo 6.17, p. 104). The setting of Skenesborough Road changed due to urban development in the area of Whitehall, the construction and expansion of the Champlain Canal, loss of forests for farms, logging, and rock quarries. Since the feature still has location, and feeling, along with the possibility of materials related to the approaches and retreats, the feature has moderate integrity. Photo Facing south across start of Skenesborough Road in Whitehall (Skenesborough).

109 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 104 Photo Facing west at cut along US Route 4, Skenesborough Road and Battle Hill defining features. Photo Facing south across Skenesborough Road, Old Route 4.

110 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 105 Wood Creek Wood Creek was used as an avenue of approach and retreat during the Battle of Fort Anne. It connected Skenesborough to Fort Anne. Its proximity to Battle Hill meant it also functioned as an obstacle to the Continental Army s attack on British positions. Historically, the creek meandered throughout the small valley between Skenesborough (Whitehall) and Fort Ann, also called the Great Meadow. During the early 19 th century, construction of the Champlain Canal straightened and rechanneled much of Wood Creek. Portions of the original creek channel are still present near Whitehall (Photo 6.18, below), but the Champlain Canal has subsumed other portions of Wood Creek. This is the case near Battle Hill (Photo 6.19, p. 106). For those areas associated with the Champlain Canal, the feature has low integrity in that location is the only criteria met. The others (setting, association, feeling, and material) have all been impacted. For portions of Wood Creek that still retain the original channeling, the criteria increase to include: location, association, and possibly material. Much of the landscape changed from the old growth woods found in the area in 1777 to the farm fields of today, affecting setting and feeling. This means that for portions of Wood Creek the integrity level is moderate to possibly high if materials are determined to be present. Photo Facing south along Champlain Canal and Wood Creek near Comstock, Wood Creek along left side of channel.

111 Historical and Archeological Research: Battle of Fort Anne Grant # (GA ) p. 106 Photo Facing west at Champlain Canal, area of Wood Creek near Battle Hill, showing impacts from construction of the canal.