COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

Transcription

1 BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION FEBRUARY 2017 Certified Current, 20 July 2017 Safety SAFETY RULES FOR US STRATEGIC BOMBER AIRCRAFT COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY ACCESSIBILITY: Publication and forms are available on the e-publishing website at for downloading or ordering. RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication. OPR: AFSEC/SEWN Supersedes: AFI , 26 October 2011 Certified by: AF/SED (Mr. James T. Rubeor) Pages: 15 This instruction implements Air Force Policy Directive (AFPD) 91-1, Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety. This publication is consistent with AFPD 13-5, Air Force Nuclear Enterprise. It applies to operations with B-52H and B-2A aircraft and nuclear weapons dedicated for use with the aircraft. This instruction applies to all United States Air Force (USAF) personnel, nuclear certified equipment, and facilities involved with nuclear weapons, nuclear weapon systems, and radioactive materials-related programs. This instruction is applicable to Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) and Air National Guard (ANG) personnel performing nuclear missions. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) , Management of Records, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS). The safety rules may only be changed or supplemented using procedures in Air Force Instruction (AFI) , Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies, Operational Safety Reviews, and Safety Rules. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using AF Form 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication; route AF Form 847s from the field through the appropriate functional manager s chain of command. The authorities to waive wing/unit level requirements in this publication are identified with a Tier ( T-0, T-1, T-2, T-3 ) number following the compliance statement. See AFI , Publications and Forms Management, for a description of the authorities associated with the Tier numbers. Submit requests for waivers through the chain of command to the appropriate Tier waiver approval authority, or alternately, to the Publication OPR for non-tiered compliance.

2 2 AFI FEBRUARY 2017 SUMMARY OF CHANGES This document is substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. It added requirements for an operational safety review prior to operations with the B61-7 and/or B83-1 on the B-52H; incorporated previously published program guidance memorandum rules regarding separation between conventional special purpose munitions and nuclear weapons; added lightning side-flash criteria; modified ALCM fueling rules to allow transit of the cruise missile into and out of the fuel room with fuel present in fueling set; clarified aircrew actions prior to jettison; made administrative changes for ease of reading and clarification; updated applicable references; and added tiering requirements per AFI Section A Authority, Limitations, and Responsibilities 1. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) The SECDEF directs the Secretary of the Air Force to implement these rules for U.S. Strategic Bomber Aircraft. 2. The Secretary of the Air Force (SecAF) The SecAF designates the Air Force Chief of Safety (AF/SE) as being responsible for overseeing nuclear surety of nuclear weapons and weapon systems throughout the Air Force. This responsibility includes the authority to implement these safety rules for U.S. Strategic Bomber Aircraft. 3. Temporary Limitations The Air Force may impose more restrictive guidance/policy than contained in safety rules, but may not unilaterally change the safety rules. 4. Functional Responsibilities The Commander, Air Force Safety Center: Ensures safety rules work, providing maximum safety consistent with operational requirements Ensures Major Commands (MAJCOMs) follow the safety rules Is responsible for interpretation/clarification of general and specific guidance in sections B and C Major Commands: Ensure their units follow the safety rules Ensure all manuals, checklists, technical orders and other publications do not conflict with the safety rules Inspect for compliance.

3 AFI FEBRUARY Section B General Safety Rules 5. General Guidance The safety rules in this section may only be changed or supplemented using procedures in AFI Per DoD Manual (DoDM) , DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Manual, general safety rules apply to all nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon systems. General safety rules primarily apply safety policy and shall be included as part of the Air Force s safety rules package. Safety rules always apply, even during war Nuclear weapons shall not be intentionally exposed to abnormal environments except in an emergency. (T-0) 5.4. Nuclear weapons shall not be used for training or for troubleshooting (i.e. to confirm the existence of a fault, identify fault isolation, or verify that a fault has been corrected except as explicitly allowed by a specific safety rule.) (T-0) 5.5. Nuclear Weapons may be used for exercises except when explicitly prohibited by specific safety rules. (T-0) 5.6. Personnel that have physical access to nuclear weapons must be certified under Personnel Reliability Assurance, in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) , Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Assurance. (T-0) 5.7. Only certified procedures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and organizations, authorized by the appropriate level of authority, shall be employed to conduct nuclear weapon system operations. (T-0) 5.8. The total number of personnel performing nuclear weapon system operations shall be held to the minimum consistent with the operations performed. (T-0) 5.9. At least two authorized persons must be present during any operation with a nuclear weapon, except when authorized by a specific safety rule; i.e., alert fly. They must be able to detect incorrect or unauthorized procedures in the task being performed. They must also have knowledge of and understand applicable safety and security requirements. (T-0) Physical security will be maintained, in accordance with DoD Directive (DoDD) , Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons. (T-0) Nuclear weapons will be transported as determined by the Combatant Commander or the Military Department, in accordance with DoDI , DoD Transportation of U.S. Nuclear Weapons. Additionally, the following safety guidance applies: Movement(s) will be kept to a minimum consistent with operational requirements. (T-0) Custody and accountability transfers during logistic movements shall be by courier receipt system to ensure positive control. (T-0) Permissive Action Link (PAL) operations shall be in accordance with plans and procedures prescribed by the applicable Combatant Command and technical publications. (T- 0)

4 4 AFI FEBRUARY Verification that a nuclear warhead is not present in a test assembly must be made utilizing nonnuclear assurance procedures at the last practical opportunity agreed upon by the Department of Defense (DoD) and/or Department of Energy (DOE) before the conduct of an operational test. (T-0) Deviations from safety rules are permitted in an emergency (T-0), except as follows: U.S. custody must be maintained until receipt of a valid nuclear control order that permits transferring U.S. nuclear weapons to non-u.s. delivery forces. (T-0) Nuclear weapons shall not be expended unless a valid, properly authenticated nuclear control order conveying release or expenditure authority is received. (T-0) Jettisoning of nuclear weapons is permitted in the event of an emergency, and is to be accomplished according to plans and procedures prescribed for the area of operations. (T-0) Note: DODD , DoD Nuclear Weapon System Surety Program, defines an emergency as "an unexpected occurrence or set of circumstances in which personnel or equipment unavailability, due to accident, natural event, or combat, may demand immediate action that may require extraordinary measures to protect, handle, service, transport, jettison, or employ a nuclear weapons." Section C Specific Safety Rules 6. Specific Guidance These rules, weapon system features, operational controls, and technical procedures, ensure that U.S. strategic bombers meet the Nuclear Weapon System Surety Standards in DoDD , DoD Nuclear Weapons Surety Programs, and AFI , Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program. (T-0) 6.2. Do not fly the weapon system until authorized. (T-0) 6.3. Nuclear weapons may be used for exercise when their use is specifically authorized by Commander, Air Force Global Strike Command (AFGSC) or designated authority except as restricted elsewhere in this instruction. (T-0) 6.4. Do not load nuclear and conventional weapons on the same aircraft. (T-0) 6.5. Violations of referenced instructions do not constitute Weapons System Safety Rules (WSSR) violations unless specifically identified in this document. (T-0) 6.6. The following weapons are authorized: B-2A: (T-0) B61-7, 11 (T-0) B83-1 (T-0) B-52H: (T-0) AGM-86B/W80-1 (T-0) B61-7 (T-0).

5 AFI FEBRUARY B83-1 (T-0). Note: Prior to operations with the B61-7 and/or B83-1 on the B-52H, an Operational Safety Review (OSR) must be accomplished by the Nuclear Weapon System Surety Group (NWSSG). (T-0) 7. Nuclear Identification Establish administrative controls and procedures to provide positive means of distinguishing between: (T-0) 7.2. Nuclear munitions and nonnuclear devices (i.e. joint test assemblies, tactical ferry payloads, bomb dummy units, and training shapes) intended to resemble nuclear weapons. (T-0) 7.3. AGM-86B missile(s) with nuclear warhead installed from those without nuclear warheads. (T-0) 7.4. Warhead shipping and storage containers that contain nuclear warheads from those containers without nuclear warheads. (T-0) 8. Nonnuclear Assurance Verification that a nuclear warhead is not present in a test assembly must be made using nonnuclear assurance procedures at the last practical opportunity agreed on by the Department of Defense (DoD) and/or Department of Energy (DOE) before an operational test. This applies to test assemblies which: 8.2. Resemble War Reserve assets (T-0), and 8.3. Will be flown on a combat delivery aircraft. (T-0) 9. Troubleshooting and Use of Equipment, Procedures, and Checklists: 9.1. Do not use nuclear weapons to troubleshoot faults. (T-0) 9.2. Use only equipment (e.g. hardware, software, etc.) and procedures that are consistent with U.S. Air Force approved publications for nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon system operations. (T-0) 9.3. Training is prohibited with nuclear weapons-loaded aircraft. This includes simulation and partial simulation mode training. (T-0) 9.4. The offices of primary responsibility for publications must ensure applicable publications conform to weapon system safety rules and meet the DoD nuclear weapons system safety standards. (T-0) 9.5. Do not modify the Aircraft Monitoring and Control system, suspension or release systems, associated handling and test equipment, or any other aircraft system that affects nuclear surety without Air Force Safety Center approval in accordance with (IAW) procedures as outlined in applicable Air Force instructions. (T-0) 10. Security Criteria DoDM S , Nuclear Weapon Security Manual; Air Force Manual (AFMAN) , Nuclear Weapon Security Manual (AF Supplement), and AFI , Integrated Defense, apply. (T-0)

6 6 AFI FEBRUARY Critical Components, Tamper Control and Detection AFI , Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs, which defines Two-person Concept and sealing requirements, applies. (T-0) A B-52H aircraft with an operationally coded Code Enable Switch (CES) loaded and sealed is a critical component and handled IAW AFI , Critical Components, and AFI (T-0) A B-2A with all preload functions complete and declared ready to receive weapons is a critical component and handled IAW AFI , and AFI (T-0) 12. Personnel Reliability Assurance DoDM , Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program, and AFMAN , Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program, apply. (T-0) 13. Weapon Safety Verification Using applicable technical orders, verify that the AGM-86B/W80-1 is safe. (T-0). The proper configuration is: AGM 86-B/W80-1: (T-0) Warhead Arming Device (WAD) safing pin is installed and the WAD indicates safe (white S on green background). (T-0) Rotary separation switch pin is installed (red band is not visible). Remove only when authorized by applicable technical data. (T-0) 14. Basic Aircraft Configurations: B-2A. Retain these configurations: Rotary Launcher Assembly (RLA) mated with B61-7, B61-11, and/or B83-1 bombs. Mixed nuclear loads are authorized. (T-0) Weapon Jettison Panel: ALL ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down. (T-0) SEL ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down. (T-0) Pilots Consent Panel: (T-0) NUC UNLK ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) NUC PA ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) Mission Commanders Consent Panel: NUC UNLK ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) NUC PA ENBL switch in the OFF position with guard cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0)

7 AFI FEBRUARY B-52H. Retain these configurations: Install operationally coded Code Enable Switch and disenable the Interconnecting Box, unless in receipt of valid execution order prior to aircraft generation. (T-0) Aircraft with Common Strategic Rotary Launcher (CSRL) mated with B61-7 and/or B83-1 gravity bombs or AGM-86B/W80-1 missiles: Pilots Missile/Munitions Consent Panel: (T-0) Off/Prearm switch in the OFF position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) Weapon Control Panel: Nuclear Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) Nuclear Prearm Enable/Off (PA ENBL/OFF) switch in the OFF position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) Weapon Jettison Select/Normal (SEL/NORM) switch in the NORM position with cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) Aircraft with Pylon-Carried AGM-86B/W80-1 (with or without CSRL): Release Circuits Disconnect (RCD) disconnected with the cover closed, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) The guards on the left and right Pylon Jettison Consent switches down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) Pylon jettison control indicators show PYLON LOCKED. (T-0) Pilots Missile/Munitions Consent Panel: Off/Prearm switch in the OFF position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) Weapon Control Panel: Nuclear Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) Nuclear Prearm Enable/Off (PA ENBL/OFF) switch in the OFF position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) Pylon Lock/Unlock switch in the LOCK position with the cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) Weapon Jettison Select/Normal (SEL/NORM) switch in the NORM

8 8 AFI FEBRUARY 2017 position with cover down, safety wired, and sealed. (T-0) 15. Cruise Missile Operations: Mission Planning: Develop mission profiles so that the required g-maneuver occurs as late in the mission as practical. (T-0) Mission planning system operations must ensure that all missions against preplanned targets terminate within the target area. (T-0) Fueling: Perform fueling and defueling operations in the Integrated Maintenance Facility s (IMF) fueling room only. (T-0) If fuel is in the fuel set, only perform operations involving the missile s fuel system or the fuel set in the IMF fueling room. (T-0) Fuel/Defuel room doors will remain closed during fuel/defuel operations and with fuel in the fuel set. EXCEPTIONS: The automatic fire door may remain open. Personnel access doors may be opened to allow entry and exit. Fuel room blast doors may be opened momentarily to allow the movement of Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) bodies while fuel is in the fuel set; however the fuel/defuel set will be isolated from missile bodies and high bay blast doors must be closed. (T-0) 16. Storage, Maintenance, Testing, Ground Transportation, Mating, Demating, Loading and Unloading: Use applicable technical data to verify weapon condition, as required (paragraph 13). (T-0) Store nuclear weapons in U.S. Air Force approved, locked, and secured facilities, Nuclear weapons operations and storage in the IMF must be kept to the absolute minimum consistent with operational requirements. (T-0) With missiles on a pylon, install the ejector safing pin. When pylons are installed on the aircraft, ensure pylon jettison safing pins are installed (Remove only when authorized by applicable technical data.) (T-0) For rotary launchers, verify CSRL/RLA ejector safing mechanism lockpin is engaged and CSRL/RLA ejector safing mechanism levers indicate locked. (T-0) Fuel aircraft for the assigned mission before loading nuclear weapons. (T-0) Do not load an aircraft unless it is capable of performing its assigned mission. (T-0) Ensure a minimum unimpeded line-of-sight (See AFMAN , Para ) separation distance of 850 feet between nuclear weapons and conventional special purpose bombs. Munitions in transit are exempt. If a separation of 850 feet cannot be maintained, place significant barricades (such as Massive Modular Blocks) to prevent free-field fragment impact to nuclear weapon(s) and ensure fragment velocities are below weapon threshold levels as defined by Air Force Safety Center. (T-0)

9 AFI FEBRUARY Maintain at least seven feet of free space between the nuclear weapon and the facility structural members (walls, ceiling, columns), metallic attachments and conductive objects during major maintenance (major maintenance is the disassembly or performance of maintenance operations which could result in exposure of the weapons internal components to electrical energy, reference AFMAN , Explosive Safety Standards) unless: (T-0) Weapon electrical/lightning isolation design features are intact IAW the applicable 11N series technical orders (T-0), or Facility design features, combined with specific maintenance procedures, provide appropriate electrical energy isolation as determined by technical evaluation and approval by Air Force Safety Center. (T-0) 17. Logistics Movement of Nuclear Weapons by Cargo Aircraft: Perform in accordance with AFI , Safety Rules for Nuclear Logistics Transport by Prime Nuclear Airlift Force. (T-0) 18. Ground Operations Involving Nuclear Weapon-Loaded Aircraft: Maintain aircraft in their basic configuration (paragraph 14). (T-0) Electrically verify safe status of the weapons with the applicable aircraft stores management system after weapons upload. (T-0) After completing the upload and postload functions, apply power to an uploaded nuclear weapon only for authorized permissive action link (PAL) operations, command disable (CD) operations, or to monitor the weapon. Note: Keep weapon monitoring to a minimum. (T-0) Apply power to a nuclear weapon-loaded aircraft only to: Perform maintenance or preflight operations. (T-0) Monitor the weapons or ejector rack locks. (T-0) Start or run engines. (T-0) Monitor the radio. (T-0) Perform authorized PAL, CD, or coded switch operations. (T-0) Do not start or run engine(s) unless: Checking aircraft status. (T-0) Performing minor maintenance. (T-0) Conducting practice alerts, exercises, inspections, evaluations, taxiing, and flying operations. (T-0) Engine starts and engine runs must: Be kept to a minimum. (T-0) Be done by at least two authorized and qualified aircrew members (Two-Person Concept applies). (T-0) Aircraft towing:

10 10 AFI FEBRUARY Keep towing to a minimum (T-0) Two authorized and qualified individuals must be in the cockpit during towing (Two Person Concept applies). (T-0) Taxi Keep taxiing to the minimum consistent with operational requirements. Taxi aircraft, if necessary, only for practice alerts, exercises, inspections or evaluations, flying operations, and increased alert postures. (T-0) At least two authorized and qualified aircrew members must be in the aircraft during taxiing (Two-Person Concept applies). (T-0) Perform fuel management actions on loaded aircraft only as necessary to support a particular aircraft s assigned mission. (T-0) After weapons are loaded, only routine servicing and minor maintenance of the aircraft are authorized. (T-0) Use applicable technical orders to conduct maintenance and weapon load changes. (T-0) 19. Flying Operations Involving Carriage of Nuclear Weapons in a Nonstrike Configuration: Conduct only when: Directed by appropriate authority. (T-0) PAL is locked. (T-0) The aircraft is in its basic configuration (paragraph 14). (T-0) Plan flight routes to avoid populated areas to the maximum extent possible. (T-0) If loss of the aircraft is anticipated, Command Disable the weapons if the aircraft is capable and time and conditions permit. (T-0) B-2A: Retain Command Disable capability. (T-0) When authorized to jettison weapons, break the locking/release system safety wires and seals and operate the controls by following applicable technical orders. Command Disable weapons if time and conditions permit. (T-0) B-52H: With bombs mated to a CSRL, or cruise missiles loaded, disconnect the CES and attach the connector to the storage receptacle. (T-0) When authorized to jettison weapons, break the locking/release system safety wires and seals and operate the controls by following applicable technical orders. (T-0) Do not apply missile power. Keep application of missile interface unit power to a minimum. (T-0)

11 AFI FEBRUARY Flying Operations Involving Carriage of Nuclear Weapons in a Strike Configuration: Conduct only when: Directed by appropriate authority. (T-0) Launch for survival has been ordered under positive threat of imminent attack. (T-0) Authorized to fly in a strike configuration as part of a deployment or dispersal. (T-0) Keep nuclear weapons in a safe configuration until authorized to prearm. (T-0) Keep the aircraft in its basic configuration (paragraph 14) until authorized to prepare weapons for release. (T-0) When authorized to jettison weapons, break the locking/release system safety wires and seals. If the aircraft is capable and time and conditions permit, safe, PAL lock and Command Disable the weapons. Operate the controls by following approved checklists. (T- 0) Do not operate the safety-wired controls required for a prearmed release or enter the Unique Signal Generator (USG) code until authorization to expend nuclear weapons is received and weapon preparation for release checklist is required. (T-0) Plan flight routes to avoid populated areas to the maximum extent possible. (T-0) If loss of the aircraft is anticipated, safe, relock PAL and Command Disable the weapons if the aircraft is capable and time and conditions permit. (T-0) 21. Coded Switch Procedures Use plans and procedures prescribed by proper authorities. (T-0) 22. PAL Procedures: Use PAL codes and PAL controllers only as directed by appropriate authority. (T-0) For aircraft with cockpit PAL control, relock PAL if a strike mission is terminated or recalled. (T-0) 23. Command Disable Procedures. Command Disable weapons in accordance with appropriate guidance. (T-0) 24. Dispersal All planned dispersal operations will comply with WSSRs. If a situation arises where dispersal operations conflict with the WSSRs, then those operations must be approved by the SECDEF prior to execution Ensure a minimum unimpeded line of sight separation distance of 850 feet between a nuclear weapon loaded aircraft and conventional special purpose bombs. Munitions in transit are exempt.

12 12 AFI FEBRUARY Only DoD personnel can be PRAP and only military PRAP certified personnel can perform close in security. ANDREW M. MUELLER, Major General, USAF Chief of Safety

13 AFI FEBRUARY References Attachment 1 GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION DoD Directive , Incorporating Change 2, DoD Nuclear Weapon Systems Safety Program, 12 May 2016 DoD Directive , Security Policy for Protecting Nuclear Weapons, 22 Jan 2015 DoD Instruction , Incorporating Change 2, DoD Transportation of U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 12 Feb 2015 DoD Manual , Incorporating Change 1, DoD Nuclear Weapon System Safety Program Manual, 15 Jan 2015 DoD Manual S M, Nuclear Weapon Security manual, 13 Jul 2009 DoD Manual , Incorporating Change 1, Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program, 27 Jun 2016 AFMAN , Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program, 29 May 2015 AFI , Nuclear Weapons Maintenance, 17 Dec 2015 AFI , Integrated Defense, 8 Oct 2009 AFMAN , Nuclear Weapons Security Manual, 1 Dec 2015 AFI , Arming and Use of Force, 2 Feb 2016 AFI , Publications and Form Management, 1 Dec 2015 AFPD 91-1, Nuclear Weapons and Systems Surety, 30 Nov 2016 AFI , Incorporating Change 3, Air Force Nuclear Weapons Surety Program, 27 Apr 2016 AFI , Incorporating Change 1, Nuclear Weapon System Safety Studies, Operational Safety Reviews, and Safety Rules, 4 Nov 2015 AFI , Incorporating Change 4, Nuclear Surety Tamper Control and Detection Programs, 26 May 2016 AFI , Critical Components, 22 Jul 2016 AFI , Safety Rules for Nuclear Logistics Transport by Prime Nuclear Airlift Force, 19 Jun 2014 AFMAN , Incorporating Change 1, Safety Design and Evaluation Criteria for Nuclear Weapon Systems Software, 23 Apr 2013 AFI , Safety Investigations and Reports, 10 Apr 2014 Adopted Forms AF IMT 847, Recommendation for Change of Publication

14 14 AFI FEBRUARY 2017 Abbreviations and Acronyms AFGSC Air Force Global Strike Command AFI Air Force Instruction ALCM Air Launched Cruise Missile AFMAN Air Force Manual AFMC Air Force Materiel Command AFPD Air Force Policy Directive AFRC Air Force Reserve Command AFRIMS Air Force Records Information Management System ANG Air National Guard CES Code Enable Switch CD Command Disable CSRL Common Strategic Rotary Launcher DoD Department of Defense DODD Department of Defense Directive DODI Department of Defense Instruction DoDM Department of Defense Manual DOE Department of Energy EAP Emergency Action Procedures EWO Emergency War Orders IAW In Accordance With IMF Integrated Maintenance Facility JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff JS Joint Staff MAJCOM Major Command NWSSG Nuclear Weapon System Surety Group OPR Office of Primary Responsibility OSR Operational Safety Review OPR Office of Primary Responsibility PAL Permissive Action Link PRAP Personnel Reliability Assurance Program PRP Personnel Reliability Program

15 AFI FEBRUARY RCD Release Circuits Disconnect RLA Rotary Launcher Assembly RDS Records Disposition Schedule SecAF Secretary of the Air Force SECDEF Secretary of Defense USG Unique Signal Generator WAD Warhead Arming Device WSSR Weapon System Safety Rules