Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems

Transcription

1 Joint Concept of Operations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems Version 1.5 Distribution Statement Distribution authorized to U.S. Government Agencies and their contractors. Other requests for this document shall be referred to: Joint Doctrine and Training Division, Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Center of Excellence, Building 56, 140 Third Street, P.O. Box 1168, Creech Air Force Base, Indian Springs, NV Attn: Lt Col Steven Tanner, USAF, Phone: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This document is the first version of an all important concept of operations (CONOPS) for the capabilities-based planning, integration and employment of unmanned aircraft systems into Joint military operations. It provides higher-level guidance while acting as a reference tool for the Joint operator and planner. No such document exists from an overarching Joint perspective. The importance of a campaign-level study involving the impact of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) upon the nature of warfare and peacetime operations has just recently come to the forefront. The proliferation of UAS in world-wide operations, with resultant employment and system integration challenges, indicate yet another paradigm in military operations. The time is right to affect a deliberate plan to integrate unmanned systems with those of not only manned aircraft but with the many systems supporting our forces on the ground, in maritime environs and in space. The discussion and recommendations developed span the next program objective memorandum (POM) cycle, and are not intended to be prescriptive in nature. Rather, the greatest military utility comes from defining, describing and guiding the military family of joint UAS utilization. This is a dynamic process requiring a CONOPS. This publication provides vision and joint context for the operation, integration, and interoperability of UAS through Why 2014? Simply, with latitude given to define a joint overarching concept of operations for the employment of unmanned aircraft systems the responsible parties of this document established the bounds of this CONOPS from the following Joint guidance 1 : CONOPS and joint tasks are focused on capabilities required in the near-term (now to seven years in the future). CONOPS and joint tasks allow the joint community to adjust or divest current capabilities by providing the operational context to substantiate current programs. This CONOPS describes a capabilities-based approach to UAS employment, which enhances the joint operator s ability to execute assigned missions and tasks. It emphasizes initial joint guidance for optimum UAS execution across a range of military operations. It provides military guidance focused at the operational (campaign) level of warfighting and defense support to civil authorities for use by the U.S. Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate system operational and program plans, supporting Service and Joint doctrine, and CONOPS. Chapter 1 sets the stage for a Joint UAS (JUAS) capability discussion by briefly describing the background and the necessity and tasking resulting in this CONOPS development. This chapter also develops baseline discussions regarding the distinctive capabilities and limitations of UAS, and strategic, defense planning-oriented assumptions necessary to scope joint task force operations of varying degrees of complexity. Chapter 2, UAS Family of Systems, defines and describes key UAS terms and related employment concepts. It begins with a discussion of UAS elements six are 1 CJCSI E Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY i

4 recommended: aircraft, payload, communications, control, support and the human aspect. These are common among all joint UAS categories. Next is an in-depth discussion of the importance of a standard UAS classification method. This section highlights the importance of a method, why development is difficult, and what makes a good UAS classification method. A broad, classification method, attending to the need and requirements of two user groups is presented. This classification method targets military and civilian interested parties with wide utility to each. Key in the developed charts is a clear depiction of UAS capabilities and system attributes. A third section emphasizes the importance of capabilities, attributes, and effects relevant to the employment of JUAS. Use of this methodology optimizes JUAS employment in operational planning and execution spanning the range of military operations. Lastly, the aforementioned information is used to delineate UAS specific employment considerations necessary to understand before successive UAS scenario employment chapters. After review of Chapter 2, the reader should appreciate the nuances of JUAS system capabilities and employment, and their potential to complement or replace manned systems. Optimal JUAS employment is a complex problem set. Knowledge and demonstration of current and near-future systems are critical to Joint operation and planning. Chapter 3, 4, and 5 provide both a top-level operational requirements recipe for the envisioned effective JUAS military utility and a starting point for JUAS integrated architecture development. In all three, chapter development is grounded in the pillar of the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations and the current Joint Operating Concepts: Major Combat Operations (MCO), Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR), and Homeland Defense (HD) and Civil Support (CS). Chapter 3, the first scenario employment chapter, describes the high-end military utility of JUAS from an operational perspective and emphasizes the importance of their functional-based capability. The questions of what JUAS must provide the warfighter, what key mission or functional areas, and/or tasks JUAS must support, and how JUAS will synchronize with crucial emerging capabilities within the joint command and control (C2), ISR and force application functional area are also addressed. Chapter 4, Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations (SSTR) is a natural extension of MCO. This chapter carries forward the assumptions and recommendations on Chapter 4. It addresses in broad, general terms, additional UAS support considerations, to include theater operations planning, support mission coordination, support monitoring and information dissemination. Chapter 5, Homeland Defense (HD) and Civil Support (CS). Contained herein are efforts required to synchronize current manned and unmanned systems, and to develop and deliver a markedly enhanced CONUS capability to the joint operator are equally complex, and extensive. Among the envisioned attributes of a fully functioning JUAS capability are assured access to restricted National airspace, flexibility, interoperability, security, timeliness, responsiveness, and accuracy. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ii

5 Chapter 6, Future Perspectives on UAS (2014), discusses the future and what impact it may have on UAS and their employment. As the family of UAS continues to grow, this CONOPS will evolve along with them. There are potential advances in technology, systems interoperability, communication, and payloads. These will affect the three main threads that permeate this CONOPS: employment C2, spectrum management, and airspace management issues. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY iii

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7 PREFACE Scope This publication provides fundamental guidance and overarching concept of operations for joint operations employment of UAS through a representative range of military operations. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It provides vision and joint context for the operation, integration, and interoperability of UAS through It describes a capabilities-based approach to UAS employment, which enhances the Joint operator s ability to execute assigned missions and tasks. This document establishes initial joint guidance for optimum UAS execution across the range of military operations. It provides military guidance focused at the operational level of warfighting and defense support to civil authorities for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate system operational and program plans, supporting Service and Joint doctrine and CONOPS. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. Application The fundamental principles, guidance and capabilities established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, sub-unified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands (see table). These principles, guidance and joint capabilities described also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service. The guidance offered in this publication is authoritative; as such, this CONOPS should be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of joint and doctrinal Service publications, the Joint publications will take precedence for the activities of Joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with United States (U.S.) law, regulations, and doctrine. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY v

8 Applications Target Organization Applicability Context Primary - Combatant Co mmand Staff - Service Component/ Functional Component Staff - Joint Task Force (JTF) Staff - JTF Service Component/ Functional Component Staff - Joint operations and planning - Joint doctrine and CONOPs - Joint operating domain - Guidance and overall joint context on UAS employment. - Joint capability area and Joint task mapping. - Interoperability. - Common terminology and architectures. Secondary - Operators (below JTF level) - Service Headquarters Staff - Service operations and planning - Service doctrine, TTP, CONOPs - Provides overarching joint context for UAS operations and its influence on Service CONOPS. - Interoperability. Tertiary - DoD Acquisition/Logistics/ Technology/Programming and Policy agencies - Coalition and multinational partners - OSD and Service business domain - Common terminology. - Guidance on how to obtain and sustain UAS - Insight into capability gaps. - Interoperability. - Others (including OGA) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY vi

9 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY...i PREFACE...v TABLE OF CONTENTS... vii LIST OF TABLES... xii LIST OF FIGURES... xii CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Background Distinctive capabilities and limitations of UAS CHAPTER 2 UAS FAMILY OF SYSTEMS UAS Elements Unmanned Aircraft (UA) Payload Sensors Relay Weapons Cargo Communications UAS Control Element Support Equipment Human Element Joint UAS Categories/Levels Why classification is important Why classification is difficult The Joint Classification System Cluster Discussion UAS Perspective on Attributes, Capabilities, and Effects Employment Considerations Integration Interoperability Command and Control of UAS Unique Aspects of UAS C C2 of UAS in Joint Operations Asset Allocation Task Authorization Determining when allocation authority should be passed FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY vii

10 Determining how task authority should be passed C2 in Time-sensitive Targeting Functional Components Allocation Mission Planning Considerations Flight Planning Tactical Planning Future Direction of UAS C Data Synchronization Airspace Management Military Airspace Restricted Airspace (OCONUS/war zones) Civilian Airspace National Airspace International Airspace Automation Spectrum Management Environment Capacity Protecting the electro-magnetic environment CHAPTER 3 MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS (MCO) Major Combat Operations Scenario Road to War Mission Commander s Intent Purpose Method End State Intelligence Estimate Friendly Force Structure Assumptions MCO Phase 1 (Deter) JTF Mission JTF Tasks UAS Capability to support JTF Mission and Tasks Desired Effect UAS Assets Concept of Operations JFACC JFLCC JFMCC JFSOCC MCO Phase 2 (Seize the Initiative) JTF Mission JTF Tasks FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY viii

11 UAS Capability to support JTF Mission and Tasks Desired Effect UAS Assets Concept of Operations Command and Control Airspace Management Spectrum Management JFACC JFLCC JFMCC JFSOCC MCO Phase 3 (Dominate) JTF Mission JTF Tasks UAS Capability to support JTF Mission and Tasks Desired Effect UAS Assets Concept of Operations Command and Control Airspace Management Spectrum Management JFACC JFLCC JFMCC JFSOCC CHAPTER 4 MILITARY SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION, SECURITY, TRANSITION, AND RECONSTRUCTION (SSTR) Military Support to SSTR Operations Scenario Road to Transition Mission Commander s Intent Purpose Method End State Intelligence Estimate Friendly Force Structure Assumptions JTF Tasks Desired Effect UAS Assets Concept of Operations (CONOPS) Command and Control (C2) Airspace Management FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ix

12 Spectrum Management JFACC JFLCC JFMCC JFSOCC CHAPTER 5 HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES Homeland Defense Scenario Assumptions Road to Threat Mission (Homeland Defense) Commander s Intent Purpose Method End State Intelligence Estimate Friendly Force Structure Joint Force Headquarters Tasks Effects Concept of Operations Shaping Deployment Operation Transition Civil Support (Natural Disasters) Scenario Assumptions: Mission Commander s Intent Purpose Method End State Impact Estimate Friendly Force Structure: (abbreviated) Joint Task Force Headquarters UAS Tasks Effects Concept of Operations: Shaping. (Pre-disaster) Staging. (Includes immediate response) (Usually pre-disaster) Deployment. (Pre-disaster through post disaster) Support to Civil Authorities. (Primarily related to post disaster operations) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY x

13 CHAPTER 6 FUTURE PERSPECTIVES ON UAS (2014) APPENDIX A G LOSSARY...A-1 APPENDIX B ACRONYMS... B-1 APPENDIX C REFERENCES...C-1 APPENDIX D BIBLIOGRAPHY...D-1 APPENDIX E CROSSWALK OF UAS TASKS TO JFC TO JCA TO UJTL...E-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY xi

14 LIST OF TABLES Table 2-1. Joint and Domestic Use UAS Categories Table 3-1. Darco Force Structure Prior to Hostilities Table 3-2. Available Troops Table 3-3. Available UAS Assets (Deter) Table 4-1. Available UAS Assets (STTR) LIST OF FIGURES Figure 3-1 Arcoe Terrain Map Figure 3-2 OV-1 for Deter Operations Figure 3-3. OV-1 for Seize the Initiative Operations Figure 3-4. OV-1 for Dominate Operations Figure 4-1. OV-1 for SSTR Operations Figure 5-1. OV-1 for Homeland Defense Operations Figure 5-2. OV-1 for Civil Support Disaster Relief Operations FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY xii

15 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background. UAS have been used successfully in recent operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. All indications show this will continue. As a consequence, despite being employed in small quantities for many years, the family of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) has come of age. Because of the proliferation of UAS at all levels throughout the U.S. Armed Forces, we are at a significant point in their history where employment guidance for Joint operations is imperative. A recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) UAS report 2 highlighted the lack of interoperability standards, which have prevented the effective employment of UAS in the joint environment. Also, the joint doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) Change Recommendation (DCR) for Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (JUAV) Interoperability submitted by U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM), noted that, presently, current operational UAVs are employed in relatively Service-specific stovepipes that sub-optimizes their potential intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) contribution to warfighters across all components and echelons of the joint force and the ability to fully exploit UA sensor products in a Joint Task Force (JTF) environment is constrained by the lack of an overarching joint guidance document and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for imagery and sensor product management in a collaborative environment. 3 Since submission of USJFCOM s recommendations, actual UAS employment in combat operations have led the Joint operators and planners realize that Joint UAS planning and employment extend beyond ISR and cross into the functional warfighting capability areas of force application, command and control, and focused logistics for this unique, rapidly proliferating families of systems. With the continued promulgation of Joint Capability Areas (JCA) through Service and JCA Management Reviews, a new era has begun for the Department of Defense (DoD) and its components responsible for the National Security Strategy of the U.S. Although the current processes have produced the best armed forces in the world, we must continue to optimize our investment in joint capabilities to meet current and future security challenges. The proliferation of UAS capabilities and subsequent impact across the range of operations require special consideration to optimize their combat and noncombat effectiveness. As the DoD redesigns its operational and enterprise processes and procedures, UAS - as a critical enabler filling combatant commander (CCDR) and JTF functional capability requirements - present a complex integration and interoperability challenge that will benefit greatly from emerging capability area review. 2 GAO-06-40, Unmanned Aircraft Systems, DoD Needs to More Effectively Promote Interoperability and Improve Performance Assessments, 13 December Joint DOTMLPF DCR JUAV Interoperability, 15 March FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1-1

16 The carefully performed design will focus on performance assessment and will be organized around the capabilities, categories, and objectives outlined in the Strategic Planning Guidance (SPG), addressed in the Joint Programming Guidance (JPG), articulated in Secretary of Defense OA-05 (Joint Force Capabilities Assessment Study) 4 tasking and subsequent JCA Management Plan. Outcome-oriented capability categories spanning both operational and enterprise functions will serve as the framework for every phase of the new process. Integral to a discussion of capability development, Joint Operating Concept describes, at the operational level, how the future joint force intends to conduct operations in support of national military objectives, and helps guide future joint force development by identifying the operational-level objectives and essential capabilities required to successfully implement the concept in the long-term while affecting concept of operations in the near-term. The conduct of such operations requires the simultaneous development of both incremental and transformational enhancements to combat capabilities. Recent development of JCAs provides a methodology by which to describe force and system capability. This CONOPS links UAS employment with Tier 1 and Tier 2 JCAs 5 as they relate to UAS and makes recommendations for linkage to the existing operational and tactical tasks in the current Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). 6 Since Tier 3 JCAs are not yet fully developed and approved within the DoD, joint tasks and scenario specific missions will be used extensively throughout this document to describe functional and operational capabilities satisfying Joint operator requirements. In addition, the CONOPS maps directly into, and is supported by the Joint Capability Integration and Development System (JCIDS) where it will be used in the front end of the process by establishing the linkage between the key characteristics with the capabilities, attributes, and effects achieved by the systems delivering those capabilities. The DoD has institutionalized a mechanism to link unique UAS requirements to JCIDS, the Defense Acquisition System, and strategic planning while supporting the tenants of our National Military Strategy. The Joint Unmanned Aircraft System Center of Excellence (JUAS COE) was established with the mission of providing support to the Joint operators and Services to pursue solutions that optimize unmanned aircraft systems capabilities and utilization. The JUAS COE was created by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) and recorded for widest Departmental dissemination in JROC Memorandum (JROCM) OA-05 Joint Force Capabilities Assessment (JFCA) Study, 7 March Tier 1 JCAs are collections of similar capabilities grouped at a high level in order to support decision making capability delegation and analysis. Tier 2 JCAs capture functional and operational detail that translate to CJTF-level operations/missions (operationally oriented capability areas) or identify lower level activities (functionally oriented capability areas). They prevent duplication between high-level categories and are not Service or platform specific. Tier 3 JCAs are intended to be specific capabilities that further delineate Tier 2 JCAs to enhance their usefulness in DoD processes, (e.g., Integrated Priority List (IPL) submissions, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) integration, Roadmaps, and program and budget databases.) 6 CJCSCM D, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), 1 August 2005). FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1-2

17 It was chartered and jointly resourced to focus on Joint UAS common operating standards, capabilities, concepts, technologies, doctrine, tactics, techniques, procedures and training. The USJFCOM DCR formed the basis for JROCM , which directed the JUAS COE to develop an overarching Joint Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Joint Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) employment. 8 The JUAS COE has the responsibility to develop, maintain and update this document and will do so on an 18 to 24 month cycle along with a sound CONOPS validation plan. The overarching JUAS CONOPS will provide a common language and reference that describes capability-based requirements for the Joint community. The JUAS COE will leverage the existing Service initiatives to provide joint integrated solutions and improved interoperability. This document provides a standard approach to the development of the capabilities of current and future UAS for campaign planning and execution under a wide range of conditions. The relationship between UAS attributes and capabilities leading to capabilities-based operations will be described. UAS attributes will be based on their independent physical characteristics, such as speed, sensor payload, endurance, etc. Capabilities will be defined as the combination of one or more attributes, such as, persistent ISR, which merges the attributes of long endurance, loiter time, payload, and command and control (C2) architecture. The Joint operator and planner will then be able to select from the UAS capabilities-set to achieve the desired operational effects. Specifically this document will:? Provide a vision and joint context for the operation, integration and interoperability of UAS in campaign operations through the year 2014.? Describe an effects-based approach to UAS employment, which enhances the combatant commander's ability to execute assigned missions and tasks in a wide range of campaign scenarios spanning the range of military operations.? Establish initial joint guidance for optimum family-of-systems planning and execution at the operational (campaign) level of military operations. 1.2 Distinctive capabilities and limitations of UAS. UAS will fill many roles. As aircraft, they can accomplish many of the same missions currently completed by manned aircraft. However, their unique capabilities have enabled Joint operators to use UAS to accomplish different missions, and one can expect this trend to continue as the operational demands and the operators creativity determine new uses for these assets. The novel characteristics of these systems provide insight into the new ways UAS may be employed in the future. These characteristics stem from the simple observation that the UA carries neither the pilot nor the equipment needed to sustain the pilot. This 7 JROCM , 5 July JROCM , 12 September FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1-3

18 document highlights the specific capabilities and limitations that the Joint operator must be aware of when planning, allocating, integrating, and controlling UAS. New uses for UAS are most likely to arise when the following conditions apply to the mission:? The risk is high The commander s willingness to risk an asset will usually be greater when no risk to human life is involved. This advantage has two manifestations: risk to the aircraft and risk to the aircrew: o For example, during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) some UA were deliberately flown into heavily defended airspace to provoke an Iraqi response. Any Iraqi attempts to engage the UA would have exposed the location of hostile forces without putting aircrew at risk. 9 o If a mission involves risk to the aircrew without necessarily endangering the aircraft, a UA offers an option. For example, a UA could carry a chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) sensor into areas unsafe for manned aircraft allowing detection of such threats without risking human operators. Future UAS may be designed as attritable assets, anticipating such missions and adjusting the design of the air vehicle and other equipment accordingly.? Physical constraints (e.g., size) prevent the use of manned aircraft. Absent the need to carry and sustain a human operator, UAS can be and have been designed differently, giving them technical characteristics not possible to obtain from a manned aircraft. Size is perhaps the most obvious example. UAs can be small, even as small as a few pounds in weight with a wingspan of a few feet. This results in significantly less supporting infrastructure, i.e., no need for runways or flight decks. This simplification in deployment and employment permits smaller, tactical units to employ UAS directly, as organic assets. While smaller tactical units can and do receive assistance from large UASs and other assets, an organic UAS will often be more responsive and achieve greater mission satisfaction.? Long, sustained missions are required. For a variety of reasons, a UA can fly further or for a longer time without refueling and can be designed for endurance. Moreover, fatigue is less a factor. No one suffers the physical stresses from flying, and the psychological stresses of long missions can be reduced because the operator(s) can be changed mid-sortie. 9 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, Background Issues for Congress, Cong Research Service, RL31872, April FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1-4

19 ? The UAS offers added flexibility or capability in dynamic re-tasking. UAS may carry multiple payloads for varying purposes or missions. Their longer endurance may enable them to satisfy several missions during one sortie. Additionally, the ability to support different units during a mission offers improved performance of multiple missions during a single sortie. One operator can use the UA to execute a mission, and a second operator-- trained and briefed to execute a different mission--can take control of the UA for a distinct mission during the same sortie. Indeed the second (or later) mission may not be planned or envisioned when the aircraft launches, i.e. the flexibility to dynamically retask without landing is the ability to change missions.. Conversely, separating the human from the UA introduces limitations:? The UAS operator may have inferior situational awareness. Though current technology permits excellent control of the UA and any payload from the ground, the remote operator may have less situational awareness than his airborne counterpart. Current UAS lack Sense and Avoid technologies needed to automatically resolve airspace conflicts. Situational awareness limitations currently vary from UAS to UAS, but marked improvements can be expected across the board as UAS mature. For example, while MQ-1 Predator crews cannot look outside, they have raised their situational awareness over time by accessing resources not available in a traditional cockpit.? UAS operators depend crucially on datalinks. The requirement to link the UA with the ground control station (GCS) introduces physical and operational limitations. Loss of the controlling datalink risks loss of the mission and perhaps the UA. The UA s operational reach may be constrained to line-of-sight distances, or the number and variety of UAS and payload that can be employed simultaneously may be constrained by the available communications bandwidth. UAS may also face unique limitations that are direct ramifications of their strengths. Smaller UA, for example, will be more susceptible to inclement weather and icing than larger aircraft. The other major factor for most UAS is the relative lack of speed. This becomes a factor for dynamic re-tasking, as the transit time and repositioning of the UA will need to be factored in, particularly when prosecuting time-sensitive targets. These limitations are not unique to UAS; they result from design choices the engineer or operator may make to obtain an advantage elsewhere. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 1-5

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21 CHAPTER 2 UAS FAMILY OF SYSTEMS 2.1 UAS Elements. From an operational perspective, an unmanned aircraft system consists of several elements that are common among all categories. These elements define the unique UAS family members. Not surprisingly, various documents and studies have separated UAS into different elements. For this Joint CONOPS, the UAS elements are: air vehicle, payloads, communications, control equipment, support equipment, and the human element. The following sections define these elements. Since these elements must be integrated into a whole UAS, it could be argued that what is included in one element might better be included in another (e.g. communication and payloads.). The important factor is completeness of the entire system. Of course, the complexity of the elements will vary significantly among the various UAS categories Unmanned Aircraft (UA). The air vehicle is the platform element of the UAS in short; it is the business end of the system. It is a rotary, fixed-wing, or lighter than air aircraft which is capable of flight beyond visual range without a crew. UAs may be expendable or recoverable, although for the purposes of this document, all UAs are considered recoverable, even if they are routinely expended. UAs may be operated remotely, or they may be controlled autonomously. The UA includes the platform itself, the propulsion system, avionics, fuel system, antennas, navigation system, and communication system (i.e. radios). UAs range in size and speed from a wingspan under one foot hovering at treetop level to a wingspan of over 130 feet cruising at altitudes greater than 60,000 feet at 340 knots; and their capabilities vary widely depending on the size and function of the aircraft Payload. The payload is the equipment that allows the UAS to accomplish its mission. There are many different types of payloads available now and in development. Some UAS have two or more different payloads that can be interchanged in response to varying mission requirements. Over the next seven years of UAS growth, payloads are likely to be the area of greatest change. The UAS payloads can be generally categorized into the following four sub elements, or combinations of these Sensors. The majority of today s payloads are imaging sensors - video and still frame, electro-optical, and infrared. However, there are also radar (including synthetic aperture radar (SAR), ground moving target indicator (GMTI), light detection & ranging (LIDAR)), Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, or high yield Explosive (CBRNE) detection, and signal intelligence (SIGINT) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-1

22 sensors. Future changes will include making existing sensor types more capable, lighter, or less expensive. In addition, there will probably be more sensor types such as multi-spectral and hyper-spectral, and other existing payloads will be adapted for use on UAS Relay. Intra-theater and tactical communications systems can become overextended by lost LOS, lack of nodes, jamming, or inadequate range due to friendly force movement and dispersion. UAS communications relay payloads can help maintain communications between commanders and subordinate units. The communications relay payload is a multi-purpose beyond line of sight voice and data relay. This payload provides very high frequency/ultra high frequency (VHF/UHF) beyond line of sight relay for battlefield communications and remote sensor data. This payload will support extended range operations with a communications on the move capability. This payload can provide beyond line of sight relay for Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) and Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) radios as well as remote sensors. Planned, near-future communications relay payloads will vary in size and supported waveforms depending on the payload capability of a particular UA Weapons. Several UAS are capable of carrying weapon related payloads, both lethal (missiles and bombs) and non-lethal (electronic attack and laser target designator) Cargo. Payloads for the delivery of leaflets and supplies can also be deployed or will be available in the near future Communications. Data links include all means of communicating between the UA and the control element. These links are used for command and control of the UA and its payload, as well as for transferring data to or from the UA or through it when it is being used as a relay platform. The data links may be either line-of-sight or beyond line-of-sight. An additional component of communications is the remote video terminal/transceiver (RVT). The RVT is a portable system that receives, processes, and displays near real time (NRT) video images and telemetry from the UA. Future FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-2

23 versions will include a transmit function which provides the tactical user with limited payload control. The RVT receives direct downlink from the UA and displays annotated imagery to the operator. Since spectrum access and management is an increasingly critical area for UAS operations, this area will probably receive ever increasing attention UAS Control Element. The UA operator is located at the UAS control element, typically a GCS. The GCS can be anything from a laptop such as is used on the man portable UAs to large control vans. UA control stations are also migrating into airborne platforms to allow control from helicopters or large fixed wing aircraft. The controlling element, whether ground based or airborne based, handles multiple aspects of the mission UA control, mission planning, payload control, and communications. Some platforms require two or more personnel to control the UA and payload while other UAS can be flown with a single operator. The control element is also where the UAS is connected to and communicates with other organizations for transmitting data and receiving instructions for operation such as from air traffic control on the larger systems. The location of the UAS controlling element can vary greatly, depending on the mission and the commander s requirements. Typically, ground commanders colocate the control element with their tactical operations center (TOC); however, larger U.S. Air Force (USAF) systems (MQ-1/Predator, RQ-4A/Global Hawk) are often controlled via satellite communication (SATCOM) with the controlling element located in Continental United States (CONUS) or outside the area of responsibility (AOR). The secondary video and data products are then routed back to the ground commanders via Global Broadcast Service (GBS) or other methods. Currently, UA are often controlled by a GCS that is unique to that particular system. However, there are ongoing programs to develop GCS that can control a variety of systems. The most notable of these efforts is the U.S. Army s One System GCS. The One System is a single set of ground equipment that will serve as a common shelter for all of the Army s UASs Support Equipment. This element includes all of the equipment that is necessary to transport, maintain, launch, and recover the UA. For a small hand launched system, there will be relatively little support equipment. However, in those cases, the systems are often deployed with small units that are quite limited in the amount of organic support they have. Larger systems such as the MQ-1/Predator and RQ-4A/Global Hawk require significantly more support equipment. They are also operated from more established locations such as air bases. Large or small, the trade-off for use of a UAS is typically how much the system contributes to the mission compared to what it takes to FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-3

24 accomplish the mission. The support equipment is a critical element that can become a single point of failure for the entire system Human Element. This aspect of the UAS is typically not considered a separate element, but it is perhaps the most critical to successful UAS employment. The idea that UAS are unmanned is perhaps a misnomer. Although UAS are operated with varying degrees of autonomy, they all require some amount of human interface throughout the operational cycle. Primary personnel tasks include, but are not limited to operator (aircraft and/or payload), maintainer, mission commander, and imagery analyst. Operator tasks include: mission planning, system preparation, launch, mission execution, and recovery and includes all elements of the UAS as described above. UAS personnel must be trained in their particular area of involvement, and they must maintain currency in their particular aspect of operations. All of this has significant implications on manpower requirements. In addition, since UAS operate in conjunction with other systems, there is a need to provide an overall understanding of how to best use UAS, including advantages and unique challenges. This is one of the purposes of this CONOPS. 2.2 Joint UAS Categories/Levels Why classification is important. An important part of this Joint document is the publication of common language for deliberating, planning, and operating with UAS. The foundation of all Joint terminology regarding UAS will be a common classification system. A MITRE white paper 10 observes that without an adequate classification scheme, consensus on regulations, standards and certification requirements will be made more difficult and international harmonization virtually impossible to obtain. For the Joint operator, the utility of common categories of UAS is to provide a means to link service publications and discussions through common categories and language, and facilitate integration and interoperability with other systems in a Joint operating environment. Within national airspace, it is important to create UAS levels that communicate sufficient information to determine what Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) standards should apply to different UAS. The levels must include information on altitudes, airspeed, and weight to determine whether UAS operating in national airspace will interfere with other domestic air traffic and whether the UA presents a significant risk to the population due to a combination of size and speed, should the aircraft fail. 10 Issues Concerning Integration of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Civil Airspace, MITRE white paper, November FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-4

25 Why classification is difficult. The difficulty in developing a classification system lies in the loose definition of what is or is not a UA, the widely varied attributes of the many UA in existence, and the rapidly growing capabilities afforded by UA through the leveraging of new technologies and CONOPS. The DoD defines UA as powered aerial vehicles that do not carry a human operator, that use aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly either autonomously or via remote C2, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or non-lethal payload. Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered UA. 11 By removing the operator (and all requirements to carry and support an operator) the lower limits on size and weight have been essentially eliminated. UA exist from the size of conventional manned aircraft all the way down to systems smaller than model planes. In addition, the reduced consideration for survivability opens these systems up to many uses for which manned systems are not suitable. With wider ranges of attributes and potential applications, classification of UAS is many times more complex than for manned systems. Finally, with new technology even the existing definition of UAS and current capabilities may be challenged as smarter munitions and multi-role UA blend the distinctions between UAS definitions and categories. Any classification system must take into account these challenges The Joint Classification System. This CONOPS proposes a single, operationally-oriented classification scheme, and it further shows how domestic airspace issues correspond to the scheme. The classification scheme is based on employing DoD UAS in a joint military operating environment (e.g. combat operations), with information relevant to employing DoD UAS in civilian airspace (national/international) for training, testing and support to civil authorities. Joint UAS Categories are based primarily on the typical military application of the systems in use by 2014 for the purpose of planning, integrating, and operating UAS in a joint environment. The Domestic Use UAS Levels are based on weight, airspeed, and altitude for the purpose of applying standards to minimize risk. The domestic airspace component of the classification scheme does not perfectly mesh with the Joint Categories because it is infeasible to create such a system that meets the needs of both operating areas without incurring significant disadvantages in one or the other area. The joint categories should give indication of capabilities and how a UAS will be employed in joint operations, the national airspace levels need to communicate whether operation of a UAS will interfere with manned systems and whether it poses a significant risk to the population Joint UAS Categories. 11 Joint Unmanned Air Vehicles in Time-Sensitive Operations Handbook, 3 March FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-5

26 The Joint UAS Categories are driven by operational usage and are stratified by level of war/level of command; the attributes of systems in each category are incidental and driven by the attributes of current DoD UAS. The Tactical categories capture those UAS developed for tactical applications and are generally considered organic unit assets from the small unit level to large units like divisions or Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEFs). They are divided into three levels that are correlated closely with the typical operating altitudes for the systems in each category. They are also generally correlated with how the UAS are deployed, launched, and recovered. The Operational and Strategic categories capture those UAS used as joint force commander (JFC) assets for operational or strategic objectives. Table 2.1 shows the Joint UAS Categories and the incidental UA attributes associated with the current systems in use. The right half of Table 2.1 relates the Joint UAS Categories to the system attributes that are important for determining what FAA standards will apply to different UAS; these attributes are grouped into Domestic Use UAS Levels Domestic Use UAS Categories. The Domestic Use UAS levels are driven by existing FAA standards stratified by typical operating altitude, weight, and maximum airspeed. The lower levels contain systems that represent lower risk of interference with manned system operation and lower risk to human life (in the event of a crash or collision). The higher levels represent higher likelihood of interference or risk in the event of failure. The breakpoints between categories are intended to line up with existing FAA guidance to facilitate integration into the NAS where applicable. For example, 1,200 ft above ground level (AGL) is the upper limit of Class G uncontrolled airspace in the US, unless the airspace has been otherwise designated such as at an airfield with a control tower. Also, 3,000 ft AGL is the lower limit of VFR en-route altitudes; while VFR traffic may certainly operate below this altitude, it represents a dividing line between local and en-route traffic. 18,000 ft MSL is the lower limit of Class A controlled airspace, above which all operations must be conducted IAW an IFR flight plan; this, in turn, drives specific equipment requirements. In terms of weight, 1,320 lbs is the maximum weight for the Light Sport Aircraft category; manned aircraft certified in this category must meet different, and less stringent, design and testing criteria. Aircraft with a maximum weight of 12,500 lbs or above are classified as large aircraft by the FAA, driving additional certification, training, and currency requirements. For airspeed, 250 KIAS is the FAA limit for operations below 10,000 ft MSL. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-6

27 Table 2-1. Joint and Domestic Use UAS Categories Joint UAS Categories T1 - Tactical 1 Special Operations Forces (SOF) Team Small Unit Company & below T2 - Tactical 2 Battalion/Brigade Regiment SOF Group/Flight T3 - Tactical 3 Division/Corps MEF/Squadron O - Operational JTF Operational Altitude (ft) = 1,000 = 5,000 = 10,000 = 40,000 Typical Payload Primarily Electro Optical/ Infrared (EO/IR) or Comm Relay Above, plus SAR, SIGINT, Moving Target Indicator (MTI), or WPNS Launch Method Hand launched Mobile launched Conventional or Vertical Take-off and Landing (VTOL) Conventional Current System Attributes Weight (lbs) Airspeed (kts) Endurance (hrs) Radius (nm) = 20 = 60 < 4 < = 100* < 24* < 100* 450 5,000 = 250 = 15,000* > 250* < 36 < 2,000 Domestic Use UAS Current Systems (Projected by 2014) Levels Hornet, BATCAM, Raven, Dragon Eye, FPASS, Pointer, Wasp, BUSTER, MAV Neptune, Tern, Mako, OAV-II, Shadow, Silver Fox, Scan Eagle, Aerosonde Maverick, Pioneer, Hunter, Snow Goose, I-Gnat-ER, Warrior, Dragonfly, Eagle Eye, Firescout, Hummingbird, Onyx MQ-1/Predator, N-UCAS, Reaper Airspeed (kts) Weight (lbs) Current System Attributes Operating Altitude (ft) Level 0 = 2 = 1,200 Level = 3,000 Level ,320 Level 3 = 250 1,321 12,500 Level 4 > 250 = 12,500 < 18,000 Current Systems (Projected by 2014) Hornet, BATCAM, Wasp Raven, Dragon Eye, FPASS, Pointer, BUSTER, MAV Silver Fox, Aerosonde, Scan Eagle, Neptune, OAV-II, Tern, Mako, Shadow, Pioneer, REAP, RAID, MARTS, TARS, JLENS Maverick, Snow Goose, Dragonfly, Hunter A, Hunter B, Onyx, I-Gnat-ER, Eagle Eye, Warrior, Firescout, Hummingbird, Predator Currently no DoD UAS fall in this category. Example system is Killer Bee concept UAS Description Systems under 2 lbs, within lineof-sight control, operating in unregulated airspace Systems under 20 lbs, operating below VFR airspace Systems under 1,320 lbs fall under light sport aircraft standards Systems over 1,320 lbs, operating below Class A airspace Systems operating below 10,000 ft MSL with max airspeeds that exceed the limit of 250 kts UAS Examples BATCAM Raven Scan Eagle Killer Bee Shadow Hunter MQ-1/Predator S - Strategic National > 40,000 Above, plus RADAR > 15,000 A - Airships Varied Varied VTOL Varied NA Days Theater wide RQ-4A/Global Hawk REAP, RAID, Depends if MARTS, TARS, tethered JLENS, HAA, NSMV Level 5 Any > 12,500 = 18,000 Reaper, Global Hawk N-UCAS, HAA, NSMV Systems operating at or above 18,000 ft MSL fall under Class A airspace standards RQ-4A/Global Hawk JLENS Note: data represents typical parameters for the systems that fall in each category; there are several exceptions - Airspeed: 250 kts is the upper airspeed limit for operations below ft MSL - Operational Altitude: The normal altitude range for systems based on payload capabilities, airspace management requirements, & aircraft capabilities - Weight: 1320 lbs is the upper MGTOW limit for FAA light sport aircraft, is the upper limit for normal, utility, and acrobatic aircraft - Endurance: Includes the time from launch to recovery, based on single aircraft capability without refueling - Altitude: ft AGL is upper altitude limit for Class G uncontrolled airspace ft AGL is the lower limit for VFR en-route altitudes - Radius: The radial distance from a launch site to the operating area, limited by C2 linkage and/or endurance and desired time on station ft MSL is the lower altitude limit of Class A airspace, (Predator is an exception as it operates above 18,000 ft.) - Exceptions: Aerosonde endurance - 30 hrs, radius nm; Silver Fox airspeed kts; Predator airspeed kts, N-UCAS weight lbs Design: FAA standards also vary for winged aircraft, rotorcraft, and airships FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-7

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29 Cluster Discussion. Figure 2-1 plots the UAS in the DoD UAS Roadmap 12 by payload capacity and maximum radius. The purpose of this chart is to give the reader a view of what kinds of systems exist today and how the categories are related. The overlap in categories is a direct result of basing the scheme on operational usage, which is related to, but not always constrained by UA attributes. An example of an overlap in categories due to operational usage is Predator and Warrior. Although the Warrior UAS has capabilities very similar to Predator, it is intended to be an organic, tactical asset for use by the JFLCC, whereas Predator is considered an operational use asset under control of the JFACC Figure 2-1. Cluster Chart of Active Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 12 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap (UAS Roadmap) , 4 Aug FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-9

30 UAS Perspective on Attributes, Capabilities, and Effects. For UAS then, attributes are qualities or physical characteristics of the system elements like wingspan or weight (for the aircraft), image quality or warhead size (for the payload), frequency or range (for the data link), size or portability (for the control element), etc. Capabilities are tasks or actions the system can perform as a result of some combination of attributes applied under some set of circumstances. Effects are desired end-states that are achieved through system capabilities.. Care should be taken not to confuse functional attributes with capabilities; although worded such that an attribute is a characteristic and a capability is an action, some actions are more properly labeled attributes. For example, although flying is an activity, it should not be labeled a capability because it is only a simple function inherent to the system. It is a means to achieving a task, but not a militarily meaningful task in and of itself. Therefore, we can distinguish between physical attributes (like weight and wingspan) and functional attributes (like airspeed and range). We will treat capabilities as operational tasks that utilize system attributes to achieve some goal or deliver some effect. The combination of attributes like the aircraft weight, wingspan, and propulsion, combined with the range of the data link gives the system the capability to employ the payload at some maximum altitude and range from the control element for some maximum endurance, for example: the capability to maintain surveillance of a location of interest day or night under ideal weather conditions for 5 hours, from a distance of 10nm, and survive. UAS can deliver essentially the same effects as manned systems except they may be less risky, more efficient, or more effective under some conditions as briefly described in section 1.2. In the capability example above, if the desired effect is to detect a mobile target when it traverses a line of communication (so it can be targeted), placing troops there may be too risky, using satellite may be too costly, and using binoculars ineffective when compared with a UAS solution. 2.4 Employment Considerations. The following examples describe some of the ways in which UAS might be employed, focusing on a variety of C2 schemes. These examples are followed by short descriptions of a number of considerations that should be taken into account when employing UAS. Many of these are the same as with manned systems, but even in those cases, there are significant differences because of UAS characteristics and the rules for employing them. A Tactical 1 category UAS, by virtue of their size and thus portability, will probably be used in direct support of small, tactical units. Their range will probably be FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-10

31 constrained by the line of sight to the GCS, and thus will be in the range of tens of miles, with the resulting expectation that such an asset will rarely support more than one maneuver unit per sortie. The relative simplicity in launching and landing allows the commander exercising tactical control (TACON) to employ the asset quickly. This benefit would be hindered or precluded if scheduling, airspace deconfliction, and other coordination were not arranged in advance and via minimally demanding procedures. Falling at the other end of the spectra for most of the technical capabilities, the Operational or Strategic category UAS may see a similarly simple employment scheme. Operational UASs will be used instead of manned aircraft because the human operator is not required for the mission and may, considering the potential for fatigue, be a (relative) limitation. However, the nature of the mission, the way the UAS is used, does not change markedly from the way the comparable manned asset would be used. The usual procedures for organizing and executing an RSTA mission, to include how one assigns specific targets to the mission, how airspace is deconflicted, etc. can apply. This suggests that TACON would probably remain with the commander exercising operational control of the asset, though one could foresee TACON shifts for special, high-interest targets or events. For example, the JFC may wish to leave TACON of an operational UAS with the The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) for most missions, organizing its support to the other components by arranging for collective tasking. However, the appearance of a time-sensitive target could trigger a planned shift in TACON to another component commander who was charged with the prosecution of this target. The use of MQ-1/Predator and RQ-4A/Global Hawk in Operation Iraqi Freedom is a good example of the typical employment of Operational and Strategic category UAS. The JFACC scheduled sorties to provide near-continuous coverage of various geographic regions, corresponding to the JFC s apportionment and the other functional commanders operational collection requirements. The JFACC assigned collection targets to UA sorties, matching the submitted requirements to the UAs capabilities. For example, a single MQ-1/Predator sortie might begin operating in western Iraq, searching for SCUDrelated activity or other strategic threats, and then shift to eastern Iraq to reconnoiter known and suspected locations of hostile Iraqi army units. As the responsible office for dynamic retargeting, the JFACC adjusted UA taskings so as to best accomplish the collective ISR requirements. In these cases control of the UAs remained with JFACC, as the ability of a single sortie to service multiple collection targets argued against allocating an entire sortie to any one command. The above description applies equally to the way manned ISR assets were operated. Differences between the use of MQ-1/Predator, RQ-4A/Global Hawk, U-2s, or other assets directly related to the specific technical features of the sensors or the aerodynamic characteristics, and not directly to the presence of an operator in the aircraft. Tactical 2 or 3 category UAS, may involve the more complicated employment schemes. Because these assets represent a balance of range/endurance and flexibility, they may prove ideal for providing a level of support to adjacent commands or other components, even when this support is not anticipated. By virtue of their smaller size FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-11

32 and relatively easy employment, Tactical 2 or 3 category UAS may be located in forward regions, and with their relatively simple launching they can accommodate quick-response tasking. However, retaining this flexibility may require simpler, more generic airspace and other procedures for controlling the UA. Consider the use of the Scan Eagle UA that the naval forces may adapt. One could foresee a scenario in which the Commander of the Amphibious Task Force (CATF), planning an amphibious landing in conjunction with the Commander of the Landing Force (CLF), employs Scan Eagle to search the coastline in the vicinity of the landing zone to ensure the enemy has not deployed combatants that could hazard the landing. If, while this sortie is executing this mission, CLF learned of an enemy battalion-sized force approaching the landing zone, he could request control of this UA sortie in order to investigate the threat. CATF would yield control to CLF, who would use the asset to address this developing event. If both commanders were still afloat, they could transfer tactical control of the sortie by temporarily transferring physical control of the aircraft and sensor. If CLF were ashore and both commanders employed a common ground-control station, they could still transfer tactical control by transferring physical control. If CLF s interest in employing the UA expired before its sortie ended, the two commanders could transfer TACON (and physical control) back to CATF, who could continue his employment of the asset. One can foresee many other scenarios in which tactical control of UASs, not just Tactical 2 or 3 cataegory UAS, could be best achieved via transferring physical control. Close air support (CAS) is a great example. The supported unit controls a manned aircraft providing CAS, achieved when the Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) radios voice commands to direct the aircraft onto the target. The TACP could control the unmanned aircraft when it is in the target area, exploiting their superior knowledge of the tactical situation and the effects they intend to achieve via the CAS mission Integration. Several sources discuss UAS roles in terms of Integration - The arrangement the missions for which they are best suited. The UAS Roadmap 13 of military forces and their recommends UA be preferred when the actions to create a force that mission is dull, dirty, or dangerous. This simple rule operates by engaging as a could be misinterpreted to convey the notion that whole. In force protection, integration is the synchronized there are manned missions and unmanned missions. transfer of units into an However, just as manned systems do not operate operational commander's force independently, UAS can accomplish complex tasks prior to mission execution. by leveraging other systems in an integrated (JP 1-02) network. 14 Similarly, manned systems leverage UAS, illustrated by the following: The benefit of Predator as ISR support for the AC-130 gunship underscores the positive synergy between manned and unmanned 13 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap (UAS Roadmap) , para. 3.4, page Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Perspective: Effects. Capabilities, and Techniques (USAF SAB UAVs), September 2003, page vi. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-12

33 systems. 15 In addition, there may be some new uses of UAS for which there is no manned counterpart mission, such as using UAS as targets to draw enemy fire (admittedly, suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions might fall in this category). These comments illustrate that UAS integration is more than merely replacing manned missions with unmanned missions. There are many factors that limit the ability to operate UAS complicating integration. The JUAV Handbook 16 lists many important issues that must be considered for integration:? Wind can keep a UAV on the ground or force it to return to base.? The operating altitude of the UAV must balance the need for adequate sensor resolution against the need to maintain covertness, avoid threats, and deconflict with other aircraft.? Low speed makes it difficult to re-task a UAV in flight or reposition it quickly.? Most UAV must remain within line of sight of its GCS.? UAVs that fly low and have a large visual signature or a loud engine may alert enemy forces or give away friendly positions.? An inappropriate payload will reduce the UAV s effectiveness.? RVTs tend to be in short supply and are usually not interoperable between UAV systems.? The video downlink may make excessive demands on bandwidth.? Although UAVs are often considered attritable, meaning that losing a UAV is not a major event in comparison to losing a manned aircraft, they should still be treated as high-value assets that are usually in short supply. The handbook also contains a useful checklist for integration considerations Interoperability. Currently, the level of interoperability among UAS is widely varied from systems that can pass full control of the aircraft from one operator to another to systems that can only transmit sensor data. In some circumstances, passing full control would have limited utility (e.g.: passing launch and recovery control of a MQ- 1/Predator to a ground combatant or passing flight control of a Raven to a joint air operations center (JAOC). In other circumstances, lack of interoperability can result in lost opportunities. Today s UAS are predominantly stove piped systems and are unable to execute Levels 3, 4, and 5 interoperability. The following levels of interoperability should be used to identify the flexibility in control for all active UAS: Joint UAS Levels of Interoperability: Level 1 - Indirect receipt/transmission of UA related payload data. 15 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles in Perspective: Effects. Capabilities, and Techniques (USAF SAB UAVs), September 2003, page v. 16 Joint Unmanned Air Vehicles in Time Sensitive Operations, Handbook, 3 March 2005, section 3, para (III-21). FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-13

34 ? Level 2 - Direct receipt of ISR/other data where direct covers reception of the UA payload data by the RVT when it has direct communication with the UA.? Level 3 - Control and monitoring of the UA payload in addition to direct receipt of ISR/other data.? Level 4 - Control and monitoring of the UA, less launch and recovery.? Level 5 - Level 4, plus launch and recovery functions. 17 Requirements for interoperability between systems should be based on operational mission needs, and not sought for the perpetuation of the enabling technologies. Examples of predictable needs for interoperability are operating a UA through another UA (as a communication relay) to extend range, passing control from one GCS to another due to inadequate local launch sites or dynamic retasking. Since mission needs cannot always be predicted, planning should focus on technologies and employment options that facilitate interoperation without arbitrarily requiring every system to have one to one interoperability with every other system. To improve integration of UAS through better interoperability, improvements in future UAS operation should include a joint system for identifying payload and mission requirements, assigning available assets, and collecting, processing, and disseminating data. To accomplish this requires not only a change to existing and future UAS to ensure network interoperability, but also a change to the network itself. The existing processes for collecting data and making decisions based on the data are being overwhelmed by the enormous amount of data available with UAS Command and Control of UAS. C2 is the arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures for the purpose of planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. When making decisions about who maintains control of UAS commanders should consider the impact on timelines for decision making. Decision timelines can be streamlined when control of the UAS is passed to the lowest tactical level using the UAS payload. Finally, there should be a joint language for managing control of UAS to prevent confusion involving service-related terminology. The following paragraphs address current and future C2 considerations relevant to the control of UA, which includes not only the considerations listed in the five levels of interoperability but also responsibility for the safe operation of the aircraft under routine and emergency conditions. Specific information on technology that enables C2 (such as network control, communications, and automated data dissemination systems) is covered in other areas of this document. 17 FM , NTTP , ATTP(I) UAS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, August 2006, chapter 3, para. 2.a. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-14

35 Unique Aspects of UAS C2. Joint doctrine provides guidance for command and control of joint and functional component assets in a joint operating environment. C2 processes for UAS assets are not much different than for other assets, but two aspects of UAS can make C2 particularly challenging: The universal need for UAS products (ISR, situational awareness, etc.) combined with the widespread call for UAS support makes it necessary to address UAS C2. Specifically, where mission planning and dynamic retargeting meet (e.g., time-sensitive targeting), Joint operators must pre-consider where system control will lie, how priority of new and emerging requirements will be determined, and what means will be used to pass system control. This section does not treat issues regarding C2 enablers such as data links and network management C2 of UAS in Joint Operations. The two components of UAS C2, command and control, can be broken down into asset allocation and task authorization. Asset allocation is the decision concerning which mission the UAS will support - strategic, operational, or tactical - made by the tasking authority. Task authorization is the tactical implementation made by the owning commander and assigned to the operator. Transferring C2 of UAS within a service component can be handled through service command structures; this section covers transfer of UAS C2 across service or functional components Asset Allocation. Authority for routine allocation of UAS is generally determined by the level of the objectives the asset is deployed to support and the command level of the unit that owns the asset. As with other DoD assets, most assets that support strategic objectives are directed nationally, most assets that support operational objectives are directed by the Joint staff, and most assets that support tactical objectives are directed by service or functional components. Components may transfer operational control (OPCON) of tactical assets to support JFC priorities Task Authorization. Joint operations utilize centralized command and decentralized execution for maximum flexibility. As with other assets, routine control of UAS is accomplished below the level of command that determines what objectives the asset will support. Since the asset is unmanned, controllers should have processes in place to handle loss of UA control or (when possible) ensure data link redundancy. With the possibility of UAS being retasked to support dynamic objectives, commanders that request support from a UAS not normally under their command should plan for how control of the FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-15

36 UAS will be handled. For strategic and operational assets, the JFACC will usually retain TACON when providing support to other component commanders or tactical units Determining when allocation authority should be passed. From a UAS commander s perspective, the UAS represents a capability set aside for the mission that commander is supporting, but especially for UAS, the asset could be requested to support higher (or other) objectives. UAS commanders should understand the following: who has awareness of the asset, who can see the asset s product, and who can contact the commander/operator of the asset. This will aid the commander in considering who might request support and plan for how to prioritize requests. As data dissemination is expanded to allow more and more people to access UAS products, the possibility of more requests for support will likely grow. It is foreseeable that answering requests for support (outside the assigned mission objectives) or chopping assets to other commanders may even require an automated system for collecting, filtering, and prioritizing such requests Determining how task authority should be passed. To the maximum extent reasonable, direct control of UAS should remain with the normal controllers and operators of that asset. When feasible, if a UAS is re-tasked to support another commander s objective, the supporting UAS commander may temporarily relinquish asset allocation authority, but his unit should retain task authorization. This will alleviate the necessity for the supported commander to understand how assets, not under their routine command, are controlled (as opposed to how they can be used). If it is necessary to control an asset below the level of allocation to support an objective (e.g., the supported commander wants to control in realtime which way to direct a live-video feed), then they should be familiar with joint terminology for controlling UAS and the UAS sensor products recommended in the UAS Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (MTTP) 18. Also the focus should be on control of the payload, leaving operation of the aircraft to the normal operator. There are circumstances where control may be passed in its entirety, such as: when a system is operating beyond the primary controller s range without communications relay, in cases where primary control is lost and a redundant system is in place, or if a commander deems it in the best interest of mission accomplishment. 18 FM , NTTP , ATTP(I) Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Tactical Employment of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, August FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-16

37 C2 in Time-sensitive Targeting. Recent operations have demonstrated that UAS can be critical enablers for prosecution of time-sensitive targets (TSTs); commanders of UAS assets should pay attention to procedures for supporting joint TST prosecution (as in the Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time Sensitive Targets 19 ). Though organic UAS assets are generally dedicated to tactical objectives, commanders should identify when a TST has been found whether or not they are responsible for the target. They may be called upon to act as a supporting commander for prosecution of a TST. TST situations may require UAS to support Close Air Support (CAS), Strike Coordination & Armed Reconnaissance (SCAR), Air Interdiction (AI) and Deep Air Support missions with ISR, to include battle damage assessment (BDA), target marking, terminal guidance of laser guided ordnance, providing precision coordinates for GPS guided ordnance, and delivery of precision guided ordnance if armed. In these roles, UASs are routed, controlled and deconflicted the same as fixed and rotary winged manned aircraft, outlined in JCAS publication and time sensitive targeting publications. These publications are currently being updated with UAS references, and include the ordnance delivery tactics used by current armed UAS Functional Components Allocation. Functional components will control their own organic assets, but the JFC may request support from organic UAS or impose restrictions on their use. Joint Publication states that: Only the JFC has the authority to reassign, redirect, or reallocate a component s air capabilities/forces. UAS present a challenge to the routine procedures for re-allocation of assets because of their proliferation and the popularity of sensor products. Commanders of under-tasked UAS should offer excess assets (within reason) to the JFC for re-allocation in the air apportionment decision. Efficient support from component UAS assets will be facilitated by Liaison Officers (LNOs). Normally there will be a UA LNO in place for each type of UA system deployed in theater. As more systems are fielded, it may be necessary to limit the number of LNOs in the JAOC, or the JFACC may stand up a UAS cell to federate UAS operation issues. Organic assets will appear on the air tasking orders (ATO) when specifically required although this does not imply any command or tasking authority over them. For systems that are not required to appear on the ATO, the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) may still impose limited procedural controls over larger UAS. These could include, but are not limited to: 19 FM , MCRP 3-16D, NTTP , AFTTP(I) Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Targeting Time Sensitive Targets, April JP 3-30 Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, 5 June FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-17

38 airspace restrictions, coordinating altitudes, aircraft identification maneuvers, and minimum risk routes. In the National Airspace System (NAS), even UAS below the accepted threshold for appearing on the ATO may be required to be centrally coordinated by the FAA and appear on the Contingency Response Air Support Schedule (CRASS) for domestic use Mission Planning Considerations. Doctrinal planning processes for the employment of ISR and attack assets exist and are applicable to unmanned aircraft with only minor modification. Planners at all levels conduct both hasty (immediate) and deliberate (pre-planned) UAS missions. Both missions have the same considerations, but the time available determines the planning detail. For both, activities are categorized as (1) Flight Planning and (2) Tactical Planning Flight Planning. Every UAS flight requires some degree of flight planning regardless of the size of the aircraft, the tactical situation, or the location of the flight. There are both tactical and civil considerations, and every UAS flight requires detailed planning for emergency recovery. Joint UAS will increasingly operate outside restricted areas and must be able to operate within both domestic and international airspace. Operational and Strategic UAS typically take off and land at military or civil airfields alongside manned aircraft, transparent to air traffic controllers. Planners must plan the route, determine communication, navigation, and surveillance requirements, verify the weather, verify weight and balance, and file a flight plan with the controlling agency or obtain a flight clearance. Though, perhaps less formal, tactical UAS require the same planning considerations Tactical Planning. The Airspace Control Order (ACO) defines the tactical airspace: The ACO allows the separation of all types of aircraft, manned and unmanned, fixed and rotary wing, by the definition of altitude layers and geographic zones. The ACO defines how a volume of airspace is to be structured for air missions over a given period. The ACO defines how this division of airspace will be used by different air operations throughout the 24-hour ACO cycle. 21 Manned aircraft plan for emergency recovery from situations such as lost communications, engine failure, hydraulics failure, and a host of aircraftspecific emergencies. The planning must be more detailed for UAS operations because there is no onboard pilot to assess and react to the situation. Especially critical is planning for lost or interrupted 21 JP 3-52 Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, 30 August FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-18

39 communications and ensuring that aircraft responses are safe and consistent with civil and tactical airspace requirements. Commanders may use their tactical assets to support troops in contact or to support a developing situation. These hasty missions offer limited time for tactical planning. Planners assess the enemy and friendly situation through C2 systems located in the Tactical Operations Center or the GCS. Analysis of the terrain and weather is critical for determining the expectation of success, aircraft availability, payload type, payload settings, flight routes and altitudes, and the time the aircraft can stay on station. They must also assess the impact on the civil populace. Operators in Iraq flew UA as a deterrent after they discovered that criminal activity decreased and enemy personnel became more mobile when UA were audible overhead. The tactical plan must also include abort criteria, prioritization schemes, and methods for Level 3 or Level 4 hand-off. The importance of the mission and the Commander s intent determine the abort criteria. Mission plans should include contingencies in the event that a malfunction or weather precludes use of the UA, and it should include procedures for transferring control of the sensor or the aircraft from the launching GCS to forward commanders. Future UA will include more automated means of providing safety and continuity of control during the hand-off process such as priority verification, authentication, and lost-link Future Direction of UAS C2. By 2014, the first UAS possessing networked command and control should be in operational use. Privileged users (possessing the required computing, communications, training, and authority) will be able to obtain Level 4 Control of any UA in his/her area of operation. The migration from current point-to-point data links to network data links will allow more users access to high bandwidth data. Gateway nodes will distribute higher bandwidth streams to privileged users with the capability to receive and the capacity to store, analyze, and disseminate information and lower bandwidth streams to tactical units for immediate use. Whereas today s C2 architecture can be depicted as one GCS controlling one UA (1-1). The 2014 architecture will depict an n-n relationship where many users have access to many different UA. UA will access distributed databases to determine authentication of a requesting entity. These controlling entities may be marines with a portable control system, manned ground vehicles, or rotary and fixed wing aircraft. They will access payload data via point and click from their battle command interfaces, and data fusion tools will allow intuitive representation. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-19

40 Additionally, the increase in onboard computational and storage capacity will allow higher levels of autonomy. Whereas autonomy today refers to following a preprogrammed series of waypoints, future UA will determine the waypoints based upon mission objectives and constraints, possibly in conjunction with the objectives of other UA or manned aircraft. The greatest challenge to the employment of dynamic, autonomous command and controlled UAS will be obtaining the required airworthiness certifications. Current certifications rely on a verifiable path from a trained operator to the flight controls. Future certifications will depend on the reliability of flight software, the maturation of sense and avoid technologies, the acceptance of software guided aircraft, and our ability to separate flight critical and mission applications Data Synchronization. The benefits of being able to collect and fuse disparate data to reach otherwise unjustifiable conclusions, and share the information with all concerned is not unique to UAS. Correlating data from similar sensors, fusing data Data Fusion The from disparate sensors (collocated or on separate aircraft), transformation of data and cueing one sensor with another are all examples of data from multiple sources synchronization. Whether the synchronization is automated into information that or performed manually, UAS will continue to present greater can be readily assimilated by opportunities for synchronization within the limits of decision makers. interoperability and spectrum availability. From the Joint operator s perspective, the technical means of data flow and fusion is less a concern than the timely receipt of actionable information, or data that has immediate relevance and purpose. As UAS are better integrated and more interoperable, there is the possibility the tactical node could be overwhelmed with sensor data and conflicting tasking and lose any efficiencies gained in decision making through communications interoperability. To fully take advantage of system interoperability requires a network agile enough to determine how best to task multiple UAS for mission accomplishment and disseminate information appropriately Airspace Management DoD UAS are operating in both national and international airspace, under both military and civilian control conditions. The greatest challenge to the employment of dynamic, autonomous command and controlled UAS will be obtaining the required airworthiness certificate. Airspace Management remains one of the top factors impacting UAS integration and the dramatic increase in UAS and UAS missions have made airspace management more complex. Airspace control measures limit how UAS can be used and may confound otherwise simple missions. Lack of proper deconfliction measures can lead to incidents like loss of a mini UA to disasters like collisions with other manned or unmanned systems. The Joint operator FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-20

41 should understand these limitations well enough to determine what airspace control measures apply to their systems (each airspace has its own considerations) and how to integrate seamlessly into the environment where their system will be employed Military Airspace The JFACC is responsible for airspace management and should be aware of integration issues for all UAS. Most systems that fall in the Tactical 1/2 Joint UAS Categories do not appear in the ATO and are generally managed through coordinating altitudes, assigned airspace, and ingress/egress routes. Joint operators should be familiar with where their system can operate, procedural controls (such as identification maneuvers), and contingencies for loss of UA control. Systems in the Opalerational/Strategic Joint UAS Categories (and some in the Tactical 3 Category) are required to appear in the ATO and airspace management is accomplished using the same positive control measures in place for manned systems. As above, an additional concern for UAS is planning for possible loss of UA control Restricted Airspace (OCONUS/war zones) In a major combat operation, Joint forces will control the airspace. In this case, UAS operators will conduct operations in accordance with JFC guidance normally found in the theater Airspace Control Plan (ACP) per Joint Publication Transponder equipped UAS can be identified by radar with interrogator capability. If the UAS has no transponder or electronic identification capability, then procedural airspace control measures (ACM) are required to deconflict the UAS from other airspace users. Smaller UA provide the biggest challenge for airspace deconfliction because they currently do not carry transponders because of weight and power limitations. Services are working on technology solutions, but current initiatives, like using Blue Force Tracker are only providing limited benefits. Services will need to continue to pursue technology solutions for positive control of all UAS. 22 JP 3-52 Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-21

42 Civilian Airspace Although the JFACC (if appointed) is responsible for DoD UA operating in domestic airspace, the FAA or host nation airspace authority controls the airspace and may require all UA (not only those that appear on an ATO) to follow FAA/host nation standards, without regard to vehicle size. Joint operators should be aware of the classes of airspace that their systems are authorized to operate in, limitations for operating in those airspace classes, procedures for launching and entering approved airspace, and the certification process for obtaining approval to operate in national/international airspace National Airspace The US National Airspace System (NAS) must be shared by all users, manned and unmanned, to support national defense, homeland security, and other civil and commercial operations. To accomplish this, UAS must be seamlessly integrated into the current NAS infrastructure while enabling safe, efficient, and effective operations. The interim solution to integrating UAS into the NAS is by requesting certificates of waiver authorization (COA) to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 23 COAs are temporary in nature. Numerous organizations, including the FAA, DoD Policy Board on Federal Aviation (PBFA), the JUAS COE, and the JUAS Materiel Review Board, are working on a short-term plan to streamline the current process, and a long-term plan to safely integrate UAS into the airspace in a similar manner to which manner aircraft are currently integrated. Solutions will include a combination of updated procedures, standards development, and technology development for sense and avoid International Airspace Joint UAS will operate in international civilian airspace during peacetime for training, or during military operations such as peacekeeping or disaster relief. The same issues regarding integration into the NAS 23 Current FAA regulations only allow UAS operations if one of the following criteria has been met: 1. Restricted or Warning Area airspace is maintained at all times. 2. A COA has been granted. Users submit their request 60 days in advance. The capability to see and avoid other aircraft cannot be based upon ground based radar. 3. Chase aircraft. A manned aircraft with a licensed pilot and a trained observer follows the unmanned aircraft at all times and is able to relay information to the unmanned aircraft operator as to traffic conflicts. The manned aircraft must maintain a distance no farther than 1 mile horizontal and 1000 feet vertical from the unmanned aircraft. 4. Trained Ground Observer. A trained ground observer in contact with the unmanned aircraft operator at all times can visually clear the airspace around the unmanned aircraft. This observer must be within 1 mile of the aircraft and the aircraft can be no higher than 1000 feet above the ground observer. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-22

43 apply here, but are even more complicated, because of the foreign aspect. The JFC must follow the host nation airspace authority procedures, rules and regulations Automation Some limits on UAS operation due to airspace restrictions may be relaxed as UAS develop more sophisticated sensors and processors and develop more capabilities to self- manage with respect to airspace. Examples are sense-andavoid capabilities, redundant control systems, and loss of data-link algorithms. Automated control systems that can manage deconfliction and mission objectives for multiple UAS in the shared airspace could alleviate many existing constraints on UAS operation Spectrum Management Spectrum management, like airspace management constrains how UAS can be used. Close coordination with the joint frequency manager is critical to safety and mission success. Joint operators should be aware of the frequency capabilities of UAS, the bandwidth requirements for sensor products, range limitations for data links, and the capabilities and conditions of the electro-magnetic environment where they plan to operate. Additionally, frequency agile systems (systems that are not designed to operate at only one frequency) gives operators the capability to deconflict with other systems or emissions in the area. Operators must still be aware of the environment and other possible interferences, but the capability allows more systems to operate in the environment than could otherwise Environment Capacity Joint UAS operators that use LOS links for control of UAS and receipt of sensor products must deconflict with other systems emitting in the same area to avoid affecting friendly operations or being adversely affected by other systems. UAS that use beyond line of sight (BLOS), SATCOM, or communications relays have a concentrated problem in that bottlenecks in relay nodes can result in an inability to send and receive sensor data. Operators have little or no control over how much capacity the environment can handle, but a better understanding of the environment can aid in understanding their limits Protecting the electro-magnetic environment Many control methods (like Global Positioning System (GPS)) are highly susceptible to jamming and interference. Operators should be aware of threats to UAS operation due to hostile interference. In addition, there are numerous unintentional causes of electromagnetic interference. If operating in an area of known interference, mitigation techniques should be employed. Planners and Operators must prepare for interference contingencies by planning and FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-23

44 coordinating with appropriate airspace, war planners, and unit manning to be prepared for the actions necessary to recover the aircraft and minimize disruption to other operations. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2-24

45 CHAPTER 3 MAJOR COMBAT OPERATIONS (MCO) 3.1 Major Combat Operations. The following scenario is intended to illustrate the use of UAS in a MCO. The central theme of the MCO is to achieve decisive conclusions in combat by using a joint, interdependent force that swiftly applies overmatching power simultaneously and sequentially, in a set of contiguous and noncontiguous operations. It occurs in 2008 with the United States defending the Nation of Arcoe against an invading neighbor, Darco. The scenario consists of three phases (1) Deter, (2) Seize the Initiative, and (3) Dominate and is intended only as a guide for Joint and Service Staffs as they prepare for similar operations. 3.2 Scenario. The United States (U.S.) has been allied with Arcoe for over 50 years since the end of a war that separated Arcoe into two contiguous geographic areas separated by a treaty-established Zone of Separation (ZOS). Arcoe is a peninsula of mountainous terrain and lush vegetation, which enhances cover and concealment. The climate has four distinct seasons with monsoon summers and harsh winters, especially at higher elevations. The opposing country of Darco is an isolated country that has intermittently experienced UN sanctions due to the belligerent posture personified by its leader. The country has a large, compulsory military force sustained primarily by illegal international arms sales at the expense of economic development of the populace. In violation of its own previous agreements, Darco claims to have a nuclear weapons capability and is developing and testing ballistic missiles with the potential to hit the continental United States. While negotiating to resolve Darco's nuclear threat peacefully, U.S. military forces are strategically placed to deter aggression or swiftly counter an attack, thus providing Arcoe time to mobilize its national power and the United States time to provide reinforcements. In theater U.S. strategic bombers are on alert and a U.S. Navy carrier task force is within striking range. Over 100,000 American forces augment 600,000 coalition forces in forward bases. U.S. and Coalition Challenges:? C2 Systems - The theater command structure is a combined Arcoe/U.S. military force which needs to operate closely together, requiring a complex, theater-unique, dual-language C2 system. The mountainous FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-1

46 terrain in Arcoe makes it difficult to use LOS devices for voice or digital transmissions. An antiquated infrastructure and limited bandwidth hinders the ability to take advantage of state-of-the-art C2 systems. Further complicating the Command, Control, Communications, Computers, & Intelligence (C4I) picture is the limited ability of U.S. forces to interoperate with Arcoe forces and other allies mandating the use of redundant C2 systems.? Interoperability - The need to exchange information is complicated by releasability issues with Arcoe s military forces. Two separate C2 systems are established to effectively communicate to the forces of each country. In the event of hostilities, some U.S. military units will fall under the operational control of Arcoe military forces. Although U.S. forces use jam-resistant, frequency-hopping SINCGARS, Arcoe military forces use single-channel radios. Consequently, U.S. military forces in Arcoe have to use SINCGARS in single-channel mode to exchange information with Arcoe military counterparts in the field. This increases the potential for Darco to jam voice communications. Incompatible C2 systems prevent commanders from receiving and transmitting real-time digital information to Arcoe counterparts. For example, a forward observer requesting fire support from an Arcoe artillery battery would have to pass information through U.S. systems. The information would then have to be converted into a format compatible with Arcoe systems.? Terrain and Climate - Arcoe consists mostly of hills and mountains with wide coastal plains in the east and south. 60% of the land is forest and woodlands, 20% is arable, and 20% is urban. The terrain hinders mobility and command and control. LOS communications are especially restricted in many regions. A rapid Darco invasion will impact U.S. and allied efforts to expeditiously receive, stage, and integrate Darco Arcoe Figure 3-1. Arcoe Terrain Map FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-2

47 essential personnel and materiel. Arcoe has a temperate climate with rainfall heavier in the summer than winter. They can experience harsh winters as well as torrential downpours and severe thunderstorms during the summer monsoon season. The Arcoe climate further hampers mobility, command and control, and logistics and can disrupt all types of communications.? Civil Concerns - The Arcoe capital is located twenty miles from the ZOS. There is a strong likelihood that civilians will evacuate to the South upon commencement of hostilities. It is also likely that Darco citizens will migrate southward as the war continues. The Darco populace is believed to be near starvation following several years of poor harvests Road to War. For decades, tension has remained between Darco, Arcoe, and the U.S. Since the end of the previous war, both sides have strengthened their side of the ZOS with increased weapons and the latest technologies. This increased tension on both sides put neighboring countries and the United Nations (UN) on edge. In recent months the test firing of Darcon long-range ballistic missiles has increased tensions along the ZOS even more, forcing the international community to take action. In response to test firing missiles, the UN imposed additional sanctions against Darco. In retaliation to the sanctions and restrictions, Darco launches an attack across the ZOS Mission. The mission is to deter aggression. Should deterrence fail, Coalition Forces conduct military operations to defend Arcoe, unseat the Darco leadership regime, destroy weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability, defeat enemy forces, and set the conditions for transition to legitimate civil authority Commander s Intent. Deter Darconian offensive objectives in Arcoe through strong defensive posture south of ZOS. If required, defeat a Darco attack into Arcoe and counterattack North forcing Darco to surrender, and conduct Stability and Support Operations, restoring the territorial integrity of the HN and facilitate establishment of a legitimate government within a new domestic order Purpose Deter aggression, but should deterrence fail, conduct counteroffensive, Joint operations to restore territorial integrity and facilitate the establishment of a legitimate government in a stable Pacific region. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-3

48 Method. Demonstrate strong unified resolve to deter aggression. Should deterrence fail, defend the capital while rapidly transitioning to offensive operations:? Gain air and sea superiority to secure Lines of Communication (LOC) and enable surface maneuver? Isolate and destroy enemy C2 to force uncoordinated autonomous enemy operations? Destroy enemy WMD capability and be prepared to operate in a WMD environment? Conduct decisive operations to defeat enemy combat forces? Transition to legitimate civil control End State. At the end of the MCO:? Darco s military forces will have ceased combat operations, be capable of only limited defensive operations, and have complied with coalition war termination conditions? The leadership regime will be deposed? Darco will retain no WMD capability? Allied territorial integrity will be restored Intelligence Estimate. Table 3-1 provides the Darco force structure at the beginning of hostilities. In addition, they have an extensive interlocking, redundant nationwide air defense (AD) system that includes interceptor aircraft, early warning, ground controlled intercept radars, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), an exceptionally large number of AD artillery weapons, and barrage balloons. The largest concentration of AD assets is along the ZOS and around major cities, military installations, and factories. There are also numerous man-portable systems available throughout the country. Darco s Special Operations Forces (SOF) consist of 100,000 elite personnel in 25 brigades. They can simultaneously attack both forward and rear friendly echelon forces and have five basic missions: (1) Reconnaissance, (2) Combat operations, (3) Rear operations, (4) Counter enemy special operations, and (5) Internal security. They also have a sizeable number of surface-to-surface missiles with ranges out to 3,500 Km and weapons of mass destruction. They are believed to have 5,000 metric tons of chemical agents, including nerve, choking, blister, and blood agent, and they are believed to have one or two nuclear weapons. They may have the capability of employing a crude weapon in the form of an emplaced explosive device. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-4

49 1614? 2 Naval Fleets? 14 Squadrons? 65,000 Personnel Table 3-1. Darco Force Structure Prior to Hostilities Naval Forces? Operational Vessels o 26 Submarines o 6 Covettes o 3 Large Patrol Craft o 158 Small Patrol Craft o Landing Craft o 23 Mine Countermeasures Craft o 71 Minisubmersibles o 146+ Fast Attack Boats o 43 Guided Missiles o 103 Torpedos Air Forces? Operational Aircraft o 525 Fighter/Bomber/Attack o 84 Attack Helicopters o 282 Transport Helicopters o 318 Transports? 25 operational air bases,? 20 dispersal fields, and? 18 highway strips Ground Forces? 20 Corps with 153 Divisions or separate Brigades o 60 Infantry o 25 Mechanized infantry o 13 Armor o 25 Special Operations (SOF) o 30 Artillery? Personnel 1 million active, 6 million reserve? Operational Equipment o 2,200 Main Battle Tanks o 12,000 Artillery systems o 5,750 Self-propelled 3,750 Towed 2,500 MRL o 9,000+ Mortar systems o 2,600+ Artillery rockets Coastal Defense? Mine warfare capability that will be used to defend against amphibious assaults, defend strategic ports, and provide seaward flank protection for land forces. o 9 Ground-to-sea missile Systems o 2 Amphibious Brigades 1615 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-5

50 Friendly Force Structure JFACC? USAF: Four complete Air Expeditionary Forces (AEF) o 8 B-2 o 16 Heavy Bombers (B-52/B-1) o 72 Air Superiority Fighters (F-22/F-15C) o 144 AI/SEAD/CAS Fighters (F-15E, F- 16CG/CJ) o 48 CAS Fighters (A-10) o 24 Rescue Helos (HH-60) o 4 RC-135 o 8 AWACS (E-3) o 8 JSTARS (E-8)? USN: Four Carrier Air Wings o 188 AI/SEAD/CAS Fighters (F/A-18) o 48 EW Aircraft (E/A-6B, E/A-18G)? USMC: One Marine Air Wing o 24 AI/SEAD/CAS Fighters (F/A-18) o 12 CAS Fighters (A/V-8B)? One Special Operations Wing Assumptions. 2008: Table 3-2. Available Troops JFMCC? Four Carrier Battle Groups o 4 Nimitz Class Aircraft Carriers o 4 Guided Missile Cruisers o 8 Guided Missile Destroyers o 4 Attack Submarines? One Expeditionary Strike Group o 4 Amphibious Assault Ships and supporting ships o Assorted Helicopters? One Marine Expeditionary Force embarked on USN Expeditionary Strike Group JFLCC? One Numbered Army o 2 Mechanized Infantry Divisions o 1 Infantry Division? One Airborne Division The following assumptions provide an interpretation of the global situation in? The world economy continues to grow at a steady rate fueled by increased productivity in the Pacific Rim.? The Global War on Terror continues, but there has been a reduction in US troops deployed overseas.? Platforms and capabilities are based on the Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap. 24? The Defense of Arcoe is the President of the United States (POTUS) number 1 priority.? During Phase II, commercial communication systems would potentially interfere with military UAS operations.? Spectrum availability will be a constraint; however, sufficient spectrum exists to support the UAS operations and platforms outlined in section If more spectrum is made available, then more UAS assets can be operated.? Beginning in Phase II, the military will control the airspace within the Arcoe/Darco Area of Operations. 24 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap, , 4 AUG FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-6

51 ? The force structure represents the total potential UAS coverage available at any phase of the scenario. 3.3 MCO Phase 1 (Deter) JTF Mission. JTF conducts operations in order to deter Darco aggression. In order to execute this mission, JTF components will execute the following missions: information operations (IO), reconnaissance, surveillance, blockade, prepare for combat, and noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) JTF Tasks. The following deterrence options are available to the JTF commander and could potentially involve or impact UAS:? Increase readiness of in-place forces? Upgrade alert status? Increase strategic reconnaissance? Increase intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance collection efforts? Initiate or increase show of force actions? Increase exercise activities, gain popular support? Protect friendly C4I assets? Protect/secure use of the Electromagnetic Spectrum in the Joint Operations Area (JOA). During this phase, the JFACC will provide air superiority over the Arcoe peninsula and surrounding areas while the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC) forces prepare for combat. The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander (JFMCC) will focus on maritime domain awareness, perform maritime interception operations, and prepare amphibious forces for combat. JTF assets, both manned and unmanned, will provide real-time ISR support to answer J2 Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) and build a common operating picture (COP). The Joint Force Special Operations Component Commander (JFSOCC) will focus on strategic ISR to locate and identify WMD, tactical ballistic missile (TBM) launch sites, and high priority SAM locations as well as conduct psychological operations (PSYOPS) activities to influence the attitudes and behavior of enemy audiences. Appendix E shows additional UJTL information and the linkage to Joint Capability Areas and effects. As expected, they focus on the use of UAS to collect information on the enemy situation and also to conduct deception operations, provide surveillance of critical installations, and collect target information. Additional tasks to be performed by JTF assets include screening and security, early warning, maintaining contact with enemy defenses on mobilization, and detecting high priority targets. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-7

52 CCDR JFACC JFLCC JFMCC JFOCC UAS Capability to support JTF Mission and Tasks. Conduct persistent surveillance of critical enemy activities in difficult and denied areas by using sensors to capture timely, relevant, and interoperable source data Desired Effect.? Situational awareness and understanding fully developed.? Intelligence produced through persistent and pervasive observation in support of COP and enemy order of battle (EOB).? Legitimate air, sea, and ground activity distinguished from hostile activity.? Enemy air, sea, and land infiltration routes identified in order to facilitate force protection and friendly freedom of maneuver.? HN popular support gained and maintained UAS Assets. UAS Category Table 3-3 Available UAS Assets (Deter) Coverage Strategic 1 x 24 hour sortie EO/IR/SAR Capabilities Operational 10 x 24 hour sorties EO/IR/SAR/SIGINT/LD/WPNS T1 Multiple UAS assets (sorties as required) EO/IR T1 15 x UAS per BCT (sorties as required) EO/IR T2 4 x UAS per division 18 hours / day / system EO/IR/LD T3 2 x 24 hour sorties EO/IR/WPNS/LD T1 2 x UAS assets (sorties as required) EO/IR T2 1 x UAS asset (sorties as required) EO/IR T3 2 x UAS assets (sorties as required) EO/IR/LD Operational 1 x UAS Asset (sorties as required) EO/IR/SAR/SIGINT/LD/WPNS T1 Multiple UAS Assets (sorties as required) EO/IR T2 Multiple UAS assets (sorties as required) EO/IR/LD T3 1 x UAS Asset (sorties as required) EO/IR/WPNS/LD/Logistics Concept of Operations. The UAS most responsive to the JTF Staff will be the Strategic and Operational assets managed by the JFACC. These assets have the following characteristics:? Operate at medium to high altitudes (18,000 feet MSL to 60,000 feet MSL)? Medium Endurance (18-40 hours)? Capable of conducting two or more missions simultaneously. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-8

53 Together with other assets, UAS develop the shared situational awareness and produce intelligence through persistent and pervasive observation of all domains. The high reliability, medium endurance, and large sensor footprint allow responsive and persistent surveillance with a minimum number of assets. The focal point for JTF Strategic and Operational UAS assets during this phase will be RSTA in order to locate and identify high value targets/high-payoff targets (HVTs/HPTs) (Long Range Artillery, TBM, WMD, SOF Infiltration). Additional taskings will include support for maritime ISR and interdiction as well as JFSOCC special reconnaissance and PSYOPS activities. Tactical 1, 2, and 3 UAS will support their commands by providing reconnaissance, surveillance, security, early warning, long endurance persistent surveillance, visual mine detection, limited meteorological survey, wide area search, and will cue other sensors and platforms. Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) missions, in conjunction with ground elements, will enable seamless coverage along the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) and shorelines for battlefield awareness, counterinsurgency operations, and force protection. This support will be available day and night and in many adverse weather conditions, though smaller aircraft may not be available in high wind or icing conditions. Also, dense, low-level cloud cover may render UAS ineffective. In addition to weather, planners will be challenged to solve three issues: (1) Airspace Management, (2) Frequency Congestion, and (3) Data Distribution. The Deter Phase may prove especially challenging because the military will coexist with a populace that is trying to maintain normalcy. UAS coexistence with civilian traffic in highly populated areas will remain a challenge for the foreseeable future. Frequency congestion, especially in the C-Band, will limit the number of aircraft that can fly at any one time. Finally, UA sensors will produce Terabytes of information, most of which will not be especially useful, or will be of interest to individuals who will not know of its existence or have trouble accessing it. The data collection and distribution plan will be critical to the successful execution of this phase Command and Control. The JFC has many responsibilities, to include overall responsibility for airspace control and AD in a Joint theater of operations. The JAOC is the focal point for airspace management within a theater of operations. It provides the JFACC with the required staff to support his responsibilities. The JAOC supports component air assets by planning, coordinating, executing, controlling, monitoring, assessing, and reporting air operations. The JFACC develops a Joint air operations plan; recommends apportionment of the Joint air effort to the JFC; and provides centralized direction for allocation and taskings. Under normal circumstances, UAS assets will remain indigenous to their respective functional component. The inherent flexibility of the UAS, however, FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-9

54 should be fully exploited when the opportunity presents itself in a fluid, modern battle space. UAS in theater, but not actively employed, will be available for tasking by other component commanders, pending coordination and approval by owning commanders. Commanders and staffs at all echelons should focus on requesting the required capabilities and products versus tasking a specific UAS asset. Appropriate systems should be tasked to meet the requested capability via the appropriate command and operational tasking authority Airspace Management. Airspace management prevents mutual interference from all users of the airspace, facilitates AD identification, and accommodates the safe flow of all air traffic. UAS in this phase must comply with the ACO, ATO, and Airspace Control Special Instructions (SPINS) just There are two methods of airspace as manned systems do. control: positive and procedural. Positive Commanders, in coordination control identifies, tracks, and directs air with their airspace C2 element, assets using radars, identification friend should consider UAS airspace or foe, digital data links such as Blue requirements as early as possible Force Tracker, or other elements of the in the planning process and C2 system. Procedural control relies on submit the request for approval previously agreed to and distributed with equal urgency. In this airspace control measures. phase, it will be especially difficult to coordinate flights within the Arcoe Air Traffic Control (ATC) system, especially if there is increased flight traffic caused by impending hostilities. Civilian ATC will control the airspace until hostilities begin. At that time, airspace control will be transferred to the military. Staffs must continuously monitor, update, and refine airspace coordination during mission execution. Staffs should establish control measures that allow civil-military separation and manned-unmanned separation. Strategic assets routinely operate at or above 40,000 feet MSL, but require special launch and recovery coordination. Operational UA operate from 15,000 to 40,000 feet MSL and require similar coordination for launch and recovery. Tactical UA operate at altitudes below 15,000 feet, but this is still controlled by civil authorities in most areas. Tactical UA do not usually require established runways for take-off and landings, allowing more flexibility. UA operating outside the Arcoe territorial waters do not typically require civil coordination. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-10

55 Spectrum Management. The Joint Spectrum Office and theater frequency managers (J6) deconflict the frequency spectrum. Key spectrum management concerns during this phase include:? Local frequency interference and denial of service? Jamming? SATCOM availability? Terrestrial bandwidth availability? LOS frequency band availability (C-band, X-band)? Ultrahigh Frequency (UHF) SATCOM priority? GPS interference. Employment considerations will be driven by frequency availability. JFC will have overall apportionment responsibilities JFACC. Strategic and operational JFACC UAS assets support JFC PIR through recurring imaging of critical named areas of interest (NAI) utilizing EO/IR, SAR, and augmented by any available SIGINT capability. Intelligence data will be disseminated via BLOS data links from the platform to an appropriately equipped Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) organization or injected into the GBS architecture for the purpose of exploitation. UAS assets will be used in conjunction with other manned ISR assets in order to develop the COP and EOB. Portions of JFACC strategic imaging missions will be conducted in support of JFMCC PIR (port surveillance, maritime activity) due to lack of JFMCC operational and strategic UAS assets in theater. JFLCC and JFSOCC PIR will also be supported in order to identify and locate WMD, TBM launchers, and long-range artillery capable of striking key population centers. JFACC will use T1 and Aerostat UAS for force protection based on base commander discretion JFLCC. Tactical UAS assets (T1, T2, T3) conduct persistent surveillance along the ZOS and of enemy activities (within their capabilities) across the ZOS through the use of full motion video EO/IR sensors. Focus of efforts will be along the ZOS to identify incursions. Cueing may be provided from manned assets as well as other JTF UAS assets. Smaller tactical assets, due to their limited range, will conduct missions to support LOC surveillance, local area force protection, convoy security, and local reconnaissance in support of patrols. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-11

56 JFMCC. Ship-based T3 UAS assets will perform persistent reconnaissance and surveillance in the littoral areas while T2 and T1 assets will provide local coverage in support of maritime interception operations. Land-based tactical assets, if they have arrived on the Arcoe peninsula, will provide support of local area force protection and friendly LOC JFSOCC. Operational UAS will provide strategic imaging of items of military interest in the ZOS, locate and identify long-range artillery capable of striking key population centers, and provide limited SIGINT capability. Tactical T3 assets will execute operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences in the operational area to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. Smaller tactical assets will perform local reconnaissance and surveillance in support of patrols and special reconnaissance missions. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-12

57 Figure 3-2. OV-1 for Deter Operations FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-13

58 MCO Phase 2 (Seize the Initiative) JTF Mission. JTF defends in depth across the Arcoe peninsula to defeat the Darco attack. On order, the JTF will attack to defeat the Darco integrated air defense (IAD) system; neutralize long range artillery (LRA); destroy WMD; and defeat SOF. Beach Party Team (BPT) will conduct the counter offensive in order to restore the territorial integrity of Arcoe. UAS will perform many of the same missions as before but with fewer airspace and spectrum restrictions. UAS will be used increasingly for Target Designation, Attack, Communications Relay, and Signals Intelligence JTF Tasks. The JFACC will be the main effort during this phase, gaining and maintaining air superiority and conducting defensive counter-air operations. JTF elements will conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to maintain a COP and perform security operations to protect the force from hostile acts or influences. They will conduct defensive operations in order to defeat the Darco attack and prepare for the counter offensive. The JTF will conduct actions to deploy, shift, regroup, or move Joint operational formations within the JOA from less to more promising locations relative to enemy locations. Other critical tasks during this phase include Joint force targeting, time sensitive targeting, close air support, SEAD, maritime domain awareness, ship to objective maneuver (STOM), and maritime interdiction operations. JFSOCC will continue their strategic focus on WMD and begin to execute direct action missions on HVT. Additional tasks include monitoring of strategic lanes of ingress south of the ZOS, conducting PSYOPS activities to influence the attitudes and behavior of enemy audiences, and conducting irregular warfare and raids against HVI/HVT UAS Capability to support JTF Mission and Tasks. Conduct persistent reconnaissance and surveillance of critical enemy activities to defeat high value and high impact targets Desired Effect.? Situational awareness and understanding developed and maintained.? Intelligence produced through persistent and pervasive observation in support of COP and EOB.? Enemy air, sea, and land infiltration routes identified in order to facilitate force protection and friendly freedom of maneuver.? Darco operational forces destroyed or neutralized in order to defeat the offensive. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-14

59 ? HN popular support gained and maintained UAS Assets. UAS assets, coverage, and capabilities will not change significantly from Phase Concept of Operations. The available capability will not change significantly as the JTF seizes the initiative. Airspace and spectrum restrictions will still exist though tactical considerations will take more precedence than during the deterrence phase allowing commanders more flexibility. The JTF will need to monitor the loss of air vehicles as commanders accept greater risk in order to meet their mission objectives, though this will be balanced somewhat by the arrival of replacement systems and aircraft. Also, the air platforms will begin to accumulate hours and will need both scheduled and unscheduled maintenance. JFACC assets support recurring imaging of critical task areas utilizing EO/IR, SAR, and augmented by any available SIGINT capability. The roll back of Darco s Integrated Air Defense (IAD) systems will be of critical importance, as it will allow UA to exploit their full capabilites throughout the AOR. Target acquisition, target designation, and direct attack by UAS assets will increase significantly as Darco forces begin their offensive across the ZOS. JTF tactical UAS assets will have an ISR focus in order to locate and identify enemy maneuver forces, long range artillery, TBMs, and AD. JFACC support of JFLCC and JFMCC tasks becomes of vital importance during this phase, especially the later portion as the counter offensive begins. JFSOCC missions continue across the spectrum with emphasis on RSTA and direct action in support of SOF raids, unconventional warfare, and combat search and rescue (CSAR). Operational and Tactical T3 assets become more important as the pace of operations intensifies and the priority increases Command and Control. Under normal circumstances, UAS assets will remain indigenous to their respective combatant commanders; however, due to the inherent flexibility of the UAS, it will be possible to task other component commander s assets, pending coordination and approval by owning commanders. Because the main effort will transition from the JFACC to the JFLCC during this phase, UAS asset allocation to another component commander will be more common in order to fulfill high priority taskings. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-15

60 Airspace Management. Beginning in Phase 2, the military would control the airspace within the Arcoe/Darco Area of Operations. The airspace control measures established by the JTF Staff from phase 1 will not differ considerably as phase 2 begins. The blanket altitudes which were in use by the various UAS A Co/15th Military Intelligence Battalion platforms will likely be supported Task Force Falcon out of Skopje, reduced due to inherent Macedonia International Airport from 1999 saturation on airspace by through Missions required close manned aircraft sorties coordination with the Macedonian civilian conducting defensive and ATC, the Combined Air Operations Center offensive counter air (CAOC) in Italy, the Task Force Falcon G-2, operations. For example, and the supported units on the ground. Once at operational UAS which were mission altitude within Macedonian airspace, operating between 15,000 to A/15th operators coordinated entrance into 40,000 feet MSL during Kosovo (CAOC controlled) airspace IAW the phase 1 will now be limited Air Tasking Order via landline or secure chat. to 15,000 to 25,000 feet Typically, a pre-planned target deck from the MSL. Another airspace G-2 would serve as a starting point for the control measure which can mission, and the G-2 would dynamically retask the Hunter UAS on station to support be employed is the use of kill boxes and key pads. A kill contingency operations. This dynamic retasking was accomplished via secure chat or box is a three-dimensional coordination measure used to secure landline. They disseminated EO/IR facilitate the expeditious air- feeds via the Joint Broadcast System which to-surface engagement of enabled commanders from the Pentagon targets, which may be to Task Force Falcon Headquarters to receive augmented by surface-to- near-real time video. surface indirect fires; however, it has become common practice during recent conflicts to use the kill box structure to deconflict aircraft in the AOR Spectrum Management. Although spectrum management restrictions will be reduced with the onset of hostilities, military planners will still face numerous challenges as more forces flow into theater and civilian spectrum interference continues. Frequency jamming and interference, from both friendly and enemy activities, will degrade UAS operations across the AOR as both command and control datalinks and GPS reception will be impacted. Spectrum availability, especially in C-band and X- band, will continue to be restricted as multiple assets compete for the limited bandwidth. The JTF will have to rank UAS employment and frequency requirements as a high priority if they are to be utilized to their full potential. Electronic protection is critical to survival of UAS assets and mission execution. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-16

61 JFACC. Counterair operations are the JFACC's top priority with emphasis shifting to counterland as the Darco IAD is neutralized. The JFACC will utilize the persistence and payloads of multiple categories of UAS assets to support his immediate priorities and JTF PIR. Strategic UAS assets will look deep into the enemy's rear areas to find and fix high priority targets such as strategic SAM batteries, TBM launch sites, WMD, and regime leadership targets. Once located, these targets will be handed off to appropriate strike assets. Operational UAS will initially focus on targets in the vicinity of the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), supporting the IAD rollback and providing Close Air Support to friendly ground forces. They will do this by locating, identifying, and sometimes attacking targets such as tactical SAM batteries, artillery emplacements, massed troop formations, and SOF infiltrations. As the IAD is rolled back and ground offensive slows, Operational UAS can expect to begin moving deeper into enemy held territory in support of Air Interdiction operations JFLCC. JFLCC elements will utilize tactical and UAS to maintain situational awareness and understanding, protect the force, and defeat the Darco offensive. Larger T3 assets, with their longer range and endurance, will focus efforts on locating troop concentrations, long range artillery and TBMs while the smaller T2 and T1 systems are employed to support lower echelon commanders RSTA and BDA requirements JFMCC. Ship-based T3 UAS assets will perform persistent ISR, target acquisition, and target designation in the littoral areas while T2 and T1 assets will provide local ISR in support of maritime interception and interdiction operations. While preparing for amphibious operations, JFACC assets will be required to build a common operating picture in depth due to the limited range and endurance of JFMCC assets. Landbased tactical assets will provide ISR in support of local area force protection and friendly LOC as the force arrives ashore JFSOCC. Operational UAS will provide strategic imaging of items of military interest in depth across the AOR in order to locate and identify HVTs. Tactical T3 assets will execute PSYOPS operations, support unconventional warfare, and perform limited logistics and re-supply activities to support special operations forces. Smaller tactical assets (T1 and T2) will support patrols and special reconnaissance missions. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-17

62 Figure 3-3. OV-1 for Seize the Initiative Operations FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-18

63 MCO Phase 3 (Dominate) JTF Mission. JTF conducts the counter offensive in depth across the Arcoe peninsula to defeat the Darco forces and restore the territorial integrity of Arcoe. On order, the JTF will conduct an amphibious assault in support of the counter offensive; destroy IAD, LRA, WMD, and SOF; conduct Operational Control Authority (OCA) in support of the counter offensive. UAS will be critical assets identifying and attacking High Value Targets during this phase. There will be few restrictions other than the congestion caused by military airspace users to include emitters. UAS will be used increasingly for Target Designation, Attack, Communications Relay, and Signals Intelligence in addition to their standard support of ISR activities JTF Tasks. The JFLCC typically assumes the main effort during this phase, conducting the counter offensive to defeat the Darco military. The JFMCC may conduct an amphibious landing in support of the counter offensive while simultaneously defeating the Darco Naval forces. The JFACC conducts (1) Counterair, (2) Strategic attack; (3) Airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; (4) Air interdiction; (5) Air mobility, and (6) Close air support, and the JFSOCC conducts direct action, counter-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, civil affairs operations, psychological operations, and information operations. The JTF operational tasks include:? Conduct Movement and Maneuver? Provide Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance? Employ Firepower? Provide Logistics and Personnel Support? Provide Command and Control? Provide Force Protection UAS Capability to support JTF Mission and Tasks. Conduct persistent surveillance of critical enemy activities to maintain air superiority and provide tactical and operational support to the JFLCC in counter offensive operations. Employ precision weapons to destroy HPTs/HVTs in support of offensive operations Desired Effect.? Situational awareness and understanding developed and maintained. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-19

64 ? Intelligence produced through persistent and pervasive observation in support of COP and EOB.? Enemy air, sea, and land infiltration routes identified in order to facilitate force protection and friendly freedom of maneuver.? Darco operational forces destroyed.? Ability of the enemy to command and control his forces is denied.? Arcoe territorial integrity restored UAS Assets. UAS assets and capabilities will not change significantly from Phase 2. UAS coverage could be impacted based on combat losses, attrition, and/or newly arriving friendly force UAS elements Concept of Operations. The available capability will remain fairly constant as the JTF initiates the Dominate Phase of Operations. Airspace and spectrum restrictions will be reduced as the military takes full control of the airspace, and civilians significantly reduce their air and signal traffic. Air vehicle Of the 45 UA lost losses will increase significantly as the pace of operations in Kosovo during increase. Though the loss of an asset is undesirable, a Operation Allied significant advantage of UA is their use in dangerous and Force, 26 were contaminated environments. The JTF will continue to combat and 19 were monitor the maintenance of the platforms as they begin to non-combat losses. exceed their normal operating tempo (OPTEMPO) by significant margins. Critical communications and processing components in the ground control elements will also begin to fail, further impacting UAS operations. Although UA may be the asset of choice for hostile environments, commanders and staffs must make survivability (the capability of the UA to avoid or withstand hostile actions) a primary objective. Use MTTP language. This can be true for Tactical 1 aircraft as well as the largest Strategic systems. Consider the Infantry soldier that has one UA in his backpack with no means of replacement. The cost of the aircraft is not as relevant as his inability to replace it or its criticality to his success. Tactical 1, 2, and 3 assets are critical at this stage of the operation. These assets are organic to commanders in contact with the enemy who require responsive and dedicated support to develop the situation and penetrate the fog of war. CBRNE missions may become critical as the enemy command becomes increasingly desperate. The focus of UAS taskings during phase 3 relates to attacking and destroying Darco forces across the AOR and supporting the counter offensive. JFACC priorities have shifted to support of ground elements in this phase; however, JFACC UAS FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-20

65 assets continue to support strategic and operational objectives. JFLCC assets conduct RSTA, attack, communications relay, and battle damage assessment as forces conduct their movements north. JFLCC will also be responsible for conducting civil military operations, deep attack, and mobile strike. Upon completion of the amphibious assault, U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) assets will transition from JFMCC control to JFLCC control. Additional JFMCC UAS assets will support naval fires, personnel recovery (PR) operations, de-mining operations, and SOF insertion. JFSOCC will be heavily involved in PSYOPS activities to influence the attitudes and behavior of enemy audiences and reconnaissance of likely SOF insertion routes. JFSOCC operational UAS will be employed deep in the AOR to support SOF special reconnaissance and direct action missions against WMD and other HVI/HVT Command and Control. This phase of the operation will normally necessitate decentralized Command and Control of UAS assets as commanders increasingly employ Tactical 1 and Tactical 2 aircraft to develop the tactical situation and as units in contact require access to ISR products. Coordinated and integrated OPLANs, ACPs, ACOs, and ATOs are essential for successful command and control of UAS. Closely coordinated C2, fire support (to include attack operations), and AD elements reduce the risk of fratricide and the unnecessary expenditure of resources. However, commanders must balance that risk with the requirements for an effective airspace defense. The JFLCC will be the main effort during phase 3 and as such, will receive the majority of UAS support. Other component command UAS assets, when flying in support of JFLCC missions, will transmit their data and products via LOS datalinks to RVTs across the battlespace or via BLOS through the use of GBS. 1/25 INF STRYKER Brigade Combat Team operated out of Mosul Airfield in northwestern Iraq in the spring of The 1/25 th organic Shadow platoon supported a Joint Cordon and Search mission for the leader of Al Qaeda in the Mosul sector in conjunction with a USAF Predator and a Special Operations Team. The Air Force Predator was responsible for wide area search and persistent surveillance while the Army brigade cordoned off the search area. The SOF unit searched house to house for insurgents using Remote Video Terminals to see both Predator and Shadow video. 1/25 th tactical operations center (TOC) received the Shadow feed directly from the aircraft and the Predator feed from the Global Broadcast System (GBS), providing the unit both feeds in the Brigade TOC. The Shadow Mission Commander communicated directly with the Predator controller in Nevada using mirc Chat and the SOF and other ground units using a combination of mirc chat and VHF/FM radios. The combined team was able to locate and apprehend the insurgents without friendly casualties. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-21

66 Airspace Management. The airspace control structure needs to be responsive to evolving enemy threat conditions and changing tactical situations requiring close coordination to deconflict airspace use with the increasing employment of Joint traffic and fires. Combat operations require prioritization and integration of combat zone airspace and AD activities, and airspace control procedures must assist in aircraft identification, facilitate engagement of enemy aircraft, and provide safe passage of friendly aircraft. UAS flights require airspace conflict resolution, established control measures, and coordinated missions with the other users. The UA separates in time, altitude, and sector (zone) from other aerial platforms and missions. Airspace control measures provide procedural control that reduces conflict. Communications among the controlling ground control element, airspace control element, fire support personnel, and FAC permit the UA mission to integrate with other missions. The following operational information should be coordinated with other airspace users:? Location of launch and recovery sites (LRS) and the altitude and radius around the launch site that must be avoided? Flight times? Operational altitudes (flight profile)? Ingress and egress routes from the LRS to the forward control station hand-off point? Area (route) of the intended flight Spectrum Management. Spectrum availability will continue to be an issue as all UAS bandwidths are saturated with users. Frequency jamming and interference will degrade UAS operations across the AOR as both command and control datalinks and GPS reception will be impacted. The JTF will have to rank UAS employment and frequency requirements as a high priority if they are to be utilized to their full potential JFACC. With air superiority achieved, the JFACC will place primary emphasis on Counterland operations. Strategic Attack, Air Interdiction, and CAS will all be performed to support the JFLCC counter offensive. Strategic UAS missions will continue to focus on strategic targets deep inside enemy territory, but will spend increasing time searching for tactical targets in support of offensive operations. Operational UAS will continue providing Surveillance and Reconnaissance on both sides of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL), supporting both Air Interdiction FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-22

67 and CAS missions in support of offensive operations. The JFACC will rapidly retask airborne UA as required to support accomplishment of the JFC's main effort JFLCC. The primary task of JFLCC UAS assets during this phase is RSTA in support of the counter offensive. Additional tasks include screening and security missions, early warning, detection of high priority targets, target designation, and attack with precision munitions. Smaller tactical UAS (T1 and T2) will support reconnaissance, force protection efforts, provide convoy security, and local ISR to support lower echelon commanders. T3 UAS will be employed by Division and Corps commanders to locate and identify high value targets such as WMD, long range artillery, TBMs, and reserve forces JFMCC. With the completion of the amphibious assault, JFMCC forces and UAS assets will focus on maritime domain awareness, naval fires, port blockade, CAS, and SEAD. JFMCC T3 UAS will also facilitate attack missions against time sensitive targets with a laser designator payload and conduct CBRNE reconnaissance JFSOCC. JFSOCC and other JTF UAS assets will support special operations raids, personnel recovery missions, and counter insurgency activities. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-23

68 Figure 3-4. OV-1 for Dominate Operations FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 3-24

69 CHAPTER 4 MILITARY SUPPORT TO STABILIZATION, SECURITY, TRANSITION, AND RECONSTRUCTION (SSTR) 4.1 Military Support to SSTR Operations. SSTR Operations are DoD activities that support U.S. Government plans for stabilization, security, reconstruction and transition operations, which lead to sustainable peace while advancing U.S. interests. 25 SSTR is not solely a military effort, but one that requires a carefully coordinated deployment of military and civilian, public and private, U.S. and international assets. This chapter discusses considerations for Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) use relevant to SSTR operations post MCO using the scenario previously presented in Chapter Scenario. The force is transitioning from the decisive combat operations phase of MCO described in the previous chapter to SSTR Operations Road to Transition. Once the end state to MCO is achieved, transition to civil authority control can begin. Support to SSTR plans are under international diplomatic review and await implementation. As the cease fire and treaty process progresses, friendly military forces establish bases of operation and begin the transition from MCO to SSTR. Host Nation (HN) military equipment will be secured and moved into containment areas during this phase. Partial redeployment begins as remaining force requirements are determined. The roles and responsibilities for UAS transition from acquiring and engaging targets to compliance monitoring and force protection Mission. On order the JTF should Conduct Strategic Communication; Establish and Maintain a Safe, Secure Environment; Deliver Humanitarian Assistance; Reconstitute Critical Infrastructure/Essential Services; Support Economic Development; Establish a Representative, Effective Government and the Rule of Law. Redeploy the force. 25 DODD Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR), 28 November FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4-1

70 Commander s Intent Purpose. Restore the territorial integrity of the HN and facilitate establishment of a legitimate government within a new domestic order Method.? Establish appropriate force protection measures.? Monitor and enforce compliance with terms of surrender.? Provide for basic needs of the populace (security, essential public services, economic development, and governance).? Facilitate transition to civil authority.? Provide humanitarian assistance.? Redeploy forces as appropriate End State. At the end of SSTR Operations:? An internationally supported representative government will have been established.? Public services will have been restored.? Effective internal and external security forces will have been established.? A self sustaining economy will have been established Intelligence Estimate. It is unlikely friendly forces will encounter an organized armed threat to internal security on a large scale. The prospects for broad social cohesion is high, therefore the threat for subversion and civil unrest is low. However, numerous small arms will be widely distributed among the population; and there is a risk that these will be used by organized crime organizations or local gangs or mobs. Any resistance will have access to a myriad of underground facilities throughout the country (it is estimated that there are more than 4,000 underground facilities near the ZOS alone). Weapons depots are also at risk of looting. High-value technologies and military assets are at risk of theft. Well established transportation routes into neighboring countries will facilitate movement of sensitive programs and technologies out of the HN for sale on the international black-market. The foreign intelligence service threat to friendly forces will be elevated for neighboring countries and the HN itself Friendly Force Structure. The base force structure is the same as used in the previous chapter. The status of the friendly force structure will depend on the progress of U.S. force FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4-2

71 deployment at the cessation of hostilities, and attrition. One of the primary tasks for this phase will be to determine a redeployment plan and what capabilities need to remain in place. In addition to a redeployment plan, a rotation policy will need to be established. 4.3 Assumptions.? The end state objectives described in Chapter 3 have been attained.? USMC ground forces remain ashore and under operational control of the JFLCC. 4.4 JTF Tasks. Specific UAS tasks during SSTR operations include:? Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance to build a common operating picture.? Locate, identify, and track hostile elements in all domains.? Provide early warning.? Locate and monitor enemy military equipment until secured.? Monitor and secure HN perimeter to preclude weapons export.? Detect mines (land and sea).? Perform communications relay.? Conduct damage assessment and assist continual assessment of infrastructure reconstitution.? Locate and monitor persons of interest. Additional JTF tasks UAS may support include:? Screen and secure LOCs.? Execute security operations with coalition partners, HN military and police forces as they are established.? Reconstitution of HN military may require training of HN UAS operators.? Monitor Meteorological and Oceanographic condition. Appendix E shows additional UJTL information and the linkage to JCAs and effects. 4.5 Desired Effect.? Secure LOCs will enable the force to have adequate supplies for sustainment and distribution to HN populace.? Civil authorities will have timely and adequate information and means to govern.? HN military equipment is controlled by friendly forces.? HN fully complies with terms of cease fire. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4-3

72 ? An orderly redeployment flow begins commensurate with transfer of control to appropriate civil authorities.? Civilian infrastructure supports basic necessities. 4.6 UAS Assets. Table 4-1. Available UAS Assets (SSTR) CCDR UAS Class Coverage Capabilities Strategic 1 x 24 hour sortie EO/IR/SAR JFACC Operational 10 x 24 hour sorties EO/IR/SAR/SIGINT/LD/WPNS T1 Multiple UAS assets (sorties as required) EO/IR T1 15 x UAS per BCT (sorties as required) EO/IR JFLCC T2 4 x UAS per division 18 hours / day / system EO/IR/LD T3 2 x 24 hour sorties EO/IR/WPNS/LD T1 2 x UAS assets (sorties as required) EO/IR JFMCC T2 1 x UAS asset (sorties as required) EO/IR T3 2 x UAS assets (sorties as required) EO/IR/LD Operational 1 x UAS Asset (sorties as required) EO/IR/SAR/SIGINT/LD/WPNS JFOCC T1 Multiple UAS Assets (sorties as required) EO/IR T2 Multiple UAS assets (sorties as required) EO/IR/LD T3 1 x UAS Asset (sorties as required) EO/IR/WPNS/LD/Logistics 4.7 Concept of Operations (CONOPS). While conducting MCO, the JFC must ensure that the campaign maintains focus on achieving the desired strategic end states, which is, setting the conditions for achieving SSTR objectives needed to create a new domestic order and a viable, regional peace. The JFC can anticipate overlap between MCO and SSTR operations with some areas of the newly established HN containing active sympathizers to the former regime while other parts of the country are relatively peaceful and supportive. The Joint Force will assume a supporting role once a legitimate civil authority is established and as soon as conditions permit. The priority for the Joint Force shifts from MCO to SSTR operations. Lower echelons may receive more priority for UAS support with ground units operating more autonomously to complete the tasks in their geographic areas. The force may employ both kinetic and non-kinetic means to capture and defeat subversive activity, often in dense urban environments, while minimizing collateral damage. Rules of Engagement (ROE) will be more restrictive in SSTR operations. The level of acceptable risk is reduced. Weather and terrain considerations may dictate continued UAS deployment, which may be seasonal. UAS can provide military presence and may be operated in a more overt posture. The JFC may need to establish UAS forward basing to facilitate mission accomplishment. Planning should consider humanitarian relief and natural disaster contingencies. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4-4

73 Success depends on the ability to develop situational awareness and understanding and to produce intelligence through persistent and pervasive observation of all domains. This depends on the ability to develop intelligence requirements, coordinate and position the appropriate collection assets, from the national to the tactical level. The J2 is responsible for integrating the efforts of National Intelligence capabilities, Joint Force Intelligence resources and Component Command Intelligence assets to plan and conduct Intelligence operations through the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC). The J2 collates PIRs from the JFC and Component Commanders. PIRs will also include identifying and prioritizing what areas need humanitarian assistance or infrastructure reconstitution. In collaboration with the Component Commanders and J2, the J3 determines what assets are available for tasking to satisfy the JFC s PIRs. The JFACC normally has the preponderance of airborne assets to satisfy the JFC s PIRs, but other Component Commanders organic assets may also be able to accomplish the task, either through a dedicated operation or as an ancillary task. For example, the J2 identifies suspected locations of weapons caches and updates those as more intelligence is collected. Once located, more persistent surveillance may be required until the site can be secured. Persistent surveillance is the forte of UAS, but could potentially be accomplished by other assets, such as a U-2. A U-2 may be preferable to UAS depending on the weather, which could preclude effective UAS mission accomplishment. Depending on the proximity of friendly land forces, this task could be accomplished by JFLCC assets. In any case, the results of the surveillance need to be transmitted to the appropriate C2 authority to direct appropriate response to suspicious activity at a weapons cache. Specific UAS tasks during SSTR operations include:? Locate, tag, and track hostile elements in all domains.? Monitor and secure HN perimeter to preclude weapons export or insurgent activity.? Assist in locating, tracking and containment of enemy equipment.? Execute security operations with coalition partners, HN military and police forces as they are established.? Reconstitution of HN military may require training of HN UAS operators.? Assist continual assessment of infrastructure reconstitution.? Locate and monitor persons of interest.? Meteorological and Oceanographic condition monitoring.? Damage assessment. 4.8 Command and Control (C2). The JFC must be able to effectively coordinate and integrate efforts between elements of the DoD, engaged U.S. Government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This requires the capability to conduct seamless knowledge sharing among DoD elements, U.S. Government agencies, and multinational partners prior to, during, and after the completion of SSTR FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4-5

74 operations. The JFC must create the ability to disseminate information to appropriate members of the interagency community to ensure consistent communication and support a User-Defined Operational Picture. UAS tasking will be influenced progressively more by civilian authorities as the Joint Force assumes a supporting role. Military command and control is more decentralized to allow area commanders more autonomy to respond to the specific conditions within their geographic areas. Redeployment considerations should package personnel and equipment into optimal units to meet operational demands. 4.9 Airspace Management. Airspace management transitions from military to civilian control. The JFACC is the ACA and facilitates transition to host nation control. A multi-phase process includes initial military control, followed by HN training and shared control, and eventually relinquishing control to civil authority. Transition from military to civilian airspace control will begin by establishing high altitude air routes. As conditions permit, civilian ATC facilities will be established with coordinated responsibilities, followed by designation of Terminal Control Areas (TCA) as required with corresponding departure and arrival routing. This transition will have an impact on UAS operations in proximity to civilian air traffic. The JFACC will establish procedures and control measures for use of UAS in joint (civilian/military) use airspace. UAS corridors and Restricted Operating Zones (ROZ) will be set up to deconflict civilian and military aircraft. Communication links need to be established between military and civilian air traffic control. Generally, as more civilian air traffic is accommodated, the availability for UAS employment is decreased Spectrum Management. Incorporate Joint Force and HN Spectrum Policies, Regulations, and Radio Frequency (RF) spectrum bands into planning. Determine if UAS spectrum requirements conflict with the HN or those of countries that border the JOA. Improvements to civilian infrastructure, such as cellular phone networks, will impact UAS operations. Generally, the more frequency spectrum that is made available to civilian authorities the less UAS will be available for use JFACC. The JFACC will conduct theater level operations in support of JFC tasking. As operational focus expands, JFACC UAS will be tasked to support lower echelon commanders. Through PIR arrangement or dynamic re-tasking when warranted, JFACC UAS assets will be made available to provide imagery collection support to non-dod governmental agencies. Where technical means exist, such as RVT, the JFACC will implement procedures to allow direct download of data and imagery to supported agencies. Other JFACC tasks include:? Conduct theater level operations in support of JFC tasking. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4-6

75 ? Border security, surveillance and reconnaissance.? Perform combat operations as required.? Determine an air asset redeployment plan for JFC approval.? Coordinate UAS tasking or allocation JFLCC. The JFLCC would operate organic UAS assets to conduct JFC tasking. Organic units provide capability to multiple echelons. With the cessation of hostility, the JFLCC may increase the operational footprint of Army and shore-based USMC UAS assets, allowing supported units a greater degree of access to UAS support. Where technical means are available, supported ground units, including non-dod governmental agencies and NGOs, will receive UAS support. Other JFLCC tasks include:? Extend presence and communications reach in rebuilding infrastructure and establishment of a stabilized government.? Monitor population movements and gatherings.? Provide persistent military presence in combination with other aircraft.? Joint Force Protection.? Counterinsurgency or peace stabilization operations (as required) JFMCC. The JFMCC will operate organic UAS assets to conduct JFC tasking. Navy and USMC UAS afloat will rely on sea-basing to conduct UAS operations. The area of operation will cover primarily the littoral (coastline, brown water) and blue water regions, but can also extend to inland riparian areas (supporting riverine operations). UAS control from ship-based control stations may require communications relay to extend AV-control and data link reach. The JFMCC continues to conduct broad area maritime surveillance, and when the situation permits, supports overland imagery collection efforts. Other JFMCC tasks include:? Secure sea basing, ports and sea-lanes of communication.? Support maritime interception JFSOCC. The JFSOCC will operate organic UAS assets to conduct JFC tasking. UAS can provide ISR support in Direct Action to capture High Value Individuals (HVIs). HVIs are likely to be former regime rogues and foreign insurgent elements. UAS can support PSYOPS to influence the HN populace by leaflet dissemination, humanitarian assistance supply delivery, or to relay radio and television broadcasts. Other JFSOCC tasks include:? Civil Affairs FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4-7

76 ? Foreign Internal Defense? Humanitarian Assistance. AWACS CONUS USAF Mdm Alt UAVS USAF High Alt UAVS USA ER/MP USA ER/MP Comms Relay JTRS USA TUAV USA CL IV JFMCC T3 li A2C2S Shipboard CS/DCGS X UA GCS/DCGS-A GCS/DCGS-A (FWD) XXXX JTF X GCS USMC GCS/DCGS-A HAA Comms Relay WIN-T Network Figure 4-1. OV-1 for SSTR Operations FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 4-8

77 CHAPTER 5 HOMELAND DEFENSE AND SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES 5.1 Homeland Defense. The purpose of HD is to protect against and mitigate the impact of incursions or attacks on sovereign territory, the domestic population, and to defend critical infrastructure. The DoD is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA), supported by other agencies, in defending against external threats/aggression. However, against internal threats DoD may be in support of Department of Homeland Security (DHS). When ordered to conduct HD operations within U.S. territory, DoD will coordinate closely with other government agencies (OGAs). Consistent with laws and policy, the Services will provide capabilities to support the CCDR requirements against a variety of threats to national security through the air, land, sea, space, and the information environment. These include invasion, computer network attack, and air and missile attacks Scenario. A major international soccer tournament is scheduled to begin tomorrow and last for 2 weeks in Seattle. The SecDef has designated this event to be a special event for homeland security (SEHS) level 1, in accordance with DODD Per an agreement between the DoD and OGA responsible for the security of the soccer tournament, the CDR, NORAD/USNORTHCOM has activated JTF-Sports as the command HQ to provide Civil Support during the tournament. The mission of Operation Soccer is to monitor the event site and be prepared to support civil agencies when requested. Because the event is being held in Seattle, a major port, there is emphasis on maritime approaches to the city. NORAD has pre-positioned a number of air assets, both manned and unmanned, that will be available to provide this support. As described below, the JTF has established a Joint Operating Center (JOC) and has established communications connectivity among the units under his control as well as other relevant OGA locations. There have been strong indications that radical Islamic terrorists are intent on disrupting the tournament as a way of protesting the war in Iraq. Intelligence indicates that they are going to attempt to transport via ship and ultimately detonate some type of CBRNE device in a U.S. or Canadian west coast harbor. The JTF- Sports assets are the most readily available to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute this threat. Therefore, in coordination with the civil agencies responsible for security at the tournament, DoD is designated as lead for Operation Ship Stopper, a Homeland Defense mission to locate, monitor, and potentially intercept and board the suspect ship. The CJCS has designated USNORTHCOM as the supported CCDR for this operation. 26 DODD Support to Special Events, 21 November FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-1

78 Assumptions. COAs have been approved for UAS operations in support of Operation Soccer in the Seattle area. The Global Hawk Maritime Demonstration (GHMD) system (Level 5 UAS), although primarily a Test and Evaluation asset, will be available for limited operational employment when requested for homeland security (HS) missions. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) National Security Cutter will be modified to launch, operate, and recover the Scan Eagle system (Level 2 UAS) Road to Threat. The US has thousands of miles of coastline and they rely on ocean transportation for 95 percent of cargo tonnage that moves in and out of the country. This combination of a large area to be protected, large volume of activity, and a relatively rapid transfer from the point of entry make shipping containers and ports possible conduits and targets for terrorist activities. In 2007, the DHS is seeking to increase container ship interdiction efforts above current levels along the western seaboard due to increased threat reporting. Analysis of data recovered after the capture of a terrorist in North Africa revealed plans targeting population centers along the west coast of U.S. and Canada. U.S. security enhancements, through inclusion of DoD personnel and resources, will greatly increase the effectiveness of this effort and lead to greater confidence in the U.S. government s ability to detect potentially hazardous materials that might be used by entities hostile to the U.S Mission (Homeland Defense). On order, JTF-Sports conducts operations to locate, identify, track and intercept potentially hazardous ship-borne materials as far from the U.S. or Canadian ports as possible. This mission has been designated Operation Ship Stopper Commander s Intent Purpose. The JTF will dedicate forces to perform Incident Awareness and Assessment (IAA) to provide early identification, monitoring, and interception of a ship with CBRNE cargo. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-2

79 Method. Share secure, near-real time IAA information with DHS and OGA. Deploy forces to plan and execute a Vessel Boarding Search and Seizure (VBSS) of suspect ships if CBRNE cargo is likely on-board. Forcibly detain suspect ships and apply the necessary force required to prevent them from proceeding into U.S. protected waters End State. Suspect vessel(s) identified and intercepted prior to entering a harbor and the CBRNE cargo neutralized Intelligence Estimate. Increased intelligence chatter indicates terrorists are in advanced stages of planning a credible ship-borne threat to the U.S. and Canada. Intelligence indicates that shipping containers are involved in the plot, but details relating to points of departure are vague. The intelligence community estimates that the highest probability for attack is Seattle due to the symbolic significance of the sporting event, casualties possible, and impact it will have on the American economy if successful. The most likely scenario for employment of the weapon is atmospheric dispersion. Method of execution is unknown at this time Friendly Force Structure. Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty personnel have been directed to provide support to local civil forces as necessary for JTF-Sports. When this HD mission, Operation Ship Stopper is initiated, these forces will continue to work for the JTF Commander as the overall lead of the operation. The following air assets may be tasked to support the effort in 2007: 2 x P-3 AIP (USN) 4 x Domestic Use Level 2 UAS 4 x Domestic Use Level 3 UAS 1 x Domestic Use Level 5 UAS 1 x Marine Airborne Re-Transmission System (MARTS) with Communications and C-band relay payload Joint Force Headquarters Tasks. The JTF Commander has assigned the following tasks to UAS in support of this mission: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-3

80 Intelligence collection Maritime vessel identification Area surveillance to detect, monitor, and communicate traffic movement CBRNE monitoring, detection, early warning Meteorological and Oceanographic condition monitoring Effects. Legitimate maritime activity distinguished from hostile maritime activity Situational awareness and understanding maintained; relevant data/information provided in support of HD operations Early detection and interception of maritime threats as far from the Homeland as possible Prevented hostile action(s) to U.S. maritime and coalition maritime partners in the littoral, coastal, and international waters Prevented use of the maritime domain from exploitation by terrorists Maritime threat identified, tracked, intercepted, and defeated in the Forward Regions and / or Approaches; attack on the Homeland prevented Concept of Operations. This HD mission will be conducted in four (4) phases: Shaping, Deployment, Operation, and Transition Shaping. JTF-Sports is fully operational providing civil support of OGA to help ensure the security of the Soccer Tournament. A Level 5 UAS, four Level 3, and four Level 2 UAS are pre-deployed to Whidbey Island Naval Air Station, WA and are available to support taskings in the Seattle area. A MARTS aerostat can be tethered over land to relay communications between the UAS and the ground operations centers. The JTF JOC has been established in the Seattle area, and full communications are operational with the NORAD/USNORTHCOM Command Center, the JFACC and his JAOC at Tyndall AFB, FL, the Pacific Area Maritime Intelligence Fusion Center (PAC MIFC), and the USCG at the Seattle Coast Guard Station. This communications capability includes the ability to send full motion video (FMV), SAR, GMTI, and EO/IR data among these locations. Intelligence has received a Tip on a ship that departed a foreign port. This information is considered credible, and the NCA, in coordination with the FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-4

81 DoD and OGA, has determined that the ship should be tracked, identified, and possibly boarded and seized if CBRNE cargo is discovered. Because this is a Homeland Defense mission, the DoD is the lead agency, and JTF-Sports has assumed leadership. It will be supported by OGA as required. The National Vessel Movement Center (NVMC) requires foreign ships to provide a 96-hour advance notice of arrival plus more information about the ship, cargo, and all people on board information that is shared with other intelligence and law enforcement agencies to detect threats. In addition, ships approaching the U.S. are tracked by the PAC MIFC, which was established in Alameda, CA on Oct 1, JTF-Sports has tasked the JFACC to coordinate with the NVMC and PAC MIFC and to track the movement of the suspect ship, identify it and to provide information to assist the USCG to determine if the ship should be interdicted and searched. The JFACC will coordinate with OGA to determine if and which airborne manned and unmanned assets will be needed to support this emerging mission. They will estimate the impact of this requirement on the main sporting event. The JTF will request additional UAS assets as necessary to support Operation Ship Stopper. Airspace Management-- COAs have been approved for UAS operations in support of Operation Soccer in the Seattle area including the city and port and ocean extending to the Seattle ATC limit. A temporary flight restriction (TFR) has been defined but will not be activated unless required. The JFACC will normally serve as the ACA for Title 10 assets. The JFACC will coordinate with the FAA for additional airspace if needed for operations as the suspect ship gets closer to CONUS. Frequency Management and Allocation--The JFACC will obtain communications frequencies for SATCOM to support BLOS operation with the JAOC and LOS frequencies to communicate with the USCG ship that is designated to conduct the VBSS Deployment. UAS are already deployed to support Operation Soccer. The Level 3 and Level 5 UAS should be available for immediate re-tasking to find, track, and identify the suspect ship and will launch as soon as possible if not already in flight to support PAC MIFC operations. The JFACC will coordinate the schedules for launch of these aircraft. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-5

82 The Level 2 ship-borne UA will be on-board the USCG National Security Cutter (NSC) and will be readied for employment from the NSC when the suspect ship gets within 200 nm of the CONUS which is the maximum point of entrance to the Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) as per Proclamation 5030 (signed on March 10, 1983, by U.S. President Ronald Reagan) Operation. The JFACC will coordinate with the NVMC and the MIFC to obtain as much information as possible on the location and track of the suspect ship. The JFACC has decided to use the Level 5 UA to locate the ship using its SAR, GMTI, and EO/IR sensors and to provide persistent observation. The UA also will cross-cue with national assets to narrow the search. He chose this asset because its long endurance and wide area search capability is ideally suited for this mission Figure 5-1, OV -1 for Homeland Defense Operations FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-6

83 The Level 5 UA locates the suspect ship approximately 600 NM from the CONUS. The UAS will cross-cue a P-3 that will be able to fly at low altitude to obtain visual identification of the suspect ship. Once the suspect ship is identified, the Level 5 UA will continuously track and monitor the ship for unusual activity on-board. This aircraft will also use SIGINT to monitor communications to or from the suspect ship. When the suspect ship reaches 200 NM from the U.S. coast, the USCG NSC on station will launch a Level 2 UA. The Level 5 UA will pass responsibility for monitoring the suspect platform to the Level 2 UA, being controlled from the NSC that will continue to send information to the JTF and components to determine if there is sufficient information to order a VBSS. The Level 5 UA will stay on station and continue to use its SIGINT sensor to monitor communications. The FMV from the Level 2 UA shows significant nighttime deck activity, and the Level 5 UA detects some suspicious communications to/from the suspect ship. Based on this information and other intelligence, the JFC determines that a boarding is warranted. The USCG will conduct the VBSS using a Short Range Prosecutor (SRP). The Level 2 UAS will provide Near Real Time FMV feed directly to the on-scene NSC and the JAOC during intercept. The NSC maintains close communications with the SRP, while continuing to monitor the output from the Level 2 UA. Additionally, when the suspect ship reaches 200 NM from the coast, the JFACC will launch a Level 3 UA equipped with onboard sensors for CBRN detection and contaminated area operations. It will also measure meteorological conditions in case the suspect ship s crew decides to release CBRN. The boarding party, composing personnel from the local USCG Maritime Safety and Security Team (MSST) stationed aboard the NSC in support of the sports event, confirms that the ship does have suspicious cargo; they seize the ship and secure the cargo. Airspace Management The Level 5 UA will fly at 60,000 feet or greater, well above any other air traffic. The JAOC will coordinate with the NSC to ensure the Level 2 UA is clear of the Level 3 UA during passes for CBRN detection Transition. On scene commander of MSST declares the ship and cargo secure and escorts the ship to Naval Weapons Station, Concord, CA, which contains a remote pier facility for transfer of hazardous materials and dangerous goods. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-7

84 At this time, the JTF Commander declares the mission complete and he returns to a supporting role and monitors for possible follow-on attempts for the duration of the sporting event. 5.2 Civil Support (Natural Disasters). Civil Support (CS) is defined as the application of DoD s rapid response and other technical capabilities to domestic emergencies or disasters in support of civil authorities. CS includes, but is not limited to, support to U.S. civil authorities for natural and manmade domestic emergencies, civil disturbances, and authorized law enforcement activities. The scenario depicted will focus on CS in response to a natural disaster Scenario. Hurricane Brian, a Category 3 hurricane, will make landfall within hours, affecting multiple states in the gulf coast area, to include a major population center. Storm surge and wind damage will incapacitate public utilities, transportation infrastructure, and communications. The DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has submitted a request for DoD assistance (RFA). The CJCS has designated USNORTHCOM as the supported CCDR for this operation. The CDR, USNORTHCOM has activated JTF-Brian as the command control HQ Assumptions:? National assets are available for tasking.? The GHMD/ Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAS will be made available to support CS operations.? One or two additional UAS will apply for a COA to aid in the hurricane rescue efforts (RQ-4A/Global Hawk) Mission. On order, JTF-Brian conducts Defense Support to Civil Authority (DSCA) for Disaster Relief (DR) operations along the Southeastern U.S. coastline in response to Hurricane Brian Commander s Intent Purpose The JTF will support OGAs, LFAs, and primary federal agencies (PFAs) in CS operations understanding that the population is U.S. citizens, who need help and assistance, as opposed to occupation and liberation. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-8

85 CS includes using the Armed Forces of the United States and DoD personnel, contractors and assets for domestic emergencies and law enforcement and other activities when directed by the President or SecDef. CS missions typically fall into three areas military support to civil authorities (MSCA), military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA), and military assistance for civil disturbances (MACDIS). We will be prepared to support all three types of mission areas should the need arise Method The protection of life will be the number one priority, followed closely by the preservation of property, peace, order, and public safety. The JTF will provide basic relief such as medical supplies, food, and water to prevent loss of life and ease suffering in the affected area. The JTF will be prepared to deploy to staging bases when conditions permit to ensure quick response. We will coordinate closely with other government agencies consistent with laws and policy. On order, the JTF will redeploy appropriate assets as the CS mission is completed End State Conditions set for restoration of public utilities, sanitation facilities, transportation, local law enforcement, and communications so that civil authorities can operate freely in a secure environment Impact Estimate. There will be approximately 200,000 displaced persons in both rural and urban areas. While State and local officials have an evacuation plan, it is anticipated that there will still be a large percentage of people who decide to remain behind. It is estimated that thousands of Gulf Coast residents either cannot or will not evacuate. Lack of public utilities, poor sanitation, over-tasked public safety agencies, and degraded infrastructure will hamper survival and relief efforts. Local petroleum, sewage treatment plants, and chemical plants may be damaged and could contaminate wide areas. The local community is incapable of performing recovery operations without assistance. There is potential for civil unrest and violence involving individual or group use of small arms and automatic weapons Friendly Force Structure: (abbreviated). Guard, Reserve, and Active Duty personnel have been directed to provide support to local civil forces as necessary. The following air and land assets may be tasked to support the effort in 2007: FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-9

86 Title 10: 2 x P-3C Aircraft Improvement Program (AIP) (USN) 1 x U-2 with Optical Bar Camera 4 x Domestic Use Level 2 UAS 1 x Domestic Use Level 3 UAS (4 x MQ-1/Predator) 1 x Domestic Use Level 5 UAS (RQ-4A/Global Hawk) 1 x Domestic Use Level 5 UAS (GHMD) 1 x Domestic Use Level 2 MARTS 2 x F-16 Theater Airborne Recon System (TARS) 2 x WC-130 (USAF Reserve) 10 x Remote Video Receiver (ROVER III) Title 32: 1 x RC-26 C-130 Scathe View Title 14: Coast Guard assets OGA: DIA DC-3 P-3 Customs and Border Protection (CBP) C-182/C-172/GA-8 Civil Air Patrol (CAP) Twin Engine Turbo - Environmental Protections Agency (EPA) ASPECT (hyper-spectral sensor) Joint Task Force Headquarters UAS Tasks. The following are illustrative tasks that would be assigned to UAS in support of CS missions. The actual missions will be dependent upon civil authority requirements and the output from mission analysis:? Provide support to IAA operations? Support to Personnel Recovery (PR) o Search and Rescue? Support to Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) o Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)? Damage Assessment support Effects. The following are the effects that UAS may provide to the Civil Support mission:? Timely / accurate intelligence coordinated / shared among interagency, inter-government, and multi-national agencies. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-10

87 ? Situational awareness and understanding maintained; relevant data/information provided in support of LFA priorities.? Timely and accurate information provided to LEA; civil unrest and unlawfulness avoided.? Timely and accurate information concerning civil and military facilities and critical infrastructure provided; accurate assessments completed.? Timely and accurate information provided to civil authorities, personnel requiring rescue located and recovered Concept of Operations: The concept of operations for CS will be generally conducted in five (5) phases: Shaping, Staging, Deployment, Support to Civil Authorities, and Transition (JP 3-28) 27. Many of these phases may be conducted simultaneously Shaping. (Pre-disaster) The USNORTHCOM is monitoring the hurricane track at its Command Center in Colorado Springs, CO. USNORTHCOM issued a Warning Order for supporting commands to prepare for requests for DoD assets should the need arise. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) activated its Hurricane Liaison Team (HLT), consisting of FEMA, National Weather Service (NWS), and State and local officials. Joint Force Headquarters - Alabama National Guard (NG) activated its Joint Operations Center. The Gulf Coast States and localities began hurricane preparations as the storm approached landfall by activating their emergency response elements, issuing emergency declarations, pre-positioning response assets, and planning for evacuations and sheltering. Initial C2 considerations USNORTHCOM will retain Collection Management Authority (CMA) to establish, prioritize, and validate theater collection requirements for DoD assets in support of civil authorities requirements. JTF-Brian will have the following basic organizational structure JFACC, JFLCC, JFMCC, JFSOCC. LNO s may be placed at the FEMA, State, and NG operating centers to provide UAS expertise. Frequency management and allocation Deconfliction of the frequency spectrum falls upon the Joint Spectrum Office, Joint Force frequency manager (J6), JFACC A6, and the State EOC. The Gulf Coast Frequency Management Plan will provide the initial guidance with respect to frequency allocation. The 27 JP 3-28, Civil Support, 6 Mar FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-11

88 JTF frequency managers will most likely be concerned with UAS frequency availability, deconfliction, loss of service, and frequency interference. The C-Band frequencies are heavily used by civilian/commercial activities. Their availability for UAS usage during a disaster relief operation is not guaranteed. The Ku-Bands should be more available. Deployment considerations Site surveys for potential bed down, operating locations (to include immediate locations), and communications infrastructure to support UAS missions should be conducted during this phase (if not already conducted). This is especially important for UAS that require an established runway for take-off and landing. From a safety standpoint, the use of smaller or more remote sites, away from other disaster relief air traffic, should be considered. Airspace management Airspace management and deconfliction is especially critical when operating within the NAS. Unlike most military operations, the JFACC is not the overall ACA. That responsibility rests with the FAA. The JFACC may be designated as the ACA for Title 10 assets. Coordination with the FAA will be effected as soon as possible in order to ensure the required UAS assets can support the mission. If not already complete, TFR and COA will need to be prepared and coordinated. Airspace management and deconfliction for each of the proposed bed down and operating sites will need to be coordinated. Coordination of routes from the operating location to the proposed mission areas needs to be addressed in the appropriate TFR/COA. The airspace management and deconfliction plan also needs to consider the route the UA will travel if it loses communication with the GCS. Collection management If not already included in the planning and contingency documents, priority information requirements (PIR) and/or Commander s Critical Information Requirement (CCIR) will need to be developed in coordination with Federal, State and local agencies. This process begins in the Shaping Phase and will continue to be validated/matured/changed during the Support Phase. Below is a sample list of CS PIR / CCIR requirements (not all inclusive):? Are there survivors in need of rescue located within the JOA? o Where are they? o How many?? What is the critical infrastructure status in the JOA that can affect military operations? o Location/status of military installations within the JOA? o Location/status of airports within the JOA?? Status of water levels within the JOA?? What LOCs are unusable within the JOA? FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-12

89 ? What is the security threat to deployed JTF personnel within the affected JOA?? Where are the hazardous material (HAZMAT) sites located within the JOA? o What is their status? Staging. (Includes immediate response) (Usually pre-disaster) During the staging phase, immediate response elements containing UAS will move to their operating locations, weather permitting. If not, they may be moved to an intermediate staging location to await movement. Competition for UAS bed down and operating sites with other relief efforts will need to be deconflicted. The use of sites not heavily used by other relief aircraft should be considered to ease congestion. The possibility of substituting rail-launched UAS if there are no suitable runways are available may not be feasible based upon the lengthy process required to receive a COA and TFR from the FAA Deployment. (Pre-disaster through post disaster) (Possibility of during disaster deployment to staging areas outside the hurricane impact area) Some Level 5 UAS, such as RQ-4A/Global Hawk, have the speed and range to allow for operations from their home station. These systems will become operational as soon as airspace coordination can be completed and collection missions verified. Once the hurricane has moved out of the region, bed down locations may require an additional site survey to determine if the location has sustained storm damage (for operating locations within the storm impact area). Competition with other relief efforts for runway and hangar space will be a concern and may hamper operations. Unmanned assets may be displaced to alternate operating locations Support to Civil Authorities. (Actual support provided/tasks performed) (Primarily related to post disaster operations) Support missions cannot start until the weather conditions fall within the operating limitations of the various UAS available to support the CS mission. Some systems capabilities, such as the RQ-4A/Global Hawk s, allow it to be utilized as soon as it can be deployed to the affected area (or JOA). As the hurricane makes landfall on the Gulf Coast, the Level 5 UAS (RQ- 4A/Global Hawk) can use its sensors to look through the storm. Near real-time imagery will be transmitted to Federal and State authorities allowing them to assess the extent of devastation, track the path of the storm, conduct initial FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-13

90 damage assessment of critical locations and infrastructure, and identify those areas hardest hit. This will allow responders to conduct advance planning Figure 5-2, OV -1 for Civil Support Disaster Relief Operations UAS mission tasks - The primary missions for UAS will revolve around providing IAA. Initial post disaster damage assessment will be conducted to determine the extent of flooding and wind damage. This will be important as the State and local authorities are conducting their post disaster assessment. The critical infrastructure or named areas of interest (NAI) may include the following:? Roads/bridges? Rail lines? Water supply system (treatment plants, dams, reservoirs, pumping stations)? Power stations (nuclear, coal, hydro) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 5-14