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1 of the Russian Strategic Forces Pavel Podvig Russian Nuclear Forces Project russianforces.org Global Security Technical Webinar Series Union of Concerned 8 May 2014
2 Current status New START limits Outline Strategic and non-strategic weapons Strategic modernization programs Strategic bombers Submarines Ballistic missiles Early-warning
3 Current status New START accountable warheads and launchers (as of 1 March 2014) 1512 deployed warheads 498 deployed launchers 906 deployed and non-deployed launchers Estimated actual numbers (as of January 2014) 490 deployed launchers 1700 deployed warheads
4 Strategic triad Launchers Warheads ICBMs SLBMs Bombers 66 ~200 TOTAL STRATEGIC Non-strategic warheads (in centralized storage) ~2000 Retired warheads in dismantlement queue ~3500 TOTAL ~8000* * Source: Hans Kristensen, Russian Nuclear Forces, 2014
5 Bombers Tu-95MS (Bear H) Nuclear ALCMs Produced in To stay in service until ? Tu-160 (Blackjack) Nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs, bombs Produced in To stay in service until 2025? PAK DA Under development since 2011 Subsonic? To enter service after 2025? Photos: russianplanes.net
6 Submarines and SLBMs Project 667BDR (Delta III) Built in submarine (+3 being retired) 16 R-29R SLBMs (3 warheads) Project 667BDRM (Delta IV) Built in , completed overhaul 6 submarines 16 R-29RM SLBMs Sineva: 4 warheads, Liner: 4-10 warheads, Photos: fleetphoto.ru, Oleg Kuleshov
7 New submarines and SLBMs Project 955 Borey 2 submarines accepted for service Yuri Dolgorukiy (Dec 2012) Alexandr Nevskiy (Dec 2013) 2 under construction Vladimir Monomakh (sea trials) Knyaz Vladimir (in dock) Total of 8 submarines by Bulava SLBMs (6 warheads) Bulava SLBM 20 tests ( ), 10 successful 6 tests expected in 2014 Photos: Sevmash, militaryrussia.ru
8 ICBMs ICBM force About 1100 out of 1700 warheads About 750 warheads on old MIRVed ICBMs Old ICBMs R-36M2 (SS-18) Produced in , to stay until silo-based missiles, 10 warheads UR-100NUTTH (SS-19) Produced in , to stay until 2019 ~40 silo-based missiles, 6 warheads Topol (SS-25) Produced in , being withdrawn About 100 road-mobile missiles, single-warhead
9 New ICBMs: Topol-M (SS-27) Development started in late 1980s Single-warhead missile Silo- and road-mobile versions Deployment: 1997 (silo), 2006 (mobile) 2014: 60 silo, 18 mobile missiles Photos: militaryrussia.ru, vitalykuzmin.net, infoglaz.ru
10 New ICBMs: RS-24 Yars MIRVed version of Topol-M 4 to 6 warheads Deployment: 2010 (mobile), 2014 (silo) Deployment plans 2014: 33 deployed ICBMs Total of missiles to be deployed? SS-18 replacement? Throw-weight is 1.2 tonnes vs. 8.8 tonnes
11 New ICBMs: Sarmat heavy ICBM Old heavy missile: R-36M2/SS-18 Launch weight 211 tonnes Throw-weight: 8.8 tonnes 10x800 kt warheads 38 warheads considered at some point in the 1970s Guided warhead tested in 1990 Hardened silos New heavy missile: Sarmat Liquid fuel Launch weight considerably more than 100 tonnes Throw-weight more than 4.5 tonnes? Deployment expected in
12 New ICBMs: Boost-glide system? Early development Albatross system in Flight tests in 1990, 2001? Hypersonic warhead test in Feb 2004 SS-19 from Baykonur to Kamchatka Partially successful? Hypersonic vehicle test in Sep 2013 SS-19 from Dombarovskiy? Failure Project 4202 Major construction in Dombarovskiy Production to begin in 2015? Photo: panoramio.com
13 New ICBMs: Rail-mobile missile Old rail-mobile missile: RT-23UTTH/SS-24 Launch weight tonnes Length 23 m 10 warheads 36 missiles in 1990 (+56 in silos) New rail-mobile missile Based on Bulava? Launch weight 37 tonnes, length 12 m Rejected earlier, but considered again in 2013 Decision to be made in 2014
14 New ICBM/IRBM: RS-26 Rubezh Intercontinental range test in May 2012 From Plesetsk to Kamchatka 5,800 km Needed 5,500 km to qualify as ICBM Tested with one warhead Intermediate-range tests From Kapustin Yar to Sary-Shagan 2,000 km With multiple (reportedly 3) warheads IRBM based on RS-24? TEL+missile: 80 tonnes vs. 120 tonnes for RS-24 First two stages of RS-24? Similar to Temp-2S/SS-16 and Pioneer/SS-20 Photo: rcforum.ru, militaryrussia.ru
15 INF Treaty compliance issues RS-26 Rubezh INF Treaty prohibits missiles with km range But RS-26 will be counted as ICBM under New START Ground-launched cruise missile US: Tests began in 2008, not yet deployed Probably not Iskander INF Treaty prohibits GLCMs with km range No good definition of GLCM range in the treaty Likely a test of SLCM from ground launcher
16 Bombers Modernization of the triad PAK DA Submarines and SLBMs Project 667BDRM subs + Sineva and Liner R-29RM missiles Project 955 submarines + Bulava SLBM ICBMs Topol-M/RS-24 Yars Sarmat heavy ICBM RS-26 Rubezh IRBM/ICBM Project 4202? Rail-mobile ICBM?
17 Ukrainian factor Yuzhmash/Yuzhnoye DB (Dnepropetrovsk) Designed and built R-36M2/SS-18 ICBM Participates in the life extension program Khartron (Kharkov) Guidance systems UR-100NUTTH ICBM 71Kh6/US-KMO GEO early-warning satellites Project 4202
18 Early-warning system: Radars Radars in Ukraine, Azerbaijan no longer used Radars in Belarus, Kazakhstan to be replaced New radars are built in Russia Voronezh-D Voronezh-DM
19 Early-warning radars: West
20 Early-warning radars: East
21 Early-warning satellites Highly-elliptical orbits US-KS/Oko system, 73D6 satellites Limited to the U.S. territory Up to 9 satellites in the constellation 2014: 2 operational satellites provide 12 hours/day coverage Geostationary satellites US-KMO system, 71Kh6 satellites Look-down capability 2014: 1 satellite at 166 East New system (EKS) Under development Photo: novosti-kosmonavtiki.ru
22 Prospects for nuclear reductions State Armament Program Total: 19 trillion RUR ($650 billion) Strategic triad: ~$70 billion Arms control New START ends in February 2021 Linkage to missile defense, multilateral disarmament, conventional precision weapons Few incentives to reduce the numbers But still some interest in bilateral arms control
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