Policy Brief. The ROK-U.S. Alliance: Current Issues and Prospect. Ⅰ. Background. No /May Choi Kang Professor. IFANS is...

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1 外交安保硏究院 Policy Brief No /May 2007 IFANS is... a think tank for Korean foreign policy makers. As a part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, IFANS carries out in-depth study on Korea s foreign policies and international relations. Special em phasis is placed on the study and development of mid-to long-term foreign policy options for government decision makers, while the institute closely monitors major current issues and analyzes them. IFANS produces a variety of reports and research papers including a biannual English journal IFANS Review and weekly as well as annual analytical papers dealing with core foreign policy issues. Ⅰ. Background The ROK-U.S. Alliance: Current Issues and Prospect Choi Kang Professor Since 2003, South Korea and the U.S. have discussed a series of pending issues concerning their alliance through frameworks such as the Future of the ROK-U.S. Alliance Policy Initiative (FOTA), the Security Policy Initiative (SPI), and the ROK-U.S. Annual Security Consultative Meeting (SCM). Through these frameworks, South Korea and the U.S. was able to reach an agreement on the relocation of the Yongsan Base, the realignment and reduction of the 2 nd Infantry Division, and the revision of the Land Partnership Plan (LPP). Furthermore, the two parties also concluded agreements concerning theꡒstrategic flexibilityꡓof the U.S. forces in Korea, the establishment of a new vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance, and the transfer of wartime operational control of Korean troopsfrom the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces

2 2 Policy Brief , May 2007 Command (CFC) to the ROK Joint Chief of Staff. However, in connection with the problems of the delay in relocating the USFK base, the U.S. has questioned whether the Korean government is really willing to carry out the transfer agreement and come to a settlement over the issues that are currently under discussion. It is even asserted that the Korean government has been purposively attempting to link the timeline on the transfer of wartime operational control with the relocation of the Yongsan Base. Also, public opinion in the U.S. increasingly stresses that South Korea has to fund a more equitable share of USFK expenses. As such, though both parties have agreed on the fundamental principle of a comprehensive, dynamic, and mutually beneficial alliance, there is a lack of consensus concerning how to substantiate the agreements signed between them. In particular, the transfer of wartime operational control, the establishment of a new command, relations, and the relocation of U.S. military bases, all of these issues are directly related to the question on how to develop the relationship between South Korea and the U.S. In this regard, the stability and efficiency of the future alliance can largely depend on the direction and progress of these agreements. In addition, questions such as: What roles should South Korea and the U.S. be entitled to carry out after South Korea creates independent military commands? What functions should the Military Coordination Center (MCC) perform? and What status should be assigned to the United Nations Command (UNC) after the ROK-U.S. CFC is dismantled in tandem with the transfer of wartime command? must be considered. In dealing with these issues, the bottom line is the establishment of a constructive and enduring partnership.

3 Reforming and Opening North Korea's Economy:Assessment and Prospect 3 Ⅱ. Major Issues and Current Trends The Relocation of U.S. Military Bases On July 14, 2006, South Korea and the U.S. agreed to conduct joint assessments on any risks posed by environmental contamination on USFK facilities and areas and to promptly undertake remedial measures required to protect human health. However, a group of Korean civil organizations have raised questions about the agreement, calling for additional negotiations. The environmental cleanup agreement includes several items which are required for the U.S. to remedy Known, Imminent and Substantial Endangerment (KISE) to human health and safety: cleaning remaining storage tanks, removing underground fuel storage tanks, removing all PCB materials (polychlorinated biphenyls, a carcinogenic chemical used in electrical and heating systems), removing lead and copper left in any old firing ranges, removing unexploded ordnance, removing refrigeration and air conditioning chemicals, and removing visible spills in motor pools. The U.S. is also responsible for removing oil and cleaning up the ground water within its five bases through a technique called bioslurping. The two allies will set up a comprehensive master plan to handle issues such as the timeline and funding for the relocation of U.S. military bases. However, Washington has expressed dissatisfaction over Seoul s recent attitude, alleging that the South Korea government is presumably attempting to bundle up the relocation of U.S. military with the issue of the transfer of wartime operational control. Nonetheless, at the 12th FOTA session, they reached a tentative agreement on a cost-sharing arrangement with regard to the relocation of the

4 4 Policy Brief , May 2007 Yongsan base through an umbrella agreement (UA) and implementation agreement (IA). However, South Korea and the U.S. must hold future talks to deal with technical details such as the distinction between private and public facilities, the cost-sharing for the C4I (Command, Control, Communication, Computer and Intelligence), and so on. The Road Map for the Transfer of the Wartime Operational Control At the 38th Security Consultative Meeting (SCM), the U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Minister of National Defense agreed to expeditiously complete the transition of wartime operational control to South Korea after October 2009, but no later than March Both sides also agreed to immediately begin to develop a detailed joint implementation plan within the first half of 2007 in accordance with the agreed road map. On February 23, 2007, they met in Washington, D.C. and announced that South Korea would take over wartime operational control on April 17, South Korea has called for regaining wartime control by 2013 on account of its deficiency of an effective self-defense system. In contrast, the U.S. has insisted that 2009 is a more appropriate target year, suggesting that, until South Korea overcomes its deficiencies in intelligence and precision-strike operations, the U.S. military would continuously provide a bridging capability to bolster the South Korean military even after the control transition is made. While the U.S. seriously considers the political aspects embedded in the transfer of wartime operational control, South Korea emphasizes the significance of the transfer in terms of comprehensive security taking into account its capabilities for strategic planning, intelligence, and operation. In fact, from the beginning Washington has regarded the transfer of control as a matter of South Korea s situation and capability rather

5 Reforming and Opening North Korea's Economy:Assessment and Prospect 5 than an issue of time. However, the U.S. realized that there would be huge political and diplomatic risks associated with the failure of a timely transition, which is perceived as a matter directly related to sovereignty by South Koreans. Furthermore, because the transition of wartime operational control is intertwined with Washington s current efforts to realign the overall U.S. military structure and alliance, the Bush administration presumably wants to complete a new military alliance framework during the course of its presidency. Meanwhile, in South Korea, political opposition and conservatives have called for an immediate halt in negotiationing over the transfer of wartime operational control, arguing that first, the South Korean military is not ready to regain and exercise control and, second, the North Korean nuclear issue has not yet been resolved. Concerns amounting over the reduction and/or withdrawal of U.S. forces and the dismantling of the ROK-U.S. alliance is likely to trigger another controversy. New Military Command and Cooperation System In place of the ROK-U.S. CFC, Seoul and Washington agreed to set up the MCC, a joint center to ensure operational cooperation between the two forces. At present, consultations on the scale, role, and status of the MCC are being conducted. However, both parties have different approaches with regard to the role of the MCC. While the U.S. plans to provide minimal cooperation, South Korea expects the U.S. to provide maximum cooperation. Highlighting that the ROK-U.S. relationship under the new command system is that of being supported and supporting, the U.S. attempts not to bear the cost and responsibility of providing comprehensive security. In this regard, the U.S. argues that it is inappropriate to expect the MCC to play a major role in place

6 6 Policy Brief , May 2007 of the current CFC under the new system. In contrast, South Korea wants the MCC to bridge the new Korean command and the CFC, playing a cooperative role between the two forces. The Role of the United Nations Command (UNC) Since the second half of 2006, the U.S. has emphasized the importance of the UNC. For example, Gen. Bell, commander of the UNC and the ROK-U.S. CFC, recently underlined the functions of the UNC as a force provider and its responsibility for overseeing the Armistice on the Korean Peninsula. He also stressed that, accordingly, the transfer of wartime operational control and the inactivation of the CFC would create a military authority-to-responsibility mismatch for the UNC and, unless addressed, this situation would make it impossible to credibly maintain the Armistice because the UNC would no longer retain immediate access to South Korea s combat troops. Gen. Bell specifically pointed out that the U.S. and South Korea need to unify their chain of command in order to effectively supervise the Armistice in the region. He also expressed that his opinions were not gearing towards claiming the recovery of wartime operational control from South Korea. However, in response to Bell s remarks, some progressive civil organization have raised speculation about the intentions of the U.S., saying that the U.S. military is attempting to make the UNC into the leading body in maintaining control over Korean forces and deterring war on the peninsula even after the transition of wartime control. In other words, the U.S. military is perceived as aiming to consolidate its command system under the UNC via the introduction of the Combined Delegated Authority (CODA) even after the transition of wartime operational control. Meanwhile, as the construction of a mechanism to peacefully

7 Reforming and Opening North Korea's Economy:Assessment and Prospect 7 end the Korean War is increasingly feasible, an enormous controversy concerning the timeline for implementation of the deactivation of the UNC and the ratification of a peace treaty may emerge. If the U.S. adopts a declaration for peace ending the Korean War, the North would call for the immediate dismantlement of the UNC, on the basis that there is no legal grounds on which the UNC can step up to. In contrast, the U.S. regards the declaration as the beginning of a peaceful regime designed to end the state of war. Therefore, from the perspective of the U.S., the role of the UNC is not only valid but also indispensable until a peace agreement is signed. However, certain countries that participated in the Korean War under the UN flag have expressed negative opinions on a peace treaty that is unilaterally led by the U.S. These countries feel the need to participate in the process of the establishment of a peaceful regime on the Korean Peninsula. Defense Cost Sharing On December 2006, South Korea and the U.S. agreed to split the cost for the presence of USFK. Both sides agreed that Seoul would pay billion won (U.S. $790 million) in 2007, and the same amount in 2008, with inflation adjustments. They also agreed to have meetings to review the current cost sharing arrangement. Emphasizing an equitable share of burdens and benefits under the Special Measures Agreement (SMA), Washington has asked Seoul to contribute a higher portion at least 50% to the stationing of the USFK. In contrast, Seoul clings to its position that cost sharing should be determined flexibly considering the process relocating U.S. bases.

8 8 Policy Brief , May 2007 <Table 1> The Formula for Defense Cost Sharing Contribution Type Direct Indirect Item SMA Cost Sharing (Cash: Korean Employee Expenditure, Construction of Noncombat Facilities Goods: Improvement of Joint Defense Capacity, Provision of Military Supplies), Etc. Forgone land rents, Tax exemption, Etc. South Korea and the U.S. are scheduled to have meetings on setting up a new plan that includes items and negotiation cycles for sharing mutual defense costs. Other Issues According to Operational Plan 5027 and 5026, South Korea and the U.S. conducted a series of military exercises such as Reception, Stationing, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI), the Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL), and the Foal Eagle (FE). However, once a new command system is established, along with the transfer of wartime operational control, these war plans and military exercises must be revised. Hence, the U.S. recently suggested that military and government organizations participate in the establishment of new war operational plans in order to check the current joint operational planning, information sharing, crisis management, and joint military exercises.

9 Reforming and Opening North Korea's Economy:Assessment and Prospect 9 Ⅲ. Prospects The Acceleration of Discussion on the Transfer of Wartime Operational Control and the U.S. Base Relocation A point of issue between South Korea and the U.S. is when and how the transfer of wartime operational control and the relocation of U.S. military bases should be dealt with. South Korea has proposed that the transfer and relocation be made in 2012 because of South Korea s security environment and the construction of new facilities. However, in spite of estimates calculated by many service providers and equipment installers, the U.S. has maintained to carry out the relocation as originally planned, pointing out the necessity and urgency of a stable stationing of U.S. troops in the peninsula. Due to limitations imposed by technical difficulties, it is possible that Washington will accept the timeline proposed by Seoul with regard to the relocation of U.S. military bases. In addition, because the transfer of wartime operational control may spark a political debate in South Korea, the U.S. may separately deal with the issues concerning the transfer of control and the relocation of U.S. bases. In other words, Washington may pursue a transfer first and relocate second strategy while pressing the South Korean government to increase its share in bearing the costs of the USFK. However, at worst, Washington can also make an additional reduction of USFK on account of the burden of costs in stationing U.S. troops in Korea. Unlike the South Korean government s claim that the transfer should be made in 2012, a rising tide of domestic public opinion calling for an early transfer of wartime operational control and the withdrawal of U.S. forces is expected as the Six-Party Talks resume and progress. In this case, the South Korean government

10 10 Policy Brief , May 2007 would be exposed to pressure from both the U.S. and domestic public opinion. Coordination and Adjustment of Opinion Concerning the Scope of Support and Cooperation Underlining that its position is a supporter under the new command system, the U.S. is expected to ask South Korea to present the scope of support it wishes to seek from Washington. At the same time, the U.S. is likely to reject the provision of providing as much support as it used to, while calling the South for an effort to increase military capacities. Because it is hard for South Korea to present the scope of support and cooperation within 2~3 years before completing the establishment of new war plans and the estimation of required military capacities, the U.S. appears to have an advantage in negotiating with South Korea, as South Korea lacks time and information. Therefore, it is presumed that the U.S. will attempt to minimize the number of U.S. ground troops while increasing U.S. naval and air forces in the region. With respect to the scale and role of the MCC, the U.S. is not likely to take an active role in advancing the MCC structure to one that can assume immediate wartime operations as the UNC. This is because the U.S. seems to believe that if the MCC is entitled to play a similar role with the UNC, there will be certain limitations placed on USFK activities. Hence, the U.S. prefers direct cooperation between the operational commands during the time of war, while limiting the role of the MCC to communications and cooperation. Accordingly, the U.S. is expected to call for an establishment of a crisis action standard operating procedure (CASOP), although the U.S. must pursue unity in the field of C4I due to the importance of information. If the South Korean government demands the U.S. to continue to actively

11 Reforming and Opening North Korea's Economy:Assessment and Prospect 11 support and cooperate Seoul, its negotiation tactics will be criticized as too ad hoc and obsolete. However, on the contrary, if the South fails in garnering continued support and cooperation, the joint defense system with the U.S. may become unstable, triggering a controversy claiming insecurity in the region. The Role and Status of the UNC Along with the progress in the third phase of the fifth round of the Six-Party Talks, a peaceful regime is expected to emerge as a central issue entailing a discussion on the dismantlement of the UNC. However, in order to prevent a political controversy from escalating in South Korea, the U.S. must stress the reason why the role of the UNC should be strengthened and on what legal grounds the UNC was established. Thus, the U.S. is likely to emphasize that the UNC will maintain its function and legal biding force until a full peace treaty designed to legally replace the Armistice is signed. The U.S. may also stress the necessity of temporarily maintaining the Armistice and negotiate a peace settlement through cooperation between Washington and Seoul so that the U.S. can effectively deal with some problems that are expected to arise during the process of dismantling the ROK-U.S. CFC. In this case, the U.S. may separate administrative authority from jurisdiction and transfer a part of these authorities and responsibilities to the South Korean military, calling for the supervising role of the UNC to be strengthened. Talks on the Defense Cost-Sharing Formula One cannot dismiss the possibility that there will be a significant amont of disagreement between Seoul and Washington on the issues of how to split the costs in maintaining the presence of the USFK and the relocation of U.S. military

12 12 Policy Brief , May 2007 bases. The U.S. has asked South Korea for a balanced defense burden-sharing arrangement at least 50% in support of the U.S. forces, underlining the so-called equitable level of cost and benefit sharing. Moreover, the U.S. may ask South Korea to take up the financial burden caused by the relocation of U.S. military bases. In this context, the different point of view between South Korea and the U.S. with regard to the defense cost-sharing formula can be perceived as triggering instability within the ROK-U.S. alliance. On the contrary, South Korean civil organizations demand the increase in the U.S. share of the burden for the relocation of military bases including environmental cleanup remedies. Accordingly, the issue of defense cost-sharing is presumed to attract much controversy. Ⅳ. Matters for Policy Consideration South Korea and the U.S. have had close consultation focusing on a futureoriented vision to develop the ROK-U.S. alliance. However, they must place more importance on content-oriented consultation rather than the establishment of a relational framework. This is very important because through these efforts South Korea and the U.S. will be able to maximize common interests and minimize misunderstandings, avoiding costly and burdensome problems. Emphasis on Technical Approaches to the Relocation of U.S. Military Bases Since South Korea and the U.S. has already agreed on relocating the USFK bases, it is more strategic to focus on technical efficiency and specifications in dealing with the timeline. At the same time, in order to prevent the U.S. doubting

13 Reforming and Opening North Korea's Economy:Assessment and Prospect 13 South Korea and to win trust, Seoul must make efforts to shorten the construction schedule. It could also consider improving the quality of residence facilities for U.S. troops as an interim measure. Also, the South Korean government must devote more resources and attention to issues regarding the environment so that the relocation of U.S. military bases is not delayed. Preparation for the Transfer of Wartime Operational Control It was agreed that the U.S. would transfer wartime control over the Korean armed forces by April 17, Therefore, South Korea must rid itself of concerns that the transfer could have a negatively impact on the security of the Korean Peninsula. For this purpose, South Korea is required to enhance its own military capabilities while also considering a flexible approach to the agreed timeline. According to situational changes, the South Korean government must adopt a flexible attitude and consider alternatives such as altering the timeline, if necessary, from fixed year to target year. Agreement on Support and Cooperation As mentioned before, the core issue between South Korea and the U.S. is expected to be content-oriented consultation, particularly concerning the scope and level of support and cooperation. Limiting its role as a supporter under the new command system, the U.S. asks South Korea to present how much support it seeks from Washington. Accordingly, by completing the establishment of operational plans that deal with the threats, main strategic goals, and operational management, the South Korean government has to be able to present what support and cooperation it needs to obtain from the U.S. This type of content-oriented consultation will be conducive to the build-up of mutual trust.

14 14 Policy Brief , May 2007 Since the U.S. suggests the provision of bridging capabilities to help the South in areas where it is still developing its defense, South Korea should classify the scope and level of support and cooperation in stages, and attempt to negotiate with the U.S. at each stage. To make the process as smooth and efficient as possible, South Korea should break down the transfer of wartime operational control and the establishment of a new command system into several phases and assess what is required for each phase. Before determining the scale, status, and the role of the MCC, the efficiency and stability of the new system must be tested through exercises under simulated combat conditions in order to minimize the risk of any adverse outcomes. In addition, South Korea needs to draw up a plan to achieve substantial cooperation between the two forces by increasing mutual compatibility of weaponry and communication, while developing new methods and technologies for joint military exercises. The UNC Issue based on a Road Map for Peace on the Korean Peninsula The UNC issue has recently emerged as a new agenda in the alliance talks because, first, there is no clear roadmap for peace in the Korean Peninsula and, second, it is hard to find a way to solve the North Korean nuclear problem. Hence, both parties should consult one another in order to sketch a roadmap and reach an agreement on the new role of the UNC, particularly concerning responsibility in armistice maintenance and crisis management. Efforts to Ensure Understanding and Support of the People To further strengthen the ROK-U.S. alliance, it is crucial not only to reach an agreement on the aforementioned issues, but to also gain the understanding and

15 Reforming and Opening North Korea's Economy:Assessment and Prospect 15 support of the people in creating a comprehensive alliance for the future. Hence, the South Korean government must present a clear picture for the development of a comprehensive, dynamic, and mutually beneficial alliance.

16 A think tank for foreign policy design makers A birthplace of world-class diplomats The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and are not to be construed as representing those of IFANS 大韓民國外交通商部外交安保硏究院 The Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Republic of Korea Nambusunhwanno 2572, Seocho-gu, Seoul , Korea Tel. (02) Fax. (02) ifans@mofat.go.kr