Small World Missions: The Impact of Military Operations Other than War on Combat Readiness

Transcription

1 National Defense Umverslty National War College RCHIVE C&Y Small World Missions: Te Impact of Military Operations Oter tan War on Combat Readiness CDR Ram6 Hemstreet, CEC, USN n Essay subnutted to Dr David Tretler Fort McNan- Wasington, D C 10 May 1999

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3 Preface In December 1990 IJotned Naval Mobile Construcf!on Battalion (NMCB) For& wic four monts earlie ad deployed to Jubail l& Saudi rabia to part&pate m Operation Desert Sield For te first time since Ketnam, te Seabees were execubng teir pnmaty mission: combat service support engineering and construction for te United States Marine Corps, in tis case te First Marine Expeditionary Force. Before and during te Gulf Wac NMCB Forty and oter Seabee battalions built base camps, maintained supply routes, constructed airflelds and dnlled wells for te Marines and oter coalition forces. fter returning from Saudi rabia in Marc 1991, we went troug a tvpcal omepott training cycle, followed by a routine European deployment. Wile te main body of te battalion deployed to Rota, Spain, I was te OK of a 75-man detail at NS Sigonefla, Slclly. During tat deploymenf, we did wat Seabees ad done on most deployments trougout te interim between l//etnam and te Gulf War. My Seabees lived rn te barracks and worked on improving and expanding te facilres on te base. We built a concrete ardsand erected a couple of small masonry structures, and constructed an addition to a Marine Rapid Reaction Force facility, among oter projects. bout alf of te det also particrpated in a tree-week exercise in Norway, Teamwork 92, were we again did base camp construction and oter engineering tasks for te Marine Corps.

4 fter anoter omepoti training cycle, my final deployment wit NMCB Forty was sceduled to be anoter routine rotabon, tis bme to Guam. t te last momenf, owever, we were diverted to Somalia due to President Bus s decision to Intercede in te umanitanan cns~ in tat failed state. For tose of H us wo ad been in Saud?, living and working in Somalia was familiar Once again we lived in tents and our primary missron was base camp construction for te Marines and oter coalition forces. We also reabrlrtated te Mogadfsu arrporf, improved and maintained te relief supply routes and drilled wells. Since Somalia, te U.S. milrtaty as been involved in many more military operations oter tan war ~MOO7VV,). One of te criticisms leveled against tis trend as been tat it detracts from te mllltary s primary mission: to figt and win trad/f/onal wars. detnmental effect on readiness is often a presumption made by bot proponen& and opponen& of MOOTW. Based on my experiences, tat presumption demands a toroug examrnation.

5 Introduction - It s a Small World, fter te Fall War is te continuation of pokical intercourse wit te intermixing of oter means. Id - Karl von Clausewi& War may be, among many oter tings, te perpetuabon of a culture by its own means. 2 - Jon Keegan Clausewltz coined is oft-repeated maxim to make te case tat polltlcal objectives sould sape and govern te use of military force. Keegan s riposte argues tat, rater tan ansing from a rational calculation of polrtlcal ends and te force needed to acieve tem, war Instead IS controlled by te inexorable r, and omnipresent pressure of cultural forces. Upon reflection, owever, It IS possible to reconcile te ttio concepts. Te cultural zeltgelst Invariably determines te ends of politics, and socletv s mores likewise sape and constrain te ways and means, including tose of te mllltaty, used to acieve political objectives. Witout contradicting Clausewitz, Keegan simply places war and politics witin te cultural bounds tat determine teir caracter, conduct and purpose. During te past decade, te end of te Cold War and te waxing Information revolution appear to ave set In motion a tectonic3 cultural movement, bot imperceptible and vast, tat IS canging bot te way In wic te military IS used and te ends it IS called upon to pursue. Te essence of tat 3

6 cultural movement IS a consensus among polwmaklng elites In te United States n and like-minded nations tat national power (diplomatic, economic, Informational, and milltar\/) sould be used to promote international stability and resape oter nations and cultures as open, pluralistic, market-oriented democracies. Tis conviction, caracterized by te current Democratic dministration as a strategv of Engagement and Enlargement was first * captured In U.S. National Security Strategy In 1993, and It IS largely sared by our allies and te United Nations Secretariat. In turn, tis strategv of 4 engagement and enlargement as spawned increasing involvement by te U.S. and its allies In mllrtarv operations oter tan war. Tis trend IS llkelv to continue, making It imperative tat te U.S. mllltarv plan for tese operations and understand teir impact on combat readiness. If tere truly IS a broad cultural movement underway, Its sources are not 14 difficult to Idenbfv. In a nutsell, growing economic Interdependence and tecnological progress ave canged te calculus of war. Popular attitudes towards warfare ave become less romantic due to te devastation wrougt by two world wars and te tremendous destructive potential of modern weapons Simultaneously, economic Interdependence and te apocalyptic power of nuclear weapons ave eliminated te marginal ubllty of war between world or regional powers by ensuring tat conquest will cost te victor as muc, If not more, tan te vanquised. Since te early Cold War, offensive war as been untinkable to even te stauncest Ideologues. Most Important of all, since te fall of te 3

7 Iron Curtain and te demise of te Soviet Union, te divided world of te Cold * War as been replaced by te Small World of te information age. In te Small World, evetvtlng IS connected to everyting else bv a prollferatlng web of Information and declslon networks. It IS Increasingly difficult to quarantine a cnsls because information and even action are no longer constrained by distance. Bot a plea for elp and a computer virus can be sent worldwide Instantaneously. In suc a world, geograpy no longer IS te most pertinent aspect of a strategic defense. Te effects of virtually any action can reverberate trougout te world almost Instantaneously. Tus, In te words of Britis Prime Minister Tony Blair, in suc a world Te spread of our values makes us safer. 4 To tradltlonallsts, suc a statement may seem noting more 4 tan routine ldeallstlc retoric. On te contrary, It IS a reallstrc reaction to a world in wic, given te lmposslbllrtv of global pysical control, only te c nurturing of compatible values can forestall disruptive or ostile actions. Because of te cultural transformation engendered by international Interdependence, protecting national security IS Increasingly defined In terms of respecting and expanding international norms and Institutions, and preserving bot intra-state and Inter-state stability. Western nations, Including te United States, use te military primarily to enforce and preserve te global status quo of relatively free markets and widespread democratic governance - In sort, liberal values.

8 ltoug polrtrcal leaders still speak in general of te national Interest, te * purpose and conduct of specific mrlitarv operations are usually rdeologrcal and multrlateral. Wile te world s rndustnalrzed democracres will still defendteir national Interests, as tey did in te Gulf War, tey now escew te use of te mrlrtarv to advance national interests; to do so would be inconsistent wit te culture. Rater, tey seek to preserve te liberal values tat ave come to dominate te prosperous portion of te globe. National security strategy now focuses on te defense, and occasional expansion, of liberal values, wic are rncreasrngly synonymous wit te national Interest. Te distinctron between Interests and Ideals IS blurring because western security and prosperity IS founded on sared values and institutronal norms, ranging from te tlantic 4 Carter to te World Trade Organization. Te need to protect and enforce tese norms as resulted in te use of te milrtary In numerous operations oter tan war -- peacekeeping, umanltanan assistance, counter-narcotics and disaster relief missions.* Tese missions are te sine qua non of engagement and enlargement, and may be Inescapable In te Small World. long wit te economic, drplomabc and rnformatronal tools of statecraft, It IS likely tat mrlltary capabrlrtres will continue to be frequently employed In tese non-combat missions. Tis trend may accelerate as te world becomes more Interconnected and Interdependent, despite te fact tat te lrmrted ObjecbveS of tese mrssions are * Te defense of beral values can also result m war Te stlllbom ROSOL o peace agreement led to Operation led Force 6

9 often polltlcally problematic to decision-makers, and receive lukewarm public 4 support. It IS less a movement of popular Ideals tan a sift In cultural realities tat requires te world s liberal nations to attempt to enforce international norms, In te Small World of te tird mlllenmum, western security cannot be voucsafed solelv by oceans, defended borders, or traditional military deterrence. Creating a benign egemony of liberal democratic values, bot at ome and abroad, will be essential to national security. Wile te public s visceral reaction IS to reiect te foreign entanglements tis will Inevitably require, self-interest demands aggressive and unapologetic U.S. engagement. Complex and interdependent systems, suc as te uman body, te world wide web, or te lnternatronal political-economic system, are susceptible to te rapid spread of infection. For all tree, viral protection IS more effective tan treatment. In te case of te International system, protection * requires tat te body politic not become Infected wit values and actions contrary to tose wic ave permitted te western world to acieve levels of wealt and ealt unprecedented In uman istory. Terefore, all treats, n weter springing from natural disaster, etnic conflict or political strife, must be preempted wit te appropriate propylaccs, wic often WIII Include mllltary capabilities and sometimes mllltary force. In an economically and informationally Interconnected world, no cnsls IS truly remote. Te global village tat Marsal McLuan accurately predicted over 4 30 years ago continues to expand its boundaries, and cannot countenance 7

10 lawlessness witin tem. Wile te instantaneous access to Information IS te most obvious aspect of te global village, Its true impact IS due to te fact tat eac event In te world IS now related to all oters. Like It or not, tis n penomenon as transformed our culture and created a totallv new psycic outlook tat makes It Impcsslble to remain totally uninvolved In even te most remote cnsls. s McLuan understood, knowledge and vlslblllty are already a form of involvement. In tis cultural environment, te U.S. military IS often tasked wit mlsslons tat ave little or noting to do wit Its traditional and primary skill, te management of violence, but rater employ subsidiary skills: engineering, medical, transportation, etc. Furtermore, te military s functional Imperative, Its 4 role, may be canging: from protecting natfonalsecurky to preserving mternatlonalstabmy and enforcing international norms. Te former role as not disappeared; rater te latter as subsumed It. If tis analysis IS correct, a pressing question IS posed to te mllltary profession: as currently composed, can te military be effective at mllltary operations oter ten war (MOOTW), as well n as traditional combat operations? c n accurate and Objective answer to tis question may determine not only te effectiveness of te military, but also te ability of western culture to perpetuate itself If western mllltanes cannot be effective at bot tradltronal *

11 combat missions and at MOOlW, ten polltlcal leaders WIN be faced wit a menu of unsavory coices: w Restructure te military to one designed pnmanlv for MOOTW, and terefore risk defeat on a mrlrtary battlefield. n Maintain a traditional military and largely abandon efforts to enforce InternatIonal norms troug mrlrtaty means, tus risking long-term cultural defeat. w ttempt to create two distinct sets of forces, an option tat IS likely to be cost prolbrtrve. n Conversely, sould we conclude tat te mllltary can perform MOOTW wit only minor modifications and/or additions to Its force structure, ten te U.S. and Its allies will ave a potent means at teir disposal to pursue te political objectives tat will protect and expand liberal values. Various commentators on milrtarv affairs ave suggested tat involvement In umanltanan and peace operations degrade te effectiveness of&l mllrtary units.. For Instance, Carles Dunlap predicts: Preoccupation wit umanitarian mrsslons (will leave) te mllrtary unfit to engage an autentic mllrtary opponent Training IS, quite literally, a zero-sum game. Eac moment spent pet-forming a nontraditional mrsslon IS one unavailable for ortodox mrlltaty n exercises. 7 Military commentator Harry Summers as likewise cntlclzed te 9

12 operations oter tan war fad as deleterious to military professlonallsm, and IS fond of former Secretatv of Defense William Perry s November 1994 statement tat we field an rmy, not a Salvation rmyjg On a more visceral level, tere IS te reaction of te Heritage Foundation s ndrew Cowin : Wen tese guys sign up, tev take an oat to defend and protect te Constitution, not to feed starving people in Somalia. re military exercises te best and only way to train? re te tasks associated wit MOOTW more appropriate for te Salvation rmy tan te U.S. rmy? Is defending te nation incompatible wit saving te starving? To determine te veracity of tese assumptions requires a detailed study of te specific military units involved in MOOlVJ and te tasks tey are assigned. nalysis of Operation Restore Hope In Somalia can sed ligt on weter te cornat readiness of te individual units deploved to tat operation suffered as a result and, If so, wat steps could be taken to minimize suc damage In te future. Tis analysis will be limited to Restore Hope (9 December 1992 troug 4 May 1993), rater tan te preceding and succeeding missions, Provide Relief and USFORSOM, respectively. Te scope of Operation Provide Relief was limited largely to airlift and included few ground troops. USFORSOM, a component of UNOSOM II, became a peacemaking mlssion and tus took on te caractenstlcs of a more tradltlonal mllltary operation, as te UN attempted to appreend General Moamed Fara ldeed, and is irregular forces responded by waging 10

13 war against te UN forces. Te critical difference between Restore Hope and UNOSOM II was tat te security and peacekeeping functions of te former (patrollrng, mine clearance, eavy weapons confrscatron), became rndrstrngursable from normal combat operations during te lattet? Operation Restore Hope was te prototypical MOOlW. It was primarily a peacekeeping and uman&at-ian operation, two of te most frequent types of non-combat missions for wic te mrlrtaty IS utrlrzed. Even toug tere was no official peace treaty or cease-fire to enforce, mbassador Robert Oakley s efforts to gain te acquiescence of te various Somali factions to UN intervention during Restore Hope limited te peacemaking (also known as peace enforcement) role of te mrlrtary. ltoug te distinctron between peacekeeprng and peacemaking can be vague, peacemaking IS war by anoter name, reminiscent of te low rntensrty conflicts of te Cold War, and sould not be considered a species of MOOTW. Wile peacekeeping can transition to peacemaking, and vice-versa, It CI IS important to maintarn a drstrnctron as we examine te impact of various mrlitary operations on combat readiness. Te distinctron could be summarized as * follows. In MOOTW, of wic peacekeeping IS one manifestation, combat IS te exception rater tan te rule. Terefore, Restore Hope and IFOR In Bosnia were peacekeeping missrons; UNOSOM II and llied Force in Serbia peacemaklng.12

14 Case Study - Operation Restore Hope In pril 1992 United Nations Secuntv Council Resolution #751 created te United Nations Operation In Somalia (UNOSOM I) to stem te growing umanltanan disaster In tat failed state. Te mission of UNOSOM I was to monitor a cease-fire In Mogadisu negotiated SIX weeks earlier and support a rq ninety-day action plan for providing umanitarian assistance. However, a token ground force of Pakistanis In Mogadlsu combined wit an airlift effort undertaken pnmanly by te United States (Operation Provide Relief) proved Inadequate. UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Gall and President George Bus, flus wit victory in te Gulf War, determined tat te world community In general and te United States In particular possessed bot te means and te responslblllty to prevent furter starvation and deat l3 fter te security situation, and terefore te relief efforts, deteriorated trougout te fall of 1992, United Nations Security Resolution #794 was approved on 3 December 1992, autorizing te use of all necessary means to establis as soon as possible a secure environment for umanitarian relief operations In Somalla.14 Under te terms of te resolution te U.S. would lead a multinational coalition, te United Nations Task Force (UNITF), to acieve tat goal. Te next day President Bus announced to te merican people te lnltlatlon of Operation Restore Hope cting Secretary of State Lawrence S Eagleburger justified U.S 13

15 n Intervention on te grounds tat Somalia constituted a tragedy of massrve proportrons and te U.S. could do someting about rt. 15 Witin te week U S. mrlrtaty units were deploying to Somalia to participate in Restore Hope. Eventually UNITF Included over 38,0Q0 troops from 21 nations, rncludrng 28,000 U.S. personnel deploved to Somalia under te command of LTG Robert Jonson, reporting to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)? ll four services, as well as te supporting Joint commands, made a significant contribution to Restore Hope. Terefore, it provides an excellent opportunity to analyze te readiness impact of MOOTW on a wide-range of units. Te following analysis proceeds by service, followed by conclusions tat relate to bot te services rndrvrdually and to te various functions performed by one or more services. ir Force - te best exercise anyone ever didn t plan For te ir Force, Somalia was an exercise; a particularly callenging and * educational exercise. General Fogleman, ten commander of te ir Mobility Command (MC) stated tat Restore Hope was te first time our air mobrlrty tee forces (were) engaged In a malor exerme In teir post-cold War configuration (Italics added). He went on to call It te most significant airlift/air mobrllty operation te command as executed, proving te ir Mobility Command s global reac 17

16 IrlIft was te USF s contribution to Restore Hope (later, during UNOSOM II, C-130 gunslps were deployed). Wile supporting tis umanitarian mission, MC learned many valuable lessons tat Improved its ability to support U.S. forces In a traditional conflict. It IS unlikely tat te ortodox exercises preferred by Colonel Dunlap would provide te unexpected surprises and daunting callenges of Restore Hope. For instance, te 50t irlift Squadron out of Little Rock rkansas sortled eigt C-130s to Kenya on 36 ours notice; nine ours after te planes landed In Kenya teir first aid fligts to Somalia were underway. l8 Fog and friction predominated trougout Restore Hope, Just as In war or oter uman activities tat require extemporaneous decisions and actions. Recreating te random callenges of tis environment in a training exercise IS almost Impossible, due to te need to bot plan te exercise In advance and control its performance. MC was faced wit te requirement to surge over 75,000 sort tons of cargo and equipment into an extremely austere teater of operations, wit few staging bases available In te Immediate vicinity. Te airlifters responded superbly. MC introduced an entirely new concept of operations tat ensured tat bot aircrews and air refueling aircraft were utilized to teir full potentlal.lg tanker bridge across te tlantic and Nort frica eliminated te need for refueling stops and crew rest layovers en route, and also reduced maintenance requirements on te ir Force s limited supply of C-5 and C-141 aitframes.20 Faced wit te severely constrained capacity of Mogadisu International It-port 14

17 (MI), ground controllers met te callenge by precisely sceduling te arrival and departure of eac aircraft, not only at MI but at te staging bases near Cairo and ddls baba.*l Restore Hope also provided MC an opportunity to prove te feaslblllty of a concept first used during Desert Sield - te use of KC-IO tankers as alrllfters. Tis Innovation could prove important during te surge pase of a traditional military operation. In addition, Restore Hope allowed MC to test te effectiveness of Its Integration of reserve units and Its InteroperatWy wit * numerous coalition partners. Peraps most Importantly, te operation rgllgted te need for te ir Force to possess better infrastructure intelligence on all te world s airfields, many of wic are III suited for a large military * operation. Tis realization as led to te development of lay-down packages for most of te world s key alrfields.22 In summary, Restore Hope was better tan any exercise MC could ave devised, and it served a purpose. Neverteless, Restore Hope also ad adverse consequences for MC and te USF, altoug tey are arder to quantify tan te benefits. Contrary to most conventional wisdom, It IS relatively easy to find training and readiness benefits to MOOTW. Te negative consequences tend to relate to wear and tear on personnel and equipment. For instance, Restore Hope increased operational tempo for te ir Force and MC significantly. Te cumulative impact of Restore Hope and oter missions required MC to defer depot maintenance of te strategic alrllft fleet23, and reduced airiif? avallablllty for 15

18 planned training exerclses.24 In order to perform te mission, safetv regulations were relaxed. Crew duty days were increased and te number of ours an aircrew could fly In a 30-day period was raised from 125 to 150, and eventually to 165 ours. During Restore Hope te rellabpy rate for sceduled departures fell well below standards, to around SO%, and te avallablllty of spare parts declined. Sould te U.S. ave been suddenly confronted wit a crisis elsewere In te world tat required a large airlift, it would ave found its men, women and macines exausted. ltoug tat did not occur, te Increased optempo during Restore Hope and subsequent operations may be contributing to te services retention and recruiting problems. Neverteless, te readiness and expertise of te military s airlift forces was actually improved by Restore Hope. Te concepts tat were tested under strenuous conditions and te lessons learned Improved te capability of te ir - Force and MC to support a traditional mllltaty operation wit surge and sustainment airlift. rmy - Triggerpullers versus Beans and Blankets More so tan for te oter services, te consequences of Restore Hope for te rmy are complicated and amblgucus, and peraps instructive In te debate over weter te U.S. needs peacekeeping troops tat are distinct from Its combat troops. 4

19 Te 10t Mountain Division (Ligt Infantry) bore te brunt of te merican P commitment to umanitarian relief in Somalia. Most of te Division s personnel deploved to Somalia at one time or anoter during t first blus, commlttlng a top-fligt combat infantry division to suc an undertaking IS a dubious and potentially dangerous enterprise. comparison of te brigade mlsslon statements wit te missions actually assigned to te task forces from n tose brigades seems to prove te critics point tat te mrlltary s combat readiness could be frittered away in suc operations. Te mission of te lst and 2nd Brigades, 10 MD (LI) IS: To maintain a ligt infantry brigade manned and trained to deploy rapidly by air, sea or land anywere In te world, prepared to figt upon arrival and w/n 25 (Italics added) Conversely, in Somalia, te mission of Task Force 3-14, drawn from te 2nd Brigade, was: To conduct tactical security operations to ensure te unimpeded flow of umanitarian relief assistance witin te area of operations; establis coalition force presence; and establis secure lines of communlcations

20 Wile te rules of engagement allowed Task Force 3-14 to figt If a treatened, doing so was inconsistent wit winning in terms of te ObptiveS of Restore Hope. Task Force 3-14 was in Somalia to save starving Somalls, not a to figt or kill tem. Wenever tat became necessat-v, tere could be no sense of triump or accomplisment. Psycologically, tis puts combat troops In a no- win position. No matter ow brilliantly tey perform tactically, te act of figting as become inconsistent wit winning. Furter complicating te mission of te combat troops in Operation n Restore Hope was te lack of a military opponent, even an unconventional one. Outside Mogadisu, most of te warlords ad accepted te U.S. led Intervention, and even witin Mogadisu General ldeed was generally quiescent during b Restore Hope. Wit some exceptions, te opposition confronting U.S. combat troops consisted of ragtag brigands and common criminals. For te first time In a generation, front-line U.S. rmy troops performed constabulary duties overseas. For te most part, tey performed tat mission extraordlnanly well. Neverteless, te infantrymen of te 10t Mountain Division were not oning teir combat skills In Somalia. For tem, Restore Hope was not an exercise tat prepared tem to do teir duty during a traditional war. Likewise, oter combat elements of te 10t MD (LI) sacrificed combat proficiency due to Restore Hope. For instance, collective training for te 3-62 ir Defense rtillery was cut sort, and its external evaluation canceled Te 3rd Squadron, 17t Cavalry ad

21 to leave 60% of its equipment In Somalia wen It re-deployed to te U S., resulting In a degraded Unit Reporting Status. Tere were some benefits for combat units, suc as te execution of an unsceduled and rapid deployment and Improvements In some tactical areas, suc as te Increased nigt vision goggle proficiency noted l~v te Falcon viation Brigade.27 Neverteless, te 10t Mountain Division s sceduled combat training routine was Interrupted and Restore Hope did not provide te opportunity to practice many of te mission essential tasks of Its combat units. However, we must examine all of te units below te Brigade level before concluding tat te operation impaired te overall combat readiness of te 10t Mountain Division. Te lessons become more complicated upon consideration of 4 te numerous combat support and combat service support Battalions In te 10t Mountain Division. For tem, Restore Hope was a perfect opportunity to practice teir missions In a real-world, real-time scenario. Table 1 summarizes te appllcablllty of Restore Hope to te missions of tose units, and igligts bot positive and negative Impacts. In general, Restore Hope was an excellent training experience wit negative consequences for equipment readiness. Like te alrllfters, te combat support units tat comprised alf of te 10t Mountain troops In Somalia benefited from Restore Hope. Te training value of actually doing te Job IS te same for combat support and logistics units weter delivering beans and bullets or beans and blanket-s. a

22 To take lust one example from Table 1, te 710t Maintenance Support Battalion ad te opportunity to practice its Mission Essential Task List (METL) under callenging circumstances. Te Battalion performed every task from a outload and port staging to logrstical support to establrsrng a defensive perimeter. Te training benefits were similar for most of te units listed on Table I. Somewat ironically, an exception IS te mrlrtary police. ltoug * peacekeeping missions seem a natural fit for tese units, te metods tey employ to maintain order on a military rnstallatron are III suited for a violent and F volatile locale suc as Mogadisu. Wile training can overcome tis sortcoming, a more serious concern IS te optempo tat numerous MOOTW de@oyments ave created for tese units. Rater tan attempt to train mrlrtary polrce to be civilran police, a preferable solution would be to create a pool of civilran polrce tat could be called upon to support mllrtary operations oter tan war.28 s MOOlW and oter deployments ave become more commonplace, te cumulative impact on personnel tempo for some non-combat units, suc as psycological operations and milrtary polrce, ave been severe. However, were negative consequences for non-combat units exist, tev do not necessarily indicate a mismatc between wartime mrsslons and MOOTW, but rater a need to resource te services adequately for MOOTW, at te expense of warfigting sould te national security strategy and Its ObJectives so demand. 20

23 Y 9 Table I - Impact of Restore Hope on Selected Units of te lo* MD (LI) * Unit Mission Participation in Operation Negative Consequences Positive Consequences Restore Hope 210t Forward Provide te combat service suppot t EstablIsed loglstlcs bases In SIX Transferred inventory to rellevlng Executed its tnlsslon In a Support Battalion a brigade Task Force from 10 MD locations to supporl te 2 d Brigade battalion callenging environment. requires to figt and win Task Force, te viation Brigade Gamed experience workmg wit and UN coalition forces and supporting coalltlon forces 710t Maintain a MSB nlanncd and Conducted port staging area Material and personnel sortages n opportunity to perform every Maintenance trained to deploy rapidly by air, sea m1sslon for Division (te latter problem existed prior to aspect of te battalion s mission and land anywere In te world and Provided logistics support for rmy te operation) statement Support Battalion prepared upon arrival to provide units In teater. te supply, maintenance, ealt Marsaled Division for rearward services, and transportation support movement te Division requires to figt and win E Company-25t Maintain a Ligt Infantry Division Provided aviation intermediate Required to leave beind key pieces Performed mlsslon In an austere viation Regiment ircraft Intermediate Maintenance maintenance support to te aviation of equipment for Incoming units environment slmllar to wat migt Company trained and ready to task force in Somalia be expected In a war zone deploy by land, sea and air anywere In te world on sort notice Upon arrival, provide aviation IntermedIate maintenance support to te Division Created a realistic and aggressive ig operating tempo training program * Excerpted from F~scdl Year t Mountnm Dlvrslon (LI) nnual H~stoncal Review 21

24 Headquarters and Provide command, control and Served as te Joint Task Force None noted. Experience operating wtt tn bot Headquarters adnttntstrattve supervtston of eadquarters, provtdtng command a Joint and coalttton environment organic and attaced field arttllety and control to subordinate UN Battery, 10t units Provide untt admtnlstrattve forces Mountain Dwon and logtsttcal support for te rtlllety Division rtillery staff sellton and elements l(j Mllltav PollC- Ltatson wtt all law enforcement Deployed ttempted to train Contributed to extremely ig Battalion agencies wtttn te area of indigenous Solnalt poltce force optempo, especially following Jurtsdtclton and maintain order and earlter deployment to Florida for mtlltary dtsctpltne tn te tnstallatton Hurricane ndrew Relief by conbolltng traffic, conducttng Operattons. tnvesttgattons and dtre&ng acttve pystcal security and crime prevention programs 41st Engrneer Deploy rapidly by air, sea and land Te Headquarters element and two Unable to conduct battalion-wtde Practtced wartime mtsston built Battalion anywere tn te world, and, upon companies deployed to Somalia and training due to split between two Bailey bridges tat were te arrival, provide mobtltty, were tasked wtt opening supply Somalia and Fort Drum longest constructed outside te survtvabtltty and countermobtltty routes U.S. since Vietnam. lso support te dtvtston requires to $onducted minesweeping and figt and wtn clearing, reconnatssance, field fotttfi&on construdton and base support llot Military To deploy rapidly by atr, sea or land SeleLLed personnel (analyst%, Due to Restore Hope and oter Restore Hope was tnstrumental tn Intelligence to anywere tn te world, and, Itngutsts, tecntctans, fallors, te number of personnel tn enabling te battalion to one upon arrival, provide te countertntelltgence teams and te Tecnical Control and nalysts tecnical tntelltgence operations Battalion tntelltgence and eleclrontc warfare ground sutvetllance teams) Element fell sort. planning and deployment skills support te Division needs to figt deployed and provided tntelltgence, and provided battalion personnel and wtn survetllance and security support wtt invaluable experience tn troug te Long-Range conducltng intelligence and Survetllance Detacment support operations II 22

25 s noted earlier, a positive aspect of Restore Hope for te 10% Mountain Division was te experience of deploying. Many of te mission statements P Included In Table I begin wit te requirement to deploy by air, sea and land anywere In te world. MissIons like Restore Hope give units te opportunity to do Just tat. In te words of one battalion Commanding Officer: unit s ability * to rapidly react to deployment instructions IS a true measurement of te unit s readiness MOOTW deployments ave provided and will continue to provide units wit real world training opportunities tus increasing unit readlness. 2g Restore Hope and oter umanitarian operations ave vastlv Increased te rmv s experience wit unexpected, large-scale deployments. Tis as rr undoubtedly Improved Its readiness to respond anytime, anywere to figt and win. Table 1 also indicates many of te negative consequences of MOOIW, aside from making It difficult for infantrymen to practice teir combat skills. Restore Hope split te Division and Its units between te U.S. and Somalia, and JI ten trougout soutern Somalia, making It Impossible for Brigades or even Battalions to train and operate togeter. Equipment tables of allowance were also divided, and equipment condition and readiness degraded. Upon close examination, te Impact of a military operation oter tan war on te combat readiness of an rmy Infantry dlvlslon IS somewat amlguous. s a wole, te 10t Mountain Division readiness was to some extent degraded 23

26 by Restore Hope, vet significant portions of Its support elements benefited from te experience. Tis IS particularly significant because In many operations oter tan war loglstlcal support IS te mission assigned te mllltary. Te Marines - merica s warriors, merica s 911 force, or bot? Te dicotomous nature of te Marine s participation in Restore Hope was evident from te operation s first comical moments, as a Marine Expeditionary c Unit executed a nigttime ampibious landing, and was illuminated on te beac bv media floodligts and bombarded by flasbulbs. Tat first nigt, and muc of wat followed, often seemed inappropriate for merica s leanest, meanest warriors. Yet, te strategic concept of te Marine Corps envisions a force tat maintains a ig state of combat readiness, wile simultaneously being prepared to execute operations oter tan war: merica s 911 force, as te slogan says. Furtermore, MOOTW IS not a mission tat te Marines ave assumed only since te Soviet treat disappeared. Te Marine Corps Strategic Concept of envisioned.. versatile, expedltlonarv force In readiness... I and balanced Force for a Naval Campaign and a Ground and ir Striking Force.. lways at a ig state of combat readiness... but also Ready to suppress or contain international disturbances sot-t of war... I

27 la Trougout te Cold war te Marine Corps was called upon to keep te peace troug te restrained use of force - from Beirut in 1958 to te Dominican Republic in 1965 to Los ngeles in Since long before te term MOOTW was coined, te Marines ave been a letal combat force tat IS often called upon to suppress or contain international disturbances witout resorting to combat. In many ways te istory of te Marines Corps belies te argument tat combat troops cannot maintain teir edge wile being used as an instrument of * coercive diplomacy or temporarily acting as a constabularv force. Te Marine Corps grunt as always been expected to exibit bot fierceness and restraint in varying proportion, depending upon te mission. In many respects, Restore Hope was a prototypical mission, as one Marine concluded wen e wrote, Te 24t Marine Expeditionary Unit experienced te unique opportunity to implement many of te missions It ad trained for in te real world. 31 Neverteless, te dual&v embraced by te Marines Corps Strategic Concept can be arduous and often frustrating. description of a Marine 81mm mortar platoon s experiences in Mogadisu concluded tat, In Operations Oter Tan War units are often assigned tasks tat bear little resemblance to teir, L normal duties Despite te Marine Corps long experience wit peacekeeping, tese operations can still burden some units wit missions for wic tey ave little training, and make it impossible to maintain proficiency in teir primary rr mission. For instance, te mortar platoon of Battalion Landing Team 2/9 spent 25

28 te last weeks of 1991 patrolling, along wit a reconnaissance platoon, te Green Line In Mogadisu and provrdlng security for te port area, an envrronment Inappropriate for te use of Indirect fire weapons. Yet most aspects of Restore Hope were not unfamiliar to Marine combat units nor detrimental to teir readiness. Toug unopposed except by te media, te ampibious landing and te subsequent seizure of key Objectives in Mogadisu was training more realistic tan an urban warrior exercise. Subsequent to te landing, te 24t MEU carried out many of te missions It must accomplis dunng training to become special operations capable, suc as security, reinforcement, sow of force, tactical deception, mrlrtary operatrons In urban terrain, and reconnaissance and surveillance operations.33 Tasked wit te seizure of weapons caces, te Marines employed cordon and searc operaons similar to tose used In Vretnam.34 Tese complex operatrons, wic require precise coordrnatron of air and ground units, were conducted In an austere environment were te unexpected was routine. Te cordon and searc operations tat te 24t MEU (SOC) and oter units conducted In Somalia were identical, except for te rules of engagement, to combat operations and undoubtedly improved unit readiness. s wit te rmy and ir Force, Restore Hope provided Marine Corps logrstrcal units te opportunity tc practice teir mrssrcn In a real-world environment, rncludrng all of te unexpected and additional demands tat often entails. For instance, Marine Wing Support Squadron 372 not only supported te

29 Marine ir Combat Element (CE) at four widely-dispersed locations, but provided essential logistical support to all U.S. rmy forces at Baledogle, and establised an airfield fuel dispensing system for coalition forces at Klsmayu.35 * MWSS 372 was taxed to te limit wit combat service support missions beyond Its carter to support te Marine CE at one primary location - excellent preparation for te unexpected demands tat te friction of warfare often imposes. s te Manne Corps Gaze&e noted in November 1993, muc of wat te United Task Force (SIC) accomplised was te result of ard work by te lst Force Service Support Group (lti FSSG). n FSSG s organization and loglstlcs support capabilities are well-suited to form te foundation upon wic umanitarian interventions like Somalia can be built. In oter words, te lst FSSG did Its mission and did it well. For combat service support units, MOOlW IS c less dangerous tan war but more realistic and demanding tan training. s Restore Hope transitioned to UNITF II, Brigadier General Hopgood, commander of te I* Force Service Support Group in Somalia, called for lessons learned from is officers. Te result was over 50 articles36 containing lessons applicable to bot umanitarian and combat missions. Wile MOOlW may increase optempo for support units, it improves, rater tan degrades teir expertise and readiness For te Marine Corps itself, MOOTW IS anoter opportunity to demonstrate te flexlblllty tat IS Its trademark. In te words of Lance Corporal 27

30 Billy Saver of Waxaw, NC., quoted37 wile on patrol in Hoddur, Somalia: If tis IS wat te Marine Corps will be doing In te future, I still want to be a part of It. Te Marine Corps will do watever It IS asked to do te world canges trr day to day. Tomorrow, someting may appen in te Middle East and we ll ave to go tere. Navy - Te Seabees Can Do, so wy don t tey? * Tere are also units and personnel tat sacrifice neiter optempo nor training wen called upon to participate in MOOTW. Resistance to utilizing some forces centers on neiter concerns over strategy nor readiness, but te arcana of F budgetary policy. Te Naval Mobile Construction Battalions are an example. Te U.S. Navv was not only present off te coast of Somalia, but on te ground as well. Two NMCBs and a regimental staff, over 1000 Seabees, participated In Restore Hope. s alluded to In te preface, assigned tasks were almost identical to tose performed In Saudi rabia before and during te Gulf War: base camp construction, airfield Improvements, well drrlllng and road maintenance Somalia was a more callenging construction environment, due to te lack of materials or native Industry. In bot cases, te Seabees ad to apply teir doctrine of self-defense wile accompllslng te task at and, I.e. practice te slogan we build, we figt. Te treat differed between te two deployments In Saudi rabia work

31 was often slowed by te need to don MOPP gear and/or take cover In air raid selters, wile In Somalia te construction crews ad to be vigilant against attacks by bandits and mllltla forces. Te experiences gained from bot deployments made te battalions and te Seabees In tem more capable and better prepared. In neiter case was optempo affected, because all of te battalions tat * went to bot Saudi and Somalia maintained te routine cycle of seven monts In omeport, and seven monts deployed. Tose seven-mont deployments are intended to train Seabees for teir combat service support mission. However, te contrast between te Somalia deployment and a routine Seabee deployment provides an example of ow a MOOTW can actually enance training and readiness. routine Seabee deployment possesses te sortcomlngs often attributed * to mllltary participation In umanitarian missions - It does not permit Seabees to practice te skills tat will be expected of tem In warbme. Seabees are not skilled at flnlsed construction, te attractive, climate controlled facilities to wic te developed world IS accustomed. However, during a routine deployment, te Seabees are tasked wit tese types of projects because base commanders do not ave to pay for military labor, as tey must wen work IS performed by contract. Tis IS a false economy to te nation. First, rt IS not te type of construction tat trains Seabees to do teir mission. Second, It IS an inefficient use of resources, since Seabees are not particularly good at masonry, 29

32 or ductwork, or fire suppression systems, or te myriad oter specialties required In modern facllitles. Tird and foremost, te opportunity cost IS tremendous. Seabees exist to do roug construction In austere environments - a combat service support mission at wic tev ave excelled In Vietnam, Saudi rabia, and elsewere. mission perfectly suited to te umanitarian needs of te underdeveloped world. Yet Seabees are seldom used to engage and enlarge because teir value to te Navy, wic resources tem, IS as free labor to accomplis minor construction on its installations. Only during exercises, suc as Teamwork, tat are occaslonally included In a routine deployment do Seabees practice teir wartime construction skills. Te value to te ml-/on would be greater If te Seabees were used to support te national security strategy In c ml1ltat-v operations oter tan war. Not onlv would tis furter our national Objectives, but it would better prepare Seabees for teir wartime mission. c It IS unlikely tat te Seabees are unique. Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) units gained Invaluable experience In Somalia tat cannot be replicated In a training environment. Most complicated but most intriguing of all are te * medical personnel of te Navy, ir Force and rmy. Experience in an austere, low-intensity conflict suc as Somalia provided te best possible training to 4 uniformed medical personnel. In a country wit no Indigenous medical facllltles, U.S. medical personnel ad to deal wit deadly and exotic dlseases.38 Yet, In tis case valuable training can create a tidal wave of negative repercussions, since military ospitals and clinics rely upon teir uniformed staff to provide routine 30

33 medical care. Te lesson IS tat te mrlrtary as become accustomed to usrng many of its logrstlcal and support personnel to maintain Itself, rater tan empasizing teir combat service support mission. Due to personnel and budgetary policy, tese forces and personnel not only cannot be spared for MOOTW, but are less ready tan tev could or sould be for operations tat m war. Conversely, te seagoing portion of te Navy, te war-figters, are largely unaffected by MOOTW. Tat IS because te Navy engages in MOOTW constantly, and as for over 50 years, ever since te decision was made after World War II to forward deploy U.S. naval forces. Forward presence IS itself a mrlrtary operation oter tan war tat, by its nature, enances combat readiness wile simultaneously serving te National Security Strategy. nd Just as wit specific operations oter ten war, suc as Restore Hope, te down side of forward presence IS rg optempo and ig cost. t various times during Restore Hope, te Navy contributed an mpibious Ready Group, a Carrier Battle Group and a destroyer squadron. However, neiter trarnrng nor operating tempo was srgnlficantly nor adversely affected because tose forces would ave been deployed and operating In remote corners of te world in any case. Restore Hope did provide te opportunity to test te US. Navy s rnteroperabrlrty wit a wide variety of coalition partners. Wile optempo remains a concern for te Navy, It IS primarily due to

34 te strategy of maintaining forward presence despite a reduced force structure, and IS only sligtly exacerbated by MOOTWs. Te only seagoing portion of te Navy tat was affected by Restore Hope was te Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF).s s wit oter logistical units, Restore Hope provided an excellent training opportunitv for te MPF. Restore Hope was a classic MPF operation. 3g Te day after a special purpose Marine air-ground task force secured te port, te first MPF sip arrived from Diego Garcia. Te following dav MPF equipment and supplies were Issued to fly-in ecelon forces.40 Tis IS anoter case In wic Restore Hope was a superb exercise. Te movement of te MPF, Seabees and sips to te Horn of frica obviously eliminated te avallablllty of tese forces for oter, potentially more vital missions. However, President Bus correctly anticipated tat none would occur. Tose Navy forces tat did participate In Restore Hope became more capable from te experience. r Joint Operations - Te proof is in te doing MOOTW as been a crucible for forging effective Joint and coalition operations. Even more tan field units, te staff responsible for a MOOTW benefits from te unscnpted fog and friction tat are difficult to build into a fictitious exercise scenario s noted In te lessons learned from Somalia, 32

35 planning for peace operations IS muc te same as planning for combat operations? CENTCOM learned in Somalia tat it lacked critical information regarding infrastructure capabilities witin its area of responslblllty. CENTCOM also discovered te flaws In te time-pased force and deployment data (TPFDD), suc as te late arrival of transportation troug-putters, soldiers trained to unscramble delays at staging areas and terminals. Peraps most Importantly, Restore Hope gave CENTCOM planners an opportunity to utilize te Joint Operations Planning and Execution System and discover its capabilities and limitations. s wit planning, Intelligence IS as vital to te success of a peace operation as It IS to any oter mllltary actwy. 42 In Somalia, a wide range of intelligence systems, Including ground surveillance radars and unmanned aerial veicles, were employed, some for te first time. Issues regarding ardware compabblllty and information access arose, and were often resolved so tat future operations will benefit from te coalition experience In Somalia. Finally, Restore Hope provided CENTCOM te opportunity to test te concept of foreign projection, vice foreign basing, by putting a large U.S.- based force on te ground in a matter of weeks. Te lessons from tat experience will be applicable to all future mllltat-y operations. 33