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1 WAR DEPARTMENT OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D. C September 1943 MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McCLOY: Subject: Confinement of Japanese American Soldiers at Fort Riley. The report of the Inspector General on the confinement of Japanese American soldiers at Fort Riley during the President's visit there on Easter Sunday, 25 April, transmitted herewith, substantiates the allegations made in the letter written by a Japanese American soldier who was stationed at Fort Riley to a friend at Manzanar. This letter was sent to us by the Director of the War Relocation Authority. I have carefully reviewed the transcript of the testimony taken by the Inspector, his report, and the Indorsement by the Inspector General. A brief digest of the case follows: CN >Po {\) I-' 00 X. On the day of the President's visit to Fort Riley, security measures to protect the President 1 s person were implemented by the various echelons of command at Fort Riley. There were three main command groups at Fort Riley, viz., the Fort Riley post proper; Camp Funston where the 9th Armored Division was quartered; and Camp Forsythe, location of the Cavalry Replacement Training Center. Japanese American soldiers were located at the Fort Riley post and at the Cavalry Replacement Training Center. The Cavalr<J School and the facilities incidental to the instruction and training at the Cavalry School are under the command of Brigadier General Rufus S. Ramey. The post at Fort Riley was commanded by Colonel William R. Irvin. Under direction of the 7th Service Command, he was responsible fort he security of the post and certain other administrative and supply functions. In this capacity it was his responsibility to provide for security ofthe President while he was a guest at Fort Riley. The Cavalry Replacement Training Center under the command of Drigadier General Robert W. Strong was under the direct command of Brigadier General Rufus S. Ramey, commandant of the Cavalry School on matters pertaining to training, organization, etc. but reported to the commanding officer of Fort Riley on matters of security..:x:.. en Cot Q 0 o' (I) "<: H ~ Ill b.j I:! 0 c c+'<l t:d 1-'... (I) "<: The announcement of the President's visit and the general Stack Box-~ofder Row I DECLASSIFIED ~~~0~7~~~~~~~~~~~~~Z~3~~~~A~ #~7~ Green Yellow Red Magenta White 3/Color Black

2 ~./ {«. ~;'~;,_.. ;1 ~~«!';~ - 2 security measures in broad terms were prescribed by the commandant of the Cavalr,y School. Under this broad directive the commander of the post of Fort Riley issued certain additional general instructions to the commanding officers of the other two commands, the Cavalry Replacement Training Center at Camp Forsythe and the 9th Armored Division at Camp Funston. Each of these commanders developed the security plan for his ov.n area. As a result of this decentralization there was a marked difference in the protective measures as between the areas of Fort Riley proper and Camp Forsythe, site of the Cavalry Replacement Training Center. There is no information in the report as to the security plan of the commanding general of the 9th Armored Division for Camp Funston. At the post of Fort Riley no restrictions were placed upon the some 30 or 40 Japanese American soldiers who were stationed there as members of the Post Headquarters Detachment. There is evidence to indicate that 1st Lieutenant Herbert D. Jones, commanding officer of the Headquarters Detachment, did receive instructions from Lieutenant Colonel Gaylord, Post Executive, that his Japanese American soldiers were to be kept under observation while the President was on the Post (page 64). At any rate, Lieutenant Jones suggested to his Japanese American soldiers that they remain in barracks during the President's visit. However, the general invitation extended to all soldiers to attend the religious service at the stadium where the President appeared, was accepted by the Japanese American soldiers and it is definite that a number of them were present. The security plan for the Cavalry Replacement Training Center was much different from that of the po t of Fort Riley and appears to have been unnecessarily severe. In brief the plan provided: A All buildings adjacent to the route over which the President would pass would be vacated, window and doors closed and locked.and guards established to prevent entry. (Note: This was a requirement of the Secret Service.) ~. All CRTC training personnel would line the road along which the President would pass. ~ All personnel, other than training personnel, i.e. cooks, cooks helper, charges of quarters, and other administrative uer onnel, and except some 100 Japanese American soldiers, would. be assembled in recree.tion halls and held there under guard during the President's stay on the post. A All No. 1 potential subversives as shown on list /0 7 I Stack Row Box-Fofder 2-3 DECLASSIFIED Authority NN{) Ztf OOft, Color Control Pate Green Yellow Red White "'- ~ ~-...

3 " furnished by Director of Intelligence, Fort Riley, would be assembled early on Easter morning and sent with suspects from other parts of the post on a work detail some ten miles a\o~a:y from the post proper. ~ Japanese American soldiers belonging to units in the Cavalry Replacement Center (approximately 100) would be assembled and placed in confinement while the President was on the post, in the Motor School. i All civilian employees of the Post Exchange, some 60 or 70 men and women, white and black, and all civilian guests at the CRTC guest house would be assembl d in the CRTC Service Club and held under guard while the President was in the post. g. All traffic and foot movement would be frozen during the time the President was in the CRTC area. The plans as herein outlined were carried out with adamant strictness, and the assembly places of the various groups were placed under armed guards. It appears that the various groups were confined for ~ to 3 hours. In addition to armed guards at the Service Club, where the civilians were confined, armed guards ~ere placed inside of the building. Complaints about their confinement were made by some of the civilians direct to the CRTC officers, but without avail. The treatment of the Japanese American soldiers appears to have been more severe than that accorded to the other soldier administrative personnel but little different from that of the civilians, the principal difference being that the interior guards for the Japanese Americans were officers equipped with pistols and one to~ gun, instead of soldiera. This extra precaution taken with the Japanese Americans appears to have been occasioned by the belief on the part of the CRTC 5 2 that they were considered to be 11 No. 1 subvereives 11 and "potentially more da.ngerous than other personnel" - See testimony Major Marquardt, 211 and 212 record. The detailed security plan at the Cavalry Replacement Training Center was developed and promulgated by the executive (Colonel Holman) and the intelligence officer (Major Marqua~) without the full knowledge of the commanding officer, :Srige.dier G-eneral Robert W. Strong. The Inspector's report makes a point of this.- See page 14, paragraph 32-J of the Inspector's report, which states as follows: \ 11 j. That the excesses in the measures carried t:.mty Authority NNV 7'1 oooz_, Color Control Patches Green Yellow Red White ; ~7- '?.. "';"''... ~ I ' ~ -~1(-:~ ~....~~._'.. ~~~~ ' ~:.~~~ '

4 ~ out in the Cavalry Repla.cement Training Center were at the instance of subordir.ate stcdf and operations officers, act1ng unon their own volition and responsibility, and are indicative of a lapse of command control and staff responsibility having occurred in that command with regard to this particular incident, which, as a \'lar Department criticism, should be brought to the attention of the Commanding General, Cavalry Renl~cement Training Center, for his future guidance in similar affairs." The report develops the fact that the Cavalry Replacement Training Center executive, Colonel Oliver I. Holman, was prejudiced against all Japanese American soldiers. {See his answer to Question No. 39, Page 5 of the record and page 133). Major Marquardt, in a conference with the Post Director of Intelligence, Colonel HUffman, received a directive that all Number 1 potential subversives would be assembled and sent on detail to repair fences ten miles north of the camp and that operatives of the C-S system would be especially vigilant and all Number 2 snbversives,.,ere to be carefully watched. Colonel Huffman did not indicate who were the Number 2 subversives but he did give Major Marquardt a list of the Number 1 subversives. Major Marquardt testifies: "While all Japanese are considered Number 1 potential subver~ives and~ being impractical to take them ~11 out of the camp because of the large number, it was suggested they be confined to their barracks during the time the President was in Camp." (Page 31 of the Recore'!.) The decision to confine all Japanese American soldier~ not sent out on the work detail in the Motor.School building anpears to have been made at a conference between ~~jor Marquardt and Colonel Holman, Executive, C.R.T.c. Following this decision Major Marquardt gave orders to 2nd Lieutenant 1'lilliam EJ'I..gle, Assistant 3 of the Cavalry Replacement Training Center, and Lieutenant Engle in turn issued instructions to theorganization commanders to which ~apanese American soldiers belonged. From this it anpears that a basic command decision was made by a staff officer and the staff channel of intelligence was employed in transmitting co~nand orders. An analysis of all the testimony indicates the justification for the conclusion arrived at by the Inspector General, viz., that the development of the security plan in the Cavalry Replacement Training Center was the work of staff officers and subordinates without the kpowledge or approval of the Commanding General, Cavalry Replacement Training Center. /07 I Stack Row Bo:x-f:ofder DECLASSIFIED 2.-3 Authority NN{) Z!f (}()ft, Color Control Green Yellow ~t~~~;,....,_ L~ ~.J.

5 - 5- It appears that the severity of the security pla.n as pertains to not only the Japanese Americ~~s but all other soldiers an~ the civilians, which placed them in confinement under guard during the PrP.sident's visit, was unnecessary and without warrant. Colonel Holu.an, the executive, and Major Marquardt, the S-2, justify their actions on the ground that no measures short of complete protection to the person of the President were justified; that in the ca.se of the Japanese.Americe..ns, since they were all considered to be potentially subversive and since there was no detailed information about each of the individuals, no measure short of the confinement of the entire group would suffice to insure security while the President was present in the Cavalry Replacement Training Center. The Inspecting Officer recommends that the Commanding General, Cavalry School, Fort Riley and Commanding General, Cavalry Replacement Training Center, Fort Riley, be informed of the results of this investigation and that a letter be directed to take corrective action to provide against recurrence of improprieties reported in this instance. The Inspector General concurs in the recommendation and adds that the report should be sent to the commanding officer of the Cavalry School, Fort Riley, for his information, and thereafter to the Commanding General, Cavalry Replacement Training Center, who should be directed to take apuropriate corrective action. A summary and onalysis of this report indicates there are officers in the Army who do not have a nroper understanding of the Japanese America. soldiers. Their assumption that all must be looked upon as Potentially dangerous must be attributed to either ignorance or prejudice. but regardless of the reason. it becomes difficult to develop loyalty on the part of these soldiers when they are all looked upon, classified, and treated as subversive. Although it develops that the Japahese Americans were treated in no great respect differently from white soldiers and civilians, the repercussions o the treatment of the Japanese Americans was more far-reaching, Knowledge of thi event was general in the 442nd Combat Team and at Camp Savage. Against the expressed prejudicial feeling of Colonel Holman and Major Marquardt there were other officers in the Cavalry Replacement Training Center who stated the Japanese American soldiers were loyal and trustworthy. Thes officers, because of their intimate relation with th J panaa American soldiers, probably were better qualified to judge t~eir /07 I Stack Row Box-FOfder U ~\... Li\.;:,;:,Jl' Jl'..JJ Authority NNP Ztf ooa Color Control Green. ' ~~ _:.. ;.LhAtri-1

6 .. ~ charecteristics than were the intelligence officers. Second Lieutenant William Engle, Assistant 3, C.R.T. C., who executed the orders of Mejor ~~rquardt in confining the Jaoanese American soldiers was opposed to the inst1~ctions imposed by the S~2. of the record). (See Peges 114 and 118 First Lieutenant Herschel L. Jones, Commandir~ Officer, Ca.sual Detachment, Fort Riley, who has a number of Japanese American soldiers in his command gave testimony on their loyalty and dependability. It was the Japanese American soldiers from his organization who attended the services at the stadium for the President. Major Jacob A. V 8 n Hardeveld, Commanding Second Squadron, First Training Regiment, C.R.T.c., who was responsible for posting the guards in the Cavalry Reserve Training Center area, testified as to the loyalty of the Japanese and pointed out that when they were asked if they were Orientals quickly ans~ered that they were Americans. He has found them to be very efficient and he enjoys working with them. It was his belief at tha time that there ould be reuercussions for the way the Japanese American ~oldiers were treated. Recommendation: be signed and dicpatched. That the attached memorandum /07 I Stack Row Box-Fofder DECLASSIFIED?3 Authority NNP Zo/ OOft, Green.. ;;l;:"'.;_f;; < ;.::ft.:.~~...