Update on SwAF replacement of Air Surveillance, Air Defence Sensors and ground based naval sensors

Transcription

1 Update on SwAF replacement of Air Surveillance, Air Defence Sensors and ground based naval sensors LtCol (AF) Martin Bergstrand Head of sensor branch at the HQ C 4 I Department

2 Scope Principles Where we are today Q

3 The study The SwAF Sensor study. Summer autumn 2014 SwAF Long term perspective studies formed the background Threat evaluation Scenarios HQ in lead Participators from J-level, A and N-levels, Navy and AF-units, AF OTEU, GBAD, FOI, FRA etc CD&E method, multiple iterations and simulations Coordinated with the parliamentary Air Defence Study 2040 Approved by HQ Defence Staff Plans and Policy

4 Fundamental principles for a system of sensors The SwAF sensor study assumed a number of different principles that should characterize (but also affects) a system of sensors The principles derives mostly from experience drawn from war gaming conducted in the Armed Forces, international experiences, but also experience from the group members These principles both complement and contradict each other, and they are not listed in any priority order

5 Ability against different types of targets A sensor(-network) must be able to detect, follow and provide data for weapons allocation Aircraft, ships, cruise missiles, ballistic weapons and targets with small RCS place heavy demands on the performance of a sensor network. Different sensors have different characteristics and against different types of targets. For this reason, there is a need for a system composed of sensors with different characteristics that complement each other.

6 The radar horizon challenge 9000 m 7000 m 5000 m 3000 m 1000 m m 500 m 6

7 Robustness Robustness can be achieved in several complementary ways Frequency diversity Weather sensitivity Resolution Potential range Low RCS Jamming Numerical strength is also part of robustness Sensor systems and its supporting communications network must also be able to withstand instance Cyber Attacks or Navigation Warfare.

8 Frequency Conflicts Armed forces and civilian frequencies expansion Civil telecommunications, data and satellite communications becomes more dominant in the traditional radar bands with substantial consequences for military sensors and communications equipment. In 2002, the Telecommunications Agency responsible for frequency planning was transferred to the new authority, Swedish Post and Telecom Authority (PTS) The Armed Forces is one actor among others..

9 Mobility Tactical or strategic? Legacy sensor systems have a strategic mobility Attacker's ability to use high precision, large warhead, long distance weapons Kinetic protection hard to achieve Reinforcement Gapfiller There is a need for highly mobile sensors!

10 Capability of passive surveillance Passive capability allows that targets can be detected and monitored without emitting your own electromagnetic energy. It enhances the ability for classification of non cooperative targets Also, this capability forces an attacker to adapt by not emitting signals from his systems. Main focus, building a RAP o RMP

11 Growth potential SwAF materiel supply strategy advocates that existing stock must be renovated and or modified if possible The need for future upgrades as results of weapon and platform development

12 Cooperative Engagement Capability Enabling a (near)real-time sensor netting system that enables situational awareness and integrated fire control capability. Allow the sharing of radar and weapons systems data on air targets Requires a very fast communications network

13 Low peace time LCC Systems must be able to operate continuously, 24/7/365 with a favourable MTB(C)F with a minimum of personell. Low life cycle cost

14 Agency cooperation Omitted in this presentation

15 International cooperation Early warning and monitoring of activities in our immediate surroundings through sensors located outside Sweden is very valuable. And vice versa Agreements with other countries on the exchange of sensor data is a reality in some areas. In other areas there are ambitions to expand cooperation, including the NORDEFCO framework. Agreements and different levels of conflict is crucial

16 The initial Concept A backbone of updated/ upgraded S-band sensors Highly mobile AESA sensors (Surveillance/ air defence) Fully integrated ESM-systems into the C2-systems Updated/ upgraded chain of coastal radars gapfillers Updated/ upgraded AEW&C Low frequency radars HiPo, resilient and flexible communications infrastructure Cooperation! However ongoing development! PCL, RPAS, Multistatic arrangements Is man or woman in the loop sufficient? Descision support HMI.. Energy management etc

17 Principles sum up Ability against different types of targets The radar horizon challenge Robustness Frequency Conflicts Mobility Capability of passive surveillance Growth potential Cooperative Engagement Capability Low peace time LCC Agency cooperation International cooperation

18 Those were the principles.. Where are we today? SwAF produced the conceptual foundation for a new network of sensors Assigned by HQ, FMV/ DMA is in the lead supported by SwAF RFI (Request For Information) issued A major project comparable with the new Gripen and the A26 submarine!

19 Sensor network procurement distribution of responsibility Defining threat environment, op. requirements and draft concept (SwAF HQ in lead) Q Q Defining concepts (FMV in lead) Q Q

20 Sensor network schedule Defining & konceptual work Production, build up and commissioning RFQ IOC RFI and requirement specifications Evaluation and contracts 28/09/

21 International cooperation

22 Thank you for your attention