The margin of victory is always slim, and the walk from the victory lane to the losers club is all too short. Robert Citino, Foreword to Margin of Victory Inevitably, in this struggle for badly needed changes in thinking, organization, structure, technology, and leadership, the enemy is not external. The enemy is us. Introduction to Margin of Victory
What is Margin of Victory s Bottom Line? The last fifteen years have severely eroded the United States military-technological edge and operational flexibility; The postwar world is crumbling/changing. Future wars of decision interstate conflicts that affect the nation s vital strategic interests are brewing; Wars are decided in the decades before they begin, not by the sudden appearance of a new, technological silver bullet. In the absence of coherent strategic thinking, open-ended downsizing makes today s military establishment smaller without making it more capable. No Fortune 500 Corporation would do what the U.S. Armed Forces have done dramatically downsize without fundamentally reorganizing with one eye on the needs of the present and the other on the demands of the future.
Mission Impossible: The Battle of Mons 1914 After 1815, the British army s leadership focused almost exclusively on battles in which the application of overwhelming firepower substituted for tactics and strategy; British Secretary of State for War, 1906-1912 Between 1899 and 1902 Britain needed 500,000 British and colonial troops and 227 million or roughly $500 billion in adjusted dollars) to defeat fewer than 70,000 Boers; Haldane transformed a 19 th Century British Army optimized for irregular warfare into a 20 th Century professional standing army. Haldane focused first on first order questions (strategy, organization, contingencies), and, then on technology and equipment). The Result: a General Staff, a 160,000 man British Expeditionary Force (BEF), a professional military strike force of six infantry divisions and a cavalry division, designed for rapid deployment plus a trained reserve.
War without End: The Battle of Shanghai, 1937 Ugaki understood that Japan s victory in 1905 was more the result of Russian incompetence than of Japanese superiority; Ugaki grasped the importance of modernization. He secured reductions in manpower 1927 to fund Army reorganization and modernization; General Kazushige Ugaki, Imperial Japanese Minister of War 1924-1927 However, reactionary generals turned back his organizational reforms in favor of masses of infantry. The Japanese generals failed to appreciate the importance of reform and modernization because their early opponents in World War II were weak. Japan s unnecessary and self-defeating invasion of China in 1937 combined with the internal war between the Japanese Army and Navy postponed Ugaki s reforms until 1942-43, too late to avoid defeat.
Reversal of Fortune: The Destruction of Army Group Center, 1944 Generaloberst Hans von Seeckt Commander-in- Chief, Reichswehr The destruction of Army Group Center (Operation Bagration), is the collision of two conceptual approaches to military reform: The Germans dramatically increased their tactical fighting power at the point of impact; The Soviets deepened and refined the process to create operational agility and strategic unity of effort. When the opportunity presented itself, a Soviet Marshal could do in minutes what General Eisenhower took months of negotiation with U.S. and British air force commanders to do: unleash 700 longrange bombers to attack and destroy 50,000 German troops encircled by Soviet tank forces. General Alexander Svechin, Soviet General Staff Academy, Theorist and Strategist
Enemy at the Gate: Counterattack across the Suez, 1973 General Saad El Shazly Egyptian Army Chief of Staff, 1973 In 1973, the IDF was commanded by a unified, national general staff that directed the operations of air, land, and sea forces. The men who built the IDF were primarily doers, combat commanders who learned their trade in a dynamic wartime environment that rewarded initiative and originality. For three or four years we had kept five infantry divisions stationed by the canal, each deployed in defensive formation over a sector of 10 12 kilometers wide We relied on the enemy to monitor this and to conclude that the divisions were not massing for an assault. General Shazly, Egyptian Army Chief of Staff General Haim Bar-lev IDF Chief of Staff, 1968-1971, CDR, Southern Command, 1973
Lost Victory: Desert Storm and the Battle of 73 Easting The Battle of 73 Easting was a battle of annihilation, a testimony to the superior combination of training, technology, and leadership that Generals Depuy and Gorman began building in the aftermath of America s failed military intervention in Vietnam. Colonel General Ayad Futayih al- Rawi, CDR Republican Guard Corps, 1991 Fox Troop I Ghost Troop Direction of Movement toward 73 Easting 26 February 1991 General William Depuy CDR, Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), 1973-1977 Hawk Company Eagle Troop II
What do we learn about winning 20 th Century Wars and Battles? If you want something new, you have to stop doing something old People in any organization are always attached to the obsolete. Peter Drucker, Management Challenges for the 21 st Century, 1999 Military Leaders and their organizations cannot reform themselves. Resolute and informed civilian leaders must do it; Military strategy must be congruent with national culture, geography and scientific-industrial capacity (Purpose? Method? End-state?); Without unity of command, there is no unity of effort; Effective integration of ISR and Strike with Maneuver is the key to future victories; Quality trumps Quantity superior armored protection plus mobility with accurate, devastating firepower is vital; Human capital limits or extends military potential.
What should the next President do to prepare for the future? A major reset of U.S. national military strategy within clearly defined constitutional parameters is essential; Focus on access to Global Commons and Limited Liability Partnerships Grand Strategy consists of avoiding, not starting conflicts; Overhaul U.S. military command structures reduce unneeded overhead and commands (unity of command); Establish a national defense staff (eliminate JCS and subordinate Services to U.S. Military High Command); Create Joint Force Commands (JFC) inside the regional unified commands (consolidate numbered air forces, armies, fleets into JFCs); Apply, the ISR-Strike-Maneuver-Sustainment Framework to build armed forces-in-being designed to execute all arms/all effects warfare.
What the next President must keep in mind: Deliberation is the work of many. Action of one alone. Colonel Charles de Gaulle, 1934 Sit down before facts with an open mind. Be prepared to give up every preconceived notion. Captain Hyman Rickover, U.S. Navy, 1950 New, revolutionary ideas pass through three stages: (1) It's crazy, don't waste my time. (2) It's possible, but it's not worth doing. (3) I always said it was a good idea. Arthur C. Clarke, Scientist and Inventor The speed with which those who once insisted, It's impossible" can switch to: I always said it could be done," is really astounding!
Backup Slides
Joint Force Commands (JFCs) Integration within a relatively flat, joint command structure is vital if unneeded overhead is to be reduced.
Single Service C2 inside the Regional Unified Commands: Example PACOM Failure in war is most often the absence of one directing mind and commanding will. Sir Winston Churchill Flag Officer Totals: Four Stars: 4 Three Stars: 15 Two Stars: 35 Total: 54 Flag Officers
More teeth, at the expense of Unneeded overhead and tail! After Conversion: Four Star: 1 Three Stars: 6 Two Stars: 30 Flag Officer Total: 36 Note 1: SOF JTF retained; Note 2: One Stars are excluded from this total More Efficient, Effective and Agile C2 at Lower Cost! Five regionally focused Joint Force Commands (JFCs); Services provide one-star commanded mission focused ISR, Strike, Maneuver or Sustainment capability-based force packages to JFCs on rotational basis; Deputy CDRs for ISR, Strike, Maneuver and Sustainment assist JFC CDR to employ mission focused capability force packages; Reduced multi-star headquarters improves tooth to tail ratio. $ Savings will be substantial!