Tsunami crisis support relief

Similar documents
MULTISECTORIAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN - CHOLERA

NEPAL EARTHQUAKE 2015 Country Update and Funding Request May 2015

Northeast Nigeria Health Sector Response Strategy-2017/18

Standard Operating Procedure for Community Event-Based Surveillance for Ebola Virus Disease in Sierra Leone

ANNEX V - HEALTH A. INTRODUCTION

JOINT PLAN OF ACTION in Response to Cyclone Nargis

Sudan Weekly Highlights Week 36 (4 10 September 2010)

Emergency Preparedness & Humanitarian Action (EHA) Week 3, January 2012

Ebola Preparedness and Response in Ghana

South Sudan Country brief and funding request February 2015

The Syrian Arab Republic

Health Information System (HIS) Module 3 - Morbidity. Using Information to Protect Refugee Health

Papua New Guinea Earthquake 34, 100. Situation Report No. 2 HIGHLIGHTS HEALTH CONCERNS 65% OF HEALTH FACILITIES IN AFFECTED AREAS ARE DAMAGED

Self-Assessment Tool: Are Health Facilities Capable of Managing Cholera Outbreaks?

Health Information from Disease Surveillance - "MDS" Sri Lanka

HEALTH CLUSTER BULLETIN September 2017

REPORT ON THE USE OF CERF FUNDS THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN RAPID RESPONSE CHOLERA 2014 RESIDENT/HUMANITARIAN COORDINATOR

Clinical Guidance on the Identification and Evaluation of Possible SARS-CoV Disease among Persons Presenting with Community-Acquired Illness Version 2

DRAFT VERSION October 26, 2016

Health Cluster Coordination Meeting. Friday December 4, 2015, Kiev

Community-Based Surveillance:

Manual of Notification of Infectious diseases By DR Mohammad Abou ele la Professor of Medical Microbiology & Immunology,Mansoura Faculty of Medicine

Sudan Health Highlights

Democratic Republic of Congo

Control of Clostridium difficile Infection (CDI) Outbreaks in Hospitals A Guide for Hospital and Health Unit Staff

Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Cluster. Afghanistan

HEALTH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT CAPACITY

Risk Communications. Focus Area 5 Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Infectious Diseases (APSED)

November, The Syrian Arab Republic. Situation highlights. Health priorities

Comprehensive Assessment of National Surveillance Systems in Sri Lanka

A total of 21 suspected cases of Acute Jaundice Syndrome (AJS) were reported from the 3 states of Darfur.

Earthquake in Padang, West Sumatra Province, Republic of Indonesia

4 OUTBREAK OF AN ENTERIC ILLNESS

Indonesia Tsunami Situation Report

Floods in Pakistan Bulletin No August Pakistan Health Cluster. Highlights

Dr. AM Abdullah Inspector General, MOH THE HEALTH SITUATION IN IRAQ 2009

Guidance for contingency planning

ANNUAL PLANNING/CONTINGENCY GUIDE

Kassala State Minister of Health visits Rashaida tribe of Abu Talha in West Kassala locality, East Sudan.

South Sudan. Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response (IDSR) Epidemiological Update W (Oct 02-Oct 08)

Health cluster partners attend a meeting to discuss the response to the current crisis in South Sudan in Juba

Togo: Yellow Fever. DREF operation n MDRTG May, 2008

Provincial Surveillance Protocol for Clostridium difficile infection

Surveillance: Post-event Strategies

A university wishing to have an accredited program in adult Infectious Diseases must also sponsor an accredited program in Internal Medicine.

Investigating Clostridium difficile Infections

Grant Programs Directorate Information Bulletin No. 409 June 1, 2016

Communicable Diseases and Clusters of Communicable Diseases in School

2.13. Training for Emergency Health Management

JANUARY Evaluation of Impact of CBEP Training Activities on the Performance of Targeted Laboratories in Iraq

San Francisco General Hospital INFECTION CONTROL

HEALTH CLUSTER BULLETIN APRIL 2018

The local health department shall maintain annually reviewed policies and procedures.

National Standards for the prevention and control of healthcare-associated infections in acute healthcare services.

AWD Geddo Region, South Central Somalia, 1March

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE S REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Sudan High priority 2b - The principal purpose of the project is to advance gender equality Gemta Birhanu,

PLANNING HEALTH CARE FOR INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS: EXPERIENCES IN UGANDA

GOARN Request for Assistance: Ebola Virus Disease in West Africa

3rd Health Programme

Health Protection Scotland. Protecting Scotland s Health

Surge Capacity for Communitybased Management of Acute Malnutrition. Regine Kopplow and Sinead O Mahony

IASC. Mozambique Zambezi River floods and cyclone Favio crisis. Health Cluster Bulletin # March Inter-Agency Standing Committee

Welcome to the Training Module for Mandatory Communicable Disease Reporting in Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Approximate time to complete this training is:

Syrian Arab Republic, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq

Disaster relief emergency fund (DREF)

Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Draft October 2003

Clostridium difficile

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO NUTRITION EMERGENCY POOL MODEL

Responsibilities of Public Health Departments to Control Tuberculosis

Objective. Note: Responsibility is ensuring the activity is done, not necessarily doing it

South Asia Earthquake Health Situation Report # November 2005

Introduction to Bioterrorism. Acknowledgements. Bioterrorism Training and Emergency Preparedness Curriculum

PHEIC Public Health Event with International Concern

ANNEX H HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES

SOP Standard. Operating Procedures. For Coordinating. Public Health Event Preparedness and Response in the WHO African Region

7th Annual International Symposium Biosecurity and Biosafety: future trends and solutions

Medical Officer of Health

Hospital engagement lessons from the five-country WHO/CIDA initiative

Post Flood Health Assessment The WR Mozambique with the Minister of Health visit a temporary health facility at Chiequalane accommodation centre

Pakistan Health Cluster

Outbreak and Disaster Management (ODM), South Sudan

Disaster relief emergency fund (DREF) Republic of Congo: Epidemic

Towards Quality Care for Patients. National Core Standards for Health Establishments in South Africa Abridged version

Infectious Diseases-HAI, Infectious Diseases Connecticut Department of Public Health, Infectious Disease: Healthcare Associated Infections, STD/TB

Supporting NGOs Globally to Promote Women s and Children's Health

Darfur: One Year On WHO S WORK TO SAVE LIVES AND REDUCE SUFFERING

National Infection Prevention and Control Guideline

Special session on Ebola. Agenda item 3 25 January The Executive Board,

Learning from Critical Incidents Michael A. Stoto, PhD Georgetown University

Infection control in ambulatory care. Benjamin A. Kruskal, MD, PhD Chief of Infectious Disease Medical Director, Infection Control

Tuberculosis Prevention and Control Protocol, 2018

WHO Emergency Health Programme for the Food Crisis in Niger Situation Report # 3

SIMULATION EXERCISE FOR TESTING OF THE INTERNATIONAL

The local health department shall maintain annually reviewed policies and procedures.

Patient Safety Course Descriptions

Williamson County & Cities Health District Epidemiologist I Foodborne Disease Epidemiologist

Cyclone Nargis Myanmar OCHA Situation Report No May 2008

Sudan: Acute Watery Diarrhoea Epidemic

North Weth West Frontier P

Transcription:

Tsunami crisis support relief Rapid assessment Early Warning System and Active surveillance and rumours verification Kalmunai region Ampara District 16 30 January 2005 WHO office Colombo Sub Office Ampara MSF Spain Ministry of Health Sri Lanka Dr. Augusto Pinto, WHO/CSR/LYO 1

Description of the assessment methodology From 21/01/2005 to 27/01/2005 WHO and MSF Spain, together with the Regional Epidemiology unit of Kalmunai region have carried out a rapid assessment of the performance of the surveillance system put in place by the Ministry of Health to face the Tsumani emergency. The main objectives of the rapid assessment were: To describe data collection and recording To identify population under surveillance To describe flow of data To describe data analysis and report To describe feed back procedure To describe laboratory capacities to confirm cases in the region To describe response capacities To assess: Simplicity Acceptability Quality of data Usefulness Representativeness Completeness Timeliness To produce recommendations Areas visited: District of Ampara, Kalmunai region 2

Active surveillance and rumours verification: To verify the performance of the system and the reliability of information collected and reported, we carried out an active surveillance, during the assessment of the system, verifying also all rumours collected at camp level about communicable diseases. In each camp we where asking to the nurses, to the Public Health Inspectors (PHI) and when present to the medical doctors working for NGOs or others humanitarian agencies whether they have seen, in the past week, any case of suspected watery diarrhoea, bloody diarrhoea, acute jaundice, rash with fever, unknown fever, tetanus in adults or neonatal tetanus. In each visited area the team made the following steps to verify the eventual detection of the above health events : Verification of the information collected at camp level with the register of Medical Officer of Health (MOH). Interview of the MOH. Interview of the director of the hospital and visit of the wards. Interview of the doctor in charge with the Out Patient Departments (OPD). In case of admission to the hospital of a suspected case, we visited the related ward to check for the presumptive or confirmed diagnosis. During the visits the team found few cases of mild diarrhoea and few sporadic cases of bloody diarrhoea. Most of the cases of mild diarrhoea were notified in the first days soon after the Tsunami wave. All of them were treated with ORS and sent home in the same day. No clusters in terms of time and space have been detected for any of the health events under surveillance. Most of the cases of bloody diarrhoea detected were in children under five year of age and in most of the cases they were treated before any laboratory diagnosis with Cyprofloxacine or with Metronidazole and cotrimoxazole. All case of bloody diarrhoea met in the hospitals were from the resident population. According to doctors of OPD hospital the detection of these few cases were in the normal figures of expected cases in this season. No doctors interviewed noticed any unusual increase of any of the health events under surveillance. Assessment of the EWAR system in place Background information The East coast of Sri Lanka has been one of the most affected area by the Tsunami. The Ampara district account for more than 10,000 deaths and hundreds of disappeared. Kalmunai region is the main coastal area in the Ampara district and has been the most affected. The population living on the coast is around 361,000 inhabitants, and among them 162,938 were displaced because the Tsunami wave destroyed all the houses and community shelters. Most of the health infrastructures on the coast have also been washed out by the catastrophe, and some of the health personnel and of the patients have died. Few hours after the tragedy, the local health authorities put in place an immediate response to face the emergency situation. All health personnel were requested to participate in the relief operations under the coordination of the Deputy Provincial Director of Health Service (DPDHS). To assist immediately the survivors, all Medical Health Officers (MOH) were requested to provide health care to the affected population though mobile clinics or by running again the health units not completely destroyed. Each mobile clinic was composed by a medical doctor (MOH), a nurse/midwife, and a public health inspector (PHI). Objective of the surveillance system in place - To ensure timely detection response and control of outbreaks among the displaced population Population under surveillance At the beginning of the disaster the system was essentially focusing on the population displaced from the affected areas to the camps. After the first three weeks many displaced people started to move from the camps to the houses of the neighbourhoods, to be hosted by other family members or by friends. This new situation enlarged the catchments population of the surveillance system including the population living around the camps. 3

Health events under surveillance and cases definitions According to the MOH interviewed and the Regional Epidemiologist of Kalmunai, all new cases of the following cases of health events attending a health unit or mobile team should be reported. Health events Viral fever Diarrhea Conjunctivitis Acute respiratory Infections Skin diseases Scabies Dermatitis Others (specify) In the first week of January MSF Spain together with the regional office of Kalmunai have distributed a written list of case definitions to be provided to the MOHs together with a record book for each camp. However their use remained limited. Rumours and surveillance information coming from the communities: The PHIs were the key persons to report eventual rumours from the camps and the surroundings communities. Type of system The system in place was: Exhaustive: all the camps of the displaced population should report Active at MOH level. The MOH collects every day the record forms filled in each camp by the nurses or by the PHI. Data were collected in each camp and aggregated at MOH level. Reporting units The reporting units were the camps. In the Kalmunai region there were 11 MOH areas, and for each MOH area there were between 5 and 15 camps for a total population of almost 60,000 IDPs at moment of the visit. MOH Number of camps Population Kalmunai North 10 7770 Kalmunai South 9 19382 Sainthamaruthu 5 7965 Karativu 5 5256 Nintavur 5 4623 Alayadivembu 3 3649 Akkarapattu 5 1782 Thirukkovil 10 2395 Pottuvil 14 5112 Sammanthurai 7 980 Addachennai 4 710 TOTAL 77 59624 Flow of data Periodicity: Daily from the camps to the MOH Weekly from the MOH level to the regional level Weekly from the regional level to the Sate level (Colombo) 4

Data transmission: data are transmitted by hand from the camps to the MOH and by fax, telephone or by hand from MOH to the regional epidemiology unit There was not regular feedback from the regional level to the MOH area and to the camps. Data collection form At camp level a daily data collection form was filled out by the nurses/midwife and the PHI assigned to the camp with aggregated number of new cases of the health events under surveillance. Deaths were not included. This was due to the fact that deaths usually do not occur in the camp or during OPD activity. The recording of deaths continued to be based at hospital level. Weekly data collection form : Every Friday MOHs aggregated the daily data in a weekly record form to report to the regional epidemiological office. Data entry and analysis The data entry was done by the regional epidemiologist on a Excel spreadsheet. The regional epidemiologist analysed the data received every week to check if there are any significant increase in the number of cases of the health events under surveillance. Indicators The indicators produced were : Number of cases by camps and by MOH by day and by week. Data validation: MOH area: When completing the form the MOH checked that the data received from the camps were reliable according to his personal experience and that all the information were complete Regional unit: The regional epidemiologist received the weekly report by fax, telephone or by hand every Friday He checked the completeness of the forms and whether there were any excessive numbers or significant increase of cases. Call back Every Saturday, the Regional Epidemiologist called the MOH who did not send the forms to ensure the completeness of the reports by the end of each week. Thresholds triggering actions According to the Regional epidemiologist in Kalmunai region, significant increase in number of the cases of the health events reported will trigger action for investigation. However, thresholds were not specified for any of the health event under surveillance. 5

Laboratory confirmation: In Kalmunay district the laboratories attached to the two base hospitals did not have yet the capacities to perform any diagnostic of microbiology, virology or serology, to confirm eventual suspected outbreak. Laboratories should collect the samples and send them in appropriate conditions and with the appropriate media to the Central laboratory in Colombo, of the Microbiology Research Institute. The laboratory in Kalmunai hospital was provided with Cary Blair for the transport of stools for diarrhoeal diseases confirmation. The district laboratory attached to the central hospital in Ampara could perform some bacteriological cultures. Feed Back The central epidemiologic department in Colombo received the weekly report from affected districts and produces a weekly summary report published in the Ministry of Health web site. Rumors verification, signal detection In case of report of unusual events from the camps or in the surrounding community the PHI and the MOH were usually in charge with the verification of the rumours. Preparedness, response and coordination: The regional epidemiology department was in charge for the preparedness and response of epidemics. The implementation of the investigation and response activities at peripheral level was carried out by the Mobile Clinics. Health coordination meetings were usually organized at regional level (Kalmunai) according to specific needs, however there iwas not a routine meeting to discuss about epidemiological surveillance and discuss about weekly data reporting. Results: Strengths The system was conceived to be highly sensitive according to the crisis condition and the need to detect events as early as possible. The system was well established, especially at front line level among the camps of displaced population. The presence of the personnel involved in the system was highly decentralized. The personnel involved, were highly motivated and the acceptability of the surveillance system was very high among them. All the health personnel involved consider the system very useful. The communication between regional and peripheral level were very good. Timeliness was good; delays in sending forms were very rare. Representativeness was high. However the majority of most severe cases went directly to the hospital OPD and thus could not be detected by the system. Completeness was 100% in the first two weeks and 90% in the third week after the Tsunami There was a high sense of abnegation among the personnel involved in the surveillance system expressed by their constant presence at every time of the day. Some NGOs, namely MSF Spain and Merlin, were collaborating closely with the Health authorities in strengthening the existing surveillance system. 6

Limits Data collection and data recording At camp level: There was not a standard and formal recording system (registry) at mobile clinic level. Most of the MOH were writing the prescription for the patients on a little paper without reporting the suspected diagnosis in a record book. The record daily form was filled by the nurses or by the PHI soon after the visit of the MOH. At hospital level: The OPD of the hospitals of the region have between 350 and 600 patients per day. However all these visits were not recorded in a record book. However the doctors working in the hospital OPD have to report all notifiable diseases as from the national law for the control of communicable diseases. Until the third week after the Tsunami, the surveillance system for communicable diseases did not include any hospital OPD activities. At MOH level: MOH consolidated the daily data collected by nurses and PHI to fill up the weekly record form. Sometimes, some MOHs were consolidating the weekly data based essentially on their memory. Health events under surveillance, case definition and thresholds The health events under surveillance did not include syndromes such as acute Jaundice or Bloody diarrhoea or suspect measles.. However according to the regional epidemiologist, if a case of these syndromes was detected, it would be reported and specified under the line Others and thus immediately notified. Until the third week of the crisis there were not specified case definitions for the health events under surveillance. Thresholds have not been specified for each of the health event under surveillance and there were not specification of the action to be triggered in case of suspected outbreak. Population under surveillance, use of denominators: Cases reported by the surveillance system did not include only the population of the camps but also the resident population. Therefore, in terms of computing incidence rate or death rate the denominator needed to be adjusted to a wider population including the residents around the camps. Data quality and data validation: Data transmitted should have the possibility to be counter checked by the presence of outpatient record books. Indicators, Data analysis: The indicators produced were absolute number of cases by MOH areas and camps. Data were not always presented by age groups. Graphics or maps were not routinely produced at regional level. Feed Back: Given the excessive workload and limited personnel, no bulletin was produced, at regional level to feed back the frontline workers at camp level Laboratory confirmation: Transport media for specimen collection should be positioned in all hospitals of the region. 7

NGOs and partners: Some NGOs providing health care in the camps, did not follow strictly the rules as indicated by MOH, and did not record their OPD activities causing, sometimes, losses of information for the system. Conclusions The regional surveillance system has shown a very high flexibility. An Early Warning System, adapted to the crisis condition was put in place 24/48 hours soon after the disaster, mobilizing the existing local health personnel. The adapted EWAR system showed a very high sensitivity, as requested in emergency situation, with a very high level of acceptability, usefulness, simplicity and representativeness. Timeliness and completeness were also very high the first three weeks of activities. More attention should be given to the use of standard case definition and the definition of thresholds for alert signals. Data analysis at regional level needed to be supported by an automatic computer application able to produce immediately the defined indicators, to alert according to defined thresholds, and to produce standard bulletin for routine feedback. Standard procedures for specimen collection and transport in emergency situation should be produced to ensure good quality of diagnosis. Transport media should be positioned at peripheral level to ensure the collection of all specimen when required. Regional epidemiologists and Medical Officer of Health should be trained in field epidemiology and surveillance of communicable diseases in crisis situation as preparedness of eventual future disasters. Lesson learned during the crisis situation could be useful for strengthening the national surveillance system with specific regard the EWAR and laboratory components. 8