Toronto EMS and SARS

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Toronto EMS and SARS Bruce K. Farr, Chief Peter Macintyre, Manager Toronto Emergency Medical Services

Toronto EMS 850 paramedics 41 stations in four quadrants 90-97 paramedic units on day shift 140,000 emergency transports yearly 40,000 non-emergency transfers yearly

Toronto EMS - 2 Paramedics are the entry point to the health care system for many patients Four Toronto paramedics contracted SARS Toronto EMS maintained service throughout both SARS outbreaks activated HDOC organized distribution of PPE controlled interfacility transfers

Lessons Learned Command & Control Communication Personnel PPE Logistics Transfers

Command & Control - 1 Need for centralized command and control of incidents like SARS outbreak Provincial Operations Centre (POC) worked well Cooperation between all players Federal, Provincial, Municipal ministries, emergency and health services represented

Command & Control - 2 EMS must be at the decision-making table Paramedics were the front line in the battle to contain SARS - need consistent protocols Paramedics encounter patients in uncontrolled environments, often without warning of patient s condition

Command & Control - 3 SARS Scientific Committee did a great job researching and developing protocols and directives for medics Future need - consistent screening tools at hospitals Paramedics passed screenings at some hospitals and not others on the same shift

Command & Control - 4 Toronto EMS Health Care Divisional Operations Centre (HDOC) EMS Police Fire Public Health? Hospitals? Unions Neighbouring services (GTA EMS, FS, PS)

Command & Control - 5 Need better local notification of outbreaks EMS needs to hear about outbreaks as soon as Public Health and hospitals Paramedics have a role in reporting outbreaks from the frontline

Communication -1 Common Message, Common Speaker Need to allow internal communication without external approvals Daily media briefings worked Who writes the message Who delivers it Reality of SARS vs. public fear

Communication - 2 Who is the scientific authority? Health Canada Provincial MOH Public Health CDC WHO Roles need clarification

Communication - 3 Talk to the troops Be open and accessible Use technology for internal communication E-mail Phone them They phone you (1-800 numbers) One on one from management Posting in stations

Immunization Sick vs. SICK Sick vs. WSIB Plan for loss of staff Personnel - 1 Quarantine Family responsibilities Other employers?

Personnel - 2 Ensure staff get paid while on quarantine If people suffer financial loss, they won t stay isolated EAP is critical Don t forget the families

Medical Support Unit -1 Public Health overwhelmed >20,000 calls EMS, Fire and Police developed internal Public Health Notification, contact tracing, medical referrals, daily chart review

Medical Support Unit - 2 Needed direct line to Public Health Daily review of current information Staffed by Toronto EMS and Fire Services Community Medicine Program RN Base hospital MD Modified duty paramedics Support staff

Home vs. Working Who decides? Quarantine We live in different jurisdictions Confusion over different rules in different regions Support Masks, food, prescriptions, family support

Working Quarantine During SARS 2, over 400 paramedics on working quarantine N95 mask all the time at work exception if > 3 metres from others in station Full PPE for all patient contact Full isolation at home Very stressful on paramedics & families

Personal Protective Equipment IT WORKS!!! Four Toronto EMS paramedics were hospitalized with SARS Paramedics got sick before mandatory use of PPE After full PPE, no more SARS in medics PPE is not designed for EMS environment

Logistics Centralized control worked - no hoarding or price gouging Need to work out methods to stockpile, share and deliver during crises Standardization and sizing are factors Disposal of potentially contaminated PPE

Transfers - 1 SARS spread by interfacility transfers All private transfer operators placed under control of Toronto EMS on March 29 Evacuation of hospitals to SARS facilities planned but not needed

Transfers - 2 We must control who we move Who moves the SICK ones?

PTAC Provincial Transfer Authorization Centre still operational Processes over 1200 requests daily All interfacility movements must be medically cleared Some still trying to beat the system Recommend continuation of PTAC

The New Normal Really not New We have to become more vigilant Infection control a priority PPE on all suspicious patients More questioning of callers Protect the medics Protect the public

Conclusions - 1 It did happen here Have a plan; test it; keep it current Build relationships before we need them Protect the staff When it happens, COMMUNICATE! Don t end it until it s over

Conclusions - 2 Implement standardized medical protocols and screening tools Need better global monitoring and reporting of communicable diseases Other Canadian EMS systems have full time Infection Control practitioners We need them here Work with manufacturers for paramedic - specific PPE

Conclusions - 3 Adequate supplies must be available Would we have had N95 masks if SARS were in Chicago? We must be able to identify all staff exposures. TEMS developed a tool, but other EMS systems must do the same.

Conclusions - 4 Ongoing training in safe PPE use and fit testing must be provided. PPE and new required equipment are expensive Who pays?

Finally Heroism is doing ordinary thing in extraordinary circumstances The paramedics and health care workers of Toronto epitomize heroism