President George W Bush

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THAT WAS THEN President George W Bush Since the liberation of Iraq, our investigators have found evidence of a clandestine network of biological laboratories. They found advanced design work on prohibited longer-range missiles. They found an elaborate campaign to hide these illegal programs. There's still much to investigate, yet it is now undeniable that Saddam Hussein was in clear violation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441. It is undeniable that Saddam Hussein was a deceiver and a danger. The Security Council was right to demand that Saddam Hussein disarm, and we were right to enforce that demand. 1 Intelligence gathered by this and other governments leaves no doubt that the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever devised. 2 The dictator of Iraq and his weapons of mass destruction are a threat to the security of free nations He possesses the weapons of mass murder the Iraqi regime will disarm itself, or the Iraqi regime will be disarmed by force. And the regime has not disarmed itself. 3 We're dealing with Iraq because the dictator of Iraq has got weapons of mass destruction; he's used weapons of mass destruction on his own people. He can't stand America, he can't stand our friends, he can't stand our allies. He's got connections to terrorist networks. The first war of the 21st century requires the United States to work with international bodies to deal with these threats, and we will continue to do so. 4 It possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons. 5 THIS IS NOW we were almost all wrong, and I certainly include myself here I've seen looting around the world and thought I knew the best looters in the world. The Iraqis excel at that. The result is -- document destruction, is we're really not going to be able to prove beyond a truth the negatives and some of the positive conclusions that we're going to come to. There will be always unresolved ambiguity here. 6 That's what I mean by unresolved ambiguity. When the ISG wraps up its work, whether it be six months or six years from now, there are still going to be people to say, "You didn't look everywhere. Isn't it possible it was hidden someplace?" And the answer has got to be, honestly, "Yes, it's possible." But you try to eliminate that by this other process. And when I reached the conclusion -- which I admit is partial and is purely mine -- that I think there were no large stockpiles of WMD, it's based on that process. 7 "The intention was to dramatize it just as the vendors of some merchandise are trying to increase and exaggerate the importance of what they have From politicians, from our leaders in the Western world, I think we expect more than that. A bit more sincerity And we now know that there were no weapons of mass destruction when the invasion started. 8 Let me be clear: Analysts differed on several important aspects of these programs and those debates were spelled out in the estimate. They never said there was an imminent threat. Rather, they painted an objective assessment for our policy-makers of a brutal dictator who was continuing his efforts to deceive and build programs that might constantly surprise us and threaten our interests. No one told us what to say 9 1 Excerpts from October 9, 2003 Speech in Portsmouth, New Hampshire 2 Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation, March 17, 2003 3 Press Availability with President Bush, Prime Minister Blair, President Aznar, and Prime Minister Barroso - the Azores, Portugal, March 16, 2003 4 Remarks to American Medical Association, March 4, 2003 5 Remarks by the President on Iraq, Cincinnati Museum Center - Cincinnati Union Terminal, Cincinnati, Ohio. October 7, 2002 6 Dr David Kay, former head US led Iraq Survey Group, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, January 28, 2004 7 Dr David Kay, former head US led Iraq Survey Group, testimony before Senate Armed Services Committee, January 28, 2004

or how to say it. 9 If CIA Director George Tenet had said a year ago today, if U.S. weapons inspector David Kay had said, that there are no stockpiles, would you still have recommended the invasion? I don't know. I don't know, because it was the stockpile that presented the final little piece that made it more of a real and present danger and threat to the region and to the world. But the fact of the matter is the considered judgment of the intelligence community, represented by George Tenet, and also independently by the United Kingdom and other intelligence agencies, suggested that the stockpiles were there. I can't go back and give you the hypothetical as to what I might have done. But the absence of the stockpiles.... The absence of a stockpile changes the political calculus. It changes the answer you get, the formula I laid out. But the fact of the matter is that we went into this with the understanding that there was a stockpile and there were weapons 10 UK Prime Minister, Tony Blair What I believe the assessed intelligence has established beyond doubt is that Saddam has continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and that he has been able to extend the range of his ballistic missile programme I am in no doubt that the threat is serious and current, that he has made progress on WMD, and that he has to be stopped And the document discloses that his military planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them. 11 But the truth is that without a credible ultimatum authorizing force in the event of noncompliance, then more discussion is just more delay, with Saddam remaining armed with weapons of mass destruction and continuing a brutal, murderous regime in Iraq. 12 "The bar has been raised People are going to be very suspicious when one talks to them about intelligence. And they are going to be very suspicious when we try to use intelligence to justify certain actions." 16 And so, we expected -- or I expected -- there to be stockpiles of weapons. But David Kay has found the capacity to produce weapons. And where David Kay goes in and says we haven't found stockpiles yet, and there's theories as to where the weapons went. They could have been destroyed during the war. Saddam and his henchmen could have destroyed them as we entered into Iraq. They could be hidden. They could have been transported to another country. And we'll find out. That's what the Iraqi Survey Group -- let me, let me finish here. But David Kay did report to the American people that Saddam had the capacity to make weapons. Saddam Hussein was dangerous with weapons. 8 former chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix.on the BBC's "Breakfast with Frost" program, Sunday, February 8, 2004 9 Director of the CIA, George Tenet, remarks made at Georgetown University, February 5, 2004 10 Interview with the Washington Post by US Secretary of State Colin Powell, February 3, 2004 11 Extract from UK Government dossier on Iraq, September 24, 2002, Prime Minister s foreword 12 Press Availability with President Bush, Prime Minister Blair, President Aznar, and Prime Minister Barroso - the Azores, Portugal, March 16, 2003 13 March 18, 2003, UK House of Commons Debate 14 Prime Ministers questions, UK House of Commons, February 4, 2004, col. 757

We are asked now seriously to accept that in the last few years contrary to all history, contrary to all intelligence Saddam decided unilaterally to destroy those weapons. I say that such a claim is palpably absurd. 13 I am not ashamed of the fact that we went to war. We did the right thing, the world is a safer place as a result, we are better able to tackle weapons of mass destruction world wide as a result 14 US Secretary of State Colin Powell this document conclusively shows that Iraq had and still has the capability to manufacture these kinds of weapons; that Iraq had and still has the capability to manufacture, not only chemical, but biological weapons; and that Iraq had and still has literally tens of thousands of delivery systems, including increasingly capable and dangerous unmanned aerial vehicles. 15 Saddam Hussein was dangerous with the ability to make weapons. He was a dangerous man in a dangerous part of the world. 17 But it was a good case, it made sense, and we're absolutely sure we got a guy in Saddam Hussein who had the intention to have these weapons, to develop these weapons, to develop even deadlier weapons, and he had the capability to do it Well, let's finish the work. Let's let Charlie Duelfer, the new head of the team, go out there and finish the work. 18 It is not merely I who have maintained that Saddam Hussein had such weapons; it has been maintained by almost every country that has looked at the issue. That is why, in November 2002, the United Nations unanimously declared the existence of those weapons a threat to the world. 19 First is the theory that WMD may not have existed at the start of a war. I suppose that's possible, but not likely. Second is that it's possible that WMD did exist, but was transferred, in whole or in part, to one or more other countries. We see that theory put forward. Third, it's possible that the WMD existed, but was dispersed and hidden throughout Iraq. We see that possibility proposed by various people. Next, that it's possible that WMD existed, but was destroyed at some moment prior to the beginning of the conflict. Or that it's possible that Iraq had small quantities of biological or chemical agents and also a surge capability for a rapid build-up and that we may eventually find it in the months ahead. Or finally, there is the theory that some have put forward that it could have been charade by the Iraqis; that Saddam Hussein fooled his neighbors and fooled the world. Or that Saddam Hussein fooled the members of his own regime. Or the idea that Saddam Hussein himself might have been fooled by his own people, who may have tricked him into believing he had capabilities that Iraq really didn't have. These are all theories that are being put forward today 20 15 Remarks to the UN Security Council, March 7, 2003 16 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, February 6, 2004 17 President George W Bush on NBC c Meet the Press, February 8, 2004 18 US Secretary of State Colin Powell on the Sean Hannity Show, February 6, 2004 19 UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, House of Commons, January 28, 2004, col. 309 20 US Defense Secretary Donal Rumsfeld, FY 2005 Budget testimony before the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, February 4, 2004