ACCUSATIONS FROM THE TIMES

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CCUSTIONS FROM THE TIMES.More than 20,000 Tamil civilians were killed in the final throes of the Sri Lankan civil war, most as a result of government shelling, an investigation by The Times has revealed..erial photographs, official documents, witness accounts and expert testimony tell a different story..un sources said that the toll then surged, with an average of 1,000 civilians killed each day until May 19, the day after Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Tamil Tigers, was killed. That figure concurs with the estimate made to The Times by Father malraj, a Roman Catholic priest who fled the no fire zone on May 16 and is now interned with 200,000 other survivors in Manik Farm refugee camp. It would take the final toll above 20,000. Higher, a UN source told The Times. Keep going..independent defence experts who analysed dozens of aerial photographs taken by The Times said that the arrangement of the army and rebel firing positions and the narrowness of the no fire zone made it unlikely that Tiger mortar fire or artillery caused a significant number of deaths. It looks more likely that the firing position has been located by the Sri Lankan rmy and it has then been targeted with air burst and ground impact mortars, said Charles Heyman, editor of the magazine rmed Forces of the UK.

1 6 4 2 3 5 2 4 1. Civilian camp Civilian encampments in front of the LTTE (Tamil Tiger) firing positions have taken the brunt of the bombardment aimed at rebel mortars. In effect, they are being used as human shields by the Tigers. Charles Heyman, editor of the rmed Forces of the UK magazine, said that the civilian areas had been destroyed by air burst mortars, a weapon used by the Sri Lankan rmy 2. Tamil Tiger firing positions Two sites identified by the military analysts as LTTE firing position, probably mortar pits. The pits are only yards from the damaged civilian shelters, making it extremely unlikely that the Tigers munitions would have caused the damage because the range of their weapons would have cleared the beach perimeter. Three independent defence analysts concurred that the likelihood of the LTTE being responsible for that destruction was negligible. While there is no evidence that the Sri Lankan rmy deliberately fired on civilians, legal and military experts told The Times that the use of such imprecise weapons was done in the knowledge that it could incur substantial civilian casualties 3. rms trailer Trailer used by the Tamil Tigers for moving ammunition and supplies around the camp. The trailer has no motor and would need to be dragged by another vehicle 4. Tiger bunker bunker dug into the beach is probably an LTTE command post. It is set apart from the firing position to protect it when the mortars are fired on by the Sri Lankan rmy 5. Sea The LTTE firing positions are less than 300 yards from the shoreline, leaving the Tigers with no escape route as the Sri Lankan military closed in 6. Bulldozer bulldozer is hidden in the trees. Likely to have been used by the Tamil Tigers for constructing the LTTE bunker and for dragging the ammunition trailer around the site

THE MP PRODUCED BY THE TIMES PPER

THE FDL ON 6 th and 13 th MY 6 th MY 13 th MY

STELLITE MP SHOWING CIVILIN SETTLEMENTS IN NEW SFE ZONE ON THE 6th B Major IDP Camp area B Minor IDP Camp area

THE TIMES MP UPDTED TO INCLUDE TIGER RES 1 B 2 Tiger Heavy Weapons Locations FDL by 13 th May FDL by 6 th May Govt. Firing Direction Tiger Firing Direction B Major IDP Camp area Minor IDP Camp area

TIGER PROJECTILE WEPONS RECOVERED FROM VELLMULLIVIKKL ON THE 17 th E D C B Type Min Range Max Range 120mm Heavy Mortar ~200m ~7km B 81mm Mortar ~80m ~5km C 60mm Mortar ~70m ~3km D BaBa Mortar (Indigenous) 200-300m 1-2km E 107mm Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher (MBRL) ~800m ~8km

TIGER IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICES RECOVERED FROM NFZ Buried High Explosive Barrel Bombs White Phosphorous Barrels

B Taking into consideration the foliage cover and the general environment (above) of the NFZ, it would be extremely difficult if not impossible for a civilian observer to tell with certainty whether the shell came from the direction of ( Tiger) or (B Govt.). Bearing in mind that an incoming mortar round would give an observer on the ground less than 7 secs warning (audible noise) before it impacts, with the shell landing near vertical. Given these facts how can an individual with no prior knowledge or any military experience pertaining to the types of weapons used by either side, differentiate between Mortars, Rockets or rtillery shells. s a result, given the environment, how can you tell from where a shell originated from?

MIN POINTS s the pictures reveal, till the very end, the LTTE had 107mm rockets, 81mm mortar, 120mm mortar, BaBa Mortar!!.. The LTTE Leadership was fully aware that it could not prevent the rmy from advancing into their remaining strongholds!!.. The only option/tactic available to the LTTE leadership during the last month of the war, to stop the army advance, was to create the conditions for a civilian massacre; where by the international community would intervene, and stop the war. Can the Press discount the possibility that the LTTE couldn t/wouldn t engineer such a scenario by firing into the safe zone even if it meant civilian casualties blame it on the military, in the hope that it would force the International community s hand?? The LTTE had already demonstrated on numerous occasions in the preceding weeks that it has no qualms about targeting and killing its own human shield. The rmy has Radar telemetry from their N/TPQ 36 Fire Finder rtillery Locating Radar that shows instances from the 6 th to the 13 th where the LTTE have fired into the new NFZ!!.. The situation maps show that even till the 13 th of MY the LTTE had the manoeuvrability to fire into the safe zone from areas still under LTTE control!!.. SLF UV s were conducting round the clock surveillance. Morning and Night. Every day the rmed forces noted where the Civilians were and did not conduct any military operations near there. The TIMES claims the pictures reveal rmy Shelling: The SL rmy have FIREFINDER Radar telemetry that proves beyond doubt that the LTTE have fired 81mm and 120mm Mortars into the Safe Zone on Several occasions in pril and May. The destruction shown by alleged mortar rounds as shown in the TIMES picture set were taken at region [B] and not region []. The TIMES claims they have UN documented reports: The UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon and the UN under Secretary General for Humanitarian ffairs and Emergency Relief John Holmes, have both gone on record claiming this estimate has no basis of fact. That it is not obtained from a UN sanctioned report or estimate. The TIMES claims they have witness testimony: Can the TIMES prove beyond a reasonable doubt that their "civilian sources" are impartial and nonpartisan??..

Does the TIMES accept that the Civilian Exodus contains individuals who were/are still sympathetic to the LTTE or the Separatist Cause through years of continuous propaganda and indoctrination, they believe the LTTE will do no wrong. Elements of Clergy/Certain Civil Servants/id workers of Tamil id Organisations in LTTE controlled areas have on several occasions in the past demonstrated their sympathies towards the LTTE and the Separatist cause. Given such blatant bias and allegiances, is the TIMES prepared to accept the possibility of receiving distorted accounts of the battlefield??.. The TIMES claims it has Expert Testimony: This testimony is based on a SINGLE photo.. Is the TIMES or the Defence analysts aware that the RMY had recovered from the final stretches of LTTE controlled areas, 81mm, 120mm, BaBa Mortar, 107mm MBRL all of which were located in an area Vellamullivaikkall, which happens to be more than 1 mile away, sufficient range to produce the damage seen!!.. Furthermore, the LTTE too have air burst fuses for their weapons 81mm and 120mm mortar!!.. Given that MORTR shells land vertically.. with only a 5 7 sec warning sound prior to impact.. How is it possible for a civilian with no prior military experience able to ascertain the direction from which the shells originated from??? It is important to note and appreciate that the deliberate targeting of civilians never formed part of the military strategy of the Sri Lankan forces. This is not to deny civilian casualties which may have occurred as collateral damage. This is not peculiar only to Sri Lanka. Such casualties do occur particularly when one party uses the civilians and civilian centres and establishments as a central part of its combat strategy. One must appreciate that in such situations the contours of the traditional battlefield recedes into the background with unfortunate consequences to civilians. However, the principles of distinction and proportionality which form the cornerstone of the principles of International Humanitarian Law were observed by the Sri Lankan forces. The military strategies ensured that civilian population and civilian establishments were never made the target of deliberate attack. The commanders on the ground have been thoroughly trained in the requirements of international humanitarian law and its governing principles. The strict observance of these principles and the law as developed in the context of an inter State conflict and clearly demarcated battle lines is not, one will appreciate, an easy task when engaging a terrorist group.