An Informed Guess About Why Patriot Fired Upon Friendly Aircraft and Saw Numerous False Missile Targets During Operation Iraqi Freedom

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MIT Security Studies Program An Informed Guess About Why Patriot Fired Upon Friendly Aircraft and Saw Numerous False Missile Targets During Operation Iraqi Freedom Theodore A. Postol Professor of Science, Technology, and National Security Policy Security Studies Program, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Voice: 617 253-8077; FAX: 617 258-5750; e-mail: postol@mit.edu Distribution and Use of this Document is Encouraged and Unrestricted Comments and Further Information Are Welcome

How Ghosting (False Ballistic Missile Targets) Can Occur When Two Similar Radars in the Same Operating Mode Track a Single Target Ghost Target generated by pulse that reflects off aircraft from a second radar at a slightly different time than the pulse from the first radar. Depending on the time-differences between pulses, the pulse from the second radar can create a false downrange target for the first radar. When this is done as an intentional electronic countermeasure, its effects are somewhat similar to that of a repeater jammer. dl=c dt + dr Note: Relative Distances are Not to Scale dl/2 Note: Relative Distances are Not to Scale

Ghost Targets Can Appear to be on Ballistic Missile Trajectories for Certain Aircraft Altitudes and Distances Between Radars Ghost Target identified as a ballistic missile due to its apparent altitude, speed, and rate of descent, which closely match that of a ballistic missile Note: Relative Distances are Not to Scale dl/2 dl=c dt + dr Note: Relative Distances are Not to Scale

Estimated Locations of Patriot Batteries Cruise Missiles at 300 500 ft Aircraft at 15,000 ft Aircraft at 30,000 ft Ranges at Which Patriot Batteries Can Illuminate Aircraft Flying at Different Altitudes Note: Radar Range Contours Assume that Patriot Batteries Can Search No Closer Than 3 Degrees from Local Horizontal Even With Horizon Diffraction.

Example of Overlapping Region Between Two Radars Where One of the Radars Could Create False Ballistic Missile Targets for the Other

Example of Aircraft-Generated False Al Samoud / Al Fatah Trajectory from Two Similar Tracking Radars in the Same Operating Mode 70 60 Location of Missiles and Aircraft Shown at 5 Second Intervals Altitude (km) 50 40 30 20 10 Al Fatah / Al-Samoud Short-Range Ballistic Missile Frog Ballistic Missile Mach 0.85 Airplane 0 0 10 20 20 seconds 18 16 30 40 50 Ground Range (km) 14 12 10 Ghost Targets? Altitude, Speed, and Descent Rate of Ghost Target Generated from 0.1 Millisecond Time-Delay Between Arrival of a Second Pulse from a Second Nearby Operating Radar 17 12 Trajectory Seen by Radar Radar for 25 seconds 60 70 80

Ballistic Missile and Aircraft Trajectories Expected by Patriot s Artificial Intelligence Software in Operation Iraqi Freedom 70 60 Al Husayn Scud Location of Missiles and Aircraft Shown at 5 Second Intervals Altitude (km) 50 40 30 20 Al Fatah / Al-Samoud Short-Range Ballistic Missile Mach 2.5 Airplane Frog Ballistic Missile 10 Mach 0.85 Airplane Mach 0.85 Cruise Missile 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 Ground Range (km)

Estimated Launch to Impact Timeline 1 Minute 2 Minutes 3 Minutes 4 Minutes 5 Minutes ~ 6-7 min ~ 20 Sec to detect ~ 70 Sec for TES to Profile & broadcast TDDS/TIBS ~ 20 Sec for ellipse ~ 40 Sec to assess& warn PAWS & Conf Bridge ~ 30 Sec for pager alert Time for MSCs & Base Clusters to go through Battle Drills Impact AL HUSSEIN Launch 1st indication of launch at CFLCC HQ. Initiate the PA Sys & Conference Bridge Alert SCUD alert Impact ellipse appears Areas at risk announced PAWS, Conference Bridge & CFLCC Cmd Net (SATCOM) Pager goes off 1 Minute ~ 3-4 min 2 Minutes ~ 3-4 min Actual total warning 30-45 Seconds Launch to Impact AL SAMOUD / ABABIL-100 Launch = Time saved by announcing Kuwait at risk - not waiting for estimated impact ellipse ~40 Sec to clear horizon & to JDN ~ 20 to get best track ~ 40 Sec to assess& warn (PAWS & Conf Bridge) 1st indication of launch at CFLCC HQ. Initiate the PA Sys & Conference Bridge Alert SCUD alert ~ 30 Sec for pager alert Areas at risk announced PAWS, Conf Bridge & CFLCC Cmd Net Time for MSCs & Base Clusters to go through Battle Drills Impact Pager ~ 1:00 min goes or off ~ 2:00 min (warning time once EW gets to the MSC/Base)

Slide 50 from Briefing by the 32 nd Army Air and Missile Defense Defense Command Original Slide as Provided in the Briefing

Slide 50 from Briefing by the 32 nd Army Air and Missile Defense Defense Command Estimated Locations of Patriot Batteries