NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN Steven Pifer Senior Fellow Director, Arms Control Initiative October 10, 2012

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Transcription:

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN 2013 Steven Pifer Senior Fellow Director, Arms Control Initiative October 10, 2012

Lecture Outline How further nuclear arms reductions and arms control can enhance US security Arms control opportunities Arms control challenges

Reduced Enough Already?

New START Treaty Each side limited to no more than 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles 800 deployed and non-deployed launchers and heavy bombers 1550 deployed strategic warheads Limits to be implemented by 2018 US-Russian strategic balance stable and numbers declining need to do more?

WHY PURSUE FURTHER NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL?

Reduce Strategic Threat to US Under New START, Russia can still have ~2000 deployed strategic warheads Most 7-55 times the power of Little Boy and Fat Man

Limit Nonstrategic (Tactical) Weapons Not constrained by any treaty Concern to US allies Russian numerical advantage Strategic vs nonstrategic

Transparency Data exchange and updates Notifications On-site inspections Result: US knows more about Russian strategic forces

Data Exchanges and Updates New START Numbers, Sept 2012 New START Limit US Russia Deployed SDVs (700) 806 491 Deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers (800) 1034 884 Deployed warheads (1550) 1722 1499 Source: U.S. Department of State

Potential US Cost Savings Robust strategic triad Need to recapitalize Ballistic missile submarines Heavy bombers ICBMs Budget demands

Non-Proliferation Goals US nuclear reductions bolster diplomacy to block nuclear proliferation US, Russia have to act Won t solve North Korea or Iran Strengthens position to mobilize pressure against states seeking nuclear weapons

A Word on Deterrence Nuclear deterrence during the Cold War At several points, world was lucky Cuban missile crisis Test errors US-Norwegian sounding rocket

Towards Lower Numbers and Zero? President Obama s Prague speech Reduce role and number Zero attractive to US? But many challenges to resolve before could even get close to zero Still, properly designed reductions can enhance US security

NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL OPPORTUNITIES IN 2013

US, Russian Nuclear Warhead Levels US Russia Deployed strategic warheads * ~1950 ~2430 Nonstrategic warheads ~500 ~2000 Non-deployed (reserve) ~2500? strategic warheads Retired warheads ~3000 ~5000 Total warheads ~8000 ~10,000 * Estimated actual number, not New START accountable number Numbers drawn from Kristensen/Norris, U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2012 and Russian Nuclear Forces, 2012, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

New US-Russia Negotiation Limit each side to no more than 2000-2500 total nuclear warheads Sublimit of 1000 deployed strategic warheads Limit of 500 deployed missiles, bombers Overall warhead limit forces trade Result = ~50% reduction US still could maintain robust triad

Notional Reduction to 2000 Total 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 Reserve Non-Strat Dep Strat 1000 0 US Now US After Russia Now Russia After

Missile Defense in Europe European Phased Adaptive Approach (1) SM-3 IA, sea-based (2) SM-3 IB, Romania (3) SM-3 IIA, Poland (4) SM-3 IIB Endorsed by NATO

NATO, Russia and MD Russian concern about EPAA Offense-defense relationship NATO seeks cooperative missile defense But Russians want legal guarantee Cooperative missile defense system Political commitment Jointly manned centers Transparency

CTBT Ratification Testing moratorium Senate did not approve CTBT in 1999 What has changed since then? Stockpile stewardship program Improved monitoring system CTBT locks in US advantage Spur ratification by others

Multilateralizing Process Lay groundwork to broaden process UNSC P5 discussions

CHALLENGES TO ARMS CONTROL

Russian Position No enthusiasm for new negotiations now Nuclear weapons = key to superpower status Link to issues such as missile defense and conventional forces Waiting to see who will be US president US strategic advantages may give Russians motive for further reductions

Data Exchanges and Updates New START Numbers, Sept 2012 New START Limit US Russia Deployed SDVs (700) 806 491 Deployed and non-deployed launchers and bombers (800) 1034 884 Deployed warheads (1550) 1722 1499 Source: U.S. Department of State

US, Russian Nuclear Warhead Levels US Russia Deployed strategic warheads * ~1950 ~2430 Nonstrategic warheads ~500 ~2000 Non-deployed (reserve) ~2500? strategic warheads Retired warheads ~3000 ~5000 Total warheads ~8000 ~10,000 * Estimated actual number, not New START accountable number Numbers drawn from Kristensen/Norris, U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2012 and Russian Nuclear Forces, 2012, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Allies and Assurance ~200 US nuclear bombs believed deployed in Europe Russians will insist weapons be based on national territory Acceptable in right circumstances? Source: U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2012

Verification Monitoring warheads in storage New ground for both sides Lower monitoring confidence

Senate Republicans Skeptical about nuclear arms control New START ratification proved more difficult than expected Seek commitment to US strategic force modernization Treaty or unilateral steps?

Prospects President Obama has indicated desire to negotiate further nuclear cuts Governor Romney skeptical of arms control But tight defense budget, NATO considerations could affect his view Possible incentives for Moscow to negotiate Have opportunity in 2013 will we use it?

Available October 16 from Brookings Institution Press www.brookings.edu/ about/press